Reassessment of the Atomic Bomb Radiation Dosimetry for Hiroshima and Nagasaki — Dosimetry System 2002 — NOTE: free-field radiation doses are attenuated in concrete buildings & shelters Report of the Joint US—Japan Working Group Editors: Robert W. Young George D. 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Energy as neutrons 3.31 x 10° MeVikt (0.127%) 1e-05 Number of neutrons 0.177 mol/kt Average neutron energy 0.311 MeV 1e-06 Energy as gammas 5.61 x 10 ‘ MeViki_(0.0216%) Number of gammas 6.67 x 10~ mol/kt Average gamma energy 1.40 MeV 1e-07 Hiroshima angle-integrated neutron spectrum. 1e-08 1e-07 1e-06 1e-05 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Energy [MeV] 6 rings of U235 around Cylinder of 9 hollow U235 rings 1 inch diameter steel rod (projectile) Explosive Tungsten carbide tamper disc (steel backed) 6.5 inch bore gun Tungsten carbide tamper (steel) (13 inch diameter) 15 inch diameter Little Boy Uranium rings: (84% U235 enrichment) fuse antenna steel nose forging 51.55 kg U was 80.4% U235 Illustration 6.25” diameter, 16.25” long projectile, enriched including 7” length of 9 hollow (4” bore) uranium rings (38.5 kg), followed by a tungsten carbide tamper/neutron reflector disc, ike spain steel-backed to the chemical explosive charge. 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Shinchara et.al. (8-7 = or 8 ee ey eee 1 1) Time efter the expicsion {hr} Tissue KERMA (cGy) structures within fire damage to Built-up area of city —e-= Severe blast and “ a & = in DNA 5512F. Institute (NMRI) performed levels of 0.069 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) in the contour. Source: oot ‘dual radiati Results of the Naval Medical Research of ground zero and 0.011 mR/hr at the outermost November 1-2, 1945 vicinity 2F. DNA 551 represented on the map in Heroshima, only 0,95 (ly) burnis) on i acl burns were due to ignited clothing, and only 0.7% (15 burns) were due to burns by firestorm flames! TABLE 8.3A Number of Persons with Burns from Different Causes (Tokyo Imperial University’s First Survey, October-November 1945) Distance from Secondary Burnst_ | Secondary Burnst Hypocenter (km) From Clothes on Fire By Flame Total Burns ae » (3.3) 1.1-1.5 1 327 (1.1) 1.6-2.0 4 4 717 (0.5) (1.2) 2.1-2.5 6 558 (0.8) 2.6-3.0 5 3 140 (0.8) (0.5) a : " (2.8) (0.7) 3.64.0 l 4 (2.4) Total 17 15 1,881 (0.9) (0.7) * Primary burns are burns by thermal rays from the A-bomb. + Secondary burns are burns by fire other than thermal rays. t Figures in parentheses are percentages of incidence. Source: T. Kajitani and S. Hatano, “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hiroshima,” in CRIABC vol. I, p. 522. Note: there were 5 burns cases within 0.6 km, all primary TABLE 8.3B Region of Burns Outdoors Indoors |Outdoors Indoors |Outdoors Indoors |Outdoors Indoors Number of 179 44 1,030 127 643 78 1,526 355 persons (11.7)* = (12.3) (67.4) (35.7) (42.1) (21.9) Total 223 ist 721 1,881 (11.8) (61.5) (38.3) * Figures in parentheses are percentages of incidence. Source: T. Kajitani and S. Hatano, “Medical survey on acute effects of atomic bomb in Hiroshima,” in CRIABC vol. I, p. 522. Above: extract from "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Social and Medical Effects", 1981 by the Japanese Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by Atomic Bombs SURVIVAL IN WOODEN AND CONCRETE BUILDINGS, HIROSHIMA TABLE 7.3 Casualties among the Groups Exposed to the Atomic Bomb inside | Wooden | Houses, Hiroshima x Two-story Distance and Direction from Hypocenter (km) Name of Building Lodging for an itinerant theatrical troupe Second Hiroshima Army Hospital | Single-story Source: Science Council of Japan, Genshibakudan Saigai Chésa Hokokusho [SRIABC] (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkdkai, 1951), p. 25. TABLE 7.4 Casualties among the Groups Exposed to the Atomic Bomb inside| Concrete|Buildings, Hiroshima Direction and Distance from Hypocenter (km) Name of Building The Bank of Japan, Hiro- three-story shima Branch two-story four-story three-story Broadcasting Station Communication Bureau Japan Red Cross Hospital, Hiroshima * While the total number of exposed is known, it has not been possible to determine how many died instantly or soon after the explosion. Source: Science Council of Japan, Genshibakudan Saigai Chésa Hokokusho [SRIABC] (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkdkai, 1951), p. 26. Above: extract from "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Social and Medical Effects", 1981 27/08/2015 12) Radiation Effects Research Foundation 25.) A Cooperative Japan-US Research Organization Solid cancer risks among atomic-bomb survivors - Radiation Effects Research Foundation F JAPANESE TOP Greetings Objective and History Organization Operations and Finance/ Compliance with Laws Yearly Schedule Research Activities Research Programs Active Research Protocals Ethics Committee Radiation Health Effects Views on Residual Radiation Highlights in Research Progress Partner Graduate Schools Recent Scientific Papers List of Publications Webinar Downloadable Data Historical Materials Request for Publications Community Access Getting to RERF Tour Reservations Inquiries Open House Request for Donations Procurement & Contracts Links Site Map + For further details Join us on Facebook Lj Top > Lj Research Activities > Radiation Health Effects > Late effects on survivors > Details Solid cancer risks among atomic-bomb survivors Increased risk of cancer is the most important late effect of radiation exposure seen in A-bomb survivors. For cancers other than leukemia (solid cancers), excess risk associated with radiation started to appear about ten years after exposure. This was first noted by a Japanese phy sician, Gensaku Obo, in 1956, and it led to continuing comprehensive analyses of cancer mortality and to the creation of tumor registries by the city medical associations in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For most solid cancers, acute radiation exposure at any age increases one’ s cancer risk for the rest of life. As survivors have aged, radiation-associated excess rates of solid cancer have increased as well as the background rates. For the average radiation exposure of survivors within 2,500 meters (about 0.2 Gy), the increase is about 10% above normal age-specific rates. For a dose of 1.0 Gy, the corresponding cancer excess is about 50% (relative risk = 1.5). Tumor registries were initiated in 1957 in Hiroshima and 1958 in Nagasaki. During the period from 1958 to 1998, 7,851 malignancies (first primary ) were observed among 44,635 LSS survivors with estimated doses of >0.005 Gy. The excess number of solid cancers is estimated as 848 (10.7%) (Table). The dose-response relationship appears to be linear, without any apparent threshold below which effects may not occur (Figure 1). Table. Excess risk of develop ing solid cancers in LSS, 1958-1998 a ae LSS subjects os Attributable risk (Gy) Observed Estimated excess 0.005 - 0.1 Zito 4,406 81 1.8% 0.1 - 0.2 3,527 968 75 7.6% 0.2 - 0.5 3,939 1,144 179 15.7% 0.5 - 1.0 3,173 688 206 29.5% 1.0 - 2.0 1,647 460 196 44.2% >2.0 564 185 111 61.0% Total 44,635 7,851 848 10.7% http:/Mmww.rerf.jp/radef/late_e/cancrisk html 1/3 27/08/2015 Leukemia risks among atomic-bomb survivors - Radiation Effects Research Foundation wi) Radiation Effects Research Foundation waa) A Cooperative Japan-US Research Organization FJIAPAHESE + TOP |) Top > |} Research Activities > Radiation Health Effects > Late effects on survivors > Details Leukemia risks among atomic-bomb survivors Excess leukemia was the earliest delayed effect of radiation exposure seen in A-bomb survivors. Japanese physician Takuso Yamawaki in Hiroshima first noted an increase of leukemia cases in his clinical practice in the late 1940s. This led to the establishment of a registry of leukemia and related disorders and to the initial reports on elevated leukemia risks published in the early 1950s. Risks for radiation-induced leukemia differ in two major respects from those for most solid cancers. First, About RERF radiation causes a larger percent increase in leukemia rates (but a smaller number of cases since leukemia is Greetings ‘ ‘ : j : relatively rare, even in heavily exposed survivors), and second, the increase appears sooner after exposure, Objective and History Organization especially in children. The excess leukemias began appearing about two years after radiation exposure, and the Operations and Finance/ excess peaked at about 6-8 years after exposure. Today, little if any excess of leukemia is occurring. Compliance with Laws Yearly Schedule Research Activities Because the Life Span Study (LSS) cohort was based on the 1950 national census, quantitative descriptions of leukemia risks in A-bomb survivors have been based on cases diagnosed from that year on. As of the year Research Programs : —— 2000, there were 204 leukemia deaths among 49,204 LSS survivors with a bone marrow dose of at least 0.005 Active Research Protocols Ethics Committee Gy, an excess of 94 cases (46%) attributable to A-bomb radiation (Table). In contrast to dose-response Radiation Health Effects Views on Residual Radiation Highlights in Research Progress patterns for other cancers, that for leukemia appears to be nonlinear; low doses may be less effective than would be predicted by a simple linear dose response. Even for doses in the 0.2 to 0.5 Gy range, however, risk Partner Graduate Schools is elevated (Figure 1). Library Recent Scientific Papers Table. Observed and estimated excess number of leukemia deaths List of Publications in LSS population, 1950-2000 Woelsinar Weighted marrow Deaths Downloadable Data dose Subjects Attributable risk Historical Materials (Gy) Observed Estimated excess Request for Publications 0.005 - 0.1 30,387 69 4 6% Community Access 0.1 - 0.2 5,841 14 5 36% oman EEE 0.2-0.5 6,304 27 10 37% Tour Reservations Inquiries 0.5 - 1.0 3,963 30 19 63% Open House 1.0 - 2.0 1,972 39 28 72% Request for Donations >2.0 737 25 28 100% Procurement & Contracts Links Total 49,204 204 94 46% Site Map relative risk (ERR) and the right panel excess absolute risk (EAR). References about this subject tml Ga Preston DL, Shimizu Y, et al.: Studies of mortality of atomic bomb survivors. Report 13. Solid cancer and ==" noncancer disease mortality: 1950-1997. Radiation Research 2003; 160:38 1-407 [=|=| Preston DL, Ron E, et al.: Solid cancer incidence in atomic bomb survivors: 1958-1998. Radiation Research ==" 2007; 168:1-64 [Ele Preston DL, Pierce DA, et al.: Effect of recent changes in atomic bomb survivor dosimetry on cancer mortality risk estimates. Radiation Research 2004; 162:377-89 Ron E, Preston DL, et al.: Cancer incidence in atomic-bomb survivors. Part IV: Comparison of cancer incidence and mortality. Radiation Research 1994; 137:98-112 1/3 TETEAA/L9II OL /Sqe/op/310 suco1g MMM //:dyY 68E-LLE ‘791 ‘Yoswasoy uoneIpey (P00Z) IB 9 “T eq “UoWseg ¢ Ayeojsyjejs ‘0419Z yyiM Juajsisuoo aie usaib ul payybyybiy sajes ayy Ajeayoedsau ‘€6 pue Op aiam BIWIBeYN] PUB JBDULD PIjOS WIO4 SYyjJeap pajejas-uoHeipel /2jO} ay] “(POOT |e J2 UO}JSA/q), spueg esop Aq pajyeiedas ‘000Z-0S61 ‘suoaisuns neseben pue ewlysosliy 11999 BuoWwe syjeap saoueyd “1 age] eo) co | secs | ores | coc ont || e889 | 00 mn S877 uOHeIpel WOT, 9321 | 9yer [e}0} UOHSIPS! WOT oye / yer [e}0} OS6] ul LOAOIS-I]]TU Joquiny syyeop BIUoRyNIT] (RIWIOB YN] ‘[OXd) syyeap I90URD asuel 3soq "LL = SUJBOP IODULD JEINJEN "Po onpul sinsodxse uoHeIpe! SEM %p'zZ USIUM JO %G"E SEM 9}e1 U}JLOp CIWIOYyND] 9y} d19YyM “(SUIO1 OO] 10 “LISADIS | 0} jeNbs) SPISASISIIW! QOOL 10A0 HulAlojeu aidood ul eimeyne] 103 }dooxe ‘soj}e1 JoDUeS puNnoIHy eq JeIN}eU WO S9SOY} UY} JO]];eEWS pue juesyiuBbisul 310M Heseben pue CUWIYSOIIP UI SUOISO/dX9 1eajoNU WOOL S¥SLI UOHeIPEY MORTALITY (%) Hirosnima TOTAL MORTALITY VERSUS PEAK OVERPRESSURE IN NAGASAKI PERSONNEL LOCATIONS 3: WFD - WOOD FRAME DWELLING i= WFC - WOOD FRAME COMMERCIAL == LSF - LIGHT STEEL FRAME 775: NRC - NON-SEISMIC REINFORCED = CONCRETE =i: SRC - SEISMIC REINFORCED CONCRETE =a SRC-L - LOWER FLOORS 3 SEISMIC REINFORCED CONCRETE BESS ff HEHE Heer i] oe ‘f° 49 ae oS Sees A ES = = = 23552535, sscSeiBS S3555522252 4 6 8 10 PEAK OVERPRESSURE (PSI) TOTAL MORTALITY VERSUS PEAK OVERPRESSURE IN HIROSHIMA 100 EEEEEEEEEEEE PERSONNEL LOCATIONS a LSF-LIGHTSTEELFRAME = GESSEHBLSF eee eA EEESE NRC - NON-SEISMIC REINFORCED CONCRETE 60 SRC-M - MIDDLE FLOORS SEISMIC REINFORCED CONCRETE G=3= : = HHH gett SSEEESSsai ipsui iste indi teas : : fail Hin aS 40 ES MORTALITY (%) tf Haga aig ib Hite aia HE HE EER ESS ESS COGS se Soe ee Sones 5408 FEEES mTEET HI HHT bs Her nrre 20 1s SHES nile Bl 33358 : ESEISM REINFORCED C L Seecesesse=-- .- See=-- _..casde - == se r — PEAK OVERPRESSURE (PSI) No MORTALITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME AFTER NUCLEAR ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA 100 1 rrp SE TT eee em emma mT TAT sok iM 3 TR i a i HA A ea SR aul Tea aa eet a iL soll a ae nna a A MURS ec at i il a i arta = oe ‘i ae a SRC Selamic Reinforced Concrete | te HAT iff LAT r i ei i tt Tm lee HTH Wen Woe krame wetting 2 vate ii nay WEC cient a od Frat i Scop Ht ittos | LG Hn TITIIIIE| OS Outside Shielded it 5 Se ue, ST} OV Outside Unshielded i =40 ‘id PRET EER HEMT ETT i i TETHER ead soll L. Wayne Davis, William L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers, | “Analysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data", DC-FR-1054 (1966) Dirkwood Corp., AD653922, Fig. 61 ata Ara BUNT IRETU LU UEL lag TTT eo HAT hn FURUUESRATEL ANTRAL 90 20 eH 24,044 case histories in Hiroshima a cert zg A 0 50 70 Time after explosion Ta) 100 60 ee i384 aS Em Left: the Diurkwood Corporation analysis of the mortality rates as a function of peak over- pressure in Nagasaki and Hiroshima is based on 24,044 traced case histories in Hiroshima and 11,055 in Nagasaki (a total of 35,099 cases). The report by L. Wayne Davis, Wiliam L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers. Analysis of Japanese Casualty Data, DC-FR- 1054, AD653922 (1966). summarises the effects versus distance. A classified report by L. Wayne Davis, et al., Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from a High-Yield Nuclear Burst, § Dutkwood Corporation DC-P-1060 compares the paper (1968), peak overpressures for t the casualties in each : city to those from the = main Texas’ City Disaster surface burst explosion of 1947, ; when 0.67 kt of explo- {sive in a ship detonated after a fire. (This is corrected for the effec- tive explosion energy, which was less than the total mass of explosive involved because some was on a nearby dock and did not explode simultaneously, and some burned without detonating.) Comparison of mor- tality versus peak over- pressure curves for dit- ferent events shows the nuclear the firestorm at Hiroshima influence of radiation and on total casualty rates. Hiroshima o t ! wwewe | || -2 - 2 ; — =. a Above: building 18 (the 7-story Fukoku department store Above right: building 5, located at just 193 m from ground building), survived 20 psi peak overpressure blast at just 329 zero Hiroshima. Designed to survive a lateral load of 10% m from ground zero in Hiroshima. It burned hours later. of its weight (Japanese minimal safety standard legislation). | es sia ‘ a ae x —* *& a \ ¥ e) eet 4 ‘tamer "6 Ble saa area Hiroshima DIRECT EFFECTS OF 1 MT SURFACE BURST Lét: the 1973 U. S. Department of Defense DCPA Aftack LIGHT DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL-TYPE BUILDINGS, ae MODERATE DAMAGE TO SMALL RESIDENCES om Environment Manual provided 1p aes Fly > _ oo a Co this caine: Seaiuenes ame eee: on os) pressure analysis, associating ON a a, the 5-12 psi peak overpressure io seca iieacenietarscrictieiaeieiaaatil o, zone with 50 mortality, without TYPE BUILDINGS, SEVERE DAMAGE TO eg 100 source references. It was used SIRALL RESIDENCES ey to for grossly deceptive exaggeration, sy fy 0-1 PSI ignoring civil defence effectiveness by SEVERE DAMAGE TO m 25 75 the 1979 U. S. Office of eae *, | % Technology Assessment study, 2 The Effects of Nuclar War. Deceptions were excluded DESTRUCTION OF ALL EXCEPT SPECIALLY DESIGNED FACILITIESo, 5 MAX FIREBALL RADIUS 0.7 MILE OVER 12 PSI from public scrutiny, debate and analysis by deliberately assigning reports secret and/or “limited distribution” (ostensi- Src ir CRATER DIAM. 0.24 MILE PY 3 5 7 MILE Left: 50% of 100 people survived inside the concrete Bank of Japan (building 24 bly to keep it from Moscow). in Hiroshima, in the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey report) at a peak over- pressure of 18 psi, just 390 metres from ground zero in Hiroshima. This was well inside the “firestorm” area, and only 7.5 m from the nearest burning building. A second floor fire, due to a firebrand blown through a broken window, was extinguished by the survivors using water fire buckets at 1.5 hours after the nuclear explosion. Note 3rd floor windows soot. The evacuated 3rd floor suffered a fire- brand ignition, which was discovered too ~ late to extinguish, and burned wzthout BANK OF JAPAN, HIROSHIMA (BUILDING 24) spreading to lower floors. (Source: DCPA - , Attack Environment Manual, Chapter 3, Panel 26, 1973. The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey report shows that it had my & _ 2 — 1? inch thick reinforced concrete walls and 20 inches of sand on the roof.) Left: the Geibi Bank building (building 18) after it survived 8 psi peak overpres- sure at 293 metres from ground zero in Hiroshima, again inside the “firestorm” area. It survived fire completely; fire- brands blown in through first and third floor broken windows at 2.25 hours after the explosion ignited curtains and furni- ture but these fires were extinguished by survivors using water fire buckets. (The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey reported ; : ——_ . GEIBI BANK COMPANY, HIROSHIMA (BUILDING 18) it had 10 inch reinforced concrete walls.) Hiroshima LOW YIELD WEAPONS (SHORT BLAST WIND DURATION) THERMAL SHADOWING (BEFORE BLAST ARRIVAL) SHADOWED FRACTION OF WINDOWS FACING THE FIREBALL 30% (1-2 STORY) 50% (3 STORY) Inco 20 DIRKWOOD CORP. REPORT DC-TN-1058-1 CURVES: L. WAYNE DAVIS, DC-P-1060-1 OUTDOORS IN FIRE AREA iQ ‘s Pian = IN BRICK BUILDINGS re) s | _/_GROUP IN WWII GERMAN CELLARS a FRIEDRICKSHAFEN UL OYAMA FCs! 0 200 400 600 800 Above: for any particular peak overpressure, the duration of the blast winds and accompanying “dynamic” (wind) pressure is proportional to the cube-root of the explo- sion yield. A megaton yield weapon exerts the same overpressure and dynamic (wind) forces at a given peak overpressure as a low yield weapon, but the time these forces last for is greater. Thes reduces the vertical load falling on people lying flat to avoid horizontal wind drag and the wind- carried debris. Therefore, although the wind speed and the dynamic pressure are independent of weapon yield (for a given peak overpressure), they last longer if the explo- sion yield is increased, so debris is spread over a wider area. This does vot affect the peak velocity attained by small PEAK, MILLIONS OF BTU PER SQUARE MILE PER SECOND Above: nuclear explosions do nof provide burning fuel like incendiary air-raids on wooden cities, and hijacked aircraft hitting the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 (where burning aviation fuel melted the steel frame). At Hiroshima, shadowing protected most window contents. pieces of debris, which quickly attain their peak veloci- ty in the blast wind regardless of the duration of the blast. However, it does affect the time they are blown by ' the blast wave, and therefore the distance they travel. Above: 1 psi peak overpressure extinguishing paper and curtain fires, like a match in a 70 miles per hour wind (source: T. Goodale, Effects of Air Blast on Urban Fires, URS 7009-14, 1970). The mecha- nism for the blast to extinguish fires is simple: hurricane winds cool the fuel below its ignition temperature, putting the fire out. This is a much bigger problem of lighting a match in a very strong wind. This mechanism put out 50% of Goodale’s curtain fires at 1 psi, and 100% at >2.5 psi, but it did not operate with red hot lumps of char- coal in Hiroshima’s breakfast braziers or with pans of burning oil in other blast tests, because the lip of the pan shelters the hot surface of the fuel from the cooling blast wind. The blast winds do not blow out hard-to-ignite thick fuels like mattresses and Encore-type cot- - ton-padded furniture, where the structure itself protects the hot interior fuel from exposure to the cooling blast winds. In one room at the Encore nuclear test of 1953 the wall around the window shielded burning rubbish from the cooling blast winds. The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey found at Hiroshima that although 107 of the 130 large buildings surveyed eventually burned, only 20% were ignited within 30 minutes of fhe nuclear explosion, so people escaped fires (source: FEMA Attack Environment Manual, 1982). Hiroshima HIROSHIMA Figure 11 MORTALITY AND CASUALTY RATES WOODEN AND CONCRETE BUILDINGS COMPARED (AS OF LATE AUG. 1945) x Dead general mortality Severly injured * 2 Slightly injured “ Uninjured ra) °o Injured Unknown ° = 74 Ke general mortality Be w - w «x 2 2 . oO 2295 re) *6%e%e%e DOOOR . OO or eretets BOO eters 2 3 TELGPH. TELPHN CITY COMM'N BRANCH FFI POST SAVINGS ee Se — OFFICE OFFICE g 6 @ 8 e eS e ) es e 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 400 1600 1000 2000 OISTANCE IN METERS Above: Fig. 12 from Ashley W. Oughterson, et al., Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs: The Report of the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan, Volame VI, U. S. Army Institute of Pathology, NP-3041, 1951, comparing the overall gen- eral mortality tor Hiroshima with the mortality inside wooden and concrete buildings. Hiroshima’ obsolete wooden houses had a higher mortality than concrete buildings. Table 12 of that report is the basis of most of the data in Table 12.21 on page 547 of the 3rd edition (1977) of Glasstone and Dolan’s book, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, which averages Hiroshima survival data for concrete buildings and correlates it to “degrees of damage,” not distance. Ibis correlation can be deceptive, because some casu- alties in concrete buildings were not due to blast effects, but due to nuclear radiation, which predominated on the upper floors, where there was less shielding from the air burst overhead than Jor the lower floors. Most fire damage to these buildings occurred 2-3 hours later at the height of the firestorm, by which time most survivors had evacuated, so she fire damage in concrete buildings did not determine casualty rates (e.g., 207 out of 400 people swrvived in Hiroshima’s Post Office, burned-out just 200 metres from ground zero). Glasstone and Dolan’s Table 12.21 correlates “severe damage” to 88% killed in the two reinforced concrete buildings right next to ground zero in Hiroshima. To correlate “moderate damage” to 14% mortality (106 killed out of 775 people), Glasstone and Dolan average NP-3041’s Table 12 data for Hiroshima’s Telegraph Office at 500 metres (301 occupants, 45 killed) and the Central Telephone Office at 600 metres (474 occu- pants, 61 killed). Glasstone and Dolan’s correlation of “light damage” to 8% killed is NP-3041’s Table 12 for Hiroshima City Hall at 1.1 km (216 occupants, 18 died up to 10 November 1945) and the Communications Office at 1.2 km (682 occupants, 56 killed). These data only apply to an unwarned population inside concrete buildings. Hiroshima ™ INCIDENT WAVE REFLECTED \ WAVE —— -— MACH REFLECTION ——— REGULAR REFLECTION Above: in any au burst explosion over a surface, the down- ward blast wave reflects off the ground, so at locations near ground zero and above the ground surface two blast waves are felt: the direct (incident) blast moves radially outwards the detonation point, and is soon followed by the upward- moving ground reflected blast wave which moves radially outwards from an imaginary mirror point which is located at one burst altitude below ground zero. But this simple mur- ror-like “regular reflection” only applies to distances within a ground radius equal to about the height of burst. LOW ALTITUDE BURST At greater distances, the ground-reflected blast wave, mov- ing faster than the direct blast wave (because it moves through air which has been heated by 1999 the direct blast wave), with the direct blast wave and rapid- catches up ly merges to form a fused blast wave. This fused blast wave is sometimes called the “Mach stem,” and it has a height which rapidly grows with dis- tance from ground zero, but rapidly decreases with increasing burst alti- tude. Fora 1 kt aw burst at height H feet, the Mach stem height at ground BURST HEIGHT, FEET distance R feet is given by approxi- mately (R - H)?/(R + 7.4X 10°H?) feet + 20%, for distances R > H, since the Mach stem only begins to form at a distance from ground zero Right: peak overpressures from 1 kt yield 0 Nevada nuclear air bursts (DASA-1200). Sanaa. sumilar to the burst altitude. (Our equation is based on the Mach stem height graphs in TM 23-200 and DNA-EM-1. For yields over W = 1 kt, all heights and distances should scale up in proportion to W !/3,) A similar fusion of direct and ground reflected blast waves will occur above the fireball region if the burst height is less than 160W 1/3 feet + 15% where Wis the standard (total) weapon yield in kilotons, sumply because the ground-reflected blast wave is greatly speeded up while it is travelling through the extremely hot fireball (TM 23-200 and DNA-EM-1). The Mach stem’ peak overpressure 1s doubled by energy added to the direct wave by fusion with the ground reflected wave (ignoring energy losses due to “air slap’ -type ground shock), causing a “knee” in graphs of peak overpressure versus distance. Using the cube-root scaling law, this doubling of energy in the Mach stem increases dis- tances for overpressures by a factor of 2!/3 = 1.26. But this is smaller than the measured Mach wave pressure enhance- AWRE team measured the various enhancements in British nuclear tests over surfaces ments in nuclear tests. Penney’s of different colours, and chemical explosion air bursts over concrete. Penney argues in his 1970 paper on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts that thermal flash energy absorbed by a surface convectively heats air, so the surface Mach region engulfs a considerable fraction of the downward-directed thermal pulse energy, at distances where the arrival times of the blast wave correspond to the emission of a large fraction of the thermal flash from the fireball. At most 50% of the thermal flash energy in an air burst (that travelling downward, for a dark coloured surface) can be convectively transferred to the air just above the surface, but since this energy ts added to only a small fraction of the complete volume of the blast wave, this pressure enhancement by cumulative engulfment of hot air over desert ts greater than the enhancement due to the blast wave fusion in the Mach stem. The graph below shows the progressive thermal enhancement from engulfed hot aur. ENHANCEMENT EFFECT INCREASES DUE TO CUMULATIVE THERMAL SURFACE HEATING TELAT EL LL TIA 7 1500 DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO, FEET Hiroshima S 1 KT NUCLEAR TESTS NO PRECURSOR 1 PSI PEAK OVERPRESSURE 2 PSI PEAK OVERPRESSURE . TS BURST HEIGHT, FEET Pt et er Pet || 7000 ee ee