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Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons exaggerations completely undermine credible deterrence of war

Russian State TV nuclear war propaganda 7 April 2023

Russian State TV Belarus tactical nukes are to be used aga...

Russian State TV Channel 1 arguing for use of nuclear wea...

ABOVE (VIDEO CLIP): Russian State TV Channel | preparing Russians mentally for nuclear war (they already have nuclear shelters and a new Putin-era tactical nuclear war

civil defense manual from 2014, linked and discussed in blog posts here) arguing for use

of nuclear weapons in Ukraine war in 2023: "We should not be afraid of what it is unnecessary to be afraid of. We need to win. That is all. We have to achieve this with the means we have, with the weapons we have. I would like to remind you that a nuclear weapon is not just a bomb; it is the heritage of the whole Russian people, suffered through the hardest times. It is our heritage. And we have the right to use it to defend our homeland [does he mean the liberated components of the USSR that gained freedom in 1992?|. Changing the [nuclear use] doctrine is just a piece of paper, but it is worth

making a decision."

Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons exaggerations completely undermine credible deterrence of war: Glasstone exaggerates urban "strategic" nuclear weapons effects by using effects data taken from unobstructed terrain (without the concrete jungle shielding of blast winds and radiation by cities!), and omits the most vital uses and most vital effects of nuclear weapons: to DETER world war credibly by negating the concentrations of force used to invade Belgium, 1914 (thus WWI) and Poland (WWID). The facts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the shielding of blast and radiation effects by modern concrete buildings in the credible nuclear deterrence of invasions (click here for data) which - unlike the countervalue drivel that failed to prevent WW2 costing millions of human lives - worked in the Cold War despite the Western media's obsession with treating as Gospel truth the lying anti-nuclear propaganda from Russia's World Peace Council and its allies (intended to make the West disarm to allow Russian invasions without opposition, as worked in Ukraine recently)! Realistic effects and credible nuclear weapon capabilities for deterring or stopping aggressive invasions and attacks which could escalate into major conventional or nuclear wars. Credible deterrence necessitates simple, effective protection against concentrated and dispersed invasions and bombing. The facts can debunk massively inaccurate, deliberately misleading CND "disarm or be annihilated" pro-dictatorship ("‘communism" scam) political anti-nuclear deterrence dogma. Hiroshima and Nagasaki anti-nuclear propaganda effects lies on blast and radiation for modern concrete cities is debunked by solid factual evidence kept from public sight for political reasons by the Marx-media which is not opposed by the remainder of the media, and the completely fake "nuclear effects data" sneaks into "established pseudo-wisdom" by the back-door. Another trick is hate attacks on anyone telling the truth: this is a repeat of lies from Nobel Peace Prize winner Angell and pals before WWI (when long-"outlawed" gas was used by all sides, contrary to claims that paper agreements had "banned" it somehow) and WWII (when gas bombing lies prior to the war by Angell, Noel-Baker, Joad and others were used as an excuse to "make peace deals" with the Nazis, again,

Russians being prepared for use of nuclear weapons, says ...

not worth the paper they were printed on).

PLEASE CLICK HERE for the truth from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the shielding of

blast and radiation effects by modern concrete buildings in the credible nuclear

deterrence of invasions which - unlike the countervalue drivel that failed to prevent WW2

costing millions of human lives - worked in the Cold War despite the Western media's obsession with treating as Gospel truth the lying anti-nuclear propaganda from Russia's World Peace Council and its allies (intended to make the West disarm to allow Russian invasions without opposition, as worked in Ukraine recently)! Realistic effects and credible nuclear weapon capabilities for deterring or stopping aggressive invasions and attacks which could escalate into major conventional or nuclear wars. Credible deterrence is through simple, effective protection against concentrated and dispersed invasions and aerial attacks, debunking inaccurate, misleading CND "disarm or be annihilated" left political anti-nuclear deterrence dogma. Hiroshima and Nagasaki anti- nuclear propaganda effects lies on blast and radiation for modern concrete cities is debunked by solid factual evidence kept from public sight for political reasons by the

Marx-media.

Russian State TV channel prepares its people for nuclear w...

Glasstone's and Nukemap's fake Effects of Nuclear Weapons effects data for unobstructed deserts, rather than realistic blast and radiation shielding concrete jungles which mitigate countervalue damage as proved in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Penney and Stanbury, undermine credible world war deterrence just as Philip Noel-Baker's 1927 BBC radio propaganda on gas war knock-out blow lies were used by Nazi propaganda

distributing "pacifist disarmers" to undermine deterrence of Hitler's war, murdering tens

of millions deliberately through lies (e.g. effective gas masks don't exist) that were easy to disprove, but supported by the mainstream fascist leaning press in the UK. Realistic effects and credible nuclear weapons capabilities for deterring or stopping aggressive invasions and attacks which could escalate into major conventional or nuclear wars debunk Marx media propagandarists who obfuscate because they don't want you to know the truth, so activism is needed to get the message out against lying frauds and open fascists in the Russian supporting Marx mass media. For the true effects in modern city concrete buildings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disproving the lies for nudes in open deserts used as the basis for blast and radiation calculations by Glasstone and Nukemap, please click here The deceptive bigots protraying themselves as Federation of American Scientists genuine communist disarmers in the Marx media including TV scammers have been suppressing the truth to sell fake news since 1945 and in a repetition of the 1920s and 1930s gas war media lying for disarmament and horror news scams that caused disarmament and thus encouraged Hitler to initiate the invasions that set off WWII! Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons exaggerations completely undermine credible deterrence of war: Glasstone exaggerates urban "strategic" nuclear weapons effects by using effects data taken from unobstructed terrain (without the concrete jungle shielding of blast winds and radiation by cities!), and omits the most vital uses and most vital effects of nuclear weapons: to DETER world war credibly by negating the concentrations of force used to invade Belgium, 1914 (thus WWI) and Poland (WWII). The facts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the shielding of blast and radiation effects by modern concrete buildings in the credible nuclear deterrence of invasions (click here for data) which - unlike the countervalue drivel that failed to prevent WW? costing millions of human lives - worked in the Cold War despite the Western media's obsession with treating as Gospel truth the lying anti-nuclear propaganda from Russia's World Peace Council and its allies (intended to make the West disarm to allow Russian invasions

without overwhelming, effective deterrence or opposition, as worked in Ukraine recently)!

Realistic effects and credible nuclear weapon capabilities for deterring or stopping aggressive invasions and attacks which could escalate into major conventional or nuclear wars. Credible deterrence necessitates simple, effective protection against concentrated and dispersed invasions and bombing. The facts can debunk massively inaccurate, deliberately misleading CND "disarm or be annihilated" pro-dictatorship ("communism" scam) political anti-nuclear deterrence dogma. Hiroshima and Nagasaki anti-nuclear propaganda effects lies on blast and radiation for modern concrete cities is debunked by solid factual evidence kept from public sight for political reasons by the Marx-media, which is not opposed by the fashion-obsessed remainder of the media, and

so myths sneak into "established pseudo-wisdom" by the back-door.

Tuesday, February 22, 2022 The lack of any credible deterrence led to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia today, 22 02 2022 (updated)

Russian State TV nuclear war propaganda 7 April 2023

Russian State TV Belarus tactical nukes are to be used aga...

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nuclear test RDS

ecently declassified high quality photos of the effects of the 1949 Russian

R -4 on mil

Extracts from Beria's , 13 final (28 October 1949)

report to Stalin the 1949 Russian nuclear test data 3akno4nTesbHbi AoKNag JIL.O.bepua 4.B.Cranuny 0 pe3y.1bTaTaX HCNbITAHHA ATOMHOH GomOnI

28 oxta6pa 1949 r. Tosapumy Cranuny VB.

OntuueckHMH H3MepeHHaMH (NpOH3BeeCHHEIMH Mp MOMOUIM CielHasIbHO CKOH- CTPyHpOBaHHBIX CBCPXCKOpOCTHBIX (oToKamep, AaromHx 600 000, 100 000 u 25 000 KapOB B C€KYHY, OOBIMHBIX KHHO- H aspodoToKamep, CielvasIbHBIX CHeKTporpatos H APyrHX H3MepHTeNbHEIX MpHOopos, 3apaHee yCTaHOBJeHHEIX Ha AuCTaHuMAX | 800, 3 000 u 5 000 Metpos or ueHTpa B3pBIBa)

(= Russia set up high speed cameras running at 600,000, 100,000 and 25,000 frames/second at 1.8, 3.0 and 5.0 km from ground zero to film fireball.)

Vsmepexo, 4TO MOTOK TeMMOBOTO H3TyYeHHA B3pbIBa CocTaBiseT 4 % sHeprHH WeneHus BCeH MaCCBI IIYTOHHA, COCTaBJIABeH 3apsx, ATOMHOM OomOnI, HCMbITAHHOH 29 aprycra 1949 roga.

(= The bomb's measured thermal yield was 4%.)

Gamma doses (R) Neutron doses (R) Reflected

raMMa-JTy4eii HeiTpoHHOTO blast, tons/ m2 300 m 420 000 300m 27000 000 Tapnenue orpaxeHHoii 400 m 155 000 400 38 000 yapHOH BONHBI 500 m 68 000 500 m 12 000 200m 2900 1/m" 600 m 32 000 600 m 4200 250m 1560 700 m 15 000 7100 M 1 800 300 m 770 800 m 7 800 800 M 800 400m 225 900 m 4 200 500 m 82 1000 m 2 300 1000 m 180 600m = 48 1100m 1 260 800 m 21 1 200 m 700 1 200 m 35 1200m 12,1 1 300m 410 1 800m 6,2 1 500m 140 3 000 m 3,1 1 600 m 80 5 000 m 1,9 1 700 m 48 10 000 m 0,9

FJleticmeue e3poieHot @ONHbI HA BOeHHYHO MexHuKy

Viz pcex BuyOB GoeBol TeXHHKH Hauboree ya3eumoll ¢ (camonetsI): 43 53 camoneToB, yCTaHOBJICHHBIX Ha OIIbITHOM 500 zo 4 000 Metpos, ocTanHch HenoBpexKeHHBIMH TOBKO 2

Apmuaneputicxoe eoopyoceHue MOMHOCThIO pa3pyLIcHO B POB H 3HaYHTeNbHO NoBpexseHO B paguyce 500 metpos or nonHOrO paspyweHHa (nonHOzO Bb1600a U3 Cmpoa) MaHKOE — HM TaHKaM B paquyce 350-500 MeTpoB HaHeCeHBI CHJIbHEIC |

Bo3sfyuHble AuHUU C6AZU CHIbHO pa3spyuIeHbI B payuyce OeNbHBIe IHHHH, MpOOXKeHHBIe Ha 3eMJIe, B paguyce 500 Mery (= Military effects: Out of 53 aircraft exposed at 0.5-2k survived intact. Field artillery and tanks were destr and had significant damage out to £ Ground-laid cables were destroyed

overhead cables were destroyed ou

Animal Effects from Soviet Atmospl Tests, by V. A. Logachev and L. A. N Corporation, 2008, report ADA4858¢ TR-07-38): "The medical/biological studies i 8,000 experimental animals (can sheep, dogs, rabbits, guinea pigs basic ways to solve medical/biok problems were by carrying out fit that used animals in open areas. in military and civilian protective Animals were placed in more tha long-term structures, more than | items (tanks, armored personnel

1 800 Mm 30

Ha oOcHOBaHHH NPHHATO AIA B3PbIBA TPOTHa 3ABHCHMOCTH AaBJICHHA yZapHoH BONHbI OT pacCCTOAHHA MW BeCa 3apsAa CHeWMAaNHCTAI YCTaHOBHIM, 4TO TPOTHOBbI SKBHBaJIeHT aTOMHOH GomOni wcnbITaHHOH 29 aprycta 1949 r. koHCTpyKyHH, paBeH 11 000 TonH Tporuza.

(= Bomb's BLAST yield partition was 11 kt of TNT.)

automobiles, aircrafts etc.), and and wooden houses.”

Page 36: at the 1.6 megaton 1955 1 burns occurred to animals in hous¢«

Goose

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covered vs CdD) » blast shelters i ” Facing sensors,

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Dogs in trench shelters

Russian Pa » Aa

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validated

Fireball near thermal Fireball brightens as the shock

minimum, showing front expands beyond shell

development of dust skirt of nitrogen dioxide which absorbs thermal radiation while

| the overoressure is high 2=7500 Opueumupozounas eve h-26e0 ‘“BAcNOnOWeNUA CAaMonemMo!

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nogr OTOBKA K IPOBEIEHIIO nEPBOrO femitne = UCIbITAHUA PO Right: 14 for the first ever Russian nuclear

different target : ‘ Cxema pacnono»xeHua cone \ oe

sectors or lines stretched out to distances of up to 10 km (6 miles) from the

29 August 1949 of Russian 22 kt 7 ceKTop — Seiarcnniscnt o6be 8 BexTOD = NPOMBILUNIEHHbIX COO

vcnbiTaHuk 29.08.1949 r:

nuclear test tower. This Russian poster uses a non- linear distance scale to show

14-15 cexropa — FS ICOEO coop

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COMPARISON OF INFINITE TIME FALLOUT GAMMA DOSES OUTDOORS FROM RDS1 AND RDS37

4 ROENTGENS EPH aa (— an Antaicnut KPA oy SA \ 08.62

% (actat Territory) { 3% + 4 { } 9.9 kt elie e ‘ 4 surface ‘ie , / | 9.9 kt i burst J surface é f -_ burst >) a n (hotspot) a L- we irst Russi Ly nuclear abe oAP Comparison of

fa fallout from

5 four typical -t nuclear tests: Cxema paguvayHOHHOH O6cTaHOBKH Ha TeppuTopuHn Antaiickoro Kpan (4036! raMMa-H3sIYYeHHAR QO NONHOTO pacnasa PagHOaKTHBHbIx BewWwecTs, P).

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Vey Ycnosubie o603HaYeHHA B3pbIBOB: Fa __ 29.08.49 r. 22kt — Key to tests -------- 22.11.55 r. 1.6Mt

07.08.62 r. 9.9kt

4 d aie ‘(dates tested)~ ee NOTE: Russian letter P = Enalish letter R (ROENTGENS DOSES) ( — -—— 25.09.62 r. 4 kt

a a ee ee ee

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CLOSE-IN GAMMA RADIATION (mR/HOUR) FROM ALL TESTS, DEC. 1955 SEMIPALATINSK NUCLEAR TEST SITE

AIABROQAPCKAR OBNACTD (39%)

Beckaparavicnuu PAMOH

I ' CEMUNATMHCK \ nonurox

CEMUNARATHHCKAA oBNAcTD (54%)

Cxema panoakTHsHoro JarpasHenns TeppHropHh = OnbirHoro,)-—nomm =k saBerOo CemHnanaTHHCkore MONWrOHa NO COCTORHHWO Ha

1956 roma. Tloxa3aHo nonoxcHne

WIONHHHA MOUHOCTeH 103 TaMMa-HINyYeCHHR B mxP/Y:

MI: 500000 ABARcKun 1-12-40 2- 40-100 3 100-1000

V. M. Loborev, et al., Assessment of t. radioactive contamination of the Alta nuclear explosions carried out at the Test Site, Final Report of the Central | Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Federation, 1992

Development (1949-1952) @ Chronicle - History of Rosatom biblioatom.ru/tl/year/1949/

1949@®)

ae

1950 1951 1952

By July 26, 1949

» The construction and equipment of a test site for detonating the nuclear charge of the first Soviet plutonium bomb has been practically con

In just two years, a colossal amount of work was completed, with excellent quality and at a high technical level. All materials were delive

LaEN) cites by road on dirt roads for 100-200 km. Traffic was around the clock in both winter and summer.

Numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities were located on the experimental field to study the i factors of a nuclear explosion.

In the center of the experimental field there was a metal tower 37.5 m high for the RDS-1 installation.

The experimental field was divided into 14 test sectors: two fortification sectors, a sector of civil structures, a physical sector, military samples of military equipment, and a biological sector.

Along the radii in the northeast and southeast directions at various distances from the center, instrument buildings were erectec photochronographic, film and oscillographic equipment that recorded the processes of a nuclear explosion.

At a distance of 1000 m from the center, an underground building was built for equipment that registers light, neutron and gamma |

explosion. The optical and oscilloscope equipment was controlled via cables from a programmable machine.

To study the impact of a nuclear explosion, sections o fragments off airfield runways, samples of aircraft, tanks, artiller [pi superecturespt various types were built on the experimental field. It took 90 offait wagons to transport 3 ee equipment.

oO ensure the operation of the physical sector, 44 facilities and a cable network with a length of 560 km were built at the test site.

The total area of the Semipalatinsk test site was 18.5 thousand square meters. km. The total cost of setting up the test site for the first atc

to 185 million rubles.

ABOVE: the Russian instrumentation and target array methodology on their first nuclear test (RDS1, 22 kt on a 37.5 m high tower, 29 August 1949; high quality declassified 1949 test photos are taken from the 2018 Sarov Nuclear Weapons Museum brochure, linked here) was far more extensive than any Western nuclear test ever conducted, and animals were successfully used to determine the protective factors of shelters and trenches against the combined blast and radiation environment, proof testing almost the entire Russian nuclear civil defense system (it continued to do this at later tests up to and including the 1.6 megaton air burst of 22 November 1955; see the data summary in the DTRA commissioned report Animal Effects from Soviet Atmospheric Nuclear Tests by the Russians V. A. Logachev and V. A. Mikhalikhina of the VNITEF, Sarovy - the protective factor of any shelter or structure is simply obtained from the ratio of the percentage of animals surviving in a structure, compared to unprotected controls - which are unfortunately lumped together for different tests with varying yields and distance ranges to avoid secrecy here). The cost of setting up the 1949 nuclear test site with its 14 target array sectors around ground zero out to 10 km radius was 185,000,000 rubles, including a 560 km cable

network which was damaged by the unexpected EMP effect. Key American nuclear test effects data on simple trench and earth covered

emergency shelters is still classified secret, since it comes within the bureaucratic province of military structures. America's secret EM-1, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, Chapter 15, Damage to Structures, revised in April 1993, Tables 15.17 and 15.18 in Northrop's unclassified 1996 compressed book summary, states that such 6x8 ft military command post and hardened-frame/fabric personnel shelters with 4 feet of earth cover, all require 30, 50 and 60 psi peak overpressure for 50% probability of light, moderate and severe damage, respectively. Northrop's unclassified Table 14.1, Combat Ineffectiveness for Personnel in an Open Two-Man Foxhole (2 x 6 x 4.5 ft) side- on the blast wave shows 50% combat ineffectiveness at 37 psi peak overpressure for a 0.01 kt and 29 psi for yields of 0.1 kt to 1 Mt (so the clean or enhanced neutron bomb is needed for credible deterrence, not just the low-yield option on high yield dial-a-yield weapons that produce trivial neutron doses). These American nuclear test data derived statistics are similar to T. K. Jones' figures - discussed later in detail in this blog post - for the excellent nuclear war survival of Russian expedient blast/fallout shelters. Figure 15.62, Basic vulnerability chart for tunnels in rock, however, shows that tunnel shelters in granite/hard rock, with a highly deformable composite lining between the rock and the tunnel lining (bags full of aluminium metal chips, for instance, were used by T. K. Jones to shock-protect sensitive equipment in successful tests, e.g. a motorbike driven away after surviving a peak blast overpressure of 600 psi, which would be in the crater for a surface burst and well over the peak at ground zero from the air bursts that optimised low pressure area damage

to wooden houses at Hiroshima and Nagsaki) survive at just 650 feet or 200 metres from | megaton yield.

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Casualty Ranges for Nuclear Weapon Effects - Troops in Open «++++ers Wooden Blast Shelter (15 psi) --- Steel Blast Shelter (50 psi) scccsececvccccccecceceececeveeseee] 93 Variation of Initial Total Dose With Range from Burst Point ...195 Soil Shielding from Initial Gamma Radiation --+-seeeeeeeeseee eo 196 Comparison of Base SIZES ceerccccvccccccccccereseccsesesssesses AH) Command and Contro] STOL Aircraft Configuration ----++++essseees 206 Concept: Hardened Off-Base Shelter Facilities -++++++seeesso++210 Shelter Communications oocrccvcvccccccccvcscvesecccscccsesessssedle Concept: Road Mobile Transport --cceececccccccsceescccsceseeesQlG Personnel and Mobile Office Transport ----- Replacement AFSAT (Compatible with MM-II]) cscssssccseess Launch Event Sequence

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1 December 1980

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SHELTER TYPE AND TYPICAL INSTALLATION

Wood Shelters USAF base Navy shipyard

Army Base Steel Shelters

USAF base

Navy shipyard

Army base

For example, Figure 5-5 shows measures emp event to protect a minibike emplaced at the 600 psi | range. Figure 5-6 shows the minibike being recovered metal damage. In fact, it was immediately started up

| Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show a grinder being emp the FOAM HEST 2 (Reference 9) event which simulated

environments at the 900 psi (6.2 MPa) range from a 100 grinder received only superficial damage.

e In almost all of these tests aluminum chips operations were used as the crushable material beca rial for weapon protection. Figure 5-9 shows the gener ing weapons with foam and soil, The thickness of fo depend on the expected soi] motion and thus on weapon shown are expected to protect a weapon or other item of environments produced at the 1000 psi (6.9 MPa) range

Blast tests led by TK Jones of ees aed that crus aluminium chips absorb blast energy, protecting a bil

4 JULY 1982

THIS MAN THINKS YOU SHOULD BUY A FALL-OUT SHELTER

(One of his, preferably — he sells them. See page 24)

oe 1y i » Pe, f< . a.

>. *

ABOVE: Left wing Observer aka Sunday Guardian promoting nuclear shelters on 4 July 1982. But are such shelters necessary? New research shown in this post proves that if people can simply descend to the lower floors in the attack warning period (behind tables to

shelter from window glass) or to the basements or underground car parks of modern buildings which survive radiation and blast effects far

Blatchford factory- assembled shellers are made from 6in-Bin thick precast reinforced concrete by BLATCON LTO of Midsomer Norton, Avon. Their managing director is John Blatchford (right). They can be built to accommodate between six and 14 people ata cost of about £1,000 per head, excluding installation. lan Mathie of Blatcon claims a blast rating of at least one aimosphere and a PF of 2.500 when the shelter is buried 2ft beneath the surface, or 3.300 if, in addition. a 12in layer of reinforced concrete is poured around it.

NUCLEAR PROTECTION Of Wellingborough. Northamptonshire, sell shelter equipment and supply the plans for a 12in thick reinforced concrete shelter. Tom Butler (left), who runs the firm, has raised his estimate of the shelter’s PF. when buried under 40in of soil, from 2,000 to 5,000 using newly available Home Office tables, and claims a

blast rating of one atmosphere. His shelter holds seven ple and costs tween £10,000 and £12,000.

OAKTREE EQUIPMENT LTD. Of Fi 0 which are pretabricated galvanisec ways, enabling burial up to a dept

va of comf

fas toler Lay hott ege

better than the wooden homes in Hiroshima in 1945 (see diagram below from EM1)), the mutual shielding from the "concrete and steel jungle" in a modern city will screen out the radiation and will reduce blast wind and debris hazards. Russia has such basement shelters and tunnel shelters already in cities, as well as evacuation plans and nuclear tested expedient blast and fallout shelters for dispersing the people in acrisis. The American bor Lord Chancellor of England, lawyer Lord Lyndhurst (John Singleton Copley, born in Boston,

Massachusetts, in 1772) said in his House of Lords Speech, Russia and the Crimean War on 19 June 1854:

"The whole series of her history, from the earliest period to the present day, has been one of long-continued fraud and perfidy, of stealthy encroachment, or open and unblushing violence - a course, characteristic of a barbarous race, and whether at St Petersburg or Tobolsk, marking its Asiatic origin. To go back to the reign of the Empress Catherine, we find her policy in one striking particular corresponding with that of the present Emperor, which policy can be traced back to the Czar Peter. She ostentatiously proclaimed herself the Protector of the Greek Church in Poland, formented religious dissentions among the people, and under pretense of putting an end to disorders which she herself had created, sent a large military force into the country ... With a like policy in the Crimea, the independence of which country had been settled by treaty, she set up a prince whom she afterwards deposed, and, amidst the confusion thus created, entered the country with an army under one of the most brutal and sanguinary of her commanders, and, having slaughtered all who opposed her, annexed this important district permanently to the Russian Empire. ... I pass over the extensive conspiracy in which Russia was engaged with Persia [IRAN] ... against this country ... These scandalous transactions were strenuously denied by Count Nesselrode to our minister at St Petersburg, but were afterwards conclusively established by Sir Alexander Burnes and by our consul at Candahar. ...we ought not to make peace until we have destroyed the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and razed the fortifications ... That she will not remain stationary we may confidently predict. Ambition, like other passions, grows by what it feeds upon. Prince Lieven, in the despatch to Count Nesselrode, to which I before alluded, says: "Europe contemplates with awe this colossus, whose gigantic armies wait only the signal to pour like a torrent upon her kingdoms and states’. If this semi-barbarous people, with a government of the same character, disguised under the thin cover of a showy but spurious refinement ... despotism the most coarse and degrading that every afflicted mankind - if this power with such attributes should establish itself in the heart of Europe (which may Heaven in its mercy avert!) it would be the heaviest and most fatal calamity that could fall on the civilized world." (For complete validation of this claim a century later, see WWIII nuclear war threat of Khrushchev, made even before Russia had a nuclear superiority, in 1959 - linked below - and Eisenhower's autistic mimickery of Chamberlain's autistic appeasement of Hitler for "peace" on 30 sept '38! The situation is far worse now because there really is a missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear warhead

designs "implementation gap" today in which we are behind, which makes Russian threats credible, unlike 1959!)

Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. | That is bluff.| If you send in

tanks, they will burn and make no mistake about it.

If you want war, you can have it, but remember, it

Khrushchev, June 23, 1959

Q: What do you think of talk such as this? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think anything about it

at all. I don't believe that |responsible saps should

indulge in anything that can b& even remotely considered ultimatums or threats. That is\not the way to reach peaceful solutions.

(TEXTBOOK AUTISM) Eisenhower, July 8, 1959

Khrushchev ge power by rejec his predecesso anti-war agen instead using | style blackma deter America opposing its 17 of Eastern Eur Eisenhower w Chamberlain's mindset, refus prepare shelte wanting to ap

50% PROBABILITY OF SEVERE DAMAGE (COLLAPSE) FOR CITY BUILDINGS (SOURCE: NORTHROP, EM-1 NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS HANDBOOK, 1996, TABLE 15.6, AND FIGURES 15.10, 15.18, SURFACE BURSTS)

STRUCTURE

15.2.2, 3-8 Story Reinforced Concrete Building (Concrete Walls)

15.2.10, 3-10 Story Steel Frame Building

BUILDING VALUES (NOMINAL

Peak overpressure

Oscillation Static yield (psi) Period (ms) resistance (psi)jratio (u) 20 KT IMT 300 3.0

600 2.0

THE ORIGINAL] SECRET EM-1 SHOWS THAT MODERN CITY BUILDINGS REQUIRE FAR HIGHER PEAK OVERPRESSURI EVEN AT MEGATON YIELDS,

THAN THE WOODEN HOUS IN HIROSHIMA FOR COLLAPSE

DESS MPOTHMBOPARMUALLUBHHbBIE YHPRITMA

NporTwBopanwauHOHHwe YHPSITHA SauiMUaIOT MOLE OT PannOakKTHBHOFO mH CBeTOBOrO WSAYYeHHR ocnaOGnntoT BsosaencTBHe YA@PHOW BONHD! AAEPHOTO BSpHisa

NpwcnocoOnenne nogsana OAKOSTAMNOFO DAGHER MOA YuDETHE

Yeporrwe ¢ mepexpeitmen «) menesobeTOnNex

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Yuporwe «3 TOHHHX OpeBen une wepaen

NpmcnocoOnenne MOdEMMOFO BABHUR NOAA yupurne

Ycrpoacrso YMDOITHR M3 BPONHEIX XBOPOCTANDIX HAM KaMbIWOBIX DIwHH

Hawpbid AONMeH 3HaTb, FHe PacNnonomenbI OnnmMahwKe NPOTHBOPAAKAWNOHHbIE (MDbITHA NO MECTY DAOOTHI HAM MNTeENDCTBA.

[amas semnat COLF Semramee ae ot none on anaes & acme & Gumvers + ® tmpamemn Y . ‘ Ameen 5 8 Mone Popes 6G tememmnenes » ~ELLLS Lele SUL VLALICD. eemmene seeeeren & A cnctewn Tene panaeray © Ueeenpemen igs = aoe ~ ions

[pamanecens ofopene CCCP. Mowvne

<, NPOCTEMMME YKPbITHA 4 SbICTPOBO3BO) YEEMMUA C YRPOWENHHbDIM OBOPYROBA

NMPOCTEAWHE YHPDbBITHA BbICTPOBOIBOAMMbIE YEEMMUA C YNPOLWEHHI

BOSACKCTUNA COeTOBOTO M3NyNeHHA ocnadnmor Buctpososeognume yGemmusa ¢ ynpouenmne oGopyansaues

Mpocredume yxpwTHA Saumujaror AW ACM OT BCOF NOPAMaAOUME GanTOpoOs OCpymun waccosor,

BODACACTEHE YAAPHOR BODHY » NDOMMHAROUIEH PAAMauHK

NOpamennn

San ie i Wedd Pil AMA. ai

: hae “

c TaO NEPEKPMTOR WeNH NPONSBOAKTCA BT MOCMEAOBATENLNOCTH: CHAYANS OHO OTPdIRBETCA MH OOOPyAyercA, saTem “epenpeiBaeTcA

SHELTER DESIGN: — ..22..

Qunetp-noraoTHTO My

we = Mecra ycranosKn AAR BORK a Ete bie aye 8 POMMME HKOTOR SENTAARUMH

UNDERROAD PEDES CROSSING SUBWAY WITH REINFORC

SLAB ROOFS)

ad wis 4 NpucnocoGnenne nogzemHoro nepexoga nog GbicTpOBOIBOANMOE |

PACCPEAOTOUEHME M SBAKYALVA HACENEHMA _ Evacuation and dispersal of the po

PACCPEQOTOUEHME HW SBAKYALIVA— STO OPFAHHSOBAHHbIM BbIBOG H BbI- TPAHCNOPTA, HE 3AHATOTO BOEHHbIMM WHE! BO3 HACENEHUA KH3 TOPOZOB HW PASMELUEHME EFO B 3AFOPOQHOKM 3OHE, CTBEHHbIMM VW XOSAACTBEHHbIMM NEPEBOSKAMH NPOBODMMbIE B NEPHOD YFPOSbI HANAQEHHA NPOTHBHUKA, C UENbIO PACCPEQOTOYEHME WU SGBAKYAUMA PABOUMX, C. CHUMEHMA NOTEPb CPEAW HACENEHHMA B CNYYAE NPHMEHEHHMA MPO CEMEM OCYLUIECTBIAETCA NO NPOWSBOACTBEHF THBHUKOM OPYMMA MACCOBOrO NOPAMEHMA. UWA HACENEHMR, HE SAHATOTO HA NPOKSBOD PACCPEQOTOYEHME MW SBAKYALIMA NPOBOAATCA B KPATYAMLUME CPOKM NO TEPPUTOPKANbHOMY NMPKHUMNY (NO MECTY HOMBUHKMPOBAHHbIM CMOCOBOM C UCNONbSOBAHVEM BCEX BUAOB PABNEHVAMWH VW MMSIWLUHO-SKCINYATALIYOHH!

OBbINHO SBAKYMPYIOTCR BMECTE C POQUTENAM

Padonw paccpedomovenua pabosus u Caymawuux

Evacuation is by marching, or bus,

train and

COKPALJEHMA HA CXEME: KEY WORKERS ARE NOT EVA COM —c6opreit seaxyaunonnei nyxxt; NOM—npwemne seanyaynonnwi nynxt; MM —- nynxrnocaaxn SHELTERS IN CITIES ARE US

Tpemanecnan odopons CCCP. Hownsont xa 19 maacaron Meaney

—. JBAKVYAUMA HACENEHH:

Oearyauwed HACeNOHHA HASHIBAETCA OPraHHSOBAHHwIA BbIB03 (eieoA) HaCeNeHHA KB ropogon, HaCe- Hble HomMOoHMH, JNA OTNPABKH BBAKYHPyeMOrO HACOAEHHA B ropOAax COsAAIOTOR CO NOHHWIX NYHKTOB B BArOpoAHylO SOHy B CAYWAE yrpPOIb! NPHMEHEHHA NPOTHBHKHOM OpPyMHA MaccOBOrO NyHKTe, @ GB BArOPpOAHOR ZOKe ANA NpKema HM PASMELEHHA SeaKyHpyeMoro Hacen NOPAKeHHA. DeakyauHh NOANEMHT TAKE HACENEHHE, NPOHHBAHOLWWEE B BOHAX BOIMOMHOTO BATONACHHA. HYAUHOHMEIO NYHKTEA. ; : JA noprorosKn # NpoBeAeHKHA MepONPHATHA NO JBaKyAWHH HACEACKHA B FOpOAAx, PahoHax H Ha 06»- se) WAYANG IBAKYAUHH HACENEHHE ONOBELIBETOR BAMHHKOTPAUMEA NPeANPHATHA @HTAX HAPOAHOTO XOSAMOTSA COSAAIOTCA BEaKYAUHOHHEIE HOMHCOKH, 8 SAaFOPOAHOH SOHE— SBaKONpPHEM- AGHHA, yueOHUx sasegeHni » HISH.

=RUSSIAN EVACUATION PLANS TO NEGATE ENEMY NUCLEAR THREATS

KH YCTSHOBMEHHOMY BPEMeHM JBaKYMPYeMOR HACeNeHHE FOPOACKHM Ha COOPHOM asBaKyauKOHHOM MYHHTe Hacenenne TPAHCMOPTOM HAM NEWHM NOPAAKOM CAMOCTORTENBHO MpKODIBAeT NPOXGAMT PerMCTpauMWO mM pacnpeAenneTCA Ha COOPNDAA 2BaKYaUHOHHDA NYHKT MO NEWHM KONOKHSM KAM TDSHCNOPTHbIM aWweNOHaM

Hacenenne episognr 8 CocTase newex

Hacenenne BHIBOJHTCA BCEMM BHAAMKM THAHCHODPTa:

lip npopegenun IBAKYAUMK HACENEHHE PONMHO YETHO BLINONHATL PAaCNOPAMEHHA MECTHBIX OPranOB BAACTH GQMMHACTPAUMK COOPHbIX HM NPHEMHbIX IBAKYAUMOHHbDIX OPaHOB, HAYAN_HHKOB JWENOHOB KH KONOHKH

MPHBOP MPEDHASHAYEH JA W3MEPEHHA YPOBHEM TrAMMA-PAQMAUMH 7 HA MECTHOCTM M PAQMOAKTMBHOM 3APAMEHHOCTH NO ramMa-vanyue. RUSSIAN DP-5V RADIAC (GEIGER CO

HUIO NIODEM, NPOAOBONbCTBHA, BODbI, TEXHHKM, OME Abi HW AP BOTH GAMMA SURVEY METER AND ] YCTPOACTBO NPHEOPA DETECTING FOOD/WATER CONTAMI

1. Tenegornm 2. Dyrnap c xpmwxoh 3. TymGnep 4 3 6 noaceeta wrany muKpoamnepmertpa 4. LUnana mn q npoamnepmetpa 5. Huonna cO6poca noKasannh mu npoamnepmerpa 6. Nepennwoxarens nogzgnana3z0nos 7. Tu6und naGens 8. Baonw aerextuposanna 9. Yann wHNTeNnbHaR WTAaHTa

2 - ROPATING BETA SHIELD HEADPHONES 3 (FOR GEIGER

CLICKING SOUND)

YCTPOMCTBO

1. Nosopotnms 4. Onoprwe e 6. Taina

0.05 mR/

TEXHMYECHKAR

ON-5B o6ec TEPHCTHKK NK Divanason wu: Hut oT 0,05 umeer 6 no“ ca npu6opa - eTOR OT TPeXx : Homnnext nut

9 = EXTENSIBLE PROBE POLE

FST PA. -ce one

POWERED BY THREE KB-1 BATTERIES an patony n FOR 55 HOURS. WEIGHT = 3.2 KG. 8 ANA NOAKNION

nocrorRHHOrO 24B

ABOVE: 10,000 marched to shout "STOP HITLER" while Chamberlain surrendered Sudetenland for a worthless peace deal. Neither the

shouting, nor the "peace deal", nor belated token rearmament, deterred WW2. In the cold war, strategic nuclear deterrence failed time and

again: Stalin took over Eastern Europe while Truman had a nuclear monopoly. Only credible tactical nuclear weapons had any effect, judging from protests the Moscow World Peace Council organized across the world against the W79 neutron bomb (see 1977 Secret CIA report on neutron bomb propaganda, below and John Barron's "KGB's Magical War for Peace" book extracts in Reader's Digest below, or see Chapman Pincher's book documenting how Moscow's World Peace Council infiltrated anti-nuclear propaganda via stupid

appeasing Western media, "The Secret Offensive") - you need credible nuclear deterrence to force madmen not just listen but to respond

usefully.

a

-

Approved For Release 2o0adS fof \esh-ROPS1M00980R003200010060-0

CIA declassified: CLA- RDP81M00980R003200010060-0 SOVIET PROPAGANDA: THE NEUTRON BOMB

2 September 1977

SUMMARY: The Soviet Union during July and August 1977 mounted a worldwide campaign against U.S. production . of the neutron bomb. The Soviets pursued this issue in every media channel and wherever it was possible to. stimulate adverse public discvssion. These efforts were directed toward pressuring tn: U.S. to back away from at producing the bomb as well as accumulating political capi-

_ tal for Soviet use at future SALT and CSCE talks. As the campaign peaked at the end of August, it was apparent —

denouncing the neutron bomb. During the week of 1-7 August, significant attention was directed toward support of the "Week of Action" organized for 6-13 August by the World Peace Council front group. To keep up steam, Pravda on 9 August published an appeal by 28 communist parties against production of the neutron bomb. The American Embassy in Moscow noted that the neutron bomb was the prime Soviet propaganda target.

7. Echoes in Eastern Europes. State Department telegrams from East European Posts agree that the aeutron bomd campaign there, which took off in the latter weeks of July, was massive, well-- organized and faithfully mirrored the Soviet effort. The campaign employed all channels of public communication: press, radio, tele- vision, petitions, public letter writing and demonstrations. Some coments: “

10. For the Soviets, the real propaganda paydirt lay in ed i treatment given the neutron bomb by this eactad gran? 4 Math wisely Judged by NATO Secretary General Luns in a 26 August speech as con- sisting of half-truths, untruths and ignorance. Given the emotional themes which were raised in the neutron bomb debate--saving buildings

rather than people; the hypocrisy of Americans advocating human

rights. in face of the bomb production; the endangering of detente--

¥t was an old-fashion editorial binge which many papers would 1 2 wl i not Geny themselves. And beyond the non-conmunist, anti-bomb press,

RET

Approved For Release 2004/09/24 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200010060-0

RGB: The Ss

Magical War for “Peace”

BYJOHN BARRON

It has spread like a rag- ing fever throughout the world, From Bonn to Is- tanbul, Lima to New York, millions upon millions of people have joined in the nuclear-freeze movement. It is a@ movement largely made up of patriotic, sen- sible people wha earnestly believe that they are doing what they must to prevent nucleur war, But itis also a movement that has been penetrated, manipulated and distorted to an amaz- ing degree by people who have but one aim—to pro- mote communist tyranny by weakening the United States, Here, in an exclu- sive report, Reader's Di- gest Senior Editor John Barron, author of the best. seller "KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secrat sAgents," authenticates in detail how the Kremlin, through suurecy, forgery, terrorism «and feria, has played upeu mankind's longing fm peace to fur. ther its own strateqie

Fabrications and Fronts

[x rie Sovinty Lexicon, Active Measures include both overt and covert’ propaganda, manipulation of international front. erganiza- tons, forgeries, fabrications and deceptions, acts of sabotage or ter- rorism committed for psychologi- cal effect, and the use of Agents of Influence.*

The KGB has concocted more than 150 furgerics of official U.S. decuments and correspondence portraying American leaders as treacherous and the United States asan unreliable, warmongering na-

he eo? ee or ee Metre UL was a fabrication titled U.S, Army Field Manual FM30-31B and classi- fied, by the KGE, top secret. Field manuals FM30-3/ and FM30-31A did exist; FM30-31B was entirely a Soviet creation. Over the forged signature of Gen. William West- moreland, the manual detailed pro- cedures to be followed by U.S. military personnel in friendly for- cign countries. These fictitious in-

Facade of Peace

THe Worto Peace Councit emerged in Paris in 1950 to foment “Ban the Bomb” propaganda at a time when the Soviets had not suc- ceeded in arming themselves with

nuclear weapons. Expelled from France for subversion in 1951, the wrec took refuge in Prague until 1954, when it moved to Vienna. The Austrians also evicted the

READERS' DIGEST, 1983 BOOK EXTRACTS BY JOHN BARRON

Romesh Chandra

DHAL WU UduiE su ate the global propayan- da campaign to com- pel withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

The president of the council is Indian communist Romesh Chandra, who long has been a controlled and witting Soviet agent. Intelligent, vain and arrogant, Chandra is almost embarrassing in his slavish adherence to Soviet dictates and his paeans to all things Soviet. “The Soviet Union invariably supports the peace movement,” Chandra said a few years ago. “The World Peace Council in its turn positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs.”

Nevertheless, the Russians su- pervise Chandra closely by assiyn- ing both International Department and KGB representatives to the per- manent secretariat of the WPC in Helsinki. The public record amply demonstrates the totality of Soviet control. In its 32 years of existence, the WPC has not deviated from the Kremlin's line of the moment. It did not raise its voice against Soviet suppression of Polish and East Ger-

man workers in 1953, Soviet slaughter of Hungarians in 1956, Soviet abrogation of the nuclear- test moratorium in 1961, the clan- destine emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, the inva- sion of Czechoslovakia jn 1968, the projection of Soviet military power in Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen, The wre has failed to criticize a single Soviet armament program; only those of the West. And it endorsed the Soviet inva- sion of Afghanistan.

WPC finances further reflect So-

tr

iat anne-al

WAS H INGTON SCEN E...trom the AIAA Washington ;

@ CIA Daputy Director John McMahon, in testimony before

a House Intelligence Subcommittee, estimated that tha |

Soviet Union had spent $200 million on propaganda and covert campaigns against NATO deployment of enhanced- _ftadiation (neutron-bomb) weapons and the modernization of theater nuclear weapons.

Enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) increase radiation while greatly reducing blast (tenfold) and heat damage to surrounding areas. Made for use in short-range, tactical nuclear weapons such as the Lance missile and &-in. howitzer, they would probably be used against large con- centrations of Warsaw Pact tanks, a major threat to NATO.

The campaign against the neutron bomb began in the summer of 1977 and was manifested in a series of coor- dinated diplomatic moves, overt propaganda, and covert political action, said McMahon. It began in the Soviet and East European press and spread to communist international front groups all over the world. "The purpose of this front- group activity was to maintain the campaign’s momentum and to draw noncommunists into the campaign, particularly in Western Europe. What had begun as a Soviet effort now appeared to many as a general public reaction to the a a horrors of the neutron bomb,” said McMahon.

By far the most important comments, said McMahon, appeared in the noncommunist press in the political center

RON AT gf DNAU January 198}

While it is difficult to assess the full impact of the antr neutron-bomb campaign, the Carter Administration in April

daferred production of the enhanced-radiation ele ment of tha warheads indefinitely while proceeding with modifications to the warheads themselves to make them compatible with ER components. In commenting on the re- sults of the Soviat bloc campaign, the CIA testimony quoted the chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Berecz, as saying, “The political campaign against the neutron Dombd was oneot thamos Sig- nificant and most successful since Wor ar i). McMahon also noted that “the Soviet Ambassador to tha Hague

(Nethsriands) at that time was subsequently decorated by the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in recognition of the success of the Dutch Communist Party, under his direction, in organizing the high point of the anti-

With the neutron bomb temporarily defused, testified McMahon, the Sovist Bloc turned its efforts against the U.S.- initiated move to modernize the theater nuclear forces (TNF) by deploying the highly accurate grounddaunched cruise!

missile (GLCM) and the Pershing Ii missila. Scheduled for de- ployment in late 1983, they will, for the first time, place tar- gets on Soviet soi} within range of NATO ground-based mis- siles. The puroose of the modernization is to minimize the:

WEAPON YIELD(KT) |

PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE

200 (percent)

MORTALITY (percent)

SCALED GROUND RANGE (ft/KT"/3) an oO

40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120

—— SEVERE — — MODERATE

5 124680 aol 4102 103108 PEAK INCIDENT OVERPRESSURE (psi)

WEAPON YIELD (KT) Figure 14.3. Mortality Due to Lung Injury;

Figure 15.52. Vulnerability Curves for a Long Axis of Body Parallel to Direction of Horizontal Cylinder, Aspect Ratio R,/T = 10 Blast Wave.

‘Structure Category 15.3.18) Buried in Dry Sand. SOURCE: NORTHROP, EM-1, 1996

NPOTHBOPAQMAWHOHHBIE YRPbITHA

(NPOAOMKEHME)

HaceneHue np yrpo3se HanageHna NpOTHBHHKa MOET CBOKMM CHNAaMh CTPOHTb H3 NOAPYYHbIX maTep) poga yKpbiTna. :

Ulears BemnsuKa YkKPbITHO HS APONMEIx awnn YxpwiThe 43 Cam Npocrerwe yxpbirna Thna ulenh ¢ OAexKROR KpyTocreH ocnaGnsior Aedctane pagnaunn 6 100—200 pas, ymenbuaior paanyc NopamcHan OT YAADHOH BOnHEI Vv 1,5—2 pe

B pakonax ropHogo6bisaiowenh wu YrONbHOM NPOMbILNEHHOCTH NOA YKPbITHA MOTYT 6biTb UCNONL3OBAaHt BbIDaborkKu NO MOGpive CTPOMTENbHbIX MaTepHanoB, KaTaKOMObI, Newlepbi H Ap.

Tanepea (paapes): Menosnie paspaborkn Canauian naanaRarn | — axor: 2? — nenessnne Dama: 3—

MpotneopaahauHoHHbimMn — yK- PbITHAMH HasbiBatoT coopyxKe- Hus, ob6ecneuMBatoulKe 3auLnTy YKPbIBAaHOWMXCH B HKHX MOgeH OF 3aPAKEHHA PaQhOAaKTHBHLIMH Be- ULeCTBaMK WM OT O6nyYeHHA B 30- He PaAhOakTHBHOrO 3aparKeHHsA MECTHOCTH.

Noa npoTHBopaAhauHoHHbie yKpbitwa = Mmoryt G6biTb WHpoKO MCNONb3OBAaHbI npucnocobnex- Hble ANA 3ausHTb! NOABAaNbI, NOA- nonbs, norpe6a 4 gapyrne yr- ny6neHus. Kpome toro, yKpbiTHs MOryT BOSBOAKTbCA C KCNONb30- BaHwem necomatTepuana, Kupnh- 4a, 6eTOHHbIx Kw mwKEeNe306eTOH- HbIX JnemeHTOB. B cenbckKOH Me- CTHOCTH YKPbITHA CTPOAT H3 NOD-

Py4HbIx MaTepkanos (Kpyrnbin nec, %#*epAn, xXBOpocT, Kambiw h aAp.).

Ykpbirne Gezepy6ourom KoucTpyKuHk Ha 40 yenoBeK

_ -

MPOTHBOPAAWAUMOHHBIE YRPbITHA

MPUCMOCOBNEHHbIE NOD YHPbITMA XOSAMCTBEHHbIE COOPYMEHMA

Npucnoco6nexne NOANONA NOA yKpbitne: Orpenbro cTos | —croaxe younexna cepexpoima; 2—rpyHToras aacein nog YKpbiTne: <a) 3— BeKTHNAHONMEIA KOpOS; 4— AONOMwHTeMLNAS KpLw- 7 faemecte epmer Ke mOKe

Nognan KamexHoro foma, npucnocoGnernbis non

yxpbiTHer

1 —o6cuinxa rpyHtom; 2—seiraxHom Kopo6; 3— repme-

THaMpomenneis mox; 4—yrnyGnenHem NpHamoK (wrenom) 20 cm; 3-

SEpcrHe any NDKTOKA |

CTPOUTENbSCTBO YKPbITHM M3 NECOMATEPMANA VK KKENESOBETOHHbIX SJIEMEHTOB

Meneso6erc CTPOMTENbCTBe }

Monta yKpbITHa Ha Menes0beroONnbIx anemeHTOB

Jen eel nen nen awauus ase MAT

TIPH BLIDOPe MECTA ANF CTPOKTENBCTBD YKPwITHH HYMKHO Y4HTbIBATH BNKAHKHE PENbeqa Mh OCAAKOB Ha XapakTEp PagnUaninsnoly sapamennn mexres sr:

Table 15.17. Command Post and P:

Interactivecp “Vulnerability Levels for Peak Over

ELECTRONIC VERSION 3 NOVEMBER 6, 2002

PERCENT PROBABILITY LEVEL OF DAMAGE LIGHT MOD

Table 15.18. Hardened Frame/Fab1 Vulnerability Levels for Peak Over

PERCENT PROBABILITY LEVEL OF DAMAGE LIGHT MOI

A product of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

stribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their The document on this CD-ROM is readable with Adobe Acrobat pntractors; Critical Technology, September 1996. Other requests Version 4.0 and higher. it is best operated on a PC platform using ir this document shall be referred to the Defense Threat Reduction Windows 95/98/2000/ME/NT.

hency, 8725 John J Kingman Rd, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6021 The equations can be accessed using Mathcad professional

larning-This document contains technical data whose export is information about this product is available at stricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Section <http://www.mathsoft.com/>. The downloadable Mathcad 8 engine 51 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended is no longer offered by MathSoft. Use of this software does not

ABOVE: Northrop's Effects Manual 1 (EM1), Tables 15.17 and 15.18 show that simple earth covered expedient shelters have a 50% probability of collapsing at 60 psi peak overpressure, which occurs at just 0.8 mile from a 1 megaton surface burst, but Figure 15.52 (linked here) shows that a simple reinforced concrete tube use as a shelter (concrete stress strength = 4500 psi, with a thickness equal to 10% of the inner radius of the tube) buried under 6 feet of dry or wet soil (note that the curves for wet soil in Figure 15.55 are similar for severe damage at 1 megaton to dry soil in Figure 15.52) has a 50% probability of collapse at 0.3 mile from a 1 megaton surface burst. (The eight deep personnel shelters under London at are much greater depths than 6 feet.) According to Table 6.12 in the 1957 edition of Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Britain's 1939-designed World War Two standard issue corrugated steel arch outdoor Anderson shelters if enlarged to 20-25 feet span (which increases vulnerability, since smaller arches have a smaller exposed area and so receive lower blast loading) and using 10 gage steel with 3 feet earth cover (over the crown), will half

collapse (i.e. collapse the side facing ground zero) at 30-35 psi peak overpressure, and will completely collapse at 35-40 psi peak

overpressure, based on the 1955 Teapot nuclear test series in Nevada. However, following careful nuclear tests on such shelters during the 1957 Plumbbob series in the Nevada and the 1958 Hardtack series in the Pacific, the "earth arching" protective effect of soil cover was discovered and better understood, so that Glasstone's revised 1962 edition of Effects of Nuclear Weapons stated in Table 4.45 (which is reprinted unaltered as Table 5.160 in the 1977 final edition of Effects of Nuclear Weapons) that such shelters with 5 ft earth cover require 45-60 psi peak overpressure for collapse. This revised table also shows that a reinforced concrete arch 8 inches thick with a span of 16 feet and 4 feet of earth cover will require 220-280 psi peak overpressure for collapse. The earth arching and earth shielding effect is the simple, nuclear bomb-tested survival principle behind Cresson Kearny's 1979 Oak Ridge National Laboratory manual, Nuclear War Survival Skills, and the UK government's 1982 Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance 2nd edition (extracts linked here with additional detailed relevant nuclear test data, see illustrations below for the 1982 version of the earth covered 1939 WW2 Anderson shelter - based on data from American and British nuclear tests, from the 1952 Monte Bello Operation Hurricane shot

onwards).

Fig. 86 Construction and installation drawings 1982 Anderson Ss elter

for outdoor kit shelter design. ain Inver ‘

(Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical a

Guidance CoRRUGATED Sections y ge) DooR SURROUND aN =e | ) | |

AIR EXHAUST HoL&e wiTyH EXCESS PRESSURE 4 EXHAUST VALVE

DooR;:

xe DETAIL 5 ras

Sa

ANS

4 is DeTe CAA

we 3 RIGIDIZED FRoNT Paver : RiGipDizeD PANELS tates Ticich 4* For GALVANISE : eee Ev vTRANCE Canory STAINLESS OisHED END J

OUTER, DOOR, IMPoRTANT — SHELTER SHOULD STAND

: LE es

Es ie 2 See Za

Fig. 92 loco mm. Minimum Earth Cover

UK Government Stiffen Surface with: Rockery or C

1982 Anderson Stones or ¢ Concrete Slab !Somm. thick with Polythene or Cloth layer. One layer of mesh BS. ref A142 | . I50 mm. Crushable material

placed centrally ae Earth Backfill , firmly Line of Excan ¢ ; a

Undisturbed

= Original C

(Domestic Shelters -’ Guidance)

UNIGDN GT

20 mm. Plywood Base el Line of Basic Shelter

‘Proofex N° 12' or similar material 'Expandite Proofex N?12.' or simil applied to bottom of plywood and appli¢d fo the entire exterior of 4

turned up to lap with shelter.

cri at ROATTOM )

Table 8.10. Height of Burst and Yie

HANDBOOK Generic Device Types. OF pee PY PES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGNS EM

SION 3

"=" NUCLEAR WEAPON ==

Device Type Enhanced Radiation (ER) (13) Low Yield 75 50 -1 High Yield 200 00 Thermonuclear (8) Boosted Fission (5)

istribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their bntractors; Critical Technology, September 1996. Other requests

ir this document shall be referred to the Defense Threat Reduction ency, 8725 John J Kingman Rd _. Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6071

larning-This document contains technical data whose export is stricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title U.S.C., Section 51 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979. as amended

ELECTRONIC VERSION 3 NOVEMBER 6, 2002

The document on this CD-ROM is readable with Adobe Acrobat Version 4.0 and higher. it is best operated on a PC platform using Windows 95/98/2000/ME/NT

The equations can be accessed using Mathcad professional r S product is available

information about <http://www_maths

ynger offered t

DOSE RATE (rads[SiJ/sec) oO

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ~... AGAINST 253 : - —e SATELLITES Mh, nevrmonson

w . NEUTRONS Oh

103

Z

10-2 10°

TIME (msec)

Figure 22.3. Neutron-Induced Dose Rate Versus Detonation at 100 km HOB on a Satellite Locate (Burst Range, 300 km).

Table 14.1. Combat Ineffectiveness for Person OF suumeg 1 wO-Man Foxhole (2 x 6 x 4.5 feet) Side-On to

VERSION 3

> NUCLEAR WEAPON NOVEMBER 6, 2002

HANDBOOK

WEAPON YIEI

COMBAT INEFFECTIVENESS 0-01 0.1 1 1

(%) PEAK INCIDENT OVERF

istribution authorized to US. Government agencies and their The document on this CO-ROM is readable with Adobe Acrobat r a

ABOVE: the report on the radiation shielding by simple, quick, and cheap US Civil War, WWI and WWII-style trench shelters exposed at the UK Hurricane nuclear test in 1952 was classified Secret, although it states in paragraph 13.1.1: "The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most important results of the trial." This cover-up even after the data is declassified ensures that in a nuclear attack, many people kill be needlessly killed. Thugs believe this will help disarmament propaganda or other propaganda rubbish that totally failed when tried out prior to WWII. Despite this hard-won data being recognised for its importance for civil defence, this data was never published in any UK civil defence manual, handbook or advertisement, and is still covered up, like the rest of the taxpayer funded nuclear test research. When you combine such simple shelters for essential key workers in target areas with crisis evacuation (or "relocation" if "evacuation" is too invocative of September 1939) for the remainder of a city, you achieve a credible war survival strategy that undermines strategic nuclear deterrence. (An enemy can still bomb an evacuated, sheltered city to cause building damage and contamination, but historically this just backfires, increasing the morale and determination of the opponent to fight back.) America for long used secret data from the 1945 combat attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as its primary data source, classifying the detailed 6-volume Strategic Bombing Survey reports from nuclear use in Japan Secret, and never publishing them or releasing them on the internet (it did not want Russia to have the information), and it did not need to expose a house to a nuclear blast wave until 1951 at Operation Greenhouse. This backfired due to the direct information Russia obtained from its own nuclear tests. (Similarly, Britain obtained independent data debunking American anti-civil defence propaganda lies on survival in flattened houses, which it used to the horror of Russian biased arms

control and disarmament folk; the CND style liars simply claimed falsely that faked style American "data" somehow was more

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2 SECRET—GUARD ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR

NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP)

AWRE-T1/54, 27 Aug. 1954 13. THE PENETRATION OF THE GAMMA FLASH

SECRET—GUARD 13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Trenches ATOMIC" WEAEONS RESEARCH ESTARLES me 13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenc ormerky st: Minietey: oh Sappty) provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From oint of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the m SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE = rtant results:of the trial.

(Monte Bello Islands, Australia—October, 1952) 13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6ft. by 2ft. in plan and 6ft. deep w

id F 6 ‘ 3 —_ ae + pix -|. ex p.S.1. placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft.

radius and 6ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.

The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and qua: fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distar with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection affor: by open and covered trenches.

In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target ve: but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 < one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 11 inches of sand.

‘ = apes et Fig. 12.1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship shown in the photo, moored 400 yards off shore.

TABLE 13.1 ose Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench tes Type of trench ean ts Distance (yards)

Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right: Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 2760 ft. Surface ye ) 12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shelters

Depth below ground

At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3.

At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of

level (inches) 6

the explosion owing to intervening sandhills. Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.

reliable than proof tested British data, whose origin was classified secret due to the Marxist infiltrated British bureaucacy which behaved basically as more subtle, even more effective Russian military propaganda front than the better known Cambridge Spy Ring; this thuggery on nuclear weapons capabilities in the UK media continues to this day via Corbyn et al., who are "respected"

on nuclear lies by all UK leading "civil defence historians", "cold war historians" and related propagandarists who know nothing

about the nuclear effects secrecy problem.) Recent official publications by the designers themselves of the latest Russian thermonuclear

warhead designs, shows equally high quality research, contrary to popular misconceptions.

Oe RE 4

LA-11401 January 2, 1991

UNCLASSIFIED

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE: 1945-1985 (U)

Raymond Pollock *The move away from simple urban t

May hi a study headed by Air Force | H. R. Harmon reported that

ene even if = weapons detonated on tar-

getj the Soviet leadership would not be crit- take selected areas of Western Europe and of the Middle East and Far Fast would |not| be seriously impaired,

capacity would not be sufficiently reduced lo prevent recovery. The resulting reassess-

ment of targeting requirements led to a substantial increase in nuclear production.

geting to a more elaborate military t geting doctrine designed to meet speci military objectives was to a large deg

| made possible by the increasing availat “ity of nuclear weapons. and this move,

lurn, stimulated the need for new weapor ror tne European retardation m

sion. which needed to deal with sor

what transitory targets, the relatively lig! weight BS tactical bomb entered stockp in 1952. This was followed in shor ¢ der by a series of new tactical weapo!

LA-11401 says that STRATEGIC DETERRENCE using all 133 American nuclear weapons in th: stockpile in May 1949 (in Harmon's USAF study anyway, the actual number is a fantasy bec Los Alamos had bits and pieces of nuclear weapons, many missing "pits" or H.E. lenses) wa

ABOVE: Secret nuclear weapons stockpile history showing that in May 1949 (the month the Berlin Blockade ended), that the USAF knew using Hiroshima and Nagasaki capabilities of nuclear weapons data that 133 nuclear weapons USED STRATEGICALLY would not win a

war against a nuclear unarmed opponent! Hence the increase in American interest in TACTICAL nuclear weapons. Teller wanted the H- bomb because he knew toss all about the effects of nuclear weapons, and didn't want to know the facts, as proved by Dr Frank H. Shelton in Reflections of a nuclear weaponeer which first exposed the crater size lies in Glasstone's book. Teller lies about the firestorm in Hiroshima in his 1962 Legacy of Hiroshima book, which says the exact opposite to the secret 3 volume US Strategic Bombing Survey report (volume 2 of which is specifically about the firestorm, which was set off not by thermal radiation but by blast overturning thousands of charcoal braziers being used to cook breakfast, and the breakfast-timing was also the reason why no air raid alarm was sent

out, according to Yoshi Oka, the Hiroshima air raid sirens operator who survived near ground zero).

ABOVE: Polish Harvard Professor Richard Pipes, who had no love for either the Nazis or the pseudo-Communist nuclear thugs who seized his homeland, famously debunked the bigoted pseudo-pacifists in charge of promoting the 1930s style US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency appeasement/peace deal lies about nuclear war annihilation in his July 1977 Commentary paper, without getting into classified data on nuclear warhead designs or Russian nuclear tests on house and shelter survivability: "When he was age 16, Pipes laid eyes upon Adolf Hitler at Marszatkowska Street in Warsaw when Hitler made a victory tour after the Invasion of Poland. The Pipes family fled occupied Poland in October 1939 and arrived in the United States in July 1940, after seven months passing through Italy. Pipes became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1943 while serving in the United States Army Air Corps.

He was educated at Muskingum College, Cornell University, and Harvard University."

July 1977 Commentary, pp

21-34:

Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War

Richard Pipes

3. The threat of a second strike, which under- pins the mutual-deterrence doctrine, may prove in- effectual. The side that has suffered the destruc- tion of the bulk of its nuclear forces in a surprise first strike may find that it has so little of a deter- rent left and the enemy so much, that the cost of striking back in retaliation would be exposing its own Cities to total destruction by the enemy’s third strike. The result could be a paralysis of will, and capitulation instead of a second strike.

Since the mid-1960’s, the proposition that ther- monuclear war would be suicidal for both parties has been used by the Russians largely as a commod- ity for export. Its chief proponents include staff members of the Moscow Institute of the USA and Canada, and Soviet participants at Pugwash, Dart- mouth, and similar international conferences, who are assigned the task of strengthening the hand of anti-military intellectual circles in the West. Inside the Soviet Union, such talk is generally denounced

mm 66h. .___

Commentary

Malenkov’s unorthodox views on tainly contributed to his downfall: dismissal in February 1955 as part companied by a barrage of press d the notion that war had become ur are strong indications that Malenk Khrushchey, capitalized on the di military to form with it an alliay help he eventually rode to power. military counterattack seems to ha the World War II hero, Marshal whom Khrushchev made his Mini

Such figures are beyond the cor most Americans. But clearly a cov 1914 has lost, as a result of two wo: war, famine, and various “purges,” 60 million citizens, must define damage” differently from the Unit has known no famines or purg deaths from all the wars waged sin mated at 650,000—fewer casualti suffered in the 900-day siege of World War II alone. Such a count assess the rewards of defense |

«Te cat S &- meee

s > LOEFILIS. 45 bDoOUTEg,eoIs pacinsm. «* TEeallStic tc

Experts refute CIA - Soviet civil defense

By Vicki Fatz |

NEWS WORLO WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON—Two experts on Soviet civil defense capabilities dis- agreed sharply yesterday with state- ments released Friday indicating that the CIA does not place great signifi- cance on the massive Soviet prepara- tions... ae a Dr. Eugenge Wigner, Nobel prize- winning physicist, and retired Gen. George Keegan, former chief of Air Force intelligence, both disagreed with Adm. Stansfield Tumer, the director of the Central Intelligence«Agency. In.

PENTAGON WARNS ON SO

|

‘ “T don’t know what the Soviets plan | to initiate,’ Wigner said, “‘but the impression one gets is that they cons- tantly claim that to destroy capitalist countries is all right, but to destroy socialism is a terrible crime.’”

Wigner referred to estimates made by himself and others that only bet- ween 2 percent and 5 percent of the Soviet Union’s population would be vulnerable to a U.S. nuclear attack, while 45 percent of the U.S. population, could be hit. oo 4 4

- In another telephone interview Gen. | Keegan said there was not the

By Henry S, Bradsher Washington Scar Staff Writer

The former head of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency says the Soviet Union might “alter the strate- gic military relationship” with the United States by military efforts that include a large civil defense pro- gram.

Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, who has since retired, told a congres- sional committee: that the change could put the United States at a disadvantage by the mid-1980s.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner told the committee the Soviets do not presently “possess a civil defense capability that would enable them to feel that they could with reasonable expectation absorb a retaliatory strike at levels of damage that would be acceptable to them.”

But, Turner added, “the Soviet Union is making more progress and effort in civil defense today than is the United /St zi While Wilson's concern was withthe future, Turner

dealt reassuringly only with the cur- rent situation.

NEITHER OFFICIAL'S testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, given secretly-last June and made public in edited form today, dealt with Soviet efforts to develop an anti- ballistic missile (ABM) defense sys- tem as part of the overall program that includes civil defense. Wilson noted, however, that civil defense was related to “various offensive and defensive measures,””

A secret néw Pentagon study has

VIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Stirred increasing ter administratior cess in developing for a workable AB a system were de tion of a Soviet-An could protect the’: some-warheads I< retaliatory attack. With ABM cove system, by itself i meaningful prote unimpeded missile

m, i &

Moy e

that Moscow had agreed to discu I ; ss the possibility /€ LE of an agreement to curtail civil defense work md to ane part of disarmament efforts, But the Soviets have tt: a ia ie, to get the talks going, and the Pl! 1 C1

nin ion has not yet decided - C8 e gotiating position. y on its own ne — a8 ot National] Security Council is nearing com- Ha pletion of work ona presidential review memoran- we a

dum on civil defense, using material from the

ing whether this countr needs a modern progr he : am, Officials have described Carter as hoping to talk the Soviets out of their prdgram sn ac th seatt he

warning that Russian civil defense risks WWIII.

Wn aoe ee

TocyaapcTBeHHast KOpMopallMsa 10 aTOMHON SHeprHn «PocaToM»

ATOMHbIii MpoekT CCCP

JlOKyMeHTBI MW MaTepHasibl

Tlod o6weu pedaxyuuett JI. Pabeea

Tom III Bogxopoanasa 60m0a 1945—1956

Kuura 2

CoctaBuTen: L.A. Touuapoe (ors. coctaputetb), [7./7. Maxcumenxo

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Ne 56

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Zeldovich & Sakharov 4 aepe 1954! 14 Jan 1954, Secret

(Oco6oli BaxHocTH) Tosapuiny Xapurony 10.5.

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coa Proposed by V.A. Davidenkc

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128

No Orser A.J]. Caxapora u JI.A. Dpan

A.D. Sakharov and I Frank-Kamenetsky, Compression", 9 De

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torte fission

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BELUCCTBE MepMORdEpHDI B3PbIE C BLICOKH (..) Density compres:

possibkeossrenpusie KO II]. Oxnazaemple xar

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No 183

TipenposoanteabHas 3anucka E.II, Caasckoro 8 [Ipesnanym LIK KITCC ¢ NpeacTaBjeHHem CoobmeHHA NO pesyabTaTaM MCnbITaHHA w3aenua PJLC-37 Secret 24 Nov. 1955 report by E. P. 94 sos6ps 1955 r. Slavsky to the Presidium of the CCCP Coe. cexpemuo on results of 1.6Mt RDS-37 test (OcoGolt saxsioctu) B Ipesuauym LK KIICC Mpeactasinw nogxpo6uoe coobwenHe T. 3aBeHArHHa M Apyrux No pesybTaTaM McnbiTaHHs M3geIKa PLC-37, noayyeHHoe 23 Hox6pa 1955 roga.

Ipraoxenne: pykonucubiit Marepvan M6. cr-119lom Ha 4 aucTax. n/n E. Caapexnit

24 Hon6pa 1955 r. wex. cT-1398/

Bepuo:! [Npunoxenue] B Npesnguym LK KNCC

22 HonBpa 1955 6. 8 9 yacos 47 MuKyT No MeCTHOMy BpeMeHH Ha Monroe Ne 2 Muxucrep- ctga oboponb! CCCP npowssegeHo McnbiTanve SKCNEPHMEHTaNbHO BOROpOgHOK Gombb! HOBOR koHeTpyKuvn — PIC-37,

Ucnbitaive npowseoaunoce nytem chpaceisaua Gombbl c camonerta Ty-16 c ebicote! 12 tric. meTpoe,

Bom6a cpacbisanace ¢ NapalwioTOM, 4TO AaN0 BOIMOKHOCTe YBENMYNT BpeMA ee NapeHus c 55 go 71 cekyHast u yaTu camonety Ha GesonacKoe pacctorHue.

B aekb vcnbitaxué 6biIna OfnayHan noroga; BbicoTa HwKHe Kpomkw OGnaxos Gbina Gonee AByx KMNOMeTpOB.

USSR Council of Ministers on RDS27 PRB TEES

Bapbip npousowen Ka BbIcoTe 1550 meTpoa, u Gnarogapr STOMY CrHeHHbI Wap Xopowo HaOnioganca, noka He noqKANce 3a OGnaKa.

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On 22 Nov. 1955 at 9.47am an RDS-37 was dropped by a Tu-16 flying at 12km altitude.

Parachute delivery gave time for the plane to escape to a safe distance before detonation.

Detonation occurred at 1.55km altitude. Severe damage occurred out to 5 km for planes, 2 km for tanks and 3 km for field artillery.

No 190

Tlocranossenne CM CCCP Ne 46-31cc © pesyabTaTax McnbITaHHA H3IeTHH PJIC-27 n PILC-37, CepHiiHom mpousBorcTBe H3fenHA Pi[C-27, paspadoTke H W3FOTOBICHHH H31eAKii Ha NpHHMNe aTOMHOTO OGxKATHS!

5 Jan. 1956

r. Mocksa, Kpemab panna 1

ocmu

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Coset Munuctpos CCCP NOCTAHOBJIAET:

1, O6s3aTb MuHuCTepeTBO CpeqHerO MallIMHOCTpOeCHHA:

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Orders: 10 bombs of 1.7-1.9Mt yield and 10 bombs of 0.5 Mt yield stockpiled for 1956. 6) opraHu3oBaTb B 1956 r. cepuitHoe u3roToBIcHHe u3genMi PC-27, Order: manufacture (serial production) RDS27 B) pa3pa6oTaTb M H3TOTOBMTb H31e1Me Ha NpHHuMNe AO MoutHocThO 20—30 MAH T

Becom 20-26 T M nogrorosvTs ucnibrtaHve ero B JJ] KB. 1956 r. Ha Hogoti Jemae c camoneta M-4 c mpHMeHeHHeM napauioma;

Order: make a 20-30 Mt bomb with a mass of 20-26 tons for air drop testing on Novaya Zemlya using an M-4 aircraft and a parachute.

ABOVE: in 2009, the Russians declassified and published a book containing some original reports on the design and testing of two-stage

nuclear weapons from 1954-1956, including 1956 designs for 150 and 1000 megaton bombs using either natural lithium deuteride (7.42%

lithium-6 abundance) or enriched lithium-6 deuteride (the enriched 150 megaton bomb has 100 tons i.e. 1.5 Mt/ton yield to mass ratio, but

the unenriched one has 500 tons mass, i.e. 0.3 Mt/ton ratio). However, for that year they ordered production of just ten 1.8 megaton yield

bombs and another ten 0.5 megaton bombs. They also ordered a 20-30 megaton bomb with a yield of 20-26 tons (i.e. a yield-to-mass ratio

of around | Mt/ton) for air burst testing. The 14 January 1954 original design paper by Sakharov and Zeldovich attributes the two-stage

Ne 192

Sanucka A.J. Caxaposa, 4.5. 3enb H.H. Tasnosy ¢ ovenkoii ni MoUHOCTbIO B 150 MeraTOHH H Of

2 Feb. 1956 report by Ya. B. Zeldovich and ‘ Davidenko to N.I. Pav Mt and 1,000 Mt proc Option 1: Coo6ulaem OllcHKy NapaMeTpoB M3HeqHsA 150Mt device using fr ipu

Tosapuiuy Ilaeaoe

Visieane c detimepudom aumus (...)%[-€ 6bITh CileMaHO B CHemyoulMx raGbapuTax:

1) unametp ~ 4 Metpa,

2) anna — 8—J0 mMetpon,

3) o6uHii Bec — oxono /00 TOHH.

Option 2 (natural // sap

Viaieane ¢ YMeHBILICHHBIM PacXOMOM tu aumua MOXeT ObIT CAeIaHO B rabapuTax:

1) aHameTp — 6-7 MeTpop,

2) simHa — 18-20 metpon,

3) o6unii Bec — oKONO S00 TOHH.

Vayenve MOULHOCTBIO B OduH MiwLIUap 110 MO60OMY 13 STHX JBYX BaPH@HTOB IIpH YI HOO ypaxa B 6-7 pa3, a BECOB JeAAUIMXCH N

Natural LiD fuelled 150M diameter, 18-20 m long, ; To increase the total yiel: Mt in either option 1 or o Li-6 D or natural LiD con simply increase the LiD : charge by factor of 6-7, a times

Comparison of U238(n,2n)U237 Page 326:

production by 14.1 MeV neutrons Ta 4yyq OMHOCUMEABHDIX 6bIX0006 " in 1953 Russian and 1954 USA tests

Jlata B3pbIBa RDS-6 (Russian) Castle-Bravo Castle-Romeo Castle-Yankee Msoroner | sett S4r. | 26lll s4r. | 4V 547. | 12.VIIS3r.

NOTE: Zr-95 abundances are indicative of unfractionated fission products, since it is well kn: American work that Zr-95 doesn't fractionate significantly, relative to U-237 in these Russian

idea to Davidenko, but it proposes using a boron filling to convert all of the x-rays from the fission primary into a shock wave to compress the fusion stage. Later, on 9 December 1954, another paper by Sakharov and Frank-Kamenetsky works out the details of a specific design: a 15 ton bomb yielding 7.5 megatons which produces a 10 fold compression of the density of the low density fusion fuel inside a spherical, dense (uranium) pusher-tamper. This was a pathetic 0.5 megaton/ton yield-to-mass ratio. It was only through the efforts of Yuri Trutnev (see quotations from him, later below in this blog posting) that the efficiency of the design was massively improved, firstly by changing the boron case filling into a spherical layer surrounding the fusion fuel to absorb case-channelled x-rays and convert them into an inward shock wave to compress the fusion fuel only (not a shock wave from a general case filling that will act in all directions, and blast

the bomb apart rapidly).

In their Livermore paper UCRL-74116 (PDF linked here on the IAEA server and here on the US Government's OSTI server), Nuckolls, Wood, Thiessen, and Zimmerman explain: "... the optimum pulse shape is determined by considerations of entropy and Fermi- degeneracy, hydrodynamics and Raylelgh-Taylor instability, and thermonuclear ignition and self-heating. The required implosion symmetry is achieved by irradiating ... from all sides ... as well as by electron transport in the atmosphere ablated from the pellet. Taylor instability is suppressed by sufficiently rapid imploclon as well as by generating the implosion pressure by subsonic ablation driven by diffusive electron transport. ... These hot electrons transport throughout the atmosphere heating electrons (via electron-electron collisions)

to temperatures which increase from one to 10 Kev. The pellet surface is heated and ablated by the hot atmosphere, generating pressures

which optimally increase from 10° to 10!! atmospheres." This paper adds that "hundreds of implosion/burn computer calculations" were

used to identify the optimal Lagrangian implosion pressure-time history equation, and then that equation was used to identify the optimum

input x-ray energy pulse shape needed to achieve the optimal Lagrangian for the most efficient thermonuclear fusion. The rate of supply of X-rays from the fission primary stage (or laser in clean burns) is then controlled by the design of the latter and by plastic foam baffles which deliver the X-rays to the fusion capsule. (There is a discussion in Livermore's UCRL-LR-105821-97-1 (pp. 22 et seq.) of low density foam shells such as aerogels for fusion capsules.) Another Livermore report, UCRL-80164, on Exploding Pusher Performance by Rosen and Nuckolls explains that denser pushers work by exploding, with half the mass of the pusher explosing outwards and the remainder imploding inwards and compressing the capsule: "The imploding half of the shell acts as a piston, driving a shock through the DT that principally heats the ions. ... Whereas the high-compression, isentropic implosion targets are sensitive to electron preheat and to Rayleigh-Taylor instability, exploding pushers, by virtue of their rapid thermal wave early heating and by their non-ablative implosion dynamics, are not sensitive to the aforementioned problems." (This paper cites Nuckolls' Secret-Restricted Data UCRL-50000 71-5, 1971,

as reference 1.)

On the subject of x-rays and plastic foam: Glasstone and Dolan's 1977 Effects of Nuclear Weapons, paragraph 7.79 on pages 307-8 states that for a typical nuclear explosion reaching 10,000,000 K temperature, i.e. very soft 4.3 keV predominant x-ray energy (considerably lower energy than medical x-rays which are often well over 50 keV), the mean free path in sea level air is only 15 cm, so that 90% are absorbed within I foot of sea level air. Clearly, therefore, sea level air will stop these x-rays from ablating surfaces of a secondary stage more than a foot or two from the primary stage. Howard Morland, Richard Rhodes and Chuck Hansen don't mention this problem for the 1952 Mike design. Was there a vacuum pump to clear the "radiation channel" of the sea-level air that will stop or seriously attenuate virtually all the x-rays? Or is the presence of air in the radiation channel used to diffuse the x-rays in all directions to a uniform concentration, allowing isotropic (similar from all directions) ablation of the secondary? Howard Morland, Richard Rhodes, and a British AWE Aldermaston paper in Nature on the "Science of Nuclear Warheads" (linked and quoted later, below) all refer to polystyrene in nuclear weapons, a plastic with approximately the density of water, i.e. over 700 times denser than air, thus cutting the mean free path of 4.3 keV x-rays to just 0.2mm! So any significant thickness (over Imm for example) of polystyrene will completely absorb the soft x-rays from a primary stage heating the surface of the polystyrene, although re-radiation can occur from the heated surface, which behaves like a diffuse or Lambertian reflector, i.e. Teller's "radiation mirror" in the title of his and Ulam's famouse 1951 report, On

Heterocatalytic Detonations I: Hydrodynamic Lenses and Radiation Mirrors.

If you fill the entire radiation case with polystyrene, however, you get a partition of energy between the kinetic energy of the colliding carbon and hydrogen ions and electrons (plasma) from the heated polystyrene, and x-ray energy which is being produced and absorbed by that ionized plasma. The percentage distribution of energy partitioned between matter and x-ray radiation is a sensitive function of the temperature; the energy in matter being directly proportional to the temperature, while the energy in x-rays is proportional to the fourth- power of temperature (see for instance: H. L. Brode, Annual Review of Nuclear Science, v18, 1968, pages 153-202). For "cold" I keV x- rays (2,300,000 K) a large percentage of the energy is in the material plasma, but for "hot" 10 keV x-rays (23,000,000 K), most of the energy is in x-rays even within the plasma. The exact x-ray temperature emerging from the primary stage is a function of the shielding of that stage by hydrocarbon plasma from the chemical implosive system used to compress the primary stage core, and the beryllium neutron reflector. If the primary stage is a 2-point implosion elongated or egg shape, much hotter (higher energy) x-rays will emerge from the

smaller-diameter sides which have less shielding than the long axis. For very low energy x-rays from older spherical primary stages,

lower density foams (Seabreeze and Fogbank have very low densities, closer that of air than polystyrene) are used to keep more of the

case filled energy in x-ray energy than in the material plasma (ions and electrons), than is the case for polystyrene.

Any such material filling the radiation channel will slow the transit of x-ray energy by diffusing it, which allows more time for neutrons from the primary to arrive and begin to fission (predetonate) any fissile material present in the secondary stage (this is not the case for a clean secondary stage, where those neutrons are actually needed to fission lithium to yield tritium, prior to implosion). Since force is the rate of change of momentum, F = dp/dt, it is undesirable to fill the radiation channel with anything, if you want to maximise the x-ray ablative recoil force on the secondary stage! But do you really want to maximise that impulsive force? Is maximum impulsive force the best way to achieve the greatest amount of secondary stage compression? It turns out, it simply isn't. This was discovered by Nuckolls in the late 1950s and proved in the very clean Ripple nuclear tests during Dominic in 1962. The maximum impulsive compression is given by using a vacuum radiation channel and using the approximately 10 ns width pulse of x-rays from the primary stage to ablate a dense metal

pusher on the surface of the secondary stage. But against this factor, you must consider:

(1) the problem of how to diffuse those x-rays uniformly all around the secondary stage (easy with a foam filling, even for a spherical shaped secondary stage), and

(2) the problem that maximising the ablative force as an abrupt, impulsive shock wave through a dense pusher increases entropy, heating the pusher, whereas a gentler, more nearly isentropic rate of delivery of energy keeps more of the applied energy in the compression of the secondary stage, rather than in heating the pusher. It actually makes no sense, Nuckolls discovered in 1961, to waste any of the limited amount of energy from the primary stage on heating up the secondary stage's pusher by using inefficient, entropy increasing shock

compression.

There is confusion possible here over Theodore Taylor's levitated primary stage analogy of swinging a hammer to hit a nail, rather than placing the hammer on the nail and pushing it gently. But this is an illusion caused by the threshold force needed to push a nail into wood: you would not use a hammer blow to push a tin-tack into a cork notice board to hold the corner of a poster to the wall! The hammer is needed for the nail in order to integrate muscle power for a second or so, into kinetic energy of the hammer. You don't have enough power in your arm to drive the nail in by simply pushing the nail into the wood. By analogy, the kilograms of chemical explosive in the primary stage lack the power to directly compress the metal shell to a maximum density, just as your arm can't directly (without the power- integrating mechanism of the swing of the hammer) push a nail into hard wood. In the primary stage, chemical explosives are assisted by having pit levitation, so that the chemical implosion can deliver power into the pusher for a period of time, to give it as much kinetic energy as possible before it hits the hard-to-compress core. Otherwise, the mismatch of acoustic impediance of the low density (carbon and hydrogen ion) explosion debris pushing at the metal pit causes the pit to reflect the energy back, rather than absorb it and be

compressed.

This is simply conservation of momentum: throw a thousand footballs at a wall with low energy, one after another, the footballs will bounce off, with minimal energy delivery to the wall and thus minimal compression or net motion of the wall. It's almost an elastic collision; the low density footballs bounce off the wall with almost the same kinetic energy as they struck it! But if you deliver the same

energy as a single iron cannon ball, collision is less elastic and more energy is coupled into the wall! This is more useful for pushing the

wall. This is not secret or highly sophisticated mathematical physics, but simply the kind of common sense we all have from experience in the real world. So with the larger amount of x-ray energy from the primary stage, the situation is not like trying to push a nail into hard wood (as for the smaller energy from 20 kg of TNT to compress a metal shell) or to knock a wall down using footballs, but is more like the tin-tack being pushed into cork. Provided that your x-ray ablator (say beryllium) is of relatively similar density to the lithium deuteride fusion fuel you are trying to compress, there is little acoustic mismatch and energy is then coupled efficiently rather than reflected. So you

are in the situation of being able to push a tin-tack into cork, rather than having to swing a hammer blow on a nail. If there is a dense

fissile "spark plug" in the centre of the fusion stage, it can be levitated to ensure it is delivered a hammer blow by a dense pusher shell.

2 Mt R-7 ICBM thermonuclear warhead, weighing 2.9 tons.

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ve RED RHE, ‘R-7 missile range ean lh only megaton range test at Se

h yield tests there were banned after it destroyed the local meat processing factory. Yuri A. Trutney (First Deputy Scientific Director

nipalatinsk because further

of RFNC-VNITEF) explains how a 500 kt yield limit was imposed on Semipalatinsk after the 1955 test of 1.6 megatons caused damage: "it was recommended to put into service a certain [double-primary] version of the product. And so, one of the products was delivered to the Semipalatinsk test site for testing, a product developed under the guidance of Evgeny Ivanovich Zababakhin. He claimed that the power of the explosion would be on the order of 0.5-0.6 megatons. I note that at that time there was a ban on carrying out explosions with a capacity of more than 0.5, because as a result of an explosion with a capacity of 1.5 megatons, the Semipalatinsk meat processing plant was destroyed. And here we are, no weather, nothing to do, I decided to read the reports. I took Zababakhin's report, I compare the calculations with ours, and I see: yes, there is not 0.5, not 0.9, all 1.5 megatons should work out there! I could be silent, but if 1.5 megatons will again “destroy” the meat processing plant? At one of the meetings, I reported this to the test leader. As Zababakhin fell on me: “This is a disgrace, this is not the case, this is ugly! You specifically say to remove our bomb from the tests. Honest people don't do that!" I suggested: "Let's see together." He did not look at anything, slammed the door and left. And it's good that they didn't try it! Because the next year in the north we blew up our version of the product and received about 0.6-0.8 megatons. On the occasion of our success, they poured me a glass of cognac: “For the victory!” It is noteworthy that it was February 23, 1958, the day of the Red Army. In the same year, 1958, we began to prepare the next session on the basis of the 49th project. There were attempts to delay the tests, and the ministry had no desire to test products of lower power. ... And they tried it, and everything worked out. This development subsequently became the most important basis for improving the thermonuclear arsenal of our country." In addition to moving to double-primary theormonuclear weapon design, they also finally conducted their first ever gaseous tritium and deuterium boosted plutonium pit primary stage test on 28 December 1957,

yielding an "amazing" 12 kt (below).

First tritium and deuterium gas —

boosted plutonium primary stage exe “amazing”™ 12 kt, (28 December 1957!

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Another way to compensate for anisotropic x-ray ablation an the far side of the secondary: elongate the shape of the secondary!

tte

detonation

How elongated fusion stages are compressed into spheres for maximum fusion efficiency by anisotropic x-ray delivery

RUSSIAN's >99% CLEAN NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN

Inspection hatch open in 1961 film

Parachute system

H-bomb Sphere of Li6 in lead H-bomb

Main fusion stage

Very clean long pipe device for peaceful uses (for insertion into narrow gas/oil boreholes)

ABOVE: how to uniformly compress a secondary fusion stage using x-rays without problems from the reduced x-ray intensity on the side of the secondary which is furthest from the primary stage (due to the "x-ray shadow" created by self-shielding on the secondary's far-side jrom the fission primary stage, by x-ray shielding due to the presence of the secondary stage itself). This problem has several possible solutions which are discussed in detail later in this post, including quotations from the actual Russian nuclear weapons designers articles and declassified reports. On April 10 and 16, 1957, Russia tested shaped new, improved two-stage thermonuclear designs, yielding 680 and 320 kt, respectively. The final R-7 warhead design, RDS-46A, was proof-tested on October 6, 1957, yielding 2.9 megatons. (Since elongated secondary aka thermonuclear stages become spheres when subjected to linear implosion from two primaries, or two two-stage thermonuclear devices as in the 50 megatons Tsar Bomba and lower yield cleaner devices, and since pear or egg shaped secondary stages become spheres when properly compressed by the anisotropic x-ray exposure from a single primary in devices without foam equalizers filling the case, we will generally depict secondaries as being spheres later in this post; even when they are elongated prior to compression.) It turns out that the first Russian two-stage device tested in late 1955 with 1.6 megatons yield (it was designed to give 1

megaton) had a secondary stage which was a sphere when compressed (it may however have been egg or pear shaped prior to

10. K. SEPHBIWEB Yu. K. CHERNYSHEV

KOHCTPYKTOP designer

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GRECHISHNIKOV -

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“9p ufo Vieg 76 umir P eqgopo AU't Sdorovich English trsnslation: Yes, creative, natural disputes in the new casi — enough. And the very "production" history of the "r PAL began, in fact, with a serious dispute-competition NOVELLA-essay founding fathers”. In the second half of the fift focus was shifted to the development of "“two- foan thermonuclear charges. And already on April 10 two thermonuclear “products” developed by NII physical principle of RDS-37 were successfully te year before that, Viadimir Fedorovich was awar of Candidate of Technical Sciences without protec 76 CAPOB 2002 SAROV 2002

compression, as shown above, in order to allow for the anisotropy of x-ray delivery to a spherically-compressed secondary stage when using a single primary, without the use of a foam filling to disperse x-rays to a uniform energy density throughout the case). The designer testimony (Yuri Trutney) states that the secondary stage used in 1955 had a /ow-density ablative material layer (e.g. beryllium metal, or

plastic foam) around it (not filling the entire radiation case, unlike Western designs with spherical secondary stages).

Yuri Trutnev: "J knew that when they explode, a lot of energy comes out in the form of x-rays. And I began to think about how to make it so that the thermonuclear charge is overlaid with a light substance - "coating", these can be chemical elements with a low number, having very good thermal conductivity, and with the help of X-ray radiation from the explosion of the primary atomic charge "coating" heat up. At the same time, its substance would evaporate outward, towards the radiation, and as a result, as during the movement of a rocket, a reactive impulse would be created, directed into the secondary charge and creating the pressure necessary for effective compression of the thermonuclear "fuel"." (The day after seeing that successful 1955 test, Yuri Trutnev told his colleague Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev another idea, the idea for using two primaries, one on each side of the secondary stage, which was assigned product number 49, weaponised by the deputy director of the lab, and air drop tested on February 23, 1958, becoming

the basis for today's cheap thermonuclar warheads made by Russia; all of this will be discussed later in detail in this blog post, since

.) This would have caused a far gentler (slower) compression of the secondary stage than when using a dense U238 or lead ablator, thus increasing what Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory weaponeer Nuckolls calls "approximately isentropic" (unchanged entropy) shock compression, which is more efficient since more of the compression energy remains in compressive mechanical work, rather than being turned into heat energy (you want the secondary stage to be as compressed as much as possible without wasting that energy as heat; heat is generated by fission in the compressed oralloy layer or the spark plug core of the secondary stage, or in clean secondary stages, in fusion of D+T gas in the core, following its extreme, isentropic compression, as used by Russia from 1965 for more efficient

thermonuclear weapons).

ABOVE: the Russian 1955 thermonuclear weapon with a low density ablator is similar to a system described for evaluation purposes in a declassified 2011 Jason report, Hydrodynamic and Nuclear Experiments (JSR-11-340, Secret-Restricted Data before deletions such as the deletion shown above) on pages 72-3 compares the shock compression versus the isentropic compression of beryllium coated plutonium

pits in nuclear weapons by different shapes of x-ray energy pulse. It notes on page 21: "The National Ignition Facility [NIF] utilizes laser

drive to compress samples using shock or quasi-isentropic compression [Emphasis added], potentially to in excess of 100 Mbar. Currently,

samples have been ramp compressed to 50 Mbar. It can also be used to explore high strain rates (up to 107 /s). It has not yet been qualified to handle Pu, but has provided important data on surrogates such as Ta." Shock compression is an abrupt hammer-blow produced by a fast-rising, brief pulse of x-ray energy, whereas the less abruptly rising pulse of isentropic compression is a reversible adiabatic pressure wave such as sound waves, which for high energy densities must be produced by a more gradually ramping, longer pulse of increasing energy density; this increases the proportion of the energy in kinetic energy of particles (dynamic pressure) rather than in internal energy (overpressure and heating). Pure isentropic compression would violate thermodynamic physics, but quasi-isentropic compression is possible. A simple analogy is hitting a door with a hammer blow, versus gently pushing a door closed. Hitting the door wastes some energy in sound waves, oscillations, and heating, causing a large, abrupt and wasteful rise in the entropy of the system, whereas a gentle push maximises the fraction of delivered energy which goes into kinetic energy of motion of the door causing it to pick up momentum efficiently and swing in the desired direction, minimising the energy wasted as sound, oscillations and heating. For a gas, isentropic flow

does not imply that temperature is constant, only that entropy is constant:

Ramp = isentropic. smn

DOE (b)(3)

E rg 9 E ° Qa 3 [=

10 Time (ns)

Figure 24: Left: the use of pulse shaping on NIF to produce either shock compression or ramp compression. DOE (b\(3)

DOE (b)(3)

initially shock compress Pu and then drive it isentropically in a way similar to the ———— SS

environment experienced by a Pu particle in an imploding primary. The concept is shown graphically in Figure 24. Of course, the actual design of the appropriate pulse shape requires careful measurements but the initial experience with the NIF laser is

encouraging. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that one can “program” a pulse of

a given shape and the laser produces the desired pulse with impressive repeatability.

Questions have arisen regarding the accuracy of the measurements that will be achieved, and the extent to which ramp compression will be possible. For example it may not be possible to maintain isentropic compression at very high pressures without suffering formation of a shock in the material. This will require further investigation. On the other hand, the recent work on diamond to 50 Mbar and Ta to 6 Mbar is encouraging. In Figure 25 we show results from explorations of the Ta EOS on several

—EE platforms. The results shown correspond to isentropic compression As can be seen the new NIf*data are in good agreement with previous data from the Omega laser and are also in agreement with data obtained on the Z pulsed power platform at SNL.

The results are the highest pressure off-Hugoniot data achieved to date.

——— Z-Data (Davis et al.. 2009) w= NIF (Eggert, 2011)

Stress (GPa)

20 25 30 Density (g/cc)

Figure 25: Measurements of the off-Hugoniot Ta EOS o forms.

No Pu experiments have yet been performed on NIF require work to ensure that the appropriate safety issues have been voiced that the type of Pu that could be inves material which typically is alloyed with Ga, has various differing isotopic compositions. In addition, it is likel} Pu samples on NIF also will not match that of weapons However, in our view this is not a compelling objection. T of fundamental measurements it is important to get a b

(both with and without Ga) as this high pressure data ———E—E——E EES

theoretical approaches to characterize the more comp! —————————E——aSSSSSD

Ultimately, of course, it will be be necessary to investigat

srade material and these issues will have to be addresse o

We next discuss the possible use of laser platforms | at high pressure. Remington et al [54] have develope investigate various strength models. The basic idea is is aimed at a gold hohlraum which then produces X

impactor which becomes a plasma after absorption of the

a

Change in entropy,

AS = nC, In(T/T,) + nRin(V/V,

Hence, for isentropic compression (no change ; entropy): 0: | “Hammer”

AS =0

Therefore: C,ln(T/T,) = —RIn(V/V,

ABOVE:We can get rid of the natural logarithms in this isentropic solution, C,/n (T/Tg) =-R In (V/V 9), by raising both sides to

become powers of the base, e, thus: 7/Tg = (V/V) exp(-R/C,) = (V/V) exp(1 - gamma). Nuckolls et al provide the idealized equation for the x-ray delivery rate of energy required for isentropic compression of the secondary (fusion) stage in nuclear explosives, in a

paper openly pubished in Nature, v239, p139, 1972 (extract is linked here): (1 - t)|:875 where the 1.875 is from 3 {gamma}/{gamma + 1} = 15/8, gamma being the ratio of the specific heat capacity at constant pressure to that at constant volume, for dense hydrogen with degenerate electrons (where gamma = 5/3), and t is time measured in units where | unit of time is the time taken for the shock wave to reach the centre of the secondary stage. You can't ever achieve this idealized isentropic energy rate, but you can do your best (any movement of the curve from an abrupt shock to a gentler rise increases the isentropic conpression contribution relative to shock compression, so it is not true that you need a "perfect" fit to the idealized isentropic pulse delivery curve, which approaches infinity in the asymptotic end limit anyway!), and Dr John Nuckolls successfully proof tested this "Ripple" concept with multimegaton 99% clean atmospheric nuclear tests during Operation Dominic in 1962, which will be discussed in detail later. The quasi-isentropic compression in the 1955 Russian thermonuclear test with a low-density x-ray ablator rather than the high-density ablators used by America, may account for the fact the yield was 60% greater than predicted (presumably the prediction ignored isentropic compression): 1.6 megatons measured, versus 1.0 megaton prediction. Since the Russians did not use tritium plus deuterium gas in the core of their secondary stage in 1955, the

contribution of isentropic compression was probably marginal, but the low-density ablator would have come into its own when Russia

placed deuterium plus tritium gas into the core of the fusion charge in their 27 October 1966 test, yielding 700 kt. Russian has always

prided itself on over-educating its population in advanced physics (poster below).

has explained ese AN PA KAGiS Cho als hathe USSR.and. the USAuMascaw .ob955i,

very clean megaton tests during 1962, authorised by Kennedy) and two others which states: "... a quantity of thermonuclear fuel is

embedded in low density, microcellular foam which serves as an electron conduction channel for symmetrical implosion of the fuel

we!)

Nuckolls explains the physics of spherical stage thermonuclear burn efficiency beautifully in his 1973 report UCRL-74345: "The rates of burn, energy deposition by charged reaction products, and electron-ion heating are proportional to the density, and the inertial confinement time is proportional to the radius. ... The burn efficiency is proportional to the product of the burn rate and the inertial confinement time ... Much higher pressures are required if the electrons in the high density DT are not Fermi-degenerate, i.e. if the implosion is not essentially isentropic. The pressures applied to implode the pellet must be uniform spatially and temporally to less than one part in twenty in order to preserve effective spherical symmetry. ... The hydrodynamlc Rayleigh-Taylor Instability must be controlled. Otherwise the pellet surface cannot be relatively gradually accelerated during the implosion as required by the optimum pulse shape." Nuckolls also states on page 15 that most of the energy supplied to the fusion capsule is lost in the ablation process (the hot blow off material has the velocity of sound for the heated surface temperature) so that only a coupling efficiency (i.e. the fraction of supplied x-ray energy that results in implosive compression of the secondary state) of 2-15% is available to compress the fuel; this coupling efficiency is given by the very simple equation: (1/2)v/C, where v ~ 10-300 km/s, is the fusion capsule implosion velocity, and C ~ 200-1000 km/s, is the velocity of sound for

the blown-off plasma.

ABOVE: the American problem with discarding the

There are still n onoan issues with the pap ceparapat {i wii TT iT iT nun 1962 isentropic breakthrough and instead using an

on the left: eg. a fissile spark cylinder (or U235 oko orallay pusher) can't he

made arbitrarily long without becoming critical

expensive highly-enriched U235 aka "oralloy" ablative

"pusher" (external spark plug around the fusion fuel

ina ‘acaasses seporate fissite 0225 oratty rings Capsule in the secondary stage of classic cylindrical

shaped American two-stage devices), to increase the yield-to-mass ratio for compact nuclear weapons like the B61 and its alleged smaller derivative the W80, is the critical mass of the oralloy pusher. You can't put a whole load of U235 concentrated in the bomb's secondary stage to give a huge yield, or it is critical (and you have a nuclear reactor, not a bomb!). One solution to this critical mass issue in secondary stages, particularly for cylindrical secondary stages, is for relatively small rings of oralloy to be separated by larger diameter neutron absorbing "washers" of, say uranium-238 or possibly lithium deuteride (above right; oralloy is colored blue, U238 washers are white), as suggested by the declassified nuclear weapons film, Developing and Producing the B-61 (see 10 minutes, 7 seconds into the video - screenshot below - where the B61's entire secondary stage assembly is seen undergoing "criticality studies of the nuclear assembly", and compared to 12 minutes 21 seconds where the partial assembly components of both pit and secondary stage are displayed). This film also shows an axial rod through the centre of the secondary stage and an x-ray baffle separator in the middle of the secondary stage, which we will ignore for the present. Teller's original "sausage" secondary concept was for a series of secondary stages connected like sausages, x-ray irradiated and imploded one at a time, with baffles separating them, because if there was just one very long cylinder, the axial fissile spark in will be initially compressed properly only near the primary, and then will pre-detonate itself along the remainder of the spark plug before the remainder of the secondary has been compressed (the x-rays may go a light velocity in a vacuum, but the compression of the secondary, whether by shock or isentropic, is much slower!). Details of the axial central rod through the B61 secondary

stage are shown below, in stills from the same declassified film.

| | -— FT.

=

View of the axial rod running through B61 bomb, as seen in declassified film Developing and |

o— Ree Se *

i2+ feet long | - 4 SES CO

The rings in the secondary stage assembly are f

the right of the central x-ray baffle. c

' RIGHT: central axial rod seen in the B61-4 trainer (similar yields to B61-12) a

IS inches

aw Oe ee =a =. . eS iT “ 1,1 5

Declassified U.S. Nucleanmiest Filme#72

Declas "Devel at 7

The alternating rings along the secondary stage in this design makes the surface area of the secondary stage rippled, a concept that increases its surface area for absorption of x-rays, which was the original motivation for Teller's ambitious but failed 1954 Morgenstein (spiked secondary stage Operation Castle shot 3) nuclear test at Bikini Atoll. Even excluding the issue with computing and achieving the geometry of isotropic compression of a sphere by radiation from a single primary, Teller at first did not want the spherical secondary stage

(used by Russia in 1955) in American nuclear weapons, because the soft 1-10 keV x-rays that couple energy between stages are absorbed

Declassified*W'S"Nuclear Test Film #72

> plo 012217 26:34

in a very thin surface layer of the secondary, so the surface area of the secondary stage is crucial, and is minimised (not maximised) for a spherical shape. This means that, because a sphere mathematically has the MINIMUM surface area to volume ratio of any shape, a sphere absorbs the MINIMUM possible fraction of the x-rays from the primary stage. So the sphere is the WORST design possible, if you want to maximise the coupling of x-rays to the secondary stage. This is not speculative or a matter of secret computer designs of classified

weaponry: it is very simple mathematically for a kid to prove that far more x-ray energy will be absorbed by the inside of the weapon

casing than on the outer surface of a spherical secondary stage. Teller's Livermore laboratory, however, even in 1954 at the Morgenstein test of Castle, tried to get around this problem of the small surface area absorption of soft x-rays by the surface of a sphere, by hugely increasing the surface area of the "sphere" by making its surface "spiked" or convoluted so it will absorb a larger fraction of the x-ray energy from the primary stage. This may also improve the stability of axial compression in a cylindrical secondary stage, where (unlike early designs like Mike in 1952) a very small primary (5 kt unboosted or 10 kt boosted) is used to axially compress just a very small part

of the secondary stage near the primary stage in an x-ray radiation channel confined by a seabreeze x-ray baffle foam.

In the Mike "sausage" and other earlier Castle nuclear designs, x-ray baffling foam was not used in this way to fill most of the case and

Vo

create a radiation channel confining the initial fusion burn region, but was just used as Teller's "x-ray mirror" (a layer of plastic hammered on the the lead lining of the steel case with nails, to reflect some x-ray energy back on the secondary stage, and to prevent high-Z lead ablation debris quickly filling the radiation channel and killing the coupling). So it appears the Mike "sausage" design required a larger yield primary stage to compress the entire clyinder, whereas the use of x-ray attenuating foam to limit initial exposure of the secondary stage to a few rings near the primary, reduces the size of the required primary. Once the fusion burn begins in a limited part of the secondary, it releases x-rays which then help to compress and ignite fusion in the remainder (this is the brains of the American secondary design, requiring very sophisticated computer modelling as well as back-up nuclear testing to verify them). A declassified film of the B61 shows the secondary stage of the B61 (and presumably its scaled down version, the W80) being tested, a rippled cylinder with rounded

shielding end caps (below). This appears to be an entirely different concept to Russian nuclear warhead design.

W680 is reportedly a scaled down version of the B61, which has a spherical 1st and cylindrical 2nd stage

Secondary stage is groved or rippled to stabilize its radial compression by x- ray ablation. Seabreeze x-ray diffusing foam fills the casing

Another option, which the Russians first tested very successfully in 1958, is to simply put two smaller fission primary stages into a radiation case, one on each opposite side of the fusion capsule, as shown below, with the two sets of neutron initiator tubes and detonators, corrected in parallel circuits - there is a delay between conventional explosives and neutron guns firing to allow for the time it takes to compress the fissile cores - via high-current, fast vacuum tube switches called krytrons. However, Britain and America (for reasons discussed later, below) completely ignored this possibility, and the American Los Alamos nuclear weapons designer of devices Scorpion, Hamlet, Viper, Davy Crockett and King, Dr Theodore Taylor, dismissed the key Russian double-primary thermonuclear warhead design when presented with it by author John McPhee: "'The shape tells you a lot about H-bomb design,' Taylor said again. 'But not enough.' I drew a sketch of a hydrogen bomb showing a cylinder full of thermonuclear fuel, with two fission bombs, one at each end... he said, ‘Nice try, but that is not what happens'." (This quote from J. McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, NY,

1974, p149. This dismissive error was then repeated again in response to Chuck Hansen's 27 August 1979 letter to Senator Charles Percy

of Illinois, which contained the diagram shown below,

B617W86-pifand seconda

a hich Howard Morland dismisses incorrectly in his stage parts’ —

E v book, The secret that Exploded. This casual dismissal primary _ S tage design

of double primary designs may well mean American efforts to deduce Russian nuclear weapon design from fallout samples by analogy to the designs America

> mw soins : : Y ested in the past, were plain wrong. Certainly, Russia ne —— ested two-stage, single-primary weapons; but their most compact efficient designs are provably double- primary for 0.1-1 megaton yields and use two hermonuclear stages for both cleaner and 1-100

megaton-yield fusion tertiary stages.)

On 23 February 1958, Russia moe kan) Se Se Z De eS ea Sak =o ee J tested the new, radical Babaev- Tope 3

xX fa . . “| _ fusion fuel

4

Trutnev compact design of

Led thermonuclear weapon (above; ‘<4

ry

detailed documentary evidence from multiple sources is provided later in this post), a pipe containing a spherical

H-BOMB CROSS SECTION fusion stage sandwiched

between two fission (primary) Chuck Hansen, 1979 letter to Percy™*""""""

parallel circuit for simultaneous

firing via a krytron high speed, high current vacuum tube switch. This was a relatively small diameter 860 kiloton deliverable thermonuclear weapon, weaponised by Vladimir Fyodorovich Grechishnikov (Deputy Chief Designer of VNIITF, Snezhinsk) and detonated at 2500m altitude (the long range American detectors, which were less accurate than close-in Russian instrumentation, suggested that this Russian test 52, codenamed "Joe 46" by America, had a yield of 1.2 megatons and a burst height of 3200m). Litvinov gives details of the development of this bomb into modern Russian nuclear weapons in his report to the 3rd Historical Conference on the History of the Nuclear Weapons Complex of Russia, Snezhinsk, June 16-19, 1998, Development of Nuclear Charges at the RFNC-VNIIFT (1963- 1976) (first published on pages 135-145 of his book, Nuclear energy is not only for military application, published by the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ekaterinburg, 2002, and now available online on pages 536-547 of his Selected Works, published by

VNIITF, Snezhinsk in 2014, linked here:http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/litvinov_izbrannye-trudy_2014/go,0/, whose page numbering

we will quote from in the list of key Russian nuclear weapons design developments, be/ow). Litvinov there explains that: (1) between 1963-76 Russian nuclear charge designs were mastered for cheap factory mass production (serial production).

(2) the very high yield 1961-2 Russian nuclear tests of 20-50 megatons yield far exceeded the practical weight for missile warheads that could be delivered by affordable missiles, and when both Russian nuclear weapons labs (Sarov and Snezhinsk) tried to scale those designs down to give ~1 megaton from 300-500 kg mass, the results (quote from page 538 follows, emphasis added): "in 1961-1962 were not crowned with success and this worried the military and the developers themselves. It turned out that it is easier to create powerful charges [20-50 megatons] than less powerful [~1 megaton] ones, that have a weight restriction [300-500kg mass]." Reports in recent years however indicate that President Putin has brought back into production the 1961 designs for the tested 50 Mt (lead fusion capsule pusher) or untested 100 Mt (natural uranium fusion capsule pusher) version, to be used in his 32 Kanyon or "Ocean Multipurpose System Status-6" 24 m long, 2 m diameter, 100 ton nuclear underwater torpedo submarine drones, propelled by a nuclear reactor

at up to 100 knots, with an operating depth up to 1000 m. This was announced by Putin on 1 March 2018 (below).

(3) To make progress with compact ~1 Mt warheads

for missiles, they improved the fission primary stage designs, testing plastic explosive for implosion for the irst time in February 1964, and then "octogen"

known in the West as the explosive HMX) for the first ime by Russia in the 280mm diameter calibre nuclear hell tested on 19 October 1966 (Russian nuclear test 56, yielding 55kt), which "more than doubled" (page 45 quote) the yield of that device, due to the greater ore compression achieved by using a better chemical xplosive. This is also of course of great importance to ussian thermonuclear weapons of higher yield, since

more efficient primary stages release more x-rays and

Russian Channel One TV showed an official Russian report on its 100 megaton

drone torpedo, showing a warhead 6 metres long and 2 metres in diameter, therefore enable greater fusion charge compression similar to the 8 m 1961 Tsar Bomba design (2 m of it was a parachute) ,

giving a more efficient fusion burn.

(4) They also improved the fusion charge design radically in 1965 by inserting tritium-deuterium gas into the hollow core of their fusion capsule (i.e. boosting the fusion capsule for the first time), which both improved the efficiency of their thermonuclear weapons, and also made possible cleaner devices (with greater fusion capsule compression due to their improved primary stages, they could replace a fissile spark plug neutron source inside the LiD charge with neutrons from tritium + deuterium fusion, which then fission lithium in the surrounding solid LiD, producing more tritium), allowing the testing of the cleanest ever 140 kt Russian thermonuclear test at Semipalatinsk on 10 December 1972, which had fully /0 times lower fission product radioactivity than the earlier similar 140 kt total

yield (of which about 6 kt was fission) relatively clean test of 15 January 1965 at Chagan River (these data are from pages 541-542).

In other words, they achieved well over 99% fusion yield (under 1% fission) in their 10 December 1972 test of 140 kt total yield

(illustration of Russian >99% clean bomb design is shown below)!

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b the igimal” fe Mage — 5,0 — MoulHocTH 203bI raMMa-H3nyyeHua (Mp/4) yepe3 24 (5) In the ate Bate ‘ 000. Deuterium", Litvinov clarifies that although Russg ade Hache Ba pema PHYSICALLY t

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e fusion of pure deuterium in its nuclear weapon tests, Russia succeeded in pure deuterium fusion, provided that the deuterium charge was ignited by prior fusion from a /arger mass of deuterium + tritium. See also the data from Russia linked

Uzen stream. T.

here, here, and here. (America never succeeded in initiating a fusion burn in a PHYSICALLY SEPARATE deuterium charge either, despite many entirely false claims to the contrary, alleging that the 1952 Mike test used a fission bomb to compress and heat a completely physically separated charge of deuterium. This is false because the Mike fusion charge was not physically separate from fissile and fissionable material but in contact with both; it had a fissile "spark plug" core inside the deuterium flask, and a fissionable natural uranium pusher on the outside of the deuterium flask; it would not have ignited otherwise as is simple for even a kid to see from the numbers: for the 1-10 keV range of x-ray energies from a fission bomb, and the fact that D-D fusion cross sections for energies of concern are about 1% of D-T cross sections, plus the fact that it was a struggle to get 35% fusion efficiency in the later Castle shots using D+T fusion even with a fissile spark plug and a natural uranium pusher, Mike would have fizzled without the deuterium charge having a direct non-separate fission energy input from within and outside.) In other words, in clean weapons, Russia can boost the total energy from expensive T+D fusion by adding a smaller additional stage of cheaper pure deuterium fuel without the spark-plug and uranium pusher America used in Mike; this smaller deuterium stage size compensates for the fact that pure deuterium requires a higher burn temperature. Naturally, once you have achieved a small very-high-temperature deutert'um burn in a small mass (a very hard job and impossible to do directly with a fission bomb, as proved by the true nature of Mike as distinct from lying "simplifications" by those who want to trivilise the problems of warhead design to ban testing for improvements), you can then try to kindle into a bigger volume burn by multiplying up steadily via a large number of "Russian doll" stages (bombs within bombs), gradually

increasing the power.

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ABOVE: the 82 tons Mike top, in photos during assembly, is covered by a flat disc until Halloween 1952, when the Sausage's Dewar flask inside is filled with liquid deuterium, the fission primary is then inserted on to the top, and the flat cover disc is replaced by the founded top x-ray reflector over the primary. Photos are from Dr Frank H. Shelton, whose friend Dr Alvin C. Graves (who accompanied Shelton on his trip at Penney's invitation to the Australian-British nuclear tests at Maralinga, Operation Buffalo, in 1956) explaining how the primary, sparkplug (kindling), deuterium (fuel logs) and uranium pusher (hohlraum) in the Mike shot works on page 5-43 of his Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (2nd edition, 1990): "First you need a match to start the fire; we use a fission bomb called the primary. Next, you wouldn't try to use the match to set one of the logs on fire, you would use some kindling [the central fissile spark plug]... That is Teller's "New Super Bomb' invention ... Now you've got your logs burning ... You need a ... kind of furnace, the Germans call this a hohlraum, that

propagates the fire ..." This is a very convoluted, pathetically expensive and low-efficiency dead-end in nuclear weapons design, one that

has created a Western impasse of "correct" dogma that Russia has broken down! Tragically, we don't just have a nuclear shelters "gap", or

tactical neutron bombs "gap", we also have fundamental, massive "gap" in warhead design.

ABOVE: Ernest O. Lawrence with his colleagues from what is now called Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, at Bikini Atoll in May 1956, preparing for their 3.53 megatons 85% clean (fusion) Livermore Redwing-Zuni test to make thermonuclear weapons fallout- safe as a deterrent (from Dr Frank H. Shelton's Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, where Shelton called the most thoroughly fallout- documented test in history (as a result he testified that fallout was completely safe, see the 10 May 1957 New York Times article below, although he was unfortunately prohibited from PROVING IT PUBLICALLY due to SECRECY nonsense - Shelton being responsible for organising this). Livermore was outdone by Los Alamos, which fired Navajo, a 95% clean 4.5 megatons hydrogen bomb without the fissile spark plug that accounted for 10% of Zuni's 15% fission yield. Los Alamos used plastic foam to slow down the x-rays, giving enough time for primary stage neutrons to be channelled through the hollow centre of their lithium-6 deuteride Sausage, fissioning enough lithium into tritium prior to x-ray implosion. Zuni and Navajo were both rendered obsolete by Lawrence Livermore's John H. Nuckoll's 99.9% clean isentropically compressed pusherless nuclear tests at Christmas Island during Operation Dominic in 1962, the "Ripple" breakthrough (discussed in detail later in this blog post), and by Russian nuclear weapons development tests allegedly "peaceful" but in reality tactical neutron bombs, lasting a quarter of a century (from 1965 onward). On page 8-15, Dr Shelton points out that at the White House's 24 June 1957 Presidential Briefing propaganda event on "clean bomb", only the Livermore Radiation Laboratory designers of 85% clean Zuni were present (Ernest Lawrence, Mark Mills - drowned at Eniwetok in a helicopter crash during a rainstorm while preparing a clean bomb for testing the next year - and Edward Teller): "Conspicuous by their absence from the Presidential briefing were the Los Alamos weapon designers. After all, it was the "clean" [95% fusion] NAVAJO shot on Operation REDWING (1956), designed by LASL, that established the state-of-the-art in reduced fission weapon designs. 'We now believe that we know how to make virtually clean weapons, not only in the megaton range, but all the way down to small kiloton weapons,’ Lawrence told the President." Shelton adds on page 8-16 that he briefed the Gaither Commmittee on 31 July 1957 on fallout, which led to the first recommendation for identifying US fallout shelters (ignored by Eisenhower but later implemented by Kennedy).

CHAPTER 7 OPERATION

In May 1956, members of a University of California Regents committee accompanied E.O. Lawrence to t Grounds to review the ZUNI hydrogen-fusion nuclear weapon test. Left to right are: University of Califor James H. Corley; UCRL Physicist Harry Keller; Regents Gerald Hagar and Victor R. Hansen; UCRL Physicists and Gerald Johnson, in front of Brigadier General Alfred D. Starbird (person to Starbird’s right is unk

Lawrence; UCRL Physicists Carl Haussmann and Charles Blue; UCRL Director Herbert York; Regent Earl J. Fens! FIGIIRE 7_392 LICR GROIID AT DACIEIC DRA VIAIGM MONI IAING

WAY 1 0 1957

SCIENTIST DOUBTS FALL-OUT DANGER

Atom Tests Can Be ast Oi te sate for 40 Years at Present Rate, Pentagon Aide Testifies

Special to The New York Times,

WASHINGTON, May 9— Atomic testing can be continued at the present rate for another forty to fifty years and not create any serious danger from radioactive fallout, the chief atomic weapons scientist in the Defense Department believes.

This opinion was offered re- cently by Dr. Frank H. Shelton, technical director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Proj- ect. He gave it when testifying before a House Appropriations subcommittee on the possible dangers to human health caused by the fall-out from atomic ex- plosions. The testimony was re- leased today.

/NEW YORK TIMES, 10 MAY 1957, '

TIwwvine s-ey.

Dr. Shelton was called before the subcommittee to discuss what had been described as a “great deal of concern” being expressed over the long-range effect on the human race of the fall-out. The subcommit- tee’s chairman, Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, had noted such “con- cern.”

At one point during the closed door hearing, Mr. Mahon asked:

“Could you not say that at the present rate we could go on for forty to fifty years without serious danger in so far as you know?”

“Yes,”’Dr. Shelton replied.

Information ‘Meager’

At the same time, Dr. Shelton conceded that information on world-wide fall-out from past atomic tests was “extremely meager.” The Defense Depart- ment, he said, is taking steps to define more precisely the amount of radioactive debris in the air from atomic tests and the rate at which it is falling to the earth.

Dr. Shelton testified that it would require large nuclear ex- plosions with a yield equivalent to 30,000,000,000 tons of TNT to

VEN YNYUT ATT RRRIIIR PNW VITIWU UONYUINS

bring the average concentration of Strontium-90 in human bones up to the maximum permissible concentration, This would be equivalent to 1,500,000 atomic bombs of the size dropped on Japan in World War II.

Strontium-90 is a long-lived radioactive product of a nuclear explosion. In human bones it can produce cancer or leukemia. The maximum permissible con- centration of Strontium-90 for general populations has been set at one-tenth of a microcurie for a person. A curie is a technical measurement of radiation, and a microcurie is one-millionth of a curie.

Dr. Shelton said that the max- imum permissible concentration was five to ten times below the concentration necessary to pro- duce a “barely detectable in- crease” in the rate of bone can- cer or leukemia. His statement was based on the assumption, challenged by some scientists, that extremely small doses of Strontium-90 will not induce bone cancer.

Dr. Shelton likewise tended to minimize the threat of ex- ternal radiation from fall-out materials. To increase ~ the world-wide external radiation exposure by 10 per cent, he said,

would rec with a yie 000,000 t per cent i be equiva! ural radia sult of lin

In the « ton said, active fa “very eff most sim]

FIGURE 6-24 MARK-17 THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON AND F.H. SHELTO

The gigantic advantage of deuterium fusion is that you don't need to create a large number of neutrons ahead of fusion to fission lithium in order to produce tritium. Lying simplified pictures of nuclear warheads with lithium deuteride secondary stages, often also showing a neutron shield to prevent neutrons from the primary stage from "pre-initiating" the secondary stage (regardless of whether the secondary stage contains fissile material or not) omit the entire problem that lithtum deuteride must be irradiated with neutrons to produce tritium

prior to D+T fusion becoming possible (otherwise you have no tritium). The 85% clean 3.53 megaton Livermore Zuni test of Operation

Statement Before the Department of Defense Subcommit Committee on Appropriations, House of Representativ

by

REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD N. PARKER, USN DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY 23 March 1960

Radioactive Fallout From Nuclear Explosions

To a degree this controversy has existed because we were ¢ with what appeared to be a new phenomenon. There has been wide ignorance of the facts con j radioactivity not only among

also _ among the "experts."" This is not surprising when one cons | its effects. Nuclear physics, meteorology, Soil science, plant “Geis Pets cca and colitical science oll have ispecies on this subject-ant Moat studies lave Involved prices oF people qieaet Gerferehtes oF opinion or of enphasia expacted ia cia Redwing at Bikini Atoll in 1956 contained a fissile sparkplug which accounts for about 10% of the 15% fission yield (Zuni contained a lead pusher around the lithium deuteride instead of natural uranium), but the 95% clean 4.5 megaton Los Alamos Navajo test of that series

had an entirely clean second stage (no fissile spark plug). But Navajo had to eliminate the neutron interstage shield (unnecessary if you

use non-fissile secondary stage) and to use a neutron channel to guide neutrons from the primary stage into the hollow cylindrical lithium

deuteride secondary stage, to enable some of the lithium to be fissioned to produce tritium, BEFORE the secondary stage was compressed by x-ray ablation of the lead pusher on the outside of that secondary cylinder. So Navajo needed to have a significant primary yield to release those neutrons, and the design would fail if its primary stage size was reduced to try to reduce fission yield to below 5%. So to make further progress on cleaner weapons, you need either immense, isentropic compressions of the secondary stage that allow neutrons from a non-fissile D+T spark plug within lithtum-6 deuteride (or natural lithium deuteride, in the best designs) to work, which has the problem of the radioactive decay of the tritium, or you must consider overcoming the hurdle of D+D fusion to achieve a long-shelf life clean nuclear warhead that doesn't require top ups to compensate for the 12.3 years half life of tritium. The key issue with D+D fusion is that, having a cross section 100 times less than D+T fusion, you need to use isentropic not shock compression to concentrate a lot more x- ray energy into compressing it to extremely high density to get really efficient fusion. But having done so, you then have the advantage of

a very clean, very cheap, very long-shelf-life bomb:

"The Mike device contained several dozen litres of liquid deuterium; however, fusion efficiency was probably not much greater than 15%, and 8 megatons (nearly 80%) of Mike's total yield came from fission of plutonium and uranium-235 [in the sparkplug radially central inside the cylindrical Dewar or Sausage of liquid deuterium] ... (If the Sausage contained 1000 litres of liquid D, then "burn" efficiency was around 6%.)" - Chuck Hansen, Footnote 93 in Swords of Armageddon, version 2.0, volume 3, pages III-

38 and III-39. (This contains calculational errors.)

Boris Litvinov's "Exploding Deuterium" chapter also examines the use of uranium-233 in nuclear weapons, which is made in reactors by irradiating thortum-232 with neutrons. There is an important storage problem, since Litvinov states that this uranium-233 is contaminated by 0.1% uranium-232, which has an alpha decay chain which includes thallium-208, which releases high energy 2.6 and 0.6 MeV gamma rays, so that a year after production, a mass of | kg of U233 or | g of U232 gives a gamma dose rate of 10 R/hour at 50 centimetres distance. This makes U233 weapons very difficult to service safely! However, Russia used U233 in place of plutonium in its RDS-37 aka "Joe-19", the Russian's celebrated 1.6 megatons, 22 November 1955 two-stage thermonuclear weapon, according to Dr Frank H. Shelton's Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, page 7-27, which cites reference 24 on page 7-68, which is the Top Secret classified 20 February 1956 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Intelligence Information for Joint Intelligence Committee", which says that the RDS-37 fallout contained evidence of U233, U235, U238 and LiD, but no plutonium! I'm just quoting here, and am curious as to how they could rule out the presence of plutonium when of course neutron capture in the U238, which definitely was present, yields U239 which quickly decays into Np239 and then into Pu239 within days! You also get smaller quantities of higher mass isotopes of plutonium, from multiple neutron captures in U238. Maybe they had big samples of fallout and excellent radiochemistry, and deduced that a// the plutonium present in the

fallout was the result of neutron captures in U238, and none had been present initially in the bomb before firing. If so, hats off to them!

or =~ == NMG TAT TRATIA AT ta dn enna bebe hee lenin dalarerrcnel hal hr aot ar inl

TMPROVEMENTS OF NUCLEAR WRAPONS

PROBABLE GAINS

PRESENT STATUS

POSSIBLE LONG

OF AINS SINCE LT ee a or THROUGH CO TERM TECH- aie TINUED TESTING NOLOGICAL UNDER EBT BREAKTHROUGHS

HOW CRITICAL IS THTS 10 US CAPABILITIES OR WHAT LOSSES CAN WE STAND?

(1) Development. of all fusion

xount of fis- e ae [ j weapons with 9 1able and 1 66 S re) t % ra patel - u235, T) fusioneble 9 In minimum depen

dence on T.

material reg- quired to obtain the

Chiefs of Staff Top Secret report calls for minimal T use as a long term aim. E.g., isentropic com fusion capsule within

| | CK2349562865-jc

ABOVE: the 1966 Top Secret US Joint Chiefs of Staff report, Study of National Security Factors in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

Savings in Pu 239 and T are particularly

must be pro- duced by

neutron bom- bardment in

reactors,

J)EFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

Appendix C, "Criticality of Nuclear Testing to US Nuclear Weapons Technology", Annexes A and B called for vital long-term improvements to US nuclear weapons designs, including reduction of U235 (oralloy) and T (tritium) dependence, e.g. with efficient

isentropic compression of pressurised D capsules replacing T+D, and also enhanced prompt gamma ray weapons for maximising EMP

(1) Efficiency of use of U235 does not appear to be critical problem since anticipated weapon require- ments at least up through 1973 are well below production. Economic strength of US and availability of natural resources sufficient to improve production if necessary.

(2) Efficiency of use of Pu and T could be important (based on present production estimates) if ABM systems small R/Vs using large quantities of reactor products are deployed in large numbers. Presently anticipated rements arc close to estimated production, However, more production is possible at great expense thru construction of more reactors,

pressi on of D+D a Li6D

Shell!

strength (this is done by putting a nickel-chromium shell around the fusion capsule in a neutron bomb, to convert a fraction of the neutron energy into high energy gamma rays). These lengthy annexes also called for reduced warhead costs, increased warhead shelf-life, directed X-ray output (i.e. simply putting the bomb into a metal tube, open at one end, before the development of nuclear pumped x-ray laser Excalibur by Livermore a decade later), enhanced ground shock warheads (e.g. hardened earth penetrator warheads), and reduced fission

yield at low total yield to allow cleaner tactical warheads.

> ~

ANNEX B - TAILORED OUTPUTS OF WEAPONS

-- _--——-- $< $$ es

WEAPON GAINS Since LTB PRESENT SATUS PROBABLE GAINS POSSIBLE LONG 4 48 TEI TO US os EFFECT TREATY THROUGH CON-~ TERM TECH- TAP? : R WHAY LOSSES hy TIMUED TRSTING NOLOGICAT, ve STAND‘ E

UNDER ITBT BRRAKTIROUGHS

ENHANCER4EDTT AND SUPPRESSION OF EFFECTS ee es

Criticality of this is difficult

e Lo assess since EMP generation KMP ef fect 18 and effects are poorly under- stood. Development of these weapons is not critical to under- standing EMP and TREE effects. Nuclear testing is required to develop these weapons and be assured of output.

Gamma. Increase Rays she fraction of energy produced in a nuclear explosion which is amitted as zemma rays. Suc weapon would rovide increasé sver present. ons in FMP

enhanced by neutron bombs ier ti th chromium .

4

ct on elec-

and tiickel casing to convert neutron a energy into gamma ever ays (1966 JCS Top ) ecret report)

\S DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

Russian VNIIFT nuclear warhead design laboratory film of t...

(6) A 2005 film (embedded above, and linked on YouTube here) by the Snezhinsk nuclear weapons lab about their nuclear weapon "products" (extensive stills from this film are reproduced below, showing the range of nuclear missile, bomb and cannon shell warheads they developed) adds further information on how Russia managed to reduce the weight of its MIRV nuclear warheads. Translating from the Russian voice narrative commentary of the film: "a Russian patent was obtained for the design of the [thermonuclear weapon casing or] container by the specialists of the two institutes under the leadership of Petrov. In close cooperation with the Institute of Superplasticity of Metals, the city of Ufa, a new technology was developed for manufacturing multi-profile parts from hard-to-form alloys based on nickel-titanium and aluminum using the effect of superplasticity. ... the new technology makes it possible to reduce the weight and increase the strength of parts, and for their manufacture to use hard-to-deform superalloys. ... Product 244 was the first mass- produced atomic small-sized bomb for equipping front-line aircraft weighing 55 times less than the mass of the product 202. Product 245 was the first mass-produced thermonuclear bomb for equipping strategic aviation weighing five times less than the mass of the product 202. When creating products 244 and 245, conceptual provisions were developed for the development of single bombs for a wide range of carrier aircraft ... more than 20 samples of aerial bombs of various calibers were developed and designations for creating a family of them were awarded the State Prize of the USSR. Product 6 was a nuclear warhead of an anti-aircraft guided missile ... Product 30: this is the first development by the Institute of Nuclear Ammunition to equip the ground-based missile system UR-100 ... Product 269 is a nuclear

warhead of an operational tactical single-stage missile ...

"The presented nuclear munitions of the missile systems of the navy allow us to trace the origin and development of the least vulnerable naval component of the country's strategic nuclear forces of the product 255a 13 nuclear munition of the R12 missile with a detachable warhead of the D2S complex. ... Product 3 combat equipment of the R21 missile with a detachable warhead of the complex 24, the first domestic complex with the launch of a missile from a submerged position. ... Product 15 combat equipment rocket R27 medium range ... Product 42 combat equipment of the R27 missile to the complex was intended to destroy aircraft carriers and electronic missile defense systems of a potential enemy. Product 46 ensuring the stability of ammunition, the operation of electronic countermeasures and air shock in the conditions of Western firing, the creation of ammunition 46, ensuring the effective use of the T9 complex. Products 82 and 83 combat equipment, the R-27 missile, the first missiles of the naval fleets that could be equipped with both monoblock main part of the v82 nuclear weapon and those sharing the main part with three nuclear weapons of type product 83. ... The ammunition 82 automation system

was improved compared to the automation of ammunition 15 and 46. ... Products 94 and 95 were developed for the value of the first

complex of the methodological purpose of the navy of the 3rd generation; this can be equipped with a single-block nuclear warhead 94 or divided main and part of the firing of warheads nuclear ammunition 95 individual targeting at specified trailer points. ..." (For clear photographic definitions of the various "Product" numbers assigned to Russian nuclear warheads, see the stills from their film

summarising their warheads, below.)

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BELOW: a declassified data summary of a wide range of Russian nuclear weapons, their designers, and the use of the weapons by various delivery systems from the VNIIFT nuclear warhead design laboratory, which designed 100% of the currently stockpiled Russian strategic

freefall nuclear bombs, and also 100% of currently stockpiled Russian tactical nuclear warheads (both freefall aircraft delivery bombs and

RUSSIAN ACADEM\

Russian Federal Nu Academician E. |. Zababakhin Ir

B. V. LITV

SELEGTED"

Publishing House RI Snezhinsk

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Russian Federal Nuclear Center Academician E. |. Zababakhin Institute of Technical Physics

B. V. LITVINOV

SELECTED WORKS

Publishing House RFYATS VNIITF Snezhinsk 2014

Pages 536-547:

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CHARGES AT THE RFNC - VNIITF (1963-1976)

B. V. Litvinov

Development of nuclear charges at the RFNC - VNIITF (1963-19765) 537

The second, but no less important reason for classifying 1963 as a turning

point in the charge industry is the transition, starting this year, to the physical

schemes and designs of nuclear charges, which became the basis for the subsequent creation of that generation of nuclear charges, which now forms the basis of Russia's nuclear weapons. The year of the end of this period can be

538 B. V. Litvinov

to name the same 1976, since by that year most of the developed nuclear charges had been mastered by serial production] wo. [mass production]

of 50 and 100 Mt TE have no future. The work plans of our institute

for 1963 included the creation of a nuclear charge with an energy release

of 100 Mt TE, since the KB-11 charge tested on October 31, 1961

at that power could not be placed in any carrier, except for a specially modified TU-95 . We assumed to make our own version of the charge with the same

energy release according to the scheme proposed at our institute

by L. P. Feoktistov, M. P. Shumaev, E. N. Avrorin and B. M. Murashkin

and successfully tested by our institute (NII-1011) in air tests in 1962

in charges of lower energy release. In rocket design bureaus , and above

all in the Design Bureau headed by Academician V. N. Chelomey, a heavy

rocket capable of lifting over 20 tons of payload was developed

specifically for our charge. All this did not seem to portend the withering of the military's interest in powerful and super-powerful nuclear charges and missile

delivery systems , but more and more information was received that the Americans had chosen a different path; namely, the creation of nuclear charges with an energ release of up to which it required for their delivery to the targets much less powerful missiles than those that were created by us. The work and, accordingly, the aerial nuclear tests of KB-11 and NII-1011 in this direction

in 1961-1962 were[not crowned with success,Jand this worried the military- and the developers themselves. It turned out that it isfeasier to create powerful charges

han less powerful ones, but having a mass restriction at the same time. It began | began

artillery fired projectiles of various kinds). This film concludes with the message: "Postscript: In the real conditions of Russia's current

position in the world community, and the state of the Russian army, Russia's nuclear weapons remain a reliable guarantor of strategic

stability in the world, independence, integrity of the country's military and economic security. - From the (VNIIFT nuclear weapons lab)

authors."

542 B.

to develop at the Research Institute-1011 (VI nuclear charge with low fragmentation < such a nuclear charge to powerful sec operating only on gaseous deuterium, é device for physical experiments of vari

The development of ideas related in the conduct during 1965-1972 of 1 various designs of nuclear explosive ds

for industrial, not military use. Not all of but the negative results were also imr us to establish the area of existence c explosive devices. Let us list some imp obtained in the RFNC-VNIITF in the de experience and the SINE.

First, the creation, together with VN explosive device for nuclear explosions

testing of such a device if December * than 100 kt TE, fits fragmentation activit

which wa

explosion to form a reservoir on the{Ct

| 1965. [Such was the progress in the:

excavation in 8 years. Unfortunately, a

Peaceful Explosions (1974), nuclear e prohibited.

Secondly, the creation of special nt for physical experiments, in which the «

explosion on materials and objects of ' Thirdly, the creation at VNIITF of 2 device with low fragmentation activity ores and other minerals. In particular, September 1972, the crushing of apati deposit in Khibiny. The apatite extracte and immediately after extraction, it was The development of nuclear charg

the line of creating industrial explosive 1965-1968, a nuclear explosive device wa gas flows from the lower horizons to tt

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(English: Working group 80)

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(Chief Designer of Institute G. D. Zelenkin)

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The film stills above taken from the 2005 film dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Victory in WWII, made by the VNIITF Russian nuclear weapons design laboratory at Snezhinsk, and it summarises the warheads, their purposes, delivery systems, uses, designers, philosophy, and so on. Note that one of the weapons designers shown to be responsible for the 1970s MIRV narrow-diameter Snezhinsk nuclear warheads (Product 83 with a mass of 170 kg was tested on 2 November 1972 yielding 165 kt, and Product 95 with a mass of 210 kg was tested on 23 July 1973 yielding 212 kt) is Viadimir Fyodorovich Grechishnikov (1917-58), who died in 1958; the point is that the dual-linear implosion primary design of thermonuclear weapon (simply a pipe with two melon-shaped linear implosion fission bombs in it, separated by a capsule of fusion fuel) was developed by 1958, earning Grechishnikov a Lenin Prize. Grechishnikov, a design engineer, had earlier appropriately worked on other straightforward and low-cost solutions for Russia, namely designing the cheap, easily manifactured, but efficient tank and aircraft engines during WWII that helped Russia win decisive battles by numerical superiority. The hard fact that the laboratory credits him with the MIRV warhead designs of the 1970s, despite his death in 1958, proves that the dual primary design first tested in 1958 was used in those 1970s MIRV warheads. Grechishnikov's background in Russian tank designs of WWIL is not an aberration of Russian nuclear weapon design, witness that in "Designer N L Dukhov and his School" published in 2004 by JSC South Ural Publishing House, Chelyabinsk, Dukhov is another similar, WWII Russian tank designer who ended up a nuclear weaponeer, deputy chief designer of KB-11 (aka Arzamas-16, or Sarov) developing over 10 years the neutron initiators for the first

generation of Sarov's deployed nuclear weapons across 17 delivery systems including the R-7 missile and the T-5 nuclear torpedo!

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say (TRANSLATION, Postscript: In the real conditions of Russia's current / - i ~ (2005) position in the world community, and the state of the Russian

army, Russia's nuclear weapons remain a reliable guarantor of strate: stability in the world, independence, integrity of the country's milita

Bus container

ICBM silo blast door

eS ie

b

Transportation of warhead bus to a Russian ICBM silo

The weapons designer with the big eyebrows in the film, shown both as a designer of the world's smallest diameter nuclear artillery shell and with President Putin on the latter's visit to the lab by helicopter in 2000, is the late Boris Vasilievich Litvinov (1929-2010), a prolific author of scientific papers and also books hankering after the restoration of Russia as a great power. Russia's version of Edward Teller. In 2019, a 506-page book of tributes to his work was published in Russia, "BORIS LITVINOV: FACETS OF PERSONALITY", published in 2019, which begins with the following quotation from Litvinov: "By the way, a bomb designed for rapid self- destruction, makes it easier to create long-term useful technologies." (VNIITF also has a 1 hour recent film about him on their

website, quoting his political books, with his colleagues talking how he remembered the German attack of 22 June 1941, how

Russian victory in the war led to progress, and prestige now needs to be restored following the tragic break-up of the USSR. You get the idea...) Boris Litvinov is one of the four authors of the article "History of the nuclear weapons industry" in the Russian journal Atomic Energy, Vol. 86, No. 6, 1999, pages 402-410), which states:

"The creation of the nuclear weapons industry in the Soviet Union is correctly considered as one of the greatest achievements in Russian history. It has been accompanied by the defeat of fascist Germany and space flights to constitute the Soviet Union as a superpower. ... The stocks of uranium (100 tons) accumulated in Germany passed to Soviet physicists in 1945 and were used to construct the F-1 reactor in Laboratory No. 2, which was the first such reactor in the USSR and in Eurasia. ... 31 theoreticians ... participated in various ways in the work on the RDS-37. ... The energy release was 1.6 Mt of TNT equivalent. The USSR was ahead of the USA, which tested a similar thermonuclear aircraft bomb half a year later on May 21, 1956. ... In 1956, NI-1011 had obtained a commission to develop an aircraft bomb containing a gigantic thermonuclear device ... mass about 25 tons. The bomb should have been dropped for bombardment purposes by M-2 and Tu-95 aircraft. Design studies showed that such a bomb could be carried to the target only by the Tu-95 after its bomb bay and framework had been modified provided that the dimensions were reduced to 1.8m in diameter and 8m long with a mass of not more than 25 tons. NII-1011 in 1956-8 worked on the design of that bomb and performed theoretical calculations on the thermonuclear device, but in connection with the moratorium on nuclear tests, manufacturing the body parts was halted, and the only body remaining after the summer tests was destroyed. The work on the device was halted. Nuclear tests were renewed on September 1, 1961. A body was prepared for the gigantic bomb. On October 31, 1961, the world's largest thermonuclear device was exploded above Novaya Zemlya, which had been developed at KB-11 under Sakharov's direction. It was designed for a total energy production of 100 Mt of TNT equivalent, and the device was tested at a height of 4000 m for half the energy production in order to reduce the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and the effects of the shock wave. ... Somewhat later, a similar thermonuclear device yielding 20 Mt was proposed by KB-11. Out of the gigantic devices tested, only two were adopted as weapons and were for a certain time part of the strategic rocket armament: one developed by NII-1011 and the other by KB-11. ... With the start of reform, the attitude of the country's government to nuclear weapons began to change. The nuclear weapons industry attained its apogee at that time. It was apparent that its experts could resolve any problem in supplying nuclear weapons to the Soviet army although there was an ongoing and considerable lag in Soviet computing behind

American."

ABOVE: 30 August 2000 Secret CIA Intelligence 23-page technical Memorandum, "Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads", now declassified with deletions at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001260463.pdf states that these 0.3 kt tactical/battlefield (so-called "non-strategic" in the obfuscation jargon popular with disarmers) nuclear warheads "blur the boundary between nuclear and conventional war ... as an ‘asymmetric response’ to US superiority in conventional weapons [e.g., Russian 0.3 kt nuclear weapons will be used when they run short of conventional weapons in the ongoing Ukrainian war, as the West replenishes Ukrainian conventional weapons to enable it to destroy Russian conventional arms]. According to Sergei Rogachev, Deputy Director of the Arzamas-16 nuclar weapons design laboratory: 'Russia views the tactical use of nuclear weapons as a viable alternative to advanced conventional weapons'." Note that these tactical Russian nuclear weapons originated, like the American neutron bomb, from early efforts to produce peaceful nuclear explosives for purposes such as space travel (e.g. American "Project Orion", led by Theodore Taylor and Freeman Dyson, employing Lawrence Livermore's relatively clean, i.e. low fission yield and high fusion yield nuclear warhead

designs Dove and Starling, which had little fallout but a huge 14.1 MeV neutron output, motivating Sam Cohen to propose using them for

. https:/iwww.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001260463.pdf e Former Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov, other 1

| T\ Be and national security commentators have described boundaries between conventional and nuclear war.

of o advocated developing a new generation of nuclear t yields that would change the perception of nuclear < Intelligence Memorandum estruction. e claim t these new-gei Office of Transnational Issues 30 August 2000 sharply lower the psychological threshold of nuclea elihood of a nuclear strike in a conflict,

(b) (1) ussian military newspaper.

Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear (b) (3) ; Warheads [ © The development of low-yield warheads that could systems would be consistent with Russia’s increasi CrAi0 oT. ball 2644-6 it deter conventional as well as nuclear attacks, espe public pratt eatsen scientists and ofhaan Bee BRARABA perceptions ofa heightened threat from NATO an since 1993 indicate that the last nuclear warhead designed during the Soviet era Risestate conventional forces R582 Bas 20 pros conventional, a ces. Russia fas ne TOS : was a device tailored for enhanced output of high-energy X-rays with a total yield military capabilities im the loreseeable future, nor 0! “ 7. < Tarai c = nor 0: ‘ih cnale 800 toiaa: procurement and deployment of advanced weapon s

at the nonnuclear level. Judging from Russian writings since 1995 and Moscow’s evolving nuclear doctrine, new roles are emerging for very-low-yield nuclear weapons—including weapons with tailored radiation output—and there are powerful advocates for

development of such weapons in the country’s military and weapons community. The possible diverse applications for subkiloton nuct The Moscow press claimed that a draft presidential edict from Yel’tsin called for tactical — shi at arco weapons. “development of new-generation nuclear weapons.” APPROVED FOR | RELEAS Current mo ernization plans wi ect Russia’s entire P 8 P DATE: OCT 2005 weapons. According to the December 1999 issue of tl ° Recent statements on Russia’s evolving nuclear weapons doctrine ; , : lower the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons and blur the For an effective impact across the entire spectrur Poundary between nuclear and conventional warfare. Very-low-yield should be capable of conducting ‘surgical’ strikes | nuclear weapons reportedly could be used to head off a major conflict shortest period of time with minimal ecological co and avoid a full-scale nuclear war. using highly accurate, super-low-yield nuclear wez

and requires the highest accuracy.” In the post-Soviet era, the need for subkiloton nuclear weapons with minimal long-term

contamination has been argued in the media by senior Ministry of Atomic Energy The range of applications will ultimately be determin (Minatom) officials, nuclear weapons scientists, and military academics since the mid- doctrine, and could include artillery, air-to-air missil 1990s. Advocates often claim to know that the United States is developing the next weapons, or multiple rocket launchers against tanks generation of nuclear weapons and argue that Russia must not lag behind. Somewhat NOTE: the last Russian nuclear wea meetin they also cite clean, venyloweyield weapons ae an sume etric response” Ukraine was on 16 September 1979, to US superiority in conventional weapons. According to Sergei Rogachev, Deputy - Director of the Arzamas-16 nuclear weapons design laboratory: “Russia views the tactical one . - — noe — vile use Of nuclear weapons as a viable alternative to ermal conventional weapons.” new Russian battlefield tactical nuc _________ ____—___—]—E———————————<—<—<<——— Because of the atmospheric nuclear e Senior Russian military officers have advocated the use of highly-accurate, super-low- time, it was set off 900m below grot yield nuclear weapons in Russian military journals such as Military Thought and Ukrainian coal mine at Yunkom in D:

Armeyskiy Sbornik. Deputy Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Muravyev stated that to have an effective impact across the entire spectrum of targets. strategic missile systems should be capable of conducting surgical strikes in a wide spectrum of ranges with minimal ecological consequences, which could be achieved with low-yield nuclear weapons.

“safety precaution” allegedly to rele This mine "resumed normal operatic Russia’s Evolving Nuclear |

Since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Moscow’:

major shift with respect to the possible use of nuclear Russia’s conventional military capabilities led to the

nuclear deterrence as early as the fall of 1992. Russia

deter any large-scale conventional aggression in addit

Soviet Era Development of Tailored - Output Nuclear Devices

Russian development of nuclear devices tailored to enhance certain types of radiation output began during the Soviet period when “clean” nuclear devices—that is with reduced contamination from fis ission n products-—were needed for peaceful nuclear

a---9_ ft -- pmarms nn __ - . . m_ee

explosions (rINb Ss), according to statements by ine developers. Clean PNE devices were ‘This concept in turn necessitated a rethinking of the o

ss in effec’ firs ced-radiation devic ced i j i Of: " ident Yel’tsin—that M uld military deterrent purposes {n fe f an pp agn Gheed NCULON. ODI dewices ARUPSIP ARS uc CES OG incidentally"| RYSTES! that Moscow would _never be. ne tat tailoréd-output devices nee nero OMI effects esting ani pons development, a November 1993 statement of Basic Provisions of the : tested a similar 0.3 kt tacticabhicheanwotupd 1!Q0dimedtsnientiztsl (kre impperndial Bifor ate Miledk dinclasiat}, pores ptenhber 1979 | Federation clearly departed from the decade-old pled; (allegedly for "safety" to expel methane gas from the mine - which resumed operat n the next day - but such tests alsd provide mi Se hactlnone ee and adopted a broadened concept of nuclear. iced-radiation weapons are designed to inc: e the effective raige of gamma, nonnuclear threats to Russia. As a waming to potenti

data for use of atomic demolittotran ntti oAddMtsomagnenicypolatiasfthts LN6AAdrtins piegecd¥ detcair Pest aad Treaty). might use nuclear weapons first if an ageressor takes < fireball effects. Clean PNE devices are designed to minimize contamination from fission operation of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, missile ; William J. Broad wrote in hy® oPebTR ary BOS SNR frien A the total vig BYE RSP A EREPY-scnal 30|Years Ago adgbemical industries | objectives aré achieved by similar design approaches.

There Are Regrets (contrary'to disarmament scammers): "At the end of the Col > the third largest nuclear pdwer on earth was not Britain, France or China. It was Ukraine. The Soviet collapse, a slow-motion downfall that culminated in December 1991, resulted in the newly independent Ukraine inheriting roughly 5,000 nuclear arms that Moscow had stationed on its soil. [Along with the nuclear civil defense underground shelters which have allowed the civilians to survive the invasion and fight back, which were fortunately not also destroyed on the say-so of the anti-civil defence journals Scientific American and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.| The removal of this arsenal often gets hailed as a triumph of arms control. Diplomats and peace activists cast Ukraine as a model citizen in a world of would-be nuclear powers. But ... both Ukrainian and American experts questioned the wisdom of atomic disarmament. The deadly weapons, some argued, were the only reliable means of deterring Russian aggression. ... “We gave away the capability for nothing,” said Andriy Zahorodniuk, a former defense minister of Ukraine. Referring to the security assurances Ukraine won in exchange for its nuclear arms, he added: “Now, every time somebody offers us to sign a strip of paper, the response is, ‘Thank you very much. We already had one of those some time ago.’” [Idealists will never be able to understand that trash lies written on paper as treaties or agreements are as worthless as trash speeches and acted handshakes in front of TV cameras. Hitler signed endless such treaty lies and also similarly gave endless lying peace speeches and peace handshakes before his

invasions and genocide, as did Stalin and all the other dictators. The media of the 1930s lapped it up then as peacemaking, as it always

does.\"

Veterans of Kyiv rue the day they gave

nuclear arsenal ST = So The Times ih"

From Anthony Loyd, Kyiv, "Veterans of Kyiv rue the day they gave up their nuclear arsenal", Friday February 11 2022, 3.00pm,

The Times: "The general who had his finger on the button warns: Don’t give up your missiles. ... tritium boosters and fragments of SS-24 “Scalpel” rocket launch systems on tabletops, all that is left of Ukraine’s nuclear missile stockpile, once the third largest in the world, as workmen began to box them, taking them away into storage in preparation to close the office for good. 'I knew deep in my soul that we should never have given them away’ ..." - https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/step-into-the-twilight-world-of- ukraines-forgotten-nuclear-silos-ljt9g3dh8 (Only one nuclear SS18 ICBM base now remains in Ukraine, 25km north of Pervomaysk, but it is now just a tourist museum, since all of the nuclear warheads have been removed from the remaining four SS-18 ICBMs on display.)

(isa) Part 3. The birth of a new - peaceful - direction in nuclear charging

B. A. Kuprowkuy "Liquidation of an emergency gas fountain by a nuclear explosion at

PepAll-BHHHT® birthplace" (Batorin V. D., Mokshenkov M. M., Fokeev S. M. // Ai B CTaHOBNeHMM aTOMHOH apTunnepnn CCCP, No. 2, VNIIEF).

Aictopua

The first JAVA RFNC - VNIITF worked on Pamuk

Minister of Medium Mechanical Engineering, E. P. Slavsky, comm development of a small-caliber JAVA RFNC - VNIITF, where nuc batteries for artillery shells were developed.

The development of a small-caliber java was carried out in the departme specially organized for the development of designs of a nuclear charc use. However, the schematic design solutions of the primary nuclear charge for this JAVA were used the same as for the artillery nuclear charge developed in department O66.

The charge developed in the department of P.A. Esin, intendec small-caliber JAVA, was successfully tested at the Semipalat on July 15, 1967. And after the complete completion of the develc Java design as a whole, a nuclear explosion was carried out on N which ensured the clamping of an emergency gas well at the Pamuk

Regular cone: simple single primary design

Cylindrical centred: two linear

Rounded, but non-tapering end to cylinder: two spherical primaries Larger diameter: 1.5 ktikg efficiency at 1 Mt

implosion

primaries Narrow diameter:

P=Primary F=Li6D

Three major designs of thermonuclear weapons in the Russian stockpile today, based on designers testimony

List of literature

Heroes of the atomic project. Authors-compilers: N. N. Bogunenko, A. D. Pilipenko, G. A. Sosnin. / Edited by L. D. Ryabev, N. A. Boldyreva, R |. lIkaev, A. A. Brisha, B. V. Gorobets and others - Sarov. FSUE RFNC - VNIIEF. - 2005

Designer N. L. Dukhov and his School. JSC South Ural Publishing House- telstvo, Chelyabinsk, 2004

Litvinov B. V. Nuclear energy is not only for military purposes. UrO RAS, Yekaterinburg, 2002

Peaceful nuclear explosions. /Edited by N.P. Voloshin, Yu.V. Duba- sova, E.P. Kornilovich, B.V. Litvinov, etc. Moscow. Published, 2001

Nikitin A.M. Design department of nuclear charges RFNC - VNIITF, 1955-2005, Snezhinsk, 2005, (on the rights of the manuscript)

Saviet Atomic Project / Head of the Editorial Board E. A. Negin. VNIIEF, Sarov, 2000.

Creators of nuclear weapons KB-11 (RFNC - VNIIEF) Volume 1. Authors-

compilers V. T. Solgalov, E. A. Astafyeva, O. A. Pogodina. Edited by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences R. |. likaev. RFNC - VNIIEF, Sarov, 2004

ve20 ep UT warheads

Theme omajer designs of thevnerescimar wnapens is the Russian stockpile tecany, based en designers testieveony.

ABOVE: declassified Russian photo of the the 99.85% clean (fusion) Russian nuclear warhead (referred to the secret CIA report above), originally developed by E. I. Zababakhin at Russia's VNIIFT (the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics) nuclear weapons lab for "peaceful" uses, but more recently weaponised and put into the unregulated Russian tactical (aka "non-strategic") nuclear warhead stockpile, for use in coercing and overcoming Western defences which now lack purpose designed tactical nuclear weapons W54 and W79. This photo is directly taken from VNIIFT's own book A WORD ABOUT ZABABAKHIN - COLLECTION OF MEMORY (second edition, corrected and enlarged book by vniitf, published in the closed city Snezhinsk in 2016, with an Editorial foreword stating: "... the editors considered it possible to

update the biographical information of the memoirists and include previously unpublished materials, such as those declassified

Word about Zababakhin (2016)

http://vniitf.ru/data/files/books/slovooz ababahine.pdf

Campiii MasioraOapuTHEii AJePHbIN apTuINepuuckuu CHapaAy (The smallest nuclear artillery projectile)

..."'), online on their website in PDF form (along with other useful books, containing previously classified data and photos of Russian nuclear warhead designs and tests). This book states on pages 6-7 that the Russian cleaner tactical nuclear weapons were first tested in 1965 when tritium and deuterium in gaseous form replaced solid lithium deuterium, in an experiment to reduce the

yield of cleaner weapons to the minimum:

"In terms of volume and breadth of coverage, the program of physical experiments VNIITF has no analogue among all the world's nuclear weapons centers. Of particular importance was a physical experiment conducted in 1965, in which thermonuclear combustion of gaseous deuterium and gaseous deuterium-tritium mixture was carried out. This experience marked the beginning of the development of a new type of atomic charges, the use of which in thermonuclear munitions made it possible to significantly reduce their dimensions and mass, which was very important for the creation of multiple warheads of missile systems, both ground-based and underwater-based. Its results were also in demand in the creation of nuclear explosive devices (NED) for peaceful applications. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions Eugene Ivanovich paid special attention. Under his leadership, VNIITF became a leader in development and use of devices for peaceful nuclear explosions: from the conducted in the USSR 124 peaceful nuclear explosions in 75 development devices were used VNIITF. ... The experience of 1965, in the development and implementation of which Evgeny Ivanovich took personal active participation, was useful for both types of NED. ... Works performed by VNUTF under the scientific

supervision of E. I. Zababakhin were marked by high government awards: received 10 Lenin and 20 State Prizes, 4 employees of

Camoe uncT0e AJEPHO-B3PbIBHOe YCTPOMCTBO

Jif MMPHbIX IpHMeHeHui (The cleanest nuclear explosive device for peaceful applications)

VNIITF became Heroes of Socialist Labor, many employees received orders and medals of the USSR." Page 15 adds: "In recent years, the VNHP team under the leadership of E. I. Zababakhin has been actively involved in search of ways to reduce fragmentation [fission fragment residual radioactivity] activity in special atomic and thermonuclear charges of high purity, intended for overburden work. To extinguish a flowing gas well under the guidance and directly with the participation of E. I. Zababakhin, a special small- caliber atomic charge was created."

ABOVE: first Russian MIRV for SLBM was 170 kt yield, 170 kg mass warhead (1974); the first Russian MIRV for ICBM use was a 210 kt yield, 210 kg mass warhead (1978). Both of these signify the 1 kt/kg limit achievable for the small-diameter MIRV warheads (2 MIRV's in the SLBM missile, 3 warheads in the bigger ICBM), using the dual linear-implosion Russian thermonuclear design. However, Russia had earlier put 1 megaton 650 kg, i.e. 1.5 kt/kg "monoblock" (single warhead) on SLBM's in 1974. The design here was more efficient, since it used two spherical primary stages (one on each side of the central thermonuclear charge), rather than two linear-implosion primary charges around the thermonuclear charge which had to be used in the later, smaller-diameter MIRV warheads. All of these weapons employing two primary stages were less "efficient" than the single-primary two-stage Western designs, but they had advantages to Russia in terms of the reduced cost and complexity. (In WWH, cheap Russian tanks overrun more costly German Panzer tanks, because of their sheer numerical superiority: Russia could afford to employ several of their cheaper tanks to destroy one Panzer. Having two primaries means you can use simpler, cheaper primary stages, that don't require boost gas, etc. Russian warheads are mass-produced, unlike hand

crafted Western devices. It is the Ford Model-T versus the Rolls Royce Silver Ghost. Which made the most impact?)

: fee S

Warhead for the first multiple reentry vehicle of a sea-launched ballistic missile. As part of the product, a thermonuclear charge and devices of the automation system, which have minimal dimensions, are used. - developers, the project was called "One Hundred per Hundred” (to accommodate 100 kilotons of power in charge). The dense layout of the components of the warhead made it possible to create a light and small-s that meets the requirements for placing three warheads on one launch vehicle. The mass of the warhead i kt/kg objective suggests it has a yield of 170 kt if design yield was achieved. The product was put into se

The first warhead of a multiple reentry vehicle wi aiming at aiming points, weight 210 kg. The prod

:

HESS SED P oe Tuy ys

i TE SLM non-MIRV, weight 650 kg, 1 Mt. Put in se

These examples suggest that dual linear imploded primary devices gave 1 kt/kg; dual spherical primaries ¢

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The book on the history of the creation, formation and RFNC - VNIITF in the development of the atomic = operation of Test Sector 12 (NIO-12) of the External USSR Testing Department was compiled based on the A witness and participant in the events tells abou

memoirs of direct participants in nuclear testing.

2015

ISBN 978-5-902278-73-3

http://vniitf.ru/rubric/books

deeds and problems associated with the creation equipment for artillery ammunition for artillery an systems and not only. The book is addressed to a readers interested in the history of the Soviet ato and the RFNC - VNIITF. academician E.I. Zababak

RX

<€¢ > C A Notsecure | vniitf.ru/rubric/books

ain alaiala = ABOUTTHECOMPANY THESCIENCE PRODUCTSAND SERVICES PRESSCENTER CARE

RFNC - VNIITF in the development of the atomic art 2.8 open USSR

B

steuman apinneown ct Awitness and participant in the events tells about people, their deeds and problems associated with the equipment for artillery ammunition for artillery and mortar systems and not only. The book is addressed t readers interested in the history of the Soviet atomic project and the RFNC - VNIITF. academician E.1. Z

2011

ISBN 978-5-902278-57-3 UDC 623.418(09) LBC 31.4(2R36)

K43

lopment of the atomic artillery of the USSR, is available online in full here:

ats-vniitf-atompeynartillerip 2¢11/go, edn 2011 01 the secret CIA

)0 which gave evidence that Russian work in the 1960s on cleaner peac¢ wey ati-diameter dual

linear-implosion devices compressing levitated pushers with gaseous thermonuclear fuel (tritium and deuterium) was combined with tactical nuclear weapons for military use by the RFNC-VNIITF based in Snezhinsk, Russia. Such devices may well be more efficient as neutron bombs than the USA's single-primary W79 enhanced neutron weapon, which was 0.8 kt fission and only 0.3 kt fusion (if the removable D+T capsule was inserted; if not it was just a pure fission 0.8 kt linear implosion shell). Please also see this book on the assembly of the 50 megaton RDS-202 test design, again in Russian, giving further details of the general approach to nuclear warhead design by Russia, showing on page 38, chapter 4 section 4.1, "Assembly of the main module", that Tsar Bomba 50 megaton bomb's fusion charge was a hollow sphere (of Li6D) with section 4.2 indicating that it had a composite core (e.g. U235 and Pu239) fissile sparkplug (illustrated below): http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/kiryushkin_kuzkina-mat_2015/go0,0/?bookhl=

2015 book:

Chapter 4 The product "202" is prepared for full-scale tests!

(Fusion charge is hollow sphere) 4.1. Assembly of the main module

The assembly of the module was carried out exactly on schedule (09.08.56). | remember well that the next day after the assembly, where | participated in the work of the acceptance commission, a technical meeting was held [12] at the main coordinator of the Research Institute-1011 to discuss the results of theoretical design and experimental work on the product RDS-202, which | was

invited too.

‘The module was assembled under normal conditions, with uncontrolled humidity in the assembly shop. The moisture-proof coating applied to parts made of lightweight material, developed according to our technical task in the laboratory of special production (based in production buildings 33 and 26), which was led by V. N. Purusov, allowed to remove the requirements for air humidity in the assembly room. This coating has found further application and development in the nuclear dawn- completion, removing the requirements for the humidity of the assembly rooms in the mass production of this type of units.

To represent the scale of the module assembly, here is a small picture.

During the assembly of the module, before checking the gaps in the joints of the faces of the five- and six-sided elements that formed a spherical layer after laying in the lower hemisphere of the housing (as in a bowl), sending them into place to seal and align the gaps in the joints of the faces (with the aim of further

filling the gaps with gaskets) was carried out by an puipigyrs of the Istomin plant* not with his hands, and with his feet (! i

inside the bowl - the housing of the module. Of course, such an action was not

provided for in the instructions for assembling the module, but the scope of work allowed it (even required it: instead of using the efforts of the hands, use the strength of the legs), and with the permission of all members of the commission, he - a young member of the commission and an official representative of the OTC,

an athlete-athlete - found a way out of the difficult situation.

4.2. Critical mass measurements of the main node of the primary module

Before assembling the primary module, control critical mass measurements were camed out. By this time, the main node for the primary module was

See 2S ee en eee ae wee ace Combine ee te Seem mies ene Bee oe ae eee es

Translated from the Russian (book about

The product "202" is fully prepared for full-sc

they are made of a special material of a new compositi the product "202". Therefore, our experimental physi and B.A. Predein, together with V. Yu. Gavrilov, in or the physical characteristics of the node and the mat out a set of control physical measurements. This w on the equipment of KB-11 in the laboratory of B. Scib warm- Gustovsky nights of 1956. We started at about official working day ended, and all the lab workers d busy with their personal affairs. And we finished | the next day. In the process of taking measurements, repeat. It also took time to adapt to the conditions of tt and to capture the features of the material.

4.3. Acceptance of the MVK product

Acceptance of the product "202" was carried ou following order of the Minister [13].

"1. To check the 202 product manufactured in KB-’ drawings and specifications approved by the chief d Institute-1011, and to accept this product, create a comn

Iskra A.D. - Chairman of the commission, Shchelkin

K. I. - member of the commission, Negin

E. A. - member of the commission,

Grechishnikov V. F. - member of the commission,

Pokrovsky N. V. - member of the commission,

Vasyukov A.M. - member of the Commission,

Shvilkin N. G. - member of the commission.

2. Finished, assembled and accepted by the teck of KB-11 and special acceptance No. 206 products "2 together with a set of equipment equipment, a set « documentation for the product and equipment equipm and technical documentation approved by the chief ¢ Institute-1011, are presented to the commission of t

of KB-11 T. Muzrukov B. G.

3. The Act Commission on the acceptance of the |

conclusion on its suitability for testing to submit to me for approval

also received Trom Flant NO. 61/ . 1Nne GetallS OT nis node were TUITINed- | The acceptance of the product "202" was carried out by

aa Pe eer

.

LIAPb BOMBA

, WN

LEAD BELT

500 kilotons

500kt spark lo Pu/U235

KRYTRON VACUUM TUBE HIGH CURRENT, HIGH SPEED SWITCHES FOR DOUBLE PRIMARY

LEFT: rear inspection cover shown removed in film

RIGHT: nose bomb

shown in film

(nose cone removed)

THE CONNECTORS TO 2 Feat BEG Eh AHO AQAA centr od ROM GR AE if AERRY slip pM Rd Bren Tiffin fd bY compre give tritium for fusion). This better accounts for the actual weight of the device than a solid central sphere, and also explains the 2-3%

fission yield better. Two "pear-shaped" 1.6 Mt 1955 two-stage RDS37's were scaled down to 500 kt each, to act as initiators of the main

charge in 50 Mt RDS202, irradiating its pusher from both sides. (The discussion of evidence declassified of this design later in this post

will, for simplicity, omit the details of the hollow central spherical fusion charge and its fissile core.)

1.6 Mt RDS-37 (1955) NepBuyHbin Mogynb

studs Bropuynbii mogynb | | pear-shaped ae

The 500 kt bombs

used in 1961 RDS-202 | were scaled down versions

i s - a * x. hives ee MR ate x ns ae

Ae ae is (gb oy Se wey : ‘ as a5 0) rear ES Ye , ed

PLC-4

Tipemnoxenne no KCNBITaHHHO OnbIT ILIA NPOBEPKH NPHHWHNA OK!

BCACHbI OCHOBHbIC PaCHCTbI PAVOTLI YCTPOHKCTBA. [peataraemoe yctTpoiicTBo COCcTOHT M3 CAenyIO

Band J. Mepsn4unoe uanenne tuna PIC-4 (...).

2. OcHOBHOe H3aMeNHe, COCTOALIee M3 CAeAyIOW

3.) [pywesuaHpii Koxyx,|(...), B KOTOpbIi 3aK/

H3AeCH4A. OxxyaemMaa MOLLHOCTb B3pbiBa OKOAO | AIK Mm

Point 3 on test proposal |

D i = fi d f a 1955 states that RDS-37 eciassine usion shaped" and had a predic

stage design book! megaton +/- 40% uncerta

Ne 208

Oryer HAM-1011 no o60cHoBaHH KOHCTpyKUMH HM pacyetam u3geana PJIC-202

6 mions 1956 1! 6 June 1956 report on the use of the Coe. cexpemuo

tested RDS-37 two-stage thermonuclear (Oco6oit BaxHOCTH) design to develop a 25 ton, 38 megaton bomb: 9x3. No ]

RDS-202. Note that this design was changed when tested with 50 Mtin 1961 — peodenne

Ocnoenoie pacuemuvie dannoie PJTC-202

3aM. D1. KOHCTpyKTopa 3aOa6axuH E.U. HavasbHuk | cekTopa Pomanos 1O.A.

B HacTOsLeM OTYeTe H31OXKCHO OOOCHOBaHHe KOHCTpyKuMH PAC-202 u ocHos- Hbl€ paCueTHble JaHHble ITOTO H3TeNHA.

B pe3yibTate ycrneliHoro 3aBepluicHHa pador Kb-11 mo PJLC-37 u ero ucnbi- TaHHA OLLI OKOHYATeEIbHO MpOBepeH HOBbIM MPHHIUMN KOHCTpyHpoBaHua u3LeNHiK, NO3BOJAIOWIMHM CO3MaBaTb U3LeMA O4€Hb OONbUIOM MOLUHOCTH Cc BbICOKHM KITJI. PesybTaTbl Bcex padot mo H3femMI0 P/[C-37 noka3aiu, YTO Ha 3TOM TIPHHIUWNe MO- TYT ObITb CO3TaHbI H31€IHA C TPOTHOBbIM 3KBUBAICHTOM B OecamKu u OaaxKe COMHU MUANUOHO6 MOHH, a TAKXE TO3BONMIM OLCHATh HEOOXOAMMbIe JIA TAaKHX W3eHi KOJIM4eCTBa AKTHBHBIX BeLeCTB (r1aBHbIM OG6pasom Li*D).

OTH BbIBOJbI M OLEHKH VM MOCAYKHIN OCHOBaHHeM Js [BbIa4H] 3aaHHst HallicMy MHCTHTYTY Ha paspaborky HOBOrO u3HeNNA PILC-202, 3Ha4NTeNbHO NpeBocxosAMe;ro TIO MOINHOCTH BCe H3Me1HA, HCMbITAHHbIe 10 HACTOALero BpeMeHH Kak B CCCP, Tak HW B CILIA.

B 3aaHHv Ha MpOeKTHpOBaHNe MpeyCMOTpeHa MOLLHOCTb H31eIA M KOMYECTBO Li°D, KoTopoe MoxeT GbITb B HEM M3PaCXOMOBaHO, a MMeHHO NOMHbI TPOTHOBbIii 3KBUBAICHT JONKCH COCTaBUTbh 20-30 man m, o6utee KonMYecTBO Li®D (c (...)% cojlepxkaHuem u30Tona Li%) — no (...) monn.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: No 208

NII-1011 report on the justification of the design and calculations of the RDS-202 product NOTE: This 6 June 1956 report states that they can produce up to about 38 Mt from a 25 ton bomb, using RDS-37 principles. The later revised design used the 1958 tested

Trutnev "double 1 Basic calculation data of RDS-202

June 6, 1956 1 Sov. secret (of special importance) Ext. No. 1

SOURCE:

Atomic project of the USSR: documents and m [in 3 volumes] / Ed. ed. L. D. Ryabeva. - 1998-2 Hydrogen bomb, 1945-1956. Book. 2 / State. at corporation. Energy "Rosatom"; comp.: G. A. ( (responsible comp.), P. P. Maksimenko. - 2009

B pe3yibTaTe COrnacoBaHHA TpeboBaHuii, BbITeEKAIOLUMX M3 KOHCT] WM BO3MOXHOCTeH CaMOseTa-HOCHTeAA, YCTAHOBJCHbI JOMYCTHMBbIit BcCerO M3e0HH, a AMCHHO:

obumi Bec — do ~25 m, auametp — 00(...) M.

lo YcHOBMSM VCMbITAaHHA B3PbIB WOIKeH ObITh NPOM3BeeH Tp v3qemua c camoueta. IIpu B3pbIBe CTOAb 3HAYHTEAbHOM CHJIbI CMH! co60M COXpaHHTb CaMOeT-HOCHTeb OT DelicTBMA TemOBOrO M3Ty" TIPHMeHEHHE MapallliOTa IIA M3Me/1MA, CHJIbHO 3aMeIsiollee ero Ma JIMHOLUee CAMONETY 3a 3TO BPeMA YHTH Ha OoNbLUIOe paccTosHHe.

HeoOxouMoctb MpHMeHHTb Mapalitor noTpedopalia pacxooBa YaCTH M3 AMEIOIIAXCA BECOB H OGbEMOB, KOTOPBIe B MPOTHBHOM Ciy HCNONb3OBaHbI AIA MOBBILMEHHA 3:peKTHBHOCTH OCHOBHOH YacTH |

PC-202 noctpoeHo no npuHunny PJ|C-37 u otmmyaetcs OT } YMTCIbHDIMM Pa3MepaMH, CBA3AHHbIM C 3THM 3AaMCTHO JIYULUMM UM sepHoro ropouero U ropa310 Hobe abcoMTHOM MOLIHOCTHIO.

(ics)

PacueTHoe oOcreqoBaHHe psa BaPMaHTOB KOHCTpyKUMH OBLIO Beca Li°D oKono (...) K2, H OHO MOKa3a0, YTO B JIYYLUEM M3 O6C PHAHTOB MOILHOCTh 3€Me€THO MpPeBOCXOJUT MepBOHAYaMbHO HaMeye M WocTHraer no pacuety 38 mH T?. B cBa3H C STMM pe3yIbTaTOM Ki mia PJIC-202 Moxert ObITb 3HaYHTeEAbHO YMCHbIICHO.

. ) Maktu4ieckad MOLLHOCTh HOJLKHa GbITb HECKOJIbKO BbILLe, T.K. o6pa3y1ouni B JeHCTBHTeIbHOCTH AeMTCA C GObUIMM Ce4eHHeM, 4eM NIPHHSTO B pacue;e,

48]

(Note: the planned RDS202 test was postpon 1957 after successful tests of products 245 an the basic concept of RDS202, being a very hig around 25 tons was resurrected later.)

As a result of the coordination of the requirements arising from the desig product and the capabilities of the carrier aircraft, the permissible weight and size of product are established, namely:

total weight - up to ~ 25t, diameter - up to (...) m.

approach" system, about 2.5 times Deputy Chief Designer Zababakhin E.l. Head of Sector 1 Romanov Yu.A.

more efficient. introduction

This report outlines the rationale for the design of the RDS-202 and the basic design data of this product.

As a result of the successful completion of the work of KB-11 on RDS-37 and its testing, a new principle of product design was finally tested , which makes it possible to create products of very high power with high efficiency. The results of all work on the RDS-37 product showed that products with a TNT equivalent of tens or even hundreds of millions of tons can be created on this principle , and also allowed us to estimate the amounts of active substances necessary for such products (mainly Li°D).

These conclusions and assessments served as the basis for [issuing] a task to our institute for the development of a new RDS-202 product, significantly exceeding in power all products tested to date both in the USSR and in the USA.

The design assignment provides for the capacity of the product and the amount of Li °D that can be consumed in it, namely, the total TNT equivalent should be 20-30 million tons, the total amount of Li ° D (with (...) % content

of the isotope Li °) - up to (...) tons.

According to the test conditions, the explosion must be produced when the product is dropped from the aircraft. With an explosion of such a signific force, the only way to save the carrier aircraft from the effects of thermal radiation is to use a parachute for the product, which greatly slows down its f and allows the aircraft to go a long distance during this time.

The need to use a parachute required the expenditure of some of the available weights and volumes, which could otherwise be used to increase the efficiency of the main part of the product.

RDS-202 is built on the principle of RDS-37 and differs from it only in significant dimensions, associated with this noticeably better use of nuclear fuel and much greater absolute power.

(...)

A design survey of a number of design variants was carried out for a we of Li°D of about (...) Kg, and it showed that in the best of the surveyed variants, the power significantly exceeds the originally intended value and reaches 38 million t* according to the calculation. Due to this result, the of Li°D for RDS-202 can be significantly reduced.

“the actual power should be slightly higher, because the U237 formed during the ex actually divided with a larger cross-section than is accepted in the calculation.

481

1949 far left 1955 left

joe1 joe17

Soviet nuclear torpedo test at Novaya cloud rising from the surface of the se underwater nuclear torpedo test. This took place on 21 September 1955 at tl Site Novaya Zemlya) of a torpedo desi The location was NZ Area A, Chyornay Russia. The yield was 3.5 kilotons of 1 positioned at distances ranging from < kilometres. Among the ships were fou submarines, minesweepers and seaplz sheep, 100 dogs, and other animals ws Only one ship was sunk by the explosi 300 metres from the explosion.

1953 400kt h bomb

Academician Yu.B.Khariton in the RFNC- VNIIE museum near the body of the RDS-1 bomb. Museum of Nuclear Weapons RFNC- VNNIEF, 1993

This was a

cop

American

shown

below

General view of the 1949 test shortly after the explosion from a distance of 5000 meters along the southeast radius. (Minatom archive )

Bapbie nepsok aromHonw Gombe: PJIC-1 Explosion of the first atomic bomb (RDS -1)

General view of the 1949 test shortly after the explosion from a distance of 5000 meters along the southeast radius. (Minatom archive )

Coo6menne TACC:

«B cooTseTcTBHH C ILIAHOM HAYYHO-HCC/IeOBATEILCKHX H 3KCICPHMeHTAJIb- HEIX paGoT B NocelHHe 1HH B CopetcKom Conse Obu10 npoBeeHo HCOEITaHHe OAHOTO H3 BHOB ATOMHOTO OpYKHA, 11€1bi0 HCOBITAHHA Oni10 H3yYeHHe Nelic- TBHA ATOMHOTO B3phiBa. [IpH HCOITaHHH NOAYYeHBI WeHHbe Pe3yAbTATHI, KO- || TOPbI€ MOMOFYT COBETCKHM YYCHEIM H HIDKeHeEpaM YCNeUIHO PeNIHTS 3a/1aqH 10

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TOUKOrO BOMCKOBOIO yYeHKA (CeHTAGPb 1954 r.) we Sona paanycon 300 Je mycom 500m — VW BKsIafy MOCKOBCKHX YYeHbIX \ sete ae a B AQepHble VCNbITAaHNA “ Adanpertvou aCapmovebod + Sotee (wt) 12xm Iinm [0mm 9xm 8kM 7am Gam Sum 4m Jum 2em xm UKM IK Macwra6uaz wKaaa NonoxeHve PPA! 3ANPETHON JOHbI 4 CxXeMa AEACTAMA BORCK Ha NpoBOAMAWweMcA 14.09.1954 Yenownme oGosnayenna: C5 - cTpenxosnit Gatanbon; MCB — morocTpenkosmi GaTanon, NO - nepegosod orpan; wm BPeMA vw Nog o6wer pemakuvenr Hay4HOro pyKOBOANTeNA Neutron induced activity, R/hr Hace toctaetetin la ~ a PAL, BHAN3®, akagemuka PAH B.H. Muxainosa SSS a ae co eS) Re EN Sa ee ee ae a SS en en ae ae ae a ae ES ee Se SSS eS ee oe ae Se ee ee MOCKBA 40 kt RDS4 Russian tactical nuclear troop test at 350m altitude on 14 September 1954 near Totskoye. 2006 WW2Z hero Marshall Zhukov sent 45,000 troops into the fallout area, 140 R/hr at 30 mins at 200 m radius!

ABOVE: 40 kt RDS4 Russian test, air dropped and detonated 350m above the Totskoye, 14 September 1954, in WW2 hero Marshall Zhukov's exercise of 45,000 Russian troops in tactical nuclear war (copying America's Nevada "Desert Rock" nuclear tests with troops in

trenches near GZ). A whole book has been published about the radiation effects from this test, showing that the gamma radiation

was 140 R/hr at 30 minutes, at 200 m from ground zero, decaying to 0.8 R/hr at 24 hours, and that a peak fallout gamma dose rate of 100 mR/hr occurred 1.5 hours after burst 70 km downwind, where the fallout pattern was 23 km wide. (These are useful data to have, since Russia has not yet openly published anything like America's DASA-1251 fallout patterns compendium.) This is relevant to the whole question of whether Russia really thinks it can use tactical nuclear weapons for military objectives in a limited war: it

has actually done the nuclear tests long ago. It is not theoretical!

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By the eariy 1960s there was a good deal of hard evidence that . considerable amount of shelter space in factories as well as public anc apartment buildings had been built, and that the Moscow and Lenin grad subways had been equipped with concealed blast doors at thi entrances to the station platforms and in connecting crosswalks.* Ar ongoing debate in the U.S. at that time concerning the existence of ¢ Soviet civil defense program was largely resolved when, in 1962, U.S military attaches and newsmen visited the Permanent Civil Defens¢ Exhibit in Moscow and learned how to identify the telltale externa features of Soviet shelters, namely their emergency exits, which ar: normally located at some distance from the building housing the shel ter. Commenting on his visit to this exhibit, New York Times corre spondent Seymour Topping reported in March 1962:

The above ground extensions of shelters now identifiable have been found to be numerous in Moscow. Travelers have seen them in other Soviet cities too. . . . These installations can be seen in the courtyards at various distances from public buildings.”

Similiarly, the Reuters correspondent wrote that

The exhibit showed that in a construction oe after the war an extensive system of shelters in basements of office and apartment build- ings was laid out."

At the same exhibit, the correspondents learned to recognize the concealed blast doors in the subways, being shown a Soviet film which revealed how “steel doors would be lifted into place by hydraulic jacks to seal off arched entrances to the platforms.’’* Unfortunately, with the rotation of U.S. Embassy personnel and newsmen, the knowledge of how to recognize Soviet shelters was subsequently lost by Americans stationed in Moscow.

‘Goure, Civil Defense in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press 1962), pp. 79-110.

“Ibid. See also Gouré, Testimony before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Armed Service: Committee of the House of Representatives, June 17, 1963.

7The New York Times, March 23, 1962, [Emphasis added.)

“Washington Post, March 25, 1962. [Emphasis added.]

‘The New York Times, March 23, 1962.

shelters are built primarily of reinforced concrete blocks, 2-3 feet thick, and 4-5 feet long, or concrete plates or panels up te 15 cen- timeters thick.

Depending on the purpose, the walls of detached and basement shelters are from 0.5 to 1.2 meters thick, and more in the case of special shelters. The roofs of basement shelters are designed to be able to bear the weight of the collapsed building above, most often being made of either prefabricated reinforced plates or cast reinforced concrete, 12 centimeters to 50 centimeters thick. In shelters 12 or more meters wide, the roof will usually be supported by pillars of rein- forced concrete every six meters. In some cases, a layer of sand is placed between two layers of reinforced concrete plates. In the case of detached shelters, the roof plates will be covered by some three feet of earth.

Considerable attention is paid to the planning and design of hasty blast shelters, making use of various precast reinforced concrete structural components, such as pipes with a diameter of 1.5-2 meters, as well as reinforced concrete blocks 2-3 feet thick and plates or steel plates.*? Normally, such shelters are built in a trench with a right angle or straight entrance and blast doors, and the concrete structure is then covered with 2-4 feet of earth. As was noted, such shelters are estimated to be able to withstand from 14.2 to 46.8 psi overpressure.

The wide variety of fallout shelters is designed primarily to provide effective protection against radiation, rather than blast overpressure. Basements in one-story houses or semibasements can be adapted by bricking in the windows and banking earth against the walls, as well as by placing 1-2 feet of earth on the floor above and reinforcing the ceiling with several upright beams. This is said to increase the attenu- ation coefficient by 300.5* For dugouts and covered trenches, use can be made of round timber, boards, bricks, sheet metal, fascines, and so on, covered with 2-3 feet of earth. The degree of radiation attenuation will vary (between 10 and 550), depending on whether the shelter has straight or right angle entrances, and whether 1, 2 or 3 feet of earth is used as cover. According to Soviet publications, such a shelter with a

8, August 1972, Deas ind “Where Thane eM tame nyratee 174 p24 Young Zant No 5, May 1975, 39 lahuowah | Oberona, P-

*Akimov and Il'in, Grazhdanskaia Oborona na Obektakh, p. 174.

Possibly indicative | space capacity is the Lytkarino (populatio in one district with a onstrated that there \

"Krasnaia Zvezda, Januar

1949 RDS-1 nuclear test target array la

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cee

ANTI-RADIATION SHELTERS MADE OF TIMBER

SUCH SHELTERS CAN BECOME THE MOST WIDESPREAD, SINCE WIDELY AVAILABLE MATERIAL IS USED FOR THEIR CONSTRUCTION-UNTREATED LOGS, POLES, AS WELLAS STRUCTURES OF OLD WOODEN BUILDINGS.

THESE STRUCTURES WEAKEN THE EFFECT OF RADIATION BY 200 TO 400 TIMES, DEPENDING ON THE DEPTH AND THICKNESS OF THE SOIL DUSTING.

iota Anti-Radiation shelters made of timber poster: protection factors of 200-400 (50-70cm earth cover)

. Ostensible Crisis

. Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Gestures

. Solemn and Formal Declarations

. Hardening of Positions—Confrontation of Wills

. Show of Force

. Significant Mobilization

. “Legal” Harassment—Retortions

. Harassing Acts of Violence

. Dramatic Military Confrontations

. Provocative Breaking Off of Diplomatic Relations . Super-Ready Status

. Large Conventional War (or Actions)

. Large Compound Escalation

. Declaration of Limited Conventional War

. Barely Nuclear War

. Nuclear “Ultimatums”

. Limited Evacuation (Approximately 20 per cent) . Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force

. “Justifiable” Counterforce Attacks

. “Peaceful” World-Wide Embargo or Blockade

. Local Nuclear War—Exemplary

. Declaration of Limited Nuclear War

. Local Nuclear War—AMilitary

. Unusual, Provocative, and Significant Countermeasures . Evacuation (Approximately 70 per cent)

. Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior

. Exemplary Attack on Military

. Exemplary Attacks Against Property

. Exemplary Attacks on Population

. Complete Evacuation (Approximately 95 per cent) . Reciprocal Reprisals

. Formal Declaration of “General” War

. Slow-Motion Counter-“Property” War

. Slow-Motion Counterforce War

. Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo

. Constrained Disarming Attack

Rung 37. Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack

= -=

ZA Diagram of a Basement Shelter in a Six-Story, Expedient S Non-Industrial Building

Inclined Ramp

Shelters made of pipes (diameter 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3 meters)

1/2 Height of Building

ee ere ced B

H 4 EEE 3 =

("Wg “>

Z | ae % H = j 7

2 Sh 5

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Basement Shelter in the center of a building basement: (1) compartments; (2) exits; (3) and (4) protective airtight doors; (5) louvered wooden door; (6) vestibule; (7) protective airtight shutters; (8) shutter with dust filter; (9) filter-ventilation chamber; (10) lavatories; (11) exhaust duct; (12) sealing safety valve; (13) basic air intake duct; (14) pressurized pipes; (15) emergency exit; (16) adjoining chamber; (17) airtight safety shutter in emergency exit; (18) floating cutoff valve; (19) vent cap of the emergency exit; (20) wooden louver

erating

6000 mm_ | 6000 mm | 6000 mm

Basement Shelters Types RK25, OMK

2.4 X2.4 m. TB-3

Emergency Exit 4; and | q 4 Ventilation Tunnel i} ni.

(1) storage for reserve of drinking water; (2) storage for a five-day supply of food; (BD) hermetically-sealing metal doors, height 1.8 m

Pillars of reinforced concrete 0.65 m X 0.65 m X 3m

REMARKS: All dimensions are in millimeters

#@¢22~—675

Cross Section of a Basement Shelter Using Prefabricated = a . F 2 nds dnd Coase Mielehsnaeemcaaee Gite Dr Leon Goure, Shelters in Soviet War Survival Strategy, ADA053.

a

—

AN 6 KT UNDERWA’

re

RUSSIAN 3.5 KT UNDERWATER TEST IN 1955 RUSSI

Joe-4 (RDS-6) 400 kt Teller "alarm clock"-design H-bomb photo taken 15 seconds after detonation 12 August 1953

28 KT RDS-4 AIR BURST AT 600 M ALTITUDE, 1953

5.B. AUT

ATOMHAA

HE TOSIbI BOEHHbIxX

Litvinov BV Atomic energy not only for military purposes: monograph / BV Litvinov; Russian Academy of Sciences, Ural branch. - Yekaterinburg, 2004. - 560 pp

550

COMEPKAHME

Or autopa Fpenucaosne ..

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AEP!

OP Enna KOMMLNEKC

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

The XX! Century Encyclopedia

Volume 14. Nuclear Weapons Complex

This volume is dedicated to Russia's most sophisticated indus- try — development, operation and utilization of nuclear munitions, and nuclear power. Special atten- tion is given to nuclear and radia- tion safety, ecology and safety of storage of nuclear materials.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

Publishing House «Arms and Technologies» The XX! Century Encyclor

s Russia's Arms and Technol Russia’s Arms and Technologies

Tha YVYYI fantuew Eneurclanodia

COAEPKAHUE

C. Vsavios Anepusiié opyxetnpit komnnekc

C. Kupwexxo O coctrosumu 4 nepcnextusax AQepHOorO

opyxeHoro KOMNNeKCa M ATOMHOK BHEpreTHKH.........8 ...-

W. Kamencnnx Hay4Ho-npowssoAcTseHHbild CeKTop agepHoro opyxeHoro Komnnexkca Poccun

JI. Pabes

Aromupiii npoext CCCP wm coppemennoctTb...........

PA3PABOTKA ABEPHbIX BOENPMNACOB

-.34

CONTENTS

S. Ivanov Nuclear Weapons Complex

S. Kirienko State and Prospects of the Nuclear Weapons Complex and Nuclear Power

1, Kamenskikh Scientific and Production Sector of the Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex

L. Ryabev Nuclear Project of the USSR and Present Time

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR MUNITIONS

Koopaunauma paspa6otok, nepegayu Ha BOOpyxeHHe

vw conposoxgeHns akcnnyaTaunn agepHbix Goenpunacos . .

Fyn «POCCHACKMH DEAEPANbHbIA SAAEPHbIN WEHTP - BCEPOCCHACKMA HAY4HO-MCC/IEMOBATENbCKMA MHCTUTYT

SKCNEPUMEHTASIbHOM OU3MKM» (POAL-BHUKS®) ... 46

O6pasup! agepHoro opyxua

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Coordination of Nuclear Munitions Developments, Commissioning and In-service Support

FSUE «RUSSIAN FEDERAL NUCLEAR CENTER — ALL-RUSSIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS» (VNIIEF)

Milestones of the VNIIEF Efforts and Achievements

Specimens of Nuclear Weapons (Exhibits of the VNIIEF Museum) USSR's first A-bomb

First serial tactical A-bomb

.. First H-bomb

First nuclear warhead for tactical missile

~ Thermonuclear combat unit for the first

intercontinental ballistic missile with a multiple reentry warhead First nuclear warhead for medium-range

. ballistic missile

First thermonuclear warhead for intercontinental ballistic missile

: World's most powerful experimental

H-bomb

Thermonuclear warheads for operational

tactical missiles

Thermonuclear combat unit

for medium-range missile with a multiple reentry warhead

Nuclear Weapons Activities Theoretical research and mathematical

. modeling

Research and development

.. Gas-dynamic research . Nuclear radiation research

Research in laser and high-temperature plasma physics

Testing complex

Production and technology complex

Safety assurance

Safety assurance in operation of nuclear munitions

Physical protection, accounting and control

of nuclear materials and radioactive substances

. ADMS operation

Disposal of decommissioned munitions

Fundamental and Applied Research Theoretical calculation and simulation

of physical processes

Research in inertial thermonuclear fusion

Studies for development of nuclear-pumped con- tinuous wave lasers

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Milestones of

1946 - 9 anpens ebiluno NpaBuTenbCTaeHHOe NOcTaHoBNe- 1946 — goverr uve O CO3AaHMM NepBOorO B CTPaHe CNelManvu3aupoBaHHoro the country's firs Hay4HO-UCCNeAOBATEN’CKOFO MW NPOV3SBOACTBeHHOrO LIeEHTpa (KB-11) for de: KB-11 Aan KOHCTPyMpOBaHUA VM M3FOTOBNEHMA «PeaKTMBHbIX (RDS).

Asuratenei C» (PAC). 1948-1954 -

1948-1954 - npennoxex, paspaboraH “ peanv3oBaH HO- tiation proposed BbIA NPMHUMN HEATPOHHOFO VHMUMMPOBaHUA ALEPHbIX 3apA- significantly the QOB, YTO NOSBONWUNO CYWIECTBEHHO NOBbICMTb SddeKxtus- 1949 - the F HOCTb MX AEMCTBMR. built; it was usec

1949 - nocTpoena yctaHoska PKBH (d@usuyeckuit KoTen masses of plul Ha ObICTPbIX HEMTPOHAX), Ha KOTOPOH ObiInw akcNepYMeHTanb- nuclear charges HO oOnpegeneHbi KpMTMYeCKMe MaCCbI NAyTOHNA-239 mu ypa- (RDS-1) was suc Ha-235 2A NepBbIX ATOMHbIxX 3apAgoB POC-1 u POC-2. 29 as- Site on August 2 rycta yCnewHo ucnbirava nepgas CoBeTCKaA aTOMHas Gom6a 1951 — an A-t PQC-1 #a CemunanatuHckom nonuroHe. pression system

1951 — npoBefeHo nepsoe BOsRyWHOe ucnbITaHve aTom- tion made it pos HOM GomMO6bI C KaYeCTBEHHO HOBOM CucTemMo” ObecneYeHuA RDS-1 and mor ccpepuyeckoro o6xkaTus. HosopsemeHue NO3BONMAO yMeHb- 1953 - the ch WMTb Maccy H3nenuA No CcpaBHeHuio Cc PJIC-1 vw yBenu4untTe air bomb tested €FO MOLWHOCTb Gonee 4eM B Ba paza. 1955 — a ther

1953 - 12 asrycra ucnbiraH 3apag ana nepeok Trepmoagep- compression ph HOM TpaHcnopTabenbyon aBuabombpl. 1957 - a bre

mance of nuclei 1958 - a ther circuit tested, wi monuclear weaj 1961 - an H- Zemlya Test Sit power nuclear v 1962 - the firs developed ther 1961-1966 — charges with as orated and grou construction of 1966 - a ther demonstrated t its specific perf 1966-1980 - nuclear explosit systems. 1967-1981 - considerably, p design based or 1970 - the fir try warheads we 1970-1975 - hardware comp full-scale nucle international an 1971-1975 - iron, tungsten ¢ sures measurec

r = f = | ei? \ | a \f i a te de | of f\ a 1970-1980 -

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1955 - 22 Hon6px ucnbiTaH TEPMOAAeDHbIN 3apAA C NPHH- unnvanbHo HOBOM cbusuyecxon cxemoi aTomuHoro o6xkaTuR.

1957 - o6ecneyen npopbis B NOBRIWEHMM yYAeNbHbIX xapak- TEPVCTUK AAEPHbIX 3apAAoB.

1958 - ucnbiraH TepMongepHbild 3apag Cc ycopepweHcTso- BaHHOW MusMyeckon CxemMoOM, KOTOPaA era B OCHOBY pasBn- THA TEPMOALEPHOrO OpyKuA

1961 - 30 oxra6pa ucnbiraha BOQOpOnHAaA GOMGa MOLHOCTbIO 50 meraToHH Ha HogosemenbcKkom nonvroHe. NosTaepxgeHa BO3MOXHOCTb COSAaHMA CBEPXMOLUHOFO AQEPHOrO OpyxuE.

PASPABOTKA AQEPHbIX BOENPMNACOB

<=> OGpa3yb! AZepHoro opyKkuaA (aKcnoHaTDI My3en P@AL-BHUMS®)

Specimens of Nuclear Weapons (Exhibits of the VNIIEF Museum)

Nepsaa atomHan 60m6a CCCP USSR’s first A-bomb Ageproi4 sapag ucnbitak 29 asrycta 1949 roga Ha Cemn- The nuclear charge was tested at the Semipalatinsk Test nanaTMHCkOM nonwrone. MousHOCcTb 3apaga go 20 KT TpoTu- Site on August 29, 1949. Yield: up to 20 kt.

AOBOTO 3SKBUBANeHTA.

O6pasub! agepHoro Opyxua (My3eA POAL|-BHUNS®) Specimens of nuclear wee

Nepsan TakTuyeckan First serial cepuunan aTOMHan 6om6a tactical A-bomb Vicnbitava 6 1953 roay Ha CemunanarMHcKom nonuroxe. Tested at the Semipal

MouwkocTb gapraga go 30 KT TpoTunoBoro ekaveanenta. Ha 30 kt. In service in 1954- BoopyxeHun c 1954 no 1965 rona.

Nepean BogopogHan G6omb6a First H-bomb AgepHbiA saps ucnbitaH 12 asrycta 1953 roga Ha Cemnu- The nuclear charge v nanaTMHCKOM nonwroHe. MouwHocTb 3apaga £0 400 Kt TpoTn- Site on August 12, 1953

AOBOrO BKBNBAaNEHTA.

wh

Pa3pa6oTka agepHbix 6oenpunacoB Development of nuclear munitions Nepsas agepHan 6oeBan YacTb First nuclear warhead ANA TAKTUYECKON pakeTbI for tactical missile MouwHocT’ 3apafa no 10 kT TpoTMNoBoro aKBuBaneHtTa. Jlanb- Yield: up to 10 kt. Range: up to 32 km. In service in HOCTb NoneTa 0 32 KM. Ha BOOpyKeHMU Cc 1960 AO 1967 roga. 1960-1967.

TepmosgepHbin 6oeBon 6noK Thermonuclear combat unit ANA NEpBOW Me@*XKOHTMHEHTAaNbHOU for the first intercontinental OannucTuyeckou pakeTbi ballistic missile with a multiple Cc pasgensrowenca ronoBHoU 4acTbtoO reentry warhead

MouwiHocT’ 3apaga Gonee 2 Mr TpoTMnoBoro 3aKBuBaNeHTa. Yield: over 2 Mt. Range: up to 12,000 km. In service in wee noneta Ao 12 000 km. Ha soopyxexuu c 1970 zo 1970-1979.

geet). > ee as a ee es ES es ES a Se.

O6paaub! AepHOrO Opyxua (myser POAL-BHUMS®) Specimens of nuclear wea

Nepsaa agepHan 6oeBan YaCTb First nuclear wat ana Gannuctuyeckon pakerTbli for medium-rang cpegHero paguyca gencTBuA ballistic missile

MowHocTb 3apaga ao 40 KT TpoOTMNOBOrO akBuBaNeH- Ta. flanbuocTs noneta go 1200 km. Ha BoopyxexHun C 1955 no 1960 roga.

Nepsaa TepmMosfepHan 6oeBan 4AaCTb First thermonuc AA M@XKKOHTMHEHTANbHOU for intercontiner 6annUcTMYeCKON pakeTbI ballistic missile

MowHoctb 3apsaa 40 3 Mt rpormnosoro aksueanenta. Janb- Yield: up to 3 Mt. Ra

HocTb noneta Ao 8500 xm. Ha soopyxexmn c 1960 no 1966 rona. 1960-1966.

Paspa6otka sgepHbix 6Goenpunacos Development of nuclear munitions O6pasub! agepHoro opyxuaA (myse” POAU-BHAUS®) Specimens of nuclear wee

Camas MOLWHas B Mupe World’s most powerful TepmosgepHbin 6oeBon 6NOK Thermonuclear |

SKCNepuMeHTaNbHaa experimental AA pakeTbI CpegHero paguyca fevcTBua = for medium-ranc

BOfOpomAHan 6om6a H-bomb c pasqensrowevica rOnoBHOU YacTbtO with a multiple r Ucneitaka 30 oxrs6pa 1961 roga Ha nonuroHe «Hosan Tested to half-yield at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site on —

Gemnn» Ha NONOBMHHYIO MOLWHOCTb. PacueTHa® MOUHOCTb October 30, 1961. Estimated yield: over 100 Mt. Gonee 100 Mt TpoTunoBoro okaveanenta.

CymmapHas MOLIHOCTb 3apagia 0 400 kT TpoTMAOBoro aKBu- Total yield: up to 400 k saneHTa. fanbHocTb noneta 20 5000 km. Ha BoopyxeHmu c 1976 1976-1991. Decommiss Ao 1991 ropa. CHata c BoopyxeHusa no Jlorosopy o PCM.

Tepmosgepubie 6oesbie 4acTu Thermonuclear warheads ANA ONepaTMBHO-TaKTMYeCKMX PpakeT for operational tactical missiles

1 — Hepean mepmondepnan boesaa 4acmn dan onepamuano-maxmureckon paxemot.

Mownocms sapada do 300 km mpomusoeoeo oxeusasenma. Jlaruocms nosema do 900 Km. Ha eoopywenuu ¢ 1965 do 1986 eoda,

2 — Tepmoadepnaa Goesan acme dan onepa- mueno-makmuneckou paxembi.

Mownocms sapada do 200 Km mpomusosoeo oeusaasenma, Jlatonocms nosema do 450 xm. Ha soopymcenuu ¢ 1981 do 1991 coda, Cxama ¢ eoopy- awenua no Jlozosopy 0 PCM.

1 — First thermonuclear warhead for opera- tional tactical missile.

Yield: up to 300 kt. Range: up to 900 km. In ser- vice in 1965—1986.

2 — Thermonuclear warhead for operational tactical missile.

Yield: up to 200 kt. Range: up to 450 km. In ser- vice in 1981-1991. Decommissioned under the INF Treaty.

NDS S aS Sn SR ER a De ia 5 ee

56

AgepHo-opyxKewHaR AeATeENbHOCTE

Nuclear weapons activities

ux HeEOGxOAUMYyIO ANA pacyeToB MHcPopMaLuio O CBOnCT- Bax BeWWECTB, OTPabOTaHb!i HOBIE TeEXHONOrMM NpoBese- HVA PACHETHO-TeOpeTMYeCKMX PaGOT NO OCHOBHbIM Hanpa- BNEHVAM MEATENbHOCTU.

CeppesHbie ycnexm @ocTMrHyTbI CneuManucTamM MHCTH- TyTa 8 cneayloumx OGnacTax:

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yeckux npoueccos;

t= 15 mxc t=15us

The VNIIEF specialists have succeeded in the following areas:

- computer-aided simulation of multivariative nuclear explo- sion and laser physics problems in a complete closed state- ment with all leading physical processes taken into account;

- studies into characteristics of turbulence; it has been for the first time that results of a range of experimental measure- ments were interpreted through direct numerical simulation of gravitational turbulent mixing using multiprocessor com- puters;

Ipouece de@opmaxuu Mamepuaaa npu éneunem 6oweicmenn A material deformation process at external effects

- uecnegoBaHve xapaxTepucTuk Typ6yneHTHOCTH: Bnep- BbIe NYTeM NpAmoro YuCNeHHOrO MOAeAMPOBaHHA rpaBuTa- uwoHHorO Typ6yneHTHOrO NepemewMBaHMA Ha MHOrONpo- ueccopHbix SBM yaanocb OObACHUTb pesynbTate! paga SKCNEPMMEHTa/bHbIX MSMEPEHMH;

Modeauposanue npoyeccos mepmMoadepnozo cunmeza Thermonuclear fusion simulation process

- development of multiprocessor computer systems and up-to-date computer networks;

7

Paspa6orka aAgepHbiIx Goenpunacos

3danue (1) w cobepureckar Kamepa esaumodeicmeun (2) yemanoexu + Hexpa-S+

The «Iskra-S» building (1) and spherical interaction chamber (2)

(ypoBeHb HEOQHOpOAHOcTH < 3%) CumMeTpMIO PeHTreHOB- CkOro NONA Ha NOBEPXHOCTH Cepnyeckon MuKPOMMWeHY u OCYWECTBHTb YHMKaNbHEIe HCCNegosaHuA CxKaTHA OOONOYeK c DT-Tonnveom 8 CuMMeTpMHbIxX ycnosuax. MpoBegerbt 3KC- NepMMeHTabHble MCCNEQOBAHMA BNMAHMA ACMMMeTpMH OG6O- NOYKM VW PEHTTEHOBCKOrO NONA Ha 3OMeKTMBHOCTe PaboTb! TEPMOAAEPHON MUWERM, PeSyNbTaTb! KOTOPbIX NpoaHanusu- poOBaHbI C NOMOLIbIO AByMep-

Development of |

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VU

J7

Biprse codopoduot bomber PAC-37 22 noabpa 1955 2oda na Cemunasamuncxom noaueone Explosion of the RDS-37 H-bomb at the Semipatatinsk test site on November 22, 1955

667

In the morning of September 21, 1955, the USSR's first under- water nuclear explosion was conducted in the Chernaya Bay by detonation of the T-5 torpedo warhead at a depth of 12 m. Its yield was 3.5 kt. Following automatic generation of the signal to detonate the torpedo charge, a vast pillar of water with a crown of a brightly white cloud rose from the sea. One could perfectly see as the water pillar crown evolved, gases broke through it and the base surge curl formed.

Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy led and was respon- sible for the first underwater nuclear test.

UcnbitaHva agepHelx Goenpunacoe uM nonuroHel

Tests of nuclear munitions ;

71-4 nonuroH BBC

VM BOUCKOBbIe yYeHuA

Ha TOL|KOM nonuroHe

Cc NpY“MeHeHMeM ATOMHOM GomO6bI

B 1950-1951 rofax wna nogrotosKa K nepsomy ucnbiTa- Hui0 B CCCP aromHoli Gombe! PO.C-3 co c6pocom ee c camo- neta 8 pexume Soesoro GomGbomerTaHua. Takoe nepsoe uc- MblTaxMe CocToAnocb 18 oxTa6ps 1951 rofa Ha Cemunana- TMHCKOM Nonurove: aBMaGomGa MOWHOCTbIO 42 KT GbiNa B30- PBaHa Hag ero ONbITHbIM NoneM Ha BbIcoTe 380 m. Tak Bnep- Bbie 8 CCCP 6bin nponssegeH Bo3sayWHEI AB. U atoT pe- 3yNbTAaT, NO CyWECTBY, ABM/ICA OCHOBO!t ANA NPHHATMA pewe- Hui 06 OcHaweHMN CoBeTCKux BBC agepHbim opykvem: 6pl- no OpraHv3s0BaHO AQepHOe NpoussogCcTBO aBuabom6 PIIC-4 vx HOCHTeNenh — Camonertos Ty-4,

B rocyfapcTBeHHONW CucTeme opranusauun vu npoBe”e- Hus AVY Gonbwyt0 ponb Cbirpan 71-4 nonuron BBC, pacno- noxeHHbi4 B Kpbimy (6 patone noc. Bareposo), KoToppii 6bin Co3qaH B aprycte 1947 roga. Ero nn4nei CoctTas B 1949-1962 rogax y"yacTsoBan B 178 AAepHbIX UCNbITaHMAX: Ha CMM — 8 94 AV, Ha CANHS - 8 83 wv ewe B OAHOM —- Ha Toukom nonuroxe, 8 xofe BOMCKOBOrO yYeHUA C NPYMeHe- HMEM a@TOMHOM GomOb! B pexume GombomeTanua c Gonbwiow BbICOTHI.

Ha 3Tom nonwroke BBC nogBepranvich TAKKe COOTBETCTBYKO- LUM MiCnbITaHisiM M CAMONeTbI — HOCMTeNM aTOMHbIx Gom6, ui Ca- monetei-na6opatopun: Ty-16, An-28 u Cy-76 (Ha CIN); Ty-16, Ty-35 4 3M (Ha CVNH3); otpa6atbisanca Be-12, KoTopbiit npo- XOOMN VicnbITaHMA KaK HOCMTeNb NpoTMBONOAOYHOrO ANepHoro opyxue 6e3 npvaneyeHua K HaTypHbIM AV,

Cnenyet oTMeTuTb, TO pesynbTaTbi uccNeAOBAaHU BO3- aevcteua AB npusenu K BbIBOAY O BOSMOXHOCTH acbdex- TMBHOrO AeMCTeMA BoopyxeHHbix Cun Ha none Gos B ycno- BURX NPUMEHEHHA NPOTHBHUMKOM AAEPHOrO OpyxXuUA. B stom KOHTeKCTe CnenyeT paccmMaTpuBaTb M BOMCKOBbIE yYeHNA, NDOBOAMBWMECA Ha Toukom apTunnepuiicxom nonwrovxe B Opex6yprcxok oGnactu 8B ceHTAGpe 1954 roga, B xofe KO- TOpHIx GbIN NDOMsBeAeH BOSAYWHbIA AB MOWHOCTbIO 40 KT Ha BbICoTe 350 m. Takan BbICOTa NnoApEiBa u3sgenun POC-3 o6ecneyusana HeEsHa4UTebHOe pagquoakTMBHoe 2arpA3sHe- Hue TEDPVTOPUM B 3NMUEHTPe B3pbiBa UY ka CNege paguoak- TuBHOrO O6naka. B xome 3THx yYeHuH NpMHuManM yYacTue oKono 45 Thic, BOeHHOCAYKAaWMX. STO GbINM eEQMHCTBEHHBIE 5B CCCP macwra6xvie BocKosLie yueHus B yCnoBuAXx Ha- Typroro AB. Cronb yuukanblbim yuennem pykosoavn Map wan Cosetckoro Cosa IK. KyKxos.

OGcyocdenue pemenun cmopor na colteKoowLx yHenunx

71st Air Force tes and military exerc at the Totskoye te in the A-bomb ex,

In 1950-1951, efforts we prepare for the country's fir to be dropped trom an airc tions. This test was condt Semipalatinsk test site. Th the altitude of 380 m over: the first Soviet air nuclear € essentially the basis for fur Force with nuclear weapor the manufacture of RDS-4 aircraft (Tu-4).

Within the government ni mance system, this was g test range near Bagerovo, set up in August 1947 and involved in 178 nuclea Semipalatinsk, 83 tests at undertaken at the Totskoy involving the use of an A-t conditions.

This Air Force test rang tests of nuclear bomb carr ing Tu-16, Il-28 and Su-7b 35 and 3M (at Novaya Zer the Be-12 aircraft as the weapons with no full-scale

It is worth noting that re nuclear explosions led to could act effectively on be weapon by the enemy. 7 address the military exer range in the Orenburg Obi. nuclear explosion of 40 kt\ m. Such altitude of the radioactive contaminatior

Jamecmui

u Munnemp cpedx USSR Deputy Defense

Ty6a Yepnan

Chernaya Bay

np. Kapcxne sopora Karskiye vorota Strait

explosions in shafts

B Area of underground tests in tunnels

C Area of air tests

Discussion of a decision by parties to the military exercise

af Vcneitanna ADEPHbIX 6oenpunacos w NonMroHbl

ATomHy0 6Gom6y cOpocun Ha OG603Ha4eHHYyO Wen’ Ha TOU- KOM Nonvrone akunax noAnonkosHuka B.A. KyTbipyega, Ko- TOPLIN yYKE MMEN ONbIT NATH NETHbIX UCNbITAHVM ATOMHOM 6om6e! Ha CemunanatMHcKom nonuroue, Npowaowno sto 14 ceHTaSpa 1954 roga a 94 34 mun.

B NOLFOTOBKE MB xOLE yuenns NPWRAIM AKTHBHOE yactue pyKOBOACTBO MunucTepctsa Cpequero MaWwMHOCTpOeHMA CCCP so rnase c B.A. Manbwesbim, a Take BeAyuMe yye- Hele - co3maTenw sfepHoro opyxus V.B. Kyoyxaroe, K.M. Wenkur 4 pykosogcreo Bcex POLOB BOCK u Cun nota, KOMAHJLOBSaHME BCEX Ppyrtl BOCK, BORHHbIX OKPyrOB, OxPyros NDOTUBOBOSAYWHOU OGOPoNe, cpnoToR u cbnoTuAMH. Ha yye- Hue ObInM NpurAaweHbl BCe MUHMCTpbI OGOPOHb! ApyxKecT- BEHHbIX B TO BPEMA HAM CTpaH. BocKoBoe yYeHue nog KO- fom «CHexOK» B WTaGHbIX DOKYM@HTAaX HasbiBaNnocb: «Npo- PbIB NOAPOTOBNEHHOM TakTMYeCKOM OGOPCHbI NpOTMBHUKAa C NPVMEHEHVEM ATOMHOrO OpyxuA».

17 cexta6pa TACC coo6uwno: «B cootBeTcTBun c nnaHomM Hay4HO-ViCCNeAOBaTeENbCKUX MW SKCNEPMMEHTANbHbIX PAGOT B nocnegHve 2Hu 8B CopetcKom Caio3e 6biIno NpoBeseHO MCNbI- TaHve OLHOFO M3 BMLAOB aTOMHOrO opyxua. LlenbiO vonelTa- Hua Geno uayyeHve AeVCTBUM aTOMHOro B3pbiBa. Npu ucnbi- TAHUM NONYYEHbI WEHHbIG PESyNbTAaTbI, KOTOPbIe NOMOryT Co- BETCKMM YYEHBIM MM MHKEHEPAM YCNEWHO PeWHTb 3ana4v NO g3aure OT ATOMHOrO HanagneHun».

Tests of nuclear munitions and test sites

epicenter and in the radioactive cloud pattern. The exercise involved some 45,000 troops and this was the USSR's only large-scale military exercise in conditions of a full-scale nuclear explosion. This unique exercise was commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov.

The A-bomb was dropped onto the specified target at the Toskoye range by the crew led by Lieutenant-Colonel V.¥a. Kutyrchev who had an earlier experience of five A-bomb flight tests at the Semipalatinsk test site. The event took place at 9.34 a.m. September 14, 1954.

The work to prepare and conduct the exercise involved the leaders of the Ministry of Medium-Machine Building headed by V.A. Malyshev, leading nuclear weapons scientists includ- ing |.V. Kurchatov and K.I. Shchelkin, leaders of all arms and naval forces, and commanders of all groups of troops, military districts, air defense districts, fleets and flotillas. The exercise was attended by all defense ministers of the USSR's friendly countries at the time. Codenamed «Snezhok», it was referred to in staff documents as the «Break through the enemy's pre- pared tactical defense using nuclear weapons»

A TASS report of September 17 read: «In keeping with the plan of research and experimental work, the Soviet Union has recently conducted a test of one of the nuclear weapon types. The purpose of the test was to study the effects of a nuclear explosion. Valuable results have been obtained during the test that will help Soviet scientists and engineers with successful solution of the task to provide defense against atomic attack».

SS

od Ucnbitanvs agepHbix Soenpunacos “ NoNMroHb! Tests of nuclear t

Cxema Tywenna ra3zoBoro doutana Gas flare extinguishing diagram

NOBEPXHOCTS Sem ground surface

Crimp HOTPeUMHOBATHIE MECNAHMKM,

CAANAA CTANEHAR Odcaan — rasonponvmuaennat

Tpyee © 210 ama Heavily fractured gas-pevheable sandstone Stee! casing x of 2219 mm 4; -1370m

/

Henpormmusenese

aa anacnacepon //<

ed 4é Boeear Cxpaina if 2445 um

Cornbat shaft 445 mer

Konye o6pywersen Caving cone

of

Sona paspywenne OBcaanon TpyGes

Jona apoOnerars Disintegration area

R.210m

Jona TpeuwMosaTocTH Jointing area

M@KAYHapOAHSIM HAaGNWLeHMeM MW NOCpeACcTBOM CoOTBeT- CTBYIOWWMX MExXAyHapOAHbIx NDOWeAyp NOTeHUMANbHBIE 6nara oT noGoro MUPHOrO NPUMEHEHMA AACPHHIX BSPLIBOB 6binv AOCTYNHbI rocyqapcTBaM = yYaCTHMKaM HacTOAUWLErO Dorosopa, He o6nagaoumx afepHeim opyxuem, Ha HEQMCKDMMMHALMOHHON OCHOBE, M YTOObI CTOMMOCTH ViCNONbSYEMBIX BaPbIBHbIX YCTPOMCTB ANA Takux ya- cTHvukos Jorosopa Gbina Tako HM3KOM, KaK TONbKO 3TO BO3MOXHO, MW He BKMIOYaNa pacxomb! No ux uccne- DOBAHMO MW YCOBEDWEHCTSOBAHHHO...»

Csoe npakruyeckoe BONNOWeHMe “Aen ucnonLacBa- HWA NOASEMHbIX AB 8 HAPOAHO-XOSAMCTBEHHEIX LIENISIX B Copetckom Coiose nonyyunu, B YacTHOcTu, Gnarogapr VHMUMaTHBe 1 WKPOKOM NoALepxke CO CTOPOHbI MUHM- cTpa cpegHero MawmuHocTpoeHna E.N. Cnasckoro,

B koporkue cpoku 6binu paspaboraHbi “4 Cco3sgaHbl cneuvanbHble AMepHbie sapAAbl ans MAB, Koroppie umenv raGapvTel, NOSBONAIOWWMe UCNONb3OBAaTb UX B CKBaKMHaX, BbIAepxKVBanu GonbuiMe AaBNeHMA KM TeM- neparypbi M MMeNv 3agaHHble NPOeKTOM ypoBHM oHep- ropbigeneHua. STO onpenenuno TexHm4ecKue BO3- MOXHOCTM VM BbICOKYIO StpcbeKTMBHOCTb NPHMeHEHVA noasemxelx AB ann peanusaunn 8 CCCP mxorux Ha- POMHO-xXOSAMCTREHHbIX NpOrpamM, ocyujecTaneHue KOTOPbIX OObINHLIMM CpencTBamH GbiIno Manoaddek- TMBHO. Tak 8 60-e rofb! XX BeKa Ha¥anu paapabaTel- BaTbCA OCHOBHBIE NONOKeHUA TOCyHaPCTBEHHOM NpO- rpammet N° 7 «AnepHble B3pbIBbI ANA HAPOAHOFO xO- 3niicTBa». PykosoguTenem nporpammb! ctan 3samec- Turenb E.M, Cnascxoro npodeccop A.fl. 3axapen- koB, e@ HayYHbIM pykoBOaMTeNemM — npodeccop O./1. Kegposcxun.

PaGora passopayusanact SbicTpo: yxe B 1965 rony 6binv NpoBeACHbI YeTbIPe SkKCNEpuMeHTa NO Nporpam- me MAB

broad support fre

Ye.P. Slavsky. Special nuclez

were developed

280

we =) >a ay a “Ts ATOMHasi SHEpreTViKa Nuclear power a iM = Ae - ? Umnynecupie Pulse — 5 a ie MarHuTorMgAposAnnamuyecknhe magnetoh renepatoppi (MI f]-reHepatopp!) generator: NpeavasHasers! ANA UCNONb3SOBaHMA B KAaYeCTBe NepBU4- ntended for 1 HOTO MOUIHOrO (ACCATKM 4 COTHM MeraBaTT) MCTOYHMKAa SNeK- (dozens and hu TpMYeCKON SHEprMM KpaTKOBpemeHHOroO AeKCTaVA (~10 Cc) B tricity in autor CUCTeMaX ABTOKOMHOrO SNEKTPONMTAHMA DASNM4HbIX OObEK- installations. T ros. B M[-renepatopax npoucxoguT noamoe (HenocpexncT- conversion of t BeHHOR) npeoS6pasoBanne Tennosoh SHEP B SNEKTPHYE- have a number ckylo, NosTOMy OHM OBnagaloT PAOM YHUKAaNbHbIX CBOACTR. Thanks to the Bnarogapa 3T4m cBokcTeam MIfQ-rexepatops! umnynbc- periodic and s Horo VM KpaTKOBpeMeHHOrO (MMHYTbI) AevcTBUA MoryT OGec- capable of ens NeYMTb TaKMe TAKTHKO-TEXHMYECKMe XAPAKTEPUCTUKK, KOTO- tics as are not <

Dbi€ HEAOCTYNHbI APyruM, Npexge BCero TPAaAMUMOHHbIM, MC- ty sources TOYHMKaM SNeKTPMYECKOA SHeprun. Npevmywectaa naagmentbix MIf-re- Burson aneprmn HepaTOpoR No cpaBHeHuio c Apyrumu nep- Energy output SVMHbIMM MCTOYHMKAMM anekTpM4ecKor SHEP HAYMHAIOT NPOABNATeCA C MYsib- TMMeraBaTTHOrO YPOBHS MOWIHOCTeN,

B oTe4eCTBEHHbIX MMNYNbCHbIX MIf-re- HepaTopax B KANECTBE MCTONHMKa TENNO- BO oneprun 4 paGoyero Tena MCnONne3y- 1OTCH CNeuMaNbHbIe TBEPAbIE (NOpoOxo- Bole) nnasmoo6pasyioume TonaMBa (TIT), ofecneymBaiouve TemMnepatypy npopyK- TOB Cropanws B renepaTope NhasmMb! AO 4400 K npu pasneHuax 30-100 atm

Npv cosfanun PasnAV4HbIx WTATHBIX | (HatypHbix) MIQ\-ycranoBok Ha ocHoBe venynbcHbix Mifl-rexepatopos ucnonb- 3oBanca GNOYHbI NpMHUMN. Bcero Obino | CO3QaHO 4YeTbIPe Gas0ebIx BapMAaHTa UM- | 2 ~ nynbcHbix Mifl-renepatopos Ha TNT: Cyewa wunyssenoeo MII-ceuepamopa

Conno Nozzle

3apan Tonnwna Fuel charge

«Mamup», «¥pan», «Caxanvik», «Caio3». Diagram of the pulse MHD-generator OreyecTseHHble wmnynbcHbie MIf-re- HepaTopb! Ha TBePAOM (NOpoxXoBOM) ToNNMBe Havanu COspa- based on pulse BaTbCA KOONepaumed npeanpuvaTuA CCCP npumepno c 1970 total, there are roga v BbinycKaioTrcsa OAO «HM3», generators: «P¢ 3a nepvon c 1971-ro no 1993 rog Sbinu paspaboranbi Ta- Pulse MHD-¢ xwe vmnynbcHpie MI{l-yctawosku, Kak «Mamup», «Ypane, be created in th «Mpvkacnuit», «XHOnHbl», «Coos», «Caxanvx» uv apyrue. Bce- around 1970 ar ro 6biNnO usroTOBNeHO OKONO 20 HATYPHbIX UMNY/bCHbIX Such pulse ! MMf-yctanoBok, B OCHOBHOM MOgMcpHKauMA aHeEproGnoKkoe «Khibiny», «Soy Namup» uv «Ypan», uv npoBegeno oKono 1000 BbesoTKasHIx 1971-1993. At 3anyckos HaTypHblx MIf{l-renepatopos. being largely n

B Hacronwee spema paspabaTbigawTca mMnyrbCHble units, have be Mifl-renepatope HOBOrO NOKONEHHA, B TOM 4YHCNE CO CBEPX- NPOBOASLMMM MArHMTHbIMM CUCTeMaMM, KOTOpPLIe OTAMYAa- HOTCH Kak YIYYWEHHbIMM SHEP emnyeCKHMN MV maccorafaput-

Motuannaa MI[-yemanoexa «I puxacnuiie

MI1-yemanosxa « the «Prikaspiye mobile MHD facility The «Pamire MHD

Ci NE TEE NR ie a i Echt Te ca ES A OE.

14 ae RP... sil. ll

ABM pans nepsok MexXKOHTMHEHTAaNbHOn 6annucTuseckonk paket P-7

NM for the first intercontinental ballistic missile R-7

Paspa6boTKol ABM B Hawei CTpaHe 3aHVMalOTCA Tp Opra- HuszauMu: PPALL-BHUUSO, POAL-BHUUT® u BHA.

Ana Toro, YTO6b! Gbina Gonee NOHATHA OONacTb DEATENbHO- ctu BHMUMA, uenecoo6pa3sHo npuBecTu OOOBLIEHHY0 CTpyK- Typy sgepHoro Goenpunaca.

Kak BUQHO “3 NPeACTABNeHHON CTpykTypbl, mobo ABN co- HEOXUT YETbIPE OCHOBHbIX yCTponcTBa:

- ADEpHbI sapag (AS), comepxauwini B3pbiBYaTOe BeELUECT- BO VU ADepHbI MaTepuan, uv o6ecneyvBalolMi np ADepHOM B3PbIBe OCHOBHOe SHEproBbigeneHve Ooenpunaca 3a cyYeT NpOTeKalOLUMX B HEM AACPHbIX peak;

- cucTeMy 3NeKTPUYeECKOrO U HEMTPOHHOrO UHULMUpoBa- HUA (CUCTeMa UHMUMNpOoBaHuA) AQepHOrO 3apsga. B ee OMyHKUNUM BXO“UT BLIDAGOTKA BLICOKOBONbTHbIX SNeKTPU4e- CKUX MMNyNbCOB ANA nogpbiBa xumMuMyecKoro B3pbIBYaTOrFO BeLUCCTBa AGEPHOrO 3apsAAa, a TakKKe reHepallNA HEMTPOH- HOrO UMNynbCa B MOMeCHT OOKaTUA AGEPHOrO MaTepuana. Sta cuctema sABNAeTCA CaMOM OTBETCTBEHHOM u camon CNOKHOM U3 HEADEPHbIX KOMNOHEHTOB AGepHOorO Goenpu- naca;

- NyCKOByt0 CUCTeMy (COBOKYNHOCTb UCNONHMTEsIbHbIX YCT- POUCTB), OTBETCTBEHHy!O 3a 3anyCK CMCTeMbI MHULMMpOBa- HUA B HYKHbIM MOMEHT (Hanpumep, Ha 3afaHHOM BbICOTE B aT- mocdepe wiv Ha 3agaHHon mryOuHe B BOAHOM Cpene);

- cucTemy npegoxpatHeHuag”, B byHKUMM KOTOPONM BxOAMT UC- KNIOYEHME ALEPHOFO B3PbIBa BO BCEX HELUTATHbIX CUTYALINAX, TaKUX KaK OTKa3bl KOMNOHEHTOB ABM, aBapniitbie BosaencT- Bua (NOKap, yap, NpocTpen ui T. n.), HEeCAHKUMOHUpOBaHHbie {(OwWN6oO4HbIe “NM NpegHamMepeHHbie) DevicTaua o6cnyxKuBa- rouwero NEpcoHana UNUM sNnoyMbILNeHHMKa.

Kpome Toro, B COCTaB HeEKOTOpbIx ABM BxogQut ABTOHOMHbIN UCTOYHUK NUTaHuA.

Yka3aHHble yCTpOMCTBa pa3smMewaloTcA B COOCTBeEHHOM kopnyce ABM unu otceke HOCHTeNA.

PaspaGoTka aAgepHbix Goenpunacos BHUMA

Development of Nuclear Munitions in VNIA

There are three Russian organizations responsible for devel- opment of nuclear munitions in the country: VNIIEF, VNIITF and VNIIA.

The diagram presented below shows the general structure of nuclear munition to illustrate more graphically what VNIIA is in charge of.

The diagram demonstrates that any nuclear munition con- tains four basic devices:

- a nuclear charge that contains the explosive and the nuclear material and accounts for most of the munition ener- gy released in a nuclear explosion thanks to nuclear reactions within it;

- a system for electric and neutron initiation (initiation sys- tem) of the nuclear charge. Its functions include generation of high-voltage electric pulses to detonate the chemical explo- sive of the nuclear charge and generation of a neutron pulse at the time the nuclear material is compressed. This is the most responsible and most complicated system among non- nuclear components of the nuclear munition;

- a trigger system (a combination of actuators) responsible for triggering the initiation system at the required time (e.g. at the preset height in the atmosphere or at the preset depth in water);

- a safety system with the function of ruling out nuclear explosion in all emergencies, such as failures of NM compo- nents, emergency impacts (fire, shock, streaming, etc.) and unauthorized (erroneous or premeditated) actions of attend- ing personnel or the intruder.

Besides, some nuclear munitions include an autonomous power supply source.

Each of the above devices has a body of its own or an indi- vidual compartment within the carrier.

In accordance with the described nuclear munition struc- ture, VNIIA develops nuclear munitions as a whole, the safety

Crpyktypa sgepHoro 6oenpmunaca NM structure

1 = wcTouHMK NuTAaHNA

2 — cuctema nycKka

3 - cuctema npegoxpaHeHua 4 - cuctema “HYuuMMpoBaHua 5 -— agepHpiit sapag,

6 — kopnyc

1 — power supply

2 - trigger system 3 - safety system

4 — initiation system 5 - nuclear charge 6 - shell

164

Paapa6orKa sgepHbix 6cenpunacos Development of nuclear munitions

Hocwrenm ageproro opyxua, ochaujennee ABN paspabotrxm BHAWA Nuclear weapons carriers armed with VNIIA developed nuclear munitions

Bannuctwveckas paxeta P-7 R-7 ballistic missile

Asmaumonnie paxeter

=~ Airborne missiles

SenvTHpe ynpaannemme paxere: C-25

S-25 ground-to-air guided missiles

ABraUuMOHHbe Airborne cruise mis- xpenaTwe paxeTe: siles

X-20 Kh-20

K-10C K-10S

X-22 Kh-22

KCP-5 KSR-5

X-55 Kh-55

X-15 Kh-15

DMponroswe xpeinarwe paxetes DKP-1 FKR-1 tactical cruise missiles

oo

Mopcxne xpeinaTeie Sea-launched cruise paket missiles n-6, 1-5 (Nn) P-6, P-5 (s) Paxets: M0 Anti-submarine N-35 (HK) P-35 (ss) «Buxpp= (HK) defense missiles «AsseTuct= (M1) Ametist (s) «Bora. (MN) Vikhr (ss) Malakhit (s, ss) «Bononane (M1, HK) —Vyuga (s) Bazalit (s, ss) «Bertep= (M1, HK) Vodopad (s, ss) Progress (ss) Veter (s, ss)

Granit (s, ss)

- NaIEPHbIE FEHEPATOPb! 4 BONOKOHHO-ONTMY4ECKME CUCTEMbI

Ocnoson mo6o4 cuctemb! snekTpuyeckoro Mu HeEATPOH- HOrO MHKLUMMpOBAaAHUA SBnsioTcA Gnok no”~pHiBa wu MH.

AsTomatuka Nonpbipa OCyuIeCTBNHeT: NpeoGpasoBanue v HaKONNEHNe SHEPrM; MrHOBeHHYO KOMMYTALIMIO HAKONNeH- HOM SHEPrMM Ha PasBOAky C 3nekTpoAeTONaTOpamu (34) pacnonoxeHHy0 Ha 3apave, Ann OGeCneveHus CHHXDOHHOrO s3pbiBa SNekTpOMeTOHATOpOB.

NosuweHue GesonacHoctu ABN, 8 Tom 4ucne 8 apapuil- HbiX CUTYALIVAX, P@ANUSyeTCR 3a CHET CHHKEHUA YYBCTBU- TenbHoctw Of], ekniovexuA B GnOK noApEiBa ycTpoMcTe IWeAOXPaHeHuA

VmnynibChbit UCTOUHMK HeEATPOHOB NpepAcTasnAAeT co- 604 MMHMaTIOpHBIA yCKOpUTeNb VOHORB TAxeNOrO MsOTONA

CuctTemb! sneKTpyY4ecKoro WM HEMTPOHHOrO MHMUMMpCBAaHMA AS Electric and neutron initiat

Aamamamuxa nodprisa uh Detonation and nei

The pulse neutron sc heavy hydrogen isotope | target saturated with ato (tritium)

The pulse neutron sou!

- converts and accum

- generates a high-int time to excite the explc compression of the nucle

In terms of instantan equivalent to the power «

Likewise the detonatic constructed on differen developed small-size

ABOVE: Russian illustration of American's very inefficient first design of a 15kt oralloy (highly enriched U235) nuclear artillery

shell, a total waste of money and materials, as the yield-predicting warhead designer of the first Russian tactical shell explains in his article (discussed in detail later in this blog post). This American design of firing hollow rings of uranium-235 was a very inefficient device. (It is not much better than the design of the gun-type assembly Hiroshima bomb which contained enough oralloy to yield 1 megaton, but was so inefficient it yielded just 16 kt!) More efficient warhead designer Dr Theodore Taylor slammed gun-type assembly

weapons as groupthink "committee" designs, based on minimising risks of a misfire, not maximising efficient use of fissile material!)

ABOVE: Russian illustration of a re-design of the America gun-assembly uranium-235 bomb to try to improve efficiency (not by much!). Here, each of the U235 pieces is fired at the other, to reduce assembly time and thus to allow a larger supercritical mass to be assembled before preinitiation risks (fizzle risk) becomes appreciable! American designs are obsessed with minimising risks. Russians are obsessed

with maximising performance, efficiency and reducing costs to a minimum (the same approach used with their tanks etc in WWID).

W-33

Stu e e a p> pe mapeen

W-48

ABOVE: Russian illustration of the first cheap, efficient American linear-implosion plutonium artillery shell, the W48, first put into service in 1963, SEVEN YEARS after the first plutonium linear-implosion Russian tactical nuclear shell was successfully tested with 14 kt yield on 16 March 1956! This American W48 old nuclear shell remained in service from 1963 until 1992, when disarmers withdrew it,

allegedly as appeasement, to somehow prevent WWIII via Russia invading Ukraine (or whatever lies are fashionable!).

ABOVE: Russian nuclear warhead designers of the 170 and 210 kt MIRV thermonuclear warheads and the 2.5kt smallest ever diameter

nuclear artillery shell (linear implosion), all at the Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70) nuclear warhead design laboratory. They are not as well paid as their American counterparts, but are respected and awarded medals and visits and praise by President Putin (compare faces

above to the photo below).

President Putin meeting Russian nuclear warhead designers in 2000, and writing his praise of Snezhinsk nuclear lab's warheads! President Biden, by contrast, campaigned against the nuclear deterrence of invasions, even criticising Donald Trump's modest efforts to convert a relatively few old, low yield W76 Trident warheads into ad hoc tactical warheads four years ago, AFTER Putin had seized Crimea! Duhhh! The Cold War propaganda for Western nuclear disarmament is still going strong today despite all the lives lost in all the wars and invasions that could have been prevented by credible nuclear deterrence since 1992! Tactical nuclear weapons are not regulated by "arms control" liars, so Russia has thousands (precise number UNKNOWN!), and America has zero specifically designed tactical weapons (as we'll see later, the neutron output of low-yield dial-a-yield options on strategic warheads like the B61 are pathetic compared to purpose designed tactical nuclear warheads, so aren't a credible deterrent, a fact covered-up by disarmers). Translation from the 2005 Snezhinsk nuclear weapons film: "In 2000 the President of the Russian Federation visited the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical

Physics. He examined the exposition of the museum of nuclear weapons and left the following entry in the book of honored visitors: The

a“ of? . op att " : D ip yn of * - . ‘ | | ( we nf I f 4 / (Pett / ae : ; af y g o | yw oi" 5 } fu' : f vt big ” é “ ue | le je | ji Lif (s : | jh. / 7) 1” ’ f , a - : joe £0 4 ee ; a p J yoy) Ma" g* ; Ae f : Ai y ’ »* f fi ‘G Y) i” sf f “a ( pe ~~ y ¢ ; oe wl” yin i a Jil 70 < ‘a ; | | : yt A fe : ad vy - ¢ h, ft . “w | { (rab errs at i yee We < " af ; val f 7 ye a Male f ¢ | f j ye * y x! y )

ABOVE: protected underground Russian launch controller centre for SS18 (Satan) ICBM's. Despite the "dead hand" automatic override system (which supposedly automatically launches missiles after a sustained loss of communications from Russian leaders), basic firing is

done using relatively simple, low-tech equipment that is hardened against nuclear effects, e.g. resistant to EMP and shielded to give

radiation protection against fallout collateral damage. Even if America could knockout such missiles, there is no guarantee that Russia

would not - in times of intense crisis such as a US-Russian conventional war - change its basic doctrine to launch them on warning,

before American missiles have arrived! Then American warheads would be uselessly blowing up EMPTY SS18 silos! Duh!!

OVE: declassified blueprint of Russian nuclear eapon detonator design. Everything they designed as more suitable for cheaper mass production than estern technology, maximising efficiency rather than

nimising misfire risks which is the Western idea!

»/ Secret Oct '49 7 Russian =

Of AtOM nny susceereey un bombs

No Bawe npocpOe xanpanzem Bam copapxy o npoxs- BoxctBe stTomuux Cow6 & CIA, cocTasxexHyp wee TEPUEUAUM % xouenTom PHIOBLM.

TPWIQEEHME: no rexcty, wa 6 x.

CABYEHKO Olpem

(This report also mentions the improved - levitated - Pu239 bo design for using just 4.62 kg

Portugal

a

Uranium mining in Gang; ae )

CNPABKA

2 mpoussoxerse arouinix Goud 6 CUA

B cnpaske ougHMBapTcH BOSMOKHNe pecypce ypaHosoro Cupha, XOTopumm pacnoxaraT CA, npousbogetBo B CWA nay- ‘TOHME m ypaHe-235, @ TaKxe KoaMYeCTBO eToMHEX Com6, npo- M3BOKMMUX exerogno B CUA. CopabMa cocTayzenva ue oCHODeAMR MSTEPHSAOB PSIBEAKM C UCHOADIOBSHMGM OYMUMEADMNX ABHHUX,

1. QGUAR AOBUMA YPAIA CCHOBHiM MCTOYHMKOM ypsis apzaeTca Beabraiicxoe Koxro, Nogesszaumad YacTh JoCusaemoro Tam ypaka OTNpPABAMETCA B Cua. Mommyectso xoCurol 8 Beabrulickom Kouro ypaxoso# py au B 1947r. m oueHKS BOSMCEHOM QoSuNH ypaHcBOM pyay c 194er. no 1952r. (B Beasrulicxom Koro, Kawage, CLA - ura? Koxopo-

Ro, Keno Agpuxe mu Nopryrauum) 8 nepeciere wa ypax mpuse- :

ess 8 caeaymmei Tadxzuue:

3 1947r. - 3400 ronH ypaHe Tons of B 1948r. - 2100

8 1949r. 1300 uranium . mined

8 1950r. 1400 8 1951r. 1600 2 1952r. 2100

US gaseous diffusion U235

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Closed City, Nuclear Weapon Development Center Closed City, Nuclear Weapon Dev

aqeveiopment of nucicar projecties OF 'J24.4 mm Caliper is consiaereda one Or tine vrigntest pages in tne Avistory ne f-ten GH RASAK Che? AIAGE VENOM CA LUMRAG? Qe yhRenmakaim ahwvaleat charges and nuclear apinimideninen danacvondt hans shar aiil/anasdwerheipassiemn wenm@amasiad AayUSSR State Prizes (1973, iv OF, TESA paar) the theats-Rriae fb QA nin caliber projectile took place. ... In the early 1970s, nuclear warheads were created in Snezhinsk [aka the Cold War lab Chelyabinsk-70, i.e. Russia's equivalent to America's Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons designers lab; a huge number of photos of their currently stockpiled nuclear warheads have been declassified with museum plaque summaries of details of the delivery systems they are each intended for, their nuclear physics package internal layout which differs from ALL Western nuclear weapons, the names of their key designers, and so on; and we have included a summary of this vital data in this blog post for easy reference, since they are the overriding nuclear war threat under the current political situation seems to be Russia, since America disarmed itself of tactical nuclear warheads in the 1990s apparently to convince Russia it could not credibly oppose a Russian invasion in the mistaken belief that this would end the risk of a nuclear war] for ammunition of 240 mm and 203 mm calibers for the B-4M towed howitzer; heavy towed mortar M-240, self-propelled mortar 2S4 "Tulip" and self-propelled artillery gun 2S7 "Pion". ... 203-mm self-propelled guns 2S7 "Peony", which were put into operation in 1975. For them, low-power tactical ammunition "Kleshchevitsa", 'Sazhenets" and "Perforator" were specially created ... The development of nuclear projectiles of 152.4 mm caliber is considered one of the brightest pages in the history of the creation of Soviet nuclear weapons. The creators of nuclear charges and nuclear ammunition based on them for artillery and mortar systems were awarded the USSR State Prizes (1973, 1974, 1984) and the Lenin Prize (1984)." - Igor Zot, The Russian army has means of delivering low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to strike at enemy troops at a distance of up to 45 kilometers, https://en.newizv.ru/news/army/03-03-2022/an-atomic-charge-from-a-cannon-what-kind-of-artillery-nuclear-charges-does-russia-

have

Dr Shirkov, the quantum field theorist who was the yield prediction designer of the RDS-41 tactical 14 kt two-point 406-mm diameter Russian nuclear artillery shell at Sarov, which was tested successfully on 16 March 1956 yielding the maximum possible predicted design yield of 14 kt kilotons, winning him the 1958 Lenin Prize, has a published unclassified article (PDF version of full article linked here) about it online (webpage with summary of article including PDF link to full article is linked here). It was melon shaped, had a U238 reflector, and a thin Pu239 hollow core containing Po210-Be neutron initiator. At Irtysh River in Semipalatinsk, while they were waiting for the wind to stop blowing towards the town, to allow the RDS-41 to be safely surface burst (an air burst would not have created this fallout risk), Shirkov's friend Lev V. Ovsiannikov became interested in the QFT renormalization group functional equations Shirkov was interested in, and solved them, publishing the solution in Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences just three weeks after their nuclear test: https://scfh.ru/en/papers/the-tsar-projectile-for-nuclear-

artillery/.

Fellow Russian nuclear weaponeer Vasilii P. Zhogin wrote in his paper, "Development of the First Nuclear Charge RDS—41 (11D) for Artillery Projectile", Combustion, Explosion, and Shock Waves, vol 36, November 2000, Issue 6, pages 689-694 (translated from the Russian version in Fizika Goreniya i Vzryva, Vol. 36, No. 6, pp. 14-20, November—December, 2000): "The result of this trial was so important that the team of implementors with Academician M. A. Lavrent’ev as its leader became Lenin Prize winners in 1958. This Prize

was introduced anew and was the second after Kurchatov, Zel’dovich, Sakharov, and Khariton. ... In the U.S., the range nuclear test of the

Combustion, Explosion, and Shock Waves, Vol. 36, No. 6, 2000

Development of the First Nuclear Charge RDS-41 (11D)

for Artillery Projectile

V. P. Zhogin*

Translated from Fizika Goreniya i Vzryva, Vol. 36, No. 6, pp. 14-20, November—December, 2000.

EDITORIAL

In the early 1950s, all publications concerning M. A. Lavrent’ev showed some reticence. Sometimes, one could read a phrase typical of that time: “... took part in the creation of the nuclear shield of the

Motherland ... .” Mikhail Alekseevich was even more

While preparing the jubilee issue of the Journal, the editorial board found it reasonable to publish the paper. Colleagues from the IEP did some editing (mainly decoding some technical abbreviations) and obtained permission for its publication. Thus, this paper appears on our pages.

The author of the article (in the last years

first nuclear charge MK-9 of diameter 280 mm (11 inches) was conducted on May 25, 1953 [the 15 kt Grable shot of Upshot-Knothole

in Nevada, which produced no significant fallout despite the fact that its 557.6 ft maximum fireball radius at second maximum

thermal output exceeded the height of detonation of just 524 feet, a fact explained by RAND Corp's Dr Kellogg in the 1957

congressional hearings on fallout; the neutron induced Na-24 maximum dose rate near ground zero was only about 10 R/hr at 1

hour and decreased to merely 10 milli-Roentgens per hour at about 1 mile from ground zero! ]. ... The [RDS-41] focusing system

was developed by V. P. Zhogin. ... Electric detonators were elaborated by M. I. Puzyrev’s team. The neutron source was designed by A. I.

Abramoy ... a thermostable explosive composition was chosen for use in the charge. After a series of examinations, it was tested on the

range of the Central SRI-58 by gun-firing of 2000 37-mm rounds to check their resistance to explosion. ... A test of the RDS-41 charge

was planned for March, 1956. The charge enclosed in a projectile was to be placed on the floor of a wooden hut. ... finally the trial was set

for the 16th of March ... The equipping operation was delayed for an hour (quite unexpectedly, the aluminum lids of the steel projectile

body were jammed, and the projectile body required cooling with snow). ... Some hours later the device was detonated. The results of the

test were beyond expectations. The charge exhibited the highest possible power." (Note that the seismic and fallout data at long range led the CIA in its Top Secret NIE report dated 16 May 1962 to wrongly assess this 16 March 1956 Russian nuclear test, "Joe 21" to

be 30 kt yield, when in fact the accurate close-in yield determination by Russia was 14 kt. At least the CIA correctly deduced it was

a surface burst!)

C @ infosmi.net/politic/280327-takticheskoe-yadernoe-oruzhie-rf-zastavit-ssha-i-nato-kapitulirovat/

Tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federa will force the US and NATO to capitulate

ENHANCED BY Google

SOCIETY / 3 hours ago

) Z = Neural networks hz Novosibirsk, weather forecast for August 18, up to 16 °C Yakutsk, weather forecast for August 18, up to 16 °C

ABOVE: Russian news aka propaganda site infosmi has published photos of Russian nuclear weapons in crates ready for use in

the Ukraine, e.g. see "Tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation will force the US and NATO to capitulate",

https://infosmi.net/politic/280327-takticheskoe-yadernoe-oruzhie-rf-zastavit-ssha-i-nato-kapitulirovat/ "As Voennoye delo reports , the risk of using nuclear weapons is only increasing, with Western experts James Ragland and Adam Lowther saying that the main danger lies in Russian tactical nuclear weapons. At the moment, according to experts, the number of such ammunition that Russia possesses ranges from three to six thousand units, while the North Atlantic Alliance does not have weapons of this type at all. In the current situation, according to analysts, the Russian side can use tactical nuclear weapons in such a way that the effect of destruction, as well as radioactive impact, is minimal, while the psychological aspect of such actions will reach a maximum. As a result, the US and NATO will be forced to capitulate to the threat of a full-scale nuclear conflict." (There is one BIG problem with this particular example of Russian "propaganda": it happens to be a credible threat, unlike Western books on nuclear weapons/war effects. Even bad propaganda can sometimes be useful kicking the self-deluded into sense, if they can be persuaded to face the truth, rather than the fairy tales from the even worse propaganda of disarmament activists and bigots on knockou blow and countervalue nuclear war. But the correct solution is not the capitulation to Russia suggested in this article, but instead for NATO to begin once more to credibly deter Russia from its conventional warfare which risking escalating to tactical nuclear war, when it runs out of conventional arms, due to the supply of Western arms to Ukraine to enable it to blow up Russian conventional weapons stockpiles. NATO had tactical nuclear weapons for this very same purpose in the Cold War, including the W54 and later the W79, these designs still exist and these can be produced again in an emergency to serve the same useful purposes, of deterring both nuclear escalation in an invasion, and WWIII. The fact is that the Western tactical nuclear warhead disarmers SIMPLY

GOT IT WRONG.)

ISH

ABOVE: the world's smallest diameter nuclear weapon is the Russian Snezhinsk lab's 2.5-kiloton 53 kg ZBV3, a 17.4km range, 152.4 mm diameter, 774 mm long artillery shell, shown here with its museum plaque (it is also shown below with the world's biggest ever nuclear weapon - also, you guessed it, a Russian product, in the Snezhinsk nuclear weapons lab instructional museum of warhead design). (For comparison, the smallest Western nuclear weapon, Theodore Taylor's 0.02 kt W54 or Davy Crockett, is 305 mm in diameter, 457 mm long and 26.5 kg. So the Russian ZBV3 is only half the diameter of the W54, but it is twice the mass and of course longer than the W54. There is also a great difference in yield, 0.02 kt for the W54 compared to 2.5 kt for the ZBV3.) The ZBV3 research supervisor was Academician E. I. Zababakhin, the chief designer of nuclear weapons was Academician B. V. Litvinov, and the chief designers of the development of nuclear weapons were L. F. Klopov, O. N. Tikhane and V. A. Vernikovsky. This design began in 1971 and was completed in 1981. Manufacture by mass-production began at the Trekhgorny City Instrument Making Plant in 1981 and was completed in 1991. The special casing it is held in is designed to protect it during storage and transit to the battlefield. It was built to be fired from the widest possible range of Russian artillery: D-20 howitzer guns, ML-20 howitzer guns, 2C3 Akatsia self-propelled howitzers, 2A36 Giatsint-B guns (towed), 2C5 Giatsint-C self-propelled guns.

The descriptive plaque on the bomb in the photo above states (in Russian): "NUCLEAR PROJECTILE. 152 mm CALIBRE. FOR SELF- PROPELLED ARTILLERY INSTALLATION. RFNC - VNIITF [note that VNIIFT = the Snezhinsk nuclear weapons lab design, now part of Pocatom; they have some information on their website about their achievements in developing the best Russian nuclear warheads, stating that they developed the smallest ever nuclear weapon, namely the 152mm one photographed above, the cleanest ever nuclear weapon "in which 99.85% of the energy is obtained through the synthesis of nuclei of light elements", the lighest ever nuclear weapon, and the "the most economical in terms of the consumption of fissile materials", and nuclear warheads capable of withstanding 120C temperature, 750 atmospheres overpressure, and 12,000g's of acceleration on re-entry; maybe we should start buying their nuclear warheads if all this is true]." Snezhinsk nuclear weapons lab also has an interesting webpage about their peaceful nuclear weapons tests here: http://vniitf.ru/article/mirnie-vzrivi "Of the 124 peaceful explosions carried out in the USSR, 80 nuclear charges developed at VNIITF were used in 75 cases. ... VNIITF began to carry out peaceful explosions of its charges from May 1968. ... All developments of NEDs for peaceful purposes were headed, carried out, supported and supervised at VNIITF by Academicians E.I. Zababakhin, E.N. Avrorin and B.V. Litvinov. ... If for peaceful camouflage explosions there were no special requirements for the “purity” of charges, then for ejection explosions (formation of dams, trenches) nuclear explosive devices with a minimum amount of radioactive fission fragments were needed. In these cases, thermonuclear devices are more suitable, in which the main energy release is due to fusion reactions. Such charges were also included in a series of peaceful NEDs developed at VNIITF, and were used to create a trench in the Pechora-Kolvinsky Canal section (Perm Region) - an integral part of the project developed in the 1970s to transfer the waters of the northern rivers to the Volga. The experiment to create this trench was called "Taiga". It was preceded by model explosions of low-power (0.2 kt) nuclear charges in wells at the Semipalatinsk test site (1968) "Telkem-1" and "Telkem-2", where the formation of an ejection funnel (a single explosion, T-1) and a short trench (a group explosion of three charges, T-2) was checked. The analysis of the results of these explosions was used in the design of the main experiment "Taiga". A year after this experiment, an improved “clean” charge was tested at the Semipalatinsk test site with a 5- fold reduced fragmentation activity compared to that used in the Taiga operation. ... In conclusion, we note that VNIITF is, in fact,

the only organization in the world that develops specialized nuclear explosive devices for industrial applications."]

Russian Nuclear Weapons Museum biggest and smallest devices compared

SAROV NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUSEUM RUSSIA

Snezhinsk/Snowtown Nuclear Weapon Museum, Chelyabinsk

SSE NMS

WESTERN DESIGNS

RUSSIAN DESIGNS

MAJOR NUCLEAR DESIGN VARIATIONS BETWEEN SLBM WARHEADS W76 AND W88 (FROM LA-4000) SECONDARY STAGE

NEUTRON GENERATOR

PRIMARY PRIMARY STAGE STAGE

ARMING/FUSING

HEAVY U235 (ORALLOY) LOADING OF W88 REQUIRES BERYLLIUM INTERSTAGE:

W88

camary SECONDARY STAGE pean

STAGE STAGE

RIMARY —

STAGE

ARMING/ FUSING

DECLASSIFIED SKETCHES OF KEY DESIGN DIFFERENCES ONLY

ABOVE: In 2015, S. Douglas oodward's book Js Russia Destined vo Nuke the US pointed out that ussia's only real military superiority is in tactical nuclear weapons, the most effective deterrent possible to allow it to invade Ukraine and Europe, since the West has now no way to counter it: "Europe protests the incursion but seems unwilling (and unable) to use military force to push Russia back from its designs on Ukraine and Crimea. ... Then there is the state of the Russian people. They suffer under economic sanctions imposed by Europe and the United States. Backed into a corner, is it suprising Russia rattles its sabre? However, Russia's only sabre - its one area of military superiority, is Russian tactical nuclear weapons [2,000] outnumbering NATOS tactical nukes 10 to | in the region. As Russia weakens in critical areas, several factors are converging which suggest Russia must act now ... The February 2014

agreement between Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany (the so-called Minsk Agrement) has failed ... "During the era of political

romanticism, the Soviet Union pledged never to use nuclar weapons first,’ Kiselyov told the audience of Vesti Nedeli, his current affairs

show ... 'But Russia's current military doctrine does not - no more illusions’.

Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War

By Michael Getler Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter has signed a new directive that modifies the strategy the United States would use in fight- ing anuclear war with the Soviet Un- ion, according to high-ranking admin- istration officials.

The new strategy involves placing less emphasis on all-out retaliation against Soviet cities in the event of a Russian attack. Instead, there would be greater emphasis on destroying So- viet military forces and both political and military -ommand centers early in a conflict 1n hopes of convincing Moscow that it could not ultimately “win” a war.

Presidential directives on.such ,mat- ters are milestones in the 35-year bis- tory of the atomic age.

on

For much of the past two decades, the United States has relied on having enough nuclear might to smash all major Soviet cities and industries, even after absorbing a first strike by Moscow, so that the. Soviets would be deterred from such an attack in the first place.

This was called by: the appropriate name of MAD, for mutual assured de- struction. It -still is a major part of U.S‘strategy.

But.as the Soviet missile force grew larger than the U.S force and as its accuracy improved, the Soviets not only could threaten U.S cities but U.S land-based missiles as well.

Furthermore, an appreciaton grew among some specialists in this coun- try that Soviet military doctrine did not necessarily accépt the idea that a nuclear. war could have no winners.

1979: Russian Tsar Bre

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His chief nati Zbigniew Brzezir talking for Some for new strategie ment tactics to m tegic balance the faces in the 1980s

Extract from Washington Post, 6 August 1980 (35th anniversary of Hiroshim

ABOVE: Russian plans for the tactical use of nuclear weapons (English translation left; original Russian on right), from our 20

September 2017 blog post here, taken from restricted Russian manual Nuclear Weapons - A Manual for Officers, which we

obtained from Ukraine and put on internet archive to show the threat. On pages 9-10 of his 1977 book Surviving Doomsday, Bruce

Sibley (who in the 1980s edited the UK CD magazine protect and Survive Monthly) pointed out: "During the 1960s, the original lead

|

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... Not only were the Ri Ee developing new <

missiles and warhead tppepiquess Hi 4 UNS BPAMERAP SIRES RFSGBS Revers at an alarming rate. At first, Soviet proggmationy Boswommpe O6beKTH ANeEPHBIX yR

asserted that this was merely a 'catching up' with America and NATO, but since this expansion has continued aggressively ... it may not be an exaggeration to hold the view that the Soviet Union has now overtaken NATO and American military might ... The matter of civil defence playing a major role in strategic warfare planning ... the 'ace in the hole' ... No country on earth has a civil defence programme as extensive as the Eastern Bloc. ... Unfortunately, the majority of Western politicians and some of their advisors seem quite oblivious to the strategic significance of Russia's preoccupation with a major civil defence programme. They either scorn or remain in ignorance of the facts. Some critics even charge that by its very existence, civil defence makes the prospect of nuclear war more thinkable, and therefore

should not be developed. This is an essential part of their package for banning the bomb."

ABOVE: Page 42 of Putin's latest 2014 Russian civil defense manual supporting the tactical use of nuclear weapons (English translation and original Russian test), from our 20 September 2017 blog post here, full manual was put on internet archive to show the threat. Again, civil defense when combined with offensive plans for nuclear weapons is an offensive problem; the opposite is true for purely defensive civil defense (which increases the nuclear threshold by enabling survival of accidental and limited nuclear strikes). On pages 5-6 of his 1977 book Surviving Doomsday, Bruce Sibley pointed out: "Meanwhile, the Soviet Union possesses the largest and most comprehensive war-survival programme in the world today. The Soviet leadership never tires of reiterating that victory is impossible unless every Soviet citizen has undergone intensive practical and moral-psychological civil defence training. ... The Soviet evacuation scheme intends to scatter 241 million citizens throughout the Russian countryside ... urban evacuation is the key to twarting the ‘estimated killing power of nuclear missiles ... the Soviets have maintained vast stockpiles of grain, tinned food, fuel, water, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts and raw materials throughout the USSR ... The entire Moscow underground railway system has been equipped to give protection and life-support to over one million persons. Every Soviet citizen has been issued with a gas mask, that will filter out radioactive dust and chemical and biological aerosol agents ... the Russians may be committed to the downfall of Western ideology - by peaceful subversion or by open conflict." (A// of the arguments against this kind of civil defense are specious: Britain evacuated 1.5 million of vulnerable people from London 48 hours before declaring war in 1939, and the Luftwaffe didn't bomb the evacuees or "simply" retarget the dispersed population. Another fallacy is that dispersing millions of people into the countryside will make sanitation and food problems worse. The reality is that sanitation and food supply logistics break down in bombed cities far sooner than in the countryside,

where people are nearer food sources! The effect of fast-decaying fallout on crops is trivial.)

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Tanks, armored personnel carriers also have protective properties and BMP.

If it is impossible to use the protective properties of ve elementary protective measures should be applied. Since high greatest danger for an unprotected person, it is advisable to head or feet in the direction of the explosion before the shc same time, the cross-sectional area is reduced by about 10 the high-speed pressure will be minimal.

The impact of high-speed pressure is reduced by v (ditches, pits, funnels, etc.) or low strong walls, stumps and. which you can hide.

Figure 1.8. Protective properties of field fortification

TRANSLATION FROM PUTIN'S 2014 CD BOOK air shock wave of a nuclear explosion

RUSSIAN STANDARD DESIGNS Rounded, but

non-tapering Cylindrical end to cylinder: centred: two spherical two linear primaries implosion primaries 650kg non-

MIRV (mono- block) SLBM

170-210 kg MIRV warheads warheads F=Li6D

P=Primary

F=Li6D

ABOVE: major designs of Russian warheads using two primary stages wired in parallel circuit (for explosive detonators on the implosive systems of each primary charge, and also parallel circuit for the later pulse of current to the neutron sources for each primary charge), to

produce x-ray ablative linear implosion of a central thermonuclear charge:

"Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev became one of the main creators of the world's largest detonated bomb ... In the future, the efforts of Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev focused on the fundamental improvement of thermonuclear charges, for which he developed the theory of

"double approach". - http://www.biblioatom.ru/founders/babaev_yuriy_nikolaevich/"

These are an alternative to using plastic foam to diffuse x-rays in all directions to allow a single primary stage to compress a spherical secondary stage isotropically, without x-ray shadowing problems. Plastic foam reduces speed and efficiency of x-ray delivery (the recoil ablation force on the secondary, F = dp/dt, is reduced when plastic foam is used to diffuse x-rays, because the longer diffused pulse of x- rays which is delivered via plastic foam has an increased pulse duration, ¢). For many purposes, therefore, two primary stages for linear

implosion of a fusion charge, without needing any plastic foam, is just as an efficient approach as that used in single-primary Western devices.

ABOVE: error by DTRA regarding energy absorption by buildings. U.S. Government's DTRA DISPATCH magazine article "Building Effects on Airblast from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Terrain" falsely conflates the abrupt shock front with the length of the entire blast wave, claiming that since buildings are 2000 denser than blast waves: "the air will move 2000 times father than the structure in the same time interval. Thus while the building is moving lcm. the shock has moved more than 20m, and the energy is a small fraction of 1% the blast energy." The key error here is the statement that "the shock has moved 20 m". They meant the shock front, which isn't the same thing as the entire blast wave, the thickness of which is dependent on bomb yield, and is what moves drag-sensitive buildings with large window openings where the overpressure quickly equalises. So they are totally wrong. They are

absurdly arguing that only 1/2000 of the dynamic pressure (kinetic energy per unit volume of air) of air presents a force upon buildings, or

Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis Center

SHAMRC Non-Responding Building Calculation Peak Overpressure versus Radius

—— 1KT Standard Scaled to 2KT = Unobstructed Radial * Obstructed Radials

Overpressure (bar)

Figure 1. Urban pressure distribution along different radials (ARA, Inc.)

While the overpressure is drastically changed by the presence of buildings, the dynamic pressure is modified even greater in comparison to the ideal. The dynamic pressure is stagnated at each encounter with a building and is en-

hanced along streets and alleys. There are regions of nearly complete stagnation (no dynamic pressure) in regions that would have very high dynamic pressures over an ideal surface. The high dynamic pressures and dynamic impuls- es aligned with streets will move any loose objects such as cars, trucks, mailboxes, or sidewalk stands hundreds of feet. Cars will be piled on top of one another and block roads and access to buildings closer to the detonation point.

Many recent calculations have been criticized because they assume the buildings are nonresponding and perfectly rig- id. The argument for this assumption is that the materials from which the structures are made have a density that is at least 2,000 times the density of air. This means that when a shock wave strikes a structure, the air will move 2,000 times farther than the structure in the same time interval. Thus while the building is moving 1 cm, the shock has moved more than 20 m, and the energy lost from the shock is a small fraction of 1% of the blast energy.

behavior, an experiment was conducted at the Ernst Mach Institute in Freiburg, Germany, in which a model house was constructed of steel and exposed to a blast wave in a shock tube. Several shadowgraph pictures were taken as the shock wave engulfed the structure. Reflections from the walls and roof could be readily identified. A second model house was constructed from balsa wood using the same dimensions as the steel house and exposed to the same blast pressure. When the shadowgraph pictures were compared, no distinction could be made between the steel and balsa wood shock reflections. The balsa wood model did not measurably move over the entire time of the shock interaction with the structure.

Another series of experiments", in the United Kingdom, were conducted with a model city built from solid concrete buildings. Pressure gauges monitored the loading at many points on buildings throughout the city. A high-explosive charge was detonated at a height of burst such that the Mach stem would be higher than the buildings as it passed over the model city. The experiments were criticized for using nonresponding structures. Therefore, the city was carefully reconstructed of thin mirror glass on light metal frames with the gauges installed at the same locations as the concrete city, and the experiments were repeated.

8 spiSPATCH?

U.S. Government's DTRA DISPATCH magazine, “Building Effects on Airblast from Nuclear

. Detonations in Urban Terrain"

falsely conflates the abrupt shock front with the length of the entire blast wave, claiming that since buildings are 2000 denser than blast waves: "the air will move 2000 times father than the structure in the same time interval. Thus while the building is moving 1cm. the shock has moved more than 20m, and the energy is a small fraction of 1% the blast energy.”

They meant the shock FRONT, which isn't the same thing as the entire blast wave, which is what moves buildings. So they are totally wrong.

Building density and the distance the shock FRONT has moved past has no relevance to thickness the layer of air BEHIND the shock front, which is what is pushing the building, and this thickness increases with bomb yield!

presumably upon ships sails (which are denser than air), or eardrums (again which are denser than air). The shoddy, imprecise form of

their statement makes it hard to understand precisely what they are saying, but it seems to be that they are assuming falsely that the blast wave consists only of a shock front, which will move 20 m past the building (without moving it significantly) before the building has moved | cm, but the density of the building and the location of the shock front relative to the building is IRRELEVANT while the mass of air BEHIND the shock front is delivering energy to the building, as proved by the absence from the relevant equations of both building density and shock front location after it has passed, but winds are still blowing. It's not the shock front that causes the building to oscillate, but the wind pressure behind the shock front. The building density, and the distance the shock FRONT moves beyond the building, have no relevance to thickness the layer of air BEHIND the shock front, which is what is pushing the building, and this thickness increases with bomb yield! (However, most of the push to the building occurs due to the highest dynamic pressure, 1.e. the air just behind the discontinuity or "shock front".) As a result, the actual energy absorption by a building is more than 100 times greater than DTRA's ratio of densities claims. Small-scale models of buildings, whether absolutely rigid or made from glass mirrors don't in any way, shape or form

model the energy captured in oscillations by thousands of tons of reinforced concrete of real buildings.

The wind (dynamic) pressure induced motion effects which have nothing to do with the relative density of the shock front compared to the building. The amount of energy picked up from either the wind pressure of normal breezes or the blast wave of a nuclear explosion, by a building in oscillatory energy is the time-integrated form of Newtonian equation E = Fx, where force F = P.A, where P is dynamic pressure and A is area, and x is the amount of displacement induced. There's no density of the building in these equations, and no dependence on the shock front, but rather the integrated dynamic pressure over the entire duration of the blast at the location of interest (if the building delays the passage of the shock front instead of letting it pass freely through windows etc, then there's an additional term for the time-integrated overpressure contribution). As dynamic pressure is removed by the building - not by the shock front but by the air behind it, lasting seconds in higher yield detonations - the overpressure also falls as the blast restores itself to the Rankine-Hugoniot conditions (overpressure energy is transformed into dynamic pressure energy, thus weakening overpressure as well as dynamic pressure). If DTRA were correct that only the front part (shock front) of a blast wave is relevant to delivery of energy and delivers only 1/2000 of the energy of the blast, then by analogy our eardrums and ship sails would be similarly so inefficient at picking up energy from the dynamic pressure of sound and the wind, respectively, that they couldn't work! Notice that their computer codes in 2013 falsely EXCLUDED any absorption of energy by the blast in oscillating thousands of tons of reinforced concrete, causing damage (much larger, huge amounts of energy are required to actually destroy reinforced concrete by permanent deformation; the springy oscillations of a building in a gale or blast wave take up far less energy than actual destruction requires), contrary to what John von Neumann pointed out (that buildings are NOT rigid but absorb energy from the blast, decreasing the blast parameters like pressures and impulses as the blast propagates through a city, unlike desert or ocean in unobstructed terrain nuclar tests!) in the 1950 Effects of Atomic Weapons (removed by Glasstone from future

editions, just as he removed the civil defence chapter from the 1977 edition!).

ABOVE: Appendix A of Glasstone's 1950 Effects of Atomic Weapons gives a specific calculated example that allows the absorption of blast energy by oscillating modern concrete buildings to be calculated: a reinforced concrete building of 952 metric tons, 75x75ft, 38 ft high (thus horizontal area of 265 square metres), resisting force 4 psi, is subjected to a peak overpressure and dynamic pressure loading of 32 psi (242,000 Pascals) decaying to zero in 0.32 second. Calculated peak deflection of middle of the building was 0.88 foot or 0.27 m (the top would be deflected twice this amount). Reinforced concrete is relatively ductile, but any cracking absorbs even more energy than

the simple calculation of the kinetic energy of blast-induced oscillation. So the blast wave energy absorbed from the simple physics law E

The Effects of

Atomic Weapons

PREPARED FOR AND IN COOPERATION WITH THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SHOCK FRONT

SLIGHTLY WEAKENED SHOCK FRONT

igure 5.3. Behavior of blast wave upon striking cubical structure: (a) before striking the structure; (6) soon after striking the structure; (c) soon after pass- ing the structure; (d) wave completely past the structure.

APPENDIX A?

AN APPROXIMATE METHOD OF COMPUTING THE DEFORMATION OF A STRUCTURE BY A BLAST WAVE

Ap(t) —>

Moi +K,=Ap fF

= if [Ap (t) — Fylde.

—_ sa =a.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.20 In the preceding paragraphs, the discus the air blast from an atomic bomb exploded in an In this section consideration will be given to the in of burst of the bomb on the area of blast damag extremely complex and can be solved only in a s manner. This is so for two reasons: first, the de a military target can never be completely given, a plete analytical solution of even such a relativel} the behavior of a shock wave incident on a wall has never been obtained for all angles. As will t tion of the basic problem of shock reflection from derived by a combination of theory and experin is, however, not readily adapted to yielding th better than an average sense in a more complicat the detailed description of the target, not only a odd shape, but they have the additional complica being rigid. This means that they do not mere wave, but they also absorb energy from it at each

3.21 The removal of energy from the blast creases the shock pressure at any given distanc detonation to a value somewhat below that whic the absence of dissipative objects, such as build

1 This section is based on work by J. von Neumann and F. Reines don Laboratory.

58 SHOCK

of such dissipation or diffraction makes it necessar what higher values of the pressure than would be a desired effect if there were only one structure rigid plane.

Glassto Append calculat of buildi

Figure A.Z, Mass supported on plastic spring equivalent to single-story structure. = energy ¢

[GIasstorie"s:1950°E teers OF ALOMTE te Zo" eh *Werponsexplairedthe basis "of eta! ee

oscillating the Building! Hard fact! \ 2

b | ast atte n Uu ati O n Cc | ea rly ° The resisting force of 4 psi used in the 1950 GlassfondFigure A.5. Displacement of center

EM.-1: ratio of energy to flatten vs. oscillate Fo¢4/ piast wave ated, exqunpleabeinfayced concrete building of 95

modern city buildings energy absorbed by a

city building, divided regiBances bpd quyngigpeiy Pridieeyireressure and dynamic pre pe y p

into the blast energy

that be absorbed lable 19.6 gn page 525 ofthe 1996Worth a " = Dua socttare onl Ulated peak deflection of middle of the building OEE L EP EEIis the elastic zone) a Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculationa

zone (VERY BIG). building = blue plus Tools Abstracted from EM-1: 3.0 psi and 0.3 second

Energy = this area red areas, divided into

blue area natural period of oscillation for 3-8 story reinforced 1 a = [0.5 + (u- 1)]/ 0.5 concrete buildings (type 15.2.2), 1.25 psi and 0.3 Ductility ratio (extension) = 4+ 2(u-41) second for brick houses (type 15.2.3), 0.5 psi and 0.25

second for wooden houses (type 15.2.5), or 2.0 psi and 0.6 second for 3-10 story steel-frame office buildings (type 15.2.10). The "nominal" ductility ratios (the ratios of displacement required for collapse/severe damage to the maximum elastic response before plastic response begins) for these four types of buildings are given by Northrop as 7.5, 4, 7.5 and 10, respectively. The maximum amount of energy absorbed in destroying the buildings is simply the area under the curve of loading versus displacement before collapse. Since this relative area is 0.5 unit for the triangle shaped slope up to a ductility ratio of 1, and is roughly a constant height rectangle for the plastic zone from a ductility ratio of 1 up to the failure limit (severe damage/collapse of building), the ratio of total energy absorbed by a building in its destruction, to the maximum energy that can be absorbed in purely elastic oscillations by a buildings (up to ductility ratio of 1 unit) is simply [0.5 + (7.5 - 1)]/0.5, [0.5 + (4 - 1)]/0.5, [0.5 + (7.5 - 1)]/0.5, and [0.5 + (10 - 1)]/0.5, or 14, 7, 14, and 19, respectively, for those four building types. It is to be noticed that the greatest amounts of plastic range energy absorption are for the most predominant two kinds of modern city centre buildings, namely reinforced concrete and steel frame multistory buildings. These buildings, with up to 8 and 10 stories,

respectively, in these calculations, also have a cumulative effect in shielding free-field thermal and nuclear radiations.

The Effects of Atomic Weapons, 1950, on page 57 has a section written by John von Neumann and Fredrick Reines of Los Alamos (it is attributed to them in a footnote) stating clearly: "the structures ... have the additional complicating property of not being rigid. This means that they do not merely deflect the shock wave, but they also absorb energy from it at each reflection. The removal of energy from the blast in this manner decreases the shock pressure at any given distance from the point of detonation to a value somewhat below that which it would have been in the absence of dissipative objects, such as buildings." Glasstone removed this from future (1957-77) editions, not because it is wrong (it isn't), but apparently because it debunks official nuclear lies used for strategic deterrence in the same way that gas

and incendiary bombing effects was exaggerated in the 1930s to try to deter war!

ABOVE: The two terms for blast wave energy. It's really very simple: the first term above is the kinetic energy contained in the dynamic

(wind) pressure of the blast, while the second term represents the internal energy of the blast (manifested as heat and related static

; overpressure). So total dyn amic the theoretical

blast R pressure R overpressure basis for the energy l

calculation of Z 2 ast ener: E=42)||—pw’ |r’ dr+4a Per dr neenaeae

2 Y = l city is not rocket 0

science, and it's

0

KINETIC ENERGY INTERNAL ENERGY**

The two terms for the blast wave energy «sss

= equations for (dynamic pressure And OVELrpFreSSsuUFe) causing vias wave's with a computer include energy balance, and you can with modern computers easily incorporate the irreversible energy losses due to the blast wave successively oscillating, one after another, the buildings with with it interacts as it travels outward in a modern city. William G. Penney gives the real basis for calculating the energy loss due to blast damage in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in his 1970 paper, which contains numerous detailed, precise calculations and measurements showing how the act of causing destruction to steel and concrete, in addition to the mere oscillations of buildings, reduced the energy content of the blast and thus the pressure fell more quickly with distance in those cities, than measured in unobstructed desert or ocean during his nuclear testing programme. (In 1985 John Malik of Los Alamos simply ignored in his report, LA-8819, all Penney's hard won facts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, without going into details at all. Glasstone and Dolan reference Penney's 1970 paper, but simply ignore its findings on blast attenuation in Hiroshima and Nagasak. So much for scientific progress! Note also that Penney's 12 kt yield for Hiroshima is lower than the current estimate of 16 kt, implying even more blast absorption in Hiroshima than Penney found, because the unattenuated free field pressures from

16 kt will be greater than those from 12 kt!)

Now consider the energy absorption in the plastic region for reinforced concrete. The calculations of energy absorption in oscillating a building are for the small "elastic response" region of the pressure-displacement curve. But vast amounts of energy are absorbed beyond that elastic limit, and yet at pressures lower than required to make a reinforced concrete building collapse (always ignored by ignorant shelter critics, as Lord Baker explained, for shelter design in his 1978 book which we reviewed in detail a few posts back). There is a summary of the key building parameters America uses in calculating the effects of nuclear blast on buildings of various kinds in Table 15.6 on page 525 of Northrop's 1996 Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects, Calculational Tools Abstracted from EM-1: building 15.2.2

(3-8 story reinforced concrete, small window area) has a severe damage ductility ratio of 7.5, i.e. it fails and collapses (severe damage) when the displacement is 7.5 times the maximum elastic response. Put another way, the plastic limit for reinforced concrete is 7.5 times the elastic displacement limit. Northrop's figure 15.7 shows the extension versus applied pressure load. The energy absorbed in the elastic limit is a triangle terminating at a displacement of | ductility unit (units are extension/elastic limit extension), so it has an area of 0.5 units (energy absorption for oscillating the building, see diagram below). But the plastic response is not a triangle but a unit high rectangle which starts at one unit and extends to 7.5 units (severe damage/collapse), its area is thus 7.5 - 1 = 6.5 units, so it absorbs 6.5/0.5 = 13 times as much energy as that used to oscillate the building elastically! So reinforced concrete buildings can absorb 13 times more energy in being damaged, than they can absorb in oscillating elastically. The ratio of total energy absorbed to flatten the buildings, to the maximum energy that can be absorbed elastic oscillate it, is (6.5 + 0.5)/0.5 = 14. Thus, the total energy absorption by a building

can be 14 times that involved in merely oscillating it!

EM-T7: ratio of energy to flatten vs. oscillate 7o¢4/ piast wave modern city buildings energy absorbed by a Loadine city building, divided into the blast energy that can be absorbed

: : to merely oscillate (i: Inelastic aka plastic irae coor

zone (VERY BIG). building = blue plus

Energy = this area red areas, divided int 7 blue area

[0.5 + (u-1)]/ 0.5

7 u Ductility ratio (extension)

1 + 2(u - 1)

ABOVE: model of a building having a blast, the simple engineering graph from EM-1 showing the ratio of energy needed to total a building to that which merely oscillates it. The axes depict loading force and displacement, respectively, so the areas under the curve beautifully correspond to energy absorbed, allowing us to calculate the total energy needed to flatten a city very easily (from a simple, standard physics formula, energy E = Fx), in terms of multiples of the energy needed to just oscillate the buildings elastically. Northrop's

data for other types of buildings are as follows: type 15.2.5 wood frame house has the same 7.5 ductility ratio for collapse, so it can absorb

in plastic deformation 13 times the elastic oscillatory energy; type 15.2.3 brick house has a ductility ratio of 4 for severe damage, and a type 15.2.10 3-10 story steel-frame office building has a ductility ratio of 10 for severe damage. This is precisely Lord Baker's principle of the Morrison table shelter (for details, please see Lord Baker's 1978 book about the problems with explaining this to the bureaucratic nutters who don't understand the physics behind engineering, the brilliantly titled Enterprise versus Bureaucracy) where the plastic deformation of steel is used to absorb many times more energy than it can absorb elastically. In other words, it's the damage done (plastic deformation of reinforced concrete) that really absorbs vast amounts of blast energy, not the smaller energy absorption from elastic oscillations of a building! Northrop's table 15.6 shows that the reinforced concrete building, type 15.2.2, has a natural period of oscillation of about 0.3 second, and a static yield resistance of about 3 psi. Northrop's Figure 15.10 shows it has 50% probability of severe damage at 2.85 km from a 1 megaton surface burst on an ideal, unobstructed desert surface with no blast energy absorption by buildings intervening between that target and ground zero! For comparison, a similar | megaton surface burst in unobstructed desert is shown in Northrop's Figure 15.11 to have 50% probability of destroying a typical British brick house at 4.42 km ground range (50% severe damage probability), whereas Figure 15.18 gives a range of only 2.74 km for collapse of 3-10 story steel-frame buildings from a 1 megaton

surface burst on unobstructed, open terrain.

[ 357 ]

THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE YIELDS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

By LORD PENNEY, F.RS., Imperial College

D. E, J. SAMUELS anv G, C, SCORGIE United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

(Received 13 October 1969)

[Plates 2 to 9]

CONTENTS PAGE PAGE . InrRopUCTION 358 Nagasaki 389 Hiroshima and Nagasaki 389 . GROUND ZEROS AND THE HEIGHTS Bending of mild steel roof ladders 392 OF BURST 361 Prison wall at Nagasaki 398 . BLAST DATA AND THE PRESSURE 6. DIsTORTION OR BREAKING OF PULSE INSIDE BUILDINGS 362 PANELS 399 Blast data b 362 Tool cabinet in Nagasaki 403 The drag coefficients _ 368 Office cabinets at Hiroshima 404 The pressure pulse inside a Dishing of a safe door in building ; ie. 369 Hiroshima 405 The pressure inside a building: Wooden platform floor in effect of window glass 370

Hiroshima Telephone Exchange 410 . DRAG OBSERVATIONS ON CIRCULAR

‘1 7. CRUSHED CANS AND DRUMS 412 SyENee 7 Four-gallon cans 412 Poles on Hypothec Bank and ; Forty-six-gallon drums 413 Chugoku Building 372 Can at 3100 ft in Nagasaki 416 Model experiments 373 Blue-print container: Hiroshima 417 Computer calculations 377 Wooden power line poles 380 8, RECAPITULATION OF YIELD The bending of I beam poles 383 ESTIMATES AND BEST VALUES 417 . DAMAGE DRAG EFFECTS OTHER THAN 9, APPENDIX 420 ON CIRCULAR CYLINDERS 384 The dynamic pressure 420 Memorial stones 384 Dynamics of elastic-plastic Hiroshima 387 cantilever 421 Nagasaki (Nishigo) 387 Hiroshima 388 10, REFERENCES 424

‘The nuclear explosive yields at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been calculated from measurements of the damage caused to some objects whose dynamical responses were simple enough to permit analysis. Examples include bent or snapped poles, squashed empty drums and cans, overturned memorial stones, some safe doors and the tops of office cabinets pushed in by the blast. ‘Ihe Hiroshima explosion was 12 +1 kilotons and the Nagasaki explosion was 22+ 2 kilotons,

Vol. 266. A. 1177. (Price £2. 8s.; U.S. $6.25) 44 (Published 11 June 1970

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM to « mesh mumber (u). ‘The radial distance (r,t), 19 expre reduced dimensionless units ‘f, being Lagrangean distance, a

NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS OF SPHERICAL BLAST WAVES that

H. L. Brode Nw r/eamad eri/e,

29 September 1954

E https://www.rand.org/pubs/resea —

rch_memoranda/RM1363.html

RM-1363-AEC where ¢ is a length expressing the energy and ambient presseu

is the total blast energy and Bent is the specifie inte: subtracted term represents the pre-shoek internal energy of |

the shoek, and R is the shoek radius. Time (t) is defined i

In fact DTRA and its predecessors back to General Groves of the Manhattan project have has been covering-up the facts determined at Hiroshima in order to foster a delusion that strategic nuclear bombing against cities can work, despite failing. Anyone can simply move people out of cities (as the UK did with kids in Operation Pied Piper, 1 Sept. '39) before declaring war, and then your entire pathetic "countervalue strategic" anti-city deterrent is flushed straight down the pan! This undermines credible nuclear deterrence, which requires tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the invasions that set off both world wars (Belgium '14, Poland '39). It Ukraine had that it wouldn't be in the situation it's now in. Nuclear disarmament didn't make it safe. DUH! (And no, Mr "Scientific American", Hitler did not send the luftwaffe to bomb the kids being evacuated from London on | September 1939!)

Professor Bridgman's Introduction to the Physics of Nuclear Weapons Effects can be used to demonstrate the exaggerations in Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons when Glasstone's free-field (unobstructed terrain) nuclear effects predictions from desert and ocean nuclear tests are improperly applied to concrete cities. Bridgman, for instance, considers a building with an exposed area of 163 square metres, a mass of 455 tons and natural frequency of 5 oscillations per second, and finds that a peak overpressure of 10 psi (69 kPa) and peak dynamic pressure of 2.2 psi (15 kPa) at 4.36 km ground range from a | Mt air burst detonated at 2.29 km altitude, with overpressure and dynamic pressure positive durations of 2.6 and 3.6 seconds, respectively, produces a peak deflection of 19 cm in the building about 0.6 second after shock arrival. The peak deflection is computed from Bridgman's formula on p. 304. This 19 cm computed maximum deflection allows us to estimate how much energy is permanently and irreversibly absorbed from the blast wave by a building (if damaged, additional energy is absorbed and is transformed into slow-moving - relative to the shock front velocity - debris which falls to the ground and is quickly stopped after the blast has passed it) by: E = Fx, where F is force (i.e., product of total pressure and area) and x

is distance moved in direction of force due to the applied force from the blast wave.

BUILDIN

LAST)

Deflection (Point-mass) in m

UK National Archives: HO 225/54 and CAE HOME OFFICE SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS’ BRANCH

The Circulation of this nancr has been

It is issued for the personal use of ...... SECRET Copy

Some Aspects of Shelter and Evacuation Polic to meet H-Bomb threat

WWII Morrison shelter co-inventor (with Lord Baker), Edward Leas wrote this Secret 1954 H bomb survival report for Strath's civil de

Table 5

en inhabitants are provided wi

= =z Ww oO c ¥ ——$$ 2 City 9 milo In position g Central f — to cause z EOE Senne maximum death ” BUILDING NO. INDIVIDUALS DESIGNATION EXPOSED 30 London 261 , O00 | POST OFFICE 400 . 2 TELEGRAPH OFFICE 301 "i 2 3 TELEPHONE OFFICE 474 Birmingham 0 56, 000 155,000 4 CITY HALL 216 5 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 682 G y, 000 ' 6 BRANCH POST OFFICE 346 lasgow ° 64, 000 152, 7 PO. SAVINGS OFFICE 750 . Liverpool fe) 67, 000 452,000 @ 05 LO 5 20 25 RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO Ashley WV. Oughterson, et al., Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs, Manchester e) 62 000 151 000 NP-3036 to NP-3041 (Vols. I-VI), Army Institute of Pathology; 1951. Total 0 24.9, OOO 671, 000 DC-P-1060 _NONSEISMIC REINFORCED - CONCRETE BUILDINGS It will be seen from Tables 4 and 5 that, with this scheme .

100g

evacuation of a central area and ahelter in the surrounding anm. homb causes m deaths at all. Clearlv. however. the enemv would

our provisions and might well choose to drop his bombs where the: HES Qudine Marinas paeis LS ani without allowing for local | Hitt 3.6 MI, whibli Ghenioveldi dactheblustwave incuformafthe “reception amulus", this w

ho es m the centre in the case of London and about & 1 the rapidly AUNT oda Be Sil Yrorage deaths from bombs in these worst posi

ca : ae i: rath gg GO MRUg at Sn ae FV S04K SYeton H-bombs on UK cities) would

Sees eer Fiesta ; etna fe Joon. eal hee ons pede pe eneesrwure Sv abi aeed Yhd'people sheltered slightly outsic i laretrtmtigntenara or 3 miles from other city 050-45 RAYeositeiaky dd [PhUlAcenieing Slastuiclh reesingthese evacuated people in she athe last forwted-tikemianh Otho thebthe perceniogswfthejettlunder a quarter of a million ca g ill aimbgetismalleeassthed blassnmpadt! Iislenty fraapartcentre of cities, or under 1 mill uc inefeses tlettwiding cidcldih ec ffentliaadargeinaatds,the peak concentration of evacue

H the example above, 10 psi peak overpressure (69 kPa in SI

eal scsi Sie . Naturallvaif.the eyasuation.was like,{hat of kids and mothers and tl

canshrog fies

bociaed A 1 negaton: strategic bomb, Hut the: 163 isqua hemisphere at that range®namdly f= oh63u(2Pir2Ps60°2) = 163/124800,000 = SALPNS SOR RS LP t take te shelter readily) on 1 September 193¢

PRESSURE ( weapon yield at this Stage “y.1 O-efith: origina blasted dotl blast wa, miles | from key cl sur jos ea bald be ece ation from London to Devon and Ge redichion of Urven Cesusltien. spa tie Medtet Lane ersal prevents this re-targetting. Evacuation detered bombing i 10°14 )* 1.37# 10 BEES SSG AH, Bie AEG A HEPTHS “Osciltations of the aispe remover? 2.6MJ A Sarit last energ merce ed,

nearly 1%, which is a similar fraction to Penney's finding in Hiroshima.

You get additional, greater, energy loss due to damage done to buildings close to the fireball. For n such buildings in a radial line, the cumulative removal of blast energy fraction is: exp(-2.6n/290), which is greater for the larger blast damage distances in built up areas predicted for effects of higher yields! So increasing the yield increases the shielding for any given free-field pressure (the distance of

which scales up with yield)!

Even with wooden 1-storey houses predominating in Hiroshima, Lord Penney who took away the overpressure debris (crushed petrol cans, etc) for analysis in England in 1945 found the blast energy at Hiroshima decreased exponentially due to blast attenuation caused by damage done, by comparing his results to the free-field Maralinga desert values for British nuclear tests

without a precursor. This was all ignored by Uncle Sam (Glasstone)!

We have already given in many posts extensive evidence proving that concrete buildings in Hiroshima and modern cities absorb thermal, nuclear and blast effects in a way totally ignored by Glasstone's unobstructed desert analysis. Strategic nuclear deterrence is thus bunk, if based on nuclear test effects data from unobstructed desert or open ocean. We need tactical nuclear deterrence to stop invasions and the use of force, not an incredible threat of bombs on cities, which is analogous to the gas and incendiary bombing exaggerations of the 1920s and 1930s which failed to deter WWII. The exaggerations were made by both lying disarmers (to scare people into disarmament) and by lying proponents of aerial bombing in war (to scare enemies into surrender). The resulting pseudo "consensus of expert opinion" from both groups had tragic consequences. Strategic bombing, megatons of ~100 kg high explosive on Germany, equivalent to a large nuclear attack however you scale the megatonnage (by the 2/3 power of blast yield for peak overpressure over unobstructed terrain, or by an even

weaker function of yield for initial nuclear radiation), also failed to produce military results when civilians were bombed. The two low

yield nuclear weapons dropped over mostly wooden houses in Japan did not produce the results publically claimed (for propaganda) for modern concrete cities. We've been blogging this for years, ignored by the loons who prefer anti-nuclear lies about

strategic nuclear deterrence! So to correct Glasstone for urban areas:

(1). Simply use Lord Penney's exponential attenuation formula from Hiroshima to reduce peak overpressures in cities: exp(- R/3.25) for R being radial distance through a city in kilometres. This reduces peak overpressure by 50% at 2.2 km. (Obviously precise

effects depend on details, but this is a "baseline" for minimal blast attenuation, in cities with predominantly wood frame buildings.)

(2). Simply use George R. Stanbury's formula for predicting the thermal flash shadowing, by calculating the number of exposed upper floors that can geometrically "see" the fireball as a function of range, so that the number of computed flash burns correspond to the number of windows that can see the fireball (e.g. for 50 ft wide streets, 3 miles from a 1 megaton surface burst, only the highest floor can "see" the fireball since the angle from the top of the fireball to building top artificial skyline is 13.5 degrees; if the buildings are on average 10 floors high, the percentage burns and fire risk is therefore 1/10 for one side of a building with 4 sides, i.e. 1/40 which is smaller than the 1/10 assumed by some simplistic propaganda; but you then get into the issue of the size of the windows and whether the people inside are protected by shadows from walls or furnishings or internal office cubicle partitions or even other people in between the target and the fireball in the office, all of which reduce the simplistic "theoretical" estimates of the number of people burned, instead of assuming that no buildings or screening exists at all as in anti- nuclear propaganda for so-called "arms control" (war via appeasement/disarmament as in the 1930s). Stanbury points out there, and in his August 1962 Restricted UK Home Office Scientific Advisory branch Fission Fragments article on Fires from nuclear weapons, that to produce firestorms in Germany - the allies tried hard to achieve this in 1943 to end the war (and firestorms produce the associated soot clouds for climatic "nuclear winter" effects hype) you needed 50% of buildings to be initially ignited, which was only possible in the (now burned and gone) medieval wooden areas of Hamburg and Hiroshima (due to blast-overturned charcoal braziers in wooden houses in Japan, not the thermal flash which was obstructed by rooms and other buildings). Stanbury's studies of the thermal flash shielding in Liverpool and Birmingham showed that the thermal radiation is shielded to such an extent you simply can't get to within an order of magnitude of that 50% ignition incidence needed for a Hamburg style intense firestorm (or, therefore, nuclear

winter due to Hamburg type firestorm soot clouds penetrating the stratosphere)!

The effect of scattered thermal radiation diffusing into shadows was insignificant at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where burns from thermal radiation were only received in an unobstructed radial line from the fireball, so that any shielding provided virtually complete protection from thermal flash. The 110 Castle-3 shot at Bikini Atoll in 1954 was fired during a moderate rainstorm to obtain data on the reduction of blast and thermal effects by rainfall. There are no films that show the fireball because the water content of the air absorbed the thermal and visible transmission. Heavy rain or fog absorbs the thermal radiation locally around the fireball, rather than creating a large amount of dangerously wide-angle scattered radiation at great distances. Northrop's 1996 Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from EM-1, gives data for Pacific test conditions in Figure 6.39 on page 248, on the effect of scattered thermal radiation from a

burst at 1 km altitude, at various distances and for different fields of view:

Vv ida 45 kiloton nuclear test Grable at 524 ft burst altitude, smok — report:

175 smoke pots 200-300 ft from ground zero established a 3.8 grams/m’2 (white smoke screen can be seen to the right of ground zero in this photo distance of 2238 feet from bomb (or 2166 ft from ground zero), the free-fie thermal exposure was 57.5 +/- 5.0 cal/cm“2; behind smoke-screen it was. Hence, 98.6% +/-0.3° s stopped by the smoke screen.

Glasstone however first lied in the 1957 edition of Efi Nuclear Weapons (page 289, paragraph 7.19) that o be stopped > (without giving any specific data reference:

credible, then he removed all reference to smoke screen:

editions. Liars still claim he is "authoritative"

J gb Smoke screen : “a

At 30 km ground range, 16% of the thermal radiation in unobstructed terrain is direct (from the fireball), and 84% is scattered, but the

angular distribution of scattering is not extreme (most of the scattering comes from air relatively near the fireball): the total (direct plus scattered) is 70% for a 40 degrees field of view (only 30% of the thermal radiation comes from angles exceeding 40 degrees from the radial line to the burst). Only 6% of the total thermal radiation at 10 km comes from angles beyond 90 degrees (i.e. 94% comes from the

hemisphere around a target facing the burst).

Northrop's 1996 Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from EM-1, also gives graphs of the thermal radiation spectrum, showing differences with burst altitude and yield. Figure 6.19 shows that a | kt surface burst gives a thermal spectrum which peaks at 1.1 micron (Planck radiating temperature = 2000 K), compared to 0.4 micron (Planck radiating temperature = 5000 K) for 1 kt air bursts at 1-30 km altitude. Figure 6.21 shows there is much less difference between the spectra for surface and air bursts for 1 megaton yield: 0.70 micron peak in the thermal spectrum (Planck radiating temperature = 3800 K) for a megaton surface burst, compared

with 0.52 microns (Planck radiating temperature = 4500 K) for a 30 km altitude megaton burst.

Northrop's 1996 Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from EM-1, in Figure 16.10 uses hydrodynamic

calculations to prove that the maximum fire wind velocity in a firestorm is only a weak function of the fire intensity, for example a fire with a radius of 10 km will create a maximum fire wind velocity of 17 m/s for a fire intensity of 25 kW/m, but this only increases to 36

m/s if the fire intensity is increased to 240 kW/m’.

Remember also that nuclear test evidence shows that the risk of clothing or other items burning is less for real levels of office humidity than for target materials left to dry out in the Nevada at the lower humidity of Nevada nuclear tests like Encore; clothing shields thermal

radiation and increases burns energy requirements contrary to Glasstone.

Northrop's 1996 Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from EM-1, Table 14.5 on page 501 also points out that while people standing nude 2 metres behind glass windows watching the nuclear blast approach them will receive a 50% median dose of 3 glass fragment abdominal wall penetrations at a peak overpressure of 7 psi, it takes 15 psi if they are wearing clothing! If they duck and cover, they will can avoid the directional flying glass (and the thermal burns) completely. What Northrop doesn't tell you is that in a built up city, the dynamic pressure needed to energise those glass fragments to lethal velocities don't exist 2 metres behind glass windows in general; only behind those windows facing the fireball with an unobstructed view. Other windows on all all sides of the building will certainly break if the overpressure is high enough, but the blast wind (dynamic pressure) is directional and so the windows will not be blasted inwards with the same speed (at lower pressures they can even fail in the negative phase and be sucked outwards, with no hazard

whatsoever to occupants! ). Northop (1996) in chapter 14 on personnel casualties gives very high mortality rates based on unprotected

head impacts, particularly for standing personnel, e.g. 5 psi for 50% mortality for people standing in buildings swept through by blast winds. Again, this assumes the blast winds are not obstructed and attenuated by the other surrounding buildings in a city, but it also suggests a simple civil defense precaution to accompany duck and cover in a crisis situation: bicycle helmets can be kept under emergency table "shelters" and can be put on quickly before the blast arrives, after a nuclear explosion, to minimise head trauma from flying debris or bodily translation and impact for high dynamic pressures and long blast durations. With duck and cover, you can avoid wind drag or injury from flying debris and you can keep away from a blast reflecting surface, then Northop shows in Figures 14.2 and 14.3 that you have 50% chance of surviving 37 psi peak overpressure from | megaton if you are lying down perpendicular to the direction of approach of the blast wave, or 62 psi if your are lying parallel to the direction of the blast (i.e., lying down facing away from the flash). In other words, blast is

then very survivable!

(3). Simply allow nuclear radiation doses in modern cities to be attenuated severely by a factor of about 100 (from the 2011 Los Alamos report unobstructed desert "free field" initial nuclear radiation dose data study for the shadowing by intervening the buildings of in New York City) - before you include the actual shielding by a building people are in, which is much better for INR than Glasstone claims, because essentially ALL of the urban area outdoor 100-fold reduced radiation dose is SCATTERED, not direct, so it is energy-degraded and not the highest-energy direct gamma and neutrons (which are attenuated severely on the transit through all the buildings in the radial line from the bomb)! Putting in "/100" to the computer formulae is not rocket-science! Simple. Nothing in the universe is perfect, but this correction is easy, and gives a minimal baseline for realism for the urban effects of nuclear weapons, lacking in all anti-nuclear diatribes. For higher yield weapons, the increased ranges for given radiation doses will lead to increased attenuation, since at increased ranges there will be more concrete buildings intervening in the the radial line from fireball to target, and although scattered radiation builds up at greater distances, it has lower energy than unscattered radiation and therefore is less penetrating (easier to shield). The most penetrating and wide-angle scattered nuclear radiation dose is from neutrons, but for the full range of 13 different nuclear weapon designs in the 1984 EM-1, the effective mean free-path for the surface burst neutron dose over the distance 1-2 km only ranges from 189 to 221 metres (the latter being weapon type 13, the neutron bomb). (The neutron dose will essentially completely arrived - except for a small portion due to delayed neutrons from fission products like bromine-90 - before blast damage occurs to those buildings Icated near the crater.) Glasstone is widely ignored when pointing out in one table in the last chapter - contrary to many free-field charts and graphs - that 50% survival in modern concrete buildings in Hiroshima occurred at 0.12 mile for the 16 kt air burst at 600 m; this scales up by the cube-root scaling law to predict 50% survival at 1.2 miles from a 16 megaton air burst at 6 km altitude; initial radiation dose

distances scale as a weaker function of yield than blast.

Additionally, the blast effects data (relating say overpressure to casualties) is way off in left-wing anti-nuclear propaganda. The actual Hiroshima and Nagasaki data proves much greater survival than bogus theoretical assessments: in reality, 100% people are not nude standing behind windows facing the blast while wearing roller-skates to ensure they are frictionlessly blown straight out of the 42nd floor by a 3psi blast, and killed by the impact from the gravitational fall to the pavement 420 feet below. Instead of the 1979 US Office of technology assessment claim that 50% of people are killed at Spsi, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than twice this was needed for the same effect, even without effective duck and cover or taking shelter (CLICK HERE FOR REPORT CONTAINING THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS). Although blast duration increases with yield, this has no effect if the pressure is below

the threshold for damage, so Glasstone's curves are wrong for not reverting to cube-root scaling at high yields (impulse rules at low

10°

SPC

10°47

Direct nuclear radiation is rapidly attenuated

by modern city concrete skylines, so only the

highly scattered radiation gets to you, and, ioe lower energy, is also easily attenuated \

AIR-GROUND SECONDARY

GAMMA RAYS ca

| | CONCRETE - CAPTURE CANIM RAYS

FISSION - PRODUCT GAMMA RAYS

CONCRETE THICKNESS (in.)

FROM: L. G. Mooney, Ca/culations of Weapons Radiation Doses in

FRACTION OF TOTAL DOSE RECEIVED

O O41 02 03 O04 05 O06 O07 O08 ASD 10 FRACTION OF 4m SOLID ANGLE, o'

Effect of neutron and gamma ray scattering on the angular distribution of initial radiation dose, 1.2 km from thermonuclear explosion. FROM: J. A. Auxier, et al., Nuclear Weapons Free-Field Environment Recommended for Initial Radiation Shielding Calculations, ORNL-TM-3396.

10° ,

10 kt in New York City

Single Compartment Above-Ground Concrete Structures, Radiation 10' yiesearohAssociatesshinidds:‘RRA‘M93n(NeVvembe*n i26 in 1969) ographs for building damage; which is

cRIGEThy My Ghittagel Mic delving hheok frag tspott NOPH06) Uhea pout dhl asrmibleblite effect was 50% af 32 psi

p&ethingicAmp lian RasmarckhnAssoaiatas(2Qid Hfevuneds100-F pidod osechedscitiion:duck-and-cover to”

reduce exposure to flying glass, debris and blast wind drag; contrasted to 5 psi in anti-nuclear disarmament propaganda lies).

For the correct application of Hiroshima's lessons to modern higher yield nuclear war threats from Russia, see for instance the 1970s congressional testimony of T. K. Jones of Boeing Corporation in hearings linked HERE (February-March 1976 congressional Civil Defense Review), and HERE (November 1976 Nuclear War Survival hearings). Whenever the factual evidence surfaces, it is falsely labelled "controversial" or "wrong" by lying mainstream media charlatans, fraudsters, and bigoted snake oil salesmen, and ignored for political left-wing propaganda purposes, or the "arms controllers" simply tell lies claiming falsely that civil defense is a joke, just as they did in the 1930s (when civilian gas masks were discounted as a simple solution to deter Hitler from dropping his gas bombs on cities for a knockout blow!) and 1970s, debunked by T. K. Jones' famous 1979 letter to congress, extract below, which led to his being appointed Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces on June 1, 1981 under the new Reagan Administration, which aimed to win the Cold War by science and technology, not lose freedom via Russian nuclear coercion. Note that while the ACDA - i.e. the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose faked nuclear weapons/war effects calculations lay behind the disastrous 1970s nuclear parity SALT farce which now results in dictators again intimidating democracies as was the case in the 1930s due to disarmament scams for "peace" which led to WWII - claimed 50% of people are killed at 5 psi peak overpressure from a megaton, while in fact U.S. classified Defense Nuclear Agency research showed that Russian public shelters were built to take 150 psi i.e. surviving within the 0.83 mile fireball radius of a 5 megaton surface burst, Russian apartment basement shelters were built to survive 60 psi, and good Russian improvised expedient shelters built outside cities survived 40 psi in American blast tests and gave upwards of

200 fallout protection factor (i.e., reducing the maximum hotspots of 20,000 rads to a survivable 100 rads and averting casualties).

ACDA disarmament bigots simply lied in the traditional "H. G. Wells" 1930s-sci-fi-style of disarmament fantasy, in testimony to congress, about the motivation and the detailed work of those people who disproved them, they ignored the classified data on blast and fallout shielding in their "effects" models, or their calculations assumed that people failed to use fallout shelters in order to deceptively "reduce" fallout protection factors by a factor of 7, by simply assuming people would go outside to be exposed to unshielded fallout (like most people, they also massively exaggerated the mean gamma ray energy of fallout during the sheltering period, as we have previously exposed, which is debunked by the measurements after the Redwing Zuni and Tewa tests) - they also lied that Jones didn't include fallout casualties when in fact he did include fallout correctly, finding that you don't get fallout casualties with the high degree of radiation shielding in shelters, an exact analogy to the situation where the 100,000 protection factor of activated charcoal gas mask filters gave no gas casualties in 1938 research, and disarmament bigots tried to claim that was some kind of ignorant dismissal of the horrors of true gas war so they would "arbitrarily" assume that only say 50% of people put on gas masks in order to then falsely claim that gas masks were somehow "calculated" to only work for 50% of people - i.e. only those assumed to be actually wearing them! - a travesty and abuse of scientific modelling (like lying that you have done detailed calculations proving that car seat belts make no difference in accidents, when in fact you have merely assumed that nobody wears the seat belts!), when in fact the true excellence of gas mask protection was proved to

successfully deter Hitler from using gas on civilians with gas masks, saving millions contrary to the hate attacks on civil defence by

disarmament propaganda deceivers (who recognised that civil defence made deterrence credible, and so was a threat to their bigoted

plans for peace at any price):

BOEING AEROSPACE COMPANY 5

__A Division of The Bosing Company

January 22, 1979

The Honorable William Proxmire Chairman, Senate Banking Committee United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Proxmire:

Your request in recent hearings for an explanation of the discrepancy between our estimates and ACDA's estimates of Soviet losses in a nuclear war is clearly important and warrants a clear and candid answer. Unfortunately, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, the Deputy Director of ACDA, chose to incorrectly represent our work. I appreciate the opportunity to set the record straight and to point out what we have determined to be the factors contributing significantly to the differences between the two estimates.

Population Protection

In his attempt to discredit our work, Mr. Keeny incorrectly inferred that this work was based on mere “assumptions” and “simple ratios." In fact, our approach was to analyti- cally duplicate the provisions of the Soviet Union's civil defense plans and preparations. This effort was supported by extensive research into Soviet literature, use of rigorous system engineering functional analysis techniques, and a program of testing to establish the effectiveness of Soviet shelters and industrial protection methods. Moreover, the impact of uncertainties and possible imperfections in Soviet execution of their plans were examined parametrically.

Mr. Keeny's statement that we “assumed there would be no casualties from fallout” is false. The record of hearings before the Joint Committee on Defense Production

(November 17, 1976) clearly shows that the data presented counted as fatalities all persons receiving a radiation dose of 200 rads or more. Moreover, our more recent studies of which ACDA is aware have treated this value parametrically.

By protecting their people against fallout, the Soviets can substantially limit their population fatalities. Figure 1 shows that even very rudimentary protection, such as basements or expedient shelters, is sufficient to minimize fatalities. In the ACDA analysis, the majority of the evacuees were assumed to have a protection factor of 10 or less, which results in enormously high fatalities compared to what the Soviets could achieve if they carry out even the most modest of the measures outlined in their plans

sad Téteratere. Assumption Variables Versus U.S.S.R.

Civil Defense Effectiveness Degree of Fallout Protection for Evacuees and Rural Population

LIMMELMUES -_ | |

ABOVE: extracts from the famous 1979 T. K. Jones B of ARS Chipb i albn letter, page 2, debunking "arms control" nuclear weapons effects lars in detail. This really exasperated my dad, JohnyB)_Cook, who was a Civil Defence Corps instructor in the oy s, but was old enough

PROTEC ovl to live through the 1930s apBERCRNT FATALLEEP ili} oel- Bas| repeated lied on theefteeteatene peo OMS eal

never work, because babies an eely won't put them on pri hidhlalgpyopepcamust ban evil civil defence and instead guarantee TION 40 4 totdant IAL BASEMENTS

peace by appeasing the Nazis pee of we don't, they ill INITELY gas us all with a massive g4s bomb raidjon day | of war. In

fact, Philip Noel-Baker did this first in a BBC radio SDF

jming gas masks will

ech in me 6 years before Hitler was elected. Fa ily members who knew the

truth from gas attacks in WWII - largely negated opal Ne gas masks and going into 8h@ltans for aon ets of persistent liquids like mustard

agent - had to put up with this lying BBC and other med nes were poe rearming and preparing for invasions @e A the world and then use efficient gas chambers to dispose of thepenuberenorecrionsarvamekvides ' ‘edtenspe", like modern snowflakes today). What really irritated dad, however, was that Philip Noel-Baker, having lied about gas effects in his February 1927 BBC radio

Nd HOPRNA NAF UACONY Hetl93 OHI ge te cr dmepinant: WhadeHestivebe did Hitler's biddittd "Was made a Lord and a Nobel cities, the Soviets are bat idite in rial shelters and ares Waamek pat

edcshpuize Waunmnerdot appeasement propaganda diessthas ded ¢o werld was anc therm gid thegsameythingall pver again during the cold war,

STE Re Seach Bard AAA Lathan EPS Le fRBREEAY Sy Hiroshima produced lethal

PeRAS SM RTHEL ANPIE hE WHO! have 66caHIsEtire|flash, the blast, the fire, will die within a short time. The first atomic bomb weighed two kilograms. It was little larger than a cricket ball. ... In 1978, more than 2,000 died

in Hiroshima from its long-term effects."

Every word here is totally untrue, and easily disproved, but nobody in the House of Lords explained the facts to him, so this he quotes on page 5 of his 1980 Ecology Party book "How to Survive the Nuclear Age", and on page 6 he adds an attack on civil defence: "I feel the same outrage in 1980 when the Home Office [UK Government civil defence] propose to circulate a a copy of a pamphlet entitled Protect and Survive to every citizen. ... To strengthen the walls and ceilings as the pamphlet suggests, he needed a garden, a spade, sandbags, and the strength to dig and transport a ton of earth." However, the infirm or elderly don't need to hire an army of helpers to make a fallout shelter, because - contrary to Philip Noel-Baker - you can simply use water from a hose to fill up water filled bags inside boxes which do the shielding, as explained in the Home Office scientific advisory branch Fission Fragments magazine article (reprinted in the Royal Observer Corps Journal, vol. 27, issue 2, February 1985, page 26, below). In any case, in actual implementation, you would have some organization for civil defence in time of crisis, with people in nighbourhoods helping one another (lending hose pipes, helping to assemble emergency shelters around tables in homes, etc). Noel-Baker ends his case by absurdly calling for disarmament as a "sure way to avoid the wat", by again ignoring the lessons of his own 1930s disarmament war effects propaganda which led to appeasement and thus the encouragement of enemy aggression, triggering the Second World War: "This is not a utopian dream. It is the system by which David Lloyd George disarmed Germany in 1919..." This claim typifies Noel-Baker's absurd, self-contradictory nonsense, since DLG's 1919

"system" led to another, far worse, world war, not to peace.

Assumption Variables Versus U.S.S.R. Civil Defense Effectiveness Distance Evacuated

50

¢ 88% OF URBAN POPULATION EVACUATED

PERCENT FATALITIES AMONG TOTAL POPULATION

30

40 AVERAGE DISTANCE EVACUATED (mi)

20

FIGURE 2

As to the reasons why our results differ from those produced by ACDA:

Assumption Variables Versus U.S.S.R. Civil Defense Effectiveness

Blast Protection Provided Evacuees and Rural Population

100

80

PERCENT 60

FATALITIES

AMONG EVACUEES

AND RURAL

POPULATION 40 POPULATION DENSITY (PEOPLE/mi2)

500 NON UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION; EVACUEES

200 CLUSTERED IN HOSTING AREAS

20 94—(UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OVER

AGRICULTURAL AREA)

40

20 30 SHELTER HARDNESS (Ib/in2) FIGURE 3 ACDA assumed

10

that 30 percent of the Soviet urban population would not be evacuated but that the

good quality shelters would accommodate only 10 percent.

Thus, 20 percent of the Soviet

urban population was assumed unevacuated and inadequately protected, which of course

subjects them to massive losses.

The Soviet plans, which we endeavored to represent

in our analysis, indicates that urban residents not sheltered will be evacuated.

A second difference centers around the way in which the Soviets choose to distribute

and provide blast protection for their evacuees.

The ACDA analysis assumed that the

Soviets would cluster their evacuees in hosting areas, which we estimate could result in

some concentrations as high as 500 persons per square mile.

The evacuees were assumed

to have no blast protection, so fatalities would occur at 3 to 7 psi according to the

source used by ACDA.

Figure 3 shows that a distribution of 500 persons per square mile

and 3 psi fatal blast level results in a fatality level almost 100 times greater than a uniform distribution and blast protection to 15 psi (the minimum provided by Soviet

expedient shelters).

It is important to remember that it is the Soviet Union and not

the United States that controls such factors as evacuation, distribution, and sheltering

of the Soviet citizens.

The ACDA study of industrial protection, which I have reviewed, is not a competent work. The hardness levels known to be achievable on industrial components are seriously under-

stated while the difficulty of achieving these levels is overstated. industry in recovering from damage is disregarded.

The resiliency of The report's fixation on the capa-

bility of one-megaton weapons to damage industry is misleading since the U.S. would be In that 198) @OU Ge tOadedderihew NFvitheserwRaPONs, AGA INS ter GQVALE :KACGSES: abHHOPROV Edi NE ACDA, study

Hay Piotr reat sie of, rotection on she gid vival. and recovery Nate he s ovine i

Y CHaCd ADDCd

had - but did not have - in the 1930s to deter Hitler]. ... A new world war can hardly fail to invol the is debunked by former NATO General Sir John Hackett's book "The Third World War" which shows hohe ORES, risks will be controlled even in the event of a Russian first-strike on Britain, provided that we are prepared for nuclear war - this book will be discussed in detail

later in this blog post, below]. ... Let us all resolve to take all possible practical steps to ensure that we do not, through our own folly, go

LIMEUM

over the edge."

FROM: "Royal Observer Corps Journal",

PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATIO

A. L. Mather ex-SA, Northumberland in ‘Protect and Survive’ a recommendation is made on page 11 para. 2 ‘Use tables if they are large enough to provide you all with shelter. Surround them and cover them with heavy furniture filled with sand, earth, books or clothing’. Similar shelters are proposed in paras 1 and 3.

Apart from the fact that under certain circumstances of location and weather sufficient soil may not be available, none of the materials suggested for radiation protection is of use to the shelter-bound occupants. The use of survival supplies as a radiation barrier is to be recommended, if not, indeed considered essential. As previously suggested fuel supplies, which have a half value thickness approaching that of soil, could be used in this way. Food supplies should be stacked in boxes as the inner protective barrier together with immediate water supplies. Water has a half value thickness of 200mm compared with 140mm for earth. One therefore has only to create a water barrier 50% greater in width to equate with a soil barrier. The water barrier can be erected in a very short time merely by filling suitable containers by means of a hosepipe. In this way an adequate shelter can be made in a fraction of the time needed for the filling and transportation of sandbags. Further this would provide a strategic supply of water for fire fighting, drinking, washing and for the later survival period during which water supplies may be limited.

Cheap containers would be needed for such a barrier and dustbins, plastic bottles etc would be expensive and inconvenient to store when not required. There is, however, a suitable container made by Bowater Scott Ltd (and possibly by other companies) which

their side) without bursting or collapsing. "A and access may be made to them by cuttin which is attached to the screw top. Additive prevent the growth of algae or bacteria.

Not only can one stack these water bricks shelter but these could also be put on up improve radiation protection in the fall ou improve fire protection in the upper floor of tl these bags is low (£592 per 1000 including cé the thickness of the box to improve stac increase the cost of the box by 50%. No dc improved by simplification of design and by

One weakness of such a system is the su bags to rupture by blast damage. Those bags openings should be protected by a suitable carpets, heavy timber and/or doors.

There would be load limitations on some aspect would need to be discussed with built However as the half thickness for water is | then the equivalent weight of water would b area of the floor.

The progressive reduction of radiation | shelter will allow the progressive use of w barrier. The empty water bags may be used

This system would perhaps find its prima shelters but there is no reason why wate

EXTRACTS

Material classification

Field fortifcations

Earth covered surface shelters

Monumental-type multistory wall-bearing bldgs.

Multistory, wall-bearing bldgs (apt house type)

Multistory, reinforced bldgs (small windown area) Multistory, steel frame office bldgs.

Wood frame bldgs.

Table B-1. Severe/Moderate Blast Damage Radii for Surface Bursts (metesr)

ALPHA | BRAVO|CHARLIE|DELTA || ECHO 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.50 ee

[sev 195] _250| 350 | (690)

SOURCE: U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL "FM 5-26, EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC DEMOLITION

MUNITIONS (ADM), AUGUST 1971".

PROTECTION (CASUALTY REDUCTION FACTOR)

= 6907/ 1007

SO MOVING TO EARTH COVERED SHELTERS REDUCES CASUALTIES TO 2%, AND THEY ALSO PROVIDE

AREA OF SEVERE DAMAGE FOR HIROSHIMA'S WOOD FRAME BUILDINGS AREA OF SEVERE DAMAGE FOR EARTH COVERED SURFACE SHELTERS

~ 50 FOR A 1 KILOTON SURFACE BURST.

RADIATION SHIELDING. IN ADDITION, THE "FIRESTORM" AND ITS "SOOT NUCLEAR WINTER" FANTASY, WERE DEBUNKED BY GEORGE R. STANBURY, WHO PLANNED THE GERMAN FIRESTORMS; YOU NEEDED 50% IGNITION OF MEDIEVAL WOODEN HOUSES IN HAMBURG TO START A FIRESTORM, WHEREAS THE SIMPLE FIREBALL SHADOWING OF HIGH-RISE MODERN CITY SKYLINES REDUCES THIS TO 5% OR LESS, PREVENTING FIRESTORMS AND CLIMATIC EFFECTS. THIS IS SUPPRESSED BY THE NUCLEAR EXAGGERATIONS BIAS OF JOURNALISTS.

ABOVE: the most advanced and latest American "counterforce" nuclear weapons, the oralloy (Oak Ridge Alloy, aka U235 loaded

secondary stage) W88 nuclear warheads were designed to knock out the huge well shock-insulated Russian SS-18 missile silos when they

had a physical vulnerability number of 52L7, corresponding to a peak overpressure of 7000 psi, which is well within the crater radius.

This is highly relevant today, since ehe SS-18 (in Russian nomenclature: R-36M2) is still in service (like the American W88), and the

Russians have 46 of them, each with 10 warheads of 800 kilotons each, i.e. a total of 10x46 = 460 nuclear warheads and 3680 megatons.

These 211 ton SS-18s are due to be replaced with the latest 208 ton Sarmat (RS-28) missiles (which made its first test flight on 20 April

2022, during the Ukraine war), extending the range from 11,000 km for the SS-18 to 18,000 km for the Sarmat. Unfortunately, as this

UNCLASSIF 1m

JOINT DOD/DOE TRIDENT MK4/MK5 REENTRY BODY ALTERNATE WARHEAD PHASE 2 FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT (U)

9.3.1.2.1. (S) SSPK Against 52L7

Woof The SPETWG calculated the SSPK of each candidate against a target with a

of 52L7. Tyla) Fessssile ss teclilltigenstinietonmentete _j WE —s _.....-.. When the W88/MKS was developed, this was the assessed 5A VNTK of the hardest Soviet silos. Although those SS-18 silos have since been assessed to be much harder than 7000 psi, the SPETWG considers 52L7 to be a significant figure of effectiveness for this system because of the history of its use. The was used, and the results varied monotonically with yield, with a pond

a NCLASSIFIED-

declassified report shows, as with the Russian civil defense shelters, the silo hardness was underrated and the physical vulnerability is not 52L7 as originally supposed. The SS- 18 silos could take much higher peak overpressures than 7000 psi and related ground shock, cratering throwout, etc. (The current "best guess" - and this is not proof tested due to the ban on

atmospheric

nuclear testing - is that it takes a peak overpressure of 10,000 psi to blow the silo door off the SS-18 silo and wreck the missile, which

occurs at a distance from the warhead similar to its inertial gyroscopic CEP targetting error if the accurate GPS satellite navigation system

is taken out by high altitude bursts, so to get a high kill probability you need to target many warheads per silo, a hugely inefficient strategy

when all the enemy has to do is launch the SS-18 out of the silo before your warheads arrive!) In addition to this underestimate of the

hardness of vital military "counterforce" targets in Russia, the Americans also massively over-estimated the cratering and ground ry g y g g

shock effects for high yields in ordinary soils (not easily broken coral reefs!). (For references, please see the earlier blog posts about

cratering exaggerations linked here and here.) The points we want people to take away, or at least openly investigate and question are:

(1) countervalue (anti-city) effects of nuclear weapons are bunk because, aside from the mistakes and deliberate omissions Glasstone and

Dolan made for propaganda purposes in their 1977 edition, if the chips really do go down, you or your opponent can simply evacuate

cities - most of which self-evacuate at 5pm every weekday, anyhow - evacuation is not a miracle, despite what Scientific American or

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists says - before issuing an ultimatum, just as the UK did with evacuating kids from London in Operation Pied

Piper on I September 1939 before issuing an ultimatum and then declaring war 48 hours later,

(2) you or your opponent can not only safeguard the civilians in cities by evacuating them (or putting the people into shelters/basements etc if you have them, as the Russians do, and as thankfully the Ukrainians do which is a key reason they have been able to fight the Russian invasion, as a result of having previously been part of the civil defense obsessed USSR), but 100% of missiles in silos can also be safeguarded from destruction by simply firing them out of their silos, if seriously threatened by a counterforce (anti-silo) enemy attack. In other words, if you decide to credibly target enemy nuclear weapons (a very costly strategy in terms of the number of W88 warheads per silo for any significant chance of damaging a >7000psi peak overpressure-requiring SS-18 missile silo, which are about as well protected as the concrete and steel around most nuclear power reactor cores), your targetting policy will encourage the enemy to /aunch first, to save their missiles from being taken out! So using nuclear weapons to target other nuclear weapons in hardened silos (or hidden in the sea in submarines!), apart from being extremely inefficient and costly in terms of your stockpile, is also a policy that provokes the risk of enemy "launch on warning" crisis instability because you are, if "successful", removing the enemy's protected second strike retaliation capability, and once the second strike option is gone, they are pushed back into the old first-strike aka launch-on-warning policy, which is extremely dangerous if their radar operators mistake some third party's missile testing for a launch against them, etc., etc. So the obsessive "disarmament fantasy" of only using nuclear weapons to try to deter other nuclear weapons in silos by targeting them, is a dangerous illusion that provokes crisis instability and risks an accidental nuclear war, in addition to being an exceptionally ineffective deterrent! All you do with that delusion is to deter the enemy from a second-strike policy, and force the enemy into a dangerous first-strike/launch on warning policy! If you can knock out the enemy warheads in their silos, the enemy will simply ensure that there is a very high probability that their missiles have been launched out of their silos before your warheads arrive, so you will be uselessly destroying EMPTY missiles silos! (your warheads take 25 minutes to arrive for an ICBM between continents, and 10 minutes for a back door attack of an SLBM launched from a submarine; less time is required for a Russian sub to hit NY or LA because they are beside oceans, unlike Moscow and

most Russian targets that are well inland!).

(3) In any case, how do you target enemy SLBMs in submarines hidden at sea? Similarly, the most numerous Russian ICBM in their stockpile is the mobile SS-27 Mod 2/RS-24, of which they have 135 missiles on 16-wheeled mobile launch vehicles which can move around, with 4 separate MIRV nuclear megaton warheads per missile and a range of 11,000 km. How do you target them as they move around during a crisis situation? They can easily move position enough to survive an nuclear warhead in the US stockpile during the 25 minutes while your missiles are on the way to hit them in a crisis situation, so you are literally trying to hit a moving target - do you really believe America will be able to reprogram the target locations for ICBM warheads in flight as they are moving? The whole idea would be amusing if it wasn't so tragic (there was an effort to create a warhead which could track its moving target and adjust its trajectory accordingly, the MARV - Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle - the only known Western MARV was the Pershing II warhead, which disarmed as part of the INF treaty to appease Russia/pro-disarmament politicians in the West). So the whole idea of using nuclear weapons to hit enemy nuclear weapons before they are launched is crazy and dangerous. It's no joke that all the disarmament propaganda claims falsely that nuclear weapons have only the purpose of targetting other nuclear weapons in silos. That policy is dangerous, because it just encourages the enemy to get the weapons out of their silos before your weapons can arrive, so you are not deterring the enemy to launch their weapons, but forcing them to launch on warning, a lunatic policy! Nuclear weapons are only effective in a counterforce operation

against armies on the move, either as a deterrent or to physically stop invasions without collateral damage by air burst enhanced neutron

weapons. The only real use of nuclear weapons should be, as Oppenheimer said, as a tactical threat to stop the military invasions and

attacks that triggered two world wars.

Nuclear weapons are exceptionally good at deterring (or stopping) armies on the move! Not so if they are dispersed in defensive positions like hasty earth covered emergency civil defense shelters that resist 40 psi peak overpressure and give a protection factor of 200 or more against radiation; but the point is that they deter enemy military offensives and once the enemy has crossed your border you are within your rights to stop them; the credible threat will prevent invasions this way, ending world war. (Nuclear weapons are also effective at destroying enemy nuclear weapons in flight, e.g. the 2 kt W66 neutron warhead in the American Sprint ABM missile could melt down the fissile material in Russian nuclear warheads in flight in the atmosphere, and the 5 Mt W71 x-ray warhead of the Spartan ABM missile would ablate, deflect and destroy Russian warheads in space; they also knock down trees to create demilitarised zones in jungle warfare which enable easy identification of insurgents entering those zones for attacks.)

SS-23 warhead pr

- = % ay # , po eee a a

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Yuri Trutnev, The cre weapons is a special | Novosti, 11/22/2017, https://ria.ru/20171122

“But in the meantime, another idea in my he: advanced product bas principle for designing charge. After testing t next day in the evenin and colleague Yuri Nil to the bank of the Irty. let's try to do just suc. agreed. We returned t. charge diagram and p1 product received an in Zeldovich had three fa thermonuclear units d. row! ... The test of pro on the Day of the Sovi 23, 1958 at the test si Zemlya. The success |

showing Putin the world's smallest diameter (152.4mm) 2.5 kt artillery shell (above), and a 99.85% clean thermonuclear bomb (above right and right), 30 March 2000.

PRESIDENT PUTIN AWARDS NUCLEAR WARHE. MERIT TO THE FATHERLAND IN 2000.

E.N. Avrorin, B.V. Litvinov, President Putin, G.N. Rykovanov, E.O. Adamov, Yu.V. Solomon

State visit of President Putin to RFNC-VNIITF, 30 March 2000

Shtanko, A.V. Oplanchuk, V.N. Zatsepin,M.E. Zheleznov, B.V. Litvinov, L.D. Ryabev, G.N. Rykovanov, N.P. Voloshin, E.N. Avrorin, THEM. Kamenskikh, V.Z. Kazachenkoy, R.I. Wozniuk

TEST

280

294 296 299 302

333 357 377

382 400 422 616

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04.07.1969} CHIT wr.710

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10.12.1972 | CHI cxs.1204} 140

23.07.1973 | CHI cxs. 1066

31.05.1974 | CAN cxs.1207 08.06.1975| CHI mr.165 32 18.08.1983 ICMMH3 urr.A-40! 0.001-20

RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENT OF

YIELD TACTICAL NUCLEAR V

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138

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT FROM PAGE 138:

Specialists of the Other Nuclear Center - VNIITF - initially suggested using solid lithium deuterides with a small addition of tritium (for seed) when creating "clean" JAVA for external explosions However, in 1963, new ideas emerged. So, theoretical physicists of VNIITFE.N. Avrorin, E.1. Zababakhin, L.P. Feoktistov, A.K. Khlebnikov, A.A. Bunatyan and others. they offered to conduct a physical experiment in which to “ignite"* a large amount of tritium and data-

* Deutons, deuterons are different names of deuterium nuclei.

138

pua. Jia storo Ha 3aBoge Mucrutyta 6bvia co3aqaHa CnelMaibHad dbu3nyec- Kasi ycTaHoBKa DO -24, cKOHCTpyHpoBaHHasd rpynnot cielMasIMCcTOB MepBoro KOHCTpyktTopckoro 61opo BHM MT® nog pykosogrctsom B. B. JiurBsuHosa u IT1.A. Ecuna. Du3snyeckuii OMbIT C MCNOb3OBaHHeM 3TOH yCTAHOBKH OUT TIpo- BeneH 04.02.1965 r Ha CemunanaTHHCKOM MouMroHe. B 3TOM 3KCIIepHMeHTe, BO3MOXHO, BIepBbIe B MUpe OBLIO OCYILIECTBIICHO 3AKHTaHHe SONbIION Macchi ra3o0o6pa3Horo Jevitepua [17].

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ria. For this purpose, a special physical installation F

at the Institute's plant, designed by a group of spec P.A. Esin. The physical experiment with the use of | [conducted on[02/04/1965)at the Semipalatinsk te: perhaps for the first time in the world, ignition of a larc deuterium was carried out [17]. (NOTE: Russia hz

Developing the ideas realized during this E.N. Avrorin proposed using deuterium gas under high pressure (high c physical charge scheme . The verification of thi: carried out on[13.02.1966]at the Semipalatinsk t and fully confirmed the results of physical calcula was carried out from the primary node, the fragm« of which did not exceed 6% of the total energy re , the fact of obtaining energy release from larg deuterium was proved. This important scientif result opened the way to the use of the cheape

in the energy sector. What could not be obtain and complex installations for thermonuclear fusior disproportionately large scale in an underground

“ Physicists call "ignition" the implementation of a the with a noticeable energy release, which can lead tc flow of thermonuclear reactions.

ABOVE: TRANSLATION FROM PAGE 139,

AS PROVED IN A 6% FISSION (94% CLEAN) 125,

per td ee a ee ed he eee

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139

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The power of gamma radiation doses on the gr epicenter of an aerial nuclear explosion produced ¢

Distance Gamma radiation dose rate for dif from the epicenter explosion, R/h of the explosion, m

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ABOVE: Russian nuclear weaponeer Boris Vasilyevich Litvinov explaining how the world's smallest diameter nuclear artillery shell and

aluminum-24 (T = 2.2 min), and then the ra characterized by the radiation level of manga sodium-24 (T = 15 hours).

allegedly cleanest thermonuclear weapon work to President Putin on 30 March 2000, during his visit to VNIITF at Snezhinsk, Russia. (President Putin wrote on his filmed entry on the Visitor's Book at VNIITF Snezhinsk - screen print of the entry is included later below in Russian - "The biggest danger facing Russia and the whole world is the violation of the balance of power at the cost of huge efforts and sacrifices to the Soviet. The Union managed to achieve a balance of great merit in this, due to your team together. We are obliged not only to maintain the existing achievements but also to achieve new frontiers relying on the talent and courage of our scientists. With hope and love, Vladimir Vladimirovich, March 31, 2000". This is from the film the lab put out in 2005, and we include a selection of stills from it. We're not as yet entirely sure of the reason for the possible discrepancy in dates of Putin's visit, 30 and 31 March 2000, from different sources. It is obviously possible Putin stayed overnight, arriving on 30 March 2000, and signed the visitor's book

when leaving the next day. Peace through credible war deterrence:

The worthless Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by Russia, UK and Ukraine on 5 December 1994 led the way to the removal of the war-preventing nuclear deterrent from Ukraine: the liars claimed like the 1930s Nazis that signatures on paper would guarantee survival, not deterrence. OK, you edit a TV show or paper, and you think this is not relevant to today's problems faced by the person in the street unless Putin actually presses the button. You're a liar if you claim this. Paying higher energy prices? It's due to nuclear disarmament liars allowing Putin to start the war, cutting energy supplies to Europe, driving up prices. Like the disarmament of the UK up to 1935 (and slower rearmament thereafter, to avoid provoking a tantrum from Nazis, in the name of "peaceful coexistence" with state terrorism and racism), Ukraine's nuclear disarmament from 1994-8 guaranteed war, not peace; it gave the green card to the supporter of enemy disarmament, Russia. Nazis in the 1930s pushed for Western disarmament in the name of "peaceful" gas chamber genocide and "peaceful" invasions without opposition (because their enemies had disarmed), just as the thugs do today. As you'll see below in this post, this is not "news". It's the regular, repeating, trick used by bankrupt dictatorships to start world wars: get your enemies to disarm then invade neighbours with impunity! They don't think they can be ever "proved lying evil warmongers by humble yours truly" because they will just keep parroting the lie that if Ukraine had nuclear weapons, there would have been a nuclear war between Ukraine-Russia, not peace: HEY GUYS COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVEN'T HAD NUCLEAR WARS YET! HISTORY SHOWS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE BEEN ATTACKED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AUGUST 1945) DID N-O-T HAVE ANY

SEE ALL THE SECRET FACTS THAT THE "SECRECY-OPPOSED" BLOGGERS REFUSE TO TELL YOU IN THE NAME OF THEIR EFFORTS TO START A NUCLEAR WAR:

C @ fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/

Federation 1 of American Scientists

Blogs Publications Get Involved About Careers

Blogs > Strategic Security > US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead

US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead

By Hans Kristensen - January 29, 2020

By William M. Arkin* and Hans M. Kristensen

The authors of the NPR also saw the dilemma of suggesting a more usable weapon. They thus explained that the W76-z intended to enable, nor does it enable, ‘nuclear war-fighting.’ Nor will it lower the nuclear threshold.” In other words, wh yield nuclear weapons lower the threshold making nuclear use more likely, U.S. low-yield weapons instead “raise the nuc and make nuclear use less likely. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood even told reporters that the W76-2 wo! stabilizing” and in no way supports U.S. early use of nuclear weapons, even though the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly warhead was needed for “prompt response” strike options against Russian early use of nuclear weapons.

How FAS-ism in America supports fucking shit nuclear dictators ("morally equivalent to Trump"!! Du

(It should be noted that we're not "trying to be controversial" but just trying to revert politicians to the saner nuclear situation that existed during the Cuban missiles crisis when OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY enabled a safer resolution than the American FASists William M. Arkin and Hans M. Kristensen in their 2020 paper "US Deploys New Low- Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead"

which sneered ignorantly and with evil warmongering maliciousness to encourage Putin to murder kids in Ukraine (they should be

kicked out of the status of "experts" since they are provably malign charlatans like the "Glasstone/Nukemap" liar in the populist Marx-media), at the East-West moral asymmetry of Putin-Trump (like the disproved liar Hans Bethe who quoted Brezhney to disprove Reagan's evil empire speech etc): "... while Russian low-yield nuclear weapons lower the threshold making nuclear use more likely, U.S. low-yield weapons instead “raise the nuclear threshold” and make nuclear use less likely." - nuclear war FAS-ist fans sneering at the West-East moral asymmetry in 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/ We'll go into the details later on, below. But if we were trying to be "controversial" we'd recommend implementing ABM in Western cities to enhance credible deterrence, or

even a first strike to disarm the aggressor and end the war - whoops - should have typed what FAS-ists call "special military ops"!)

ABOVE: from 1992-8, Russia pushed for Ukraine (which has excellent nuclear competence, having Europe's largest nuclear power station, which could have been used to irradiate lithium to produce tritium for independent maintenance of nuclear warheads), to disarm its extensive nuclear warheads using its Cold War traditional Russian supported hypocritical "peace through nuclear disarmament" propaganda movements in the Western media and Western politics (including the current US president) and in 1994 signed a peace guarantee to protect Ukraine's borders, with the UK and USA. Many of us were worried that this was a recipe for a future world war should Russia's attempt at reform fail, leading to a decision to rebuild the USSR starting with the biggest component outside Russia, i.e. Ukraine. At the same time, Boris Yeltsin and the Russian nuclear labs were producing a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons to counter and cancel US conventional weapons, according to a secret-classified 2000 CIA report (linked here). "During Putin's mobilization announcement, he[Putin] also threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, baselessly accused Western countries of provoking him with "nuclear blackmail," and said his remarks weren't a bluff. Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, equipped with both tactical nuclear weapons as well as strategic nuclear weapons, which would be used against cities. "Russians that I keep in touch within Russia are convinced he's going to go nuclear," [ex-CIA agent] Baer told CNN. "I don't know how well-connected they are, but this threat — it was a threat initially — but the more trouble he's in, the more likely he's going to use nuclear weapons"." - Business Insider, 27 September 2022, Ex-CIA officer says Putin is ‘completely cornered' and the chances of his using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine are increasing ‘by the day’. "The US and its allies would eradicate Russia’s military troops in Ukraine and sink its Black Sea fleet if Vladimir Putin uses nuclear weapons, said former CIA director David Petraeus." - US would destroy Russia’s entire army if Putin use nukes in Ukraine, says former CIA director, The Independent, 3 October 2022. Nobody believes Petraeus because Putin has already made clear he will start start off with a Fourth Protocol style false-flag (contrived) nuclear attack on a Russian supply dump or whatever in Ukraine, pretend that is an enemy attack, and use that as a basis to "retaliate" using nuclear weapons. This is actually a very old diplomatic "fog of war" tactic, which President Kennedy's brother Robert referred to as "sinking the Maine again", in a taped discussion on 16 October 1962, when he considered it during the Cuban Missiles Crisis as a possible false-flag "justification" for invading Cuba to remove those Russian nuclear weapons. (The USS Maine was sunk, supposedly by a Cuban mine, in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, and was used to "justify" the American war with Spain in April.) As a pretext for war, this doesn't matter a dime from the perspective of whether the West believes it. It's just about creating an iota of doubt to enable it to violate agreements. Similarly, Russia has never admitted the lethal attacks with Po-210 (UK, 2006) or Novichok (UK, 2018). It's not about whether the West believes any of it. It's purely about Russian bureaucracy. The more evil there is, the more fake justification. (The Nazis were also obsessed with generating fake justifications by diplomatic bureaucracy to excuse genocide and invasions; this always seems to

be about trying to go down in history as holier-than-holy.)

@REUTERS/LT- SS-19 nuclear m at a military base capital Kiev May the rocket carrie been sent to Rus

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Novosti news: January 1992 Ukrainian nuclear warhead

: SS: disarmament : hurtin d mis

egins to ensure .

7g dis

the peace of Ukraine |

“A boy from the Moscow outskirts, born on the eve social cataclysms of the year, Yevgeny Zababakhii quarter of a century - from 1960 to 1984, was the s leader of the second (in time of creation) nuclear-v center of our country. But the general public, this | virtually unknown. ... such trains, camouflaged as

were a dozen, made up of three special divisions o missile forces. One - in the Perm region, the other Kostroma, the third - under the Krasnoyarsk. ... the the "Scalpel" under the car roof is a separable war ten warheads of individual guidance. The power of 550 kilotons in TNT equivalent. All together, starti - 5.5 megatons. We are not going to specify what t missiles were aiming at and what they could erase powder."

- https://en.topwar.ru/107278-tam-gde-zatochili-yad skalpel.html

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BaGaes fOpnit Huxonaesuy san 19 « 186 1.)

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B wayane 1951 r. Opn Huxonaesny Kak nyu crymenT Goan wanpasnex @ K5-11 (BHVYYS®, r. Capoe), PaGotars Kayan 6 nadoparo- pv A. 2. Caxaposa. Ywacrsosan 6 paspaGorKe nepso esonopognon Gom6n!, 2a 4TO Omy GEWO NpHCROeHO ananKe Naypeata CranwHcKoA mpemun. Overs Guictpo npowen nyt. of cTapworo na6opanta no same- cTuTen® HaManbHuka OTAeNeHKA.

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10. H. BaGaen Gun Kpynnemumm CoeuMaAnnCcTOM & O6nacTH CcoanannA @TOMHeX H TepMORREepHEIX Sapanos. B 1955 r. coumectno c 10. A. Tpyt HEBLIM OH CIPOPMUpOBaN HOBOe HaNpasneHve B COaMaHHM TeEPMORREPHEIX SapAQOe C KAPAMHANLHO ynyYWweHHbiMM xapaKTepnctuxamu. B 1958 Fr. Gua yCNAWHO sAREPUNOHA IKCNEPHMEeHTaMHAA OTpaGOTKA NEpROrO 3a~ PARA HOBOFO THM.

Sto pafote npenwectsosanu Gonbwne TeopetmyecKne wocnenosa- HHA NO QMaMHecKOMy OGOCHOBAKMIO MW MaTeMaTHYeCKOMy pacYeTy pas- MAMHeIX NPOURCCOB, KOTOPHIe OhinH BO MHOTOM ee HeACHRMH, Bene Chopmynuposany: sana4H Ma pASpAaGOTKy HOBLIX NporpamM ANA pacYe toe. Ga coamaHwe HOBOTO HaNpaBneKMA uM paspaGoTKy TepMoAREpHEIX 3aprnos @ 1959 r. 10. H. GaGaes Sean ynoctoer seaxna naypeata Nenn- CxO Npemwn,

8 1961-1962 rr. KOpnem Huxonaecenwem wu ero Konnerammn Gem Paspa6otats! HOBLe, Gonee COBepweHHbIe sapAne!. Gonbuiar YacTe sTux SAPAQOB QO CHX NOP WaxOpLHTCA Ka BOOpyKeHnH PoccHiicKo# Apmwn, 3a yvacTwe 6 paspadorke pana TeEPMOANEPHHIX SAPANO C BRICOKHMH YRENb- ome xapaxtopyctvxamy 10. H, BaGacoy o 1962 r. Geno npwceoeno aganne Tepon Counanvcrvyeckoro Tpoyna c spy4eHwem opneva Nennna ¥ 30ncTo# menanvw “Cepn w Monor”. B atom xe rogy emy Guina npucyx- NOMA YYEHAA CTENEH> QOKTOPA TeXHM4eCKMx HaAYK, @ 1968-M OW CTAHOBHT- cA “ACHOM-KOppecnompentom AH CCCP.

Non pyxosonctaom 10. H. BaGaesa 8 nocnenywoume rome Senn paspaGoTans! HOEK AREPHe HW TEPMORMEPHEIe SApAAL! PAaNWYHOrO Ha~ SHaYEHHA ANS OCHAWeHHS GCoNbUHHCTBa ponos BOPCK Boopymernbix Cun CCCP. On muoroxpamio ywactnooan 6 vcnuTaNMAX TepMORROpHDIX SapA: OB Ha NonwroHax MO Kak cneymarwcr # KaK pyKOBOMATeNb. Ero BKnan 68 paspaSoTKy 3apAROS HECWsHM.

No wnwunatuse 10. H. GaOaesa » 10. A. Toymesa « Non ax pyKoBoR- croom 80 BHAKS® Gunn paspasotam Tepmoranepnmwe sapanw arr HAPOQMOXOSRACTBEHHEX LEN@A — 3aDANb! C MMMKMANEMOR OCKOROYHOR PAAMORKTHBHOCTHO. HeKOTOpele #3 HMx GhinM NPAMeHeW ANA CoanaHHA BOACXPAMHNMY, FAWENHA (AS0HRIX MAKENOB, HNTEHCHMRaUHH [A3S0BDIK 4 HOQTAMLIX MOCTOPORAOMMI HT. A

Sonewar Teopetmyeckar padora Geina nposenewa nM MO woNONLsO- RaHHO AREPHeEX BIpeIROR ANA HaAPAGOTKM RENAWIMXCA MATePHANDB.

Dansnetavm nanpasnenmem paGor 10, H, Gabaesa Geino Koperoe YCOROPWONCTEOBANHO AREPHLIX JAPRNOB — AROMHOH MoAxON, Gena parpa- GotaHa TeopmnA, ycoBepweHCTBoBaHe: MeTOmE! pacueTa uw T.A. Taxwe Tep- MORREpHMe SapAfe! Guinn Sonee Npoctes NO KONCTPYKUMM M TeXMONOrHH wsrorosnenun, Orv Seam woneirann, HO padorant We BCEMa Crabwneno 4 TpeGorans noeonxn, HO lOpwit Huxonaeew4 we yonen store cnenate.

10. H. Ba6ae KX RBYMepHbIX F “ecxoro annapata BHTHA pacveTos npoueccos. On m HO# TEMATHKOR: Hi oH # Gwonormel, cpenay. Goim y wer BOENMHOFO HaaMaue

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8 2000 r. no Hiuconaesny pw gena Tocynaperse opmeHamm Senn “Za rpynoayio not

Bessepxwa 1 xa Hoooreopracec nactw & Kpectbaw exana 8 Montaaci SHama”, me Vsar xypem Tpaxtopuct npwaeax 6 apmnw Banca, octanca 6B XWMCTPOA” Maui KpacnompeKoro Kg 4eHia, CENLCKOXO

3a peinaouy nerxn ” Ccoumanw xonnoro Conota seanwe Tepoa Cx 4a w 30nOTOR Me

lO. H. Ba6aees 6bIn KpynHevwum cneuvanuctom B O6nacru cospaHna ATOMHbIX “ TEOMOAREPHbIX Zapagow. B 1955 r. cogmectHo c IO. A. Tpyrt- HeEGbIM OH CHOpMupoGbaN HOGOE HanpasneHve B COsAaHMN TepMOAMEPHbIX ZapAgOB C KaPAVHANEHO YAYYWEHHbIMU xapakTepucruKamy. B 1958 r. 6vina yCNeWHO 3aBepWweHaA SKCNEPVMeHTAaNbHaA OTPAGOYKaA Nepeoro 3a- pana HOBOrO THNAa.

Srov pa6ore npeAawecteosanu Sonbwue TeopeTuyeckue uccneposa- HUA NO @usnyecKomy OBOCHOBaHMIO U MaTeMaTMYeCKOMYy pacuery pas- NUYHbIX NPOUCCCOB, KOTOPbIO ObINN BO MHOFOM OWlO HOEACHbIMUY. Boinu copmynauposabb! 3agaun Ha paspaoboTKy HOBbIX NporpammM ANA paocue- Toe. Sa cogmaHve HOSBOrO HanpaeneHuA uv paspabotKy TepMoAAepHbIxX gapanos e 1959 r. lO. H. Ba6aes 6bin yAocroeH aeanua naypeata NlenunH- CKO“ npemun.

B 1961-1962 rr. lOpuem Huxoneesuyem uv ero Konneramu O6binn pagpasoranbl HOBbIe, GONCE COBEPWEHHKIG sapAAbl. Bonbwan YacTb 9INXx 3aPAROB AO CUX NOP HaxOguTCcA Ha BOOPyxeHMN PoccnucKoN Apmuu. 3a yuacTne B PaspasoTKe PANMA TEPMOAAEPHbIX ZapAQOG C BbICOKUMN yAENb- HbIMM XapakTepuctTukamu IO. H. Babaesy B 1962 rf. ObINO NpucBOeHO geanue Tepon Counanucruyecxoro Tpyfaa c epyyeHvem oppeHa SJledvHa uv 2zonorow mepanu “Cepn u Monot’. B stom x*e rogy emMy 6bina npucy>x- M@Ha YYCHAA CTONCGHb AOKTOPA TEXHNYeCKUX HayK, a 1968-M OH CTaHOBMT- CA YUNCHOM-KOppecnoHAeHTOM AH CCCP.

Nog pykoeogcteom 10. H. Badaesa eB nocnenywoume ropbi 6binu PAsPa6oOTaHbl HOBLIG AROPHbIC VU TEPMOAAEPHbIE 3aPAAbI PasANYHOrO Ha- 3HAYEHMA ANA OCHAWCHYA OONbWUMHCTBA POROB BONCK BoopyxeHHbIx Cun CCCP. OH MHOroKpaTHO yY¥aCcTeOBaN B VCNbITaHYAX TEDMOAAEPHbIX BapA- foe Ha nonuroHax MO kak cnmeyvanucTt uv Kak pyxosoAuTenb. Ero exnag 8B pagpaoorKy 3apAgos HeEoueHuM.

Translation from Russian to English

Yu. N. Babayev was the largest specialist in the fiel and thermonuclear charges. In 1955, together with Yt Trutnev, he formed a new direction in the creation of thermonuclear charges with radically improved chara the experimental testing of the first row of a new type successfully completed.

This work was preceded by extensive theoretical r the physical justification and mathematical calculatior processes, which were still largely unclear. Tasks for development of new programs for calculations wer creation of a new direction and the development of 1 charges in 1959, Yu. N. Babaev was awarded the title Prize laureate.

B 1961-1962 Yuri Nikolaevich and his colleagt

developed new, more advanced charges. Most of these are still in service with the Russian Army, For his parti development of a number of thermonuclear charges w characteristics, Yu. N. Babayev was awarded the tit Socialist Labor in 1962 with the award of the Order of

medal “Sickle and Mopol". In the same year he was a

of Doctor of Technical Sciences, and in 1968 he becar member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Under the leadership of Yu. N. Babayev , new and thermonuclear charges of various values were de" subsequent years to equip most branches of the Armecd ‘of the USSR. He repeatedly participated in the tests of thermo landfills of the Ministry of Defense as a specialist and as a leac the development of charges is invaluable.

ABOVE: useful entry about Babaev's design work on Russian thermonuclear weapons in the 2005 Russian book, epou aromnoro mpoekra (Heroes of the atomic project), with side by side Russian and English text translation (since this is important to establish as hard fact beyond any doubt, for the record): "In 1961-1962, Yuri Nikolaevich (Babaev) and his colleagues developed new, more advanced charges. Most of these charges are still in service with the Russian Army. For his participation in the development of a number of thermonuclear charges with high specific characteristics, Yu. N. Babayev was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor in 1962 with the award of the Order of Lenin... Under the leadership of Yu. N. Babayev, new nuclear and thermonuclear charges of various values were developed in subsequent years to equip most branches of the Armed forces of the USSR. ... The further direction of Yu. N. Babayav's work was the radical improvement of nuclear charges - a dual approach. ... Such thermonuclear charges were simpler in design and manufacturing technology." . (Tip: to translate Russian to English from a low quality image scan, upscale the

image of the text with Zyro, and then translate the result using Yandex translate.)

Mo uvnuunatvee lO. H. Ba6aesa uv lO. A. TpytHesa uv nog ux pyKoeon- creom bo BHUUS® G6oinn paspa6oTtaHb! TepMOAAEPHIO Z3apAgbI ANA HAPOAHOXOSAMCTBCHHbIX LIONEH — B3aPAMbI C MVHVMANbHOM OCKONOYHOU PAQnoaKkTUeHOCcTbIO. HEKOTOPbIO U3 MUX ObINN NPVMeHEHbI ANA COsAAaHuA BOAOXPAaNUNUW, TAWEHYA FasOBbIX MaKENOG, MUHTOHCUuKauUMN rasoBbIx u HEMTAHbIX MECTOPOXMCHYM VT. @.

Bonbwaan Teopermyueckan pabota 6bina npoBegAeHa uM NO ucnoNnLao- BAHUIO AMEPHbIX Bspbiaocw ANA HapaooTKu AeNAWMxCcA MaTepuano.B.

QanbHenwum HanpaeneHvem paooTt 10, H. Babaesa Obino KOpeHHOe YCOPEPWEHCTEOGAHYE AMEPHLIX sapAgOe — AeOMHON nog”xoA. Boina paspa- 60raHa TeOpuA, YCOBGPWEHCTeOBAHbI MeTOAbI pacuera uv T. oO. TaKne Tep- MOAQEPHbLIG BapADb! ObiINu Oonee NpocTbi NO KOHCTPyKUMM WM TeXHONOMMN verorosneHua. OHU ObIAV UCNbITaHbI, HO PadoTanu He eBcerma CTaOuNbHO u Tpe6oeanu poeogKu, HO lOpum Huxonaeeu4 He yonen sroro caenate.

lO. H. Ba6aes BHEC KONOCCaNbHbIN BKNAA B PaseuTue Teoperuuec- KUX MOYMEPHbIX NpOorpPaMM, 4TO CNocobcTeoBaNno cOsfaHUuKH MaTemMatTu- yweckoro annapata. Ero Q@ATONbHOCTb 6bINA MOUIHbIM CYMVMYNOM ANA pas- BUTMUA PaCueTOB CNOXKHEMWMX MaTeMaTMYeCKux gana4y U MusnvyecKux npoueccos. OH MHOro paboTan B CMexHbIx OGNMacTAx. SaHumanca nazgep- HOM TEMATUKON: HAKAYKON NAsepoe OT AAePHOrO BapbiBa. VNTepecoeanca OH WW Ononoruev, BANAHVNGM paguauun Ha YeNoBeKa MU OKPYyxalowylo cpeay. Boinu y Hero uv NPeANOXeHUA NO BbIBEAEHUIO B KOCMOC annapaTos BO@HHOFO HaSHayeHuA.

tO. H. Ba6aee Bbipactun 6Gonbwylo nneAAy MONoAbIX yYeHbIx, KAaNANAa- TOB YU AOKTOPOS HayK, KOTOPbIeG CerogHA yCNeCWHO NpopONMxaloT ero geno.

B 2000 r. no 3aeepweHuu OAHOM us paspaboTOK, B KOTOpON lOpun Huxonaeeny npvkvman HeNocpeACcTeeHHOoe yYacTue, emy Ovlna npucyx- feHa TocymapcreeHHan npemua P® (nocmepTHo). OH HarpaxKneH AByMA OpaeHamnu JlexvHa, OpAeHOM Tpygosoro KpacHoro SHaMeHY, Mefanbio “Sa Tpymaosylo Ao6nectb”.

At the initiative of Yu. N. Babaev and Yu. A. Trut their leadership , thermonuclear charges for natior economic chains were developed at VNIIEF - char with minimal scoping radioactivity. Same of them wel used to create reservoirs, extinguish gas flares, intens gas and oil fields, etc.

A lot of theoretical work was carried out by him « nuclear explosions for the development of fissile ma

The further direction of Yu_N. Babayev's work w: improvement of nuclear charges - a dual approach. aif was developed, calculation methods were improved,

thermonuclear charges were simpler in design and mv technology . They were tested, but they did not always

required fine-tuning, but Yuri Nikolaevich did not hav

Yu. N. Babaev made a copossal contribution of theoretical deumeric programs, which contribute: of a mathematical apparatus. His activity was a powe the development of calculations of the most corm problems and physical processes. He worked a lot was engaged in laser subjects: pumping laser from ; He was also interested in biology, the effect of ra and the environment. He also had proposals for launs vehicles into space.

Yu. N. Babayev has raised a large galaxy of young and doctors of sciences, wha today successfully con

In 2000, upon completion of one of the develo| Yuri Nikolayevich took a direct part, he was awarded of the Russian Federation (posthumously). He was < Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner of Lz “For Labor Valor".

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MX MeCMbUINe NO cpaniensio c coTpyyumkaoit JIAHJI 1 JUIPUI noamonaio- ~The peak is smaller in comparison with the staf CTH CIUISGIt C FAPYOONILINU CNeIUIMIICTAMH. possible connections with foreign specialists. Moknswid aderniniocrs ci~pyiouwan ocodaimiocrs crpyiry pb POALL, The effectiveness was confirmed by the followin Nompaane@ieiow1 KoTOphHix oOpasyotesn He No pemaemoll aie, Ano cnetut- structure, the units of which are not equipped accordir muigouin. Tak, pee Muguiat-reopeniat coOpanh! B OJUIOM NosMpAsN@ienuH, | am on specialisation . So, all theoretical physicists

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| The thermonuclear charge to equip the first domestic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) R-7. The charge had a capacity of 3 megatons of TNT equivalent. The length of the rocket is 31.4 m. The range of the rocket was 8500 km. - It launched Sputnik The thermonuclear warhead for the first R-36

1957 and the Vostok-1 ICBM was tested in 1962 with a yield of 2 Mt. The ‘spacecraft piloted by range of the missile was 12,000 km.

Gagarin in 1961.

Temp-S operational- - tactical missile. The , length of the missile is 12.3 m. The ~ power is up to 300 kt, the range of the missile is a Sa ee ‘ 900 km. SOURCE: http://www. vniief.ru/about/museum/excurse/4edbf100497d7a42b9a3bb971ecf5820

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Nuclear Weapon Museum in Snowtown aka Snezhinsk at Chelyabinsk

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Russian 370 kg thermonuclear warhead for missiles, put into service in 1978.

1st ever Russian MIRV warhead, 210 kg each; first put into service in 1978.

Monoblock warhead of the

first megaton range missile for

submarines, 650 kg, year 1974

40 kt tactical nuclear warhead, 1960: length 287 cm, midsection diameter 88 cm, mass 950 kg (Much heavier than American designs for such a low yield!)

Monoblock warhead for use against ships and shore bases, 690 kg, 1975

1962: first mass-produced Russian aircraft dropped megaton yield strategic thermonuclear weapon

1st Russian MIRV for SLBM submarine — missiles, put into service in 1974: = mass is 170 kg, a small-sized thermonuclear charge allows placing : three warheads on one launch vehicle Monoblock head: 406 kg, entered service in 1974.

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650 kg 1968 SLBM warhead

RIGHT: 1961 Russian megaton ICBM warhead Length 189.3 cm, midsection diameter 130 cm, mass 736 kg

200 kt thermonuclear warhead deployed from 1981 to 1991 fora 450 km range operational-tactical missile which was withdrawn

ae alan £5... FAI

Wom service wnacr tne 11vr Treaty, in exchange for the American Pershing INF

| disarmament.

1963 deployed Russian megaton SLBM warhead, length 230 cm, 2x8m size, tested at half power on diameter 130.4 cm. Mass 1144 kg. December 24, 1962, Novaya Zemlya.

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First ever Russian 40 kt 4 nuclear warhead for an i , Mi intermediate-range ballistic missile, 1200 km range, withdrawn from service 1960.

2 megaton warhead for ICBMs, range 12,000 km, 1970 to 1979.

First ever Russian thermonuclear warhead for an intercontinental ballistic missile, 3 megatons yield, 8500 km range, in operation 1960 to 1966.

Source: http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/nuclear museum.html (before that entire site was deleted

lock 1953 H-bomb (Teller's 1947 ernally-boosted implosion bomb) ~~

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1949 ‘ie (courtsey of Dr Fuchs, David Greenglass, et al.)

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Academician Y.B. Khariton at the Russian Nuclear Center museum, near the RDS-1 bomb case

Russian 1st serial nuclear warhead

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ABOVE: the precise nature of Putin's nuclear threat, photos from both the Russian nuclear weapons labs museums (older stuff is in Sarov, but the latest Russian very small MIRV warheads whose shapes reveal design data are in the RFNC-VNIITF Museum at Snezhinsk including the pink painted warheads which are not in the Sarov collection). The first two-stage 1.6 megaton yield Russian thermonuclear weapon, tested in 1955, RDS-37, had a spherical secondary (fusion) stage which required isotropic compression (unlike early American cylindrical designs). The Russian design omitted the plastic foam used to fill the radiation channels in the early UK two stage warheads (and modern W87 and W$88 etc.) to deliver x-rays isotropically to the secondary stage. Instead, the Russian design used precise geometric mirroring of x-rays by a large (1.5m diameter) ellipsoidal (prolate spheroid) shaped case, with the fission primary at one focus and the secondary stage at the other (legendary Russian thermonuclear warhead designer Yuri Trutnev has confirmed this use of a lead lined case, a reasonably effective x-ray mirror - it isn't a perfect mirror since the "reflection" is accompanied by a lot of absorption of radiation - in the RDS-37 and later designs, with low-density material merely used as an x-ray absorber as a surface covering on the spherical secondary charge and not as a radiation channel filler - as discussed later in this post, below). This design - without plastic foam filling the radiation channel - was first used by America a year later, as the Egg device tested during Operation Redwing shot Huron (discussed and illustrated later in this post). It has its advantages: faster and more efficient compression with less risk of neutron pre- initiation of fissile materials in the secondary stage, since x-rays are slowed down by plastic foam, but travel faster than neutrons if simply reflected from the case. Therefore, when using the outer case as an x-ray radiation mirror, the speed of delivery of the x-rays to the secondary (to compress it) is faster than the speed that neutrons can arrive, so you don't need a neutron interstage barrier the way you do for devices employing a plastic foam filling, which slows down the x-rays delivery time and allows more neutron fission in the secondary

to occur before full compression by x-rays.

Anything large in the case which creates x-ray "shadow" zones increases anisotropy of x-ray delivery to the secondary stage. This problem doesn't exist for the early American cylindrical stages, where the compression geometry is simply axial symmetry, i.e. radial compression in 2, not 3 dimensions. (To double the density of the secondary, radial compression of a cylinder requires a 29.3% reduction in radius, compared to just a 20.6% reduction of radius for spherical compression to achieve similar doubling of density.) But this outer case x-ray mirroring also has the disadvantage that the overall diameter of the outer radiation reflecting case must be /arge in comparison to the diameter of the spherical secondary charge (at least several times larger), or you do not get a sufficiently isotropic compression of the secondary stage (i.e. similar compression from all directions), because if the case is too small, the finite size of the secondary stage itself blocks reflected radiation from hitting it on the opposite side to that in proximity to the primary stage, which reduces compression, efficiency, and yield. This is just a simple shadowing problem that you can see in a room lit by daylight from a window. If you place a large object in front of the window, it creates a shadow behind it, so it is not isotropically illuminated (i.e. lit equally on all sides). If you place a smaller object in front of the window rather than a huge object, this shadowing problem is reduced or even eliminated because enough light can get into the room around the object, to be reflected back on the far side of that object by the walls of the room - particularly if you have mirrors on the walls - since the mirrors can then reflect light back so that the object is illuminated more uniformly on all sides (isotropic exposure, as opposed to anisotropic - unequal - exposure of all sides; for a diagram illustrating a suppressed example of the effects of a certain kind of fascinating anisotropic radiation exposure, please - for example - see my very

brief 1-page long PDF paper linked here!).

Anisotropic (unequal from all directions) x-rays on 2nd stage:

Second stage is not uniformly compressed due to x-ray shadow on side furthest from primary stage. Solutions: (1) put a partial shield between the two stages to try to "level up” the x-ray exposure on each side, (2) use foam to slow down and diffuse the x-rays to a uniform concentration everywhere in the case (even on the far side), (3) use a huge case that focusses x-rays uniformly.

ABOVE: illustration of the problem of the anisotropic x-ray exposure of the secondary stage and some of its possible solutions, namely fill the case with foam to slow down and diffuse the x- rays to a uniform concentration everywhere in the case (a terrible idea for several reasons, e.g. it reduces recoil ablative impulse, allows neutrons time to arrive and pre- detonate any fissile material in the secondary stage, and it means the outer case has to hold the whole thing together for longer while the fusion

burn hopefully starts, but

this is nevertheless still used in Western devices), make the case huge so you can reflect x-rays more uniformly on to the far end (right ride

above) of the secondary stage, use two primaries - one on each side of the secondary stage - as Russia does still, or design an "interstage"

shield to go between the two stages above to try to even-up the exposure on each side of the secondary stage (but be careful to design it

well, or you will over-shield the secondary and it won't get compressed at all!). The 1958-tested double primary Russian solution has the

genius that easy to design: you don't need to bother to make careful design calculations at all!

Use of foam in modern warheads to minimise outer case size for spherical secondaries

1.6mt RDS-37, 1955:

©

Case/charge diameter ratio is large (3-5)

©

Case/charge diameter ratio

is large (3-5) mirroring

© by casing

Russian 1955 test American 1956 test

Both efficient but too big for ICBM, due to case mirroring for isotropic compression; not foam

X-ray

250kt Egg (Huron), 1956:

Megaton Grapple's

:

UK 1957-58 tests

Foam allows isotropic x-ray compression with a SMALL ratio of case/charge diameter!

Modern warhead using foam filling

RDS-37: first two-stage Russian H-bomb, 1955

METRES

Nepawsneit moaynt Bropwunsit wonyne |

Laan t / NA | met ~ _ - | / aa eee “, Ne KE » t | / foes ail 5.6 tons, 1.5m diam, 6.5m long ———SO CO

Nice idea for a concave dish x-ray focussing device. However, in 1955 Russia would have been unable able to compute this complexity

ABOVE: two versions of the RDS-37 first Russian nuclear weapons design. The first shows RDS-37 as the simple prolate spheroid

elliptical system for x-ray mirroring, fitted into an RDS-6 case as shown on a globalsecurity.org page (the RDS-6 case was used for the earlier 1953 400 kt Alarm Clock externally boosted device). Actual film from the 22 November 1955 test of RDS-37 show a longer bomb, probably with an added parachute to slow the bomb down while the delivery aircraft escapes (the 1953 RDS-6 test, unlike RDS-37 in

1955, didn't need a parachute, as it was a near surface burst). The second illustration is from a Russian language source (Military

Russia, bom6a c 3aps0m PJIC-37) showing a slightly different variation in which there is a very clever concave shield used between primary and secondary stages to try to achieve uniform (isotropic) irradiation of the spherical secondary stage with x- rays. The source given is not a declassified report but a Russian youtube video. The problem is that this convoluted design, while simple to draw, is very complicated to design in terms of calculating the sizes and shapes of the various elements for optimum performance, requiring 2- or 3-d simulations by computers unavailable at the time, even in America. It is more likely to be the basis of the 500kt two- stage single primary devices developed in 1958 and used in the 50mt Tsar Bomba (discussed and illustrated later) than the first 1955 test of a two-stage device. The diffulties with the isotropic compression of spherical devices was a key reason why early American bombs had cylindrical secondaries with just radial compression not isotropic compression; they are far more straightforward for design calculations, because you don't have to worry about how to get radiation to the far side of a sphere! In other words, you don't need 3-d calculations. The simpler prolate spheroid case, with primary and secondaries at the two elliptical focii, is easier to analyze mathematically without a computer using straightforward geometrical considerations (cf. Winterberg's 1981 book Physical principles of thermonuclear explosive devices, Fig. 4 on page 28 and discussion of x-ray mirrors on page 32, as shown later in this post), and thus more likely what was tested in 1955. This is because there is less to go wrong, and it is easier therefore to get a definite result if the design has an error; whereas, if you test a design with /ots of innovations, and it fails, you learn nothing because you don't know which of the many factors caused the failure (it is not even the case that you know that one thing has gone wrong, which can be discovered by elimination after many changes and tests, because there could be several different design failure causes all working together, in a radical product with lots of innovation!). The same youtuber also has a video of the design of the 50Mt Tsar bomba which is also incorrect, showing a more modern device with a single primary stage (completely debunked below in this post, since that 50mt bomb was provably set off by two 500 kt thermonuclear charges). In both designs above, the overall bomb case diameter is at least three times the diameter of the secondary charge, which is

necessary to prevent an x-ray shadow on the side of the secondary furthest from the primary stage, resulting in anisotropic compression.

SECOND FIRST SECONDARY SECONDARY THERMONUCLEAR ny STAGE

©

SECOND INTERSTAGE

FIRST INTERSTAGE

INTERSTAGES IN THIS DESIGN AVERT THE ANISOTROPIC COMPRESSION OF SPHERICAL STAGES BY X-RAY ABLATION

Double secondary design tested by UK during Operation Grapple Z3 (800 kt) on 11 September 1958 at Christmas Island

ABOVE: cartoon-style (non-blueprint) sketch of the problems of designing the interstage to stop neutrons from the primary stage from pre-detonating and deforming the fissile U235 (oralloy) in the secondary stage, while x-rays are diffusing (relatively slowly, compared to

X-rays in a vacuum) through the foam

(Primary has 4.5" small axis diameter) W88 schematic. 475kt. Built in 1980s, taking 14 nuclear tests in Nevada.

shown in blue, to allow isotropic Cursa 7" diameter secondary : compression of the secondary stage.

This requires detailed 3-d computer

simulations and nuclear tests for verification, and is very difficult design engineering to get right. Traditionally, the light weight interstage has been beryllium, a toxic brittle material, for its transparency to x-rays and opaqueness to neutrons, while not being excessively heavy for a missile payload. There has been a recent effort to replace the toxic, brittle beryllium interstages with safer, more durable interstages

made of alternatives like boron, cadmium and lithium. (For aircraft delivery, where weight is less crucial than for missile warheads, U238

can be used as the neutron shield. But if weight is not an issue, you could simply have a clean secondary stage, comprising of Li6D and lead or tungsten pusher, without any fissile material, so then you don't need a neutron shield interstage!) But the more fissile oralloy there is in the secondary stage of a W88 warhead, the closer it is to criticality, so the greater the complexity of the design to keep primary stage neutrons from predetonating it, while still allowing sufficient channelling of x-rays. This is a complex design trade-off to get right, requiring sometimes multiple nuclear tests and re-designs, which explains why detailed data is still classified secret. (Not shown in the sketch is a thick neutron shield cylinder enclosing the entire secondary stage to reduce its vulnerability to predetonation by neutrons from defensive nuclear warheads from the Russian ABM system. When such a U238 neutron shield shell is shown in diagrams, it is usually misinterpreted as some sort of tamper or reflector to help the reaction! In addition, the primary and secondary stages are simplified. Fissile material would have a hollow core supplied with D+T boost gas from an external flask, prior to detonation. There is also the external x- box with capacitors that must be charged up with HV from a battery powered inverter prior to detonation, supplying large parallel current pulses to detonators and neutron initiator tubes. These are also safety features, helping to ensure that several stages of preparation must be

undertaken in order to achieve a full-yield detonation, so the weapon is relatively safe in an accidental fire or impact.)

One of the biggest secrets of thermonuclear weapons became clear from the "clean" H-bomb research at Operation Redwing in 1956; the Zuni (15% fission, 3.53mt total yield) and Tewa (87% fission, 5.01mt total yield) were basically identical designs, but U238 in the Tewa device was replaced with lead in Zuni, and Zuni was topped up with extra liéd to try to compensate. As the results showed, although fusion is on paper more efficient than fission, in reality it was not possible in that design to get as much yield out of the cleaner device. In other words, in the dirty design, the fusion stage is just used as an external boosting tool to release high energy neutrons to fission U238, which produces most of the yield. An exception to this is the more efficient pusherless pulse-shaped isentropic compression system tested in the Ripple II device in 1962, discussed later, where it is claimed by its designer Nickolls that a higher efficiency of thermonuclear burn was achieved than in pusher devices (this isn't reflected in the overall yield/mass ratio of the entire device, which was just a prototype; we're talking just about the yield/mass ratio of the fusion capsule in Ripple II, not the entire prototype bomb whose mass is not relevant to

a final warhead system).

"To form the direction of energy transfer, at the suggestion of A. D. Sakharov, the [1.6mt RDS-37] primary and secondary modules were enclosed in a single shell, which had a good quality for reflecting X-rays, and measures were provided inside the charge to facilitate the transfer of X-rays in the right direction. Yu. A. Trutnev in the course of this work proposed a method for concentrating the energy of X-ray radiation in material pressure [a low density x-ray absorbing layer around the secondary stage, discussed later in this post with quotations from Trutnev himself about it], which made it possible to effectively carry out radiation implosion. During this development, he also proposed a method that determined the predictability of the configuration of channels for the transfer of x-rays, which later found wide application in two-stage thermonuclear charges. ... In this case, the problem of ensuring spherically symmetric compression of the secondary module was radically solved, since the time of “symmetrization” of energy around the secondary module was much shorter than the compression time of this module. ... The fact is that the overall mass parameters of the RDS-37 charge and the first samples of thermonuclear charges of the USSR that followed it and the first thermonuclear charges of the USA are fundamentally different. The characteristic value of the ratio of length to diameter of the first thermonuclear charges of the USSR is less than 2, and for the first thermonuclear charges of the USA it is 3.2-4.8.This difference indicates fundamental differences in the structure of the secondary

modules of the first thermonuclear charges of the USSR and the USA. The thermonuclear charge modules of the USA had a cylindrical

configuration, while the thermonuclear charge modules of the USSR had a spherical configuration." - I. A. Andryushin, A. K. Chernyshev, and Yu. A. Yudin, Creation of the first samples of thermonuclear weapons, http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/coretaming 5.html (deleted site, but available now on Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20130515010737/http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/coretaming 5.html).

In the sense the Russians I. A. Andryushin, A. K. Chernyshev, and Yu. A. Yudin (above quotation) argue, that America first tested thermonuclear weapons with cylindrical "pipe" secondaries whereas Russia was straight-in with the spherical secondaries now used in compact MIRV warheads, Russia seems to have been ahead in the 50s. The Russian design of 1955 was essentially duplicated by the American Egg design (Redwing-Huron) of 1956. But it was bulky because to get isotropic compression efficiently of a sphere using radiation mirroring from the inside of a prolate spheroid reflecting case, the case needs to be at least 3-5 times the diameter of the secondary stage (unlike getting isotropic compression from plastic foam, where you just need a few cm wide radiation channel!). So Russia wasn't ahead, unlike Britain which in 1957-8 successfully used spherical secondaries (like Russia), but with plastic foam in the radiation channel (unlike Russia) to make the secondary stage compression isotropic while reducing the outer case size to a minimum. If you just use the outer case as a mirror (as the Russians Ya. B. Zel’dovich, Yu. A. Trutnev, and A. D. Sakharov did very successfully with their 1.5m diameter RDS-37 in 1955, and the Americans did with their Egg device in the Redwing-Huron test of 1956), and don't instead use foam to fill the case to absorb and re-radiate x-rays isotropically, you will always need a REALLY HUGE DIAMETER outer bomb case for the geometry to work efficiently! This is due to the immutable mathematical laws of geometry. So although they were able to use a single primary stage with success in 1955, they had a huge problem with trying to miniaturise that design without going back to fission

bomb yields.

There were only three possible ways to change their design to get their huge 1955 H-bomb small enough physically to fit into the warhead of an ICBM: (1) change the shape of the secondary to the simpler to compress geometry of a cylinder, where you ignite the end closest to the primary stage and then an auto-catalytic self-burning wave is hopefully initiated (as used in the early 1952 American Ivy-Mike test), but the Russians had already investigated and discarded Teller's original Superbomb "pipe" (the Russian word for it); (2) fill the radiation channel with plastic foam to make the energy delivery isotropic to the secondary, but this is less efficient since the x-rays are delivered more slowly than by simple case reflection (through having to be repeatedly absorbed and re-radiated in a mathematical "drunkard's walk" going in all directions by the electrons in the foam), and this x-ray energy delivery delay also allows neutrons to arrive and partly melt down, expand and pre-detonate any fissile materials in the secondary stage (unless you have an efficient neutron shield or interstage between the primary and secondary stage, which is hard to design effectively without good electronic computers, which the Russians then lacked); or finally (3) use /inear-implosion of the final fusion stage, by using TWO primary stages, one on each side of the fusion stage, within a cylindrical casing, wired in a simple parallel circuit for simultaneous detonation. Linear implosion is never the most efficient solution, but it is necessary to get a very small diameter thermonuclear weapon for a ICBM warhead. So it turns out that the Russians use a very different approach to compact nuclear warheads than America and Britain. Yuri Trutnev in 2017 explained the details (this has now

been deleted from the Russian site):

".., Avraamy Zavenyagin ... said - take a thermonuclear charge, surround it with atomic charges, blow them up at the same time, they will squeeze it. ... This idea was later developed by our theorist Viktor Davidenko. In fact, he proposed a scheme for the so-called two-stage charge - a casing in which there were spatially separated atomic and thermonuclear units. The explosion energy of the primary atomic stage would be used to ignite thermonuclear reactions in the secondary stage. Our outstanding specialists Yakov Zel'dovich and Andrei Sakharov had great hopes for this scheme of so-called nuclear implosion. ... I did a lot of work on the theory of the efficiency of atomic charges. I knew that when they explode, a lot of energy comes out in the form of x-rays. And I began to think about how to make it so that

the thermonuclear charge is overlaid with a light substance - "coating", these can be chemical elements with a low number, having

very good thermal conductivity, and with the help of X-ray radiation from the explosion of the primary atomic charge "coating" heat up. At the same time, its substance would evaporate outward, towards the radiation, and as a result, as during the movement of a rocket, a reactive impulse would be created, directed into the secondary charge and creating the pressure necessary for effective compression of the thermonuclear "fuel". But how was it possible to ensure a uniform, symmetrical effect of radiation on the spherical surface of a thermonuclear charge with a "coating"? Here Iam stuck. ... Zel'dovich proposed exactly how to direct X-rays, Sakharov showed that this radiation is not absorbed by the walls of the casing, but remains in it, and therefore a uniform effect on the surface of the thermonuclear unit can occur. And my idea is a "coating" of a light substance to transfer radiation to the required pressure. ... | already had another idea in my head - a more advanced product based on a new principle for designing a thermonuclear charge. After testing the RDS-37, the next day in the evening I called my friend and colleague Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev to the bank of the Irtysh and said: "Yura, let's try to do just such a thing." And he agreed. We returned to Sarov and drew a charge diagram and proposed it. This product received an index of 49. I will not say what it is. Product 49 is similar to the RDS-37, but not in everything. They started laughing at us, this is all nonsense, nothing will work out for you. In short, they didn’t support us because they didn’t understand. ... We were supported by Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov. The test of product 49 took place on the Day of the Soviet Army, February 23, 1958 at the test site on Novaya Zemlya. The success was very big. In 1958, several tests of products of different capacities based on the 49th charge took place. He went into a series, he was put on rockets, and this was already the basis of our country's thermonuclear weapons. ... I said to Khariton: "Yuli Borisovich, let's make a 100-megaton charge. Maybe then the West will understand that it would be pointless for them to increase their megatonnage further." He agreed. But here, for safety reasons, we also made a half- power charge, replacing the uranium-238 stage with lead. ... The Americans understood that they would not frighten us, but we would frighten them. And they lowered the power in their trials. We could have done more, but what's the point?" - Yuri Trutnev, The creation of nuclear weapons is a special kind of creativity, ria.ra/20171122/1509304656 22 November 2017 (this page has now been deleted, but is available on Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20220429180233/https://ria.ru/20171122/1509304656.html)

To get small thermonuclear warheads for missiles, after successfully testing a compact linear implosion primary stage for nuclear artillery (detailed later in this post), at the suggestion of Yuri Trutnev, starting in 1958, the Russians began testing thermonuclear weapons having two compact primary stages, one on each side of a spherical or cylindrical thermonuclear charge, wired in parallel electrical circuit using large krytron vacuum tube switches to get simultaneous detonations and a more uniform compression of the secondary stage. This was because they lacked the computers America and Britain used to design smaller thermonuclear warheads where plastic foam was employed to deliver x-ray energy uniformly to a secondary charge from a single primary stage. Trutnev suggested replacing the two primary stages with two 500 kt thermonuclear weapons to achieve a 50 megaton clean test in 1961. But what is more important is that this whole

approach was continued by Russia with more practical weapons, under the leadership of Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev (1928-86):

"Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev became one of the main creators of the world's largest detonated bomb ("Tsar Bomba") with a capacity of 50 megatons, tested at the test site on Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961. ... In the future, the efforts of Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev focused on the fundamental improvement of thermonuclear charges, for which he developed the theory of "double

approach". - http://www.biblioatom.ru/founders/babaev_yuriy_nikolaevich/"

The use of two primary stages (or two whole thermonuclear devices, for higher yields) to compress a fusion capsule inside a narrow tube casing without plastic foam to make the radiation isotropic is like a linear implosion system for fusion charges: the central (main) fusion charge will be most compressed along the axis of the bomb than from the sides, so it can be elongated so that it becomes a sphere when compressed (below). This is avoided in US and UK weapons by the use of computer designed low density baffles of plastic foam to make the x-ray energy isotropically compress the secondary (the foam doesn't do the compression, the x-ray ablation of the secondary does it; the foam is merely used in modern Western designs to reduce anistropic compression of the secondary, missed out by the Russian

approach which uses two primary stages or two thermonuclear stages for larger devices, instead).

"The A6027 charge was tested on October 30, 1961 at the Novaya Zemlya test site. ... The creation of nuclear weapons by the Soviet

Union, despite the hardships of the post-war period, has become an effective factor in deterring any aggressors from launching new global wars [the aggressor is Russia, fighting democracies in Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine, eh]. ... The young theoretical physicist Yu.A. Trutnev proposed the idea of creating a 100 Mt superbomb, which could frighten foreign skeptics who believed that Soviet nuclear

scientists were significantly weaker than American ones [subservience and slavery to authority is always a weakness compared to free

thinking trial-and-error based innovation for profit and to supply customers with the latest products they want and need; the backwardness of Russia in microelectronics for decades illustrates the failure of centralised control most clearly; free countries also have this problem but the people are generally better capable of overcoming the tyranny]. The idea was supported by Academicians A.D. Sakharov, Yu.B. Khariton and Ya.B. Zeldovich. The top leadership of the country, having agreed on the issue with scientists, decided to create and test super-powerful weapons. The final decision to resume nuclear testing and create a superbomb was made in July 1961, when the scientific leadership of KB-11 (VNHEF) reported to N.S. Khrushchev on the possibility of developing a hydrogen bomb with a capacity of 100 million tons of TNT. ... [Copying the USA, which opened a second nuclear weapons lab, Lawrence Livermore, to challenge its first lab at Los Alamos...] In 1955, by decision of the Government, a second nuclear center was established - NII-1011 (RFNC-VNIITF) in Chelyabinsk-70 (now the city of Snezhinsk), where a third of the employees of KB-11 were transferred. ... After the adoption of the decree of the Government of the USSR on the resumption of testing of nuclear weapons in July 1961, KB-11 began emergency work on the development, theoretical justification and preparation for testing not only superbombs, but also a series of other nuclear weapons. Even before this decision, the theoretical physicists of KB-11 were distributed to develop "their" charges. Therefore, to develop a superbomb, it was decided to call Dr. Ph.D. Adamsky V.B., by connecting to it a theoretical physicist - a recent graduate of MEPhI Yu.N. Smirnov, as well as the initiators of the creation of the superbomb, Ph.D. Trutneva Yu.A. [center of photo below, in front of

bomb] and Ph.D. Babaeva Yu.N. Academician Sakharov A.D. took over the development leadership. ...

The situation was aggravated by the tight deadlines for the start of tests (09/01/1961), the lack of a

omputer park to carry out the proper number of alculations. I had to use all the computers of the Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (mathematicians at KB-11 worked there at might and on weekends). And only on October 24 (6 days before the tests) was the final report on the design of the bomb and the theoretical justification completed. But even then A.D. Sakharov (already without a omputer) additionally worked out the necessary improvements. A large number of serious innovations ere applied in the design of the superbomb itself and its charge. A powerful thermonuclear charge was —made according to the “bifilar” scheme: for radiation implosion of the main thermonuclear unit, two thermonuclear charges were placed on both sides (front and back) to ensure synchronous (with a time difference of no more than 0.1 Ms) ignition of thermonuclear “fuel”. KB-25 (VNIIA) finalized a serial detonation automation unit for this charge. It seemed to A.D. Sakharov that the calculations carried out on a computer were not enough. 2 days before the product was sent to the test site at 8 pm,

Sakharov came to the workshop, approached the product (the body of the bomb was open and access to the charge was provided from

both sides). Andrei Dmitrievich looked inside, felt the construction, then sat down on a chair in the corner ... the academician drew a sketch, where it was proposed to install lead belts 60 mm thick from the side of the initiating charges on the inner conical surface of the charge body. | call the director of KB-11 B.G. Muzrukov at one in the morning: “What should I do, after 36 hours, sending?” Answer: "Do as Sakharov said!" At 6.00 in the morning, the designers draw “squirrels” in the shop and after 4 hours the lead belts are ready (from the memoirs of the head of the assembly shop of the KB-11 plant A.G. Ovsyannikov). After 40 years, when, on the instructions of the director and first deputy scientific director of VNIIEF, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Ilkaev R.I. In the most powerful computer center in Russia, VNIIEF, the calculations for the three-dimensional problem "Mimosa" were checked, it was confirmed that the absence of these lead belts would lead to a significant distortion of the radiation implosion sphere and a decrease in the explosion power by ~ 80%. So the thought of the academician turned out to be much more perfect than computers available at that time. ... In the history of Russia, a certain pattern was noticed in the creation of hypertrophied samples of unique products: the Tsar Bell (which did not ring), the Tsar Cannon (which did not shoot) and, finally, the Tsar Bomba (which was blown up with some excess of the calculated power - 52.5 Mt). ... only about 2 percent of the energy of the explosion came from the fission reaction, the rest of the energy from the fusion reaction ... The creation and testing of the most powerful thermonuclear charge in the world with a capacity of 50 Mt served as an impetus for reducing the arms race throughout the world. And this is the great merit of our outstanding nuclear scientists. [Jn plainer words, Russia succeeded in starting the West on the road from nuclear superiority to arms control parity, allowing the dictatorship to survive longer before going bankrupt.]" - A.V. Veselovsky, honorary veteran of the RFNC-VNIIEF, head of the scientific and testing department (in 1956-2009), laureate of the USSR State Prize, http://www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3364

Yu. N. Smirnov, Academician

A fundamentally new approach was proposed by Yu.N. Babaev and Yu.A. Trutnev. It was a promising proposal in terms of downsizing, increasing power density and what is called miniaturization. It was not about the very small sizes. But now the charges really became weapons: they could be placed on certain carriers. The new charge was successfully tested on February 23, 1958. Within a year, on the basis of this idea, a rather large series of charges of various calibers was designed, including the smallest of them for that period.

Table 2. Heavy-duty nuclear explosions, USSR.

No. p / p (in brackets - the serial number of Explosion Conditions for the the test) explosion

1(123) 10/23/61

2(130) 10/30/61 The most powerful explosion in

the world

ee a

Total capacity: > 136.9 Mt

In addition to six super-high power explosions ( £ > 10 Mt, Table 2 ) , the USSR conducted 2 sr class alr tests (1.5 Mt < E< 10 Mt) , which were carried out in the period 1955-1962 . All of them, with the exception of the explosion on November 22, 1955 near Semipalatinsk, were carried out at the

Novaya Zemlya test site. S$QURCE: http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/testing_ground_213.html (BEFORE THAT SITE WAS DELETED)

"After the end of the moratorium in 1961, they returned to the task of creating a superbomb, but now it was a thermonuclear charge with an energy release of 100 Mt, which was to be placed in an aerial bomb developed according to the “202 project”. At this stage, the development of a new super-powerful charge was carried out in KB-11 on the initiative of Yu. A. Trutnev and A. D. Sakharova, the team of authors also included Yu. N. Babaev, V. B. Adamsky and Yu. N. Smirnov. Original solutions and accumulated experience made it possible to implement this development extremely quickly, and the charge was successfully tested on October 30, 1961. Among the features of this charge, it should be noted that the large volume of the charge (due to its high energy release), required significant amounts of X-ray energy for implosion. The developed nuclear charges did not satisfy this condition, and therefore, a previously developed two- stage thermonuclear charge with a relatively low energy release [~500kt] was used as the primary source of the “superpowerful charge” [TWO of them, one on each end of the main fusion stage!]. This [~SOO0kt] charge was previously developed by Yu. A. Trutnev and Yu. N. Babaev. ... In 1962 Yu. A. Trutnev and V.S. Lebedev developed a smaller version of the superbomb with an energy release 2.5 times less than the 1961 version. The reduction in energy release and overall mass parameters made it possible to count on equipping a heavy ICBM

with such a charge. The charge was tested in a non-full-scale version using passive materials [/ead ablator/pusher and case lining] that

significantly reduced (as in the 1961 test) the release of radioactivity in the test explosion." - I. A. Andryushin, A. K. Chernyshev, and Yu. A. Yudin, Development of the nuclear weapons program of the USSR, http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/coretaming 6.html (deleted page but it is still available on Internet Archive Wayback Machine here:

https://web.archive.org/web/20130921043813/http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/coretaming_6.html).

"The development of super-powerful thermonuclear charges was considered as an important task for both nuclear institutes of the USSR. The developments of nuclear charges discussed above, tested on October 30, 1961 and September 27, 1962, were carried out at VNITEF (Arzamas-16 [now called Sarov]). As examples of the development of super-powerful charges carried out by VNIITF (Chelyabinsk-70) , one can cite devices tested on September 25 and December 24, 1962. In the first case, a charge was tested that was close in characteristics to the VNIIEF charge tested on September 27, 1962. The comparison shows that they were essentially duplicate designs. In the experiment on December 24, 1962, a super-powerful charge with a nominal energy release of about 50 Mt was tested under conditions of a non-full-scale explosion with a power reduced by about half. The test confirmed the expected characteristics of the charge. Note that in the test version, which is a high purity charge, the actual nuclear [fission and fallout] energy release was small. ... The first test for the same purposes [reduced fission yield proportion, i.e. cleaner] was carried out in the USSR on October 20, 1958 at the test site on Novaya Zemlya in a modification [lead replacing U238] of the previously tested "dirty" two-stage charge. The level of nuclear [fission and fallout] energy release achieved in the development was an insignificant part of the total energy, however, the total [fusion plus fission] energy release was significantly reduced compared to the base [U238 containing] charge. ... Already in 1954, it was realized that a non-nuclear explosion of a nuclear charge is accompanied by the dispersion of plutonium, which is part of it, with its subsequent fallout. The first experiment in which practical results were obtained in this regard took place on October 19, 1954, when an unforeseen failure of a nuclear charge occurred. ... The first experiment to study the "single-point safety" of a nuclear charge was carried out in the USSR on August 26, 1957, and, in essence, the USSR nuclear test program in the interests of security began to be implemented in 1961. A total of 11 experiments of this type were carried out during the period of atmospheric testing in the USSR. After the transition to underground nuclear tests, 14 more special nuclear tests were conducted for these purposes, as well as an additional 17 experiments as part of group nuclear explosions. ... The maximum nuclear energy release in the nuclear safety experiments was realized in the experiment on September 9, 1961. This value is close to the maximum energy release realized in the US nuclear safety tests during the period of atmospheric tests, which is 500 tons of TNT equivalent. [Nice to know Russia is concerned for nuclear safety! ]" - Nuclear testing and the creation of nuclear weapons, http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/nuclear_testing_1.html (deleted but still available on Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20130515005510/http://wsyachina.narod.ru/history/nuclear_testing_1.html

tn ") © : a) c °

% fission,

0) megatons,

“[Tsar Bomba designer] Yu.} on the fundamental improve: thermonuclear charges, for \ developed the theory of "dot - http:/;www.biblioatom.ru/fo iy_nikolaevich/

Hence, the use of two prima

Tsar Bomba in Moscow 23 August 2015

The Hansen Letter a? cere ae TTT hes

oe: A m4 ray rr. a ‘fusion fuel Sd ets.

ey ST ele ST el | 1 fission triggers ——

These elements are... supported by a caxsing “élling" of polystyrene or polyurethane foam frevemted by UCRLA725. Chicago Sun-Times. May 18, 1979).

Right

Radiation Implosion

Wrong

Two Primaries No Neutron Blocker No Snark Plus

’ higher yields, the use of two stages, with the higher yield facing towards the tertiary)

LEFT: Howard Morland, on the basis the US Redwing BASOON (3.53mt Z1 Tewa devices) incorrectly-declassifi Livermore June 1956 weapons deve report he was sent by Rotow in 1975 Chuck Hansen's H-bomb suggestion. actually correct for Russian but not You don't actually need a neutron bi don't have fissile material in the fusi fact you want the neutrons to fissio!

ar ne peireae 2 aarp S

esigns was foam: there was none in the Hear devices to achieve uniform tertiary c

OLIVE GREEN PAINTED PRIMARY STAGE

IN RED SUPPORT CRADLE

CAMERA ANGLE FOR TAIL BOMB SHOWS ONLY Quick VIEW OF END SECTION, INCLUDING X-UNIT (ORANGE BOX TRAPPED TO PRIMARY)

{>

ORANGE BOX = X-UNIT FOR 500KT TAIL BOMB

SPHERICAL GREY/BLACK 500 KT SECONDARY STAGE

ORANGE BOX = X-UNIT FOR 500KT NOSE BOMB

OLIVE GREEN PAINTED PRIMARY STAGE

IN RED SUPPORT CRADLE

FOR EACH PRIMARY STAGE THERE IS AN ORANGE BOX (X- UNIT CAPACITOR BANK) STRAPPED ON SIDE TO RED TUBULAR STEEL SUPPORT CRADLE (HOLDING PRIMARY TO SPHERICAL SECONDARY STAGE)

NOTE: the lead belts were added 2 days before shipping to test site (not

in film below) stages (green) - the secondary is grey & black

N

Huge ~ 7 krytrons (switches) were needed for

: 10ns parallel pulses to two bombs!

Inspection hatch open in 1961 fil

Parachute system

—_

‘

AF SPECTION HATCH > % (TAIL TS)LEFT, NOSE-RIGHT)

“Bombs within bombs” ("Russian Doll" principle)

Lead Inspection hatch

8m long, 27t nts open in 1961 film

50 Mt test, yf} Parachute (3 \@ system 1961. G-

A = primary B = secondary

"a Se ———— |

C = tertiary

50 megaton Russian con trick in 1961: two 500kt thermonuclear bombs are used! | yy. A. Trutnev r charges were than 0.1 ps)

Inspection hatch if] lead belts 60

open in 1961 film ... it was

belts would lead

wer by ~ 80%. So

it that time.”

Parachute

500kt H-bomb Sphere of Li6 in lead 500kt H-bomb

Li6D STAGE

What would be really impressive: series of bombs within bombs from ONE primary!

Higher resolution stills clearly show

Charged up magnetic flux com

coils could be added to linear

to power magnetic compressi« Piezo electric

High E

Li6D STAGE

To get the pulse shape ri the laser, a pulse shapin:

100% clean nuclear weapon design, using entirely proof-tested technology {} with suitable X-unit capa (no speculative B.S.) D+T gas capsule and krytron switches car

CHANGE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

Field Manual No 101-31-1 DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES Radius of vulnerability (emergency risk criterion: 5% combat ineffectiveness) Figure 54. Radii of Vulnerability. Protective factor = ratio of naTEROny PERSONNEL (LL) IN— area of effectin the open, fo (Based on Governing Effect) area of effect for shelter Radii listed are distances at which a 5 percent incidence of effect occurs. HOB used is 60W'/> meters. Example: for 300 kt, the protective F Open Earth factor of open foxholes is equal to Yield (KT) Open Foxholes APCs Tanks Shelter (14,000)2/(2,100)2 an Yield (KT) (Distances are in meters} Open Earth ; ee Foxholes — Shelter 0.1 700 600 600 500 300 1 1.36 1.36 1.96 5.44 1 1200 900 900 800 500 1 1.78 1.78 a2 5.76 10 3200 1300 1300 1250 900 1 6.06 6.06 6.55 12.6 20 4000 1500 1450 1400 1000 1 Flt 7.61 8.16 16.0 100 8000 1900 1800 1800 1400 1 17.7 19.8 19.8 $2.7 200 12000 2000 1900 1900 1500 1 34.0 39.9 39.9 64.0 300 14000 2100 1950 1950 1600 1 44.4 $1.5 a1.9 76.6

Calculation of the injury-averting protective factors by simple open foxholes and earth shelters, as a function of weapon yield. Most countermeasures are relatively ineffective against tactical nuclear wapons (due to the predominating neutron radiation effect at 0.1 kt yield), but are extremely effective against strategic nuclear weapons with yields of 100, 200 and 300 kt (protective factors of 44 to 77).

The definition of protective factor used here is the factor by which casualties numbers are reduced.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

6}s/zors

The Honorable Mitch McConnell Majority Leader

United States Senate Washington. DC 20510

xD eng Sovaren Ms Ce Naocel,

You recently received 2 letter from several former government officials regarding the President’s request to lower the nuclear explosive yield of a smail number of existing submarine launched ballistic missile warheads (W76-2). As you know, the President requested this modest adjustment to our nuclear capabilities to counter Russia’s apparent belief that it could use its low yield nuclear weapons to coerce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or otherwise support conventional aggression against U.S. allies and partners.

Critics of this approach argue that current U.S. nuclear forces and nuclear doctrine can counter Russia's limited nuclear use doctrine and tactical nuclear weapons. It is not possible to determine preciscly what is needed to deter with high confidence. 1 is, however, possible to get

nuclear threats against the United States, its allies, and partners. This suggests that Russia is seeking ways to use nuclear weapons in support of its national security policy. and it suggests that measures by the previous Administration to modernize our nuclear forces may not be sufficient to deter Russian aggression. North Korea has made similar, coercive nuclear threats.

Particularly in the case of Russia, although it is true that the United States already has low-yicid capable nuclear weapons, these weapons must be delivered by aircraft. which are vulnerable to formidable existing Russian air defenses. Russia may conclude that it can blunt the current U.S. low-yicld response and that the United States would be seif-deterred from using Strategic nuclear weapons; the W76-2 low-yield warhead dispels this notion — however mistaken it might be.

(Aiso, low-yield option of B61 has insignificant neutron output!) The authors of the letter argue ths ar war cannot be co bot theen ic nn such thing as a limited nuclear war. Unfortunately, potential adversaries have openly discussed

the benefits of limited nuclear employment. Therefore, effective U.S. deterrence requires

ensuring that potential adversaries do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear

first use, either regionally or against the United States itself. They must understand that there are

no possible benefits from non-nuclear aggression or limited nuclear escalation. The W76-2 warhead is meant to reinforce the credibility of our response, which strengthens deterrence by denying potential adversaries the advantages they appear to believe they could realize from nuclear first use. It sends a signal to Russia and other potential adversaries that, in the words of

ee

the authors of the letter, “the United States is serious about ma nuclear deterrent.”

Finally, we get to the crux of the authors’ argument, w feel less restrained about using it in a crisis.” Let me be clear, weapons would be the most difficult decision a President has t the ones before it, has said that nuclear weapons would be emy circumstances to protect our vital interests and those of our all strengthens deterrence by raising the threshold to nuclear emp!

eee é onl by the previous Admini con The President’s request for the W76-2, a supplemental capabil in Russian nuclear doctrine, exercises, and its new nuclear cap deterrence of attacks against the U.S.., allies, and partners, it de nuclear warhead or nuclear testing, it does not violate any nuc: not increase the size of the nuclear stockpile.

Nuclear modernization is affordable and is the number Defense. Thank you for your continued support.

SiM<«<« eRe *

= — (US ae sh

MATTIS)

The 1990 revised secret Capabilities of Nu EM-1 gives initial radiation data for 13 de edition, showing neutron doses at 1 km g! surface burst on ordinary soil in unobstru: only 0.666 rads/kiloton for nuclear warhe yield dial-a-yield option for a B61 strategi multiple yield options), compared to 1,66! warhead type 13 (the tactical neutron we

This is because the thicker outer casing or high yield options absorbs most of the ne primary stage, and thereby shows that yo the low-yield option on a B61 as a replace nuclear weapons like neutron bombs.

President Trump's US Secretary of Defense defending low yield tactical nuclear weapons against Presid«

an aoe e ene ee ee . ae :

oo LAI206-MS SECRET ii SZ ooce

Tenens eee nee The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces No. 90 copies, Series A keen Are These Capabilities Still Needed? (U) Nuclear Weapon Data = Joseph S. Howard II Edward I. Whitted April 30, 1991

— pb page

Therefore, we are incredulous of US forces without NSNF to prevent war or to Under the three categort

terminate war against hostile nuclear-armed states. The rationale for NSNF deter aggressi aie capaca ee ed must rest upon its capabilities to deter a plausible resurgent Soviet Union, or rationale of deterrence or restoration of det any of several regional powers with potential nuclear capabilities. As NSNF prevention and if need be, war termination kept the long peace in Europe because it engendered cautious behavior, so : .

should NSNF be kept as an incalculable risk towards any nuclear state Recommendations contemplating aggression. The rationale for NSNF also involves the element of credibility: the NCA should 1, Army should keep an organic cap have options other than central strategic forces for an appropriate response. + Maintain the W79 and &-Inch del 21 « At the appropriate time (sugges - Formally assess future Strategic / ‘a)Another example would be early retirement of the W79. The W79-1 ~ Examine organic Army force struct *“ enhanced radiation warhead is very effective against troop formations. ; - Define technical options for future

Many DCAs delivering gravity bombs would be needed to substitute,

2. Alr Fi hould develop a theate probably inadequately, for this capability loss. sliding ——

nah misslle

UNCLASSIFIED

—e— Open Field Dose —® NYC Urban Dose }

Dose (cGy)

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 Distance from GZ (m)

UNCLASSIFIED 49

oO oO

%

PEAK OVERPRESSURE FALL DUE TO DAMAGE DONE,

@ oO

| |

Blueprint container

- Petrol cans

. Paper screens in bamboo frames - Panel of timber barn

60

5 {o)

1) oO

3 4 5 6

0 1 2 DISTANCE FROM HIROSHIMA GROUND ZERO, KM Data from Dr W. G. Penney, et al., 'The Nuclear Explosive Yields at Hiroshima and Nagasaki', Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc.,

v266 (1970),

pp. 357-424.

Basis for the 99.9% clean Inertial Confinement Nuclear Fusion:

A historical Approch by its Pioneers. Edited by Guillermo Velarde and Natividad Santamaria

Foxwell & Davies (UK) Ltd © 2007

Ripple 11 10 megaton Houstonic deterrent, tested by Nuckolls in 1962

Contributions to the Genesis and Progress of ICF

John H. Nuckolls

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL

Hig, 4, Bure Drop Target with Optimized Pulse Shape (1961),

Pulse shape is (1 7 t) -1 .875

“The implosion enables efficient TN burn by reducing the fusion burn time relative to the inertial confinement time and the radiative cooling time.(1)"

(1): For example, a spherical implosion increases the specific burn rate faster than the inertial confinement time decreases. Specific burn rate is proportional to density, which is inversely proportional to the cube of the radius. \nertial confinement time is proportional to the radius. At constant temperature, total burn-up increases with rate X time, which is inversely proportional to the square of the radius.

Which is produced using plastic foam baffles to Time control the x-ray transit from the primary stage

Meanwhile, | focused on technological surprises. In April 1962, a few months before the scheduled

end of the atmospheric test series, | proposed a nuclear test of a radical high-yield TN design so fan- tastic that my colleagues thought it was an April Fool’s-day joke. In this radical design, a high-per- formance TN secondary was imploded with a highly optimized pulse.

Foster dispatched me to Washington to support approval of a nuclear test of my scheme. I was accompanied by Roland Herbst, a theoretical physicist and experienced weapons designer. I briefed AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, and my former boss, DOD’s R&D leader Harold Brown. President Kennedy approved the nuclear test - the last experiment in the test series.

I was the lead nuclear designer - and this was my first nuclear test. Not nearly enough time or com- puter resources were available. Livermore’s nuclear design experts believed success was impossible. Foster and Moulthrop were notable exceptions. I severely constrained the nuclear design to minimize calculations, to use parts that could be rapidly fabricated, and to avoid or overpower failure modes. Nuclear design, engineering, and fabrication were completed in two months. (Today, years would be

The pulse history needed (shaped by plastic foam baffles to control the x-ray flow),

In 1957, Brown asked me to help evaluate the feasibility of prov by periodically exploding half-megaton yield H-bombs in a one-the cavity excavated in a mountain. This large-scale ICF scheme was p to develop peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.’ The commercial val

oer een

I realized that a few hundred electron volt radiation temperature ate a very small-scale fusion secondary. Radiation losses into a hohl. the fourth power of the radiation temperature. With low radiation t can be avoided even though the surface-to-volume ratio increases a:

Implosion symmetry is enhanced because the radiant energy abs

walls of the hohlraum is efficiently re-radiated multiple times and ha er than the implosion velocity of a fusion capsule. Energy radiates f idly equalizing temperatures.

Growth rates of fluid instabilities are reduced because kilovolt 1 hundred eV temperature black body rapidly ablates the unstable int

Driving pressures of several hundred megabars and implosion {ors/second can be generated by ablation with several hundred eV ra peratures, material sound speeds are several hundred kilometers/se velocities required to isentropically compress DT to more than one thousand-fold compression of a sphere can reduce the required dr fold,

‘{\) minimize the implosion energy most of the DT must be neat iJenalilex, ‘The Fermi energy of DT compressed one thousand fold

I developed an ablatively driven spherical rocket implosion to c out use of a pusher. A sustained ablatively driven implosion is made er input and a suitable ablator. Optimum pulse shapes make possibI of most of the DT while igniting a central hot spot. The temperat adjusting the pulse shape so that a strong shock is generated near target design containing low-density DT gas.

In a series of 1961 calculations, I explored the potential of str pulse shapes, very high-gain, pusherless, near isentropic, low tem

. On a pre-dawn morning in early July 1962, I observed the mult sion of my device from a Christmas Island beach at the Joint Task F

In August and September, Ron and I worked day and night to d ievice. We further optimized the pulse shape to achieve practical

initial shock speed in the imploding matter i sound speed (pressures of 10°-10° atmosph

qeentty so that the compression is near-isentri ptimum x-ray pulse shape needed isent

E= Eo . where t= 1 —1#/t’, ris time, ¢’ (which is > £) is | the centre of the sphere of the initial shock (ge

3¥

cation of Eo), s= ee = 15/8 for dense hydrog Y

is in John Nuckolls, Lowell Wood, et al., Nature, 15 September 1972, RIGHT: electrons (y=5

x nn a Yer M eect es copbereelees seey earn Ee sreseer dong

—————_—_-nm <n ipamecmmmmatcen ae 13 1949,

$Y. a October » \ )

¥ TO: Technical Council Members =m A\

is docf?t'", : —— eM) Verrise oi the Gaited state PROM: ward Teller lacpes Coites ~tates. A PROM: Edwar babie tikeaslr'ii'shee clcdemvake Gh ice 7

A upyECT: THE SUPER BOMB AND THE LABORATORY PROGRAM '*' bn A! Unsutnorized person w prokincad

nay Tesult in severe criminal penalties WE applicable Federal laws, Sp. H2000 % ev poo?

? voudew pecwnent

will be a disoussion in the Tech Council conoerning the See and in particular concernirg the question whether our effort can be so increased as to make the Super Bomb feasible within the foresecable future. I should like to present to you my views on this matter in this memorandum. In this way, I hope that more thought can be given to the question before Technical Council] convenes.

ADWD-2-7 —n

OF ENERGY DEGLASBIPICA TIONG rem vin rr

I would Wike to outline why it is essential for us to develop a Super Bomb at the earliest possible time or else be able to say with reasonable con- fidence that the Super is not feasible. The arguments that have lec me to this conolusion are of various kinds.

POLITICAL COKSIDERATION:

It is my conviction that a peaceful settlement with the Russians is poss only if we possess overwhelming superiority. We do not now possess such reriority. The most promising prospect to acquire a great lead is by an

DR EDWARD TELLER ON NEED FOR DEMOCRACIES TO USE "OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY” TO ATTAIN PEACE!

This is a repeat of Winston Churchill's argument for peacekeeping in 1908, when Norman Angell opposed him by arguing that it would create an arms race with an enemy. (See Joad's 1939 Why War.) After WWI, due to Grey's dithering failure to deter the invasion of Belgium (akin to Chamberlain with Poland 25 years later), Grey used Angell's theory of an arms race to excuse his failure. (See President Kennedy's Why England Slept to see how this arms race excuse was then used in the 1930s to prevent an arms race with the Nazis, with tragic results since rearming slower than the enemy causes war, not being superior!) Angell was given a Knighthood and a Nobel Peace Prize, essentially for helping Hitler's thugs!

The bottom line is, an arms race is better than WWIII; you win an arms race through the economic attrition of the enemy!

ABOVE: physicist and author Colin Bruce Sibley's 1977 book Surviving Doomsday, which was reviewed by Peter Laurie in New Scientist, 13 April 1978, p97, where Laurie points out: "I'm afraid that Mr Sibley has fallen into the popular error of confusing what modern weapons can do, with what they will do." This followed his 1976 Foreign Affairs Research Institute paper, "The strategic significance of Soviet civil defence preparedness". Unfortunately, Sibley had been producing children's educational stuff, for example producing a vinyl record of the 1969 Moon Landings, Journey to the Moon (Pickwick International Ltd.), and in 1976 he authored The How and Why Wonder Book of Energy and Power Sources and The How and Why Wonder Book of Oil (Transworld Publishers Ltd., 1976 and 1979), see illustration below. He used this same children's book style to write Surviving Doomsday! Sibley

3

). (Nuckolls in Nature, vz

Prefacese bore bi ee oe Det Hiroshima and Nagasaki -... 5 Biological Warf

Sidaktrcn ua OOM ate 6 i The Nuclear Arsenal rebar ent e The Advantages ¢ Race Without Ends 8 Drawbacks to Bic Strategic Missile Warfare... ........ 9 Infection, Incubat The MIRYV and MARV Missile'Systems .... 12 Biological Aeroso Submarine Launched Strategic Missiles. . . . . 13 Insect Carriers — |

Anti-Submarine Warfare- ASW. ....... 13 Protection Agains Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems - ABM’s. . . . . 14 Bacterial Diseases The: Cruise: Missileseaitaperancre sonra seat iets 14 Rickettsial Disease Viral Diseases . .

The Physics of Nuclear Weapons Fungal Diseases .

Whatiis an Explosion jee icmearai natin peetne 16 Absa tt “eas The Physics of Nuclear Explosions. .....- - 16 Crop Diseases . .

The -AtomiceBombycors ect memccnee ieee trenton 18 Thermonuclear Weapons — The Hydrogen Bomb 19 Technical Aspects « Fission-Fusion-Fission Bombs. ......-- ald) Agents: Anthrax... . - The Effects of Nuclear Weapons Bricellosise ee The Distribution of Energy Released. ..-- - 20 QFever..-.-- The Blinding Light Flash... - +--+: 20 Tale Sele The Fireballdmitc ea om reart ncnasmoiions zt z reat Ee een a Radinted Hleatenve ante e Naser ets lel Acer a= Das ran cent RE The Blast or Shock Wave. - +--+: >: °° 22 Epidemic Typhus . g The Mushroom Cloud =. 220-02) = 2 2 2; 23 og ST rf Cube-Root Law for Blast (Only). ----: > oa Encephalitis nce Initial Radiation sew cn ccna tinea ane yh Residual Radiation. ---:- °° “Acapulco : Radioactive Fallout is Harmful to Lifes een. Bt Scenario for a Thir

Local and Intermediate Fallouteetacs noma Global: Ballo utesiiemes:s ous capcom gaia

The Effects of Radiation ionand

Survival Who Will Survive? . Shelter ; Advice sete

LD-50 EXPOSURE DO ANIMALS & PLANTS Organism LD-SO 1

ES FOR

Glos oe snecialatt oha xf

fee RHE ‘ears WOT

ni as veateredians eos HS

Bae fel ee hiiched see scientific arucles'4

"Protect & aves Monthly October 1981 anaes

a (P&S MONTHLY EDITOR = BRUCE SIBLEY)

rget Cities...

Graham M. Stathers

During @ nuclear attack (or indeed conventional/gas attack), British citizens will be instructed to remain indoors, to ‘stay-put’ inside crude refuges made of wood, plastic bags filled with soi! and slanted doors, or back garden trenches. This extraordinary dictum has led to heated debate; in parliament, in local authority council chambers, at home and in the factories and offices. Most of this argument and counter- argument is reflected in the news- casts and special features of the press and broadcasting media. Undoubtedly, without ‘ proper shelters’ millions may die or be seriously injured if our cities, towns, ports, and airfields fal! victim to a massive air attack.

Graham Stathers — cartographer and member of the Roya! United Services Institute for Defence Studies and the National Council for Civil Defence, has made a special study of city evacuation logistics (or Crisis Relocation in the US.}. His knowledge of maps and population statistics provides us with some new insights into the practi- calities of relocating large numbers of citizens away from potential targets. This article is based on a Monograph Study prepared by the author after several years of research. It is possibly the ‘first’ unofficial report of its kind in the United Kingdom. And it is obvious that its findings underline the value of city-evacuation in time of international crisis — both from a humane and defensive morale standpoint. Without a national shelter policy, “stay-putters’ would undoubtedly ‘vote’ for evacuation — regardless of the official attitude. Unsupervised ‘panic’ evacuation can only lead to the widespread breakdown in public order and the disinheritance of cae directives. We could lose the fight for freedom by turning in upon ourselves — victory would go to the attacker .

-_- HH ha

IN ORDER TO CREDIBLY DECLARE WWII AGAINST GERMANY ON SUNDAY 3 SEPTEMBER 1939 DUE TO THE INVASION OF POLAND, BRITAIN EVACUATED KIDS FROM LONDON IN OPERATION PIED PIPER 48 HOURS EARLIER

odern warfare and ci ne nei s Veta Res

e Ronomicaly YBble for printing.

am ats 9 RG Maan’

and papers in popular and special

aided by NAS:

Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that

Germen troops have crossed the Polish frontier and

that eneacheipes Poli sh towns are fe ie this “informetian—is preanan’ appears to the

Government of the United Kingdom and France that by their

proceeding, J

action the German Government have created conditions

(viz, en aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom end France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.

I eam accordingly to inform Your mene i Bsieh that unlesa the German in Governnent|cen 4 inpcéritely satisfy Wis > ajegay*s

fe United Kingdon Aare these-seporte~; ave

Governgént in =, Jrspuady ohed Gunde he di-tern fare preparedato give unféunded, or in thé a a a bre pres g

ajesty's Government satisfactory assurances thet the

His May FOR KIDNAPPING ttc os * German Government has suspended all eggressive action

against Polend end azemppeperetpromptly to withdraw their

age

forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their

to Polend,

obligations

Britain's “free press” sw criticisms after war was appeasement of Hitler b;

This is Britain's final ultimatum letter to Germany, written by the fascism appeaser and Jew hater Lord Halifax, delivered at 9 am on 3 September 1939.

“Home made” Protective suit

i Y |Ventilator/fhow No. 1 INTAKE

o

A ¥

‘ain

dtinkin: water

~ y | tan)s ye) Heel

SJ

db A |

ond |

Aretraction shaft

4| | Toilet/washing, | waste shaft. >

AB 3

Y\ Flue exhatst pipe for p¢trol generator |

Blast

ates Nhe ee aes maniters) at most campin Fhereis-no i the domestic

your attic wit Wish to take a

A survivor's protective suit must fulfil several important criteria ninatedulter

upply remaining inta

allack

@ The suit must prevent fallout dust and bio-chemical agents

ers anit from touching the skin.

Set bys! evices are ejected from ir by

And remember, all chimneys must be sl nol WAT Decontamination }

ating .& Cooking, and lighting by

asible “uble provided you ensure that Y these

drainage system: @ The suit respirator (air mask) must filter and absorb all poisonous gases, fumes, aerosols, and radioactive dusts

me will Permit polluted air to enter the she ‘ vill Talise that all flames consume OXY MEA 10 redine the omauet available for breat

@ The suit must be impregnated with chemicals whic neutralize or greatly weaken the effects of lethal chemica' agents when they contaminate the suit.

C. BRUCE SIBLEY

COLIN BRUCE SIBLEY WROTE THE 1976 CHILDRENS BOOKS, 7he How and Why Wonder Book of Energy and Power (above left) and The How and Why Wonder Book of Oil (above right). He wrote his civil defence book in exactly the same way, Surviving Doomsday.

Page THE ATOMIC AGE BEGINS 5 Death of a City 6 DAWN IN THE DESERT 6 Zero Hour 7 A DANGEROUS GAME 7 Fifty-two Tons of Uranium 8 Will It Work? 8 The Game Starts 10 A LITTLE EXTRA WORK 11 | Letter from Berlin 11 A Sound Nobody Ever Heard 12 A VERY STRANGE IDEA 12 What is the universe made of? 12 What is the difference between matter and energy? 13 How can we tell matter from energy? 15 What is energy? 15 How do we measure energy? 17 Can we “make” energy? 17 Do we burn up energy? 18 Where does used energy go to? 18 What happens when we burn matter? 18 Can we change matter into energy? 18 When did physicists change their mind? 19 What does E = mc? mean? 20

Does E = mc* work for all kinds of matter? 20 How much energy can we get from matter? 21 INSIDE THE ATOM 21 What is matter made of? 21

What are clements? 22 What did Dalton discover about atoms? 22 ire atoms solid? 22

an we see atoms? 23 w did we learn what is inside the atom? 23 ow do we look at atoms? hat is inside the atom?

v big is the nucleus?

it is the nucleus made of? 25 / do the electrons keep flying around

omic energy a special kind of energy?

oy

Contents

Page What is chemical energy? 27 Where does “atomic energy” come from? 27 What holds the nucleus together? 28 How much binding energy is in the nucleus? 28 How many kinds of atoms are there? 28 Are all the atoms of an element the same? 29 What is an isotope? 29 What is the “binding energy curve"? 30 Did the big atoms have the most binding energy? 31

How can we get at some binding energy? 31

Why doesn’t binding energy stay inside

the atom? 31 ATOM SMASHING 32

Who discovered radioactivity? 32 Do atoms ever split by themselves? 32 Why was radioactivity important? 32 Why are neutrons good atomic bullets? 35 How do we split uranium atoms? 35 What happens when a uranium atom splits? 35 What is a “chain reaction”? 36 What do we need to make a chain reaction? 37 What isotopes are good atomic fuel? 38 Can we make atomic fuel? 39 How do we separate isotopes? 39 What is gaseous diffusion? 40 What does an isotope separation-plant

look like? 41 How do we start the chain reaction? 41 Why is there a “critical mass"? 41 How does an A-bomb work? 42 How can we tame the A-bomb? 42 How do we keep from getting

too many neutrons? 43 Why are slow neutrons better than

fast neutrons? 43 How do we make the neutrons slow down? 44 What kind of reactors can we build? 46 How can we use reactors? 46 Why do we need new elements? 46

SUNS MADE TO ORDER 47

Where do stars get their energy? 47 What happens inside the sun? 47 How does an H-bomb work? 47

Can we tame the

TAt

"erasing,

i = COINS

Dr. Blackwood is a pr ; “This book was edited by endorsement by the Off

T T T T T T T

This book |!

© 1960, by Wonder Books, Inc., §)

These books answer the questions most often . h asked about science, nature and history. They nes i ra a 2 All rights reserved under Internatio ENERGY AND sil ae ee: : oe THE HOW AND WHY WONL

‘POWER SOURC

Written by BRENDA RALPH | /Hustrated by W. F. PHILLI!

THE HOW AND WHY WONDER BOOK OF TRANSWORLD PUBLISHERS LT

ENERGY AND POWER

Written by C. BRUCE SIBLEY Mustrated by RAYMOND TURVEY MID-16TH CENTURY SETRONGR

OR SHORT ARQUEBUS TRANSWORLD PUBLISHERS LTD. - LONDON Po

hed | Sea-Launched —_—_ Air-Launched ee 3 ri¢ = = : A & 14%

12%

NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS SINCE 2010

1962:

TOTAL TRIAD: 17.1% of DoD Budget

1984:

TOTAL TRIAD: 10.6% of DoD Budget

10%

S B 8% re) fa) = = AL B 6% = sss Eg a 9 re) Oo 4% () : = re} Legacy Triad + 5 and Sustainment ; a 5” hs U 9 rama & = 2 0% 5 i x S@-xpReessgee2eesabspes i oO ORK eoneoaeoeeeogcses KEY Deore oooaooaooooadss oc ; : : ee i ey ar td ddd AANA OC Figure 1. Nuclear Delivery Systems Since 2010 | =a a £&e | Figure 3. Cost of DoD Nuclear Force Replacement Data provided by the DoD Data provided by DoD

CONVENTIONAL ERA NUCLEAR RUSSIA'S NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEZ

2.5%

2% a | : ‘anti raft Mi Ant

1.5% RUSSIA

1.15%

% OF TOTAL POPULATION

1%

UNITED STATES

0.5%

<0.01%

1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 Figure 4. Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Challenge

Figure 2. Wartime Fatalities Percentage of World Population Data provided by the DoD

Data from the DoD Historical Office Russia is modernizing an active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuc

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018

f _*

Then finally | heard the buzzer and a commander's note was passed out to us

| ran to the switching equipment and inserted the codes into it.

7”

hen finally | heard the buzzer and a mander's note was passed out to us That was 8.13 am

ABOVE: Air raid si

nord of Hiroshima

e military bunker

rease is 10, t.e. 10%3.

and although the blas 1s Iso takes 10 times Ie

for the blastgpa ‘ e Cross of Course in the higher;

burst theg 5 ution shielding met

my officers in

the swiiching equipment and That was 8.13 am Mserted the codes into it

re

free democracies.

KOUMEKTABHBIE CPEDCTBA SAWATbI OT ATOMHOTO OP)

Even in 1956 (as this poster shows), Russia had an extensive civil defence shelter program, from subway station shelters

ve

5 Megaton airburst; Masonry bridges intact , G.P.O. tower cores Outer edge of Factory chimneys

at 8000 feet at 1.7 miles; steam + stand at 24 miles: rubble 3? miles. survive at

high, fireball does locomotives head on to new Civil Defence — Houses 75 per 34 miles,

not touch - blast at 24 miles will aerials can _ cent. down at heavy lathes

ground; there is no still run. Man, if protected easily be fitted. 54 miles, but 90 and major significant omheat = —_—— Shipsat 2% miles —_per cent. of industrial

fall-out. Underground and debris, can _ damaged people under plant trains undamaged live at 2 miles but seaworthy stairs will live at 6 miles

he whole subject of

nuclear war is so nasty

that most people prefer not

to think about it at all. If

they are forced to, they

probably have two hazy

but permanent convictions: a couple of H bombs will completely flatten the country, and that Civil Defence quite rightly lay down and died years ago. Neither idea is accurate. For the 4o| second, Civil Defence in its wider

aspects is very much alive; spending this year will amount to £19.5 million, | roughly the capital cost of the deterrent and we are well up the international - and delivery systems.

head of the population. though it is because of the loss of life W. Germany 17s. 6d it will cause, it is not as totally destruc- Britain 10s. Od tive as is popularly supposed. This dia- Italy 5s. Od gram, based on information gathered at U.S.A. 4s. 6d. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and in American Sweden 2s. 4d. weapons trials, shows how close various France 2s. Od. objects can be to a five megaton air-

Since 1948, when C.D. began, we | burst and survive.

have spent over £1000 million; |

As for the H bomb, terrifying

T bri ne ieee at Ay miles, diesel _ locomotives — but will run at 54 miles because that is th of using a nuclear:

‘Blast carries 30 p

60 per cent. furth burst. There wor fall-out, but anyo scale attack migh since it has been Humphries of

Weather Bureau into the stratospk

# ep T 00 feet ioe hl on “ond ot 34 miles: rubble ai mies. ee evi at a eed vocPhast ot 24 miles vil Se ceitcrcan cent sonnet haat ines ground; there is no still run, Man, easily be fitted, 54 miles, but 90 and f segnificant rom heat Ships at 24 sities re onus bal eee sles vecencoed CMe oth vie but seoworthy Graney will live at 6 miles he whole of in very much alive; spending | have spent over £1000 million; 2 elie aie wl wns wo C195 llico, roughly the capital cost of the deterrent that most people prefer not | and we are well up the international | and delivery systems. to think about it at all, If | league table of the amount spent per As for the H_ bomb, they are forced to, they | head of the population. though it is because of the loss of life probably have two hazy W. Germany 17s. 6d. it will cause, it is not as totally destruc~ but permanent convictions: a couple Britain 10s, Od, tive as is popularly supposed, This dia~ of H bombs will completely flatten the Italy 5s. Od, gram, based on information gathered at country, and that Civil Defence quite USA. 4s. 6d. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and in American rightly lay down and died years ago. Sweden 2s. 4d. weapons trials, shows how close various Neither idea is accurate. For the France 2s. Od. objects can be to a five megaton air- second, Civil Defence in its wider Since 1948, when C.D, began, we | burst and survive.

Truss bridges Elect

ricity

at 44 mik iPRagieeriing self rl eal wet locomotives a dented towers aod care but will run at survive ot 55 miles about 6 miles We show the effects of an airburst because that is the most efficient way of using a nuclear weapon against a city.

Blast carries 30 per cent. further, heat 60 per cent, further than from a ground burst. There would be no significant fall-out, but anyone launching a large- scale attack might well be glad of that, since it has been calculated by W. J. Humphries of the United States Weather Bureau that the dust thrown into the stratosphere by a.2000 mega-

Limit of major fire zone in average British weather

tons groundburst would reduce solar radiation by 20 per cent. and might precipitate another ice-age,

The strong tactical point about nuclear weapons is their ability to raise fires. It’s often thought these will coalesce into firestorms —as shown in The War Game. There is some doubt whether this will happen: but since one can't do much about a firestorm except to build deep shelters — which we can't afford — the point is rather academic.

Scale: each band represents one mile

So much for the relative certainties of the single bomb. If we were involved in an all-out war more than one would arrive. How many, and where? The basic problem is to imagine an enemy's motives in launching a strike against this country, but the Home Office makes the underlying assumption that a bomb might arrive anywhere (in C.D. exercises they often fall on the most unlikely places) mixed in with two basic attack patterns. One, the pre-

_: -

emptive counter strike, im of perhaps 100 one megat directed at naval bases, m quarters and the V bombe fields. But as Bomber Con they can scramble their have them safely on their the four-minute warning arguable that an enemy r to deal with them more chi their run in over his territ: The other attack patte:

Limit of major fire zone in average British weather

tons groundburst would reduce solar radiation by 20 per cent. and might precipitate another ice-age.

The strong tactical point about nuclear weapons is their ability to raise fires. It’s often thought these will coalesce into firestorms — as shown in The War Game. There is some doubt whether this will happen: but since one can’t do much about a firestorm except to build deep shelters — which we can’t afford — the point is rather academic.

Scale: each band represents one mile

So much for the relative certainties of the single bomb. If we were involved in an all-out war more than one would arrive. How many, and where? The basic problem is to imagine an enemy’s motives in launching a strike against this country, but the Home Office makes the underlying assumption that a bomb might arrive anywhere (in C.D. exercises they often fall on the most unlikely places) mixed in with two basic attack patterns. One, the pre-

Peter Laurie, S

70 per cent. of trees still stand

at 10 miles

emptive counter strike, imagines a hail of perhaps 100 one megaton warheads directed at naval bases, military head- quarters and the V bombers’ dispersal fields. But as Bomber Command claim they can scramble their aircraft and have them safely on their way within the four-minute warning period, it is arguable that an enemy might prefer to deal with them more cheaply during their run in over his territory.

The other attack pattern is a coun-

0/12/67

habitable

at 13 miles

live in cities ¢ unlimited roc could kill eve But against th of an enemy several rather

ABOVE: Peter Laurie's article on civil defence in the Sunday Times Magazine, 10 December 1967, pages 39 et seq., formed the basis of his later book Beneath the City Streets. The article states (on page 50) that the popularist (faked) megadeath nuclear war casualty figures were even in 1967 not without precedent since exactly the same media trash exaggerations on casualties and knock-out blow strategy also existed before WWII (contributing to the appeasement that encouraged Hitler): "a very similar situation existed in 1938. Everyone believed - and these were official estimates - that the Luftwaffe could flatten half London in 3 weeks and kill 3,000,000 people. Few Londoners ran away, and few got bloodthirsty. More to the point, a booklet was issued to every household that winter: The protection of your home against air raids. In August 1939 Mass Observation did a survey on what people knew of something simple: the two air raid sirens. Five out of six got them wrong ..." Laurie's article was, of course, published just 4 months before the British civil defence corps was abolished by hard left wing Prime Minister Harold Wilson in March 1968. But Laurie points out on page 40 of his article that the London underground (ordinary tube trains, not just the specially hardened shelters at 8 stations) will survive directly below a 5 megaton burst at 8,000 feet altitude, which optimises blast effects on buildings, and he points out that the "fireball does not touch the ground: there is no significant fallout." Sure, you can reduce the height of burst to try to damage underground facilities and to cause fallout, but then you no longer optimise the effects on ordinary houses. Laurie in his massive nuclear weapons effects diagram on the same page points out that 75% of British houses are demolished at 5.25 miles from the 5 megaton air burst at 8,000 ft altitude: "but 90% of people under stairs will live" (the WWII Morrison table shelter principle, which is independent of bomb yield because the weight of a collapsing house is independent of bomb yield). His article states that the 1967 British civil defence budget was 10s per person, compared to 17s 6d in West Germany, but adds that "Since 1948, when [nuclear war] civil defence began, we have spent over £1000 million; roughly the capital cost of the deterrent and delivery systems." Laurie also points out in his 1967 article that the very high protection factors of deep shelters make them unfeasible because Russia can produce rockets to negate them for 33% of the cost of the shelters. In order to win an arms race by economic attrition through civil defence, therefore, you need cheaper shelters that cost less than the weapons the enemy is making to try to break through your defences (the same point occurred in WWII, when cheap indoor Morrison table shelters were deployed instead of the economically-crippling gold-plated variety, having been invented and tested by Lord Baker and his assistant Edward Leader-Williams, who - with Frank H. Pavry and George R. Stanbury - in the 1950s tested key British WWI shelters against nuclear weapons at Monte Bello and Maralinga and used the results to develop them into effective but cheap nuclear shelters, published finally in the 1982 UK Government book Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance). Finally, Laurie makes the point that devastation in war can transform politics into dictatorial communism: "Russia, for example, by the end of the first world war [the Red revolution was in October 1917 in Russia] had lost, in comparison to 1913: one half to two thirds livestock, one half grain production, 90% of coal, steel, textiles, and transport, 28 million people." The lesson is that if your country is devastated by the effects of war like Russia or Germany in 1918 or Vietnam in 1975, the survivors are likely to have to live in a politically extreme dictatorship, justified by

the sheer destruction and the populist need for revenge at any cost.

ABOVE: photos of paranoid dictatorial Russia from the 25 March 1933 //lustrated London News article, when British citizens in Moscow (Allan Monkhouse, John Cushny, W. H. Thornton, W. H. McDonald, Charles Nordwall et al.) were arrested by the OGPU of Stalin's regime on trumped up charges of sabotage (they all worked for the British Metropolitan-Vickers electrical engineering company, and the

Russians claimed falsely the company was planning to blow up the Dnieprostroy Dam by pouring sand or acid into the turbines, when in

41U—THE ILLUSTRATED LUNDON NEWS—Mancr 2). 194 Maxcn 25, 1933—1

MOSCOW—WHERE BRITISH SUBJECTS WERE ARRESTED ANDMAY BE TRIED: WORK AND WAITING Al

the right, | could see the walls of the Kremlin M

| trom Omsk

ow alter an unoomfortable journey

ame of the avenues were

and leaning a little farther | could see the

Tsar's golden eagle gleaming at the very moothly paved he writes In 1912 highest potnt of the Kremlin buildings sur ihey were content with cobblestones. Pri rounded by the red flags of Communism vate automobiles were few, but buses were By virtue of its own beauty, Moscow was many, and the trams were frequent and a magnificent sight in the dawnlight, with full. Shacks and palaces passed by us in the sun fresh upon ft. But the mind added chaotic alternation; the bizarre grandeur

h interest, by the consciousness of all of old churches mingled with the crude he mystery and all the violent passion that boxes and parallel lines of modornistic lay acealed beneath those golden domes monstrosities; the great stores that had and especially within that Kremlin, where the given colour to this thoroughfare twenty red flags and the golden eagle 4 side by years before were closed, and white sheets side. the eagle surrounded by red flags, as by draped their vast windows dismally. Dingy an army that had captured and caged It.” tenements opened their sleepy portals and We may turn from Mr, O'Flaherty’s romantic sent forth streams of workers to shops and vision to see what a matter-of-fact American factories. These people seemed better bserver—and one with a confessed affec dressed than those in Omsk, though they tion for the Russian people—found in had caps for hats and sneakers for shoes,

w. Mr. Will Ourant gave his im and thelr blouses, though unwashed, were

pressions of Russia in a series of exceedingly a picturesque and sensible costume. The lucid 1d well-informed articles in the manners seemed rough, but not unkind Saturday Evening Post.” He arrived in , We passed the Red Square

[Condinaed om right.

FROPAGANDA IN MOSCOW, WHERE OF INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE Amr PRAISE AND COLLECTIVE ENTHIS! ON WHICH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS FACTORIES ARK FUBLICLY DISPLAYED—A SNAIL SYMNOLISING SLOW WORKERS; AND 80 FORTH.

N view of the arrest of British subjects in Moscow, on a charge of sabotage, and the consequent protests by this country, general conditions in the Russian capital are of exceptional interest at the moment “A city unique among the cities of the world, the cultural, social, and political centre of a country occupying one sixth of the entire surface of the earth, the capital of the first Socialist State—the USS.R.— which has preserved many Interesting relics

of all stages of its growth through eight [Contiomaed Belen.

IN A LAND IN WHICH MUNGHY CKOWDS OF PROFLE AKE CONTENT TO WAIT FOR SOME DAYS YOR A SEAT IN A TRAIN: A TYPICAL ASSEMDLY OF RAGORD ‘ PASSENGERS WAITING PHLEGMATICALLY IN A MOSCOW STATION.

WHERE A CERTAIN MODICUM OF FOOD IX A WORKER'S KATION—#0 LONG AS HE DESERVES WELL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES A PATIENT FOOD-QUEUE WAITING TO FRESENT THEIR FOOD “ COUPONS.”

roRGSIN, par hal

ANOTHER DEPFLORABLE SURVIVAL A CHURCH IN MOSCOW, WHERE “ANTI-GOD " PROPAGANDA, AX

SHOP WIECH TR RUN ON MORE FAMILIAR LINES, IN WHICH PURCHASES MAY ME MADE IN ORDINARY WAV—AGAINST FOREIGN MONEY OF GOLD) «A “TORGSIN ESTABLISHMENT. WITH NOTICES IN ENGLISH FOR THE BENEFIT OF FoRKIONERS

2°

arrival at the Mecca of ou

long centuries although continually changing its aspect—such is Moscow.” So

the official guide-book. Let us now take the reaction of a sensitive observer, It is a relic of the ol looking over the city on his first morning. ‘The dawn was wonderful and At last order rad ae : strange” (writes Mr. Liam O'Flaherty in ‘| Went to Russia”) “ because of the | vast, bou! ry % < city that lay before me, gleaming in the morning light, with its golden domes : what pierre if ies all shimmering. The hotel was on a height, and my room was on the sixth A FREQUENT SIGHT IN MOSCOW—WHERE AN UNDERGROUND RAILWAY HAS NOT A THOKOUGHLY UNSOCIALISTIC AND PERFECTLY PSPIVIPUALISTIC ECONOMIC tions. And yet we are as

PUENOMENON [—THADESPEOPLE BRINGING FOOD TO SELL ON THE STATION to go, and that Moscow |

a 1 PRVVURE ry Ene 2 me 80 EPrRsIVE _peareoem TO VEU [Misorjyeoy ERAT eOUldpee Ht quartet HOT TNE Hetty HEME YON NNE very ouTERITER FRY means amrwwns neem rer et rte at erreeeny ee memeamesme oT RRA GRAN 70 RAVER

fact the blades were 5 tons and were washed clean by millions of gallons of water daily!), and when ordinary Russians had to endure food

rationing in peacetime.

ABOVE: the relationship of civil defence by a dictatorship to its aggressive policy (such as Germany's compulsory cellar bunker shelters in the 30s and Russia's in the cold war) was documented in the 14 October 1933 ///ustrated London News showing civil defence anti- disarmament propaganda in Hitlers Nazi Germany, stating: "In view of the world-wide interest in the question of disarmament, with which is involved that of the re-armament claimed by Germany, it is significant that the Nazi regime appeas to be conducting all its activities, and training of the youth of the nation, on more or less military lines ... We illustrate in the photographs on these pages one phase of the all-pervading propaganda calculated to create in the German people the fear that one day or another they may be attached ... children are taught to take refuge promptly in special underground shelters and to extinguish, by sand, fires of the kind that might be caused by bombs. The spirit in which these lectures are given may be gathered from the following extract ... : " 'Germany is not allowed to have fighting aeroplanes on land or sea.' Thus runs Clause 198 of the shameful Treaty of Versailles ... Germany has been completely disarmed and has no defence against an enemy air attack." Having first set up effective German civil defence in 1933, the next step of the Nazis was to re- arm in preparation to setting the clock back to 1914. Stalin did the same in Russia. Putin follows suite. As Herman Kahn forecast over 60 years ago, we are now paying the price for neglecting civil defence and also for refusing to put freedom loving states ahead in the arms

race. The options available to such weak loons are disastrous.

“4 THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS-Ocr 14 19%

Oct, 14, 1935

PROPAGANDA IN SUI INSTRUCTION IN THE US

GERMANY PRACTISING “PASSIVE AIR DEFENCE” : TEACHING CIVILIANS HOW TO ACT UNDER AERIAL ATTACK.

REEN LECTURE TO HOVS: THE LECTURER GERMANY IS ALLOWEE ANTICAIRCRAFT GAS-MASK DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE STRERFS: CIVILIANS INSTRUCTED MILITARY ARROPLANES UNDER THE “ SHAMEFUL MER MEIOMMOURS MAVE 10 MAKE THEIR WAY TO A SUELTER WHEN THE ALARM [5 SOUNDED, AND COVER FROM JO00 TO So0C THEIR MOUTHS WITH A WET CLOTH IF THEY HAVE NO GAS-MASK

F INVASION BY AIK

A TUNLEC LECTURE TO CIVILIANS ON THE DANGE A MAZE OFFICIAL EXPLAINING VARIOUS TYFES OF BOMB TO AN AUDIENCE COMPOSED MOSTLY OF WOMEN

Ey ERMAN a

hey NO hetey FIRt-pomns

E view of the world-wide interest in the question of disarmament,

with which Is involved that of the re-armament claimed by fale to rem Germany, it t significant that the Nazi régime appears to be S&S | proceedings 3 conducting all its activities, and the training of the youth of ie provocative nation, on more or less military lines, At the same time it is only — pages one |

Conivaned opporite a pe _ In the Germ

SERVING = OW Gas- ‘4 ps DEMONSTRATING OW

THE AIR ENTERING A REYUGE - CELLAR rROM OUTSIDE 18 CLEARED oF POISONOUS GASES: AN INSTRUCTOR MANIPULA- TING THE AIR TER BEFORE CIVILIANS

MASKS IN ONE OF THE ANTI = AIRCRAFT | SIIEL~

oe em ey IER

Fihrung

CIVILIANS «WATCH THE PROCESS

Offentlicher

Continwed) attacked—that Is, the in- struction of the popula- tion In protective devices,

And the War of the future will be the air attack | The small army of 100,000 men left to us, with our navy, is powerless to stop an attack {rom the air. In the event of an air attack on Ger. many we are completely detenceless, and the lay- man can hardly imagine

such as the wearing of gas-masks, to be adopted in the event of an in vasion by air. Frequent lectures and demon strations are given, and

men, women, and children are taught to take refuge promptly

in special underground AT ONE OF THE REFUGE-CELLARS IN WHICK LECTURES AR INTERESTING IN VIEW OF A RECENT WARMING TO CERMANS its horrors. G bomb: tlnpulsh, by sand, fires ENGAGED IN WRITING PARTICULARS OF THE ARRANGEMENT AN INSTRUCTOR EXPLAINING A MODEL OF A moUSE FRovipen ‘OWEN Gangerous, are = ON A BLACKBOARD WITH A FIRE<PROOFED ROOF dependent on the

of the kind that might

be caused by bombs. The spirit in which these lectures are given may be gath from the following extract from a German descriptive note which accompanie photographs Germany is not allowed to have fighting aeroplanes either on Thus runs Clause 198 of the shameful Treaty of Versailles, What

Weather, and the gassing of Greater Berlin seems impossible. On the other hand, small fire bombs are most mgerous, as they can be dropped in large quantities Since 1924 Germany has been planes, but the former German Government took no pre-

against the possibility of an air attack, by organising aerial defences and educating the population on this matter Thue ome af the Beet dustes of she aris

wed to have civil ae

cautio

or se ervuce-cettan!" A DUMMY FIGURE IN A GAS-MASK decision means can only be realised when one knows that the States ad

“ewe wav 9h THE PURLIC At ‘ a meunwereseene ease

TAC OAMLY MIRKOR, Saturday. Peoruiry 9, 1998. Broadcasting - Page 20

Dail Mirror sia 2

THE DAILY PICTURE NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST NET — nneyeaedg A cyetonets -

|» 10,062 eat agro SAT URDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1936 _ One » Pemy_|

Amusements: Page 22

HITLER’S “LET’S BE FRIENDS. PLEA TO WORLD

An Exclusive Interview with “Daily Mirror”

“| APPEAL L TO REASON”

Passionately... fervently ...in the plain words of a Man of the People, Adolf Hitler, Leader and Master of Germany, in an exclusive interview with the “Daily Mirror” yesterday, pleaded with the world:— “LET’S BE FRIEND, “I appeal to reason in international affairs,” he said. “I want to show that the idea of eternal enmity is wrong. We are not hereditary enemies.” The “Daily Mirror” challenged his views with those in his book, “My Struggle.” “ My justifica- tion,” said the Leader, “I shall write in the great book of history.”

Man of Destiny Speaks

By BERTRS ay DE JOUV SOUVENEL

NM the room where the destiny of Ger- | eh ut is the most advantageous for my country? took on thelr fighting light; his fists clenched, —————————-—-———— ——— 5 a3tity THE a THIN FOR MY¥ “Political problems appeared complicated. many ts planned her Man of Destiny cACE, The German people did not understand them, gat to receive me, te me as someone quite dif- to aa pret bere, in such Gondittons, te leave i essed ng at his desk, ne vofessional politicians the task of freeing

Simply dre ? a S = pf hopes know quite well that I started at the | them from these vomplications. est of the News uaburdened to me heart... hls hope: D aud have become the master of Ger- “1 simplitied (hese problems. [ reduced

.- his fears, a uch U rather an astonishing achicve-| them to simpie terms, Countess Haugwite-Reventlow, for-

He eyed me keenly for a moment Dy a we must be some extraordinary boxed understood—and they fol- moerly Misa Barbora Hutton, the Wool-

‘ 4 eire “ i Then ... slowly, this man who secs [nto isis ™ Atul 80 the clase war—that notorious wat budge teelveste. SOs, ) Sigg abd ef A vabictonain Of the ciasses-—was shown Lo be an absurdity. ; Aras the mind, said: y * OB seemanstrahcs le: chanel a in to be gravely Hl after aa operation.

“Yes L know what you ste tunity a meen SP people _pnderst: meal tae t y an el] See back pare.

” w lo youn, Hitter makes pace:s, | Chance, or—? PT made an ai bn thal Wheat Poor five Vase 2 dectwi ations Lo us, but'is it in good faith 7 oooh aos AKING MAN APPR |} steanmria 2 he ce?" S3ate say teat it ts duc to ¥ RE: we a Are a

“fastest of giving, yourselyss up to psycho | ‘os 2 cttet of the Ger ST WANT ro SHOW MEY PROPLECTHAT | 408 Aiv bot Pia

lotical Gucsss, WOUG you net co veller to reason, to make use of logic ?

“This a ic, in which the French profess Implicit bet (does it not lead you to think that it would be obviously to the advantage of Feance and Germany to maintain [riendly retalions ?

“Would it not be mpeg for then So meet fn Sy ne on new fields of battle “Is it not logical that 1 Aibuia wish for

“o¢ OS OF & NAUGT OF UG tO We would have tad our capture by violence a usion of

‘a Ounere any thal ey succena Ba Sie ta,tue mynticiens that I have created. declare tat it is due to cyance, “I must tell you what has brought me to whose LC om— TU eS face look on a change, His eyes

ate VE ENMITY & AND TuAt. We ARE IN NO Way HRaenrracy ENEMIES. THE GER- based yer UNDERSTAND THAT, TOO. artON le have followed me in a reroeaittion that fees been infinitely more ad Fe cults rcownciition of Germany and

2 a Soma th agreement between Germany (Contiqved on back page)

Painted King Grorae Lying: Vostiaan Leaves 015.00 Muikdins New Pace on a Ma Life or Death ina ™ Twist. Your Heroines of Commons .

Sir Atstea sel Reausacet ,

ertssesre:

OATLY KRPRINR. Sahirdor Cet 1. 1é08.

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Saturday, October 1, 1938

Multitude cheer the Premicr home and hear him cay:

“YOU MAY SLEEP QUIETLY— IT IS PEACE FOR OUR TIME”

Mussolini invites

him for new

talks

in yacht next week

DALADIER MAY BE THERE AS WELL

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE, IN THREE CHEERING CROWDS, WELCOMED HOME MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, THE PRIME MINISTER OF PEACE, LAST NIGHT.

The first was at Heston airport, where he

landed irom Munich.

The second was at Buckingham Palace, where the Promier and Mrs. Chamberlain went on to the balcony with the King and Queen. The third was at No. 10, Downing-street. There the Premier leaned out of

a window and said:—

“This is the second time in our history that there has come

back from Germany to Downing-streot peace with honour.

1 believe

it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our

hearts. And now | recommend in your beds.”

kA SY De AER AOU a ‘Vey tee German PEhzwr wnt Cheseelien and Oe Sritsan Prine Minteter, Rave tad » RarDar

seeting Soday wut fry mgreed Ln Tesngaising hat "Ae getetion at Satan Peietions 12 af the

iret tigertanae for he we ommtrion at fer ree. :

OA er AELeSereey Mere Aerwment ne qpedelic af the denies GF car two peoples sever to gs 18 wer WIth coe soother agen Vo ere ressvet wes the meted Of

ene tashen WAAL be Oe weed ateptee to taal Aw ear other questions Gat any coneenn Gt Ge ‘eommirion, ant ve are derernined te oentions ee

atterty te reeees presinte ascrow of difference ot ton to pontribale 0 samen te penne af

a. 2

ia

‘

When Ar, Chamberlain tanded at Heston yesterday he waned a

Fyne over his head for the crowd to see. This is it—the “No

ore War™ pact signed by him and Herr Hitler yesterday morning at Munich —The story and world tributes are on Page Six.

you to go home and sleep quietly

By GUY EDEN ~ Daily Express Political

Correspondent §1Gxor MUSSOLINI, 1 understand, has in- vited Mr, Chamberlain to confer with him on various questions of in- terest to Britain and Italy. Mr. Chamberlain intends to take 9 short holiday after he has tact Parliament next week, aad he will probably spend some of it yachting in the Mediterranean, M. Daladier, the French:

Premier, is likely to join in the! talks, some of which are expected) to be held in the yacht. |

The demobilisation of the German Army may be expected as soon as the peace plan is well ander way.

ABLE TO RELAX

This will emadie other countries, including Britain and France, to felax the precautionary meargres taken tn the jast few days The Government are anxious to release

Mee as s00n as Patkament will Bot be asked to,

partments, ‘were to bave included a Bill posal of

the Commons om Mon- day op the Inside story of hia “last- last” efor. for peace. Then there|

RB © ce Two, COLUMN ONE

Hitler told the Premier:

“Britain should be strong” ”

From SELKIRK PANTON

\

|. Maif am nour tater they mes, qot;round settiemens in Europe. Three!

|

“We thank you from the bottom of our hearts!’— Mr, Chamberlain at a window of No. 10.

(The Chamberlains greet London from the Palace—Page Nine. Pictures, Back Page.)

| limit expires at noon.

\recelpt, of a letter from Prague at) |10 p.m. accepting all Pollsh claims)

Sint ft)

Poland sends ultimatum

Deity Express Sta’ Reporter WARSAW, Saturday morning. ZECHO-SLOVAKIA turned to face a new menace last night—a Note which reached Prague at 10.7 p.m. threatening that Polish troops might march against the Czech Republic soe LATEST

The Note insists on the immediate evacuation of SENTRA Secs all Czech territory in- habited by Poles. It is understood that the time

FRONTIER SHOTS AT 1 am.

A midnight broadeast from the) official Polish radio statson at) Teschen declared: —

nets. We are at the end of our Patience,” Responstbiity lies with oo

‘The Pollan Note followed the!

Cerch population/ ‘The reply was declared by Poltad!

FORGET THE CRISIS

ep as "iGheats aieci'n. BUT REMEMBER TO

German troovs go in at noon

From C, VY, R. THOMPSON, LINZ, Saturday Morning. ERO hour in Adolf Hitler's march on Czech Slovakia has been fixed for noon today. Final preparations for the “invasion” along several sectors

quarters in Linz last night,»

are mattered tn this) i former Austria, own where ence

Mitler trampee he streets at & young man beicre he became A student in Vienna.

For weeks they bg been prepar- ing “tee ‘manorsvrea™ Batty today

Spree ig not unt in the yards of hotels and warehouses that you see military preparations

‘Tee international commission of ‘set up under the agree

| PAGE SIX elgarettes evac frontier, sones| PAGE NINE | PPHE Chamberiains

acrows

the Diane, were immediately seat London from Palace ibe German Ciech ary k

Pritaly was represented on. the | international ceammisaion in Berlin! by Sir Nevile Henderson. —Reuter.

on the south-west frontier were made at the head- |

itey will parade snd prepare to] PAGE FOUR 1 elowing tha eon- RAGUE mourns; General) erin ip Seuale ee wit pei Syrovy tells the nation: i mets. In-| ‘sold | | fiead\ they will probably wear| AS A soldier I had to cheese eae tie plame for today PAGE FIVE In. spite of 1 DaGe RIVE Ling looked Jaat night as deserted as)! 770 is all the country * around i. | (TARE care of your gas masks.

| PPRENCH give German troops) the|

greet

Queen Mary: |

“That's one of the famous white horses of England,”

“But not so famous as the White Horse of Scotland. Famous for its delicate and subtle

Dally Express Stafl Reporter [in the magnifcens Peehrersaus|qeeations will now be settled. Ger- -

flavour, Famous for its glow without a trace

| BERLIN = Pees: iE aaa _ laryngitis TIER today realised at Hipaates re of ls te, [atasae. Ss = : ‘The following statement was) ee Spe Famous as the whisky that's fine as which he put down +485 Seat Marlborough Boure|

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colon Today he and Mr. Chamberlain! # os 2 rai hse engagement)

exaggeRieUneko ST amici Bs Sapa Boe

Te the two nations intes ‘an, Mr early ini quotati =e Corrupte poh TE, La ri. obs: Last ght nee Res agreement pees the any ee or ones i * 1 lgeede ee iter ds'a matter 0 Se garian.reveluti tober and November 1956 1 Ohceen ond.

lary ls seventy-coe years)

E. these

Safe ielysbe least tion of the f 1 an weneral ahi! oy eee Waa Mesea

demelittratea the ‘ane faced even by a vastly superior army in attempting to dominate hostile territory. The [Soviet Union]

Image ID: E5GGWo

[i.e. fallout contaminated areas which are so large that thousands of people would need to evacuate or shelter indoors for up to two weeks] only in the range of explosive power of 500 kilotons and above, it could be proposed that no weapon larger than 500 kilotons will be employed unless the enemy uses it first. Concurrently, the United States could take advantage of a new development which significantly reduces fall-out by eliminating the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process.’ - Dr Henry

Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper, New York, 1957, pp. 180-3, 228-9.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: (1). Thank you to http://www.militarystory.org/nuclear-detonations-in-urban-and-suburban-areas/ for re-blogging a typical post from this glasstone.blogspot.com blog, kicking out the lies from under secrecy obsessed loons who want

disarmament to start WWIII.

(2). Thank you to https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/02/are-nuclear-weapons-100-times-less.html for reblogging: "Are [strategic, not tactical] Nuclear Weapons 100 times Less Effective Than Supposed? Nigel B. Cook’s Glasstone.Blogspot Blog has beautiful coverage of many nuclear topics here. http://glasstone.blogspot.co.uk/ Cook is a master researcher who digs up incredible piles of research on all topics nuclear and the following is digest of various writings of his gathered for easy access centered on the remarkable thesis that the effects of nuclear weapons, while literally awesome, have been exaggerated or misunderstood to an even

greater extent, with perhaps very considerable military consequences."

TIPS: There is compendium debunking commonplace anti-nuclear CND disarmament propaganda, exaggerations and fake news on nuclear weapons effects and deterrent capabilities linked here. Also, each post on this blog can be viewed in either a simple format, e.g. for this current post, https://glasstone.blogspot.com/2022/02/analogy-of-1938-munich-crisis-and.html is the simple (faster loading) format, or you can view it (slower loading) in a fancy format by adding: ?m=1 to the end of the URL, e.g.

https://glasstone.blogspot.com/2022/02/analogy-of-1938-munich-crisis-and.html?m=1

"The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances ... at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary on 5 December 1994... signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States ... prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As a result of other agreements and the memorandum, between 1993 and 1996, Belarus,

Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons." - Wiki.

FIGURE 2 Size of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2020

(OR, WHY PUTIN FEELS CONFIDENT INVADING UKRAINE JUST AS HITLER INVADED HIS NEIGHBOURS WHILE PACIFISTS DISARMED THE UK UNTIL 1935 THEN REARMED SLOWER THAN THE NAZIS, TO AVOID PROVOKING A SECOND WORLD WAR BY WINNING AN ARMS RACE.)

35,000 =—— Number of weapons ————— Maxi rh 1,255 30,000 aximum wa cads [31,255] 25,000 § 20,000 o 2 @— End of the Cold War © 45,000 =

10,000 Total warpgad

as of 2020

5,000

! ! ! ! ! | ! |

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

0 1945

1950

1955

Fiscal Year

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, October 2021b. NOTE: The figure depicts active and inactive warheads. Approximately 2,000 additional nuclear warheads are retired and awaiting

dismantiement.

DIAGRAM ABOVE IS FROM FRANK G. KLOTZ AND ALEXANDRA T. EVANS, MODERNIZING THE U.S. NUCLEAR TRIAD, RAND CORP., 2022, document: PE-A1434-1, 2022 https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1434-1.html

ANNUAL NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

(millions of dollars)

Country 1933, 1934 = 1935-1936 = 1937) 1938 = 1939

1817 4400

1693 4000

846 2600

1263 3600

480 299

39> 381

Britain 5 Germany 5

Source: J. F. Kennedy, Why England Slept, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1962, p. 184.

“There is no security in armaments we Shall be no party to piling them

— Labour Party Leader of the British House of Commons Opposition, Clement Attlee, 1935 (two years af Hitler took power and began rearm Germany; quotation from Gilbert ar Gott, The Appeasers, 1967).

Troubled by the failure of unilateral disarmament to save millions of liv WWII, Attlee 12 years later as Prim Minister secretly ordered the

stockpiling of the first British nucle weapons to deter WWIII from starti

“How horrible, fantastic, incredible that we should be digging trenches rying on gas-masks here because « quarrel in a far away country betwe people of whom we know nothing.”

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020- British Prime Minister Chamberlai

radio broadcast, 27 September 193

“Supposing | had gone to the count and said that Germany was rearmin and that we must rearm ... | cannot think of anything that would have n the loss of the election from my poi of view more certain.”

— Prime Minister Stanley “the bomb will always get through” Baldwin (speech in House of Commons, 12 November 1936; his fans simply lie« that he was referring to earlier non. existent elections than the 1935 on

“If we handle Hitler right, my belief is that he will become gradually more pacific. ... | would feel confident if it were not for ... alarmists by profession and Jews.” - Sir Neville Henderson, racist British Ambassador to Berlin, February 1939 telegram to the British Foreign Secretary.

“Hitler has gone straight off the deep end again ... What distresses me more than anything else is the handle which it will give to the critics NATO ifeisd Noi inte hhemsiers esa 1h Fda Bed taler AMWHS sada tot Resiaty, KaleqramifovttenBritiaklEnreigpoiedratary, 15 March 1939.

anyone ose to Ltda te Me HRT ee TH30E HEN papers Baldne Which Spelt out tre Problem! plamiys: THe propredris; chenmeame> O99 and S95.

While BeEhiBdirs ¢-bealiate’ if they attacked him. The dng ilechop pisite Heigham a cond eh tim med quar lusiniylGke ni 23S .rox yHitide loo duyd edn fladorante lef Gtexkpilloisdiiall\f he technique he used is such an obvious

REPRE? TEATHACE BRACE SHAT EPCOT HUB fdr emeshtrdath te Mines USHA OHM eHA IA MEAP MeEpORSE With the problem of maintaining a

Id ,.." - Tr i Uni ity P 6 . 403. (Putin's technique today! REEF INE RE CaB MRE ikea HC TOT more deta on the seal SeclassiNed titeoe found in PAVOSAINN, contsaiy fo” Pe AOS ( asa

etail on the assifie Glasstompos eeyy shace nung ieataye at, Blenstealsacick berefersnutele dasgitied d 06? woenn creme igiene HeRUdcaF WEeIABIAG over-estimated by large amounts. This dvtascavedatatdebunkingthabandnthat odrhyehtust abckanisammeemh than VeARS<esions the British and the French chose appeasement to standing firm or fighting. Incidentally, these staff calculations were more lurid than the worst imaginations of fiction.” - Herman Kahn, testimony to :cts of Nuclear War, page 883.

Biden confuses Iran and Ukraine in State of the Union gaffe a year and a half, [British Prime Minister] Ramsey McDonald still continued to urg

| their army by 50 per cent, and their air force by 75 per cent. In effect, MacDonal: is in Europe to disarm itself to a level equal with their potential attackers, the

line to disarm its nuclear deterrent 30 years ago!] . ... Probably as much as any oth rged with causing World War II. [Emphasis by Herman Kahn.]” - Herman kahn, On 390-391.

‘Sharp as a tack’: Joe Biden confuses Ukraine and Afghanistan

§ SSSGr eee nc esesevt —

stra US troops in Eastern Europe

Source: Daily Mz Moscow) ®) BELARUS RUSSIA

Russia and the United States account for 92 Nato troops percent of the world’s

US troops nuclear arsenal.

ESTONIA Nato members

Russia

6,850 Lee

1,444 deployed

Type: Heavy artillery tank Caliber: 203 mm Targets: Command posts

baal FATHER OF ALL BOMBS’

RUSSIA UK R AN)NE

“N.y Luhansko &

United States Donetsk ©

6,550|-

i 1,350 deployed

ROMANIA | § pig GeO UU) Crimea* BULGARIA : » - 200 - 200 ge Type: Thermobaric Range: 1,500 miles NT *Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 Blast yield: 44 tons of TNT Weight: 2.3 tons tock: 4, 9s are included in the Nato figures. Ho y eas = } ' Cost: $16 million Cost: Unknown . Range: 11,200 miles 3 shown are not under Nato command Ty, { Seen: Odessa Power: 550 kilotons

° RUSSIA HAS A BIGGER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, PLUS NOVICHOK CHEMICAL

CHARLES BALL . BANGAN 532c0\24u4¢000. Ukraine's

Log 03-015 4990s nuclear

National Security information di t N a “= isarmamen

Dervaive Clssifer VW. Shrely, Goipiear YISKS Exposed : _- LLNL/GG-SS-2/0ADR

Weapons E : | only in States Assessments Intelligence Brief = SECRET : reports kept Denuclearizing Ukraine: locked away Potential Bumps in the Trilateral Road (U) go an Charles J. Ball - Western

and Mark A. Warmerdam

media. DUHIN

ae Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, November 12 ee - . . . aS ; 1991 remarks to the San Diego Union editorial board 15 Were Crimea to erupt, Russia could be = into rep conflict which rose “ Unfortunately, if you look at the historic record, we have ee aetey eOaere eager eee never, ever gone through one of these periods and gotten it on Trilateral implementation. (U) ; ; ; : ,

right. We’ve always screwed it up. Every single time when

it’s happened previously we’ve been so quick to cash in the peace dividend, to demobilize that force, that within a very short period of time we find that our weakness in and of

itself becomes provocative and tempts others to do things

Glasstone.blogspot published these docs +more years they shouldn’t attempt; that we always end up having, once

ago: again, to commit the force some place — we get in trouble in

https://ia600501.us.archive.org/31/items/NuclearDeter the world and have to send in troops; that we find 7

renceDeclassified/Nuclear%20deterrence% ourselves with troops that are not well trained or we equipped, not prepared to go to war.

20declassified.pdf

Nuclear Weapons Program

SAO _‘Cursus) ero OVIE 4: 129N¥D ‘

qaLaNo ana

ae /gam

aYN IO :ALnouLAY

UNCLASSIFIED: NSNF =:tactical nuclear weapons — Potential NSNF Weapons Concepts

Va

oan“ oal f AVO-MSIARY 61

SUC ADWINA 40 INANLUVda

- for the 21st Century y)

OLLWOIISSV TO

~ Perspectives, Warhead Technologies, and 5 Delivery System Concepts

mao JON

Briefing to Joint. Defense Policy Board/Defense Science Board Task Force on . Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces

December 17-18, 1991

1A - Willian ‘Daitch; DNA " 2h0=) J.-S. Howard, A-5, MS F602 3A ~. Ts Ps Sektes NWI=WE 5 MS: F633 4& = CRM-4,°MS°A150 a : 5A - A+S File

‘ UNCLASSIFIED

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFIER,

UNCLASSIFIED.

Warhead Technologies: Low Yield Designs eee

__ Very-Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons could be very effective

$ and credible counters against future third world nuclear threats

+ 10-ton EPW ~

-Holdburled C3atrisk - Neutralize MOBs by cratering runways = Collateral damage very localized

+ 100-ton ATBM warhead — ee Wiantene. nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads In ght yas :

* 1000-ton battlefield weapon

Bits docunont oo as tofined in the atop

NEVAGIED COPY

A-5:91-79(S} SR BONWIT December 16, 1991

LOS AL |

WU

| 818788

Sandia oo Los Alamos

STRICTED DATA

i

n? Restri

Modernized Within New US National Strate

SEGRE T sss UNCLASSIFIED

| Perspectives on NSNF

WHY: Insurance to Counter Post-USSF

- Counter Russian Civil War Spillovers a Central Nuclear Control

- Deter Resurgent Russian Imperalism A Nuclear Weapons

HOW: Air-Delivered Weapons in Eur CONUS Air- & Sea-Launched |

“TECHNOLOGIES Common Strategic & Non-Stra Stand-off Air Munition

Maritime Bomb & ASW Optic

UNCLASSIFIED —

ed date

Mnerow tas —

UNCLASSIFIED

Hundreds of NSNFs Should Be Maintained

& As the US Downsizes its Military and Nuclear Warhead

Stockpiles, a Nuclear Force Other Than Strategic Weapons Is Needed —

- For NATO forward-deployment - To deter future nuclear-armed third world adversa

- To guard against Russian instabilities, and post-U: relapses and regional spillovers

- For far-term deterrence & insurance

The Nuclear Weapons Laboratories Must Maintain < Broad Level of Competence to Support Future NSNF Ni

pe

SOURCE: https://w

4 q i 4 a

FIGURE 7-33. TEWA DEVICE (D-3, HOB = 8 2’ ABOVE WATERLINE) FIGURE 6-8. MARK-9GUN WEAPON AND F.H SHEL

(MARK-19 WAS A REDESIGN OF [HEIN Size comparison of a tactical Mk9 nuclear shell to deter the invasions that start wars (photo on right including Dr Frank Shelton for size cc book Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, 1988) with the deliverable Mk41 shown on board a barge anchored in the lagoon of Bikini Atoll, "dirty" 87% fission Redwing-Tewa 5.01 megatons thermonuclear test. Notice the people in each photo for scale! The tactical weapon is S the 5 megaton H-bomb has size!

Figure 2. Fault Tree for Russian Strategic Launch After U.S. Escalation Past Russian Nuclear Threshold

Russian strategic launch after Russian tactical nuclear use in response to U.S. escalation past

Russian nuclear threshold in conventional conflict

Conventional conflict begins between Russian and U.S. forces

Conventional conflict breaks out between Russia and U.S. ally/partner in “near abroad," and conflict grows to involve both Russian and U.S. forces

Conventional conflict breaks out between Russia and U.S. ally/ partner in

ally/partner in “near abroad" grows to

“near involve both

Russian and U.S. forces

abroad"

RAND PE191-2

Conventional conflict breaks out between Russian ally/partner in “near abroad" and U.S., and conflict grows to involve both

Russia and U.S.

Russian and U.S. forces

Conventional conflict breaks out between Russian ally/ partner in “near abroad" and U.S.

Conflict between Russian ally/partner in “near abroad" and U.S. grows

to involve both Russian and U.S. forces

U.S. escalation event occurs and results in Russian tactical nuclear launch

Russian tactical nuclear launch in response to inadvertent escalation by U.S. past Russian nuclear threshold

In conventional] | U.S. intentional

conflict action between inadvertently Russian and crosses Russian U.S. forces, nuclear redline U.S. takes

intentional

action that

could inadver- tently provoke tactical Russian nuclear response

Russian strategic nuclear launch after Russian tactical nuclear launch

Russian tactical nuclear launch in response to accidental escalation by U.S. past Russian nuclear threshold

In conventional} | U.S. accidental conflict action actually between crosses Russian Russian and tactical nuclear U.S. forces, redline

U.S. takes

accidental action they do not intend to

provoke Russian tactical nuclear response

"During the Cold War, it was often assumed that the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons would eventually escalate to East-West strategic nuclear exchanges (Quinlivan and Oliker, 2011, p. 72). ... there seems to be a recognition within Russia of brinkmanship hazards—namely, that Russian nuclear use could get out of

hand and result in further escalation (Quinlivan and Oliker, 2011, p. 72)" - Anthony Barrett, 2016 RAND Corp report RAND-PE-191-TSF, False Alarms, True Dangers? - Current and Future Risks of Inadvertent U.S.-Russian Nuclear War.

ABOVE: "During the Cold War, it was often assumed that the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons would eventually escalate to East-West strategic nuclear exchanges (Quinlivan and Oliker, 2011, p. 72). ... there seems to be a recognition within Russia of brinkmanship hazards—namely, that Russian nuclear use could get out of hand and result in further escalation (Quinlivan and Oliker, 2011, p. 72)."" - Anthony Barrett, 2016 RAND Corp report RAND-PE-191-TSF, False Alarms, True Dangers? - Current and Future Risks of Inadvertent U.S.-Russian Nuclear War, page 7.

ABOVE: W54 Davy Crockett tactical nuclear deterrent of approximately 0.02kt yield and 20ft burst altitude, tested in front of Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, in the final Nevada atmospheric nuclear weapon trials to deter invasions: 2,100 were deployed in the 1960s, successfully deterring a Russian invasion. But ALL tactical nuclear weapons were removed in the 90s after false propaganda from appeasers, leaving a dangerous gap in the spectrum of deterrence. (Photo credits: US National Archives photos above taken on 14 July 1962 show tactical 0.02kt+/-10% yield W54 Davy Cockett nuclear weapon projective M388 on M29 launcher at Nevada Test Range, with two soldiers from the Heavy Weapons Platoon, Ist Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, US Army.) The Ukraine invasion is an invasion deliberately caused by the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed on 5 Dec 1994 to remove the nuclear deterrent from Ukraine to prevent war. Like the disarmament of the UK up to 1935 to guarantee "peace in our time", loads of excuses are used to try to justify weakness and enemy aggression, by left wing warmongers who profit by causing war with its refugee crises with financial and humanitarian disasters. Until the so-called peacemakers disarmed Ukraine of its 176 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers with some 1,240 warheads, leaving Ukraine to make improvised Molotov cocktail petrol bombs (polystyrene dissolved in petrol in a bottle) to try to protect its kids from Russia, Russia was deterred from invading Ukraine by reliable nuclear deterrence. Ukraine had experts and still does have expertise on servicing and using those nuclear weapons - in evidence, before they were invaded, we bought the confidential Russian nuclear weapons employment manuals (LINKED HERE) from the Ukrainian military on ebay. In fact, Russian nuclear weapons are more straightforward and easier to service and employ than American nuclear weapons, so the lie that the Ukrainian nuclear weapons in 1994 couldn't be serviced by Ukraine - which has Europe's largest nuclear reactor and

all the nuclear expertise that goes with it - is just that, a lie by anti-nuclear folk.

"In the event that deterrence fails, this Perspective also finds a number of factors that could undermine NATO’s ability to respond to a crisis. As repeated RAND wargames have shown, Russia could quickly overwhelm any or all of its Baltic neighbors (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which are not sufficiently supported by NATO allies to stop a concerted thrust into their territory ... In dozens of RAND-run wargames involving a variety of players, strategies, and variations in initial starting conditions, the longest it took Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the capitals of Estonia and Latvia in a short-notice invasion was 60 hours (Ref. 19)." - Clint Reach, Edward Geist, Abby Doll, and Joe Cheravitch, Competing with Russia Militarily - Implications of Conventional and Nuclear Conflicts, RAND Corp document PE-330-A, 2021, pages 2 and 9."

"It would be disastrous to have a conspicuous gap in the spectrum of deterrents and capabilities." - quotation from RAND Corporation's Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, 1960, page 286. (Any gap in the "spectrum of deterrents and capabilities" is exploited by enemies, just as any gaps in a prison wall are not ignored but seized upon by escaping prisoners. A gap in the spectrum was created by the 1990s removal of tactical nuclear deterrents that deterred/stopped invasions, on the basis of populist lying anti-nuclear propaganda that the world would be safer as a result. It was only safer for warmongers, invaders and dictators. The world was in fact a "nuclear unarmed" place until 1945, but that didn't prevent nuclear weapons being made and used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. So much for peace or even an aversion of nuclear war escalation risks in war, through nuclear disarmament. Also note that those nuclear weapons were made by a democracy in secret, and during a world war. How much easier was it for nations with smaller economies to produce nuclear weapons in secret during peacetime? It was certainly cheaper, since none could have afforded the billions spent by America's Manhattan project during WWII. So

much for nuclear disarmament preventing war or even preventing nuclear warfare during a war that began in a world free from

nuclear weapons. Again, when WWII began, there were no nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons were made and used during the war itself, being made in secret by a democracy, and under a Democratic Party president. If this doesn't fit in with the nuclear

disarmament hype you have been told, then you know they are liars.)

As the illustrations below from Dr Shelton's Reflections of Nuclear Weaponeer, a shelter well within the fireball radius of the first multimegaton hydrogen bomb survived 330 psi peak overpressure, and a 1.4 megaton W49 thermonuclear warhead detonated at 400 km altitude above Johnston Island as the Starfish prime test on 9 July 1962 produced EMP effects 800 miles away in Hawaii (colour photos on the front page of the 9 July 1962 Honolulu Star Bulletin, mentioning that streetlights were turned off and air raid sirens were activated - due to EMP). The Russians later, on 22 October 1962, performed such an EMP demonstration with a 300 kt warhead detonated at 290 km altude, so they could use this type of "nuclear weapon demonstration" threat as an alternative to usual disarmament propaganda about nuclear weapons automatically being used to kill people by Hiroshima-type low altitude air or

surface bursts:

| "Weat ther Forecast

Shelton, Reflections

Honolulu Star-Bull

sa VT No, 189 : RONOLUL, HAWAIL _HONDAY, JULY 9, “1962 aa kkk 4 He

> Before and _after photos of Station 200 shelter surviving 330psi, 9000 feet from 10.4 megatons Mike

SOURCE: Dr Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p5-40, Fig 5-33 (view NW from Station 200 to shot cab, D-1) & 5-34 (view NW from Station 200, D+2).

RIGHT: Dr John Malik entering Station 520 shelter on Ruchi Island, 2.3km West of 10.4 megatons Mike, 4 days after burst (12 R/hr gamma radiation level): Shelton p5-41, Fig. 5-35.

RUCHI ISLAND WAS 2.3 KM

WEST OF GROUND ZERO AT ABOUT 3000 R/HR AT ONE HOUR

i4

Color photos by Torry Luke show how last nights hydrogen bomb “explosion lonked fromm the slayetor shaft né erga irs i Punchbowl, The first photo wes exposmd of exactly 11 puri, the momént of ignition. 7 is phot! wes token about sch a light was’ so intense that the sky appears blue as in daylight, Tha light spot in the ay | right hend photo was made at abo

Toman §6SOeCrACUlar Lest Shot Lights

Russia also {5 NOVEMBER 1952), DOSE RATE OF 3000 F/HR AT 1 HR HAD DECREASED TO ABOUT 12 R/HR

detonateda = Colour photos of 1.4 es

” the spokesmat borwh st lent! Ht ceused worried phona! Fired posritty B00 mites: -After 2 series of faitarss «scribed exploaiod 98 | Some, he calls to “pewspapers ¥ for above Johnston Ikland it was and postpoaements, 2% was #) Srey o ectantine exper ts hele te as 3.80 statute males from 2 spectator stiow for thou satlatying firet success for) meat.” uN igi ik folinston In Auckland. New sands of persons in Hawait US. Joint Task Foree Bin) He sad le doubted» ¥ continu

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weapon at 290 Megaton Starfish -

km altitude for H i ea Prime, taken in

on long power Hawaii of the cables on 22 test 400 km October 1962!

over Johnston Is.

FIGURE 11-28. STARFISH EVENT FROM CHRISTMAS ISLAND FIGURE 11-.29Q STARFISH EVENT FROM CHRISTMAS ISLAND

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a

(150 kilotons yield)

AGM-86B AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

Nuclear warhead for cruise missile, W80, weighs 290 Ibs. and measures 31.4" long

and 11.8" in diameter aes

NATIONAL

GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM)

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ABOVE: in the Cold War, Russia was deterred from invasions using a variety of tactical nuclear weapons including 2,100 W54 Davy Crockett tactical nuclear weapons, and later - after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan began - 550 deployed W79 thermonuclear 1.1 kt W79 neutron bombs (to achieve a significant fusion yield with the very brief compressions available with a sub-kiloton fission yield, a second stage capsule of tritium and deuterium gas had to be employed, instead of the solid lithium-6 deuteride secondary stages that require neutron fission of the lithium-6 to produce tritium, prior to fusion; the x-ray compression at such a low yield was too brief to allow the fission stage neutrons to arrive at the secondary stage in time to fission enough lithium-6 prior to the x- ray compression pulse). The fission primary stage of the W79 shell uses small-diameter linear implosion system invented for a variety of purposes, both nuclear and non-nuclear, by US Government explosives expert Bernard Drimmer, and has now been declassified and published (after decades of being kept secret) as US Patent US5450794A/en, presented without the central fissile core for compression, as merely a method to increase to a maximum the efficiency of underwater explosives (just sticking a detonator into a lump of explosive leads to incomplete burning since some of the explosive ends up being blasted outwards into cold water before detonating; using the implosion system with the burning wave going inwards therefore maximises efficiency for non-nuclar torpedoes). The W79 deterred both massed troop invasions and also tank and APC invasions, since 14.1 MeV D+T fusion reaction neutrons penetrate armour very efficiently (even without the removable fusion capsules, the neutrons and gamma rays from 0.8 kt pure fission yield of the W79 was still a highly effective deterrent against Russian tanks; the fusion capsule reportedly added 0.3 kt of fusion yield, 80% of this or over 0.2 kt in the form of 14.1 MeV neutrons). Click for a Secret (now declassified) Los Alamos report detailing why we need the W79 enhanced neutron tactical nuclear weapons to deter Russian expansionism (report LA-12063-MS "The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces: Are These Capabilities Still Needed," dated 1991, LINKED HERE), and linked here with a previous slightly different declassified version linked here (which gives the names of the LA-12063-MS report authors, unlike the OpenNet version), ignored by left wing (discussed on previous blog post linked here - a brief extract from this 74-pages long report, containing detailed evidence that tactical nuclear weapons kept the peace in the Cold War much to the fury of Russia, is shown below; notice that tactical nuclear weapons are asymmetric in that they are more useful to deter invasions than to cause

invasions, hence they are a stabilizing influence in crisis instability despite left wing propaganda to the contrary):

ARBZBRERRARBRAAAA? LA-12063-MS SESRE=- Looo 1S612

This document consi | anne ee The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces a Are These Capabilities Still Needed? (U) NielearWerporrDita Sse

DELETED O5)p 6(6) REDACTED copy

April 30, 1991

Derinatine Classifi

{ DELETED —— 5) Los Alamos National Laborat iversi

_ TED eis Na 4 — Bee O8-6 Classification Analyst b ( 6) the United States Dapertmant of Energy. oe phone WIE EN ee -

LOS Alamos tes sane: tatona taberat

| SECRET 2x0pe003050 ARAABAAAAAAaaAaa

LA-12063-MS SECRET RE April 30, 1991

PAGE 16:

The old raison d'etre for US NSNF: the Soviet Threat_

1. Democracies and economies of Western Europe 2. The overriding threat: the Soviet Union

3. NATO was unable to provide sufficient conventional forces

4. Deployment of nuclear weapons to Europe created an extended deterrence umbrella for conventional force deficiencies

LA-12063-MS SECRET 22. April 30, 1991 aia ‘aa

PAGE 18:

The presence of NSNF in Europe contributed to the long peace of 45 years

These weapons helped to deter the Soviet Union from Initiating

LL talalelalalatrlecbelabeletatalate

LA-9004

— EERE T—D0003341 3 Nuclear Weapon mR 2

Sigme-t

This document consists of 10 pages No. oR of 79 copies, Series A

The Ultra-Low Yield Antitank Weapon The Teeny Tiny Tacnuke (U) REDACTED COPY

Johndale C. Solem

8 Ss “> N z = => 4 1 — =. g i=5 ty =s === ~ 1=8 Pe) ae

-

University of California

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY

Post Office Box 1663 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545

RESTRICTE

is Restricted Data mic Energy Act of

Derivative Classifier 1954 fe subject

E. M. Sandoval Classification Analyst EERE RRR REE ER ERR

inistrative and Criminal

THE ULTRA-LOW YIELD ANTITANK WEAPON The Teeny Tiny Tacnuke (U)

Johndale C. Solem

ABSTRACT Oey

DELETED

The effect of such a

device on tank crews is shown to be consistent with the P, of unity for ballistic delivery systems, Estimates of collateral damage indicate that such a device could be used in close proximity to civilian populations with minimal hazard.

THE W79

The W79 is an 8-in., enhanced radiation, artillery fired atomic projectile. The device is in production and will en- ter the stockpile in the early 1980s. It is about 44 cm long and weighs about 200 Ib complete with its arming, fusing, and firing system and its rocket assist. The range of the projectile when fired from an 8-in. howitzer is about 32 km.

TACTICS

Should a European Theater conflict escalate to the nuclear level, the effect will be to force Soviet and War- saw Pact armies to disperse formations of tanks to avoid having large numbers incapacitated by a single weapon. Denying an aggressor force the use of massed forma tions of armor is the single most important aspect of the Wis.

“SECRET RE—

DELETED Whether a device

with a lethal range as great as the W79 is an optimal weapon against massed formations of tanks is much debated; nevertheless, it remains a significant achieve- ment of the technological community to get such an ad vanced device into the tactical stockpile.

The principal purpose of this report is to propose a complement to the W79 for the one-on-one engagements with tanks that will result from their forced dispersal.

THE ONE-ON-ONE ENGAGEMENT

A war with a technologically sophisticated enemy such as the Soviet Union will present extremely stressing countermeasures to high technology weapons systems. Although I have great faith that precision guided muni tons of extraordinary accuracy and durability will be developed, the survival of such devices against counter measures and in the severe environment of a nuclear war is certainly unproven. Almost any beam-riding weapon, using a laser or radar guidance system, is vulnerable to

4

Countermeasures and can reveal the position of the at- iacker. Devices employing low levels of artificial in- telligence such as pattern recognition gadgetry are bound to suffer from smoke, dust, and chaff. Wire-guided and fiber-optic-guided munitions also suffer from counter measures, mainly owing to their intrinsic lack of speed, It seems that for every new guidance system a new wrinkle can be discovered to defeat it. Furthermore, all devices using solid-state microcircuitry are vulnerable to elec tromagnetic pulses.

SIMPLICITY IS ELEGANCE

There is no countermeasure to a ballistic trajectory. What weapon is then appropriate to ballistic delivery at typical one-on-one engagement distances? Normally the target will be acquired at ranges of about 2 km. This will be purely visual contact. Normally, ballistic delivery miss distances do not exceed 7 1/2 mils; that is, 7 1/2 mat 1 km. The type of circular error probability varies with the type of ballistic delivery mechanism, and because a tank

eee — Table 7-5 Dose Transmission Factors (Interior Dose/Exterior

TM 23-200/OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.1C/AFM 136-1/FMFM 11-2

THIS PUBLICATION SUPERSEDES TM 23-200, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.1B, Gamma ra ys AFM 136-1/NAVMC 1104 REV, NOVEMBER 1957, INCLUDING CHANGE 1, 24 JUNE 1960

en a eee Geometry Initial Residual ate diglis ons R Foxholes? — eee Te ee 0.20 0.10 ; ; Underground—3 ft __. Say was 0.04-0.05 0.0002 CAPABILITIES Builtup city area (in open) ........ — 0.70 OF Frame house... ...................... 0.80 0.30-0.60 NUCLEAR WEAPONS (u] Basement... _.. ........ Mee sakenas 0.05-0.5 0.05-0.1

Multistory building:

TION CANCELLED J

we Bee TI POP onc ck abi gasr ees whens : 0.9 0.01 pee 7 - Lower ©. 6... ee ee 0.3-0.6 0.1 Ck, ae 7 Fas ey Blockhouse walls:

Ee ee ene ee 0.1 0.007-0.09 [us por sRCTIVRS TOA goa ches Rees ab eenaeeene 0.05-0.09 0.001-0.03 9 ee ae — a ee rr ree 0.01-0.03 0.0001-0.002 Vokind vin Cctecomiot Desiing lke Factory, 200 x 200 ft bak Gh ctougeine — 0.1-0.2 ee conan’? shelter, partly above grade: SS ae With earth cover—2 ft ...... 0.02-0.04 0.005-0.02 With earth cover—3 ft : 0.01-0.02 0.001-0.005

Another declassified Los Alamos neutron bomb report, Johndale C. Solem's 1982 Secret Los Alamos report LA-9004 (LINKED HERE) on the neutron bomb, The ultra-low yield antitank weapon, the teeny tiny tacnuke, complete with declassified markings showing it was "Nuclear Weapon Data Sigma 1: Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information", in a limited edition of just 79 printed copies, secret (now declassified with deletions of design information) describes the kiloton W79 neutron warhead (44" long [note that there is a typing error, incorrectly stating it is 44 cm long in LA-9004], 200 lbs including firing system, capable of being fired 32 km from a 8" howitzer), and explains correctly that the whole point of such weapons is to deter the concentrated blitzkrieg assaults that started WWI in 1914 (the invasion of Belgium by concentrated force) and WWII in 1939 (the invasion of Poland by concentrated force). The principle of concentration of force can be deterred with nuclear weapons, thus preventing the invasions that trigger wars. By forcing enemies to disperse their forces, any attacks that are made can be dealt with using conventional weapons like handheld anti-tank rockets (no use against concentrated firepower, but useful against dispersed forces), preventing invasion and WWIII (the map below is from the 1st Cold War, but demonstrates the kind of threat possible after

completion of invasions of Ukraine and its neighbour/NATO supporter Poland):

DENMARK &* Probable Axes y See igs

of Attack 4 Baltic Sea North Sea * : : Fam Ne Hombu As é Polish/Soviet forces XK Sa | silat re

c ; ~— \ L Z Helmsted} \

S % Cf ) ~«~~ ® c o ; 1. Eg % ,

\ ttl \

j © Géttingen \,

; = \

> . Leal g

RADIATION IMPLODED primary fission trigger © Encyclopesdia Britanr NEUTRON GUN Ry ee meth ae eae W87 warhead FISSION (Pu-239 spark plug core, Li g = erium-tritium

PRIMARY layer around it, and U ablator)

[_] plutonium-239

oO beryllium

ia chemical explosive

‘s

uranit

neutre

Ww8s8

“Secondary”

xe < { Spherical, all-fissile,

“Peanut-shaped™ / fusion-boosted outer case minimises ca radiation implosion volume to maximise the

x-ray coupling energy 475 kiloton W88 war density (energy/volume) | 8" diameter March 199

Removable capsule Pu-239 Cylinder of high explosive

W54 2-point prolate spheroid implosion warhead || | Disk-shaped steel plate (implosion wave shaper)

High explosive (Beryllium MI Plutonium-239

Detonator

W79 Enhanced neutron weapon with cylindrical linear Comparison of 1961 W54 with 1981 W79 warhead implosion fission primary stage and removable 2nd stage

"Denying an aggressor force the use of massed formations of armor is the single most important aspect of the W79."

LA-9004 then goes on to suggest a lower yield version of the W79 for use against individual tanks, like the Kennedy era portable 0.02 kt W54 that could be fired by individual soldiers, air burst at 15 metres altitude to eliminate local fallout, blast and heat collateral damage.

Page 5:

"Tank crews within 25 m of the weapon would be immediately incapacitated. Civilian populations 300 m from the point of detonation would be completely safe. ... Beyond 300 m, exposed personnel might be temporarily blinded from looking directly at the detonation, but would suffer no burns to exposed skin. ... The effect of blast on civilian structures near the battlefield would be trivial. Three hundred metres from the point of detonation windows would rattle but not break. ... the fallout would be expected to be confined to the battlefield itself. ... The principal advantage of such a device in reducing collateral damage from local fallout is that it simply does not produce much

in the way of fission fragments or activated weapon debris."

LA-9004 then points out, on pages 7-8, that such a defensive low yield weapon with no significant risk of collateral damage is of no

significant use to terrorists, contrasted to easy-to-procure alternatives.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYMPOSIUM D fusion yield

Held at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the University of California Los Alamos, New Mexico

September 3-5, 1969

Cecil I. Hudson, Jr. University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory

CLEAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE RESEARCH APPLICABLE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS @@%&)

Los Alamos report LA-4350-MS SCRE.

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail?osti-id=104261:

LA~4350-MS RIGHT: a Secret

SURFACE DOSAGE FOR 1 KT. PU neutron bomb report : BURST HEIGET = 150 FT.

shows that 1 kt of T-

detonated at 750 — feet altitude gives 800,000 rads (85% being high energy neutrons) at 1000 feet ground range.

wae * ¢

q ¥ J * => % mw

400,000 rads

DOSAGE, RADG

”

GROUID RASGE, THOUSANDS OF |

-85 75 -70 55 NEUTRON DOSAGE/ToOTAL DOSA

ABOVE: the 405-pages, originally Secret 1969 Proceedings of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Symposium, Los Alamos document LA- 4350-MS, has been declassified and is available on Opennet (pdf is LINKED HERE). For | kiloton of D-T fusion air burst at 750 feet altitude (for the W79 this fusion yield is reportedly 0.3 kt, so you multiply the following doses by 0.3, before adding on the fission dose from 0.8 kt of fission), Dr Hudson's Lawrence Radiation weapons lab article "Clean nuclear explosive research applicable to tactical nuclear weapons (Secret-RD)", applying clean fusion tests research to peace-making deterrent purpose in the 1969 conference LA-4350- MS, shows that the unshielded dose at a 1,000 ft ground radius or range (i.e., distance from ground zero, not the slant distance from bomb) is 800,000 R (85% being neutrons), falling to 100,000 R at 2,000 feet (75% being high energy neutrons, with the rest being high energy gamma rays from inelastic neutron scattering by the air), and 10,000 R at 3,000 ft radius, but a relatively trivial 10 R at 7,000 ft radius, preventing collateral damage to nearby civilians. The U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency assessed that immediate permanent incapacitation for all tasks occurs at 18,000 R, or 8,000 R for physically demanding tasks, while 3,000 R produces immediate temporary incapacitation. The original 1972 secret Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons DNA-EM-1 gives initial radiation data for 8 designs of nuclear warhead, but it was revised and expanded to 13 designs in the 1984 edition. However, the neutron outputs from three of these are practically identical: nuclear warhead types 4 and 7 (1-30 kt boosted two-point implosion and 1-10 kt multipoint implosion) and 11 (30-300 kt cleaner tactical nuclear warhead), all giving about 83.6 rads per kiloton at 1 km ground range for a surface burst on unobstructed silicate soil in sea level density air, plus about 28 rads/kt of secondary gamma rays (the fission product initial radiation dose is independent of bomb design details apart from fission yield and total yield, being 19.3, 332 and 13,000 rads for 100% fission total yields of 1, 10 and 100 kt). For comparison, nuclear warhead type 13 in EM-1, the 1-2 kt enhanced neutron warhead produces about 20 times that dose (1,660 rads/kt of neutrons and 450 rads/kt of air secondary gamma if surface burst; a 1 kt "type 13" neutron bomb air burst at 500 m altitude gives a dose at ground zero of 170,000 rads of neutrons plus 27,200 rads of secondary gamma rays, according to EM-1). At the other end of the scale, the lowest neutron dose, just 0.666 rads, is produced by the type 10 in EM-1 (the low-yield fission primary stage "dial a yield" option of a B61 thick-cased thermonuclear weapon having multiple yield options). This is because the outer casing on a weapon with high yield options absorbs most of the neutrons from the primary stage, and thereby shows that you cannot simply use the

low-yield option on a B61 as a replacement for tactical nuclear weapons like neutron bombs.

Triple-Point Tissue Dose (rads)

hang ie hina Burst Height ee Secondary Fission-Product ‘ Mm (m) NOUtONS uma Rays Gamma Rays Total 40 kiloton 5 1210 2358 ~l 4 <1 5 10 900 1470 200 320 45 565 15 785 1204 1,300 1,300 200 2,800 20 720 1053 3,700 3,000 560 7,260 30 625 879 12,000 8,000 1,600 21,600 70 440 $87 85,000 40,000 10,000 135,000 100 410 $28 350,000 55,000 15,000 420,000 300 kiloton 5 2350 4624 10 1760 2884 1 5 pe) 8 R) 1530 2362 11 40 25 76 20 1400 2064 60 150 100 310 30 1220 1715 430 670 560 1,660 10 860 1150 12,000 7,800 8,400 28,200 100 800 1037 24,000 13,000 14,000 51,000

Air burst relationships between yield, distance, peak blast overpressure, and the initial neutron and gamma FROM Shielding Against Initial Radiations from Nuclar Weapons, https://www.osti.gov/serviets/purl/4460107

Note that once NATO C3I command is neutralised by Russian nuclear forces, e.g. EMP high altitude burst effects if not blast and nuclear radiation from surface or low altitude bursts, blitzkrieg by troops protected by armour enables rapid invasions, even in fallout radiation areas (tanks and APCs offer good shielding against the low energy gamma rays from fallout, unlike the higher energy initial flash of gamma rays and neutrons). When on 8 December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine dissolved the USSR, the Soviet military was 3.7 million strong. "From 1945 to 1948, the Soviet Armed Forces were reduced from about 11.3 million to about 2.8 million men", while the Soviet Union actually increased in size, as puppet governments were installed across half of Europe, despite the American nuclear weapons monopoly until 1949. Today, with the tactical nuclear deterrent removed from Europe, it is only necessary to blow up the military and political bases in Europe to destroy its capacity to harm Russia by economic warfare and military support to enemies of Russia. A business which puts its rivals out of operation becomes a monopoly. It doesn't necessarily have to send in huge numbers of "boots on the ground" to physically occupy all the destroyed rival business offices in order to succeed in "winning" the war; remember that in both the Third Reich and USSR/Warsaw Pact/Iron Curtain era, occupied countries were put under puppet governments (Vichy France, etc.) in a thinly camouflaged effort to portray the occupation as a mutually cooperative "peace

initiative" (i.e., "you will do was we say, then we won't shoot you and blow your cities up, how's that for peacekeeping collaboration?").

X-ray mirroring: secondary stage

Capsule with / ablator and fuel

Hohlraum

_» Blowoff

~\

Inward transported

ad thermal energy

33 HS

Atmosphere formation

oe Ba

Compression Ignition

HYBRID-E

/Ablator, low-density / foam or solid

Solid or liquid fuel

~ “Gas at vapou

pressure of solid or liquid fuel

Hot SL eceadty. wonton | Main fuel

Temperature’

Density

Proposed ICF capsules are imploded by ablation of an outer shell. Ignition occurs in a central hot spot, and fusion burn propagates out through the main mass of D-T fuel. Figure 1

Hohlraum

LEFT: “Hohlraum design for larger-scale capsules", Fig. 1 from "Design of inertial fusion implosions reaching the burning plasma regime”, by A. L. Kritcher, C. V. Young, and G. B. Zimmerman, published on 26 January 2022, Nature Physics volume 18, pages 251-258 (2022).

This paper explains principles relevant to nuclear weapons secondary stage development: "The rocket is created when the outer layers of the capsules containing nuclear fuel are ablated by an intense X-ray radiation bath that is generated ... inside of a gold-lined depleted uranium X-ray conversion cavity called a ‘hohlraum’. The remaining capsule mass and fuel are accelerated towards the centre of the DT gas core at extreme implosion velocities of nearly 400 km/s. During stagnation, the kinetic energy of the imploding shell and DT fuel is converted into internal energy in a dense fuel layer surrounding a central lower density ‘hot spot’ where most of the fusion reactions occur. Symmetric compression of the DT fuel surrounding the hot spot is essential ... before the system explodes and rapidly cools as it expands, as well as achieving adequate areal densities required for sufficient alpha deposition. This redeposition of alpha-particle energy back into the hot spot leads to further fusion reactions and amplified neutron yield."

Declassified patent: https://patents.google.com/patent/US5450794A/en (linear implosion devices alse used in non-nuclear al aaa | S Sw an D evi ce

Fissile Core High Explosive

Slow Explosives Hollow Core "Pit"

Inert Wave Shaper

: Detonator /d > Example Detonation Fronts Emerging From Around Wave Shapers

‘ackage: Fast Explosives © Tamper ALL OF THESE 2-POINT IGNITION SYSTEMS REQUIRE SMALLER ELECTRIC CURRENT 1 ial (Beryllium) (SMALLER X-UNIT CAPACITORS). MORE X-RAYS LEAK FROM SIDES TO BE CHANNELE THE THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF 1950s LLNL SMALL-DIAMETER PRIMARY STAGES SUITABLE FOR COMPACT MIRV MI SOURCES CREDIT: above left, http://andstillipersist.com/2009/11/iran-closer-to-the-bomb-than-we-thought/

above central, https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/DoSuitcaseNukesExist.html (see also patent L

MPLOSION

above right, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swan_(nuclear_primary)#/media/File:U.S. Swan_Device.svg

To give some idea of the complexity (the diagrams above are open-source, unclassified, not to scale, and demonstrating principal concepts pictorially rather than as design blueprints) of the compact 1950s designs of tactical warheads that now form the primary stages in American two-stage missile warheads, please see the biography of John S. Foster, Jr., the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory physicist who led the designs of the compact primary stages needed for compact SLBM and MIRVed ICBM warheads. The quotations about the history of the modern primary designs that follow are from T. F. Ramos, Call Me Johnny, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, report LLNL-BOOK-783447, 2019:

"Much of the effort to design an atomic device relied on using a computer program, or code, to guide the designers. The group’s computer code support came from Bob LeLevier and Chuck Leith. Leith was a real computer pioneer. He had written out the Laboratory’s first codes on one of the world’s first computers, the UNIVAC. The physicist Jim Wilson, who was a distinguished graduate from UC Berkeley and a member of T Division, was yet another code developer, and became Johnny’s technical leader. In 1954, in a series of nuclear tests called Operation Castle, the Laboratory had once again fielded a shot that failed. This was a test of a Megaton Group secondary. It was the third successive nuclear test failure of the Laboratory. There were powerful men in Washington, DC who wanted to see the new Laboratory in Livermore shut down. The stress of the failure had its effects on Lawrence and Teller, and they both suffered from attacks of colitis and had to be hospitalized. Herb York came down with Valley Fever and had to remain at home in bed rest. That meant that the

future of the nuclear weapons program at the Laboratory rested squarely on the shoulders of Johnny Foster and Harold Brown. ...

"Johnny was especially interested in designing a weapon for the Army, which during the Korean War, had experienced massive “human wave’ attacks of Chinese soldiers — assaults that had almost destroyed Eighth Army. The Chinese Army attacked with large, closely packed formations that overwhelmed American defenses. Chastened, the Army wanted a nuclear artillery shell that would deter any nation from using those tactics again on a battlefield. ... He did not know it, but a team of Los Alamos engineers and technicians had developed a diagnostic technique called a pin dome that could measure how a device imploded. ... The Cleo was a tactical weapon, suitable for the Army, and it promised to be one of the smallest atomic devices yet developed. The Cleo concept required multidimensional modeling to fully understand its workings, and Jim Wilson performed Cleo calculations on new codes that he wrote. But even with Wilson’s talents, multidimensional computer codes were primitive affairs in 1954. ... For its transport to the Nevada Test Site, the Cleo was constructed in two parts, and each part was placed into a reinforced Samsonite suitcase [Cleo was tested in Nevada on | March 1955 as 7 kt Teapot- Tesla, atop a 300 ft tower. The predicted yield was 3.5-7kt. It was only 10 inches wide, 39.5 inches long, 785 lb, and used an external Zipper neutron gun. An even smaller version, Cleo II, was tested as 2 kt Teapot-Post on 9 April 1955, 34.2" long, weight 322 Ib]. ... The Cleo had worked; the first warhead from the Laboratory to do so. Someone, apparently, had leaked information out about how the device had been delivered to the tower. Time magazine wrote a story about a new type of nuclear weapon that could fit inside a suitcase. ... Lawrence opened a discussion by asking, “Why do we need small diameter nuclear weapons?” Teller responded that they were needed for

nuclear artillery, which had been identified as a need for the Army."

- T. F. Ramos, "Call Me Johnny", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, report LLNL-BOOK-783447, 2019, p. 19-22, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1576166

BERBER EEE BB BB sgt. eae ' ij ‘’ =

y) ory. UNIQUE DOCUMENY £ SHePONO KET? (\

LA-11404 pe ~aagggpe cmt pea A Brief History of the First Efforts of the . Livermore Small-Weapons Program (U) Ni Wea Lawrence S. Germain n ——— January 2, 1991

‘iin

LA-11404

Lawrence S. Germain retired from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1985 after thirty years of experience in weapons design and testing in the national laboratories— twenty years at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and ten years at Los Alamos. He received a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1949 and taught physics for four years at Reed College, Portland, Oregon, before joining Livermore. Much of this report is drawn from the author's memory, and many of the opinions expressed reflect his personal recollections.

The first draft of this report was written in 1988, and the information in the report does not reflect events or research since 1988. L

———————“7-] wom ~~ ’ —— Ss ee Oe es Operation Teapot had, by and large. been an The Livermore Small-Weapons Program important step in Livermore's growth. At the thus organize -prong attack for opera- start, the Livermore weapons i " tion Redwing}!

they had their backs to the wall.\

[The feeling in Ivermore was do or die. These tests had to be

————— .

The design physicist was repeatedly scolded for presenting unpromising results. He was urged to make the system work. As a result,

PREFACE

This report is one in a CNSS series that surveys the over the past forty-five years. The unifying themes throt advances and failures associated with new weapon s stockpile.

Authors, titles, and report numbers are listed below.

William G. Davey. Free-Fall Nuclear Bombs in the |

William G. Davey, Nuclear Tests Related to Stockp LA-11402

Lawrence S. Germain, A Brief History of the First Weapons Program (U), LA-11404

Lawrence S. Germain, The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear (U), LA-11403

Lawrence S. Germain. A Review of the Development before the 1958 Test Moratorium(U), LA-11749

Raymond Pollock, The Evolution of the Early Therme

Raymond Pollock, A Short History of the U.S. Nucle 11401

(All reports are classified Secret Restricted Data)

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRS LIVERMORE SMALL-WEAPO!

Lawrence S. Gerr

ABSTRACT (U)

This report, one in a series concerned with t research and development, describes the evol nuclear explosives at the Lawrence Livermore inception in 1952 to the nuclear testing morator used as the unifying thread for the descriptio important families of nuclear devices are ider lined, and the stockpile weapons that resulted

and the results were considered successful. It was followed by Turk one week later (March 7, 1955). With a yield of 44 kt, Turk was also considered a success—as was Post. _-

The low point of the weapons design history of Livermore had been passed—but not with- out considerable turmoil. Shortly before the date of the Tesla test. news reached Livermore concerning the results of some experiments on

| successful—or else! The first one up was Tesla

he took the most optimistic view of each of the several areas of uncertainty in the design—too optimistic, as it tured out. It was only the nuclear test that revealed the overly optimistic approach. In the absence of nuclear testing, the design errors might never have been uncov- | ered. |

Sif there were no

tests to keep the system honest, nuclear design-

" Eniwetok Atoll as close to the ground as pos-

Quince Story No. 2 is |

and Fig were fired on Runit (Yvonne) Island in | wanted responsibility warhead of their des

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Pe fs , ' ad be ers could be pressured into certifying designs to accommodate a fallout experiment conducted_| _ the equation of state of plutonium that had been P made a special effort

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much of the diagnostic equipment was set for l resdyablingna nuclear Brtilleryash@lierThe Swalloyy’s desigh*kd to be strong enough to withstand the high tofquefamd atdeterpiohaif@duldood tower in French- safety tests of W ' ; " . ; ; Flat,. Humboldt was fired atop a hast- Crockett warhea

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nameddaspex:Welchs whonwould-eventuallysrise;to the rank ofunajoargensrad. thewrndh &é othiieofinm 1956,dlfiny moved his Runit Island, Eni

® Ss ——————————— ont hp WS ERNE SR's AHL EAY EAE ADER ims livinkReaeoMReRAEAPRRY RIAN waned fo fake pom aTargd-aRRNRRENNToWEA Weal. clean.andrela- 18 pula the available at an earlier date. The Los Alamos about the safety of nuclear weapons ass tively clean warheads led to the testi . kt, respectively. Calpain eee ape ses: ryt =< a" sharks SFU ABBR HAR eee Dh MRS Regus AMAA. A q whysieis earned ; | explosive detonz Lafty GaHnain tL AW Pence SCR anaita aathBE of the LEAWEi ti stogustaaceiear IAA ORF Weup dis Alid rated thermonuclear primary satel diexta results and were certain that the results woul ; ent was that no more four plutonium dioxi stages,taeeriustriations above frome compendium of BRR daca fh Kea here. wrealeays wofe a pair of thick glasses, was FIG was detonat tre SUfiy Wate Heatbyratd ‘ToAAY Uskted Hint F3Swatch out fer the-sharks-andaviarahimyiftkeycbepimthe get|eloser. ... When he resurfaced, Nevada soil, shi

there was no Germain, and Johnny noticed that the sharks'Werd EOMtny PRSRSS ERT ARP BREE to feel and spotted Germain lying on the beach. When he asked Germain why he had left his post, the bespectacled physicist responded, “Well, I thought about what you said about

there being sharks in the water, and I decided to get out of there.”

"It was time to test the devices, starting with the Swift [0.19 kt Redwing- Yuma, 27 May 1956, 5 inches in diameter, 24.5 inches long, weighed 96 lb.] . It was tested atop a 200-foot tower. It gave a low yield, about one-fourth of what had been expected. This was not an encouraging start. ... they would have to wait and see how the other designs worked. That opportunity came two weeks later, with the test of the Swallow [1.49 kt Redwing-Kickapoo, 13 June 1956, 8 inches in diameter, 28 inches long, weighed 225 Ib] atop a 300-foot tower. The mediocre performance of the Swift made the mood tense. ... the Swallow performed well, rendering a yield greater than had been predicted. The Army had wanted a tactical nuclear device, and it looked like they may now have one. Next it was the Swan’s turn. When test day arrived, the same controls that had detonated the Swallow now triggered the Swan, which lit up the South Pacific sky and gave a yield in the upper part of its predicted range of values, which was gratifying [Swan, reported to be a boosted a two-point ignition hollow-pit air-lens flying plate slapper device, aka XW-45, was tested as the 15.2 kt Redwing-Inca nuclear test on 22 June 1956, with a mass of 47.6 kg, a length of 58 cm and a diameter of 29.5 cm. On 2 July 1956 it was used as the primary stage of the 360 kt Redwing- Mohawk test which used a Flute secondary stage. Mohawk was 15 inches in diameter, 46.2 inches long, and weighed 1116 lb]. This was the mothership of their atomic designs — the main hope for the Hectoton Group — and it had performed well. ... At a meeting held back in Livermore in August 1956, Johnny announced, “A study named Robin has been started on a different method of implosion [Dr Peter A. Goetz states the Robin was melon shaped in A technical History of America's Nuclear Weapons, v2, revised edition 2020, p209: "The Robin contained a hollow, boosted, plutonium core that resembled a "thick eggshell" ... Instead of using a shockwave to shape and compress its core ... Robin relied on deflagration ... burning ... at subsonic velocities ... the explosive envelope of the Robin primary was composed of PBX9404 (94% HMX) and its core was composed of alpha-phase Pu239, the densest known allotrope ... 19.89 g/cc"]. It

aims to achieve a device characterized by light weight, ruggedness, and moderate efficiency.” ...

"They quickly converged onto a design that was a marvel to study. There were originally two versions of the Robin, Robin A and Robin B.

The first A version used enriched uranium as its nuclear fuel, and it was cumbersome. The second version, Robin B, had a plutonium pit

and when it was tested, it performed exquisitely. The Robin B was a true descendent to the original Geode concept. It was light and rugged, and it gave a significant yield. When the Robin B team was done, the device could be carried by one man. ... The Robin never showed up in America’s nuclear stockpile; that was not its legacy. It was much more important than that. It became the foundation upon which to build warheads for the future. It was the ultimate fission weapon, the prototype used to build the country’s modern stockpile. [However, Robin primaries were used in the 1963 Lawrence Livermore Lab W47Y2 X1 warhead, with an oralloy (U235) Fife secondary stage, for the Polaris A2 SLBM. In 1965, when tests showed that 75% of these 144 Robins failed due oiled neutron absorbing wire corroding permanently into the plutonium core of the Robin primary - this cadmium-boron wire was supposed to be pulled out by a small electric winch motor automatically before detonation as a safety system to prevent nuclear yield release in accidents - the Robins were replaced by 10kt boosted linear implosion Kinglet primaries. The Polaris A-3 carried three 200kt W58 thermonuclear warheads, the first American deployed devices with spherical oralloy loaded Tuba secondaries, Kinglet primaries and thorium casings. Polaris was important not only for giving a protected second strike capability to the West, eliminating the dangerous need for launch on warning and a first strike to avoid missiles being hit first like sitting ducks in a surprise strike by the enemy, but also for replacing regional land based missile systems. For example, the old vulnerable Jupiter missiles in Turkey which Kennedy removed in "exchange" for the removal of Khrushchev's missiles in Cuba, were simply replaced in March 1963 by the USS Sam Houston SSBN-609, an A-2 Polaris submarine using a base at Rota in Spain. So Khrushchev actually improved American nuclear deterrence by asking for the junk Jupiter missiles to be

removed from Turkey!] "

- T. F. Ramos, "Call Me Johnny", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, report LLNL-BOOK-783447, 2019, p. 23-27, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1576166

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Dmitry V. SHIRIKOV is a theoretical physicist, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

His major scientific interests are Quantum field theory and the theory

of superconductivity and dispersion relations.

Alter the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was set up, Dmitry

Shirkov worked for ten years for the Artillery self-propelled guns with nuclear ammunition institute of Mathematics, Siberian Branch; at the military parade. then was employed by the Joint Institute Moscow, November 7 1957

for Nuclear Research based in Dubna,

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device, without using computers, which was tested with success (full design yield) in March 1956. An illustrated article, The Tsar projectile for nuclear artillery, by one of its developers, Dmitry V. Shirkov (in charge of predicting the yield, not so easy for a radical two

point linear implosion device if you don't have any computers!) is linked here, see also the page here.

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; Sheu der.of i | d the ph f we Johnny descr{bed the enhanced radiation weapon they were testing, ani et if Res may Oe Ke dR felis, attheeps HON Ki "Som D!”” Cohen : : he "a went Pack Pig ipsa BCLS Wed A AE GS WR) I oe a ey ae i sacar ies com

saording to Cohen, and Johnny wasn't developing a neutron bomb to end world wars, but cleaner, low yield thermonuclear weapons "Dove" and "Starling" for project Plowshare, and it was him - Cohen - who in 1958, after looking at the "Dove" and "Starling" designs, asked for their neutron outputs off his own back, and then put together the collateral-damage-averting two-stage 1-2 kt enhanced neutron air burst concept for deterrence of invasions! ]. The weapon underwent development over the years until it was ready to be

deployed with NATO troops. ...

"Six months after the crisis over Berlin, [President] Kennedy flew out to Berkeley to receive an honorary degree from the University of California [23 March 1962] ... The nuclear warheads that Kennedy had relied on when he faced Soviet threats had been designed by these very same scientists, and Kennedy wanted to thank them personally. As Director of the Laboratory, Johnny would be giving the President a briefing to show him the warheads that were part of the backbone of the nation’s defensive posture. ... Full-scale models of the Polaris and Minuteman warheads were placed on demonstration tables, and Johnny showed the President the strategic warheads. After that, Johnny planned to give a pitch for an idea he had conceived the year before concerning the security of tactical nuclear weapons. He had an idea about how to protect the weapons, and he initiated a program to design a sophisticated anti-theft system that came to be called the Permissive Action Link (PAL). ... ; Johnny explained the PAL concept and Kennedy became animated with the demonstration and pulled

up a chair and sat before the device. ...

"The President liked the idea and agreed with Johnny’s approach to solving the problem. Kennedy asked his Presidential Science Advisor, Jerome Wiesner, to look at the matter more deeply, and Wiesner replied on May 29, 1962, that the approach seemed to be a good idea and a timely solution to a national security need. On June 6, Kennedy issued National Security Memorandum No. 160, which directed the

Department of Defense to install PAL systems into selected nuclear weapons, principally those in NATO. On July 6, 1962, the New York

LA-UR- \\- 242 $3

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- T. F. Ramos, "Call Me Johnny", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, report LLNL-BOOK-783447, 2019, p. 31-33, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1576166

UNCLASSIFIED

Chapter V will outline and briefly discuss the history of the weapon systems assigned Alamos as Phase 3 programs during the 1966-1972 period. In addition, mention will t made of Phase | and 2 programs and early development programs under consideration dur those years. This chapter will attempt to inform the reader as to the extensive effort that wé required. However, as Chapter V will also describe, the Los Alamos weapon teams failed ( 1966-1972 to win a viable Phase 3 assignment to develop a warhead for a strategic missile

LA-14066-H weapon system. The W62 for the Minuteman III with a Phase 3 of 1964 went to Livermor History The W68 for the Navy’s Poseidon submarine with a Phase 3 of 1966 also went to _— * 5 at Earlier, the W56 (the warhead for the Minuteman I, IT) and the W58 (the warhead for Tracing the Origi Gis of the W76: Polaris) had also gone to Livermore. The Chapter will also note some trends in the U.S. nu 1966-Spring 1973 (U) stockpile that were important for the weapon programs at the Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos laboratories. Betty L. Perkins made by the Defense Department. It we weren’t providing the technology that allows thes November 3, 2003 yields in smaller packages to be made we wouldn’t be keeping up with the Soviets becaus

e Los Alamos

number of Minuteman we have is the same and the number of submarines is the same. It i warhead technology that enables this country to keep up its deterrent, and that is only bec: the technological base which the weapons laboratories supported by the Committee and tt Commission provide the country.”

S part of his new job as director at Los Alamos, Agnew would continue intensi!

campaign for Los Alamos to receive the Phase 3 assignment for the W76. He was success this effort.

““Remarks by H. M. Agnew Concerning Need for Testing,” (June 15, 1970 Briefing), DIR-2244 (SRD) (Oc

1970), pp. 7.6-7.7, A99-019, 269-1.

LA-14066-H

Classifier: Michael Pankratz Derived from: LA-4000, Rev. 8, 9/02 ee ee EEE SG EELS 3.

NATIONAL LABORATORY

Reservoir Designs to Provide Minimum Helium in the Boost Gas

July 14, 2003 Los Alamos NM 87545

JEBEL,

a. Military Requirements for Small, Lightweight Warheads As noted previously, in the mid-1960s the Los Alamos design group had begun work on 10-inch diameter or less primaries

(b)(3)

The reason for this great interest on the part of the design laboratories in the 10-inch and less diameter was the fact that the Military was pushing for small, lightweight systems. By this period, the missile/guidance/nose-cone establishment in the United States had developed their systems to where it appeared that it would be possible to put several warheads on one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), deploy the missile, and have each of the warheads hit a different target. This concept is referred to as use of multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRY). It was felt at that time that the USSR was also going into these types of systems. Because a warhead is much less costly than a missile, the Military wanted to pack as many warheads as possible into each missile. This desire for as many warheads as possible on one missile pushed the nuclear weapon groups to achieve as small as possible in terms of diameter. Moreover, the Military wanted as long a range as possible for each missile; this requirement pushed the weapon groups to try and design minimum-weight warheads.

A request for multiple-carriage capability for the forthcoming improved Minuteman system

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In a March 1969 memo, primary designer R. Canada outlined the problems that were

result of the formation of *He from the decay of the triti i rimary’s boost ga (b)(3)

The yield of a DOOStEd primary is degraded as tittunris co to *He both by the loss of the-Source of 14-MeV neutrons and also by the decrease of the | boost multiplication rate caused by the high cross-section for neutron capture which is characteristic of *He.” He went on to add, “In a conventional boosted single-stage device | tritium produced by *He appears too late in the bomb’s explosion to contribute to the yiel¢ the temperature does pot get high enough to produce significant He + D fusion.””

2 Canada to Distribution, Subject: “He in Weapons,” W-4-2518 (SRD) (March 10, 1969), 5 pp., A’ 199-13,

In an April 1972 TWX to Assistant Director for Safety and Liaison (Division of Mil Application) Colonel Robert T, Duff, Agnew reported that he was worried about maintai U.S. nuclear deterrent. Agnew noted, “It occurs to me that as we go to lower and lower y Our strategic missile warheads and the Soviet Union builds up a better and bettercivil de! position, the reality of this deterrent may become questionable.

‘If the Soviet leadership t “This, then our strategic deterrefit Will have Tost a-good deal of its force. If our MIRV trend

pantiauas eat ll bo shows it 1 ut

Was 1UTTMUZCU 1 a January 1Y0) ICVISION LO We INaSC 1 SwWOY. 1 nTeC roCuUy vou weir we wuunucs we 1 OC ulvalening tO row Conretti al a potential aggressor. Conreti nas nigi be carried in this freee pepctyen 12 (L). On February 12, 1964, ey 3 penetration and survivability but little deterrent power.” "In tovebberi96 0s Wasivenfordbad Wi jvarenore na: f HPAESHHAE WEE huge by todaynssfagsaased mh bangs : A : " to receive the assignment (the warhead would carry the Sen Kien, In November 1964, pees ine P s 1972, to Giller, at that time Assistant General Manager beginnémgline) Uhiranchitico whe enxhicld Qeovkitl sachbhafesonephiopawhine MIR rive to obtaifl One Seratity, Agneny agaimionted several reasons why low yield warheads might not icati ; inuteman missi t solution for maximizi capabili ockpi (greate r 05 ABT CRS en yg SET ET eT that would then reduce the size SHUiMsota He Wes St Taga s) on uty of tho 08 a

August 31, 1964, in a letter to marines and the low efficiency in their use of spec

DeferseCRepailm artim sealona siete eop, batiaiemleh Quackaginesringultiple, indupload enaterial tho, koniclyicld Nititieads were not very cost effective. Moreover, Agnew aimed SHARE espe SRO MEN WHATS Fes PR Snary how primary design. GUL OAL Ua i epee gemiammeenlger psaerlaerbad rae

lightex,-andumore-efficient primary design was reasonably well developed. His was the ledthih $ode sige! dha Manni Hes keapese ww. Although the Soviets had an extensive ci % ‘ : 78 ‘ . a ” ‘ational Laborat . 2 = T= °

the Man Lomnsamsdiydeh i FARLLE seuBS ie pyealceesstully a vance upon Sack’s design [Robert RePUwone wah Plas Ayre iesket did not work to reduce loss of civilian lives, the So

: t not mind losing a few people. Agnew wrote, “Again, to me, to continue to increase

work#n¥on a previous effort to imgeanyritisians, took the leadlotr #OT1s A lamapaineigan mlfabbrs Hi he wud Bfg decrease in yield per warhead could eventually lead to 1

designinglandhestingerudiiplt, Ligtindiagin, Seeméaeyprimary used in the W76 warhead thaS@ieTeRcAnstbemiansafthasa wa hope to deter.” Agnew stated, “I feel very strongly th

should endeavor to vjnCg round i Navy’s Trident-class nuclear submanines. The W76 is the most numerous warhead in theyefyenuctear stockpile - fhe Do D.that what they should have on the next ean

Best, The FPG FADS We YS Mian beeen se BAAD HPF OPIAlloK hebie PURIee Los Alamos-NationaHbaberateryrepert LA-UR-18- ja ge ite team began Leeched ofa ey 78117, M. Agnew, University of California, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, N.M. | HC 195 : BY3/Colonel Robert T. Duff, USAF, Assistant Director for Safety and Liaison, Division of Milite Today the 1E33 detonator is still in use in the W76. Ginsberg has reported that these Application USAEC, Wash., D.C. (SRD) (April 14, 1972), pp. 1-2, B11, Drawer 56, Folder } of HEDMAN Sill DOSiPHS NT GHeADrAdi Ga GUE QB.NU CLEAR COERCION BY A RUSSIAN DICTATOR iia

(b)(3) Meagt tit Ginsbers, personal geypmunication (SRI OL a worthless paper agreement promising "peace’»Ch4ffedthin allows Hitler to invadgh Arh tral tnd German populated part (Sudetenland) of Czechoslovakia, declaring the need to peacefully protect its own foreign nationals (Germans) living in other countries. Big fuss in media: talk of sanctions, weight of world's opinion weighing on shoulders of Hitler to restrain him - proving that appeasement has allowed Britain time to rearm slower than Germany, thereby removing any real deterrent, and reassuring Hitler that we are committed to "peace in our time". (He had already annexed Austria, but that was permitted just like Crimea's annexation by Russia in 2014.) Six months later - after world's media has "moved on" - the remainder of Czechoslovakia was invaded by Hitler (March 1939). Next invasion (12 months after invasion of Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia): Poland (September 1939). Chamberlain has finally drawn a line in the sand (after years of him and his predecessor Baldwin rearming the UK slower than Germany, allowing any hope of deterrence to slip away, by permitting an enemy to go from no threat in 1933 to a bigger military than the UK, requiring UK rearmament, prior to any credible deterrence being feasible*): he finally tells Hitler invading Poland will provoke war. But given the

previous farce, Hitler is not deterred by the paltry level of UK rearmament (compared to Germany), and invades Poland.

Note that once the remainder of Ukraine is invaded by Putin - he has already condemned the government of Ukraine as a danger for fighting to defend parts of its own country that border the Russian bear, so everyone can see where the ship is headed - he will be in Hitler's situation in 1939, since Ukraine has a direct border with Poland. The next replay of history will be that "Poland has been a member of NATO since 1999, and NATO presents a threat or antagonism to Russian occupied Ukraine, which must be neutralised to preserve the peace of mind of Putin and his comrades. If NATO tries to defend its members from further Russian peace keeping invasions and conquests, then Putin/Russia will be forced, regrettably, to use its ICBMs etc. to defend itself, and since America has no ABM since the Safeguard system was defunded by Congress anti-nuclear fanatics like Biden in 1975, goodbye democracy." Also note that Putin has more nuclear warheads and Novichok nerve gas than the West. (Until 22 June 1941, Russia was on Hitler's side and jointly invaded Poland in September 1939, contrary to all airbrushed Russian school history books; and all left wing UK school history books!

The reality is the secret annex to the 23 August 1939 Russian-German Molotov—Ribbentrop so-called non-aggression pact, which

led to the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia on 1 and 17 September 1939, respectively, according to which Poland was divided up between the two invaders, Russia and Germany; a fact that Russian and left-wing Western pseudo historians have sought to ignore, play down or cover-up. The point is, there is an historical precedent here to Russian aggression in Europe,

despite propaganda denying it.)

Russia could invade not only Ukraine but Europe, if you look past troop numbers to the Russian nuclear and chemical missile stockpile in relation to the West's, which has been depleted (Joe Biden as an anti-nuclear senator for decades was always pushing for Western arms reduction, encouraging enemy aggression). Once Ukraine is invaded by Russia, Poland will be on the new Russian border. It's quite possible that if the chips go down and blitzkrieg becomes the order of the day, NATO will collapse. It just doesn't have the firepower of Russia, undermining deterrence. Kennedy deployed 0.02kt yield W54 tactical battlefield nuclear weapons to Europe to deter invasions. (Little Feller I, on 17 July 1962, proved the W54 - reportedly a scaled down 2-point prolate spheroid implosion Swan device - to observer Attorney General Robert Kennedy, in the last ever atmospheric nuclear test at Nevada Test Site, the film of which was only declassified on 22 Dec 1997. Fired by a crew of two using a 155 millimeter launcher, it detonated at a height of burst of 20 feet, some 1.7 miles from the launch point with a 0.018 kt measured yield. An identical warhead was tested as Little Feller II, 10 days earlier, gave 0.022 kt, also demonstrating a W54 yield reliability of 0.02kt +/-10%.) After Nixon decommissioned them, Carter and Reagan replaced them with W79 tactical nuclear warheads, which remained a credible deterrent against invasions (unlike trying to deter the invasion of Crimea by saying you will bomb Moscow) until the Cold War ended. The USSR collapsed. Then people like Biden lobbied successfully to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons in the 90s, and now we don't have a credible deterrent. How can a threat to put sanctions on Putin, or to bomb Moscow as a last resort, deter an invasion of the Ukraine, when

he has a bigger nuclear stockpile plus chemical weapons like Novichok? It's insanity. End of story.

We have experience of this insanity from disarmament propaganda by enemies of liberty, freedom and democracy, not just from Hitler's invasions in the 1930s, but from Stalin's invasions in the 1940s and his successors until the Cold War supposedly ended with the break up of the USSR: America had a monopoly on nuclear weapons until 1949, but it failed to make enough, quickly enough and was unable to use nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent to prevent Stalin from seizing half of Europe after WWII. Puppet governments controlled by Moscow (backed up by tank invasions whenever the strings on the puppets broke, e.g. Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968) put tanks on the border of NATO. Then, tactical nuclear weapons were needed until the end of the Cold War to prevent invasions. When they were not there, invasions occurred. When they were available, invasions didn't occur. QED. They tipped the balance of risk against aggressors in a way that sanctions and massive retaliation bluffing doesn't. Biden and comrades in the 70s used the old 30s mythology of "arms control" to try to get rid of credible deterrence. The typical argument is that deterring world wars using the credible deterrence of tactical nuclear weapons is "dangerous" to people planning invasions. That's the whole point. The nuclear fear mongering issue of the much higher background radiation in the mile high city of Denver (if you are fanatical about radiation, then why not start by banning mountain climbing, high altitude cities, aircraft, etc, rather than the fallout from nuclear technology?), also occurs with nuclear weapons deterrence: if you think high yield nuclear weapons that could cause collateral damage are a problem, then why not campaign positively for the tactical weapons that deter the invasions that triggered world wars (the invasion of Belgium in 1914, and Poland in 1939) in place of strategic warheads which fail to deter invasions? If we only have tactical nuclear weapons, we can only stop invasions

and there can be no escalation risk. In both cases, it's obvious that the anti-nuclear folk are conning the media, successfully as their

forebearers did in the 1920s and 1930s. This was the case also in the 1920s and 1930s when poison gas bomb scare mongering was used in the media to successfully prevent credible deterrence, tragically resulting in world war and tens of millions dead. As the Cold War proved, even carrying a big stick is no deterrent if you speak softly to make it appear incredible. The squealing from the pro-Russian so-called anti-nuclear media folk against the W79 neutron bomb 40 years ago proves that was a credible deterrent

(they wouldn't have cared otherwise).

The Western media outlook until a few days ago was that the 150,000 or so Russian troops around Ukraine was just the normal Russian military training exercise, pushed nearer the Ukrainian border for added realism, and such numbers are not enough to occupy Ukraine or Europe, so there can't possibly be a real problem, just American bear-baiting propaganda. Not so. Again, as we saw in the Cold War conquest of Eastern Europe, and even before that in the Third Reich era, you don't actually need huge numbers of boots on the ground to successfully invade countries. All dictatorships are by definition a minority controlling a majority - if it were the other way around dictatorship would not be needed since democracy is a numbers competition where the majority tribe or party wins (even if they have to rely on postal ballots). In any case, secret police (Stasi for instance, in East Germany in the Cold War) did the major job of controlling dissent, not Russian boots on the ground. The primary techniques used are political infiltration, coercion, media subversion, propaganda, fear, and political concentration camps/Gulags for dissidents, which massively reduces the need for large numbers of troops. Putin's seizure of Crimea was done using Russian special forces with their insignia removed from their uniforms. There are lots of tricks involved in warfare to reduce the troop numbers required for invasions. Putin's latest one, officially "recognising" the separatist Russian-infiltrated parts of Ukraine bordering Russia and its sphere of influence, doesn't require a million boots on the ground. Like Hitler's annexation of Austria or Sudetenland, you can "invade" with a token force once you have infiltrated it first by stealth. This was the whole point of Hitler's "peace" propaganda machine in the UK in the 1930s, and the USSR's World Peace Council. Invasions occur at first by reasonable appearing salami tactics: small "peace keeping" incursions are then followed by support to rebels until those rebels mount an assisted coup d'etat or declare a separatist state in their region. Then the process is simply repeated to get further slices, until the rebel numbers

become big enough for blitzkrieg to be a success.

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Tritium

2. & spherical fusion bomb, the "secondary," is the most powerful. Huge amounts of X-rays from the first explosion compress and heat the fusion fuel in the secondary capsule, and it explodes.

Plutonium 239 Fission fuel

Uranium 235 The “spark plug."

Lithium deuteride Converted by explosion to tritium, an isotope of

3. A layer of enriched hydrogen; hence

uranium around this “hydrogen bomb.” device fissions on Uranium 235 detonation, creating a Creates a third third blast. explosion

(c) 1999 San Jose Mercury News, by Reid Brown, Karl Kahler, and Dan Stober

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ABOVE: 1974 USSR nuclear weapons design poster showing critical masses under different conditions, pointing out that using implosion for compressing a subcritical 12 kg mass of U235 makes it critical, compared to needing 48 kg (a 16.8 cm diameter sphere) for a critical mass of uncompressed U235. Switching to Pu239 reduces this by a factor of 2.82, while enclosing it ina 10 cm thick neutron reflector reduces the bare sphere critical mass by a further factor of 3.42. A combination of using both a neutron reflector and core compression can produce better than a 10-fold reduction in critical mass, according to Russian nuclear weapon designers. The simple Russian Sakharov-Zel'dovich elliptical thermonuclear design published by Uwe Parpart in the 15 October 1976 issue of New Solidarity allegedly originates at least in part from the July 1976 disclosures at U.S. labs by Soviet physicist Dr Leonid I. Rudakov, which also led to an earlier 8 October 1976, article in Science, entitled "Thermonuclear Fusion: U.S. Puts Wraps on Latest Soviet Work", page 166. (In March 1976 Pravda claimed Dr Rudakov had solved the clean fusion power problem using implosion principles.) The Rudakov principle demonstrated how hard radiation energy from the primary (fission) stage of a nuclear weapon is reradiated by a plasma as soft x-rays, to compress fusion fuel at the focus of a 1950s Russian nuclear weapon ellipsoidal radiation case. According to Chuck Hansen, the first American nuclear test using this Sakharov-Zel'dovich ellipsoidal radiation case was the Egg design, fired as the successful 250 kt Redwing-Huron shot at Eniwetok Atoll in 1956 (this is according to Sybil Francis, Warhead politics: Livermore and the competitive system of nuclear weapon design page 131; it also used a spherical secondary stage - the L-3 concept referred to by Francis - which wasn't liked by the USA - unlike Russia and Britain - because of the complexity of doing 3-d computer calculations for the geometry spherical isotropic compression in the 1950s; spherical secondaries were first deployed by America in miniature thermonuclear weapons in 1963, namely the 200 kt, 117 kg Polaris warhead W58 and the 170 kt, 115kg Minuteman warhead W62, while Britain and Russia had

by then stockpiled weapons with spherical secondard stages for years). Dr Friedwardt Winterberg mathematically analyses the use of

an ellipsoidal radiation case with fission and thermonuclear stages at the focii, in his 1981 book The physical principles of thermonuclear explosive devices, Figure 4 (below), explaining how x-rays of varying energies can be mirrored. Even so, you can make paper calculations that are testable in the field, without requiring 3-d computer simulations, as proved by the 1950s British

and Russian programmes.

The American insistence on fuller theoretical analysis prior to testing was bureaucratic time-wasting. It was Teller's less dogmatic Livermore that took up the discarded excellent Los Alamos Huron spherical secondary in 1958, testing to develop warheads not unlike today's contemporary designs. The need for complex computer design simulations may be averted by simple "overkill" to compress and ignite fusion charges using x-rays from multiple stages, bombs within bombs like a Russian doll to avoid the need to enhance the primary stage yield using tritium gas with its 12.3 years half-life (as shown, Howard Morland's use of the 1958 lithium deuteride stage idea in his book reproduces an actual design tested in the 1960s called "Swiss cheese", in which the fusion stage contains several separate subcritical lumps of fissile fuel which release neutrons into lithium deuteride, as an alternative to Teller's original cylindrical "spark plug" idea). These weapons are very simple to service, and incorporate "reliability through redundancy", since the multiple fission primary stages allow for reasonable thermonuclear efficiency even if one primary stage fails for some reason. The accompanying official limited distribution Russian nuclear weapons employment manual, Nuclear Weapons - A Manual for Officers, which we obtained (all three editions) from Ukraine, has photos of Russian MIG-15 fighter jets and tanks which were exposed to nuclear tests by Russia (see illustrations below), and many tables and graphs showing the measured blast and radiation effects of 8, 30 and 150 kiloton yield nuclear tests on different targets, plus thermal effects from a 50 kt test, and is linked here - these confidential Russian nuclear weapons capabilities manuals differ drastically from Glasstone's American exaggerations for propaganda on nuclear effects, e.g. Table 3 in the 1961 nuclear test data compilation shows very different data on thermal effects to Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapon. Russian test data from a 50 kiloton burst shows glass only begins to melt at 700-800 cal/em“%2, while white boards only ignite at 150 cal/em“’2 (although they temporarily smoke or char at 40 cal/em“%2)! (Note that in the Russian tables, kas = cal.) The Russians also show how building skyline shadowing stops most direct radiation. We also uploaded extracts from the 128 pages standard Russian manual, How to operate in the conditions of application of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapon, by the USSR's Department of Defense, Moscow, which has 99 illustrations, and other Russian manuals linked here, and there is a Russian

translation of the Glasstone propaganda book here.

28 PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THERMONUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

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Further reading: a complete analysis of this invasion situation is included in our 2015 detailed review of Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, linked here (in summary, sanctions can escalate such situations into all-out war; so the people talking about "hard-hitting" sanctions, who don't and won't have either a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent invasions or civil defence to withstand enemy threats, are effectively - despite their lies to the contrary - the warmongers). In Chicago, on 5 October 1937, President Roosevelt (Democratic Party) gave his "quarantine the aggressor speech", to destroy fascist dictatorships without the need for military deterrence: it failed since Japan had hard-hitting sanctions placed on it by America, after it started expanding by force prior to WWII, which led to the Pearl Harbor attack and the Pacific Theatre of WWII, instead of peace. If someone is pointing a large nuclear stockpile in your direction and is hot-headed enough to use Novichok nerve agent and Polonium-210 radioactive agent to kill people in the UK during "peacetime", then what is going to happen if you put hard hitting sanctions on them? Their media will present it as being an act of war; it will provide the excuse to escalate the situation. This sanctions idea, like disarmament for peace, is an example of groupthink autism, whereby nonsense propaganda is used to saturate the media to submerge the key facts, just as occurred in the 1930s when the media became obsessed with proclaiming that appeasement would produce "peace in our time". Some relevant extracts from UK declassified Cold War manuals can be found here and the Russian

nuclear weapons employment manuals we obtained from Ukraine prior to the invasion are linked here.

Putin's Kremlin instagram post on 8 December 2021 stated (in Russian): "Experts spoke about the reasons for the negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden. Sanctions do not threaten Russia, and the United States is interested in dialogue, said Vladimir Vasiliev, chief researcher at the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “The American side is interested in these negotiations. Today, all this talk about the sanctions list, about some other use of sanctions weapons like Nord Stream 2 or List 35, some other measures, I call this the “formula divorce." ... According to the Kremlin press service, Vladimir Putin told Biden during the talks that Russia is interested in receiving legally fixed guarantees that exclude the expansion of NATO to the east and the deployment of strike offensive systems in Russia's neighboring countries. At the same time, the White House claims that Biden, in negotiations with Vladimir Putin, did not give him obligations that Ukraine would remain

outside NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Joe Biden held talks on November 7 via videoconference."

(In original Russian: "Ikcneprbl paccka3aJM 0 NpH4unHaX NeperoBopos Baagumupa Iytuna u JKo baiiqena. Cankunn Poccun He rpo3sT, a CLIUA 3anHTepecoBanbl B (Hasore, CHUTAaeT WIaBHbIi HaydHbIii COTPyHHK HHCTHTyTa CIA nu Kanagpr PAH Baagumup Bacuibes. "AMepHkKaHcKasl CTOpOHa B ITHX NeperoBopax 3anHTepecoBana. Ha cerosqHAWIHH JeHb BCe 9TH pa3roBopbl 0 CAHKIMOHHOM CIIHCKe, 0 elle KAKOM-TO HCHOJIb30BaHHH CAHKUMOHHOLO OpyKHA Kak "CeBepHbiii noTOK - 2" nam "CrncoK 35", ele KaKHe-TO MepbI, 9TO 1 Ha3bIBalo "dopMy.1oii pa3sBoza". ... [lo cooOmjenuto npecc-c.1y2KOEI Kpemsia, Baagumup Ilytun B xoje lleperoBopos 3anBu baiijeny, aro Poccus 3anHTepecoBana B NOJLYYeHHH IOPHANGeCKH 3aPpHKCHPOBaHHbIX rapauTHii, HcCKJ1I0UaIOWHX pacuuMpenne HATO ua BocToK H pa3Melienne B coceqHHx c Poccneii crpanax yapHbix HACTyMAaTeJIbHbIX CHCTeM. IIpu 9Tom B besiom Jome yTBep2kalor, 4To baiijen Ha neperoBpopax c BaagumMupom IlyTHHbIM He AaBall eMy 0083aTeJIbCTB, 4TO Ykpanna ocranetcs BHe HATO. Ipe3ngzent Poccun Baagumup Ilyruu un npe3ngzent CIUA J>xo baiizen nposesm neperospopsi 7

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If this is accurate, you wish Biden - already under probation from Joe Public for his disastrous withdrawl from Afghanistan last year, allowing that country to become another dictatorship, just the direction Ukraine will go under his brand of useless grandiose sounding "diplomacy" - akin to Chamberlain shaking hands with Hitler and signing worthless bits of paper, but refusing to deter war credibly and effectively for fear of media condemnation by ignorant journalists - had been a bit more "diplomatic" and promised Putin that Ukraine would remain outside NATO, or even outside of the universe: by the time it would enter NATO, Biden would be out of office anyway so what was the big deal? (Appeasement is ineffectual sanctions; appeasement is not about successfully averting war by making agreements that can later be terminated if necessary!) Biden thankfully can only serve two terms maximum, even if Trump doesn't get back in next time, and American Presidents hardly bother to honour the promises made by their prececessors, even if they are members of the same party. E.g., Truman renegaded on Roosevelt's wartime promise to Britain to continue postwar nuclear weapons collaboration. Britain then had to independently develop its own fission and thermonuclear fusion weapons until collaboration resumed in 1958! If America can do that, it could have given some worthless paper promises to Putin, to keep him out of Ukraine. The Chamberlain appeasement situation was

the exact opposite of this: Sudetenland was given to Hitler in exchange for a worthless paper promise from Hitler!

*(Footnote): UK Prime Ministers Baldwin and Chamberlain used a whole array of excuses to keep the UK from deterring WWII,

all of which are still used today against nuclear weapons (Kahn pointed this out sixty years ago). For example, Chamberlain

proclaimed himself (both publically from the window of his flat above 10 Downing Street in September 1938, and in private papers and letters proving he really believed he had achieved peace that way) a hero of peacemaking for allowing the invasion of Sudetenland by Hitler in exchange for a worthless signature from Hitler, promising no more invasions after that one! Then, when proved wrong by events in 1939, Chamberlain lied that he always knew Hitler was lying, but he was a secret hero for cleverly making bogus peace deals in order to "buy time for rearmament", a claim disproved by the fact that Britain was rearming ata slower rate than Germany, thereby making a military success less likely with every day "bought", and he knew it was. Chamberlain was as much a lying fraud as Hitler in terms of peacemaking. His lies are still promoted as "news" by bogus "historians" of the

AJP Taylor CND peace propaganda lies variety, because many prefer fairy tales.

UPDATE, 27 February 2022: Putin puts Russia's nuclear forces on alert, cites sanctions - By Yuras Karmanau, Jim Heintz and Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press in Washington post, 27 feb. 2022 - KYIV, Ukraine — "In a dramatic escalation of East- West tensions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian nuclear forces put on high alert Sunday in response to what he called “aggressive statements” by leading NATO powers. The order means Putin has ordered Russia’s nuclear weapons prepared for increased readiness to launch, raising the threat that the tensions could boil over into nuclear warfare. In giving it, the Russian leader also cited hard-hitting financial sanctions imposed by the West against Russia,

including Putin himself."

This report, by Associated Press in the Washington Post, confirms sadly that so far Putin has responded to sanctions by following the predictions made above, escalating his nuclear weapons readiness for war to counter the sanctions with a nuclear threat, akin to what happened when Japan responded to hard-hitting American oil sanctions against it for its 1930s invasions prior to its attack on an American Pacific military base located at Pearl Harbor. This is the whole problem with the arms control situation. Supplying arms to the Ukraine Government to defend itself against Russia could easily be construed to Putin, if he so chooses, as essentially an act of war against Russia, deserving retaliation. Everything the "liberal elite", the left wingers headed by President Biden, does is always at best autistic lunacy that escalates the danger we face. While the BBC may claim that "Putin is isolated"**, he has a larger nuclear force than us, and also powerful nuclear allies in China. It is simply untrue that sanctions will solve the problem; they escalate a crisis into a bigger war. Carpet bombing of civilians, used by Democratic President Johnson in Vietnam, was the same kind of autism; instead of kicking enemies into surrender, such

actions as sanctions and attacking civilians just hardens enemy aggression more.

**(Footnote): The 1930s media also claimed incorrectly that Hitler was isolated (he had allies in Italy, Japan, etc.), but such lies in the "free" press helped to back up liars in the UK Government like Baldwin and Chamberlain and their populist lunatic policies for "peace in our time" which also lacked any credible deterrent, and just escalated the threats, encouraging genocide, not peace. Sir Norman Angell's Great Illusion argument that economic interdependence of nations prevents escalation in war is precisely reversed by the use of heavy economic sanctions against Russia, which cuts off the supposedly peace-keeping economic interdependence of nations and pushes it into the position of Japan in December 1941 and of Germany in September 1939 (thanks to Roosevelt's 1937 "quarantine the aggressor" theory). Irrational acts, not surrender, is what human nature usually produces when cornered and isolated, despite groupthink

brainwashing arguments to the contrary, which were used to determine policy in the Vietnam War and recently in Afghanistan. You need

to accept enemy mentality as it exists, and not "put yourselves in the enemy's shoes", if your way of thinking lacks the paranoia, cultural mentality, and aggressive nationalism of an enemy. Russia is not completely isolated anyway, due to its allies in China, North Korea, et al. The latest ideas on fighting the war in Ukraine being mooted by the BBC pyschotics/pundits centre around allowing Ukrainian pilots flying missions to bomb Russian forces in EU funded aircraft from airbases in NATO country Poland, while claiming that NATO is not involved. Again, the pressures of this kind provide excuses for Putin, if he wishes, to escalate it to WWIII at a time and in a way of his choosing, with the factor of surprise in his hands. Threatening to bomb the Kremlin suffers from the risk that Putin could move to a bunker elsewhere, even if the bunker under the Kremlin is really at risk bearing in mind the Russian ABM system around Moscow that can knock down incoming warheads (lacking from Western cities) and the nuclear crater sizes exaggeration scandal, which reduces the ground shock and cratering destruction to underground targets due to the ignorance in the 1977 Glasstone and Dolan Effects of

nuclear weapons book about the work done against gravity in excavating large craters.

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weapons in 1955, then the first satellite in space in 1957 and the first human in space in 1961. It is simply untrue that all Russians view WWIL as being the disaster that it is portrayed for Britain. (Russia actually achieved a victory that included territorial expansion and corresponding financial gains, unlike certain other countries that lost Empires due to WWII.) According to Professor William R. Kinter and Harriet Fast Scott's 1968 book The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (University of Oklahoma Press, pages 184-191), the Russian Marshall V. I. Chuikov, who was made chief of civil defense for the USSR after stopping the Nazis at Stalingrad in WWII, and later advising Chiang Kai-shek and also founding the Whampoa Military Academy, in 1966 wrote an article in the Russian journal

Military Knowledge, stating that civil defense allows a Russian victory in WWIII:

"The outcome of nuclear rocket war will now be decided not only on the battlefield, it will in significant measure be predetermined by strikes on the rear areas and on important political and economic centres. Victory in such a war will depend to a large degree on the

ability of the state to survive."

- Quotation from William R. Kinter and Harriet Fast Scott's 1968 book The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, University of Oklahoma Press, pages 184-5. (Emphasis added to words which are totally taboo here in the West in connection with all things "nuclear". Note that co-author Harriet Fast Scott, a research agent/spy fluent in Russian, lived in the USSR for years in the 1960s since her husband

was assigned there as U.S. air attache.) Kinter and Fast Scott point out on page 185 of The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs:

"Military Knowledge, the magazine in which the [Chuikov] article appeared, is the official monthly journal of civil defense. There is nothing comparable with this publication in the United States ... The expensive, elaborate family shelters - advertised in the United States some years ago - are unknown. A practical, inexpensive approach for protection measures, using materials readily available, is stressed. It is hardly appreciated in the United States that the Soviet Union already possesses the world's finest shelters ... These are the deep, elaborate subways in five of the largest cities - Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, and Baku. Many sections of the subways run well

over 100 feet below street level and are provided with heavy blast doors ... A large number of the total inhabitants of Moscow and

Leningrad could be provided shelter in their subways alone." (Britain installed some similar deep shelters in various London tube

stations.)

Regarding the Chuikov doctrine on the ability to achieve a "victory" in nuclear war by being better prepared for any eventuality than the opponent, the side which is better able to survive a nuclear war (by civil defense) can be considered the winner: this Marxist concept of war also prevailed successfully in Vietnam, where the Vietcong dug deep tunnel shelters and left civilian kids to be napalmed in the open for left-wing Western propaganda. It worked, they won in Vietnam using that strategy. This is the very opposite of the "knockout blow" mythology that prevailed in Germany in 1914 and 1939, and also in the West during the Vietnam War, but not the Ist Cold War as a whole, where the West achieved victory and the USSR defeat, through the West's surviving longer than the increasingly bankrupt USSR. Herman Kahn pointed out in the 26 June 1959 U.S. Congressional Hearings on the Biological and environmental effects of nuclear war, that Germany did not start WWI or WWII by a direct attack on Britain, and that Germany planned for a short "knockout blow" military conquest; in both cases it was Britain that declared war on Germany first, not vice-versa. In other words, "Type I Deterrence (deterrence of a direct attack on Britain)" did not fail in either 1914 or 1939. Only "Type II Deterrence (deterrence of an act of provocation, e.g. the invasion of a third party)" failed. So a country starting WWIII, on the basis of WWI and WWII experience, does not need to directly bomb London or New York. Put another way, strategic nuclear weapons, if they had existed in 1914, would have no more deterred the invasion of Belgium then, than they deter the invasion of Ukraine today. For victory you need to be capable of fighting and surviving sufficiently either a surprise attack or long war of attrition, regardless of whether that is an economic cold war via an arms race, or a hot war involving

any kind of weapon.

The strategic nuclear deterrent's role is purely Kahn's debunked Type I deterrence - a fallacy due to the Western obsession with "knockout blow" mythology - which also prevailed in the West in the 1930s where the media was filled with hype claiming that single gas or incendiary aerial attacks on cities would induce defeatism and immediate surrender. This was a travesty of logic which ignores precisely those situations - indirect attacks - that triggered both World Wars. Deterring indirect attacks like sinking the Lusitania in 1915, invading Belgium in 1914, bombing a Pacific island naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941, or invading Poland in 1939, requires not Type I but the more difficult Type II deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, since conventional weapons failed to deter both world wars and strategic nuclear weapons have not proved to be a credible deterrent against invasions of third parties. This is because the mobilization of conventional conscripted large armies or tank columns to borders for deterrence of large scale invasions is seen as an act of aggression, whereas nuclear weapons of significant deterrent power are small enough to be continuously available aboard submarines and in missile silos and iglo bunkers on airfields, ready at all times without the trigger-happy 1914-crisis-escalating massive mobilizations that set off World War I. As General Boisdeffre stated lucidly to Tzar Nicholas in 1892, the mobilization of conventional weapons to try to deter world war has the opposite effect because the highly-visible mobilization of the relatively bulky conventional weapons and massive

armies is naturally a massive escalation rather than a deterrent, causing immense crisis instability:

"THE MOBILIZATION IS THE DECLARATION OF WAR. TO MOBILIZE IS TO OBLIGE ONE'S NEIGHBOUR TO DO THE SAME ... OTHERWISE, TO LEAVE A MILLION MEN ON ONE'S FRONTIER, WITHOUT DOING THE SAME SIMULTANEOUSLY, IS TO DEPRIVE ONESELF OF ALL POSSIBILITY OF MOVING LATER; IT IS PLACING ONESELF IN A SITUATION OF AN

INDIVIDUAL WHO, WITH A PISTOL IN HIS POCKET, SHOULD LET HIS NEIGHBOR PUT A WEAPON TO HIS FOREHEAD, WITHOUT DRAWING HIS OWN ..."

The mad emergence of nuclear parity, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, occurred after Robert S. McNamara used now-discredited computerised nuclear war effects models (with no more sensible equations than those he used to lose the Vietnam war, i.e. ignoring Russian civil defense just as the improvised conventional war underground shelters of the Vietcong were ignored) to determine nuclear deterrence stockpile levels. The Russians then produced more weapons than America into the 1970s, and America responded with the neutron bomb and arms control treaties for strategic weapons. This was a reversal of the American nuclear superiority behind the amicable resolution of the Cuban missiles crisis by Kennedy in 1962, a factor pointed out by General LeMay in his 1968 book America is in Danger. (Where the left-wing disarmament-biased "historians" analyze the lessons of the Cuban missiles crisis, they deliberately ignore the massive U.S. nuclear superiority which existed in 1962, and its positive effects on Russian decision making, just as they ignore Feis' argument in Japan Subdued, that the emotional aspects of nuclear weapons effects in August 1945 tipped the balance against accepting a dishonorable surrender; in other words, although Japan knew it was defeated and the nuclear attacks were in that sense totally unjustified, emotionally they needed an "excuse" to hoist the white flag after so much suffering, and this

saved 200,000 Yanks earmarked for an invasion of the Japanese home islands as well as 1,500,000 Japanese lives.)

There is a compendium of classic 1960s and 1970s arguments for civil defense, and their political suppression by left-wingers and fools, in Nobel Laureate Dr Eugene P. Wigner's Collected Works, part B, volume VIIT, edited by Jagdish Mehra (Springer, 1998, 258 pages). Wigner on 28 April 1976 testified before the U.S. Congressional Hearings of the Joint Committee on Defense Production (page 144 in their printed hearings, online version is LINKED HERE) that the new Russian evacuation plans - as shown in its 1969 Civil Defense Manual (translated as ORNL-TR-2306, Oak Ridge National Lab.) - are very effective (the Russian civil defense plan

includes only essential workers commuting into cities for 12-hour shifts, and using shelters):

"Indeed an easy calculation shows that, if the USSR carries out its city evacuation plans, the total number of casualties that all the nuclear weapons in our missiles could cause would be a good deal less than 50% the losses they suffered in World War II. A reasonable estimate, based on the Oak Ridge [National Laboratory] test of a blast resistant 'expedient shelter', described in the USSR civil defense handbooks, gives for the loss which our missile carried nuclear weapons could cause, about 3% of the USSR population. What about our own situation? ... An evacuation plan [costs] $1.2 billion .... a blast resistant shelter system similar to

that of China ... would cost around $35 billion."

In 1979, in a joint article with hydrogen bomb advocate Dr Edward Teller in the U.S. Senate Congressional Record (2 August 1979, page S-11490), Wigner points out that Kahn's Type I deterrence is inadequate to prevent war (Type I is also called "mutual assured destruction", if both sides have parity via "arms control" delusions): "... I believe that the so called Mutual Assured Destruction is nonsense, because suppose even if the attacked nation could retaliate, if the other nation pretends that it does not believe it and makes a demand, is there any

point in resisting? What good does it do if it can destroy hundreds of thousands of the aggressors' lives ..."

In his 26 May 1964 address to Mercer County NJ Civil Defense organization (reprinted in his Collected Works, part B, Vol. 8, p35 et

seq.), Wigner explains that "people who are against Civil Defense often have some element of frustration ... and they find more easily time

for, and outlet in, their opposition," as explained by Robert Waelder's article Protest and Revolution Against Western Societies, in M.A. Kaplan (ed), The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962, p 18), i.e. it is the same as the mechanism for Marxist agitators, some of which are openly Marxist and others pretend to be libertarian while remaining faithful to the bigoted dictators. Wigner's address continues: "Much more literature - I think 80% - is against than for Civil Defense and much of it is completely irresponsible. A few weeks ago I read an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which the author said that a complete fal//out [cheaper than blast] shelter program would cost $50 billion. Now $50 billion is more than would be spent on the complete blast [and fallout] shelter program which I

mentioned [$35 billion]. But ... who will contradict it?"

In Publication 82 of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Civil Defense, 1966, edited by H. Eyring, Wigner remarks on page 121: "Dr Rapoport said, in a note to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, that it is possible that surrender to Hitler would have led to fewer deaths ... My view is the opposite in this case: I believe that if the West had shown clear resolve and determination from

the start, WWII could have been averted."

After Leon Goure wrote his May 1972 report, "Soviet Civil Defense - urban Evacuation and Dispersal" (Centre for Advanced International Studies, Miami University, DTIC report AD0745136), Wigner and J. S. Gailar wrote in their joint article "Russian Evacuation Plans - the Fears they Create" in the September-October 1974 issue of Survive (v7, n5, pp 4-5): "If the leadership of the USSR should change and become more aggressive, it would have, under the present circumstances, a terribly tempting option: to stage an evacuation and to provoke a confrontation when this is completed." Wigner later testified to the U.S. Congressional Hearings of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Civil Preparedness and Limited Nuclear War (28 April 1976, pp 143-7) that the principal danger: "is the possibility of the USSR evacuating its cities, dispersing their population, and the making demands on us, under the threat

of a nuclear attack, approximating those made by Hitler on Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich Pact."

The only reply Wigner received was a nonsense filled 11-page article attacking all these lessons from Russian Civil Defense, headed "Limited Nuclear War" by Sidney D. Drell and Frank von Hippel, and published in the November 1976 issue of Scientific American, the editor of which, Dennis Flanagan, refused to publish Wigner's rebuttal, entitled "We heartily disagree", just as Kahn's rebuttal to the nonsense review of his book on Civil Defense in 1961 had been refused by Scientific American, leading Kahn to expand it into his 1962 book "Thinking about the unthinkable". Wigner's and A. A. Broyles rebuttal to Scientific American was finally published instead as "We heartily disagree" in the Journal of Civil Defense, v10, pp. 4-8, July-August 1977 issue, pointing out that the Russian casualties with civil defense would be 4% on Wigner's unclassified estimate or 2% using T. K. Jones's classified data estimate (utilizing secret data on the survival of foxholes in nuclear tests, in the 1972 DNA-EM-1 Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons), and that the Russian improvised lined, covered trench shelters survive a peak overpressure of 40 psi as well as heat flash and fallout radiation, and adds that contrary to the nonsense in Scientific American, the Russians did test their plans by evacuating the city of Sevastopol in a drill which led to improvements

in their plans.

H-bomb proponent Edward Teller, Eugene Wigner, and A. A. Broyles in May 1973 had jointly authored the American Security Council report, "Without civil defense we are in a glass house", which basically argues that you can't have a deterrent for world war if you are not prepared to use that deterrent when your bluff is called. /f you are in Chamberlain's position in 1938 or Baldwin's in 1935, you are scared

of using the deterrent because it is like "throwing stones in glass houses", because - if you can't shelter people because you refuse to have

shelters and you also won't have a plan to evacuate kids from London (Operation Pied Piper, 1939) before you declare war - then you can easily be scared and coerced by Hitler or other dictators, who can see clearly that your "deterrent" is a complete bluff and totally, pathetically useless, because a weapon you can't use is not a credible deterrent. Naturally, as we keep repeating on this blog, this is what the defeatists who love Putin and other dictators want since surrender has two vital steps: (1) get rid of the shield (civil defense) since that makes the sword credible as an alternative to disarmament, and (2) point out that a sword without a shield is an incredible deterrent that is useless, so we had better disarm (and surrender)! Arms control delusions like supposed "parity" (a balance of weapons on both sides, as if democracies need detering like dictatorships), when one side has credible civil defense and the other doesn't, is like a duel between two people, similarly armed, but with one wearing body armour and the other totally unprotected! Not on that, but the dictator is the one

wearing the body armour!

DEBORAH SHAPLEY, SCIENCE, v 194, 10 Dec 1976,

issue 4270, pp. 1141-1145:

Soviet Civil Defense: Insiders Argue Whether Strategic Balance is Shaken

An emotionally charged debate, which is now erupting into the public arena, has been raging within the American in- telligence community about the Soviet Union's ability to protect its leadership, industry, and population in the event of an all-out nuclear war with the United States.

Some high officials believe that the Soviet Union is becoming so well forti- fied through its civil defense program that it could survive and recover from a nu- clear war. Therefore, they assert, the strategic balance between the two coun- tries, which has governed foreign policy and arms control for over a decade, has been upset.

But this conclusion is hotly contested in some quarters, and one official simply calls it *‘a joke.”

No matter who is right, the con- troversy seems to be rekindling dis- cussion of whether the United States should step up its civil defense effort.

The evidence that a massive, acceler- ated civil defense effort is under way in the Soviet Union is hotly disputed, but government officials who believe this is taking place cite the following to support their case:

> A gigantic, 7- to 8-million-square- foot factory hidden under a mountain, **west of the Urals and east of Moscow”’ of which the stacks, blast doors, and service roads are the only visible ele- ments. Others have also been found.

> Population shelters near apartment complexes in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. These look like dirt mounds, but they have ventilation panels on top and stairwells on the side.

>» About 40 underground grain silos whose reserves are replenished period- ically to prevent spoilage.

> Approximately 30,000 blast-proof and fallout-proof shelters to protect mili- tary equipment, troops, and communica- tions. These include approximately 75 hardened underground facilities in the

Altunin is said to have 78 generals under him whom American sources can identi- fy by name.

> New industrial plants in dispersed locations away from urban centers. The patterns of development follow those outlined in Soviet civil defense manuals. Several underground facilities have also been found, apparently designed to shel- ter the work force, goods, or machinery.

Within the intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is said to be most skeptical of claims that the above findings, and other evidence, add up to a civil defense effort that milita- ry strategists and foreign policy-makers need worry about. Opposing this view is the Air Force Intelligence Service, which found some of the new evidence and which adheres to the view that the program is large enough to threaten na- tional security. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which oversees the in- telligence bureaus of the armed services and which is officially responsible for information on Soviet strategic targets, has taken a middle position.

The discussion has spread to Con- gress, where members and key staffers have received sometimes conflicting briefings, and where emotions are run-

ning high, both among those who think the whole argument is ridiculous and those who believe the United States is already Number Two. Calls for a U.S. civil defense effort, and for new strate- gic weapons have been issued; and the controversy shows every sign of gather- ing momentum in the coming year. While his boss was being briefed, for example, an aide to one conservative Republican said, with a gleam in his eye, “‘It was when I realized the Russians were Num- ber One, that I really began to worry.” Several congressmen have been briefed by Thomas K. Jones, a Boeing Aerospace Company employee and former member of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) staff. Jones, with his mod style of dress, plain-spoken manner, and fervent, almost religious be- lief in the issue, has become a star wit- ness at a number of hearings. He also acknowledges that he is privy to in- telligence information on the status of Soviet civil defense. Jones claims that after a nuclear war, 98 percent of the Soviet population would survive and So- viet industry would recover in 2 to 4 years, as compared with industry in the United States, which would take 12 years to recover. minent nongovernment experts have become embroiled in the con- troversy. Former Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze, one of the elder deans of the defense community, recently added legit- imacy to Jones's claims when, in an ar- ticle in the January issue of Foreign Af- fairs magazine, he included Jones’s calcu- lations of the relative weakness of U.S.

vicinity of Moscow. Bunkers for the Po- li O an i mee

— ©

ABOVE: long-haired scientist Thomas K. Jones, better known as T. K. Jones, (pictured testifying before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, in Science magazine, 10 December 1976 after his Congressional Testimony raised the wrath of crackpot Scientific American and Bulletin of Atomic Scientist fans) was the "fall guy" of Reagan's civil defense, doing the explosive tests for Boeing Corporation on Russian civil defense shelter designs and testifing on their consequences for strategic nuclear deterrence - basically debunking strategic nuclear deterrence and McNamara's/Glasstone's totally fake news on urban nuclear weapons effects entirely, since 98% of Russians would survive the US nuclear stockpile when dispersed in shelters - which inspired Cresson Kearny's Oak Ridge National Laboratory manual, Nuclear War Survival Skills. President Ronald Reagan, prior to his election as US President, was

leaked secret CIA reports on Russian civil defense tests of shelters and evidence of their tests of city evacuation plans for instance by

evacuating Sevastopol in Crimea and also, in 1975, Lytkarino (a suburb of Moscow containing 40,000 people). A clue to who helped him was shown by Reagan's decision to controversially appoint T. K. Jones as Under-Secretary for Defense for Research and Engineering! A book was then published called With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, ignoring the key scientific evidence entirely, and merely trying to ridicule Reagan's appoinment of T. K. Jones (who is quoted on the front cover), as a left wing Democratic supporting political instrument - like Duncan Campbell's similarly vacuous War Plan UK. This was left-politics

versus hard science. It often appears to work because Mr Joe Public loves a tall-story fairy tale!

If proof of this is needed, Robert Scheer, a fellow in arms control at Stanford University and the author of With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, became "Truthdig" editor-in-chief, a propagandarist who claims that ending WWII with nuclear weapons made Truman guilty of "the most atrocious act of terrorism in world history", so he needs to check his facts on the numbers gassed in the Holocaust, or starved in Ukraine by Stalin, unless he denies those deliberate acts of terrorism like the other left wing Holocaust deniers who confuse racism and anti-racism, terrorism and anti-terrorism. When you actually check the facts: (1) Secretary Stimson (U.S. Secretary of War) knew he has a secret nuclear weapons program of investment of billions of dollars to justify to Congress after WWII ended and didn't want to hold back using the bomb for that reason, so he promoted Hiroshima as being a military target (it did have military bases, particularly at Hiroshima Castle just north of ground Zero, but it was also a highly populated civilian city), (2) Hiroshima's air raid shelters were unoccupied because Japanese Army officers were having breakfast when B29s were detected far away, says Yoshie Oka, the operator of the Hiroshima air raid sirens on 6 August 1945, (3) Colonel Tibbets, former bomber of Germany before becoming the Hiroshima pilot as commander of the 509th Composite Group, explains how his pilots and crew were ridiculed heavily for lack of accomplishments, while preparing for weeks on Tinian Island. According to Tibbet's own book The Tibbets Story a poem was published before Hiroshima called "Nobody knows" lampooning the 509th's results: "Nobody knows. Into the air the secret rose; Where they're going, nobody knows; Tomorrow they'll return again; But we'll never know where they've been. Don't ask us about results or such; Unless you want to get in Dutch. But take it from one who is sure of the score, the 509th is winning the war. When the other Groups are ready to go; We have a program of the whole damned show; And when Halsey's 5th shells Nippon's shore; Why, shucks, we hear about it the day before. And MacArthur and Doolittle give out in advance; But with this new bunch we haven't a chance; We should have been home a month or more; For the 509th is winning the war." Tibbets was therefore determined create maximum effects after his group had been ridiculed at Tinian Island for not attacking Japan during weeks of preparations on the island, rehearsing the secret nuclear attacks while other B29s were taking took flak trying to bomb Japan into surrender with conventional bombs. He writes in The Tibbets Story that regular morning flights of small groups of weather and phototographic survey planes that did not make significant attacks over possible nuclear target cities, helped to reduce civil defense readiness in the cities, as well as reducing the air

defense risks, since Japan was rationing its use of its limited remaining air defense in 1945.

The November 1976 Scientific American anti-civil defense article claimed that civil defense was discredited since: "In the 1960s the US adopted a strategic policy giving top priority to the prevention of nuclear war through deterrence ...", to which Wigner and Broyles responded to this claim in "We heartily disagree" in the July-August 1977 Journal of Civil Defense: "How do you deter an attack unless

you convince an enemy that you will fight the war that he is starting?"

Dictators often start wars which their people don't need: the Persian war against the Greeks, Hannibal's war against Rome, the Tartar's invasions of Europe, the Turks' invasion of Hungary, the invasions of Napoleon. You have to accept that aggression is not necessarily a completely rational activity! All that counts for deterrence is that it is credible. If you don't prepare to fight with strategic nuclear weapons, then they are just a pointless bluff, a paper tiger as the Chinese put it, not a credible deterrent. Which is precisely what the disarmers want, of course, since nuclear parity, with the shift away from credible nuclear deterrence to incredible foolery, is only one step away from

admitting the uselessness of the strategic nuclear stockpile, disarming and surrendering! UPDATE (10 March 2022): A commenter on this blog post states:

Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union, An Interdependence Perspective on Sanctions, Springer, 1991, by David W. Hunte, pp 14-15:

Economic Sanctions: Pre-World War II Through Cold War

"In 1925, British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain stated in the League of Nations: “The great advantage of economic sanctions, is ... they do not involve the resort to force.’ The commonly held view was that economic sanctions were the perfect weapon to pressure states into compliance without blood being spilt or lives lost. By 1980, however, Adler-Karlsson had reached a different conclusion: economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy almost never worked. ... . In both Britain and France, the situation was one of

choosing the least undesirable alternative."

The reality is that "sanctions work" but not in the way intended. Sanctions against Japan resulted in the surprise attack on Pearl harbor, thus war, escalating into nuclear war against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Sanctions against Nazi Germany resulted in invasions to seize wealth, and war. Sanctions against Saddam's Iraq ended in a Gulf War. So

much for sanctions being a proved alternative to deterrence.

Just one final thought on Kennedy's experience: apart from putting civil defense "nuclear shelter" signs on public building basements and putting geiger counters, food, water and emergency toilets into them to enable America to take shelter if the chips go down, apart from sending his brother to Nevada test site to watch the test firing of the W54 Davy Crocket battlefield tactical nuclear deterrent weapon in 1962, apart from standing firm on the Cuban blockage in October 1962 (instead of appeasing Khrushchev, and note that the obsolete pile of junk he removed from Turkey, the highly vulnerable liquid-fuelled old Jupiter missiles, were obsolete anyway and due to be replaced by less vulnerable Polaris sub in the Med), and apart from approving the final series of high altitude nuclear tests, Operation Fishbowl, which revealed the magnetic dipole EMP, Kennedy also rejected the economic trade sanctions against the USSR which could have forced

another war like the sanctions of the 1930s:

President John F. Kennedy, “U.S. Grain Dealers to be Allowed to Sell Wheat to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.” U.S. Department of State Bulletin, v49, 1963, p.660-661: "It demonstrates our willingness to relieve food shortages, to reduce tensions, and to improve relations with all countries and it shows that peaceful agreements with the United States which serve the interests

of both sides are a far more worthwhile course than a course of isolation and hostility."

by JOHN F NEDY

(The Inevitable Result of the Slowness of Conversion of

the British Democracy from a Disarmament to a Rearmament Policy.)

An answer to Winston Churchill's WHILE LNGLAND SLEPT,

PREFACE

This thesis is a study devoted to one phase

TABLE OF CONTE NTS of the most controversal subject in modern diplomacy -

See Sree Part I, Period of Disarmament Policy

5 Chapter I Fundamental Beliefs of the the intensity of the hates and bitternesses that have British Public Regarding

Armaments. Page 1

The word controversal does not fully express ~

colored evaluations of the Pact. This has been due

Chapter II Influence of the Financial to the fact that Munich was regarded as decisive in Crisis on Disarmament,

1931-1932. Page 14

I - F the battle between Democracy and Fascism or this Chapter III Tarlusdee oo ane Geral

Disarmament Conference on REDIT: JFK LIBRARY); notice the statenténf+2" Armaments, 1953. Page 30

ness of the conversion of thé British ~Y ee ee eet

the litical facts and dgments uo! ABOVE: John f Renhedy's Why England Slepr manuscript dated 25 May 1940 ¢ which Munich was founded have been buried by a cloud

above right t that his conclusion is that the war was the inevitable res result, of the sloy of political emotionalism. In the debate

disarmament nt po olicy ints into a a policy, of rearmament! John FJ Kennedy's S Coilets thesis on the need for deterrence and civil defence tomake'* *97** Ss , Chapter V Inf f the General it credible Tieecs Lspanasireee a eeeaicn (a big.stick in the hands of a goliath is useless if the enemy is a David with Election; Pinal Phase of

Disarmament Period. Page 65

slingshot that,can,stun, the, gqliathwith.a stone to the,forehead, allowing victory, so you need some defensive armour to make the big stick

a credible deterrentsathen.than mere:bluffthat canibe easily:neutralised by any smaller enemy due to your vulnerabilitiés), Wi Englanthesmament Polley

Slept, is stiHeworthntore*thar allethessarictions and i ie Pap as written, explaining his often forgotten speech on Civil peer sl "eee F Page 82

defence as #HAtional Hebdssity for Credible déterrencvor war givena8 United States President to a Joint Sessien.ofGongress siowness of Fulfillment of

precisely 27 year¥ faterto thé day from the Completion of his Bok (speech on 25) ay 1961, precisely 21 years to theday aftertnee ae eee eS

25 May 1946 date’ on his manuscript above : ita nary is | i ~ see the vn iii i Sag Page 113 the documents and reports are still secret; until they

"No role irhistér eéald be hore diffiebile or nfreimportant) We stand for freedom. ... | am here to promote the freedom" Page 140

doctrine. .. the WdveFSuriés Uf freedoIi se serd JARS, Witaths: did, eehnicians

fighting is Peqitees, Bia usually de done by ¥ others by guerrillas striking at night,

nich Pact itself should asi be the object of criticism taken the ives of four thousand civil officers in the las twelve months in Vietnam alone - by subversives and saboteurs and

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and propaganda to every troubled-area. But where

by assassins striking alone - assassins who have

insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent uatens ... We stand, as we have always stood from our earliest beginnings, for the independence and equality of all nations. This nation was born of revolution and raised in freedom. And we do not intend to leave an open road for despotism. ... Military pacts cannot help nations whose social injustice and economic chaos invite insurgency and penetration and subversion. The most skillful counter-guerrilla efforts cannot succeed

where the local population is too caught up in its own misery to be concerned about the advance of communism. ...

"One major element of the national security program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but from national inaction in which most of us have participated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference and skepticism ... this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century, is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable - as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed - but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe. Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nation-wide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of large-scale nuclear attack. Effective performance of the entire program not only requires new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements. Therefore, under the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, I am assigning responsibility for

this program to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense ... no insurance is

cost-free; and every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves whether this form of survival insurance

justifies the expenditure of effort, time and money. For myself, I am convinced that it does."

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ABOVE: Hitler propaganda and coercion so called peace offers in October 1939 and March 1940, because he knew that Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, was keen on trying to negotiate a peace deal with the Nazis rather than face up to a repeat of WWI, particularly after Britain's defeat in France at Dunkirk in the face of the overpowering German Panzer attacks (radio propaganda, aided by plenty of whisky and cigars, from Churchill portrayed this retreat and evacuation from Europe as being a miracle, but although losses were minimised - thanks not to Churchill's planning but to emergency improvised evacuation across the channel using small private boats from England - Hitler won the actual battle and successfully drove the British Expeditionary Force from France). Russia in the 1st Cold War set up the World Peace Council in Moscow to fund and help Western nuclear disarmament movements to try to make its domination of the West possible by removing W79 neutron bombs etc, leaving us without a credible deterrent against Russian

invasions. It simultaneously made peace propaganda offers to end war by collaboration with dictatorships, an offer that appealed to many

idealists who believed it, as Lord Halifax believed Hitler's repeated peace lies. We can expect Putin to make peace promises as a

propaganda tool. If he actually wanted peace he would not have invaded Ukraine.

March 14, 2022 5:04 PM GMT https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-says-prospect-nuclear-conflict-back-within-realm- possibility-over-2022-03-14/

U.N. chief: prospect of nuclear conflict back 'within realm of possibility! over Ukraine By Humeyra Pamuk

March 14 (Reuters) - United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Monday sounded the alarm over Russia raising the alert level [weeks ago] for its nuclear forces after invading Ukraine, describing it as a "bone-chilling development." "The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility," Guterres told reporters, and repeated his call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Russia's invasion of Ukraine that began on Feb. 24 has so far sent more than 2.8 million people fleeing across Ukraine's borders and trapped hundreds of thousands in besieged cities while triggering broad Western sanctions on Russia. [Actually, the so-called UN, better called the non-united nations, contributed to the war by its repeated calls for nuclear disarmament, which has had precisely the effect John F. Kennnedy found when he wrote Why England Slept from his experience in London with his dad, the American Ambassador to Britain, when deterrence failed due to Nazi propaganda on war devastation and poison gas on cities for disarmament, defeatism, and a Third Reich conquest using a minimal military force.)

https://www.ft.com/content/6cf7229b- 1aa7-435e-84d9-e3c7a094350d#post-5a7c0648-f48b-4cfb-al 63-95b922713201 Financial Times, 16 March 2022. Zelensky pleads with Biden for no-fly zone or fighter jets. James Politi in Washington. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky pleaded for the US to enforce a no-fly zone or provide fighter jets or other means to fend off Russia’s attack on his country, in a virtual address to members of Congress on Wednesday. Zelensky urged US lawmakers to impose harsher economic sanctions on Moscow ... He called on Americans to remember the attacks on Pearl Harbor and September 2001, saying “our country is experiencing the same thing every day right now”, and showed a video of the missile attacks and shelling destroying Ukrainian cities. ... At the end of his address, Zelensky directly addressed US president Joe Biden in English, saying: “I wish you to be the leader of the world. Being the leader of the world means to be the leader of peace.” (Loon's "peace" is the nuclear deterrent-lacking world of 1914 or 1939.)

BANK OF JAPAN BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA survivors extinguished fire with water buckets.

U. 8S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan Sueet No. 2

Building No.: 24, Coordinates: 5H. Distance from wee ste a gg os branch. The Former Bank of Japan, Hirashima Branch was representative of Hiroshima’s historical buildings in the early Showa

period, with an outstanding classical-style appearance. Despite being exposed to the A-bombing a mere 380 meters from CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN the hypocenter of the A-bomb, thanks to its sturdy structure, the bank still remains it appeared when first built, Type: Reinforced-concrete frame (steel core). Since the armored shutters on the first and second floors were closed at the time of the A-bombing, the the interior was was REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of not badly damaged. However, the third floor, where the shutters were open, was completely burned. Only two days lat two days later Pg : . on August 8, 1945, the Bank of Japan reopened for withdrawals and provided space for temporary branches of other second story and in entire third story. No fire in Herealnemuicns te cneahens Civ eter had bean ended anebia in conduer hunineta hice ate neanen ne bombed building that conveys its history of support for the reconstruction of Hiroshima from a financial aspect. Fire in room in second story extinguished with water jt was used as a bank until 1992; Hiroshima City now rents it. It is mainly used as a gallery and visitors are welcome buckets. inside during exhibitions. www.arch-hiroshima.netyarch-hiroshima/arch/delta_center /nichigin_e.hitm| This was built as a branch of Nippon Ginko, Japan's central bank, in 1936 designed by NAGANO Uheiji. The exterior is in the Renaissance style with lonic columns. The entrance, which used to have an office area and bank counters, has an expanding space of a vaulted ceiling. The interior ornaments were lost at the time of the A-bombing.

http Jiwww.hiroshima-navi.or.jp/enisightseeing/hibaku_ireihiitatemono/21383.php

toe es cma er

building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours.

LA-14066-H History

Tracing the Origins of the W76: 1966-Spring 1973 (U)

Betty L. Perkins

November 3, 2003

7. Yield: The Confetti Argument

Agnew felt that the yield of the W68 was too low to be really effective. In addition, in terms of the overall total yield available from all the W68 warheads, the W68 design was very costly in terms of the amount of required special nuclear materials.

In an April 1972 TWX to Assistant Director for Safety and Liaison (Division of Military

_ Application) Colonel Robert T. Duff, Agnew reported that he was worried about maintaining the

U.S. nuclear deterrent. Agnew noted, “It occurs to me that as we go to lower and lower yields in Our strategic missile warheads and the Soviet Union builds up a better and better civil defense position, the reality of this deterrent may become questionable.

(b)(3)

‘If the Soviet leadership believes

“This, then our strategic deterrent Will have tost a-good-deal of its force. If our MIRV trend

continues we'll be threatening to throw confetti at a potential aggressor. Confetti has high penetration and survivability but little deterrent power. _

In a letter dated October 10, 1972, to Giller, at that time Assistant General Manager for National Security, Agnew again noted several reasons why low yield warheads might not be the best solution for maximizing the deterrence capability of the stockpile. He reported that considering the number of required submarines and the low efficiency in their use of special nuclear material, the low-yield warheads were not very cost effective. Moreover, Agnew pointed out that for the Hiroshima device, the effects on Hiroshima in terms of loss of substantial buildings and the people in them “wasn’t all that impressive.” In terms of loss of life, the USSR had lost more than ten million people in WWIL Although the Soviets had an extensive civil- defense network in place, even if that did not work to reduce loss of civilian lives, the Soviets

wind aalet net ented Daates « Baces een A Hn Ol Be Se ne

MUBUL INA LULU IUD @ 1CW PCOPIC. Agnew WIole, “Again, lO Me, 10 conunue to increase | warhead numbers at the cost of a decrease in vield ner warhead could eventuallv lead to no

ABOVE: Hiroshima ground zero showing surviving concrete buildings amid the debris from now-obsolete wood frame (with tiled roof)

buildings that burned in a firestorm that developed 30 minutes after the bombing, not instantly as claimed in approximately 100% of newspaper and TV fake news propaganda on nuclear weapons for disarmament - a Los Alamos nuclear weapons jobsworth and coward called Dr Harold Agnew exposed only in SECRET classified documents the exaggerations of nuclear weapons effects on people on modern concrete city buildings in Hiroshima with a "Confetti argument" - see the originally SECRET Los Alamos report LA- 14066-H, Tracing the Origins of the W76: 1966-Spring 1973 (U) by Betty L. Perkins, thereby preventing widespread public understanding of the truth, and so enabling anti-nuclear media dominating anti-civil defence pro-disarmament pro-dictatorship liars to deceive the world about nuclear weapons capabilities just as the 30s poison gas media dominating anti-civil defence pro-disarmament pro- dictatorship liars to deceive the world about the Nazi threat to gas bomb all modern cities, etc. This anti-nuclear disarmament propaganda effort is still covering-up the hard scentific facts on nuclear radiation effects for everything from medicine to nuclear power, such as the extensive evidence (see the graph below from the still-maintained website of U.S. Government's radium dial painter dos-effects

project investigator, the late Dr Robert E. Rowland, 1923-2017) that there is a dose-rate threshold for cancer of approximately 100

micro-Sieverts per hour or 10 mR/hour in old units (from an intake of 100 microcuries of radium-226 alpha emitter or its

equivalent), summarised as follows by study leader Dr Robert Rowland in his published 1995 Oral History interview:

"Two of the things that most people haven't realized on the induction of malignancies by radium deposited in a human [are], one, how few there are and, two, the fact that, whether we like it or not, they are the best definition of a threshold relationship that I've ever come across. ... an initial systemic intake of less than about 75 microcuries of radium that's systemic intake, which is one-fifth of the total intake has never induced a malignancy, either bone sarcoma or carcinoma of the air cells. ... [Radium-226 radiation dose threshold for effects is] 75 microcuries, systemically, which is five times that in terms of oral ingestion, or 75 if you inject it with a needle in the vein. ... if you quote rem, 20,000 [assuming relative biological effectiveness, RBE = 20 for alpha particles, i.e. alpha dose in rem or cSv = 20 x alpha dose in rads or cGy]. ... I mean, I [grew] up with the idea that 600 rad, to the whole body, was lethal. And then I go talking about, "But we've never seen a malignancy under 20,000 rem, or 1,000 rads, of radiation." You know, you don't even get a malignancy, yet you kill someone with 600 rads! ... This population of people we've measured, if we line them up in order of initial systemic intake, how much radium got into the bloodstream, and put them in pecking order — of the 2,400, all of the malignancies occur in the highest 280 cases. The lower 2,100 cases, nothing. All of it occurs right there. ... which is another way of saying, "It sure looks like a threshold relationship." ... As you well know, several years ago, it was proposed that the radium levels in drinking water be changed significantly upward. ... It's one of these mandates of our Congress that have insisted that a certain level was God-given, and we had better not have more than that in our water. ... And, incidentally, you may not be aware, radium in water is causing a big problem, not in drinking, [but] in the oil industry ... When you pump oil, water comes up. That comes from way down, and it's loaded with radium. ... If you own an oil well that has four miles of pipe going down, each one 30 feet long and 3 inches in diameter, when they scale up [with calcium carbonate deposits] you don't throw them

[away], you pull them and clean them out. This went on for years, until somebody discovered they contained radium in the scale."

Note the two red lines drawn on this plot; the vertical line is drawn at the year 1926, the horizontal one at an Initial Systemic Intake value of 100 uCi. There are no malignancies (red diamonds) in or after 1926, indicating that no dial painter who started after this date ever experienced one of the known radium-induced malignancies. There are no red diamonds below the horizontal line drawn at 100 uCi, indicating that an intake of greater than 100 uCi is required to induce the radium-induced malignancies.

The complete measurement of radium in the body of a dial painter yields two values, one for Ra-226 and one for Ra-228. Since the ratio of Ra-228 to Ra-226 might vary with each batch of paint being used, it was not possible to compare radium cases on the basis of the quantity of radium within the body. What was needed was a method of defining a “radium equivalent”, so all measured cases could be expressed in the same units. It has been determined that, per microcurie (uCi) of intake, Ra-228 is 2.5 times as effective as Ra-226 in inducing bone sarcomas. Thus a unit, Initial Systemic Intake’, may be used to define the risk of the induction of a bone sarcoma in a given dial painter. It is the sum of the activity of Ra-226, in Ci, that entered the body plus two and a half times the activity of Ra-228, in uCi, that entered the body.

https://digital.library.unt.edu/search/?q3=%22Rowland%2C%20R.% 20E.%228&t3=untl agent&src=ark&searchType=advanced

Rowland, R. E., Stehney, A. F., and Lucas, H. F., Jr.: Dose-response relationships for female radium dial workers, Rad. Research, 76: 368-383 (1978).

Stehney, A. F., H. F. Lucas, R. E. Rowland. Survival times of women radium dial workers first exposed before 1930. In: Late Biological Effects of lonizing Radiation. proceedings of |.A.E.A. Symp., Vienna 1: 333-351. (1978).

Stehney, A. F. Survival times of pre-1950 U.S. women radium dial workers. Proceedings of the International Seminar "Health effects of internally deposited radionuclides: emphasis on radium and thorium", Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 149-155. (1994).

Rowland, R. E. Radium in Humans: A Review of U. S. Studies. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne Ill. (1994).

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc708597/

SOURCE: http://www.rerowland.com/Dial_Painters.pdf

SYSTEMIC INTAKE IN MICROCURIES

10000 +

1000 -

100 -

0.01 + 1910

PRE-1950 FEMALE DIAL PA

1920 YEAR OF ENTRY INTO THE DIAL |

Pe

.

*

1,468 radi exposed t particles; years) anc particles; years).

1930

Me << = Si [< . | ‘ii 7777S) =e

h

a ma

vi

Housing damage DERIVATION OF THE BRITISH EXPLOSIVES SAFETY DISTANCES

JARRETT, DE. (1968). Derivation of the British explo- Annals of the New York Academy of DERIVATION OF THE BRITISH EXPLOSIVES sives safety distances. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 152(art 1), S@@nces D. EB. Jarrett® © SAFENV DISTANCES 18 Volume152, Issuel Ministry of Defence D. E. Jarrett October 1968 United Kingdom Fitst published: October 1968 A scaling relation for blast damage to housing has been Pages 18-35. iven by Jarrett (1968): given by Jarrett ( ) 1, RESPONSIBILITY pws Cube-root damage Explosives are manufactured and stored in Britain by private industry and the R=>——— = Government, the former being mainly interested in mining explosives and pyro- Lx: (2p) scaling becomes technics, and the latter normally in military explosives. The coordinating body for determining safety distances is the Explosives

valid for high yields! Storage and Transport Committee (E.S.T.C.) which prescribes safety distances : : . applicable for both the civil and military interests (E.S.T.C. 1943) and recom- hai on piacere a Mba eeu RED T TK and mends other safety practices for military explosives. This Committee is a fair a constant. Lhe constant # detines the degree of damage = analogue of the Armed Services Explosives Safety Board. which may be expected to the average British dwelling . house. It is based on the analysis of damage in 24 well- 2. Basis documented explosions and in wartime bombing. The fol-

lowing categories of damage are defined: In determining safety distances, the approach has been:

(1) to assume that an explosion will take place at some time,

(2) to arrive at an acceptable degree of risk to persons or damage to prop- k erty in such an event.

The term ‘Safety Distance’ is somewhat of a misnomer in that the layman Almost complete demolition 9.5 assumes that once outside the safety distance there is no danger to persons or 50—75% external brickwork destroyed or 14 property. Since all the variables that determine safety are continuous with dis- rendered unsafe and requiring demolition tance, this is rarely, if ever, true. Certainly in a small country like Britain, it is Cc Houses uninhabitable — partial or total 24 impossible always to use distances at which the effects are negligible, and for collapse of roof, partial demolition of one or many types of explosive, damage beyond the safety distance may be extensive.

: Seoul ed Lead The more familiar term quantity-distance seems preferable and will be used for two external walls, severe damage to Load- the remainder of this paper.

bearing partitions requiring replacement Probably the first systematic experimentation on determination of quantity-

Example: 2 Mt yield, of which distance relationships was carried out by Burlot (1932), and it is not thought that

any of his conclusions have been discounted, although some of the explosives

50% is blast (i.e. | Mt blast) tested will not be found in modern military usage.

The existing quantity-distance relationships date from 1948 onwards, the Bur- lot data having been much extended by data derived from statistical analysis of

gives A radius of 2.34 miles, B war damage, from subsequent trials, and latterly by exchange of information of 3.45 miles, C of 5.91 miles. "™*t" NATO countries.

ABOVE: Blast duration effects on cube root scaling are only important at low yields, not high yields, as observed for house damage in

De

Britain, based on actual observations, not faked "theoretical analyses" used for propaganda for anti-nuclear disarmament scare mongering,

which is designed to try to discredit civil defense using lies in order for disarmament and surrender to be the "only option" for survival.

The blood of the Ukrainian kids must be partly on the hands of those who permitted the circulation of nuclear deterrent lies to remove Ukaine's nuclear deterrent against Russian aggression. What a terrible people keep the truth secret, thereby allowing public deceptions by political left-wing thugs for nuclear disarmament to enable dictatorships to launch lethal invasions with effective impunity. Other warhead histories by Betty Perkins include LA-13755-H: Tracing the Origins of the Modern Primary: 1952-1970 (U), LA-12950-H: Why Nougat? (U) Understanding the Events Leading to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's First Full-Scale

Underground Test Series and Related Considerations (U), and LA-12393-H: The 1959-1961 TA-49 Experiments and Related Considerations (U).. Don't expect to ever see anything like this published on the front page of any Western so-called newspaper or as the lead item in any Western TV "news" show. They carefully screen out anything that upsets the nuclear warmongers who don't care about provoking another war through disarmament lies, as they did in the 20s and 30s, because the Western public want to be protected from reality until it breaks through their comfort zone and kicks their ass, as happened to Ukraine after it surrendered its nuclear deterrent for loads of lies on a piece of paper which has now proved no more valuable than worthless

paper peace promise which Hitler signed on 30 September '38.

ABOVE: in 1979, the basic data on yield, weight and configuration of various nuclear devices including data on the primary stages Swan (Redwing-Inca, 15.2 kt W45, 11.6 by 22.8 inches, 105 Ib; also tested as the primary stage inside the successful 360 kt Redwing-Mohawk thermonuclear test) and Swallow (Redwing-Kickapoo, 1.49 kt, 8 by 28 inches, 225 lb), and megaton range thermonuclear device Bassoon (Mk41 Redwing-Tewa, 5.01 Mt, 87% fission, 39 by 135.5 inches, 15,735 Ib; and in its cleaner form Redwing-Zuni, 3.53 Mt, 15% fission, 39 by 135.5 inches, only weighing 12,158 lb due to replacement of U238 with lead, which - contrary to populist myths - is not entirely useless or inert since lead does undergo a beryllium-like (n,2n) reaction for T+D fusion neutrons with energy exceeding 10 MeV, with the (n,2n) lead neutron cross-section reaching 2 barns for 14.1 MeV neutrons), and the use of plastic foams to reflect and channel X-rays for the ablative compression of thermonuclear fusion stages, with tested design results (rated in megatons per metre length of fusion cylindrical stage), was disclosed in report UCRL-4725, Weapon Development During June, 1956. This was after having been mistakenly declassified 4 years earlier, on 30 July 1975. Only 56 copies of this secret report were printed, and the whole report was declassified accidentally when only pages 23-29 should have been released. Bassoon worked like the Mike and Castle devices, which were basically Teller 1946 Classic superbomb cylinders of thermonuclear fuel ignited at one end, but sideways compressed by x-ray ablative compression on the cylindrical surface rather than end-on heating through a beryllium shield as Teller has envisioned in 1946, utilizing a relatively low yield fission primary stage to initiate the thermonuclear burn. Howard Agnew told Richard Rhodes (Dark Sun, 1995) that in the 1952 Mike device, a layer of plastic foam was attached to the lead lining on the inside of the casing of weapons to act as "x-ray mirrors", preventing the ablative blow-off of metal into the radiation channel by x-rays. However, the British designer - Brian Taylor - of the first successful 1.8 megaton spherical secondary stage test in 1957 on TV recently reported that their devices used plastic foams filling the entire x-ray radiation channel, in order to allow isotropic (uniform from all directions) ablation of the pusher around the spherical fusion stage, which would be harder to achieve by x-ray mirrors than was the case for the simpler cylindrical geometry of the fusion stage used by Teller in Mike. According to the June 1967 Sandia Corporation's originally secret thermonuclear weapons development history (extract below), the new Los Alamos Maniac I computer's first task in 1952 was to determine "... the flow of

radiation pressure along channels between fission and fusion components of the bomb ..."

Fri., May 18, 1979 tnt

HEU ___“xt| Revealing report on H

[itm document contains 29 pages.

mere’) Nas Aeclassified by m UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Radiation Laboratory, Livermore Site By Brian J. Kelly atomic “trigger bombs”

Livermore, California Chieago Sun-Times thermonuclear fusion reac’

CHICAGO — The power, or yield, and yield-te

Compost Mo. W-7008-eng-48 declassified a report of mid-1960s hydrogen bomb tests that Rotow said one impo

is more revealing “by a factor of 100” than the discussion of “fuel dimensi

magazine article that the government is trying to suppress,a material in the bombs. Affi aoe for the American Civil Liberties Union says. a key element in understa report,

discovered in the Los Alamos, Scientific Library, ACLU obstruction of justice in ¢ aust! 1%) aad canes epuse he detent feta union cara Declassification of the report was called a “serious error July 12, 1956 by Energy Department officials.

The library subsequently was closed to Rotow, who found

WEAPON DATA

Rotow, 23, said that although he had not read the Progressive's article, by Howard Morland, he was familiar from court records with the kind of information it

goes far beyond just a scientific discussion of ' thermonuclear weapons,” he said. “It goes far beyond RESTRICTED DATA Morland. It contains the results of actual detonations of

This document Contains restricted data a® defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Me teanemuttal of the disclosure of th Contents in any mone r to an ane evibertized person is prohibited,

a contains concepts that are confidential under the Atomic $43." ¢ :* Energy Act. A federal judge agreed with the government

a preliminary injunction stopping publication. The case is on

* OE ee Lawipy Commission

i

had

Chicago Sun-Times ua and was now reclassified as “secret restricted data.” BOTH ‘SECRET’ AND ‘DECLASSIFIED’ STAMPS WERE ON COVER $ not an ke Researcher: report more revealing than controversial article —— said. “This was just a very bed instance.

Fon (UCRL) 4725, tg age during

une 1956,” declassified , 1975.

Shooting victim is identified P pena thang mya ge omen ov The Contra Costa County coroner southwest of Martinez. declassification order specified that only pages 23 through 29

today identified a body found near a A coroner's spokesman said it were to be declassified and that “a clerk apparently made a

adie

country road as that of Michael Allan Frantz had been shot in the mistake.”

i and dumped beside the road = The document is a status report detailing results of Ser ora —" 1 less than 24 hours before he was found. ongoing experiments on nuclear weapons tests for June 1956

Se | The sheriff's department is investi. — during the early stages of H-bomb development. . =, ating the death. There are descriptions of the Swan and Swallow, two

aa

UNCLASSIFIED (ec A UNCLASSIFIED es

DCS FILE

Double layer of plastic x-ray baffles used in the 1956 Redwing XW-27 test

Rather than the x-rays simultaneously compressing the whole cylinder (which is what Hansen and Morland show in their illustrations, ignoring the time factor), the thermonuclear burning wave - if the x-rays are slowed down by plastic foam filling the radiation channel - propagates along the cylinder beginning at the end nearest the primary stage: by having a sufficient "spark plug" of fissile material in the core (both to irradiate compressed LiD with neutrons, fissioning some of the lithium into tritium, and also to provide heat to initiate fusion in the compressed fusion fuel), a self-sustaining burning wave could be established, so that you could increase the yield simply by making the cylinder longer (the Bassoon was increased up to 25 megatons in the W41, five times the Tewa test yield!). In such a design, the role of plastic foam blocking the radiation channel, is to deliberately prevent the rather limited primary stage x-ray energy yield from being diluted excessively by flowing over the vast surface of the secondary stage cylinder, which would reduce the compression and lead to

secondary stage fizzle. The whole point of the hydrogen bomb is to get away from the critical mass yield-limiting problem of fission

weapons, and you can't do that if there is no way to control the spread of the vital x-ray radiation from a primary stage when you have a very large secondary stage to compress. The diagram below applies to the basic W41, but note that the neutron shield between the primary and secondary stage is there to prevent pre-initiation of fission in the core spartplug of the secondary, cylindrical stage, but in a very clean weapon like 95% clean, 5% fission Redwing-Navajo, there is no spark plug so the neutron shield is replaced with a neutron channel to allow primary stage neutrons to fission lithium, producing tritium in the secondary stage, prior to its compression. Furthermore, Bassoon's 15% and 87% fission yield versions showed the effect on both bomb yield and mass of replacing the U238 ablative pusher around the fusion clyinder with lead to make it much cleaner. The results showed that doing this drops the mass from 15,735 to 12,158 lb, while only reducing yield from 5.01 to 3.53 megatons. Moreover, while you get an area of 520 square miles giving a fallout dose over the first 50 hours of 1000 R (survivable indoors with the shielding provided by most city buildings) for the "dirty" version, this drops to only about 150 R for the "cleaner" version, for land equivalent surfaces outdoors. As a result, details of nuclear warhead designs were published in various books and articles. At this point (if not in 1949 with Fuchs, Greenglass and other spies giving Stalin the bomb "for peace"), sensible people realise that "secrecy" markings on documents sooner or later fail to protect you from dictators, so you

instead need credible nuclear deterrence and civil defense.

PLASTIC X-RAY MIRROR AND SHIELD PREVENTS PRIMARY STAGE X-RAY ENERGY BEING DILITED TO LOW ENERGY DENSITY OVER ENTIRE CYLIND!

X-RAY CHANNEL

PARTIAL FILLING OF RADIATION CHANNEL WITH X-RAY ABSORBING (AND RE-RADIATING, OR MIRRORING) PLASTIC FOAM ENABLES THE LIMITED X-RAY YIELD FROM PRIMARY STAGE (ON LEFT) TO BE CONCENTRATED ON STARTING THE FUSION BURN IN THE LIMITED SECTION OF THE SCONDARY STAGE CYLINDER NEAR THE PRIMARY STAGE, INSTEAD OF BEING DISSIPATED ALONG THE ENTIRE WEAPON CASE, WHICH WOULD REDUCE COMPRESSION AND CAUSE FAILURE.

INITIAL FUSION REGION (NOT ENTIRE CYLINDER); FUSION “BURN”, ONCE STARTED IN LIMITED REGION, THEN PROPAGATES RIGHTWARDS IN THE MANNER OF THE 1946 TELLER SUPERBOMB, BUT WITH COMPRESSION.

«

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY The W-88, a miniaturized, tapered warhead, is the mo

~ SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

105TH CONGRESS, 2d Session, REPORT 105-851, May 25, 1999

The PRC has obtained classified information on the following U.S. thermonuclear warheads, as well as a number of associated reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects the thermonu- clear warhead during reentry).

1988: PRC tests neutron bomb.

Late 1970s: PRC steals classified design information on W70 “neutron bomb.”

Mid 1990s: U.S. learns PRC acquired U.S. technical informa- tion on insensitive high explo-

Sives used in nuclear warheads. Chemical explosive

Beryllium

Plutonium-239

U.S. NUCLEAR MISSILE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED Trident D-5 SLBM Yes Peacekeeper ICBM Yes Minuteman Ill (Mark 12A) ICBM Yes Trident C-4 SLBM Yes Lance SRBM No Minuteman Ill ICBM Yes Minuteman Il ICBM No

weapon the United States has ever built. In the U.S. arsenal, it: marine-launched ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident » United States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 | well as about the theft of information regarding several other nu

he PRC has stolen U.S. design information and other for neutron bomb warheads. The PRC stole classified the neutron bomb from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. © theft of this classified information on the neutron bomb in 19

In the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on | from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The U.S. governn theft several months after it took place. The W-70 warhead may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon, or a weapon (“neutron bomb”). The PRC tested the neutron bom

he stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design monuclear weapons on a par with our own. Currently targeted on U.S. cities are based on 1950s-era nuclear wea stolen U.S. technology, the PRC has leaped, in a handful of! strategic nuclear capabilities to the more modern thermonu

The “Walk-In”

In 1995, a “walk-in” approached the Central Intelligenc« PRC and provided an official PRC document classified “Secre information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, the most moc as well as technical information concerning other thermonuc!l

The CIA later determined that the “walk-in” was direc gence services. Nonetheless, the CIA and other Intelligence C reviewed the document concluded that it contained USS. t design information.

The “walk-in” document recognized that the U.S. nucl ed the state-of-the-art against which PRC thermonuclear wa

Fusion dev

ice

2220

¢ The stolen information includes classifie

a" 7 U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including | 1998: "Wallcin’ document TI ororrroncioar warhoad in the Us. balls

CHAIN OF EVENTS "of Sines Syppec and, ening Tereny RADIATION DOSES TO UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED — CAUSE ( TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON NUCLEAR ~ (1:

INCIDENT RADIATION

NEGLIGIBLE Ob X,y —e- ton seb biological or ; Fug . RISK INCAPACITATING —~——~-—————— )—+» — Non S$ t Clinical Cytok >i damage effect Percent gq ae pees Sane we Therapy (50 rads) (3000 rads+) All Causes | n—+pt Mortality LDgp= s”—LDeg= Leukemia 30F 260 cGy ."o 338 cGy ra Genital F Neopl 10-10 sec se 10-5 sec ieee to years Dj nia > bh. irculatory i 200 250 300 350 400 45¢ Respirator Learning and Memory basa tees, MIDLETHAL (450 rads) petal Task avoidance _ CURRENT NUCLEAR RADIATION xia es . . ¢ : (Killed In Action after radiation Survival With Vitamin E CRITERIA Mean 9 fitamin E scavenges free radicals Vv in E eben? 0 100% a DOSE (rads) CASUALTY CRITERIA stems (sec) 29 18,000 immediate Permanent Incapacitation NUCLEAR WE. 10 75% 8,000 Immediate Permanent Incapacitation NATIONAL RE

(physically demanding task)

Onam 01 #10 10 100 The total body

Dose (rads) 5u% 3,000 Immediate Transient Incapacitation Sensi’ Goandiack

650 Latent Lethality the higher than

Retrograde amnesia produced on sii aed BEHAVIORAL INCAPACITATION of leukemia am passive avoidance task AS A FUNCTION OF RADIATION DOSE prostate cancer 90 . is the result of

(Wheeler & Hardy, 1983) the tests. How

Curiosity 7 4 8 Fae 20 24 28 80 tests are consic “ Statistically signi

Mean WR2721 Cancer 60 in leukemia or ¢

Pal drug used against WR 2721 Percent test participants

OF 205,000 Do OF NATURALLY

e If each par

radiation effects 40

© Most Studied Radioprotectant WR2721 reduces the radiation LD50 (lethal dose for 50%) in mice bya 99

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Modeling the Effects of Nuclear Weapons in an Urban Setting

Radiation Countermeasures Symposium An AFRRI 50" Anniversary Event

Kyle Millage, CHP, PE

15 June 2099

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We, the German Fthrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to wer with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference

and thus to contribute to assure the peace of

Europe.

Sepbencter 90, (SIP -

For a nuclear weapon, the radius of the ionized region,a, produc- M. H. OLESON, "OPERATION IVY, PROJECT 7.1, REPORT TO THE ing the electromagnetic pulse was estimated from the relation SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS FROM NUCL EXPLOSIONS," nuclear weapons test report WT-644, AD-A995 500:

4.55 x 1072 a exp {25 (1-exp (-0,1254a]} (1.2)

FIGURE 15: EMP 500 kt IVY-KING WAVEFORM FROM aS 500 KILOTON KING I\ AN pad ENIWETOK TEST IN ; effective radius, kilometers. 1982, RECORDED AT lisa siawscbinl iomioais

MAUI. OF STANDARDS, MAUI

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Page 9: "During Ranger (Nevada, January-February, 1951) large excursions were noted on a Brush recorder attached to a long wire < crystal diode. Hastily-planned measurements, using oscilloscopes, during Greenhouse (Eniwetok, early Summer, 1951) demonstrated pt

= peak electric field, volts/meter

= effective radius, feet with sharp rise times coincident with the detonation of the nuclear devices. In the Fall of 1951 (Nevada,Buster-Jangle) electromagnetic R = distance, feet effects which could be fairly well correlated with the atomic explosic , rted by stations at varying distances from the detonation be predicted reliably. were rene Low-frequency magnetic fields could not Pp ntal component points.

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uv/

ABOVE: surface burst EMP data from pages 16-17 of POR-2239 / weapon test report WT-2239, by P. J. Sykes, Jr., "Operation Sunbeam, Project Small Boy, Project Officers Report - Project 7.1.4, Transient Radiation Effects Measurements on Guidance Systems Circuits", DTIC AD-A995 378.

3.2.1 Shot Tewa, During Shot Tewa, the sixteenth of the seventeen Redwing test shots, on the aircraft was 06 naut mi (178 km) south of the detonation, at the 18,000-foot altitude which was usual for the flights. The signals received on the two fiducial antennas were both shown in the dual-beam oscilloscope, Type 333. The amplified signal from the smaller fiducial antenna, mounted inside the aircraft on the window rack, was displayed on Channel A, while Channel B displayed the signal {rom the larger antenna, mounted outside the aircraft akin.

+s Operation Redwing, Nuclear Weapon test report WT-1352 AJ. Waters, OPERATION REDWING-PROJECT 6.4 AIRBORNE ANTENNAS

MICROSECONDS

Figure 17 Shot King = National Bureau of Standards band wave form recorded at Stanford University. | sections show probable shape.

A. Glenn Jean, “National Bureau of Standards, Preliminary Report on Castle, Project No. A/419/NE DTIC report AD0338553 (partially declassified in 2(

‘burst, Bikini Atoll, 1956 (source: ADA995297)

Answering FAQs about the Nuclear Test Films

\LTY HARLEM: USS LOYALTY Upper-loop, lower-whip

n Sweep speed, 1 msec/cm

ABOVE: Dr Gregg Spriggs of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who gave Hans Rosenwinkel (producer and director) a PBS America TV interview recently (in the 2021 TV documentary on the Bravo test, called "Burning Sky", first broadcast on PBS America digital channel in the UK on 26 June 2021 after being broadcast 3 days earlier in the USA; we taped it for personal use but due to copyright cannot upload it to youtube), claiming that water spray in most Pacific nuclear tests led to yield underestimates so Bravo would be 22 megatons not 15 megatons, leading - if correct - to even greater reduction in the measured effects of nuclear weapons of given megaton yields shown in Glasstone's book: "They did their best back in the 1950s ... on Bravo they had adjusted the analysis somewhat ... when you do a shot over water, as the shock wave moves out it picks up water and it makes the shock wave heavier, so we think now that the yield of Bravo - and in fact the yield of all of the barge shots that were done in the Pacific - were about 27-50% higher than what was originally reported, so Bravo, instead of being 15 megatons, might actually have been on the order of 22 megatons!" (We're not updating the Pacific nuclear tests yield data on this blog until we see the reports with hard data on this, because the 1950s yields were also substantiated by radiological yield from fission product and actinide samples in fallout, which doesn't depend on shock wave data or fireball expansion films! However, this claim about H-bomb yields in the Pacific being underestimates is interesting, and Dr Spriggs may well have secret-classified reports hidden from public view, with more data which will eventually be declassified and become

available. If indeed the total fireball expansion-derived yields are higher, then the percentage fission yields - derived from fallout sample

Senaitivity 0,98 y/n/om

al, tape, Shot Rinconada. Figure 3.32 Experimental signal, tape, Shot Harlem

2 a

Reagan tells Soviet jokes si Fig. 12 11 megaton: xe as Paried in Wecroneconds me 3 ROMEO im yield and the fetid strength Figure 1.3 Empirical curve relating detonation yield and the period Maui, 4200 lon path Castle-Rom« # of 100 ken (#4 naut mi). —-&! the electromagnetic pulse. Sweep rate 66 useo/om

surface burs

A. P. BRIDGES, ET AL., “OPERATION DOMINIC AND FISH BOWL SERIES, PROJECT OFFIC! REPORT - PROJECT 7.1, UNDERWATER EMP", POR-2033, weapon test report WT-2033, AD-A995 288, page 9:

"The electromagnetic (EM) signz from a nuclear detonation has a waveform that has definite characteristics and is repeatable has been proposed to use this phenomena as the basis of a terminal surveillance system

for use aboard the Polaris. "

analyses - must be smaller by a similar factor, which would have huge implications for not just nuclear weapons effects but also for constants in the semi-empirical models of nuclear weapon designs for megaton yields!) He has also put some recently restored films of nuclear test explosions on youtube. The most interesting, in view of the photo of the "upright" test configuration of the 5 megaton Redwing-Tewa bomb at Bikini in 1956 (see photos at the top of this blog post for a pic of the Mk41 Tewa test prior to testing) shows the primary stage being ejected vertically upwards out of the fireball and creating a second smaller fireball above the main fireball produced by the main cylindrical secondary stage (which is heavier and nearer to the ground), an effect analogous to that seen in the 1962 Starfish test (basically the two stages are exchanging radiation which causes them to recoil apart as the weapon case vaporizes, and

the lighter primary stage gains the most velocity, due to straightforward conservation of momentum):

Operation Redwing - Tewa 37369

Operation Redwing - Tewa 37363

Nuclear lightning discharge at 25 ms after 5 megaton 87% fission Tewa

ay

Tewa’'s primary stage is ejected upwards, approaching top of fireball:

0.285 sec

Tewa’'s primary stage has > 1 second erupted out of top of main (2nd stage) fireball!

FIGURE 7-33. TEWADEVICE (D-3, HOB = 8 2’ At 001011 TRS primary stage at top of bomb is ejected out

Operation Redwing - Tewa 37373

Operation Redwing - Tewa 37376

ABOVE: Bravo's 1 kiloton x ray channeled fireball travelling in vacuum pipes towards Station 1200 at 2,286 metres (1.4 miles)

distance. Most high quality versions of films and photos showing such interesting weapons effects are still classified because they contain interesting information on the effects which are denied public viewing, along with EMP waveforms showing transit times between fission and primary stage ignitions. Station 1200 at 1.4 miles from Bravo survived 130 psi, despite being designed for just 50 psi from a yield of just 6 megatons. If Dr Gregg Spriggs is correct to claim that Bravo's real yield was 22 megatons (rather than 14.8 megatons), it will mean that a structure designed to survive 50 psi can survive at 1.4 miles from a 22 megaton bomb, which is

even more impressive than 15 megatons.

15 megaton Bravo: nuclear lightning bolt to right of fireball

1 kt of energy channeled in the 12 vacuum pipes towards Station 1200 from the Bravo bomb casing, creating the secondary fireball visible moving leftwards from ground zero in this film. Stiding Colgate in Los Alamos

Science magazine in 2003 (issue 28, 2003, Figure 1 on page 3?) explains: "Less obvious was a late worry that a ‘fireball’ of energy might travel along the pipe lines [just as X-ray energy flows like a fluid from the primary to the secondary stage within a thermonuclear weapon]. ... Later pictures showed a fireball of 1 kt equivalent energy travelling along the pipe lines..."

=

U

PDATE - 6 April 2022:

The roots of the present crisis are covered in General

SS sSir John Hackett, DSO and Bar, MC, LLD, et al., The

Third World War, Book Club Associates, 1978. Hackett

was an Australian born Oxford classics and history scholar, who went into the British Army when Hitler went off the deep end in 1939, being wounded while leading a parachute brigade against the Nazis at Arnhem. He ended up NATO Commander of the British Army on the Rhine, when he started a political war with the British Government by writing a famous letter in The Times complaining that NATO was under resourced and needed strengthening to resist Russia. He survived that by claiming he was wearing his NATO hat, not his British Army hat, when writing the letter (the British Army bans its employees from writing politics in the press, whereas NATO doesn't). After retirement he became Principal of King's College, London, and then wrote The Third World War to point out the risk of NATO weakness encouraging Russian aggression, just as he had seen happen with the Nazis in the 1930s, stating in Authors' Note and Acknowledgements

(p 359):

"Those who argue for the reduction of defence expenditure in the countries of the West .... seem to live in a land of total make-believe ... What they [Russia] have been doing is building up huge armed forces, far greater than what would be necessary, in any conceivable situation, for their own defence, at a cost gravely detrimental to domestic development ... and in a mode essentially offensive. ... We have assumed that enough is done to ensure that, when the Soviet machine travels of its own momentum along a path of miscalculation and mischance towards an attack on NATO, the West, at some cost, is able to survive. It is possible, of course, that enough will not be done. The outcome is then likely to be different. ... the free countries of the West would be in no position to withstand political pressure from the

USSR, which would enjoy the fruits of a military victory, without having to fight for it."

Hackett and associates outline what they consider the most probable nature of WWIII, pointing out (on page 31) that in 1978 only 35 out of 180 governments in the world were truly democratic, and the remainder relied on dictatorial succession or coup d' etat for changes of leadership. They assume (Appendix 5, p355) that the West has a nuclear inferiority by 4 August 1985 when they assume WWII breaks out, with 2450 ICBMs, IRBMs and SLBMs on the Russian/Warsaw Pact side, compared to just 1900 available to the West. They assume that Russian assistance to Egypt causes subversion and overthrow of Middle East countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait) in 1984, with Saudi's Sunni sect versus Iraq's Shia sect being provoked by insurgency to cause war. Russia also attacks Western assets, ships etc, leading American hawks to propose (p 282): "Why not now go over to the offensive, it was asked, and finish off forever the threat ... East Germany and Poland could be freed and the advance could be pushed forward in the Ukraine as far as the Dnieper. Control of the Ukrainian harvest and of the Dnieper hydro-electric installations would be enough to cripple any further war effort by Soviet Russia. It would be tempting to go on and liberate Georgia and control Baku, but that ... would expose too long a line of Western communications ..-" Instead, the Russian Kremlin followed President Truman's doctrine of 6 August 1945 (p 285): "They insisted on an immediate move towards the threat of nuclear action. A single atomic attack on a Western target would be enough to demonstrate their determination. A simultaneous message would be sent to the US proposing the immediate withdraw] of all foreign forces ... It was important to make it absolutely clear to the Americans that this was a single attack to demonstrate what might happen if they refused Soviet demands. It was not to be seen as an immediate prelude to a general nuclear offensive. ... Most views were fairly near the truth so far as a proposal for negotiation was concerned, but few guessed that this would be accompanied by a Hiroshima-type demonstration, or that the time-table would be as narrow and threatening as it turned out to be ... he demanded that the US should send representatives within one week ...

failing which further selective strikes would be carried out."

After the explosion, NATO retaliates with a similarly small-scale tit-for-tat nuclear strike, being constrained by escalation fears (a factor which contrary to CND propaganda, was the prime factor in all NATO Cold War plans). Hackett comments on the Cold War conflict between oppressor Russia and its victim Ukraine (p 306): "Soviet policy had always been at pains either to suppress or appease any symptoms of independence of mind on the part of Ukraine [Khrushchev gave Ukraine the Crimea in 1954]. Its enormous contribution to Soviet food supplies, its position in the front line of Soviet territory facing the West, bordering on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and

Romania, and its vast hydro-electric potential, had made it, after Russia proper, the most vital component of the [Soviet] Union."

Hackett argues (p 311) that Marxism only took root among a "group of people accustomed to absolutism", such as those in the Tsar's Russia of 1917 or Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam, and failed elsewhere, unless continuously enforced by a regime of brutality and violence. Put another war, "Marxism" was essentially successful merely because it became a mere public relations symbol or label, used as a handy excuse for excesses by dictators, just as certain religions were likewise used as mere excuses for invasions labelled Crusades or Holy wars in the past. His conclusion (p 327) is that WWIII would end Cold War Russia's role as a Western superpower, leaving China (largely a rival to Russia in the Cold War) to take its place: "After each major war this century, a great empire has melted away. After the 1914-18 war, the defeated Austro-Hungarian empire. After the 1939-45 war, the victorious British empire." The basic problem remains that relatively few countries are completely democratic and free, while many have military power. The cheap-fix of disarmament for this world is beautifully debunked by world history following the nonsense written on pages 101-2 of the 1931 book by Major Victor Lefebure, Scientific Disarmament (published by the communist Victor Gollancz's Mundanus Ltd imprint in London, with glowing Introductions by 14 disarmament "experts" including David Lloyd George and H. G. Wells): "The claim that a peacefully disposed country, highly organised for industry, with vast facilities for manufacture of all kinds, can suddenly spring from a condition of disarmament to one of intense armament appears to be untenable." (Hitler disproved him soon after being elected two years later. This book was given a lengthy

and laudatory review in The Observer on 1 March 1931 by a Major-General Sir F. Maurice!)

Update: 17 April 2022. President Biden is sending further military aid for Ukraine to fight Russia, $800 million including 500 Javelin armour penetrating missiles, two hundred M113 APCs, eleven Mi-17 helicopters, eighteen 155mm howitzers, 40,000 artillery shells, 300 switchblade drones. The problem is that this kind of proxy conventional war can drag on, devastating the country. If you remember the neutron bomb "controversy" from 40 years ago, Reagan's admin argued (1) they'd deter invasions, and (2) if some kind of accidental special military adventure/invasion occurred, then they'd swiftly stop the armour without any collateral blast, fire or fallout damage (1 kiloton enhanced radiation/reduced blast at a few hundred metres doesn't cause any damage apart from a flash of nuclear radiation to stop/deter invasions, UNLIKE conventional weapons which leave the country in ruins and hurt civilians). According to Sandia's declassified Defense Nuclear Agency Nuclear Weapons Characteristics Handbook, pages 13-15: "With the advent of the Korean War in 1950 ... our focus shifted to tactical nuclear weapons. The Mk7 bomb and the Mk9 280mm artillery fired atomic projectile were the first of these weapons. In the early 1950s we started developing nuclear warheads for short-range missiles such as the Honest John and the Corporal ... In 1962, President Kennedy directed that permissive action links (PALs) be incorporated in all NATO deployed weapons to protect against unauthorised use."' Deterrence was lost in the 90s due to lying anti-nuclear propaganda disarmament activists. Without credible nuclear deterrence, we are back to long sieges of cities, where attrition in the face of dwindling food and ammunition determines the outcome, as in the 11 month long siege of Sebastopol in Crimea, from October 1854 to September

1855, or its siege from October 1941 to July 1942 (during June 1942 alone, Germany reportedly dropped 20,528 tons or 20.5 kilotons

- more than twice the blast yield of the Hiroshima bomb - on Sebastopol, which of course goes unnoticed by the anti-nuclear

propagandarists who don't care deterring conventional war).

https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/president-zelensky-putin-russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons-b994743.html

President Zelensky warns world to prepare for Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine

The Ukraine leader called for more air raid shelters and more anti-radiation medicines

By Sami Quadri, Evening Standard, london

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said the world should be ready for the prospect of Vladimir Putin using nuclear weapons.

Speaking from the country’s capital Kyiv, Mr Zelensky voiced his fears the Russian president could also be prepared to use chemical

weapons against Ukraine.

The leader called for more air raid shelters and more anti-radiation medicines.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10726663/Increasingly-desperate-Vladimir-Putin-attack-NATO-base-stop-weapons- getting-Ukraine.html

Increasingly desperate' Vladimir Putin could attack a NATO base to stop the western weapons that are stalling his invasion from

getting to Ukrainian forces, ex-national security chief warns

Putin could strike a NATO base in order to halt the transfer of arms to Ukraine Former Government security adviser Lord Ricketts made the warning yesterday Putin may even attack aircraft or convoys headed to Ukraine from NATO, he said By JESSICA WARREN FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 19:00, 17 April 2022

Vladimir Putin could consider striking a NATO base in order to halt the transfer of arms to Ukraine, a former British security chief has warned. Lord Ricketts, the Government's first national security adviser, said yesterday that Mr Putin is becoming 'increasingly desperate to choke off the flow of arms' to Ukraine. He may even do this by attacking aircraft or convoys headed to the country from NATO, Lord Ricketts suggested. ... Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelensky said that it is important for Russia not to win any territory in the Donbas

region. ...'We shouldn't wait for the moment when Russia decides to use nuclear weapons ... We must prepare for that,' he said.

This is the place and time to once more debunk Dr Hans A. Bethe's nonsense anti-Reagan address in April 1982 to the American Physical Society, "We are not inferior to the Soviets" (published on pages 90-98 of Bethe's book The Road from Los Alamos, Touchstone, 1991). Bethe admits in table 1 of his article that the Russian empire had 2,490 ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, compared to just 2,030 American delivery systems, and also in his table 2 that the nuclear warheads on these systems amounted to 8,000 equivalent megatons on the Russian side, compared to just 5,600 American. However, he then made the totally false propaganda claim that this vastly superior Russian nuclear force "is cancelled by the lower accuracy of their missiles"! This is totally misleading "chalk versus cheese" propaganda fake news from Bethe, because the American and Russian targetting strategies were different: Russia was targetting soft targets with higher yields that don't require high accuracy, whereas America was trying to target Russian Kremlin leaders bunkers and Russian nuclear weapons in their very hard missile silos, not civilian targets, with lower yield nuclear warheads that produce less collateral civilian damage and injury, but that do require high accuracy unlike the Russian targetting strategy, and in fact America FAILED due to errors in its crater sizes predictions, a fact only discovered at the end of the Cold War! They have been trying to rectify it ever since by "converting" old surface burst tested H-bombs into underground earth-penetrator warheads that can overcome the crater predictions errors by penetrating the ground to tens of metres depth to increase the energy coupling into hardened silos and bunkers, but such converted warheads simply haven't been fully system-proof-tested to work due to the atmospheric test ban treaty! In addition, Bethe quotes Brezhnev propaganda speeches, claims falsely that neutron bombs aren't needed to deter invasions since NATO can somehow use anti-tank missiles against a concentrated tank barriage once it starts (a very dangerous gamble, disproved by numerous surprise attacks in history, and also requiring huge conventional forces mobilized at borders that repeat the 1914 world war disaster), and claims falsely that both sids already have "vast overkill capacity", which is simply not true if in a dangerous crisis one side evacuates target cities and takes to shelters before taking declaring war or taking provocative actions, as Britain did when evacuating

kids from London before declaring war in 1939!.

Bethe's book The Road from Los Alamos also contains other nonsense that make clear that he is double-talking subjective political drivel that ignores the real issues. For example, in his chapter headed "Meaningless Superiority", on page 87 he states: "There can be no victor in a nuclear war." Nuclear weapons were used in WWII and victory was declared in both European and Pacific theatres. Bethe just adds the word "nuclear" to the anti-war drivel of the 1920s and 1930s post-WWI pseudo-pacifists, who would think of gas bombs as a cheap short- cut for disarmament propaganda to close down discussions of victory, in the manner that nuclear weapons are used for this purpose today. But a war ended by a demonstration high altitude EMP effects shot which causes fewer casualties than a conventional bomb is a "nuclear wat" that evidently disproves this, and then you get into the problem of what he means by "victor". You don't necessarily engage in a war to achieve the kind of "victory" Bethe sneers at; you fight to survive as a free society. But from the left-wing political angle, all you need to say is that you believe the weapons will be used in enough quantities, on such targets to make the survivors envy the dead, and bob's your uncle: the debate closes in your favour since nobody wants such an argument. However, did Hitler drop his 12,000 tons of deadly tabun nerve agent (or his smaller sarin nerve agent stockpile) in a knockout blow to win World War IL, or did he not? Those weapons were found in 1945 when Germany was invaded, and dumped in the Atlantic. The point is, by distributing gas masks to everybody and shelters to keep the liquid droplets off the skin, the gas bomb threat was discredited. The same applies to simple fallout radiation precautions:

anything to keep fallout off the skin stops the beta burns that the Marshallese and Japanese fishermen suffered in March 1954, while

simple shelters also shield gamma rays fom fallout, which are of relatively low energy for the Russian designs with U238 casings, where neutron capture produces a lot of low energy gamma rays from Np239 and U237 for the crucial sheltering period of 1-10 days after detonation. Bethe ends his meaningless "Meaningless Superiority" article by declaring on page 89: "Negotiations on arms control must not be linked to 'good behavior' ... We Americans should have learned in Vietnam that we are not the policeman of the world." This is a simply a reversal of the lessons of WWII, it is a retreat to the isolationism of the 1930s, when America followed Britain's stupidity and failed to get involved in actively stopping or credibly deterring Germany and Japan from starting WWII. If anyone wants to draw lessons from the Vietnam war, he should do so using Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy D. Kohler's analysis of the megatonnage dropped on Vietnam and its failure to win the war due to simple Vietcong shelters and survivalism which completely repudiates strategic

bombing, linked here.

Regarding nuclear shelters, Bethe attacks them on page 60, where he admits that if nuclear weapons are used on military targets, "then fallout shelters will be very useful", he then irrationally reverses this in the next sentence by saying that since Russian nuclear weapons are targetted on soft targets (countervalue), not hard silos (counerforce), such an attack is "highly unlikely because it is ineffective against an invulnerable missile force." Bethe knows nothing about the true hardness of the Russian shelter system against all kinds of nuclar attacks, counterforce and countervalue. But his argument against shelters, by claiming Russia has superior deterrence in being able to do countervalue attacks, contradicts his own claim in another chapter of his book, where he claims that Russia's superior equivalent megatonage and missiles stockpile is not superior for deterrence, because it has less accurate missiles. Bethe merely redefines the meaning of "superiority" to whatever suits his subjective political agenda. What are we trying to deter? According to Bethe's Russian inferiority argument, we are trying to deter Russia from damaging our nuclear warheads, which is not a problem because the Russian missiles are inaccurate. But that's not what most people are concerned about, which is deterring Russia from attacking civilians. In that sense, Russia has superiority, because accuracy is not a problem for hitting targets the size of cities (as compared to missile silos or Trident submarines). Accuracy is then irrevelant. But it is also largely irrelevant in any case, since submarines hidden at sea are hard to hit so any "counterforce" strategy against a nuclear trident of mixed forces (planes, submarines hidden at sea, and silos) is half-baked at best, and in any case, Russia had not only vast countervalue superiority, but also counterforce superiority, since it turned out that simplistic Glasstone crater size analysis was false and massively exaggerated, so the nuclear weapons targetted on Russian silos wouldn't

have done the job Bethe supposed, even ignoring Russian submarines hidden at sea!.

In yet another deceptive propaganda essay, Bethe's chapter on SDI claims that "to be useful" a Western ABM system or space based defence (Reagan's strategic defence initiative) would have to shoot down "virtually all of the 10,000 or so" Russian weapons! Again, this is Bethe's highly bigoted view of how Russia will use nuclear weapons in WWIIL: he thinks they will disarm themselves by firing everything they have to overwhelm a Western ABM or other defence system. This is the 1914 and 1939 "knockout blow" delusion that Kahn debunks. Since they have a protected second strike force, they don't need to do this. The far more likely threat of a rogue missile or limited demonstration attack in the manner of Hiroshima or Starfish Prime, is ignored by Bethe. It isn't ignored by Russia which does have an ABM around Moscow for this reason! Bethe then on page 124 then claims that a high altitude nuclear detonation releasing | kev soft X-rays to pump a directed "x-ray laser" (in fact you don't need anything so fancy, since a tube or case around the weapon, with one end open, will function to send out a directed pulse of x-rays, as proved in numerous tests, starting with the x-ray fireball coupled into vacuum

tubes in the Bravo test of 1954), is useless because warheads can be protected by "A crushable layer installed under the [missile] skin

[which] could prolong and weaken the [x-ray ablative "blow off"] pressure wave ... thereby protecting both the skin an its contents." Again, this is deliberately scientifically vague, because no calculations about the range, yield, cost to the missile in terms of size and payload increase trade-off, etc., are given. Sure, you can harden missiles by making use of the large take up of energy in deformation beyond the elastic limit, which is how Lord Baker's clever design for the Morrison table shelter worked in WWII (as with car crumple zones, denting absorbs energy very efficiently, allowing a 3mm steel sheet to stop a collapsing house, something you can't achieve cheaply if you you design a shelter not to be dented, the classic delusion of green engineers set to work on shelter design). But you can use the 14 Mev highly penetrating neutrons from a neutron bomb to melt the fissile material in an incoming enemy warhead, causing it to fizzle,

ending that threat!

(Reagan's controversial SDI nuclear explosion pumped X-ray laser was first suggested in 1977 by Lawrence Livermore's George Chapline Jr. and was tested underground in Nevada in 1978, with the x-ray detector instrument breaking down so no results came. In summer 1979, Chapline held a meeting at Lawrence Livermore lab to design a re-test, where Peter Hagelstein suggested an improvement which led to the successful "Dauphin" sub-20 kt nuclear explosion test of the Excalibur pumped x-ray laser underground Nevada on 14 November 1980. It used laser rods made of doped fogbank like the lowest density x-ray transmitting foams in the W76 warhead, but until it is declassified in full with the test results, it will remain on the sci fi shelves of the library. Hegelstein has one very vague report

online about x-ray laser technology, a data-dump list of possibities and a lot of references, but no illustrations or definite schemes.)

According to the declassified American 30 July 1963 "DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) Briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff", the Russian nuclear warhead designs up to 1963 below 150 kt all exceeded 600 lb in mass, and adds on page 8 that: "There is no information indicating that the USSR has successfully designed and detonated low yield thermonuclear devices with enhanced radiation and reduced fission or devices with the secondary heavily loaded with oralloy such as the US TUBA device [Tuba was the secondary stage used in the 773 lb, 18" diameter, 46.6" long higher yield Polaris W47-Y2 missile warhead, tested to yield 1.2 megatons in the Dominic-Harlem test dropped from a B52 to detonate with a yield-to-weight ratio of 3.42 kt/kg, at an altitude of 13,645 feet, 17 miles south of Christmas Island on 12 June 1962}. In the case of reduced fission devices the chance of collection and analysis of test debris is markedly reduced for low yield tests and thus the absence of debris analysis indicating the detonation of such devices in the 1961-62 test series cannot be considered conclusive negative evidence." The document also states that Kingfish and Bluegill Triple Prime high altitue tests at altitudes of about 100 and 50 km in 1962 were both 200 kt warheads, not 410 kt as previous data suggested. The diagrams from this very important declassified Top Secret nuclear designs document, which plot a graph of Russian versus American warhead test results (the ratio of yield to mass of bomb, with identified data points for specific Russian and American tested devices including the cleaner "Ripple II", a hollow rippled fusion second stage design by John H. Nuckolls of Livermore lab, which when tested as 7,139 Ib Dominic-Housatonic, yielded 10 megatons with alleged 99.9% clean fusion yield on 30 October 1962, superseding the success of previous secondary stages Bassoon, Cello, Fife, Oboe, Calliope and the spherical Tuba) and tabulate a comparison, are of poor quality - hand-drawn not typeset due to the problems of disseminating Top Secret data to printers - but are sufficient to see the key facts (note that this data has NEVER been superseded from the Russian point of view, because this direct data on Russian nuclear weapons from fallout samples ended in 1963 due to the atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty, which moved tests deep underground until they were halted altogether, so since 1963 there has not been fallout analysis

data to determine Russian designs):

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30 July 1963 Top Secret classified American versus Rt weapons designs advantages "DCI Briefing to the Join

Tape-recorded White House Meeting on the Dominic Nuclear Test Series, 5 September 1962 (Meeting on the Dominic Nuclear Test

Series, 5 September 1962, in Tape 20, Box MTG, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), Boston,

MA.):

President Kennedy: What about our tests? How would you summarize our tests ... how would they? If they [Russian nuclear

warhead designers] were talking about our tests would they dismiss them quite as you dismiss theirs?

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Chair Dr Glenn Seaborg (Nobel Laureate for discovering plutonium): I think that they would

not be able to understand the sophistication of some of the biggest advances we have ...

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ficiency».

McGeorge Bundy: It may be worth just a moment to explain what that is ... Because that is probably the most important technical

development in our own Dominic series. Carl Kaysen: That’s the sort of breakthrough of the Livermore laboratory.

QUOTATION SOURCE: J. Grams, "Ripple: An Investigation of the World's Most Advanced High-Yield Thermonuclear Weapon Design", Journal of Cold War Studies, v23 (2021), issue 2, pp. 133-161.

ABOVE: Nuckolls 1994 opennet paper OSTI-10173564 (Lawrence Livermore paper UCRL-JC-117385), "Achieving Competitive Excellence in Nuclear Energy, The Threat of Proliferation, The Challenge of Inertial Confinement Fusion" explained the history of how nuclear warhead design improvements suggested isentropic compression of tritium-deuterium capsules (the maths had already been published in 1972 in J. Nuckolls, L. Wood, A. Thiessen, and G. Zimmerman, "Laser Compression of Matter to

Super-High Densities: Thermonuclear (CTR) Applications," Nature, p239):

"In 1957 I was assigned the task of designing a fusion power plant driven by the explosion of a series of hydrogen bombs in a giant steam- filled hole in granite. Although this approach would eliminate the magnetic confinement system, the scale is very large, and the hydrogen bomb is initiated by a fission explosive. ... The feasibility of very small fusion explosions follows from the fact that the thermonuclear burn rate is proportional to the density of the fusion fuel, and the fact that fusion fuels can be imploded to at least 1000 times normal density. The inertial confinement time is proportional to the characteristic dimension of the exploding system. Therefore, for a sphere, a thousand-fold increase in the density (and burn rate) makes possible a thousand-fold reduction in the radius ... less than 1% of the pellet needs to be ignited, since the radius of the compressed pellet is six times larger than the range of the 3.5-MevV alpha particle arising from the DT reaction. If (1/6)*3 ~ 0.5% of the pellet mass is heated to ignition, this critical-size hot spot will then initiate a burn wave which ignites the remainder of the pellet. For this pellet, the minimum required ignition energy is about 5x10“3 J. After compression, the ignition is also energetically 'free'." ... Because the fusion energy is so much larger than the minimum energy required for compression and ignition, an ablative implosion (which is typically 10%efficient) may be used to achieve both compression and ignition. However, because the velocity required for ignition (of a milligram) is roughly three times the velocity required to compress 1000-fold, the overall efficiency is reduced to 1%. ... The 14-MeV neutrons may be absorbed in several tens of g/cm2 of lithium rich material. Lithium fission and (n,2n) reactions may then be used to regenerate the tritium consumed by the DT burn. The soft x-rays and hot plasma are readily absorbed in the lithium-rich material. ... To meet these coupling requirements with the as yet unknown driver, I proposed in the late 1950s to adapt a powerful thermonuclear weapon concept invented by Edward Teller in the early 1950s. I proposed to "indirectly drive" the ablative implosion with thermal x-rays generated by rapidly injecting energy from the driver beam into a cavity which has high-Z walls and contains a DT pellet coated with a low-Z ablator. Re-radiation of thermal xrays back and forth across the cavity rapidly reduces temperature gradients, and rapid ablation of the pellet surface by the x-rays generates the required implosion pressures while reducing the rate of growth of fluid instabilities. To prevent excessive thermal losses into the cavity wall due to the adverse scaling of the surface to

volume ratio as the cavity is made smaller, I decreased the cavity temperature and the average initial density of the imploding capsule. In

UCRL-JC-117385 PREPRINT

Achieving Competitive Excellence in Nuclear Energy: The Threat of Proliferation; The Challenge of Inertial Confinement Fusion

John H. Nuckolls

This paper was prepared for presentation at the American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting New Orleans, Louisiana June 20, 1994

In the late 1950s and early 1960s an inertial confinement approach to controlled fusion energy was explored at LLNL. In 1957 I was assigned the task of designing a fusion power plant driven by the explosion of a series of hydrogen bombs in a giant steam-filled hole in granite. Although this approach would eliminate the magnetic confinement system, the scale is very large, and the hydrogen bomb is initiated by a fission explosive. To eliminate the use of fission explosives and to greatly reduce the scale, I addressed two key questions:

¢ What is the smallest possible fusion explosion?

¢ How can such a small fusion explosion be ignited without a fission explosion?

The feasibility of very small fusion explosions follows from the fact that the thermonuclear burn rate is proportional to the density of the fusion fuel, and the fact that fusion fuels can be imploded to at least 1000 times normal density. The inertial confinement time is proportional to the characteristic dimension of the exploding system. Therefore, for a sphere, a thousand-fold increase in the density (and burn rate) makes possible a thousand-fold reduction in the radius and a 10®-fold reduction in the mass and fusion

me

A milligram of DT imploded to a thousand times ni and ignited will achieve a 25% burn efficiency and a

Only 104 J is required to compress 1 mg of DT to 200 is isentropically compressed to a Fermi degenerate : thermal energy of the compressed DT must be a sm energy, which is several hundred electron volts at 2 energy release from this milligram of DT is almost 104 J, so that the compression is energetically “free.’

The minimum ignition energy is also much smalle If the entire milligram-mass pellet at 200 g/cm3 is } ignition temperature, then the resulting fusion ener times larger than the ignition energy. However, les needs to be ignited, since the radius of the compres: larger than the range of the 3.5-MeV a particle arisi If (1/6)3 (0.5%) of the pellet mass is heated to ignit spot will then initiate a burn wave which ignites th For this pellet, the minimum required ignition ener; compression, the ignition is also energetically “free.

The sum of the minimum energies required to com pellet is 15x103 J, almost 10-4 of the roughly 108-J ft

Because the fusion energy is so much larger than tt required for compression and ignition, an ablative i typically 10% efficient) may be used to achieve both ignition. However, because the velocity required fo milligram) is roughly three times the velocity requit fold, the overall efficiency is reduced to 1%. Then tl deliver 106 J to the target, and the efficiency of the e: more than 10% for civil power applications.

To meet these coupling requirements with the as ye proposed in the late 1950s to adapt a powerful therr invented by Edward Teller in the early 1950s. I pro the ablative implosion with thermal x-rays generate energy from the driver beam into a cavity which ha contains a DT pellet coated with a low-Z ablator. R rays back and forth across the cavity rapidly reduces and rapid ablation of the pellet surface by the x-rays implosion pressures while reducing the rate of grov To prevent excessive thermal losses into the cavity ° scaling of the surface to volume ratio as the cavity i:

yield. Minimum-size tusion explosions can be achieved by imploding UI, aecreased tne cavity temperature ana tne average 1 the eR facies tneurping: hagk dorvetye high denaitiet-drive" approach in ICF - and the fact that this appHAPAQdisye éeAimsule.

thermonuclear weapons driven by fission explosions. [Emphasis added] ... A program was conducted by LLNL and LANL to implode ICF capsules in underground nuclear experiments driven by underground nuclear explosions. These experiments have been named 'Halite- Centurion'." (Note that there are good technical reports by Nuckolls with the equations predicting fusion explosion charge efficiency here

and here.)

Grams states that the Ripple designer, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory physicist John H. Nuckolls, received authorization from President Kennedy to test the first version of Ripple on 2 July 1962, initially set for 5 days later, 7 July, in the crowded Operation Dominic series (America was trying to test every wild idea it could possibly construct and ship to the Pacific, before signing a cessation of atmospheric tests, and some shots failed to get off the ground in time, most notoriously the Uracca high altitude test which Dr Ogle was desperate to have fired at an altitude of 1,300 km, leading to furious technical arguments between Kennedy, his adviser McGeorge Bundy, and testing organiser Dr Frank H. Shelton, documented bitterly in the three books about the 1962 tests by Dr Shelton, Dr Ogle, and Dr Seaborg, respectively, namely Shelton's Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, Ogle's A Return to Testing, and Seaborg's Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, all giving very different perspectives on the subject - when Dr Shelton finally got Uracca ditched, Dr Ogle was so furious he tried to pull out of making any more Los Alamos EMP measurements in the high altitude Fish Bowl series in retaliation). (Uracca was first designed to be 410 kilotons, then due to NASA's fears a spaceman might get a few rads, Ogle sold out to protests and compromised and accepted 200 kilotons, but the spacemen put their lives ahead of national security so then the yield was lowered still further, until it was practically a waste of time, due to the very high burst altitude and the evident failure to obtain any significant x-ray effects data on MIRVs for such an unrealistically low yield.) Nuckolls vividly described the overloading of the computer resource time for nuclear device design

studies at that hectic testing time, and the desperate use of punched IBM cards for 1-d calculations and only a few 2-d calculations:

"I was the lead nuclear designer and this [Ripple secondary] was my first nuclear test. Not nearly enough time or computer resources were available. Livermore’s nuclear design experts believed success was impossible. [John] Foster and [Peter] Moulthrop were notable exceptions. I severely constrained the nuclear design to minimize calculations, to use parts that could be rapidly fabricated, and to avoid or overpower failure modes. Nuclear design, engineering, and fabrication were completed in two months. (Today, years would be required.) Invaluable assistance was provided by my sole assistant, Ron Theissen, a technician on assignment from the Computation Department. Several other designers volunteered to assist. Day and night, Ron and I punched IBM cards as inputs for hundreds of one dimensional calculations. Although the device was an extreme design, enough computing time was available for only a few simple two dimensional

calculations."

Five days behind the original schedule, the first 9,162 lb 56.2x123" Ripple on 11 July 1962, a B-52 dropped Ripple as the very last ever air-drop of Operation Dominic at Christmas Island in the Pacific, named shot Pamlico - it yielded 3.85 megatons with a 14,330 ft detonation altitude to avoid local fallout, and was watched by Nuckolls from the beach on Christmas island, where the first British thermonuclear weapons had been tested five years earlier (Seaborg's book Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban explains how the emerging scandal about the fallout contamination of Marshallese in 1950s tests made it difficult to resume testing in the Marshall Islands in 1962, so American testing moved to Christmas Island for Operation Dominic, 1962): "The giant mushroom cloud surged upward and

stabilized at an altitude of 80,000 feet. The Soviet spy ship was steaming over the horizon. ... My colleagues were amazed at my

beginner’s luck and counseled me “quit while you are ahead.” But, I resonated with the creative optimism of Lawrence and Teller. I had no fear of failure. Foster’s rule was if you don’t fail half the time, you aren’t trying hard enough. His dynamic spirit inspired Livermore. “You can excel! I want to run so fast anything the Soviets build will be obsolete. ... In August and September [1962], Ron and I worked day and night to design an even more radical nuclear device [Ripple II]. We further optimized the [primary stage x-ray] pulse shape [using fogbank interstage x-ray pulse shaping] to achieve practically isentropic fuel compression ["if the flow is very gradually compressed (area decreases) and then gradually expanded (area increases), the flow conditions return to their original values. We say that such a process is reversible. From a consideration of the second law of thermodynamics, a reversible flow maintains a constant value of entropy. Engineers call this type of flow an isentropic flow; a combination of the Greek word "iso" (same) and entropy"]. On October 1, this device was exploded in the “Androscoggin” nuclear test conducted in the Johnston Island area of the Pacific. A small

percent of the calculated yield was generated. A fizzle!? Everyone believed I had “snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.”

Post—Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism John H. Nuckolls

Wamings of “loose nukes,” black market plutonium and uranium, and North Korean and Iraqi nuclear weapons development programs have focused attention on post- Cold War nuclear dangers. A National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study warmed that vast quantities of surplus plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of tens of thousands of weapons from Cold War nu- clear arsenals pose a “clear and present danger to national and international secu- rity” requiring urgent actions in the former Soviet Union (FSU) (1). The World Trade Center bombing was a wake-up call alerting us to the dangers of terrorism on an unprec- edented scale. In spite of favorable devel- opments in South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, and North Korea (?), the long- range outlook for nuclear proliferation is troubling: Economic growth and the diffu- sion of advancing science and technology will provide more and more nations with the capability to develop nuclear weapons and post-Cold War turmoil will provide motivations. President Clinton addressed the growing dangers of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a speech to the United Nations (2). “If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democra- cy can feel secure.” Senator Sam Nunn, recently chair of the Senate Armed Ser- vices Committee, stated that addressing the threat of WMD is likely to be “our top continuous national security challenge for the next ten to twenty years ...” (3).

weapons), with a disastrous launch-on- warning instability. (iv) Nuclear terrorism, that is, a “World Trade Center” destroyed by a nuclear explosion.

The best hope for avoiding these nuclear nightmares is through the combined forces of politics, defense, science and technology, and economics. The elements of the matrix formed by the four nightmares and the four forces are nonlinearly coupled, including multiple incompletely understood instabili- ties managed by fallible human beings. Di- mensions involving biological and chemical WMD also exist and are coupled to the nuclear nightmare matrix (for example, use of biological weapons would stimulate nu- clear proliferation and could escalate to use of nuclear weapons). The “enemy” is not yet any particular nation, it is the complex system of nation-states that includes cou- pled nonlinear instabilities and WMD. Here, | will focus on nuclear proliferation and terrorism and the role of science and technology.

Loose Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise

Loose nukes smuggled from the FSU could provide near-term access to nuclear weap- ons by rogue nations, subnational elements, and terrorist organizations. There is top- level U.S. government concern about loose Russian nuclear weapons such as artillery shells and land mines (4). In the present period of internal disorder, it is difficult if not impossible to ensure security; for in-

Before the recent agreement with the Unit- ed States, North Korea’s potential role as a supplier of nuclear weapons was addressed by Secretary of Defense William Perry: “A nuclear North Korea could be in a position to export nuclear technologies and weapons to terrorists or rogue regimes around the

world, unleashing a nightmare spread of nuclear threat” (5).

Iran was identified by former Central Intelligence Agency director James Wool- sey as “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.” Woolsey stated that “Iran is also looking to purchase fully fabricated nuclear

mand for nuclear and other WMD and their corresponding motivations were summarized by Senator Nunn: “First of all those who use terrorism as a tool of national policy, coun- tries like Libya and Iran; second, those who harbor expansionist ambition like Iraq; third, those who both fear an invasion and threaten an invasion of others ... like North Korea; fourth, those who are armed to the teeth because they fear their neighbors in the region, like India and Pakistan” (3).

Senator Nunn also noted the desperate state of Russian weapons personnel. “This is the first time in history that literally thou- sands of scientists who know how to make nuclear weapons . . . ballistic missiles, and

. chemical and biological weapons .. . don’t know where their next paycheck is coming from and how their families are going to be fed” (3).

Nuclear weapons experts could greatly amplify nuclear dangers by assisting terrorists to bypass weapons security systems, accelerat- ing proliferant weapons development pro- grams, providing confidence that an untested weapon would work, reducing the amounts of Pu or HEU required, and facilitating use of reactor-grade Pu to make nuclear weapons (for example, Pu from commercial power reactors in Iran or North Korea).

ABOVE: ‘oun. Nuckear Nish: Hei E Dr Herman eli on fe Matton Isl NR PAAR M Eee RA Ud ese tere aren ari pl steed

etenation, MiulynQRar nightmares: (i) Cold War Il, resulting from a revanchist failure of Russian reform and possibly accompanied by internal disorder, unstable leadership, unreliable command and control, and inad-

equately trained military personnel. (ii) Es-

calation of conventional war to nuclear

war, arising from the geopolitical instabili-

ties that led to World War I and World . (iii) Proliferation epidemics (pos

ading toa thi 192 nations being armed with nuclear

The author is associate director at large. Lawrence Liver- Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550, USA.

sponsored by an agency of the U.S. government. 1112

stance, against corrupt insiders working

fsitlon of b

Sartith, riers to achieving a nuclear —, od bility. The NAS Committee on Internation- al Security and Arms Control (CISAC) rec- ommended that Western countries provide necessary equipment and funds for a series of actions in the FSU, including immediate installation of portal monitoring systems to detect any theft of fissile materials; adequate armed guard forces; and improved economic conditions for personnel responsible for ac- counting for and security of weapons and fissile materials, in order to reduce incen- tives for corruption and insider theft (1).

If armed with nuclear weapons, Iraq, Iran, and other nations could serve as sup- pliers of nuclear weapons and materials.

The diffusion of advancing science and

ots rl the Seth ering more an economic

: senate more and more na-

ar weapons. "The scientific sanciles of nu- clear weapons are widely known. The com- puting power of the 1950s supercomputers used to design early U.S. nuclear weapons is far exceeded by that of modern PCs. Iraq

used electromagnetic and centrifuge tech- nologies for isotopic enrichment of urani- um, and North Korea used nuclear reactors

gross

times are roughly 30 years for many devel- oping nations. In the 100-year period from the 1940s (when the United States devel- oped nuclear weapons) to the 2040s, nucle- ar weapons will have become 10 times more affordable in relative terms.

[ SCIENCE ¢ VOL. 267 * 24 FEBRUARY 1995 |

CHAPTER 11 A RETURN Té

Figure 2 COMPUTER SIMULATION OF ISENTROPIC COMPRESSION USING WEAK SHOCK WAVES

This computer-produced graph shows a succession of two weak shock waves used in the isentropic compression of a spherical fuel pellet. The computer has plotted the density of the fusion fuel, which is indicated by the closeness of the contours, the lines perpendicular to the radial lines. The closer the lines are together, the higher the density. The two areas of closely spaced contours are shock waves propa- gating toward the center of the pellet. The simula- tion was done for a conical section of the spherical pellet only, since the same compression occurs for all such conical sections. The accompanying cross section of the pellet consists of a hollow fuel core and a spherical outer shell that is irradiated by the laser. The acceleration of this outer layer creates the shock wave and the resulting ‘compression. The separate shock waves are produced by increases in the intensity of the laser pulse. The strength and timing of the shock waves is such that they converge at the center of the fuel pellet creating the density and temperature conditions necessary for a fusion reaction.

Computer graph

Riemann’s essential physical insight . shock wave could create a change of

which would be a new phase that had ;

Cross section of spherical pellet

mt HH

Conical slice used for computer simulation

I} Lasers heat outside surface | Solid shell of deuterium-tritium fuel(From LiD.) L___ tow density hot corona

The basic principles successfully tested as the 99.9% clean (fusion) 10 megaton Ripple Il fusion stage (ignited by a 10 kiloton fission primary stage), were revealed in the article by Dr. Steven Bardwell and Uwe Parpart, "Breaking the Impasse in Inertial Confinement Fusion", in the October-November 1981 issue of FUS/ON, pp. 22-32.

\-~ characteristic of a liquid. This point is -- wave does not function merely as th /+-- energy is deposited on the laser fusion 4+ -—— its only purpose, then there would be + strong shock wave over a weak one. [1-+— on. The shock wave, if it is strong en -~ new condition of matter so that it can 1 matter more efficiently.

The basic idea is using the equation for shock wave e! the phase of the compress a degenerate Fermi fluid o: the use of voids in the Rip; stage allows the shock wa solid fusion fuel to the poir fluid, allowing more efficie

See: John H. Nuckolls, et a compression of matter to s densities: thermonuclear a Nature, volume 239, 15 Sey pages 139-142.

ABOVE: John H. Nuckolls, inventor of the 99.9 percent clean 10 megaton Ripple II H-bomb, based on eliminating the compression of a heavy pusher, and instead using ablative recoil to isentropically compress the fuel itself to higher density than is possible when a heavy pusher is absorbing energy and being compressed itself. The Androscoggin test consisted of a Kinglet primary and Ripple II secondary, 6,647 lb, 128.5x56.2", with a 15—16 megatons predicted yield, but an actual yield of only 63 kilotons. Kennedy received a request on 12 October to retest Ripple II, while Ripple II was tested as Calamity on 27 October 1962, yielding only 800 kt instead of the predicted 3 megatons. Kennedy authorised the retesting of Nuckoll's Ripple II, which was done with modifications as the Housatonic shot on 30 October 1962, yielding 10 megatons from 7,139 Ib, 147.9x56.2", without the use of a lead pusher, with a fusion yield of 99.9%, i.e. 99.9% clean (a vast improvement on the 98% fusion 1961 Russian 50 megatons test), according to the “Report by Commander Joint Task Force Eight,” 4 June 1964, pp. L-B-5-1—2, as cited by Grams. Grams makes it clear from declassified reports quoting Seaborg clearly stating that the 98% clean 50 megaton Russian test in 1961 and other clean Russian shots used a lead pusher, which was an entirely

different process to the clean mechanism of Ripple II.

Dr Nuckolls explains that the origin of the successful clean 10 megaton Ripple I nuclear weapon design was actually the effort to develop peaceful fusion energy (which failed with lasers but worked with a very low yield fission primary stage providing x-rays!) in his paper "Contributions to the Genesis and Progress of ICF", pages 1-48 of the 2007 book, Inertial Confinement Nuclear Fusion: A historical Approch by its Pioneers (Edited by Guillermo Velarde and Natividad Santamarfa). Basically, the fusion burn rate is directly proportional to the fuel density, which in turn is of course inversely proportional to the cube of its radius. But the inertial confinement time for fusion to occur is proportional to the radius, so the fusion stage efficiency in a nuclear weapon is the product of the burn rate (i.e., 1/radius’3) and time (i.e., radius), so efficiency ~ radius/(radius*3) ~ 1/radius’2. Therefore, for a given fuel temperature, the total fusion burn, or the efficiency of the fusion stage, is inversely proportional to the square of the compressed radius of the fuel at the time! The radiation loss (cooling by inverse Compton effect) problems that Teller's classic superbombs suffered from can be virtually eliminated by lowering the x-ray energy (temperature) to below | KeV, because the radiation losses to the nuclear bomb case are of course proportional

to the fourth-power of the radiating temperature:

"I was introduced to Teller's radiation implosion scheme in the summer of 1955 ... As a 24-year-old assistant to Harold Brown, the 26- year-old TN Design Division Leader, I studied nuclear explosives and weapons design code development and use. In 1957, Brown asked me to help evaluate the feasibility of producing commercial electric power by periodically exploding half-megaton yield H-bombs in a one-thousand foot diameter, steam-filled cavity excavated in a mountain. This large-scale ICF scheme was part of Teller's Plowshare program to develop peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. I realized that a few hundred electron volt radiation temperature might suffice to implode and initiate a very small-scale fusion secondary. Radiation losses into a hohlraum wall decrease with more than the fourth power of the radiation temperature. With low radiation temperatures, excessive wall losses can be avoided ... Implosion symmetry is enhanced because the radiant energy absorbed in a thin layer of the high Z walls of the hohlraum is efficiently re-radiated multiple times and has a velocity a thousand times larger than the implosion velocity of a fusion capsule. Energy radiates from hot areas to cooler areas, rapidly equalizing temperatures. Growth rates of fluid instabilities are reduced because kilovolt range thermal radiation from a few hundred eV temperature black body rapidly ablates the unstable interface in low atomic weight materials. ... Distortions and instabilities generated by energy concentration processes located in the driver are effectively decoupled from the spatially separate secondary implosion when the secondary is energized by black body radiation from the driver-heated hohlraum walls. Consequently, radiation coupled drivers and fusion capsules may both be operated near their stability limits to achieve maximum performance. Driving pressures of several hundred megabars and implosion velocities of hundreds of kilometers/second can be generated by ablation with several hundred eV radiation temperatures. At these temperatures, material sound speeds are several hundred kilometers/second, comparable to the implosion velocities required to isentropically compress DT to more than one thousand times liquid density. ... In 1961, my group leader, Peter Moulthrop; nuclear designer Ray Birkett; and I addressed the pusher fluid instability problem by separating the pusher from the ablator ... the fusion energy generated can be 10%4 times larger than the Fermi energy of the compressed DT! The gain can be further increased by igniting a relatively small fraction of the DT mass in a hot spot near the center of spherical convergence. Fusion yields can then be amplified by TN

propagation from the hot spot into a much larger mass of DT. ...

"I developed an ablatively driven spherical rocket implosion to compress DT to high densities without use of a pusher. A sustained ablatively driven implosion is made possible by use of a sustained driver input and a suitable ablator. Optimum pulse shapes make

possible very high isentropic compression of most of the DT while igniting a central hot spot. The temperature of the hot spot is amplified

by adjusting the pulse shape so that a strong shock is generated near zero radius, and by using a hollow target design containing low- density DT gas. ... With near ideal pulse shapes, very high-gain, pusherless, near isentropic, low temperature radiation imploded fusion capsules that ignite propagating bum are feasible. ... Livermore's professional weapons designers regarded my tiny low-cost, high gain ICF target designs as science fiction. We joked about "Nuckolls' Nickel Novels" (referring to my prolific series of classified memos). Without nuclear tests, these radical target designs could not be taken seriously. Fortunately, my efforts were strongly supported by Carl Haussmann, who succeeded Brown as TN Division Leader, and by Foster, who succeeded Brown as Livermore director in early 1960. (Brown was selected by President Kennedy to lead Department of Defense (DOD) Research and Engineering.) ... Livermore was focusing all possible efforts on responding to high yield Soviet atmospheric nuclear tests (including a 57-megaton explosion). ... In April 1962, the U. S. responded to the Soviet tests by launching an intensive nuclear test series. Livermore's advanced warheads achieved a major success in an "Admiral's test" of the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile. This Polaris weapons system addressed the first strike instability,

by creating a secure second strike nuclear force. ...

"In April 1962, a few months before the scheduled end of the atmospheric test series, I proposed a nuclear test of a radical high-yield TN design so fantastic that my colleagues thought it was an April Fool's-day joke. In this radical design, a high-performance TN secondary was imploded with a highly optimized pulse. Foster dispatched me to Washington to support approval of a nuclear test of my scheme. I was accompanied by Roland Herbst, a theoretical physicist and experienced weapons designer. I briefed AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, and my former boss, DOD's R and D leader Harold Brown. President Kennedy approved the nuclear test the last experiment in the test

series."

Dr Nuckolls' scientific and political viewpoint was disastrous when he eagerly used his position as Director of LLNL (at the end of the Cold War, when the research budget was drying up!) to try to start a speculative pie-in-the-sky peaceful nuclear fusion energy program (leading to a major argument with U.S. Secretary of Energy Watkins in May 1992 when Watkins visited LLNL and demanded nuclear deterrence against proliferation and nuclear terrorism, not peaceful fusion energy!), but Nuckolls' views on deterrence were always sound

and he warned clearly against nuclear disarmament scams for "peace":

"The author [John H. Nuckolls] concludes by warning that nuclear disarmament may eliminate the highly successful deterrent mechanism for avoiding another major world war. In a world made safe for major conventional wars by the apparent "elimination" of nuclear weapons, the leaders in a conventional World War III - involving unimaginable suffering, hatred, terror, and death - would be strongly motivated to introduce nuclear weapons in the crucial decisive battles. Even if diplomacy could "eliminate" nuclear weapons, man's knowledge of nuclear weapons can never be eliminated. The paradox is the attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons may maximize the probability of their use." - John H. Nuckolls, "Strategic defense initiative: critical issues", UCRL-92803, Conference: 4. international conference on nuclear war, Erice, Sicily, Italy, 19 Aug 1984,

https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5529030-strategic-defense-initiative-critical-issues

Nuckolls and Lowell Wood (another LLNL physicist, best known for his secretive work on EMP effects from nuclear explosions and for chairing a controversial EMP commission, which produces reports with the vital technical data we need removed due to secrecy concerns) also wrote an interesting article called "The Development of Nuclear Explosives" (published in the 1988 book Energy in Physics, War and

Peace, edited by Wood) stating on page 312: "The development of high-yield weapons was motivated strongly by rising concern in the

U.S. Government regarding the potentially unstopable character of Soviet land forces, as the nature of the war machine that had broken Nazi power in the 1943-45 period became clearer in post-war analyses. The basic Soviet doctrine of massing forces and breaking through the enemy front, even at very high costs in men and material, came to be seen as very difficult to counter. However, since it involved concentrating a division into a few square kilometers for its effectiveness, 0.1-1 megaton nuclear explosives used as area (blast + thermal) weapons came to be seen as an effective and affordable response by the defense: a single high-yield weapon costing under a million

dollars could neutralize an armored division costing several orders of magnitude more."

Ripple warhead designer Nuckolls with Lowell Wood and others had in 1972 published a paper about the new physics involved, in Nature vol. 239, pp. 139-142, see the illustration below. In simple terms, what Nuckolls does to the Teller-Ulam thermonuclear secondary stage is analogous to what happened in the evolution of primary fission stages: get rid of the thick, dense tamper/pusher surrounding the fuel, to allow the available implosion energy pulse to compress the fuel, and to do at the correct rate to get "isentropic compression", i.e. keeping the shock energy in mechanical work (without the conversion of implosion shock energy into heat energy, which reduces the component of the energy being used for compression). The rate of delivery of X-rays can be controlled by low density plastic foams used as baffles and for delayed re-radiation of soft x-rays. To design the shape in detail, an iterative scheme is used, where a range of basic guesswork possibilities are all simulated in detail on a computer, and the best results are then picked out and used as the basic templates for another range of designs, but honing-in on the most promising shapes, thicknesses, etc. This process is repeated many times to optimise a final

design, before a nuclear test is done to check that it actually works as intended.

The controlled higher compression factor you get without having to also compress an inert, thick dense pusher (you just use a relatively thin, say 1-cm thick beryllium ablator surface shell) allows efficient, isentropic compression, of a hollow lithium deuteride sphere with D + T gas in the centre to act as an initiator, providing neutrons to kickstart the fission of lithium in the lithium deuteride fuel, replacing the Teller-Ulam fissile sparkplug; something only possible due to the much greater compression in Nuckolls design than in the older Teller-

Ulam system.

If you think this is questionable and don't want to believe in a 99.9% clean H-bomb, note that Nature published this paper suggesting that a laser system could be used, in place of the x-ray pulse from a 10 kiloton fission primary stage that Nuckolls used in all of his 1962 tests, and which is way more powerful than laser pulses! There is also an article, "Energy Balance in Fusion Hohlraums", in the unclassified Los Alamos Nuclear Weapons Journal, issue 2, 2009, pages 6-11, which contains two diagrams side-by-side, comparing the use of laser beams and x-rays, such as from nuclear fission primary stages, for focussed x-ray compression of fusion capsules, including a detailed description of the fogbank x-ray mirror lining needed to focus soft, 0.2 keV, x-rays isotropically on to the fuel capsule, and including x-ray shadowgraphs of implosions showing the shockwaves with and without fogbanks/x-ray mirrors which are composed of '20-mg/cm‘3 silica aerogel" - the same issue has a helpful article about the use of fogbank interstage material in W76 warheads:

"... Fogbank is an essential material in the W76 warhead. During the mid-1990s, Fogbank production ceased ... As time passed, the precise techniques used to manufacture Fogbank were forgotten. ... Los Alamos computer simulations at that time were not sophisticated enough to determine conclusively that an alternate material would function as effectively as Fogbank. ... Despite

efforts to ensure the new facility was equivalent to the original one, the resultant equipment and processing methods failed to

produce equivalent Fogbank. ... in some cases the current impurity levels were much lower than historical values. Typically, lower impurity levels lead to better product quality. For Fogbank, however, the presence of a specific impurity is essential. ... . Scientists found that modern cleaning processes, used in the manufacture of the feed material, clean it better than the historical processes; the improved cleaning removes an essential chemical. ... The historical Fogbank production process was unknowingly based on this essential chemical being present in the feed material. As a result, only a maximum concentration was established for the chemical and the resulting impurity. Now the chemical is added separately, and the impurity concentration and Fogbank morphology are managed. ... Just as modern scientists unraveled the secrets behind the production of the Japanese katana [samurai sword], materials scientists managed to remanufacture Fogbank so that modern methods can be used to control its

required characteristics. As a result, Fogbank will continue to play its critical role in the refurbished W76 warhead."

“Implosion of hollow (rather than solid) pellets makes possible order of magnitude reductions in the required laser power [or fis primary stage yield and size, for thermonuclear weapons].” - John H. Nuckolls, et al., Laser-driven implosion of hollow pellets, conference on plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion research, Tokyo, 11 Nov 1974; OSTI/PUB-381(Vol.2); CONF-741105-

X-RAY PULSE

START OF IMPLOSION

FIG.2

1 CM THICK BERYLLIUM ABLATOR (NO PUSHER) ON OUTER SURFACE OF LITHIUM DEUTERI

IMPLOSION

SOLID THE X-RAY PULSE SIMPLY DELIVERS ENERGY (NOT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE) TO A BERYLLIUM LAYER AROUI THE LITHIUM DEUTERIDE FUSION FUEL. THIS ENERGY CAUSES THE OUTER 1 CM THICK BERYLLIUM SURFAC

TO ABLATE, PRODUCING BLOWOFF. THE RECOIL FROM THIS EXPLOSIVE BLOWOFF, CALCULATED FROM HIGH PRESSURE PLASMA NEWTON'S 3RD LAW OF MOTION (REACTION BEING EQUAL AND OPPOSITE TO ACTION), CAUSES IMPLOSION.

THE BLOWOFF LAYER IS THE EXPANDING HIGH PRESSURE PLASMA.

D + T GAS IS NEEDED IN THE CENTRE T'

PRODUCE NEUTRONS TO START THE FISSION OF LITHIUM IN THE SOLID FUEL LAYER, IN A RELATIVELY CLES NUCLEAR DEVICE LIKE RIPPLE II. IN THE OLDER TELLER-ULAM SYSTEM, THERE IS A PLUTONIUM SPARKPLU' IN THE CENTRE TO PROVIDE NEUTRONS TO KICKSTART THE FISSION OF LITHIUM (THIS PRODUCING TRITIUI FOR FUSION TO BEGIN), AND A DENSE U238 (OR LEAD OR TUNGSTEN) INERT PUSHER AROUND THE FUSION FUEL. THIS IS A MUCH SLOWER PROCESS WITH LESS COMPRESSION, SINCE IMPLODING A DENSE PUSHER TAKES MORE TIME AND MORE ENERGY FROM THE LIMITED X-RAY ENERGY SUPPLIED BY THE PRIMARY STAG

REPLACING THE DENSE U238 PUSHER/TAMPER WITH A LIGHTER SHELL OF BERYLLIUM IN A SECONDARY STAGE TO INCREASE COMPRESSION EFFICIENCY IS ANALOGOUS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY STAGE

NATURE VOL. 239 SEPTEMBER 15 1972 139

Laser Compression of Matter to Super-High Densities: Thermonuclear (CTR) Applications

JOHN NUCKOLLS, LOWELL WOOD, ALBERT THIESSEN & GEORGE ZIMMERMAN

University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

Pulse Shape

THERMONUCLEAR burning occu terrestrially in nuclear explosio: burn rate is proportional to de

dense hydrogen with Fermi-d

on? E _ (KT = —ne&| — + —( — 3 rls ae

where 7, is the electron density;

energy; AT is the thermal eners is the electron mass.

The Fermi-degenerate state—which minimizes the required implosion pressure—may be achieved by shaping the laser pulse in time. When implosion begins, laser power is set so that the initial shock speed in the imploding matter is comparable to sound speed (pressures of 10°-10° atmospheres) and subse- quently so that the compression is near-isentropic; the hydro-

adjusting the pulse shape so that the characteristics intersect just before the centre is reached, a small fraction of the pellet mass in the central region is compressed and strongly heated, producing thermonuclear ignition. The laser power history which generates an optimal, isentropic compression of a degenerate hydrogen sphere is approximately *

E= E> 1 ia

where t= 1 —1/t’, is time, ’ (which is > £) is the transit time to the centre of the sphere of the initial shock (generated by appli-

. 3 cation of Eo), s= — = 15/8 for dense hydrogen with degenerate Y

electrons (y=5/3). Such a pulse shape may be generated with

* Computer calculations of spherical implosions show that this power history generates a near optimal pressure history, and that this pressure history is (for a Lagrangian surface):

h 2/3 S R P = P ,hA= d (is) { pdr

It may be shown analytically (via the hydrodynamic characteristics) that this pressure history also generates an optimal compression ofa plane slab (where h=ho=const.). As expected P~ E23, since E~ Px velocity, velocity ~ P*!?.

Symmetry

To implode matter to high « must be applied with sufficien temporally, and hydrodynamic controlled. In compression \ radius decreases rather more

Stability

The implosion of the pelle generated pressures is hydro relatively long wavelength sui too slowly to be damaging. Th the droplet surface grows dur Ag is the initially present ampli

nuclear

WEAPONS

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« Los Alamos

Energy Balance in Fusion Hohlraums 6

Energy Balance in Fusion Hohlraums

A second approach uses intense beams of photons, electrons, or ions to heat and compress the

rs

Laser beams X-ray beam

; ; ; ; ; Radiation fuel very rapidly; the fuel’s mass, or inertia, confines it enicance hole. ok x long enough for significant fusion reactions to occur. a . This second approach is called inertial-confinement <—Hohlraum—> fusion (ICF). )

beams will pass through Diagnostic_.

a small hole at each end of a hohlraum (German for J jg | eR J “cavity” )—in this case, a hollow gold cylinder about the 4

size of a pencil eraser (see figure on page 7). The laser beams will strike the inner surfaces of the hohlraum’s walls and heat them to very high temperatures. In

this indirectly driven ICF technique, the hot inner surfaces of the hohlraum will then emit x-rays that will compress (implode) a target capsule—a hollow, BB-sized sphere of beryllium or plastic suspended

at the hohlraum’s center. The capsule will contain fusion fuel—in this case, a 50/50 mixture of deuterium

and tritium

Target capsule f ;

a

s Pd

7 X-ray beam

“Thejinner surfaces of the hot walls will then emit x-rays/that impinge on the spherical target capsule at the center of the hohiraum. The capsule’sjouter surface will absorb the x-rays

K-shell ah pik of soft (0-1.58 KeV) x-rays by 500,000 K, 0.014 g/ml Al plasma at 500,000 K

1.0 0.8

0.6

5 Ke) Q 2 € D S oO — kK

0.4

0.2 —— Experiment — Calculation

1,520 1,540 1,560 Photon energy (eV)

Figure 6 Opacity measurement and calculations. Laboratory measurements of plasma opacity can be made using high-power lasers such as HELEN. The subject material is heated indirectly using a foil radiator or hohlraum, and allowed to expand against a plastic tamper. In this way, uniform plasmas can be created. A laser-irradiated fibre behind the target acts as a point source of X-rays, which is

ABOVE: the transmission of soft x-rays inside nuclear weapon through the absorbing K-shell electron barrier of aluminium plasma generated by the ablation of an aluminium fusion capsule pusher (aluminium in this example is a plasma at a density of 14 grams/litre and at a temperature of 500,000 K), Figure 6 in the officially (Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston) approved UK Goverment paper, "Science of nuclear warheads" by Keith O’Nions, Robin Pitman and Clive Marsh, Nature, v415, 21 Feb 2002, pp. 853-857: "Little has been published about nuclear warhead science. Here we set out elements of the programme that will underpin future assessments of the safety and performance of Britain’s warheads in compliance with treaty obligations. ... The approach builds upon previous nuclear test experience and seeks to replace the requirements for further empirical test data by developing a deeper theoretical and experimental understanding of the relevant fundamental science. This must then be drawn together and applied to the nuclear warhead system using intensive numerical modelling. ... Lasers and pulsed power machines are able to achieve relevant

densities and temperatures and also produce the only source of data on X-radiation flows. ... In the very hot matter of a nuclear

warhead, thermal radiation is particularly important. The crucial parameter is the radiative opacity, which quantifies how thermal radiation interacts with matter by absorption, emission and scattering. It is sensitive to the composition, temperature and density of the material and expresses the degree to which a material impedes radiation flow. ... [Figure 6] The subject material is heated indirectly using a foil radiator or hohlraum, and allowed to expand against a plastic tamper. ... Figure 6 describes the techniques used and shows a comparison of an aluminium opacity experiment with the corresponding calculations. ... As well as opacity and radiation flow, laser experiments can be designed to test theoretical models of complex radiation/hydrodynamic phenomena (Fig. 7). ... [Figure 7] Here a laser is used to heat a... hohlraum, which in turn heats a piece of aluminium (shown in blue). The resulting jet of aluminium penetrates a piece of polystyrene, which is radiographed by an X-ray backlighter also driven by the laser. The results from two numerical codes are shown together with the X-ray record from the experiment. Both codes reproduce the main features of the flow but show different development of the jet tip. Analysis of the detail will indicate where the

theory and algorithms must be improved."

Our point in emphasising the 99.9% clean (fusion) 10 megaton Ripple II bomb, air dropped successfully in 1962, is to demonstrate that the technology and science does exist to make even large nuclear weapons a credible deterrent without any fallout collateral damage. Although the neutron effects from 10 megaton bombs in sea level air are usually severely curtailed by neutron scattering in nitrogen, this can be prevented by using two such devices burst 5-20 seconds apart in time, so that the neutron burst from the second device undergoes hydrodynamic enhancement in the large hemisphere of low-density air behind the shock front created by the first burst, tailored to cover the desired area (the precise time between the two detonations is the control determining the radius of efficient hydrodynamic enhancement of the neutrons from the second detonation). So there are excellent prospects for making the neutron bomb credible as a deterrent against invasions, air burst near borders at an altitude that prevents fallout and blast/thermal collateral damage but deters military

field equipment and personnel from invasions.

UPDATE (30 April 2022): https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10766541/Ben-Wallace-predicts-Russia-use-parade-9-

announce-mass-mobilisation-population. html:

"Putin 'could declare war on the world's Nazis' on Victory Day (9 May 2022): UK predicts Russia will use parade on 9 May to announce mass mobilisation of reserves for final push in Ukraine to defeat West's support for Kyiv ... Britain's Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has predicted that Putin may instead use the parade to declare war on the world's 'Nazis' and mobilise his reserves ...

Earlier this week, Putin vowed to use nuclear weapons against any country that dares to 'interfere' with Russia's war in Ukraine."

A couple of points about this prediction: (1) Russia has at least 2 million reserves, which would boost the total Russian armed forces to 3 million (the 1 million normal Russian military includes a 1 year conscription of personnel aged 18-27); (2) this would be a major step up what Herman Kahn called the "escalation ladder". To give some kind of context to the threat a Russian military of 3,000,000 presents us with, please remember that as we stated earlier in this post (above): "When on 8 December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine dissolved the USSR, the Soviet military was 3.7 million strong. "From 1945 to 1948, the Soviet Armed Forces were reduced from about 11.3 million to about 2.8 million men", while the Soviet Union actually increased in size, as puppet governments were

installed across half of Europe, despite the American nuclear weapons monopoly until 1949."

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“Aleksey Zhuravlyov, chairman of the nationalist Rodina party, angrily declared that the UK was ‘accusing us (Russia) of state terrorism’ on Channel One's 60 Minutes show. Producers on the show put up a map appearing to show how long it would take for Russian missiles to hit the UK, France and Germany if launched from Kaliningrad (202 seconds for London, 200 for Paris, and 106 seconds for Berlin).” - https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10769957/Russian-propaganda-declares- nuclear-missile-strike-London-no-survivors.html

ABOVE: Russian state TV Channel One's 60 Minutes show reportedly broadcast the missile trajectories Russia could use and the delivery times to hit London, Paris and Berlin (202, 200 and 106 seconds, for nuclear missiles fired from Kaliningrad). This is because Russia has been left with the world's largest nuclear stockpile of countervalue (city destroying) low-accuracy missiles but high- yield warheads. Such weapons can also be used for high altitude large area EMP strikes, where missile accuracy is again largely irrelevant as it is for large city targets. Until the crater exaggerations farce was exposed firmly around 1988, we had - on paper but not in reality - strategic and tactical counterforce superiority due to the fact that our missiles were so much more accurate than Russian ones, we could hit their missile in their silos (provided we attacked first, before the Russian missiles were launched), and we also had tactical nuclear weapons to deter invasions, which was a credible deterrent to Russian aggression. After 1988, however, the Glasstone and Dolan cratering scam was exposed for what it was, debunking our strategic counterforce deterrent (which was never much good against enemy subs hidden at sea anyway), and then the anti-nuclear "peacemakers" persuaded politicians to disarm our tactical counterforce nuclear weapons, leaving us without a credible deterrent to stop invasions. In the 1962 Cuban missiles crisis, Kennedy had clear nuclear superiority and was able to use that in his TV speech on 22 October 1962 to persuade Khrushchev to back down (he said that a single nuclear missile launched

from Cuba, even by accident, against a Western target, would be met by a "full" retalitory nuclear response), but today Kennedy's gunboat

diplomacy option has a much higher risk because we have surrendered in the nuclear arms race and Russia is way ahead. And it's nut just Mr Putin. China and North Korea have tested thermonuclear weapons and North Korea's Leader Kim Jong Un recently stated in Pyongyang that it would use nuclear deterrence against "escalating nuclear threats from hostile forces". In other words, the dictatorships are now using nuclear deterrence against us to prevent our interventions for peace, just as Hitler did when he built the Luftwaffe: "Margarita Simonyan, editor of state broadcaster RT and one of the Kremlin's highest-profile mouthpieces, declared on TV last night that the idea of Putin pressing the red button is 'more probable' than the idea that he will allow Russia to lose the war. 'Either we lose in Ukraine,’ she said, 'or the Third World War starts. I think World War Three is more realistic, knowing us, knowing our leader'." -

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10762143/Ukraine-war-Russian-state-T V-says-nuclear-strike-probable-losing.html

"Alexander's career was piracy pure and simple, nothing but an orgy of power and plunder, made romantic by the character of the hero. There was no rational purpose in it, and the moment he died his generals and governors attacked one another. The cruelty of those times is incredible. When Rome finally conquered Greece, Paulus Aemilius was told by the Roman Senate to reward his soldiers for their toil by "giving" them the old kingdom of Epirus. They sacked 70 cities and carried off 150,000 inhabitants as slaves. How many they killed I know not; but in Etolia they killed all the senators, 550 in number. Brutus was "the noblest Roman of them all," but to reanimate his soldiers on the eve of Philippi he similarly promises to give them the cities of Sparta and Thessalonica to ravage, if they win the fight. ... the intensely sharp preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing ... the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the "peace"-interval. ... Nations, General Lea says, are never stationary - they must necessarily expand or shrink, according to their vitality or decrepitude. Japan now is culminating; and by the fatal law in question it is impossible that her statesmen should not long since have entered, with extraordinary foresight, upon a vast policy of conquest - the game in which the first moves were her wars with China and Russia and her treaty with England, and of which the final objective is the capture of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and whole of our Coast west of the Sierra passes. This will give Japan what her ineluctable vocation as a state absolutely forces her to claim, the possession of the entire Pacific Ocean; and to oppose these deep designs we Americans have, according to our author, nothing but our conceit, our ignorance, our commercialism, our corruption, and our feminism. General Lea makes a minute technical comparison of the military strength which we at present could oppose to the strength of Japan, and concludes that the Islands, Alaska, Oregon and Southern California, would fall almost without resistance, that San Francisco must surrender in a fortnight to a Japanese investment, that in three or four months the war would be over and our republic, unable to regain what it had heedlessly neglected to protect sufficiently, would then "disintegrate," until perhaps some Ceasar should arise

to weld us again into a nation." - William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, speech delivered at Stanford University in 1906.

UPDATE: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10774235/Ukraine-war-Russian-state-media-threatens-U K-underwater- nuke.html: "Russia's chief propagandist threatens to ‘plunge Britain into the depths of the sea' with underwater Poseidon nuke that would trigger a 1,600ft radioactive tidal wave and wipe the UK off the map. Dmitry Kiselyov, known as 'Putin's mouthpiece’, threatened the UK with Poseidon underwater nuclear bomb. By CHRIS PLEASANCE and WILL STEWART FOR MAILONLINE. PUBLISHED: 08:36, 2 May 2022 | UPDATED: 13:21, 2 May 2022. Dmitry Kiselyov, a man often known as 'Putin's mouthpiece', used his Sunday night show to call for attacks on Britain with a Poseidon underwater drone that he said would trigger a 1,600ft radioactive tidal wave and 'plunge Britain

to the depths of the ocean.' The drone ‘has capacity for a warhead of up to 100 megatons', Kiselyov claimed - several thousand times the

strength of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima - which would 'raise a giant wave, a tsunami, up to 1,640ft high' - enough to reach halfway up Scafell Pike, the tallest point in England. Speaking against a background graphic showing the UK being erased from the world map, Kiselyov added: 'This tidal wave is also a carrier of extremely high doses of radiation. Surging over Britain, it will turn whatever is left of

them into radioactive desert, unusable for anything. How do you like this prospect?"

This exaggeration of nuclear effects is debunked by the table of nuclear test water waves data declassified in Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1, Table 2-9, Measured Water Wave Data from Nuclear Tests (linked here): the biggest water waves are generated by the deepest scaled depth of burst, e.g. the 32 kiloton Wigwam test in the Pacific detonated at 2,000 feet depth in 15,000 ft of water, which gave a peak water wave height of 118 feet at 2,000 feet range (the wave height scales up in proportion to the square-root of bomb energy yield, and decreases inversely with increasing distance from surface zero). This height will increase by a factor of 56 when you increase yield from 32 kilotons to 100 megatons, so the wave height is 6,600 feet at 2,000 feet from surface zero. The problem now is that (1) Scafell Pike is 15 miles or 80 kft from the Irish Sea (the Ravenglass Estuary, appropriately the most alpha particle and 59 keV low energy gamma active place in Britain, due to Am-241 in the mud from Sellafield, amounting to nanocuries per gram of dried mud), a range which would reduce the wave height to just 6,600* (2/80) = 165 feet, and (2) the Irish Sea is only 1,000 feet deep at most! If detonated just off Ravenglass Estuary, you wouldn't get any tidal wave because there would not be the depth of water required; if you detonated it as the deepest part of the Irish Sea, which is 1,000 feet deep, the horizontal target range would increase, reducing the wave height at Scafell Pike to below the 165 feet we just found, and you'd get a further reduction because the scaled depth of burst for 100 megatons in 1,000 ft of water would make it a shallower burst, reducing the fraction of the yield that is coupled into the water as water waves! This is before calculating the

attenuation and breaking of a water wave when it runs far inland and up a mountainside!

There is now detailed published data on the Russian underwater nuclear tests: see Vice Admiral E. A. Shitikov's paper, Testing ships at the Novaya Zemlya test site (see illustrations of the ship set ups for the 1955 and 1957 underwater tests, below): "On Novaya Zemlya, three large-scale full-scale experiments were carried out to study the effect of the damaging factors of an atomic explosion on ships. ... First experience, September 21, 1955 ... to test the atomic charge for a 533 mm torpedo, to assess the impact of an underwater nuclear explosion on ships, and to obtain experimental data to develop the theory of an underwater nuclear explosion ... in Chernaya Bay at the Novaya Zemlya test site, September 21, 1955, power 3.5 Kt, depth 12 m. In the center of the battlefield was a small minesweeper T-393 project 2531, from which a torpedo with a charge was lowered on a cable to a depth of 12 meters. This operation was led by Lieutenant Commander E.L. Peshkur. Target ships were installed at six radii from 300 to 3000 meters. Surface ships stood side and bow to the center of the explosion, submarines - in the surface and underwater position at periscope depth. ... S-19 - due to the fact that the cork on the torpedo tube was knocked out (in accordance with the test program, the front cover was open) , about 15 tons of water entered the first compartment (the damage was repaired by personnel in two days). ... the sinking radii amounted to 300-400 meters, significant damage to light surface ships occurred from a shock wave at a distance of 500-600 meters. Damage to the superstructures of light surface ships from an air shock wave - at a distance of 700-800 meters. Insignificant damage - at a distance of 1200-1300 meters. ... Immediately after testing B.V. Zamyshlyaev promptly carried out a study in which, in particular, he showed that when the same charge is buried by 70 meters, instead of 12 in the experiment, the effect increases by about one and a half times (in deep water)." There is a lot more to follow, but it is

probably best organised into a book rather than blogged about...

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Total Pages 650

whe Vr February 16, 1998 DY ti J

INTEC od

sandia national laboratories

Survey of Weapon Development

and Technology (WR70O8) (VU)

sa

This document cont the Atomic Energy Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative an inal Sanctions.

RARRARARARARARRARARARA GSRABAARRABARABARLRS

heen a Ee encery eer eer NOnNproireration A New Challenge to the US Nuclear Weapon Program

SESSIONS XVI John Taylor National Security Policy Research Department Sandia National Laboratories

607

622

Why Not Zero?

Many nations and individuals want us to com, weapons -- attractive philosophy but dubious

likelihood of war

0

size of nuclear arsenal

A Snapshot of the W

e 253 Sovereign nations, dependent area e 189 (+) Countries

e 177 Members in the United Nations

e (171 Members in FIFA!)

e 60 conflicts in progress involving more 130 states or subnational entities

Q12592 Operation Dominic - Housatonic (99.9% clean 10 megaton Ripple II) - 12.6 sec

ABOVE (update on 13 May 2022): 100% clean H-bomb design (cartoon style sketch, not design blueprint). The basic ideas are illustrated in a previous blog post from 2016, linked here, which describes also the use of von Neumann-Fuchs invention (28 May 1946 patent "Method and apparatus for releasing nuclear energy" of a beryllium oxide ablator as the compressive mechanism in the wall of a fusion capsule. It's clear that the use of plastic and various ablative fusion stage capsule walls underwent a lot of evolution even in

the 1950s. That 2016 blog post also gives the references to Teller's idea of magnetic compression of the secondary stage in nuclear

Charged up magnetic flux com coils could be added to linear |

to power magnetic compressic = 9 Piezo Sebate

High E

Li6D STAGE crystal

i To get the pulse shape ri the laser, a pulse shapin:

100% clean nuclear weapon design, using entirely proof-tested technology {} with suitable X-unit capa (no speculative B.S.) D+T gas capsule and krytron switches car

weapons, and John S. Foster's work on magnetic flux compression conventional systems to try to power that (however, as we explain, a small nuclear primary stage might be the only way to get it to go!). Another application of such technology is Project orion, a nuclear impulsive drive that is actually practical, tested technology for space exploration which Joseph Friedlander has summarised from blog posts here on The Next Big Future (note that the accidental declassification of the secrets of plastic foam filling the radiation channel of the Mk41 Basoon nuclear device - contrary to its use as a radiation mirror to delay outer case metal ablation in earlier "sausage" devices tested at operations Ivy and Castle, and the Swift, Swallow and Swan primary stage tests in secret UCRL 4725, dated June 1956, originated from the incorrect implementation of a decision to declassify only a 6-pages

section in UCRL-4725 about nuclear explosives for propulsion of nuclear rockets for space exploration!).

Ve ssn of i, 4] 25 HME mf Sechgehs IE « u Con Dewe Y 4 fp Hlanogs

poe Sloe"

wh St

Zeldovich and Sakharov, On the use of the product for the purpose of compressing the superproduct RDS-6s, January 14, 1954.

Yury Trutnev (b. 1927), an employee of Zeldovich's department, during an interview on his 90th birthday, stated: “I did a lot of theory of the efficiency of atomic charges. I knew that when they exploded, a lot of energy came out in the form of X-rays. And I started thinking about how to make a thermonuclear charge coated with a light substance - a “coating” ... and with the help of X-rays from the explosion of the primary atomic charge “heat the coating” ... But how to ensure a uniform, symmetrical effect of radiation on the spherical surface thermonuclear charge with “coating”? Here I am stuck. And at some point in the spring of 1954, Zeldovich came from Moscow and said: “I know what to do! Let's emit radiation like this.” And immediately drew a diagram of how to implement the “third idea”. ... That same day | came to Sakharov and said: “Andrei Dmitrievich, here Yakov Borisovich proposes to act with radiation in such and such a way. And I propose to surround the thermonuclear charge with a light substance and with its help to produce compression. And they

stopped there ... This is a proposal of three people - Zel'dovich, Sakharov, Trutnev. Zel'dovich proposed exactly how to direct X-rays, Sakharov showed that this radiation is not absorbed by the walls of the casing, but remains in it, and therefore a uniform effect on the surface of the thermonuclear unit can occur. And my idea is a “coating” of a light substance to transfer radiation to the required pressure. | remember how I came up with my idea, but how they got to their ideas, now I can only guess.”

- Yuri Trutnev, The creation of nuclear weapons is a special work, RIA Novosti, 11/22/2017, https://ria.ru/20171122/1509304656.html

“But in the meantime, | already had another idea in my head - a more advanced product based on a new principle for designing a thermonuclear charge. After testing the RDS-37, the next day in the evening | called my friena and colleague Yuri Nikolaevich Babaev to the bank of the Irtysh and said: "Yura, let's try to do just such a thing.” And he agreed. We returned to Sarov and drew a charge diagram and proposed it. This product received an index of 49. ... Zeldovich had three failures of thermonuclear units during tests ina row! ,.. The test of product 49 took place on the Day of the Soviet Army, February 23, 1958 at the test site on Novaya Zemlya. The success was very big.” - Yuri Trutnev, below with Tzar 17/11/2017

American

tapering of secondary stage cylinder

(the tapering is due to the gradual fall of the fusion burn efficiency as it propagates along the length of the cylinder, if the cylinder is uniform/non- tapering)

Russian 370 kg thermonuclear 1st Russian MIRV warhead for missiles, put into missiles, put into : service in 1978. mass is 170 kg, a:

thermonuclear cha

three warheads on

1st ever Russian MIRV warhead, 210 kg each; first put into service in 1978.

The tapering seen in the shapes of early American Polaris warheads is absent from

Russian devices, Monoblock warhead of the Monoblock warhead which have first megaton range missile for ships and shore bas

uniform cylinders! submarines, 650 kg, year 1974

The 1.6 Mt 22 Nov 1955 Russian test used a spherical-shaped simplified Teller “Alarm Cl x-rays from a primary stage. Yuri Trutnev used a cylindrical-shaped secondary stage on 2

ABOVE: Zeldovich and Sakharov's January 14, 1954 report, On the use of the product for the purpose of compressing the superproduct RDS-6s which suggested using x-rays reflected by a suitably shaped radiation case on to a spherical fusion secondary stage (a simplified Teller "Alarm Clock", with fissile material in the centre to release neutrons when compressed, lithium deuteride around it which would be hit by neutrons from the fissile material when compressed to fission lithium to yield tritium, an outer shell of uranium-238 as a "pusher" and final fission stage since the 14 MeV neutrons from D+T fusion can fission U-238 efficiently). However, Yuri Trutnev improved this design by placing light material such as beryllium oxide (used as the D+T compressor in the Fuchs-von Neumann superbomb patent) or indeed any light elements (such as the carbon and oxygen in plastics), around the the lithium deuteride. Photo shows President Putin meeting the designer of later successful Russian devices, Yuri Trutnev (then 90), on 15 November 2017. Trutnev says that the 22 November 1955 successful Russian 1.6 megaton thermonuclear test went to Zeldovich's head and he later had a run of three failed

bomb designs in a row, before Trutnev was permitted to test his own new design ion 23 February 1958 in the arctic, with great success

(860 kilotons air burst at 3 km altitude); the Russians at this time started testing cylindrical secondary stages in an effort to make warheads more compact for ICBMs and SLBMs. Photos of the first AWRE British single warhead for a Polaris SLBM show it to have a tapering secondary stage (an innovation first revealed by Howard Morland in 1979, see illustration below, which also highlights the problem that Los Alamos expert Vernon Kendrick told Morland at Los Alamos in November 1978 that modern warheads "don't use spark plugs [which Kendrick pointed out to be spheres of plutonium throughout the secondary, a 1960s development] anymore" because the fissile oralloy pusher does the job of releasing neutrons to fission lithium into tritium, formerly done by spark plugs, but Morland still included a 1950's style cylindrical spark plug in his diagram of a modern 300 kt MIRV warhead and failed to show the tapering of the outercase in line with the tapering of the secondary), whereas photos of otherwise very similar Russian SLBM warheads first deployed in 1978 show no tapering of the secondary stage cylinder. Russia adopted cylindrical secondary stages in place of spherical secondaries, to reduce the diameter of thermonuclear warhead to fit missiles because it was using x-ray mirroring by the outer casing which makes the weapon bulkier than the American designs; whereas America after 1956 filled the radiation channel with a baffle of low density plastic foam instead of using case mirroring, and so went in exactly the opposite direction to the Russians (America went from cylindrical to spherical secondaries for smaller thermonuclear warheads, whereas Russia did the reverse because it was still using the outer casing as an x-ray mirror and needed more space for the mirroring geometry). Putin is seen presenting Trutnev with the Order of Merit to the Fatherland,

First Class.

70 PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THERMONU'!

al we: PROGRESSIVE

S t Wa boners — November 1979 $1.50 WY

Figure 16. H-bomb using the autocataly: bomb A sends soft X-rays through the g: the *LiD thermonuclear fuel.

78 PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THERMONU(

\

/

SSS cS

lithium-6 4 F deuteride

Jy A®A dq

Figure 18. Compact H-bomb or neutron t fuel is simply precompressed by the soft

How we got it- : catalytic principle. why we're telling it

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Update (16 May 2022): https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/16/scenarios-putin-nukes-00032505: By GREGG HERKEN, AVNER COHEN and GEORGE M. MOORE, 05/16/2022 12:00 PM EDT. "Scenario 1: Remote atmospheric test. Least provocative would be Putin’s resumption of above-ground nuclear testing — by detonating a low-yield nuclear warhead high ... Scenario 2: Atmospheric detonation above Ukraine. A more provocative demonstration would be an ultra-high-altitude explosion of a more powerful weapon over Ukraine itself. In a 1962 test, the U.S. detonated a 1.4-megaton H-bomb in the mid-Pacific, 250 miles above the Earth. The resulting electromagnetic pulse unexpectedly knocked out streetlights and disrupted telephone service in Hawaii... Scenario 3: Ground explosion in Ukraine. Most dangerous — and, for that reason, perhaps least likely — would be using a tactical nuclear weapon to achieve a concrete military objective such as disrupting the delivery of weapons to Ukrainians... In May 1945, weeks before the successful test of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico, former President Harry Truman’s advisers considered, briefly, the option of a harmless but spectacular demonstration of the revolutionary new weapon as an alternative to its military use, in hopes of compelling Japan to surrender.

For practical reasons — there were too few bombs in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and some feared a dud — the demonstration option was

Fission- bomb Plastic foam fillerE&in trigger Fission- bomb radiation channel, with blast

Miscellaneous

mm beryllium polystyrene

KV Foam

t

© D-T neutron generator

ma ae

tlager shield EB.

Channel filler has active role in implosion: "matter pressure,” not "radiation pressure."

"... you'd need something in there to keep the neutrons off the secondary."

TNT U-235

Radiation is "channeled," not "reflected."

sisi sini [7] ; Vernon Kendrick = } ’ Bast Bose U-238 casing ' l ‘ Hos ridward Teller Americana ) “1 November 1978 in Los Alamos. | had finished interviewing a te i hari aie eee eet Manhattan Project veteran... | showed him the Teller Americana drawing ... | asked if he could add some detail to it, 1. Réfiecfion 1. Separate Stages so | could trace the components back fo their factories. > ee Mek : n —— > 2. Radiation He pointed to the space between the primary and the secondary SS Coupling and said, "you'd need something in there to keep the neutrons 3. Compression 3. Compression off the secondary.” ... | knew the Lapp World Book bomb needed to be imploded to set off its plutonium triggers, and radiation =a pean pressure inside the outer bottle could do the job. That was the secret, ... Barely containing my excitement, | showed him the (rovesed by UCRL #725, Greago SunTimos: May 181979) Pomwenane foam \ other drawing and suggested it might make a good secondary. 7 He pointed to the plutonium balls and replied, "They don't use NBC: BECAUSE, since TUBA c1962, spark plugs anymore.” So they, too, have a name.” HAS BEEN **REPLACED** BY ORAI

never presented to Truman. But the warning shot idea would surface again and be taken more seriously. During the 1961 Berlin crisis, former President John Kennedy was presented with the option of firing a nuclear-tipped missile at Novaya Zemlya to show American resolve. Israel has also considered a nuclear demonstration; prior to the Six-Day War, in May 1967, Shimon Peres proposed detonating a nuclear device over the Sinai desert to head off the conflict. Six years later, the Israelis again briefly entertained the notion of a high- altitude nuclear warning shot to force an end to 1973’s Yom Kippur War. In 1981, with the Cold War again heating up, Secretary of State Alexander Haig — a former NATO supreme allied commander — let slip that “there are contingency plans in the NATO doctrine to fire a

nuclear weapon for demonstrative purposes...” regardless of what Putin decides, engaging Russian forces in direct combat should only be a last resort."

UPDATE (24 May 2022) on yield of Bravo nuclear test: it was mentioned (above) that nuclear effects researcher Dr Gregory Spriggs of

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who has been scanning by computer and re-analyzing old films of nuclear test fireballs, went

on TV last year (during a documentary about the Bravo test) to argue that due to water entrainment by the fireball affecting the fireball expansion rate, its total yield may have been 22 megatons, not 15 megatons as extrapolated from fireballs over land in Nevada. There are some LLNL reports now available, giving some of the basic data on fireball expansion rates and blast arrival times, that backs up what he said (though for other Pacific tests like Zuni and Dakota, not Bravo - note that I would love to see all the fireball films of Bravo in high definition taken from surface level, rather than aircraft above the clouds, since the rather grainy declassified ones so far available show that normal clouds obscured most of the fireball and its thermal pulse at the surface and that you can also see a secondary fireball running down the diagnostic x-ray vacuum pipes!). I'm particularly interested in this because I did an analysis of the G. I. Taylor fireball expansion formula (on vixra) giving analytical - rather than taylor's shoddy numerical integration ("cheating" according to maths professor!) proof of the correct formula (Taylor didn't even get his numerical integration right, making errors in his derivation; so much for the wonders of his so-called brilliant mathematicial brain!). The new LLNL papers are by Kelly M. Cook, Shockwave Arrival Times from Operation Redwing and Operation Upshot-Knothole, LLNL-TR-814172, which in table 1 shows that Redwing-Zuni whose fireball was partly over an island in the south of Bikini Atoll but also extended over the sorrounding lagoon water to the north and ocan to the south, had an entrainment coefficient of 1.075. The value is | for no entrainment like the Nevada Climax air burst, and the yield is proportional to the cube of the coefficient, i.e. 1.0753 = 1.242, so megaton range tests over ocean would have a fireball yield at least 24% higher (or more than 24% if the area covered by highest overpressures had a larger ratio of water area to land area). Secondly, a paper by Adele Myers, Water Entrainment in Nuclear Detonations, LLNL-TR-758735 (extracts below) shows how a funnel of water enters the surface burst fireball in a comparable way to the funnel of water thrown up by the Baker underwater test as also shown below, thus cooling the top portion of the fireball (which as Stanbury pointed out in his paper cited above is the only part that most city windows can see, relevant to coastal cities or cities around large river estuaries). She also gives graphs of relevant data and notes that this effect has

a 100 kiloton yield threshold. Very interesting!

Fireball \ - Line Height/ Fireball |

Lower yields

Water entrainment line

S wn

° 5

9 N

Water entrainment makes the bottom half of the 1.1 megaton Redwing-Dakota fireball brighter than

Line Height/ Fireball Height

the top half. This has effects for the fireball determined yields of nuclear tests >100kt over water! 0.1 . _— Fireball Water entrainment line ssetdarmnea heielers a cools only the TOP Water spray thrown up by 0 part of the fireball the blast wave hitting 0 0.05 0.1 water ripples (storm Time ( BRIGHT BRIGHT effect) forms a funnel of

water cooled air in fireball

Figure 3: A predicted cross sectional view of the shape that the water entrainment

ree 3 SOURCE: Adele Myers, Water Entrainment in Nuclear De would take inside of the nuclear fireball. atid

Investigation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, |

oy ee NG MET ‘l BREAN TES

OS ee

CONDENSATION RINGS (WII

Top of fireball is cooled by water entrainment; bottom is blocked by city skyline (or clouds) duh

NORMAL CLOUDS

BRAVO (15 megatons or 22 megatons) seen not from an aircraft above cloud cover, but from surface level: clouds block hot base of fireball!

ABOVE: Hurricane 25 kt nuclear test at 2.7 m depth inside ship moored in water just 12.2 m deep at Monte Bello had severe fireball cooling by water funnel; its thermal flash yield was only about 1.4%. Fires were started by bits of the ship in very dry vegetation on nearby island, NOT by thermal flash! Also, despite lying from prime Minister Churchill about this test causing a large "tidal" wave, it didn't as the water was too shallow and there was no water innundation to the WWII Anderson shelters on the beach of the island nearest the test! (Churchill was the only person to have been in the Cabinet of the country declaring every single World War in human history, and yet he still failed to ensure the enemy was deterred, despite publically arguing for overwhelming superiorty ahead of each war and also being supposedly a supreme orator and public relations genius according to the similarly deluded mass media and politically correct "historians"). It would be great if this data from a 25 kt near surface nuclear test were used to improve models of water entrainment in fireballs. It seems that the "100 kt limit" for water entrainment is misleading because all it signifies is that at yields below 100 kt you don't find a "water line" in fireball photos since the

water/soil is ejected into the fireball so quickly that it cools down the entire fireball (not just the top section where the funnel

OR NATIONAL ARCHIVES! HS 5/2 DOF SECRET-GUARD ’ SECRET GUARD ?

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OPERATION HURIUCANE—THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE IAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

(Moste Belo, Auctralie—Ocsober, 1942)

Sent = EN

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Tor Secner Secnos oF Dencyos’s Reroxr DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Semmary ATOMEC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT Tals secon of the report oa wieotite date obtained at Operation Hurricane ied the dosewrate contours of the retidusl radioactive comamisation revlling as (he detention of tas Rows Devka ne y which was exploded sordet coninas sepecnseting s ship-berse ofisch 20 8 pert The maic body of Ge report, mtued separately, cowers ether aspecs of the comamitabon, a wel as the er blast gamms fast, cherms! trdistion and ender 3 weer shock. TIME (eacanea) onto te epetied taann poodece pronase snp eoanrtoios te te chet SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT a . ci Tocagnan ol pasos Fodation coule Ve Tecetved nay be esreced vy tht OPERATION HURRICANE Sterumanstie bys omer of trom Tos to tow ' TOP SECRET SECTION OF OTRRCTOR'S REPORT FIG.2-3_ EXPANSIO FF FIREBAU WATERLINE. [] Rises of musmd water and Diack cartous oxide fom WAP aancys a& i-2 seconds from the top of the fireball, which cools aad os P| fesse tears sesonan” Lane pacta 4a at's muonae after borat re aer) 32 Fallout comenenoed from the rete of the cotane bet the dd 201 sprted 4 and cat wee preety The more —— trom : he clnke and ah ai ey fst ot fet pe soe pouting ooytel pi sheet fae a oe the explomon, Figs 14 and 39, amd famed by H continuing for at lnest tem minwees. Minuory of Detence, 3 The roughly as sf came CMy: 278 Agus, 1954 H 1g et ie Snag mato ef tr ow ; when ms scceet was mutetaniially opped by a temperetes: vere ry OY secrer—cuarp as 26? secret-Guarp H SECRET—GUARD

BRITISH “Hurricane™ 25kt nuclear near surface test (2.7 m depth, in ship) “= ++" =

Funnel of water a very severely cool

|

sprays out horizontally) as seen in the Hurricane test. Similar cooling in surface bursts, caused by crater ejecta entering the fireball very quickly, accounts for the fact that thermal yields in surface bursts are lower than in air bursts. Just in case you are wondering if Russia is aware that clouds etc attenuate thermal radiation, they are; see photos below of the shielding of their first

thermonuclear weapon test fireballs by clouds:

B dKCNO3K UNM My3eAR NOYeTHOe MeCTO J3NMMICT Kopnyc 6orm6bi Ann 3apaga PAC-1. Heckonbko Takitx KOpnycos 6binw H3roTOGNeHbI “Ha BCAKMHM CHyYaly DB 1950-1951 rogax 5 K6-11

© Oe

- >_<

Nepean coverckan CepHinan aromnan 6om6a PAC-4 (aTarpana»)

TaKHM YBHACNK B3IPbiB TepwmoApepHON 6om6bi yaacrHHKH HCNoITAaAHHHM PAC-6c

Kopnyc 3apana PAC-6c, sHameni MCNbITaHHOK Ha CemnnanaTMHci 12 aprycta 1953 ropa

—- Ree fs

o Lewy

_ ee Ka " = 41.2 kt Russian 380m air burst Joe-3 / RDS-3 (composite Pu and U235 core), 18 C

Clouds shielding 50 megaton RDS-220 Tsar Bomba fireball on 30 October 1961

ABOVE: clearly some of these RUSSIAN published fireball photos of USSR tests are carelessly switched over and wrongly labelled, e.g. the 400 kt 1953 and 1.6 Mt 1955 tests are a little similar, and easily muddled up by officials in the photo archives. It will be left as an exercise for the reader to sort them properly! (There are so many similar nuclear test photos of fireballs and mushroom clouds that you get nuclear brain paralysis if you look at too many!) .... But it should be noted that confusions like this also led to errors in Dr Frank H. Shelton's Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (2nd ed, 1990; it is identified by extra pages inserted in places with a letter after the page number), for example he reprints the same photo of 1953 shot Grable twice, once labelled as Grable, and later in the chapter on Operation Plumbbob, labelled as 1957 Priscilla! (Contrary to Dr Cary Sublette's false assertions, sorting Grable from Priscilla photos is very easily identifiable since there was NO SMOKE SCREEN in the Priscilla test, see photo of Grable with black-and-white smoke screen clouds BELOW):

"The U.S. press, like the U.S. government, is a corrupt and troubled institution. Corrupt not so much in the sense that it accepts bribes but in a systemic sense. It fails to do what it claims to do, what it should do, and what society expects it to do. The news media and the government are entwined in a vicious circle of mutual manipulation, mythmaking, and self-interest. Journalists need crises to dramatize news, and government officials need to appear to be responding to crises. Too often, the crises are not really crises but joint fabrications. The two institutions have become so ensnared in a symbiotic web of lies that the news media are unable to tell the public

what is true and the government is unable to govern effectively." - https://hbr.org/1995/05/why-the-news-is-not-the-truth

Russians being prepared for use of nuclear weapons, says Ukri

ABOVE: Ukraine's President Zelensky explaining to John Simpson how his call for Putin to be stopped from starting WWIII has

been perverted by US media liars who love Putin, and how Putin is preparing Russia for nuclear war (although he has not yet completely prepared; Putin probably requires collaboration with China, North Korea, Iran et al. to defeat the West in WWIII, and fortunately they are not yet ready to go that far according to Zelensky). As a step forward for peace and humanity, we've set up twitter.com/nukegate to fight US warmongers! The current world situation is akin to a repeat of the 1930s, with the West causing war NOT by "appeasement" (the scapegoat lie of the pseudo "historians", regardless of whether they are "for" or "against" appeasement, a total irrelevance and red-herring) but by DISARMAMENT OF THE MOST VITAL DETERRENT CAPABILITIES WE HAD IN THE NAME OF PSEUDO-PEACE DUE TO WEAPONS EFFECTS LIARS BEING ALLOWED TO GO UNOPPOSED IN THEIR SCARE MONGERING BS FOR YEARS, TO REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE, AND THUS TO CAUSE ANOTHER WORLD WAR, as we can see

Vv ida 45 kiloton nuclear test Grable at 524 ft burst altitude, smok — report:

175 smoke pots 200-300 ft from ground zero established a 3.8 grams/m’2 (white smoke screen can be seen to the right of ground zero in this photo distance of 2238 feet from bomb (or 2166 ft from ground zero), the free-fie thermal exposure was 57.5 +/- 5.0 cal/cm“2; behind smoke-screen it was. Hence, 98.6% +/-0.3° s stopped by the smoke screen.

Glasstone however first lied in the 1957 edition of Efi Nuclear Weapons (page 289, paragraph 7.19) that o be stopped > (without giving any specific data reference:

credible, then he removed all reference to smoke screen:

editions. Liars still claim he is "authoritative"

J gb Smoke screen : “a

Churchill's words, 'no foreign policy can have validity if there is no adequate force behind it...' [Slessor is quoting Churchill, Gathering

Storm, 4th ed, p337] ... The climax of misjudgement ... was the surrender at Munich in September 1938. ... Sir Winston Churchill remains convinced that it would have been better, in all the circumstances at the time, to fight Hitler in 1938 [note that the 1938 annexation of Sudetenland including Bohemia gave the Nazis the Joachimsthal uranium mine and many other vital war minerals and heavy industries for munitions production, enabling not just Nazi nuclear research but also conventional weapons production which helped sustain the Nazis in WWI, so the 30 September 1938 surrender to Nazi aggression in Sudetenland by Britain was not "just" about a "few Jews in a faraway land" being murdered in cold blood, or whatever Chamberlain claimed, but it was doing the OPPOSITE of "buying time for BRITISH disarmament"; Chamberlain was knowledgably and dishonestly NOT MERELY BUYING TIME FOR ENEMY REARMAMENT (he rearmed Britain more slowly than the Nazis), but he was also PROVIDING RESOURCES FOR NAZI REARMAMENT, a fact omitted in scam "history" books praising the fascist, anti-libertarian, Nazi collaborator and traitor Chamberlain and his toady pals in the British press] ... He himself has written in his book of the overriding influence of the hatred of war in the hearts of the Democracies, and of our

national unwillingness to provide the force to back our policy. ...

[p148:] [French army commander at the outbreak of WWII, General Maurice] Gamelin was a likable person, a courtly and confident old soldier; but I thought him then [at the September 1938 meeting between Gamelin and Slessor in London, due to the Munich crisis] as remote from reality as he afterwards proved ... At this meeting, he said he would like to attack [Hitler] on land at once, but that the French were very interested in avoiding air attack, and wanted some days to get their Air Raid Precaution [ARP] arrangements under way (actually they had no ARP worthy of the name). ... He thought that heavy air attacks on England would be difficult - it was possible, but he did not regard it as very important. ... No one can say what would have happened if war had come in September 1938. The real key to the situation was not Poland, as Gamelin thought, but Russia. ... If Russia had intervened loyally and wholeheartedly against Hitler, the whole history of the past fifteen years would have been entirely different. ... [p150:] One fact which it is essential for anyone to realise who wishes to understand ... is that the war of 1939-1945 was the first air war. In 1914 to 1918 the Air had been in its too early infancy to have any very significant effect. ... we really did not know anything about air warfare on a major scale. ... [p151:] Anyway, in those years immediately before the war the possibility of what was referred to as the 'knock-out blow' bore heavily on the minds of the Air Staff. We were faced with a potential enemy who could bring against us something between 1,200 and 1,500 first-line bombers [with a combined blast and incendiary effects power in a single air raid, when correcting for correct nuclear blast and thermal devastation area scaling laws even ignoring the possibility of gas bombing, equal to a typical MIRVed nuclear missile today]. ... There is, of course, always a tendency, which should sometimes be discounted, for Military Staffs to over-insure and assume the worst case. But it is difficult to blame the Air Staff for assuming that we might find the whole air-power of Germany directed against this country very early in a war. That was

not impossible ... The Joint Planning Committee, in a comprehensive review of the air defence problem in late 1936, had estimated that we

might have to endure prolonged attack on the scale of 400 tons a day - and that scale increased with the growth of the German striking

force. ..."

"[p152:] In a minute to the Secretary of State in April 1938, the C.A.S. [Chief of the Air Staff] wrote- 'I feel strongly that the time for mincing words is past and that the Air Staff should state their view of the situation plainly. Their view is that unless the Cabinet are prepared to incur at the very least the full expenditure required for Scheme L and possibly more, we must accept a position of permanent inferiority to Germany in the air. ... in the event of war, our financial and economic strength, which the present financial limitations are

designed to secure, will be of no use because we shall not survive the knock-out blow'."

"[pp.160-1:] Looking back at it now in the atmosphere of 1953, it is almost impossible to believe the extent to which financial considerations were allowed to exert such an influence in bringling us to the very lip of disaster in the face of the Nazi menace, in the years immediately preceding Hitler's war. Every undergraduate knows that a sound economic situation is an essential basis of military strength; but that principle was carried to ludicrous extremes under Mr Chamberlain's Government. I remember one of the Chiefs of Staff saying in this connexion that, as far as he could see, a certain Cabinet Minister was primarily concerned to ensure that we had enough money left to pay the indemnity after losing the war; naughty, no doubt, but that is uncommonly like what it seemed to us in those days. ... Even in the full knowledge of facts such as those I have just described, the Government continued to rule early in 1938 that the three fighting Services between them should not be allowed to spend more than about £1600 millions over the five years 1937 to 1941 - an average of little over £300 millions a year for all three Services; and this eighteen months after the Prime Minister [Chamberlain], as Chancellor of the Exchequer, had confirmed that he knew the Germans were spending £1000 millions a year on warlike preparations, a

figure which by now, of course, was being greatly exceeded."

"[p163:] The parity idea first became theoretically the basis of Government policy in 1923 at the inception of the old 52 squadrons programme, which followed the post-war period when Britain virtually disarmed herself in the air. ... [p165:] Either we were dealing with Hitler - a mad dog out for blood - in which case ... there should have been no question of parity, or anything else but to outbuild him and kill him, regardless of any other consideration; it would have been cheap at the price. Or we were dealing with a German Government ... We should have recognised what we were up against when Austria was swallowed up - at the latest. ... we did not really get down to

arming ourselves on the necessary scale and tempo until after the fall of France in 1940. ..."

"[pp.169-170:] So a time comes, when war appears really imminent, when the 'shop-window' policy [e.g., ving propaganda fed from the prime minister to the editor of the Times to print rubbish on the front page like, a single gas bombing raid or nuclear firecracket can wipe out a city so we don't need to spend serious money on deterrence of yet another world war] must go by the board. This time, in our view, was overdue when Hitler absorbed Austria. On the morning when the German columns were moving on Vienna (March 12, 1938), I sent a minute to the C.A.S. ..."You may think it wise to suggest to the Secretary of State that ... we should now base our arrangements on the

a0

assumption that we may be forced into war this summer".

Regarding Winston Churchill, a wartime friend of Slessor whose rantings about the Nazis were ignored by Chamberlain and his entourage partly (as we explained previously on this blog) because Churchill was the last person to be able to lecture them (he sent most of them to

hell in his disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915, which led to his being fired from the Cabinet in WWI and then being deemed a

"warmonger" and fool in the 1930s when he warned those men he had sent to hell in what sounded to them like a conceited, deluded, vain

war-mongering prophecy), Slessor writes on pages 259-260:

"But I do not regard uncritical adulation as a compliment to any man. Mr Churchill is human, and as such makes mistakes; and the mistakes of a really big man are liable sometimes to be big mistakes. I am not so arrogant as to claim that when I disagreed with him I was necessarily right. But this book aims to be a humble contribution to history by recording events as they appeared ... I confess that I thought at the time, and still think, that policy in Scandinavia in the opening months of 1940 was one direction in which Mr Churchill's splendid aggressive spirit got the better of his judgement. ... On September 20, 1939, in the House of Commons, Mr Chamberlain said, "What we will not do is to rush into adventures that offer little prospect of success and are calculated to impair our resources and to postpone ultimate victory ... Strategy is the art of concentrating decisive force, at the decisive point, at the decisive moment’. That perfectly sound principle had not prevented the British Government a few days before from issuing a declaration that a German attack upon Norway would meet with the same resistance as an attack upon Great Britain; a declaration, unexceptionable in theory, to which we had about as much chance of giving practical effect as to our earlier guarantee to Poland of all assistance in our power - which amounted to precisely

nil."

Naugthy, but true. Chamberlain, the lover of Nazism, was the better strategist, whereas the more "experienced" military man, Churchill was a bungler competent only to issue ranting Goebbels' style propaganda, aided by brandy and cigars, who needed constant restraining and coercing by the straight-jacket of his asylum keepers like Slessor, who were often overcome by Churchill's fits of insanity. In reality,

Slessor writes on page 258, Churchill was a baby who was most happy playing his war with toy bombs:

"This [fluvial mine prototype] was really a sort of toy that Mr Churchill enjoyed playing with - a toy with just the appropriate flavour of aggressive villainy. I remember him one evening, as the little gadget in the fire-bucket touched off its electric bulb, taking his cigar out of his mouth and saying, with his irrestible chuckle, 'This is one of those rare and happy occasions when respectable people like you and I

a)

can enjoy pleasures normally reserved to the Irish Republican Army’. Churchill was not Fiddling like Nero while Rome Burned, but was Commissioning a War Song while London Burned, page 303:

"On one occasion we were walking in the [late 1940 Chequers] garden with the Prime Minister [Churchill] late after dinner. London was being bombed and the eastern sky was red with the glare of great fires. The P.M. gazed at it sadly, shaking his head. Then he said unexpectedly that it was strange that this war, unlike the last, had produced no good songs - no Tipperary or Keep the Home Fires Burning. Someone suggested the Lambeth Walk, but that was held not to count because it was pre-war. 'I must write to Novello and tell

him to produce a good war song,’ said the P.M., and then, with the chuckle, 'but this time it will have to be Stop the Home Fires Burning'."

Slessor finishes his book on pages 636-7, stating that the the proven role of air power in WWIL in defeating enemy air power and "Germany's oil fuel" to pave "the way for the invasion", was finally incorporated into British defence policy by Churchill in his postwar Statement on Defence, Commandment 9391: "this deterrent must rest primarily on the stategic air power of the West, armed with its nuclear weapons. The knowledge that aggression will be met by overwhelming (emphasis added) nuclear retaliation is the surest

guarantee that it will not take place."

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ABOVE: Russian President Putin used exactly the same excuse for invading Ukrainian territory that Hitler used in his invasions (precise quotation is below): he just wants to enable his nationals abroad to have the "right" to join the Russian Federation, and he repudiates the notion that Ukraine is a soverign country because it is "just" an arbitrary political fabrication like Czechoslovakia was in 1938 (he could -

and will soon - be saying that about the UN, USA, EU, UK, etc.). Russia should have been paid off at the end of the Ist Cold War in 1991,

with some kind of Marshall Plan, as was used to safely demilitarise Germany, Japan et al in 1945. But the UK instead sent BP into Russia to help them develop high technology oil and gas supplies, which they now use against us. Russia is a corrupt, bankrupt superstate which now has its own oil and gas supplies, its own massive nuclear weapons infrastructure, and a rapidly depleting obsolete conventional weapons stockpile. There are many former USSR territories and other areas Putin can lay semi-spurious claim to, beyond Ukraine. Russia gained Warsaw, Poland, under the 1815 Vienna Settlement, losing it in 1918 when Poland became independent. Finland was gained by Russia from Sweden in 1809, Alaska became Russian territory in 1784 before being sold by the Tsar to USA, and so on. If Ukraine is "simply" surrendered to Russia, the way Chamberlain surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler (rewarding Nazis for aggression, using financial costs and fears of poison gas war as his excuse), WWWIII by deliberate "accident" or "miscalculation" will be far more likely than during the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, when the West had a massive nuclear superiority over Russia! Gustav Bychowski's 1948 Dictators and Disciples explains dictatorship as an interdependence between the leader and the people, e.g. Stalin's war and territorial expansions (with help from propaganda) actually enhanced his reputation with his own people, and he really couldn't have cared less if the

"capitalists" in the rest of the world disapproved.

ABOVE: telegrams from Sir Henderson, British Ambassador to Nazi Germany, to British Foreign Secretary Halifax, 22 February 1939 and 15 March 1939 (taken from Docs on Brit Foreign Policy, s3, v4, pages 593-5 linked online here), proving that even at that late time, freedom of criticism of the Nazis by certain (humane) elements of the British press and Jews (!) were still being blamed for Nazi evil, and this is some 4-5 months after Kristallnacht, and many years after Mein Kampf: Notice that Henderson writes that he would like to see Nazi Field Marshall Goering awarded a medal by the King to appease him (/ike his from the King for helping Chamberlain to give away Sudetenland to the Nazis 5 months earlier in exchange for Hitler's autograph!), then writes that he had sympathy with the Jews, but then immediately claims that the Jewish plight is "not a basis for policy for England." When Hitler broke the worthless Munich Agreement by invading the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Henderson telegrammed Halifax: "What distresses me more than anything else is the handle which it will give to the critics of Munich." Well, not to Captain W. E. Johns, who was fired two months previously, from his editorships of Popular Flying and Flying on his orders, for criticisms of the government using subversive methods (government pressure on his publisher!). Let's now go back two volumes, and see what Henderson and Chamberlain did to try to start World War I

(while lying about it) in 1938:

"If Lam right, I do wish it might be possible to get at any rate 'The Times', Camrose, Beaverbrook Press &c. to write up Hitler as the apostle of Peace. It will be terribly shortsighted if this is not done. Cannot the News Dept. help? ... give Hitler as much credit as possible. The last word is his. We make a great mistake when our Press persists in abusing him. [He and Chamberlain "bravely" abused magazine publishers into getting Captain W. E. Johns fired from his position as editor of best selling magazines Popular Flying monthly and Flying weekly for calling for the deterrence of Nazi aggression by an arms race, in case their great lover Adolf Hitler was a trifle displeased with the British press! So much for liars who claim their exists "freedom of the press"!] ... If our only

satisfaction is to slang him, then we must abandon hope of ever getting results."

- Sir Nevile Meyrick Henderson, GCMG (1882-1942), British Ambassador to Nazi Germany, Letter to Sir A Cadogan from the British Embassy in Berlin, 6 September 1938, reprinted as document 793 on page 257 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume IT, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's

(v) Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscount Halifax (UK Foreign Sec. BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN, February 22, 1939

Pages 592-3 of Does. on Brit. For. Policy, s3, v4:

Henderson was UK Ambassador.

Dear Secretary of State, The following are some of the loose ends of my talk with Goering last weekend.

OTe CTCCrry

The Field Marshal was very anxious to know all about the decoration which I had received from His Majesty. I spoke in glowing terms of it and referred to mantles, chains and banners etc. Goering clapped me on the shoulder and said ‘Such orders are never given to foreigners are they?’ I told him very, very seldom which made him look regretful. He has always in mind a visit to London one day and the decoration part might be decisive. It is a point to bear in mind, if ever the day came. Who cares about your "belief", you're paid to prevent war,

and Hitler made his plans clear in Mein Kampf anyhow!!! ling is that this year will be the decisive one, as to whether én the side of peaceful development and closer co-operation decides in favour of further adventure eastward. If we handle him right, my belief is that he will become gradually more pacific. But if we treat him as a pariah or mad dog we shall turn him finally and irrevocably into one.

I would feel confident if it were not for the British Press or at any rate that section of it which is inspired either by an intelligentzia, which hates Hitler and the

Nazis so much that it sees red whatever the facts are, or by alarmists by profession and Jews. If I were a Jew, I would move heaven and earth regardless of the conse- quences, to attack Germany when and wherever I could. Though I athise with this attitude, it is not a = for policy for England.

SES ae oF |

Kristallnacht was 4 months earlier, on 9/10 November 19 *3. ‘so what is he going

(i Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscoun

BRITISH EMB.

Page 595:

Dear Secretary of State, Do you wonder that I regard Berlin as a soul-scari!

Hitler has gone straight off the deep end again. Ithz

—even for the Germans and Goering, who has been great disgust, would never have been allowed to go aw

move been contemplated. But Hitler is a master o! advantage and the Czech military coup at Pressburg ‘And the extremists have again won the day & all on eventually regret it.

What distresses me more than anything else is the

the critics of Munich. Not kiana aac! agg not alw servience of the Czechs to Germany was inevitable. |

why all the talk about Holland, Switzerland & thi turned people’s minds from the real objective & was, by the extreme Nazis themselves for that very purpos

i pening turn which events would take—nor, in justice wonder y what Musso of it all. The

Above: Henderson worries about "critics of | 1939, just after Hitler violates Munich Agre remainder of Czechoslovakia, having promis

One"

Johns, former editor of Popular Flying

critic" he didn't need to worry abo

on about? What a fucking racist, c valling for the King to reward Goering a medal!!! (weekly) , whom he and Chamberlain ha Stationery Office, SBN-11-591527-3*. This particular volume doesn't appear to be available online yet, although it is the dynamite in the

series! (I'm quoting this here to PROVE that there is nothing NEW in lying fascists in Western governments promoting racist fascism by

secretly wining and dining - or coercing with threats of abuse if the velvet glove over the iron fist fails to work - the populist media into

supporting terrorism against the Jews and others in the name of the Devil.)

"I reminded him [Adolf Hitler, during conversation at Berchtesgaden, 15 September 1938] that after 1914 it was said that if we had then told Germany that we would come in, there would have been no war ... He [Hitler] said a warning and a threat had the same effect. I dissented ... but I did not pursue this subject ... He said that he had from his youth been obsessed with the racial theory and he felt the Germans were one ... he is concerned with ten millions of Germans, three millions of whom are in Czechoslovakia. He felt therefore that

those Germans should come into the Reich. They wanted to and he was determined that they should come in. Apart from that, he said,

there was no other place where frontiers made any territorial difficulty. ... he was out for a racial unity and he did not want a lot of

Czechs, all he wanted was Sudeten Germans."

- British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, BRITISH Minute of the Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Fuhrer, 15 September 1938 at Berchtesgaden, reprinted as document 895 at page 339 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume IT, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN-11-591527-3*. (I'm quoting this here to PROVE that talking to evil devils provides you a load of lies, propaganda,

and false promises.)

"He, Mr Chamberlain, must frankly admit that many Englishmen regarded the Fuhrer's speeches solely as words, behind which were concealed carefully prepared plans. He, Mr Chamberlain, however, regarded the Fuhrer as a man who, from a strong feeling for the sufferings of his nation, had carried through the renaissance of the German nation with extraordinary success. He had the greatest respect for this man ... After 1914 England had been reproached on many sides because she had not made her intentions clear enough. The war might perhaps heve been avoided, these critics objected, if England had taken a clearer attitude. ... The Fuhrer replied that ... after a certain moment, little could be done to change the unalterable course of events. In his opinion a

British warning would have come too late in 1914 as well, since the difficulties had by then reached too advanced a stage."

- British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, GERMAN (Herr Schmidt, translator) Minute of the Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Fuhrer, 15 September 1938 at Berchtesgaden, reprinted as document 896 at pages 342 and 346 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN-11-591527-3*. (I'm quoting this here to PROVE differences between the BRITISH and GERMAN Minutes of the Conversation between Chamberlain and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 15 September 1938!)

"Herr Hitler said [to Chamberlain at Godesberg, 22 September 1938] that he would like to thank the Prime Minister for his great efforts to reach a peaceful solution. He was not clear, however, whether the proposals, of which the Prime Minister had just given him an outline, were those submitted to the Czechoslovak Government. The Prime Minister replied: Yes. Herr Hitler said he was sorry, since those proposals could not be maintained. ... Czechoslovakia was an artificial construction, which was called into being and was established

solely on the grounds of political considerations." [Cf: Putin's description of Ukraine, DUH!]

- Note of a Conversation between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler at Godesberg, 22 September 1938, reprinted as document 1033 at page 465 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume IT, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN-11-591527-3*. (/’m quoting this here to PROVE what

happens when you are such an EGOTIST you think you can "negotiate" a "peace agreement" with the Devil!)

"The Prime Minister [Chamberlain, at the Munich Conference with Hitler on 29 September 1938] pointed out that he could not give such a guarantee [for the Sudeten evacuation of Jews by 10 October 1938 for FAST Nazi annexation] ... This led to a tirade from Herr Hitler (who was otherwise calm throughout most of the Conference), his line being that if - having asked him to stay his hand - we were not prepared to take the responsibility of ensuring the concurrence of Czechoslovakia we had better let him

resume his way!"

- Note by Sir Horace Wilson on the Munich Conference, between Chamberlain and Hitler, 29 September 1938, reprinted as document 1227 at page 631 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN-11-591527-3*. (I’m quoting this here to PROVE that once you start on the road to diplomacy with a Devil who takes a mile whenever you give an inch, it becomes worse than the

script for an unfunny, depressing episode of Monty Python's Flying Circus. It's worse than the dead parrot sketch!)

"Herr Hitler [to Chamberlain, in Hitler's Munich Flat, 30 September 1938]: Years ago he [Hitler] made proposals for the restriction of the use of the air arm. He himself fought in the Great War and had a personal knowledge of what air bombardment means. It had been his intention, if he had to use force, to limit air action to front line zones as a matter of principle ... he would always try to spare the civilian population and to confine himself to military objectives. ... Herr Hitler: The situation about air disarmament is just the same as it is in the case of the naval situation. If a single nation refuses to agree, all the others have to follow her example. [Secretly-rearming fascists agree to PAPER "disarmanent" for the concessions involved like lifting sanctions etc, but then secretly break the agreement! DUH!] One sees what has happened in the case of the Naval Treaty. When Japan refused to agree, all the other nations had to give up their restriction. It would be just the same if one tried to abolish bombing aircraft. ... He himself [Hitler] had proposed years ago- 1. The abolition of bombing aircraft; 2. If '1.' could not be accepted, the abolition of bombing outside a zone of 15 to 20 km from the front line; and 3. If neither '1.' nor '2.' were accepted, the limitation of bombing to a zone which could be reached by heavy artillery. ... The development of

bombing from the air [Hitler declared] extends the horrors of war to the non-combatant population and is therefore a barbarism."

- Note by Dr Schmidt of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, at the latter's Flat in Munich, 30 September 1938, reprinted as document 1228 at pages 636 and 638 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN-11- 591527-3*. (I'm quoting this here to PROVE that negotiating with dictators is a complete farce; they are experts on "peacemaking" and "disarmament" propaganda lying scams and will turn the tables verbally and appear to be the heroes of liberty! It was at the end of this very meeting that Chamberlain did his "magician act" of plucking a piece of paper from his pocket which outlawed war between the Nazis and British, and they both signed it, which naturally prevented WWII, just as intended! Duh! Wicked diplomacy! It is LINKED HERE with a snap of Chamberlain celebrating his "success" back home from the window of his flat above 10 Downing Street, a fraudulent travesty of propaganda lying which he called "peace in our time", but which would certainly have "earned" him a few

dozen Lordships and Nobel peace prizes, if it hadn't been a staged farce.)

"After emphasising that the gathering was a confidential one, and that nothing was to be quoted as official, the Prime Minister [Chamberlain, speaking CONFIDENTIALLY to the "British Press" on 11 September 1938, in a typical travesty of the populist claims about "freedom of the press" etc.] said: ... War ... is something which might in the very first few hours affect the civilian population. Thereby it becomes an even more dreadful and horrible thing than it was before. The Government's policy and the Government's efforts are directed all the time to the avoidance of any such catastrophe as that [a complete lie since slow rearmament plus appeasement encouraged war as these thugs had been told repeatedly by Captain W. E. Johns in Popular Flying and Flying editorials, but they had used backhanded techniques to shut up Captain W. E. Johns by getting him fired via

subversive pressure on his publisher, proving them narcissistic lying fascist-technique thugs]."

- Text of the Prime Minister's Statement to the Press on September 11, 1938, reprinted as Appendix II at pages 680 of E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and Margaret Lambert (editors), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919- 1939, Third Series, Volume IL, "1938", published in 1949 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, SBN- 11-591527- 3*. (This book can be read like a depressing

thriller in a

DAILY SKETCH, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1998. , . few hours,

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“How well that faith in Mr. Chamber- | give way to discouragement, refusing to be lain has been justified! His firmness of | intimidated by opposition or ridicule, he went spirit and gentleness of heart have raised | relentlessly on until his spirit stood alone humanity to a new level. between the waiting armies of the two sides.” “Refusing to bow to fatigue, refusing to See Editorial Comment. page 15

"appeasement" disaster. Again, as repeatedly pointed out on this blog, appeasement is a wonderful thing and not a problem UNLESS you do it through coercive fear about being wiped off the face of the earth in a 1930s imaginary poison gas cloud, or a 1950s over-hyped nuclear radioactive fallout cloud (all such hyped up "threats" can be easily countered, as we will see in this post, later below). Kennedy made the point in 1940 in Why England Slept that appeasement was not a tragic policy; the bad policy was instead a REFUSAL to rearm FASTER than your opponent, simply out of fear of upsetting your opponent or triggering a first strike against yourself if you don't appease the enemy. Coercion is the problem, not "appeasement". By all means appease if you have might on your side and can afford to give favours, just don't do it out of WEAKNESS to encourage your opponent to keep advancing until your back is against the wall, fighting on

your opponent's terms.)

ABOVE: compiler of this blog post, anti-nuclear-disarmament (aka Marx-war-for-global-communist-and-peace-through-classwar-and- racewar-and-nuclear-war) liars, anti-fascist activist Nige Cook, holding the fascist Marx-media to account for causing the Ukraine War since 2006 on this blog with his dad (who took the photo) and author of the 1990-4 Nuclear Weapons Effects Theory (censored from publication by Cambridge Uni press's Simon Mitten, Oxford Uni press's Donald Degenhardt, and all the various hyper left wing anti- nuclear lying newspaper editors in the UK, all duped simpletons who believed disarmament Glasstone or Nukemap style populist liars for

"peace" aka russian racewar/classwar/nukewar/eurowar/corbynwar).

Russian State TV Channel 1 arguing for use of nuclear wea...

ABOVE (VIDEO CLIP): Russian State TV Channel | preparing Russians mentally for nuclear war (they already have nuclear shelters and a new Putin-era tactical nuclear war civil defense manual from 2014, discussed later in this blog post) arguing for use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine war in 2023: "We should not be afraid of what it is unnecessary to be afraid of. We need to win. That is all. We have to achieve this with the means we have, with the weapons we have. I would like to remind you that a nuclear weapon is not just a bomb; it is the heritage of the whole Russian people, suffered through the hardest times. It is our heritage. And we have the right to use it to defend our homeland [WFT does he mean, the liberated components of the USSR that gained freedom in 1992?]. Changing the [nuclear use] doctrine

is just a piece of paper, but it is worth making a decision."

PLEASE see quote (LINKED HERE) from disarmament liar Noel-Baker on gas masks being universally agreed by experts to be impossible despite their successful use in WWI, in his February 1927 BBC radio broadcast on page 31 of O'brien's official book

U Vd WO TO ction, 10 CTD G WiIitl 0 5 D V q

to make it credible. Over 40 years ago, Samuel Cohen's neutron bomb "controversy" raged: because modern city concrete and steel buildings are blast and heat resistant (unlike the wooden houses with charcoal stoves prevailing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945), you can detonate a nuclear weapon at a height that eliminates modern city damage and fallout dust, but that still causes non-lethal EMP or a lethal neutron flash to stop operations by an opponent. So nuclear weapons can be used to credibly deter the invasions that set off the world wars (Belgium 1914, Poland 1939). The CND/Corbyn claim that there will be uncontrolled automatic nuclear escalation from counterforce to countervalue attacks on civilians is like the claim of inevitable gas war knockout-blow city gas war escalation: gas

knockout blow escalation was disproved.

Russian State TV channel prepares its people for nuclear w...

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In WWI, Britain's fired 170 milli 1.5 million were fired before th Somme. In 1917 alone, Britain million shells containing 185 ki 943,947 shells were fired in a 2 the Britain on 28-29 September 1914-17 Britain fired 290 kt at | The "equivalent megatonage” o smells is immense because the destruction and thus casualties power of energy, not directly w typical WWI shell contained ab explosive. Thus, in 1917 alone was equivalent to: 50,000,000(: 120 separate 1 megaton bombs WWI, Britain fired 170 million s equivalent damage to: 170,000, 4.9)“{2/3} = 408 separate 1 mec weapons. In Vietnam, 7,662,00' conventional bombs = 766 sepa explosions. In WWII, London ret 100 kg bombs, thus 188,000(10

The 1.3 megatons of convent on Germany in WWII was like 13,000,000(10*-7)*{2/3} = 28C thermonuclear weapons, eac SOURCE:

https://glasstone.blogspot.co anti-terrorism-policing-world.

The "equivalent megatonage" or equivalent to 1 megaton nuclear weapons, isn't just 0.29 megatons, but is immense because the area of destruction ar

casualties scale by only about the 2/3 power of energy, not directly with yield, and each average shell contained only 3.7 kg of explosive. Thus, the

equivalent megatonnage of Britain's shelling in 1917 alone is:

50,000,000(3.7 x 107°)? 3 = 120 separate 1 megaton nuclear weapons. In the whole of WWI, the British Army fired 170 million shells, with equiva

damage to:

170,000,000(3.7 x 107°)” = 408 separate 1 megaton nuclear weapons.

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Now consider WWII, where London alone received about 18.8 kilotons in roughly 188 thousand separate 100 kg explosives in the 1940 Blitz :

188,000( 1077) = 4 thermonuclear weapons, each 1 megaton.

The 1.3 megatons of conventional bombs dropped on Germany in WWII was likewise equivalent to:

13,000,000( 10°7)23 = 280 separate thermonuclear weapons, each 1 megaton.

In total, 74.2 kilotons of conventional bombs were dropped on the UK in WWII causing 60,000 casualties, equivalent to 16 separate 1 megaton nucle: weapons, confirming the British Home Office analysis that - given cheap-type civil defence - you get about 3,750 casualties for a one megaton nuclea weapon. Naturally, without civil defence, as in early air bombing surprise attacks or the first use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualty rates can be over 100 times higher than this. (For example, Glasstone and Dolan, in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1977 point out that in Hiroshima the 50% lethal radius was only 0.12 mile for people under cover in concrete buildings, compared to 1.3 miles for those caught totally unprotected outdoors. The difference in areas is over a factor of 100, indicating that the casualties in Hiroshima could have been reduced enormously

people had taken cover in concrete buildings, or simple earth covered WWII shelters which offered similar protection to concrete buildings.)

Con

based editions). Sure, you get smoke without fire from nuclear weapons thermal radiation, but that smokescreen arises rapidly near

ground zero and so shields targets ar greater distances. The existence of an artificial skyline of concrete buildings in the "concrete jungle" of modern cities - unlike Hiroshima and Nagasaki which were mostly single storey wood frame buildings - has a similar effect as proved by British nuclear tests civil defence effectiveness researcher George R. Stanbury, who was ignored for decades for political propaganda reasons by the Pentagon. Dad, an advanced civil defence corp instructor, met Stanbury during a residential course at the civil defence staff college, Easingwold, Yorkshire (having special authority from Essex's Civil Defence chief, to attend as the course was usually for full-time employees only), and later corresponded with British nuclear test and Hiroshima and Nagasaki blast effects expert William G. Penney on blast shielding by cities by blast; he found that both knew that their own specialised effect - thermal and blast, respectively - was exaggerated, but both falsely believed that the other effect. Stanbury "knew" blast was the problem because skyline shielding would stop the radiation and getting people to simply toss wet paper on their fires on the attack warning siren would create an effective smokescreen to stop scattered thermal ray fires/burns, while Penney knew that the blast absorption by damage done in modern cities would kill the blast, but thought the thermal flash would start firestorms because he hadn't bothered to investigate ther firestorm mechanism in Hiroshima and had been misled to lies from the Americans on this. Consequently, neither felt inclined to launch a full-on assault on the Pentagon's nuclear weapons

effects mythology!

decide NOT to launch-on-warning in an intense East-West crisis! Duh. Duh. Duh! We'll discuss this in more detail later. EM-1 contains a mathematical model allowing detailed calculations of blast wind pressure induced overturning of mobile missile launchers based on their size and mass, but as we've just pointed out, they can reduce vulnerability simply by moving off when a USA launch is detected, and then turning to face their previous position, and extending their stabiliser/outrigger foot pads. "Simples!", as the Meerkats say in UK TV ads.

We have no credible deterrent whatever. We'll discuss this problem of mobile Russian ICBM and tacticla nuclear warhead launchers later

in more detail in this post (below).

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rads of secondary gamma ray the type 10 in EM-1 yield options. This

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—a-stow=nation-downfall tha culminated in December 1991, resulted in the newly independent Ukraine inheriting roughly 5,000 nuclear arms that Moscow had stationed on its soil. Underground silos on its military bases held long-range missiles that carried up to 10 thermonuclear warheads, each far stronger than the bomb that leveled Hiroshima. Only Russia and the United States had more weapons." - https://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/william-j-broad-ukraine-gave-up-a-giant-nuclear-arsenal-30-years-ago-today-there-are-

regrets

DISARMAMENT WARMONGERING RESULTS: (1) Disarmament via agreement (ignoring for now the 30 September 1938 UK-Nazi signed peace pact, etc) was disproved by Putin when - despite being signed up to the Chemical Weapons disarmament conventions, he ILLEGALLY BROKE THE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS and used chemical weapons, not just sarin nerve agent to help Assad win in Syria, but the latest most lethal Russian agent, Novichok, in the UK in 2018 to murder Dawn Sturgess (please see our blog post chronology at the time of the attack and analysis of Russian lying propaganda on disarmament, linked here). [fhe does that for Novichok, he can do it for tactical nuclear weapons! In WWII nuclear weapons were even made in secret from scratch by a democracy which had never made a nuclear weapon and wasn't even sure if it was possible, and then used on a nuclear unarmed state during the war, despite the democracy in question not having stockpile containing a single nuclear weapon when the war started! So this proves that 100% total disarmament can't stop a nuclear war! Unbelievable fact, that, according to the simplistic, fake news and smug disarmament lies you read in the papers and see on fascist style SIPRI lying TV murderers of kids through disarmament to prevent the credible deterrence of war, isn't it? Thus, paper agreements with the entire class of lying thug dictatorships that use WMDs to win a war against you, are useless. Hoping Hitler would cover himself shame if he violated agreements wasn't a good military policy, but it was used by thugs who clearly wanted a war in the 1930s and were rewarded with peace prizes in consequence (Angell and Philip Noel-Baker were the worst of the lot;

the latter was made a Lord and continued to splutter lies for disarmament in 1980 in the House of Lords with no opposition, as we'll

.R PHENOMENA

Table 8.5. Neutron Source Spectra and Output for Types 3, 5, 8, and 13.

ENERGY RANGE (MeV)

UPPER LOWER 1.49 x101 = 1.22 x 101 1.22 x101 = 1.00 x 101 1.00 x101 -— 8.19 x 100 8.19 x100 — 6.38 x 100 6.38 x100 — 4.97 x 100 4.97 x109 -— 4.07 x 100 4.07 x100 — 3.01 x 100 3.01 x100 — 2.31 x 100

2.31 x109 — 1.83 x 100 1.83 x100 — 1.11 x 100

1.11 x100 — 5.50 x 10-1 5.50 x 10-1 — 1.58 x 10-1 1.58 x10-1 — 1.11 x 10-1 1.11 x10-1 - 2.19 x 102

SOURCE 3

8.85 x 10-5 5.63 x104 2.06 x 10-3 5.26 x 10-3 1.34 x 10-2 2.81 x 10-2 4.19 x10-2 8.11 x10-2 137 «10-1

219x102-123x103 3

1.23 x10-3 - 1.01 x 104 1.01 lien

NEUTRONS PER MeV

SOURCE 5 9.47 x 10°3 2.38 x 10-3 3.14 x 103 6.27 x 10-3

1.59 x 102

3.05 x 10-2 4.59 x 10-2 8.76 x 10-2

SOURCE 8 1.65 x 10-2 5.49 x 10-3 3.86 x 10-3 6.00 x 10-3 1.25 x 10-2 2.22 x 10-2 3.39 x 10-2 5.85 x 10-2 5 x 10-2

SOURCE 13 1.42 x10-1 2.03 x 10-2 2.11 x102 2.06 x 10-2 2.33 x 10-2 2.74 x102 3.05 x 10-2 4.87 x102 8.65 x 10-2

expose later in this post). Weart proved in Never At War years

for superiority to deterthe excuse his failure to deter

with 2000+ tactical neutron bombs against a USA which now hates Kennedy's Why England Slept).

(3) HISTORY SHOWS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE BEEN ATTACKED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AUGUST 1945) DID N-O-T HAVE ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEING NUCLEAR UNARMED DIDN'T SAVE IT FROM BEING NUKED. Moreover, the pre-war stockpiles that disarmers concentrate on minimising are almost purely FOR DETERRENCE, as easily proved by dividing those pre-war (pre WWI and pre WWII) weapons stockpiles into the total munitions used in wars. In other words, the number of pre-war weapons you have has jack ---- relation to the number of weapons used in the war you fail to credibly deter! This COMPLETELY DISPROVES THE "ARMS RACE" CAUSES SLAUGHTER MYTHS OF WWI AND WWII! The weapons that flattened the wooden houses (not concrete buildings in general, or air raid shelters in general) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that burned the wooden medieval slums of Hamburg, were made DURING THE WAR, not in the non-existent "arms race" prior to the war. (Let that fact sink in for 24 hours before you read Glasstone or play with Nukemap, or head "history" written by Russian biased Marxists like A. J. P. Taylor and Adolf

Hitler. Don't trust those Nazis, the're unreliable due to bias!)

(4) GLASSTONE/NUKEMAP IGNORE THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT USE/EFFECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DETERRENCE IS AN EFFECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT YOU IGNORE AT YOUR PERIL, AND AT THE PERIL OF UKRAINIAN KIDS, AND IN FUTURE, THE LIVES OF AMERICAN KIDS WHO YOU INSTRUCT NOT TO DUCK AND COVER AND NOT TO HAVE A DETERRENT THAT IS CREDIBLE! This is all Russian Cold War anti-Western civil defence lying! Russia was (and is) totally pro-civil defence just as it is and was always pro-nuclear; the anti-civil defence stuff and anti nuclear stuff from Russia and its comintern comrades in the Western Marx Media is a trick to undermine Western defence, enabling Russian superiority; unfortunately people like Hans Bethe and the entire Western "arms

control and disarmament" organization fails to appreciate the con-trick and hypocrisy from Russia on this. As a result, the effects

of nuclear weapons have been totally distorted by Glasstone / Nukemap propaganda on behalf of pseudo (fake news) "Arms Control" liars who are effectively fellow travellers of Putin's agents in the media: nuclear weapons in the Kennedy era were used to try to de- escalate crises, e.g. USA had a large nuclear superiority at the time of the October 1962 Cuban missiles crisis and in his 22 October 1962 television address to the American people, Kennedy was able to use that nuclear superiority to deter what the Marx media call nuclear "accidents" (deliberate carelessness or contrived attacks under the name of a "that was JUST a mistake - SORRRRRREEEEY, now I've said sorry shut the ---- up about it or you'll start a REAL war, matey!"). Guess what? "Arms Conrol" mass-murderers with kid's blood soaked hands who caused all the wars that should have been credibly deterred by USING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CREDIBLY DETER WAR, refuse to acknowledge, assess, or respect the true fact that kennedy used nuclear superiority in 1962 and that parity and inferiority encouraged genocide by the Nazis! What newspaper or TV station in the corrupt West will publish this? None. They're all determined to soak their hands repeatedly in blood so they can report mass murders, not deter war (a newsroom "non-event:

move along please, nothing to see here" that doesn't exactly "boost viewing figures or sell toilet paper").

GLASSTONE'S EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNOBSTRUCTED TERRAIN DATA DEBUNKED FOR STRATEGIC COUNTERVALUE DETERRENCE

If the effects of nuclear weapons are so terribly extensive, why not simply reduce their yields from megatons to subkiloton yield like the W54 warhead? If fallout is such a problem, why not use air bursts and also put up with a reduction in overall yield to use a clean (non-oralloy loaded) secondary stage, like the 95% fusion Redwing-Navajo test of 1956? Such questions get to the heart of the groupthink political disarmament mythology on nuclear weapons. The reality is that there are serious problems in public appreciation of nuclear deterrence. The whole concept of deterrence is undermined by secrecy. Once your opponents have nuclear weapons, secrecy only serves to keep the populations of democracies ignorant of the facts. As with Edward Witten promoting superstring "theory" with the fake news claim "there are no alternatives to what we say" (and consequently such alternatives must be opposed and censored out by groupthink fake "peer" review), underhand methods are used by the self-enobling "disarmament" brigade to make false assertions about nuclear weapons, to undermine nuclear deterrence. Such "peace" media propaganda and "disarmament" lying was used by Hitler to generate appeasement which allowed WWII, and again in the Cold War it was backed by the USSR via the Moscow based World Peace Council, which infiltrated disarmament organizations in the West with propaganda. The exaggeration of nuclear weapons effects by draconian propaganda for disarmament is now leading to a lack of credible deterrence of precisely the kind of invasions (Belgium 1914, Poland 1939) that triggered both world wars. In reality, if you disarm democracies sufficiently that Teller's deterrent criterion of "overwhelming superiority" is removed, you clearly invite a return of the world war. Perhaps the most absurd kind of exaggeration is the Glasstone/Nukemap application of free-field nuclear test data from deserts to modern concrete cities which absorb energy from blast, nuclear and thermal radiation

quite efficiently. (All published here in 2006, and ignored.)

If you're sick of reading rubbish on nuclear effects by authors who defend Russian aggression as a reaction against Western imperialism, and that the Ukraine war proves we must disarm now to prevent nuclear deterrence of WWIII (some gung-ho military folk will endorse that, too, seeing some kind of fun to be had in the hell of a conventional WWIII or more likely surrender and then an unelected "world

government for peace" of the Brezhnev variety), then one really good, well informed nuclear weapons history (unlike the Hiroshima

effects lies and propaganda about people with no feet running around in Hiroshima quoted uncritically by Mr Rhodes et al.), albeit subjected to a hate rant by Carey Sublette ("Most of the text that is not Shelton’s actual recollections or direct commentary is lifted verbatim from government reports"), who also runs a site promoting lying ignorant crap about nuclear weapons designs and effects over unobstructed deserts being applicable to modern city targets and who falsely claimed it contained plagiarism (it doesn't, and the Nukemap guy also deleted a comment by me pointing out that Feynman does write about what he actually did at Los Alamos - e.g. running the implosion calculations on IBM mechanical card sorters - in one of his books, after the Nukemap guy had attacked Feynman for allegedly not being clear), is the Shelton's Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (very brief extract of under 5% of the book is linked here, just to give the flavour), particularly the 2nd edition of 1990 which has enlarged page litho printing (it's literally the size and mass of a good old fashioned Church Bible) and contains vital updates like color photos supplied by Agnew, and also in the last notes section, Lord Penney's endorsement of the Ist edition. Shelton (October 4, 1924 - November 27, 2014) doesn't pander to the USSR, their spies, or radiation orthodoxy. He writes that by helping to credibly deter WWHI, the bomb proved useful and we don't

need to forget that. Not a message Putin and his friend thugs in Western "arms control and disarmament" seem to appreciate.

Also in living memory (but now practically entirely deleted from the mainstream pseudo-"history" of the appeasement, disarmament, collaborate-with-thugs-for-peace-not-nuclear-deterrence pseudo-"communists") is Andrei Sakharov’s Memoirs (Knopf 1990), which

details the gulag and psychiatric treatment provided by the CCCP for dissidents.

Sakharov was exiled with his wife to Gorky by Brezhnev for criticising the latter’s decision to invade Afghanistan at the end of 1979. He was there relentlessly persecuted by the KGB and went on repeated hunger strikes for 7 years until Gorbachev released him. His statement of 27 January 1980 (Appendix B of his Memoirs, pp. 673-5):

“On January 22, I was detained on the street and taken by force to the USSR Procurator’s office ... | was asked to return the medals and orders and certificates ... Rekunkov also informed me of the decision to banish me to the city of Gorky, which is closed to foreigners ... I was instructed to report three times a month to the police ... The authorities are completely isolating me from the outside world. The house is surrounded 24 hours a day by police and the KGB, who keep away all visitors, including my friends. Telephone connections with Moscow and Leningrad are cut off. We have not even been able to call my wife’s mother ... Even in prison, there is more possibility of communication with the outside world ... The worsening of the international situation was caused by the following actions of the USSR ... Supporting terrorist regimes ... Supporting the actions of quasi-governmental terrorists in Iran who have violated diplomatic immunity ...

the invasion of Afghanistan ...”

(That time, we still had the W79 neutron bomb, the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation if Russia tried to escalate to win that war.)

posted by Nuclear Weapons Effects 10:47 pm 149 comments

‘Archives “> 03/28/06 “03/29/06

FirstStudent Body officers at Boulder City High School, in 1942: Mary Robertson, Freak Shelton, Bob Clark, Mary Jane Carter.

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e Glasstone's fake nuclear weapon data for unobstructed terrain debunked for cities! Realistic effects and credible nuclear weapon capabilities for deterring or stopping aggressive invasions and attacks which could escalate into major conventional or nuclear wars. Credible nuclear deterrence

of invasions and conventional wars reduce the risk of large conventional and nuclear wars occurring through escalation of invasions such as the

invasion of Belgium in 1914 and the invasion of Poland in 1939, of surprise attacks like those against France in 1940 and of Russia and Pearl

Harbor in 1941, Afghanistan in 1979, Kuwait in 1990, or Crimea in 2014. Contrary to irrational, pseudo-scientific propaganda, the number of nuclear weapons is smaller than the millions of conventional weapons used in large wars and the correct scaling shows that the overall effects are similar, not massively different as often claimed for political propaganda by enemies of peace. Furthermore, the greater time delay of effects from nuclear weapons over the damaged area increases the efficiency of cheap civil defence countermeasures, as compared to conventional weapons. We need credible effects of nuclear weapons for real world peace: peace through tested, proved and practical declassified deterrence and countermeasures against collateral damage. Credible deterrence through simple, effective protection against concentrated and dispersed invasions and aerial attacks. Discussions of the facts as opposed to inaccurate, misleading lies of the "disarm or be annihilated" political dogma variety. Hiroshima and Nagasaki anti-nuclear propaganda debunked by the hard facts. Walls not wars. Walls bring people together by stopping divisive terrorists. In conclusion, credible nuclear deterrence of conventional war offers a beautiful opportunity to create a peaceful world, free from fear peddling, ranting dictators. The only oppositions you will meet will come from authoritarian obsessed fear peddling myth makers. If they can't tell the truth and face the facts, why listen to them? Please see our post on the need to deter not only direct threats from nuclear attacks but also conventional wars and invasions that can escalate into nuclear wars (as proved by the use of nuclear weapons in WWIL, for example, after they were developed during the war itself and did not trigger or provoke the war), linked here, here, here, and here, here, here, and the true scaling law equivalence between a few thousand nuclear weapons and the several million tons of small conventional weapons in a non-nuclear world war as proved by our post summarising key points in Herman Kahn's much-abused call for credible deterrence, On Thermonuclear War, linked here. Peace comes through tested, proved and practical declassified countermeasures against the effects of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons. Credible deterrence to end invasions and wars comes through simple, effective protection against invasions like low yield tactical weapons and walls, and civil defence against collateral damage. Peace comes through discussions of the facts as opposed to inaccurate, misleading lies of the "disarm or be annihilated" political dogma variety, which are designed to exploit fear to close down criticisms of errors in mainstream orthodoxy. In particular, please see the post linked here on EMP results from an actual Russian 300 kt test at 290 km altitude over unwarned civilian infrastructure in Kazakhstan on 22 October 1962, which caused no injuries or deaths whatsoever (contrary to all of Jeremy Corbyn and CND style lying propaganda that any use of nuclear weapons on civilians would automatically kill millions), but shut down the communications and power supply lines! This is not secret, but does not make newspaper headlines to debunk CND style dogmas on the alleged

incredibility of nuclear deterrence.

Hiroshima's air raid shelters were unoccupied because Japanese Army officers were having breakfast when B29s were detected far away, says

Yoshie Oka, the operator of the Hiroshima air raid sirens on 6 August 1945...

In a sample of 1,881 burns cases in Hiroshima, only 17 (or 0.9 percent) were due to ignited clothing and 15 (or 0.7%) were due to the firestorm flames...

Dr Harold L. Brode’s new book, Nuclear Weapons in ...

800 war migrants drowned on 22 April by EU policy:...

Photographed fireball shielding by cloud cover in...

Nuclear weapons effects "firestorm" and "nuclear w...

Proved 97.5% survival in completely demolished houses ...

How to achieve peace through tested, proved and practical declassified countermeasures against the effects of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons. Credible deterrence through simple, effective protection against invasions and collateral damage. Discussions of the facts as opposed to inaccurate, misleading lies of the "disarm or be annihilated" political dogma variety. Hiroshima and Nagasaki anti-nuclear propaganda debunked by the hard facts. Walls not wars. Walls bring people together by stopping attacks by "divide and rule" style divisive

terrorists, contrary to simplistic Vatican propaganda.

"There has never been a war yet which, if the facts had been put calmly before the ordinary folk, could not have been prevented." - British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, Hansard, 23 November 1945, column 786 (unfortunately secret Cabinet committees called "democracy" for propaganda purposes have not been quite so successful in preventing war). Protection is needed against collateral civilian damage and contamination in conventional, chemical and nuclear attack, with credible low yield clean nuclear deterrence against conventional warfare which, in reality (not science fiction) costs far more lives. Anti scientific media, who promulgate and exploit terrorism for profit, censor (1) vital, effective civil defense knowledge and (2) effective, safe, low yield air burst clean weapons like the MkS54 and W79 which deter conventional warfare and escalation, allowing arms negotiations from a position of strength. This helped end the Cold

War in the 1980s. Opposing civil defense and nuclear weapons that really deter conventional war, is complacent and dangerous.

War and coercion dangers have not stemmed from those who openly attack mainstream mistakes, but from those who camouflage themselves as freedom fighters to ban such free criticism itself, by making the key facts seem taboo, without even a proper debate, let alone financing research into unfashionable alternatives. Research and education in non-mainstream alternatives is needed before an unprejudiced debate, to establish all the basic facts for a real debate. “Wisdom itself cannot flourish, nor even truth be determined, without the give and take of debate and criticism.”

— Robert Oppenheimer (quotation from the H-bomb TV debate hosted by Eleanor Roosevelt, 12 February 1950).

“Apologies for freedom? I can’t handle this! ... Deal from strength or get crushed every time ... Freedom demands liberty everywhere. I’m

thinking, you see, it’s not so easy. But we have to stand up tall and answer freedom’s call!” — Freedom Kids

CONVENTIONAL WARS HAVE KILLED TENS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN RAPIDLY DETER THIS REAL THREAT TO PEACE WITH MINIMAL CASUALTIES. ‘During the critical period 8-15 February [1968], the U.S. command realized [that conventional] bombing was not sufficiently effective. ... The air campaign dropped over 110,000 tons of bombs and napalm on the area around Khe Sanh during the 77-day siege ... the most heavily bombed target in the history of conventional warfare.’ — W. C. Yengst, S. J. Lukasik, and M. A. Jensen, Nuclear Weapons that went to War, SAID report DSWA-TR-97-25, September 1998 (quoted in the 2015 book by the secret Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons editor, Dr Harold L. Brode, Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, page 287). British Nuclear Test Civil Defence Research

Millions of books, audiobooks, magazines, documents, sheet music, and more for free.

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When the planning began, a lot of thought was given t

which type of explosion would provide information and experi the greatest value. Purely scientific measurements are ms‘ made when the weapon is placed at the top of a high tower, bi were other weighty considerations. The Civil Defence autho: this country badly needed more data about atomic explosions :

accordingly, the test was planned to get as much novel infom

CHANGE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

Field Manual No 101-31-1 DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES Radius of vulnerability (emergency risk criterion: 5% combat ineffectiveness) Figure 54. Radii of Vulnerability. Protective factor = ratio of saresiay PERSONNEL (LL) IN— area of effectin the open, to (Based on Governing Effect) area of effect for shelter Radii listed are distances at which a 5 percent incidence of effect occurs. HOB used is 60W'/? meters. Example: for 300 kt, the protective ‘ Open Earth factor of open foxholes is equal to Yield (KT) Open Foxholes APCs Tanks Shelter (14,000)2/(2,100)2 mr Yield (KT) (Distances are in meters) Open Earth aeb Foxholes oe: -Naeee Shelter 0.1 700 600 600 500 300 1.36 1.36 1 1200 900 900 800 500 1.78 1.78 10 3200 1300 1300 1250 900 6.06 6.06 20 4000 1500 1450 1400 1000 ait 7.61 100 8000 1900 1800 1800 1400 17.7 19.8 200 12000 2000 1900 1900 1500 36.0 39.9

300 14000 2100 1950 1950 1600 44.4 51.5 $1.5

Calculation of the injury-averting protective factors by simple open foxholes and earth shelters, as a function of weapon yield. Most countermeasures are relatively ineffective against tactical nuclear wapons (due to the predominating neutron radiation effect at 0.1 kt yield), but are extremely effective against strategic nuclear weapons with yields of 100, 200 and 300 kt (protective factors of 44 to 77).

The definition of protective factor used here is the factor by which casualties numbers are reduced.

Richard P. Feynman, ‘This Unscientific Age’, in The Meaning of It All, Penguin Books, London, 1998, pages 106-9:

‘Now, I say if a man is absolutely honest and wants to protect the populace from the effects of radioactivity, which is what our scientific friends often say they are trying to do, then he should work on the biggest number, not on the smallest number, and he should try to point out that the [natural cosmic] radioactivity which is absorbed by living in the city of Denver is so much more serious [than the smaller doses from nuclear

explosions] ... that all the people of Denver ought to move to lower altitudes.'

“Tf a man reads or hears a criticism of anything in which he has an interest, watch ... if he shows concern with any question except ‘is it true?’ he thereby reveals that his own attitude is unscientific. Likewise if... he judges an idea not on its merits but with reference to the author of it; if he criticizes it as ‘heresy’; if he argues that authority must be right because it is authority ... The path of truth is paved with critical doubt, and lighted by the spirit of objective enquiry... the majority of people have resented what seems in retrospect to have been purely matter of fact ... nothing has aided the

persistence of falsehood, and the evils resulting from it, more than the unwillingness of good people to admit the truth ... the tendency continues to be

shocked by natural comment, and to hold certain things too ‘sacred’ to think about. ... How rarely does one meet anyone whose first reaction to anything is to ask: ‘is it true?’ Yet, unless that is a man’s natural reaction, it shows that truth is not uppermost in his mind, and unless it is, true

progress is unlikely.”

- Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn from History?, PEN Books, 1944; revised edition, Allen and Unwin, 1972.

Civil defense countermeasures, to be taken seriously by the population, require the publication of solid facts with the scientific evidence to support those facts against political propaganda to the contrary. Secrecy over the effects of nuclear weapons tests does not hinder plutonium and missile production

by rogue states, but it does hinder civil defense countermeasures, by permitting lying political propaganda to go unopposed (see linked post, here).

Terrorists successfully prey on the vulnerable. The political spreading of lies concerning threats and the alleged ‘impossibility’ of all countermeasures, terrorizing the population in order to ‘justify’ supposedly pro-peace disarmament policies in the 1920s-1930s, resulted in the

secret rearmament of fascist states which were terrorizing the Jews and others, eventually leading to World War II. Political exaggerations about nuclear weapons effects today:

(1) encourage terrorist states and other groups to secretly invest in such weapons to use either for political intimidation or for future use against

countries which have no countermeasures, and (2) falsely dismiss, in the eyes of the media and the public, cheap relatively effective countermeasures like civil defense and ABM. Therefore, doom-mongering media lies make us vulnerable to the proliferation threat today in two ways, just as they led to both world wars:

(1) Exaggerations of offensive technology and a down-playing of simple countermeasures such as trenches, encouraged belligerent states to start World War I in the false belief that modern technology implied overwhelming firepower which would terminate the war quickly on the basis of offensive preparedness: if the facts about simple trench countermeasures against shelling and machine guns during the American Civil War had been properly understood, it would have been recognised by Germany that a long war based on munitions production and logistics would be necessary, and war would have been seen to be likely to lead to German defeat against countries with larger overseas allies and colonies that could

supply munitions and the other resources required to win a long war.

(2) Exaggerations of aerial bombardment technology after World War I led to disarmament ‘supported by’ false claims that it was impossible to have any defense against a perceived threat of instant annihilation from thousands of aircraft carrying gas and incendiary bombs, encouraging fascists to secretly rearm in order to successfully take advantage of the fear and vulnerability caused by this lying political disarmament

propaganda.

Contrived dismissal of civil defense by Marxist “Cambridge Scientists Anti-War Group” bigots: (a) appeased war-mongering enemies, and (b) maximised war mortality rates. Idealism kills. Super effective, fully proof-tested, cheap civil defense makes nuclear deterrence credible to stop

conventional war devastation by avoiding collateral damage, tit-for-tat retaliation and escalation.

Historically, it has been proved that having weapons is not enough to guarantee a reasonable measure of safety from terrorism and rogue states; countermeasures are also needed, both to make any deterrent credible and to negate or at least mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. Some people who wear seatbelts die in car crashes; some people who are taken to hospital in ambulances, even in peace-time, die. Sometimes, lifebelts and lifeboats cannot save lives at sea. This lack of a 100% success rate in saving lives doesn't disprove the value of everyday precautions or of hospitals and medicine. Hospitals don't lull motorists into a false sense of security, causing them to drive faster and cause more accidents. Like-

minded ‘arguments’ against ABM and civil defense are similarly vacuous.

‘As long as the threat from Lran persists, we will go forward with a missile system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is

eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile-defense construction in Europe will be removed.’ - President Obama, Prague Castle, Czech Republic, 4 April 2009.

Before 9/11, Caspar Weinberger was quizzed by skeptical critics on the BBC News program Talking Point, Friday, May 4, 2001: Caspar Weinberger quizzed on new US Star Wars ABM plans:

‘The [ABM] treaty was in 1972 ... The theory ... supporting the ABM treaty [which prohibits ABM, thus making nations vulnerable to terrorism] ... that it will prevent an arms race ... is perfect nonsense because we have had an arms race all the time we have had the ABM treaty, and we have seen the greatest increase in proliferation of nuclear weapons that we have ever had. ... So the ABM treaty preventing an arms race is total

nonsense. ...

‘You have to understand that without any defences whatever you are very vulnerable. It is like saying we don't like chemical warfare - we don't like gas attacks - so we are going to give up and promise not to have any defences ever against them and that of course would mean then we are

perfectly safe. ...

‘The Patriot was not a failure in the Gulf War - the Patriot was one of the things which defeated the Scud and in effect helped us win the Gulf War.

One or two of the shots went astray but that is true of every weapon system that has ever been invented. ...

‘The fact that a missile defence system wouldn't necessarily block a suitcase bomb is certainly not an argument for not proceeding with a missile

defence when a missile that hits can wipe out hundreds of thousands of lives in a second. ...

‘The curious thing about it is that missile defence is not an offensive weapon system - missile defence cannot kill anybody. Missile defence can help preserve and protect your people and our allies, and the idea that you are somehow endangering people by having a defence strikes me almost as

absurd as saying you endanger people by having a gas mask in a gas attack. ...

‘President Bush said that we were going ahead with the defensive system but we would make sure that nobody felt we had offensive intentions because we would accompany it by a unilateral reduction of our nuclear arsenal. It seems to me to be a rather clear statement that proceeding with

the missile defence system would mean fewer arms of this kind.

‘You have had your arms race all the time that the ABM treaty was in effect and now you have an enormous accumulation and increase of nuclear weapons and that was your arms race promoted by the ABM treaty. Now if you abolish the ABM treaty you are not going to get another arms race - you have got the arms already there - and if you accompany the missile defence construction with the unilateral reduction of our own nuclear

arsenal then it seems to me you are finally getting some kind of inducement to reduce these weapons.’

Before the ABM system is in place, and afterwards if ABM fails to be 100% effective in an attack, or is bypassed by terrorists using a bomb in a suitcase

or in a ship, civil defense is required and can be effective at saving lives:

‘Paradoxically, the more damaging the effect, that is the farther out its lethality stretches, the more can be done about it, because in the last fall of

its power it covers vast areas, where small mitigations will save very large numbers of people.’ - Peter Laurie, Beneath the City Streets: A Private Inquiry into the Nuclear Preoccupations of Government, Penguin, 1974.

‘The purpose of a book is to save people [the] time and effort of digging things out for themselves. ... we have tried to leave the reader with

something tangible — what a certain number of calories, roentgens, etc., means in terms of an effect on the human being. ... we must think of the

people we are writing for.’

— Dr Samuel Glasstone, DSc, letter dated 1 February 1957 to Colonel Dent L. Lay, Chief, Weapons Effects Division, U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Washington, D.C., pages 2 and 4, concerning the preparation of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

© COVERED SKIN revise See

G ae RANGE, ™ Glasstone and Dolan stated in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1977), Table 12.17 on page 546, that the median distance in Hiroshima for survival

after 20 days was 0.12 miles for people in concrete buildings and 1.3 miles for people standing outdoors. Therefore the median distances for

survival in modern city buildings and in the open differed by a factor of 11 for Hiroshima; the difference in areas was thus a factor of 11? or about 120. Hence, taking cover in modern city buildings reduces the casualty rates and the risks of being killed by a factor of 120 for Hiroshima conditions,

contrary to popular media presented political propaganda that civil defence is hopeless. This would reduce 120,000 casualties to 1,000 casualties.

From Dr Glasstone's Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1962/64 ed., page 631): ‘At distances between 0.3 and 0.4 mile from ground zero in Hiroshima the average survival rate, for at least 20 days after the nuclear explosion, was less than 20 percent. Yet in two reinforced concrete office buildings, at these distances, almost 90 percent of the nearly 800 occupants survived more than 20 days, although some died later of radiation injury. Furthermore, of approximately 3,000 school students who were in the open and unshielded within a mile of ground zero at Hiroshima, about 90 percent were dead or missing after the explosion. But of nearly 5,000 students in the same zone who were shielded in one way or another, only 26 percent were fatalities. ... survival in Hiroshima was possible in buildings at such distances that the overpressure in the open was 15 to 20 pounds per square inch. ... it is evident ... that the area over which protection could be effective in saving lives is roughly eight to ten times as great as that

in which the chances of survival are small.’

Lord Mayhew, House of Lords debate on Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations, Hansard, vol. 444, cc. 523-49, 1 November 1983: ‘... if there had been effective civil defence at Hiroshima probably thousands of lives would have been saved and much human

suffering would have been avoided. There is no question about it. ...’

Since the 1977 update by Glasstone and Dolan, extensive new updates to EM-1 for a further revised edition of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons have not actually been published with unlimited public distribution, due to President Carter’s 1979 executive order which transferred responsibility for civil defense from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency to the new agency (which is not an Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense, and is not concerned with the analysis of nuclear weapons test effects data), the Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, the February 1997 U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Special Weapons Agency 0602715H RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2 Exhibit) states that a revision of Glasstone and Dolan’s unclassified Effects of Nuclear Weapons was budgeted for 1997-9:

“FY 1997 Plans: ... Provide text to update Glasstone's book, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, the standard reference for nuclear weapons effects. ... Update the unclassified textbook entitled, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. ... Continue revision of Glasstone's book, The Effects of Nuclear

Weapons, the standard reference for nuclear weapons effects. ... FY1999 Plans ... Disseminate updated The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.”

The new publications are either classified or unclassified with limited distribution restrictions (e.g., Bridgman’s Introduction to the Physics of

Nuclear Weapons Effects, which includes several chapters on nuclear weapons design to enable initial radiation outputs to be calculated precisely)

which prevents up-to-date basic nuclear effects information to justify civil defense against the latest nuclear threats from being widely disseminated; the books are printed for use only by government agencies. The problem with this approach is that widespread public

understanding of the best information for civil defense countermeasures is prevented.

20 KILOTON AIR BURST— 10 SECONDS 1 MEGATON AIR BURST— 37 SECONDS

0 02 O4 06 O8 10 12 34 16 18 20 22 24 26 IMT = MILES 9 1 2 3 4 s t 7 4 ° 10

aoxT MILES

‘The evidence from Hiroshima indicates that blast survivors, both injured and uninjured, in buildings later consumed by fire [caused by the blast overturning charcoal braziers used for breakfast in inflammable wooden houses filled with easily ignitable bamboo furnishings and paper screens] were generally able to move to safe areas following the explosion. Of 130 major buildings studied by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey ... 107 were ultimately burned out ... Of those suffering fire, about 20 percent were burning after the first half hour. The remainder were consumed by fire spread, some as late as 15 hours after the blast. This situation is not unlike the one our computer-based fire spread model described for

Detroit.’

- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, DCPA Attack Environment Manual, Chapter 3: What the Planner Needs to Know About Fire Ignition and Spread, report CPG 2-1A3, June 1973, Panel 27.

The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, US Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific Theatre, report 92, volume 2 (May 1947, secret): Volume one, page 14:

“,.. the city lacked buildings with fire-protective features such as automatic fire doors and automatic sprinkler systems”, and pages 26-28 state the

heat flash in Hiroshima was only:

“,.. capable of starting primary fires in exposed, easily combustible materials such as dark cloth, thin paper, or dry rotted wood exposed to direct

radiation at distances usually within 4,000 feet of the point of detonation (AZ).” Volume two examines the firestorm and the ignition of clothing by the thermal radiation flash in Hiroshima: Page 24:

“Scores of persons throughout all sections of the city were questioned concerning the ignition of clothing by the flash from the bomb. ... Ten school boys were located during the study who had been in school yards about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, respectively, from AZ [air zero]. These boys had flash burns on the portions of their faces which had been directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys’ stories were consistent to the effect that their clothing, apparently of cotton materials, ‘smoked,’ but did not burst into flame. ... a boy’s coat ... started to smoulder from heat

rays at 3,800 feet from AZ.” [Contrast this to the obfuscation and vagueness in Glasstone, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons!

Page 88:

“Ignition of the City. ... Only directly exposed surfaces were flash burned. Measured from GZ, flash burns on wood poles were observed at 13,000 feet, granite was roughened or spalled by heat at 1,300 feet, and vitreous tiles on roofs were blistered at 4,000 feet. ... six persons who had been in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton blackout curtains were ignited by radiant heat ... dark clothing was scorched and, in some cases, reported to have burst into flame from flash heat [although as the 1946 unclassified USSBS report admits, most immediately beat the flames out with their hands without sustaining injury, because the clothing was not drenched in gasoline, unlike peacetime

gasoline tanker road accident victims]

“,.. but a large proportion of over 1,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the centre of the city within 10 minutes after the explosion. Of the total number of buildings investigated [135 buildings are listed] 107 caught fire, and in 69 instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of the buildings or their contents was as follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the bomb

(primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources, and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposed [wooden] buildings.”

‘It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought necessary, but the 100-megaton bomb of which they spoke two years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield ...’ - President John F. Kennedy in his television broadcast to the

American public, 26 July 1963.

‘During World War II many large cities in England, Germany, and Japan were subjected to terrific attacks by high-explosive and incendiary bombs. Yet, when proper steps had been taken for the protection of the civilian population and for the restoration of services after the bombing, there was little, if any, evidence of panic. It is the purpose of this book to state the facts concerning the atomic bomb, and to make an objective, scientific analysis of these facts. It is hoped that as a result, although it may not be feasible completely to allay fear, it will at least be possible to

avoid panic.’

— Dr George Gamow (the big bang cosmologist), Dr Samuel Glasstone, DSc (Executive Editor of the book), and Professor Joseph O. Hirschfelder, The Effects of Atomic Weapons, Chapter 1, p. 1, Paragraph 1.3, U.S. Department of Defense, September 1950.

‘The consequences of a multiweapon nuclear attack would certainly be grave ... Nevertheless, recovery should be possible if plans exist and are

carried out to restore social order and to mitigate the economic disruption.’

- Philip J. Dolan, editor of Nuclear Weapons Employment FM 101-31 (1963), Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons DNA-EM-1 (1972), and The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1977), Stanford Research Institute, Appendix A of the U.S. National Council on Radiological protection (NCRP) symposium The Control of Exposure to the Public of Ionising Radiation in the Event of Accident or Attack, 1981.

‘Suppose the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had been 1,000 times as powerful ... It could not have killed 1,000 times as many people, but at most the entire population of Hiroshima ... [regarding the hype about various nuclear "overkill" exaggerations] there is enough water in the oceans to

drown everyone ten times.’

- Professor Brian Martin, PhD (physics), 'The global health effects of nuclear war', Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 59, No. 7, December 1982, pp. 14- 26.

In 1996, half a century after the nuclear detonations, data on cancers from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors was published by D. A. Pierce et al. of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, RERF (Radiation Research vol. 146 pp. 1-27; Science vol. 272, pp. 632-3) for 86,572 survivors, of whom 60% had received bomb doses of over 5 mSv (or 500 millirem in old units) suffering 4,741 cancers of which only 420 were due to radiation,

consisting of 85 leukemias and 335 solid cancers.

‘Today we have a population of 2,383 [radium dial painter] cases for whom we have reliable body content measurements. . . . All 64 bone sarcoma [cancer] cases occurred in the 264 cases with more than 10 Gy [1,000 rads], while no sarcomas appeared in the 2,119 radium cases with less than 10 Gy.’

- Dr Robert Rowland, Director of the Center for Human Radiobiology, Bone Sarcoma in Humans Induced by Radium: A Threshold Response?,

Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting, European Society for Radiation Biology, Radioprotection colloquies, Vol. 32CI (1997), pp. 331-8. Zbigniew Jaworowski, ‘Radiation Risk and Ethics: Health Hazards, Prevention Costs, and Radiophobia', Physics Today, April 2000, pp. 89-90:

‘,.. it is important to note that, given the effects of a few seconds of irradiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a threshold near 200 mSv may be expected for leukemia and some solid tumors. [Sources: UNSCEAR, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, New York, 1994; W. F. Heidenreich, et al., Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1999), p. 205; and B. L. Cohen, Radiat. Res., vol. 149 (1998), p. 525.] For a protracted lifetime natural exposure, a threshold may be set at a level of several thousand millisieverts for malignancies, of 10 grays for radium-226 in bones, and probably about 1.5-2.0 Gy for lung cancer after x-ray and gamma irradiation. [Sources: G. Jaikrishan, et al., Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. S149 (for natural exposure); R. D. Evans, Health Physics, vol. 27 (1974), p. 497 (for radium-226); H. H. Rossi and M. Zaider, Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1997), p. 85 (for radiogenic lung cancer).] The hormetic effects, such as a decreased cancer incidence at low doses and increased

longevity, may be used as a guide for estimating practical thresholds and for setting standards. ...

‘Though about a hundred of the million daily spontaneous DNA damages per cell remain unrepaired or misrepaired, apoptosis, differentiation, necrosis, cell cycle regulation, intercellular interactions, and the immune system remove about 99% of the altered cells. [Source: R. D. Stewart,

Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. 101.] ...

‘[Due to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986] as of 1998 (according to UNSCEAR), a total of 1,791 thyroid cancers in children had been registered. About 93% of the youngsters have a prospect of full recovery. [Source: C. R. Moir and R. L. Telander, Seminars in Pediatric Surgery, vol. 3 (1994), p. 182.] ... The highest average thyroid doses in children (177 mGy) were accumulated in the Gomel region of Belarus. The highest incidence of thyroid cancer (17.9 cases per 100,000 children) occurred there in 1995, which means that the rate had increased by a factor of about 25 since 1987.

‘This rate increase was probably a result of improved screening [not radiation!]. Even then, the incidence rate for occult thyroid cancers was still a thousand times lower than it was for occult thyroid cancers in nonexposed populations (in the US, for example, the rate is 13,000 per 100,000 persons, and in Finland it is 35,600 per 100,000 persons). Thus, given the prospect of improved diagnostics, there is an enormous potential for detecting yet more [fictitious] "excess" thyroid cancers. In a study in the US that was performed during the period of active screening in 1974-79, it was determined that the incidence rate of malignant and other thyroid nodules was greater by 21-fold than it had been in the pre-1974 period.

[Source: Z. Jaworowski, 2/st Century Science and Technology, vol. 11 (1998), issue 1, p. 14.]’

‘Professor Edward Lewis used data from four independent populations exposed to radiation to demonstrate that the incidence of leukemia was linearly related to the accumulated dose of radiation. ... Outspoken scientists, including Linus Pauling, used Lewis’s risk estimate to inform the public about the danger of nuclear fallout by estimating the number of leukemia deaths that would be caused by the test detonations. In May of 1957 Lewis’s analysis of the radiation-induced human leukemia data was published as a lead article in Science magazine. In June he presented it before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the US Congress.’ — Abstract of thesis by Jennifer Caron, Edward Lewis and Radioactive Fallout:

the Impact of Caltech Biologists Over Nuclear Weapons Testing in the 1950s and 60s, Caltech, January 2003.

Dr John F. Loutit of the Medical Research Council, Harwell, England, in 1962 wrote a book called Irradiation of Mice and Men (University of

Chicago Press, Chicago and London), discrediting the pseudo-science from geneticist Edward Lewis on pages 61, and 78-79:

‘,. Mole [R. H. Mole, Brit. J. Radiol., v32, p497, 1959] gave different groups of mice an integrated total of 1,000 r of X-rays over a period of 4 weeks. But the dose-rate - and therefore the radiation-free time between fractions - was varied from 81 r/hour intermittently to 1.3 r/hour continuously. The incidence of leukemia varied from 40 per cent (within 15 months of the start of irradiation) in the first group to 5 per cent in the

last compared with 2 per cent incidence in irradiated controls. ...

‘What Lewis did, and which I have not copied, was to include in his table another group - spontaneous incidence of leukemia (Brooklyn, N.Y.) -

who are taken to have received only natural background radiation throughout life at the very low dose-rate of 0.1-0.2 rad per year: the best

estimate is listed as 2 x 10° like the others in the table. But the value of 2 x 10° was not calculated from the data as for the other groups; it was merely adopted. By its adoption and multiplication with the average age in years of Brooklyners - 33.7 years and radiation dose per year of 0.1-0.2 rad - a mortality rate of 7 to 13 cases per million per year due to background radiation was deduced, or some 10-20 per cent of the observed rate of

65 cases per million per year. ...

‘All these points are very much against the basic hypothesis of Lewis of a linear relation of dose to leukemic effect irrespective of time. Unhappily it is not possible to claim for Lewis’s work as others have done, “It is now possible to calculate - within narrow limits - how many deaths from leukemia will result in any population from an increase in fall-out or other source of radiation” [Leading article in Science, vol. 125, p. 963, 1957].

This is just wishful journalese.

‘The burning questions to me are not what are the numbers of leukemia to be expected from atom bombs or radiotherapy, but what is to be expected from natural background .... Furthermore, to obtain estimates of these, I believe it is wrong to go to [1950s inaccurate, dose rate effect ignoring, data from] atom bombs, where the radiations are qualitatively different [i.e., including effects from neutrons] and, more important, the

dose-rate outstandingly different.’ Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed., 1977, pp. 611-3:

‘From the earlier studies of radiation-induced mutations, made with fruitflies [by Nobel Laureate Hermann J. Muller and other geneticists who worked on plants, who falsely hyped their insect and plant data as valid for mammals like humans during the June 1957 U.S. Congressional Hearings on fallout effects], it appeared that the number (or frequency) of mutations in a given population ... is proportional to the total dose ... More recent experiments with mice, however, have shown that these conclusions need to be revised, at least for mammals. [Mammals are biologically closer to humans, in respect to DNA repair mechanisms, than short-lived insects whose life cycles are too small to have forced the evolutionary development of advanced DNA repair mechanisms, unlike mammals that need to survive for decades before reproducing. When exposed

to X-rays or gamma rays, the mutation frequency in these animals has been found to be dependent on the exposure (or dose) rate ...

‘At an exposure rate of 0.009 roentgen per minute [0.54 R/hour], the total mutation frequency in female mice is indistinguishable from the

spontaneous frequency. [Emphasis added.] There thus seems to be an exposure-rate threshold below which radiation-induced mutations are absent .. With adult female mice ... a delay of at least seven weeks between exposure to a substantial dose of radiation, either neutrons or gamma rays, and conception causes the mutation frequency in the offspring to drop almost to zero. ... recovery in the female members of the population would bring

about a substantial reduction in the 'load' of mutations in subsequent generations.’ George Bernard Shaw cynically explains groupthink brainwashing bias:

‘We cannot help it because we are so constituted that we always believe finally what we wish to believe. The moment we want to believe something, we suddenly see all the arguments for it and become blind to the arguments against it. The moment we want to disbelieve anything we have previously believed, we suddenly discover not only that there is a mass of evidence against, but that this evidence was staring us in the face all the

time.’

From the essay titled ‘What is Science?’ by Professor Richard P. Feynman, presented at the fifteenth annual meeting of the National Science

Teachers Association, 1966 in New York City, and published in The Physics Teacher, vol. 7, issue 6, 1968, pp. 313-20:

‘,.. great religions are dissipated by following form without remembering the direct content of the teaching of the great leaders. In the same way, it is possible to follow form and call it science, but that is pseudo-science. In this way, we all suffer from the kind of tyranny we have today in the

many institutions that have come under the influence of pseudoscientific advisers.

‘We have many studies in teaching, for example, in which people make observations, make lists, do statistics, and so on, but these do not thereby become established science, established knowledge. They are merely an imitative form of science analogous to the South Sea Islanders’ airfields - radio towers, etc., made out of wood. The islanders expect a great airplane to arrive. They even build wooden airplanes of the same shape as they see in the foreigners' airfields around them, but strangely enough, their wood planes do not fly. The result of this pseudoscientific imitation is to produce experts, which many of you are. ... you teachers, who are really teaching children at the bottom of the heap, can maybe doubt the experts.

As a matter of fact, I can also define science another way: Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.’

Richard P. Feynman, ‘This Unscientific Age’, in The Meaning of It All, Penguin Books, London, 1998, pages 106-9:

‘Now, I say if a man is absolutely honest and wants to protect the populace from the effects of radioactivity, which is what our scientific friends often say they are trying to do, then he should work on the biggest number, not on the smallest number, and he should try to point out that the [natural cosmic] radioactivity which is absorbed by living in the city of Denver is so much more serious [than the smaller doses from nuclear

explosions] ... that all the people of Denver ought to move to lower altitudes.'

Feynman is not making a point about low level radiation effects, but about the politics of ignoring the massive natural background radiation dose, while provoking hysteria over much smaller measured fallout pollution radiation doses. Why is the anti-nuclear lobby so concerned about banning nuclear energy - which is not possible even in principle since most of our nuclear radiation is from the sun and from supernova debris contaminating the Earth from the explosion that created the solar system circa 4,540 million years ago - when they could cause much bigger radiation dose reductions to the population by concentrating on the bigger radiation source, natural background radiation. It is possible to shield natural background radiation by the air, e.g. by moving the population of high altitude cities to lower altitudes where there is more air between the people and outer space, or banning the use of high-altitude jet aircraft. The anti-nuclear lobby, as Feynman stated back in the 1960s, didn't crusade to reduce the bigger dose from background radiation. Instead they chose to argue against the much smaller doses from fallout pollution. Feynman's argument is still today falsely interpreted as a political statement, when it is actually exposing pseudo-science and countering political propaganda. It is still ignored by the media. It has been pointed out by Senator Hickenlooper on page 1060 of the May-June 1957 U.S. Congressional Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, The Nature of Radioactive

Fallout and Its Effects on Man:

‘I presume all of us would earnestly hope that we never had to test atomic weapons ... but by the same token I presume that we want to save

thousands of lives in this country every year and we could just abolish the manufacture of [road accident causing] automobiles ...’

Dihydrogen monoxide is a potentially very dangerous chemical containing hydrogen and oxygen which has caused numerous severe burns by scalding and deaths by drowning, contributes to the greenhouse effect, accelerates corrosion and rusting of many metals, and contributes to the erosion of our natural landscape: 'Dihydrogen monoxide (DHMO) is colorless, odorless, tasteless, and kills uncounted thousands of people every year. Most of these deaths are caused by accidental inhalation of DHMO, but the dangers of dihydrogen monoxide do not end there. Prolonged exposure to its solid form causes severe tissue damage. Symptoms of DHMO ingestion can include excessive sweating and urination, and possibly a bloated feeling, nausea, vomiting and body electrolyte imbalance. For those who have become dependent, DHMO withdrawal means certain

death.'

From the site for the petition against dihydrogen monoxide: ‘Please sign this petition and help stop This Invisible Killer. Get the government to do something now. ... Contamination Is Reaching Epidemic Proportions! Quantities of dihydrogen monoxide have been found in almost every stream, lake, and reservoir in America today. But the pollution is global, and the contaminant has even been found in Antarctic ice. DHMO has caused

millions of dollars of property damage in the Midwest, and recently California.’

A recent example of the pseudoscientific radiation 'education' masquerading as science that Feynman (quoted above) objected to in the 1960s was published in 2009 in an article called 'The proportion of childhood leukaemia incidence in Great Britain that may be caused by natural background ionizing radiation' in Leukemia, vol. 23 (2009), pp. 770-776, which falsely asserts - in contradiction to the evidence that the no- threshold model is contrary to Hiroshima and Nagasaki data: 'Risk models based primarily on studies of the Japanese atomic bomb survivors imply that low-level exposure to ionizing radiation, including ubiquitous natural background radiation, also raises the risk of childhood leukaemia. Using two sets of recently published leukaemia risk models and estimates of natural background radiation red-bone-marrow doses received by children, about 20% of the cases of childhood leukaemia in Great Britain are predicted to be attributable to this source.' The authors of this pseudoscience which is the opposite of the facts are R. Wakeford (Dalton Nuclear Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK), G. M. Kendall (Childhood Cancer Research Group, Oxford, UK), and M. P. Little (Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Imperial College, London, Uk). It is disgusting and sinful that the facts about childhood leukemia are being lied on so blatantly for non-scientific purposes, and it is to be hoped that these leukemia investigators will either correct their errors or alternatively be banned from using scientific literature to promote

false dogma for deception until they mend the error of their ways and repent their sins in this matter.

Protein P53, discovered only in 1979, is encoded by gene TP53, which occurs on human chromosome 17. P53 also occurs in other mammals including mice, rats and dogs. P53 is one of the proteins which continually repairs breaks in DNA, which easily breaks at body temperature: the DNA in each cell of the human body suffers at least two single strand breaks every second, and one double strand (i.e. complete double helix) DNA break occurs at least once every 2 hours (5% of radiation-induced DNA breaks are double strand breaks, while 0.007% of spontaneous DNA breaks at body temperature are double strand breaks)! Cancer occurs when several breaks in DNA happen to occur by chance at nearly the same time, giving several loose strand ends at once, which repair proteins like P53 then repair incorrectly, causing a mutation which can be proliferated somatically. This cannot occur when only one break occurs, because only two loose ends are produced, and P53 will reattach them correctly. But if low-LET ionising radiation levels are increased to a certain extent, causing more single strand breaks, P53 works faster and is able deal with faster breaks as they occur, so that multiple broken strand ends do not arise. This prevents DNA strands being repaired incorrectly, and prevents cancer - a result of mutation caused by faults in DNA - from arising. Too much radiation of course overloads the P53 repair mechanism, and then it cannot repair breaks as they occur, so multiple breaks begin to appear and loose ends of DNA are wrongly connected by P53, causing an increased

cancer risk.

1. DNA-damaging free radicals are equivalent to a source of sparks which is always present naturally.

2. Cancer is equivalent the fire you get if the sparks are allowed to ignite the gasoline, i.e. if the free radicals are allowed to damage DNA without

the damage being repaired.

3. Protein P53 is equivalent to a fire suppression system which is constantly damping out the sparks, or repairing the damaged DNA so that cancer

doesn’t occur.

In this way of thinking, the ‘cause’ of cancer will be down to a failure of a DNA repairing enzyme like protein P53 to repair the damage.

Dr Jane Orient, 'Homeland Security for Physicians’, Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, vol. 11, number 3, Fall 2006, pp. 75-9:

"In the 1960s, a group of activist physicians called Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) undertook to "educate the medical profession and the world about the dangers of nuclear weapons," beginning with a series of articles in the New England Journal of Medicine. [Note that journal was publishing information for anti-civil defense propaganda back in 1949, e.g. the article in volume 241, pp. 647-53 of New England Journal of Medicine which falsely suggests that civil defense in nuclear war would be hopeless because a single burned patient in 1947 with 40% body area burns required 42 oxygen tanks, 36 pints of plasma, 40 pints of whole blood, 104 pints of fluids, 4,300 m of gauze, 3 nurses and 2 doctors. First, only unclothed persons in direct line of sight without shadowing can get 40% body area burns from thermal radiation, second, duck and cover offers protection in a nuclear attack warning, and G. V. LeRoy had already published, two years earlier, in J.A.M.A., volume 134, 1947, pp. 1143-8, that less than 5% of burns in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were caused by building and debris fires. In medicine it is always possible to expend vast resources on patients who are fatally injured. In a mass casualty situation, doctors should not give up just because they don't have unlimited resources; as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they would need to do their best with what they have.] On its website, www.psr.org, the group boasts that it "led the campaign to end atmospheric nuclear testing." With this campaign, the linear no-threshold (LNT) theory of radiation carcinogenesis became entrenched. It enabled activists to calculate enormous numbers of potential casualties by taking a tiny risk and multiplying it by the population of the earth. As an enduring consequence, the perceived risks of radiation are far out of proportion to actual risks, causing tremendous damage to the American nuclear industry. ... Efforts to save lives were not only futile, but unethical: Any suggestion that nuclear war

could be survivable increased its likelihood and was thus tantamount to warmongering, PSR spokesmen warned. ...

'For the mindset that engendered and enables this situation, which jeopardizes the existence of the United States as a nation as well as the lives of

millions of its citizens, some American physicians and certain prestigious medical organizations bear a heavy responsibility.

‘Ethical physicians should stand ready to help patients to the best of their ability, and not advocate sacrificing them in the name of a political

agenda. Even very basic knowledge, especially combined with simple, inexpensive advance preparations, could save countless lives."

Dr Theodore B. Taylor, Proceedings of the Second Interdisciplinary Conference on Selected Effects of a General War, DASIAC Special Report 95, July 1969, vol. 2, DASA-2019-2, AD0696959, page 298 (also linked here):

'I must just say that as far as I'm concerned I have had some doubts about whether we should have had a civil defense program in the past. I have no doubt whatsoever now, for this reason, that I've seen ways in which the deterrent forces can fail to hold things off, so that no matter what our national leaders do, criminal organizations, what have you, groups of people over which we have no control whatsoever, can threaten other groups

of people.'

This point of Taylor is the key fact on the morality. Suppose we disarm and abandon nuclear power. That won't stop fallout from a war, terrorists, or a foreign reactor blast from coming. Civil defence knowledge is needed. Even when America has ABM, it will be vulnerable to wind carried

fallout. No quantity of pacifist hot air will protect people against radiation.

Charles J. Hitch and Roland B. McKean of the RAND Corporation in their 1960 book The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, pp. 310-57:

‘With each side possessing only a small striking force, a small amount of cheating would give one side dominance over the other, and the incentive to cheat and prepare a preventative attack would be strong ... With each side possessing, say, several thousand missiles, a vast amount of cheating would be necessary to give one side the ability to wipe out the other’s striking capability. ... the more extensive a disarmament agreement is, the smaller the force that a violator would have to hide in order to achieve complete domination. Most obviously, “the abolition of the weapons necessary in a general or ‘unlimited’ war” would offer the most insuperable obstacles to an inspection plan, since the violator could gain an

overwhelming advantage from the concealment of even a few weapons.’

Disarmament after World War I caused the following problem which led to World War II (reported by Winston S. Churchill in the London Daily Express newspaper of November 1, 1934):

‘Germany is arming secretly, illegally and rapidly. A reign of terror exists in Germany to keep secret the feverish and terrible preparations they

are making.’

British Prime Minister Thatcher's address to the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament on 23 June 1982, where she pointed out that

in the years since the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 10 million people had been killed by 140 non-nuclear conflicts:

‘The fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types. It is the disposition on the part of some states to impose change on others by resorting to force against other nations ... Aggressors do not start wars because an adversary has built up his own strength. They start

wars because they believe they can gain more by going to war than by remaining at peace.’

J. D. Culshaw, the then Director of the U.K. Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch, stated in his article in the Scientific Advisory Branch journal Fission Fragments, September 1972 (issue No. 19), classified 'Restricted':

‘Apart from those who don't want to know or can't be bothered, there seem to be three major schools of thought about the nature of a possible

Third World War ...

* 'The first group think of something like World War II but a little worse ... * '.,. the second of World War II but very much worse ...

* ‘and the third group think in terms of a catastrophe ...

"When the Armageddon concept is in favour, the suggestion that such problems exist leads to "way out" research on these phenomena, and it is sufficient to mention a new catastrophic threat [e.g., 10 years later this was done by Sagan with "nuclear winter" hype, which turned out to be fake because modern concrete cities can't produce firestorms like 1940s wooden-built areas of Hamburg, Dresden and Hiroshima] to stimulate research into the possibilities of it arising. The underlying appeal of this concept is that if one could show that the execution of all out nuclear, biological or chemical warfare would precipitate the end of the world, no one but a mad man would be prepared to initiate such a war. [However,

as history proves, plenty of mad men end up gaining power and leading countries into wars.]'

J. K. S. Clayton, then Director of the U.K. Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch, stated in his introduction, entitled The Challenge - Why Home Defence?, to the 1977 Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch Training Manual for Scientific Advisers:

‘Since 1945 we have had nine wars - in Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam, between China and India, China and Russia, India and Pakistan and between the Arabs and Israelis on three occasions. We have had confrontations between East and West over Berlin, Formosa and Cuba. There have been civil wars or rebellions in no less than eleven countries and invasions or threatened invasions of another five. Whilst it is not suggested that all these incidents could have resulted in major wars, they do indicate the aptitude of mankind to resort to a forceful solution of its problems,

sometimes with success. ...'

It is estimated that Mongol invaders exterminated 35 million Chinese between 1311-40, without modern weapons. Communist Chinese killed 26.3 million dissenters between 1949 and May 1965, according to detailed data compiled by the Russians on 7 April 1969. The Soviet communist dictatorship killed 40 million dissenters, mainly owners of small farms, between 1917-59. Conventional (non-nuclear) air raids on Japan killed 600,000 during World War II. The single incendiary air raid on Tokyo on 10 March 1945 killed 140,000 people (more than the total for nuclear

bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined) at much less than the $2 billion expense of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs! Non-

nuclear air raids on Germany during World War II killed 593,000 civilians. The argument that the enemy will continue stocking megaton fallout weapons if we go to cleaner weapons is irrelevant for deterrence, since we're not planning to start war, just to credibly deter invasions. You should not try to lower your standards of warfare to those of your enemy to appease groupthink taboos, or you will end up like Britain's leaders in the

1930s, trying to collaborate with fascists for popular applause. House of Lords debate Nuclear Weapons: Destructive Power, published in Hansard, 14 June 1988:

Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: ‘My Lords, if we are going into the question of lethality of weapons and seek thereby to isolate the nuclear as distinct from the so-called conventional range, is there not a danger that the public may think that Vimy, Passchendaele and Dresden were all right

—sort of tea parties—and that nuclear war is something which in itself is unacceptable?’ Lord Trefgarne: ‘My Lords, the policy of making Europe, or the rest of the world, safe for conventional war is not one that I support.’ House of Commons debate Civil Defence published in Hansard, 26 October 1983:

Mr. Bill Walker (Tayside, North): ‘I remind the House that more people died at Stalingrad than at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Yet people talk about fighting a conventional war in Europe as if it were acceptable. One rarely sees demonstrations by the so-called peace movement against a conventional war in Europe, but it could be nothing but ghastly and horrendous. The casualties would certainly exceed those at Stalingrad, and

that cannot be acceptable to anyone who wants peace’

On 29 October 1982, Thatcher stated of the Berlin Wall: ‘In every decade since the war the Soviet leaders have been reminded that their pitiless ideology only survives because it is maintained by force. But the day comes when the anger and frustration of the people is so great that force

cannot contain it. Then the edifice cracks: the mortar crumbles ... one day, liberty will dawn on the other side of the wall.’

On 22 November 1990, she said: ‘Today, we have a Europe ... where the threat to our security from the overwhelming conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact has been removed; where the Berlin Wall has been torn down and the Cold War is at an end. These immense changes did not come

about by chance. They have been achieved by strength and resolution in defence, and by a refusal ever to be intimidated.’

'The case for civil defence stands regardless of whether a nuclear deterrent is necessary or not. ... Even if the U.K. were not itself at war, we would be as powerless to prevent fallout from a nuclear explosion crossing the sea as was King Canute to stop the tide.' - U.K. Home Office leaflet, Civil

Defence, 1982.

‘... peace cannot be guaranteed absolutely. Nobody can be certain, no matter what policies this or any other Government were to adopt, that the United Kingdom would never again be attacked. Also we cannot tell what form such an attack might take. Current strategic thinking suggests that if war were to break out it would start with a period of conventional hostilities of uncertain duration which might or might not escalate to nuclear conflict. ... while nuclear weapons exist there must always be a chance, however small, that they will be used against us [like gas bombs in World War II]. ... as a consequence of war between other nations in which we were not involved fall out from nuclear explosions could fall on a neutral Britain. ... conventional war is not the soft option that is sometimes suggested. It is also too easily forgotten that in World War II some 50 million people died and that conventional weapons have gone on killing people ever since 1945 without respite.’ - - The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Gray of Contin), House of Lords debate on Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations, Hansard, vol. 444, cc. 523-49, 1 November 1983.

‘All of us are living in the light and warmth of a huge hydrogen bomb, 860,000 miles across and 93 million miles away, which is in a state of

continuous explosion.’ - Dr Isaac Asimov.

‘Dr Edward Teller remarked recently that the origin of the earth was somewhat like the explosion of the atomic bomb...’ — Dr Harold C. Urey, The

Planets: Their Origin and Development, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952, p. ix.

‘But compared with a supernova a hydrogen bomb is the merest trifle. For a supernova is equal in violence to about a million million million million hydrogen bombs all going off at the same time.’ — Sir Fred Hoyle (1915-2001), The Nature of the Universe, Pelican Books, London, 1963, p. 75.

‘In fact, physicists find plenty of interesting and novel physics in the environment of a nuclear explosion. Some of the physical phenomena are valuable objects of research, and promise to provide further understanding of nature.’ — Dr Harold L. Brode, The RAND Corporation, ‘Review of

Nuclear Weapons Effects,’ Annual Review of Nuclear Science, Volume 18, 1968, pp. 153-202.

‘It seems that similarities do exist between the processes of formation of single particles from nuclear explosions and formation of the solar system

from the debris of a [4 x 1078 megatons of TNT equivalent, type Ia] supernova explosion. We may be able to learn much more about the origin of the earth, by further investigating the process of radioactive fallout from the nuclear weapons tests.’ — Dr Paul K. Kuroda (1917-2001), University of Arkansas, ‘Radioactive Fallout in Astronomical Settings: Plutonium-244 in the Early Environment of the Solar System,’ pages 83-96 of Radionuclides in the Environment: A Symposium Sponsored By the Division of Nuclear Chemistry and Technology At the 155th Meeting of the American Chemical Society, San Francisco, California, April 1-3, 1968, edited by Symposium Chairman Dr Edward C. Freiling (1922-2000) of the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, Advances in Chemistry Series No. 93, American Chemical Society, Washington, D.C., 1970.

Dr Paul K. Kuroda (1917-2001) in 1956 correctly predicted the existence of water-moderated natural nuclear reactors in flooded uranium ore seams, which were discovered in 1972 by French physicist Francis Perrin in three ore deposits at Oklo in Gabon, where sixteen sites operated as natural nuclear reactors with self-sustaining nuclear fission 2,000 million years ago, each lasting several hundred thousand years, averaging 100 kW. The radioactive waste they generated remained in situ for a period of 2,000,000,000 years without escaping. They were discovered during investigations into why the U-235 content of the uranium in the ore was only 0.7171% instead of the normal 0.7202%. Some of the ore, in the middle of the natural reactors, had a U-235 isotopic abundance of just 0.440%. Kuroda's brilliant paper is entitled, 'On the Nuclear Physical Stability of the Uranium Minerals', published in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 25 (1956), pp. 781-782 and 1295-1296.

A type Ia supernova explosion, always yielding 4 x 1078 megatons of TNT equivalent, results from the critical mass effect of the collapse of a white dwarf as soon as its mass exceeds 1.4 solar masses due to matter falling in from a companion star. The degenerate electron gas in the white dwarf is then no longer able to support the pressure from the weight of gas, which collapses, thereby releasing enough gravitational potential energy as heat and pressure to cause the fusion of carbon and oxygen into heavy elements, creating massive amounts of radioactive nuclides, particularly intensely radioactive nickel-56, but half of all other nuclides (including uranium and heavier) are also produced by the 'R' (rapid) process of successive neutron captures by fusion products in supernovae explosions. Type la supernovae occur typically every 400 years in the Milky Way galaxy. On 4 July 1054, Chinese astronomers observed in the sky (without optical instruments) the bright supernova in the constellation Taurus which today is still visible as the Crab Nebula through telescopes. The Crab Nebula debris has a diameter now of 7 light years and is still expanding at 800 miles/second. The supernova debris shock wave triggers star formation when it encounters hydrogen gas in space by compressing it and seeding it with debris; bright stars are observed in the Orion Halo, the 300 light year diameter remains of a supernova. It is estimated that when the solar system was forming 4,540 million years ago, a supernova occurred around 100 light years away, and the heavy

radioactive debris shock wave expanded at 1,000 miles/second. Most of the heavy elements including iron, silicon and calcium in the Earth and

people are the stable end products of originally radioactive decay chains from the space burst fallout of a 7 x 1076 megatons thermonuclear

explosion, created by fusion and successive neutron captures after the implosion of a white dwarf; a supernova explosion.

How would a 10°> megaton hydrogen bomb explosion differ from the big bang? Ignorant answers biased in favour of curved spacetime (ignoring quantum gravity!) abound, such as claims that explosions can’t take place in ‘outer space’ (disagreeing with the facts from nuclear space bursts by Russia and America in 1962, not to mention natural supernova explosions in space!) and that explosions produce sound waves in air by definition! There are indeed major differences in the nuclear reactions between the big bang and a nuclear bomb. But it is helpful to notice the solid physical fact that implosion systems suggest the mechanism of gravitation: in implosion, TNT is well-known to produce an inward force on a bomb core, but Newton's 3rd law says there is an equal and opposite reaction force outward. In fact, you can’t have a radially outward force without an inward reaction force! It’s the rocket principle. The rocket accelerates (with force F = ma) forward by virtue of the recoil from accelerating the exhaust gas

(with force F = -ma) in the opposite direction! Nothing massive accelerates without an equal and opposite reaction force. Applying this fact to the

measured 6 x 107! ms? ~ He cosmological acceleration of matter radially outward from observers in the universe which was predicted accurately in 1996 and later observationally discovered in 1999 (by Perlmutter, et al.), we find an outward force F = ma and inward reaction force by the 3rd

law. The inward force allows quantitative predictions, and is mediated by gravitons, predicting gravitation in a checkable way (unlike string

theory, which is just a landscape of 10° different perturbative theories and so can’t make any falsifiable predictions about gravity). So it seems as if nuclear explosions do indeed provide helpful analogies to natural features of the world, and the mainstream lambda-CDM model of cosmology - with its force-fitted unobserved ad hoc speculative ‘dark energy’ - ignores and sweeps under the rug major quantum gravity effects which increase the physical understanding of particle physics, particularly force unification and the relation of gravitation to the existing electroweak SU(2) x U(1) section of the Standard Model of fundamental forces.

Richard Lieu, Physics Department, University of Alabama, ‘Lambda-CDM cosmology: how much suppression of credible evidence, and does the

model really lead its competitors, using all evidence?’, http://arxiv.org/abs/0705.2462.

Even Einstein grasped the possibility that general relativity's lambda-CDM model is at best just a classical approximation to quantum field theory,

at the end of his life when he wrote to Besso in 1954:

‘I consider it quite possible that physics cannot be based on the [classical differential equation] field principle, i-e., on continuous structures. In

that case, nothing remains of my entire castle in the air, [non-quantum] gravitation theory included ...’

‘Science is the organized skepticism in the reliability of expert opinion.’ - Professor Richard P. Feynman (quoted by Professor Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, Houghton-Mifflin, New York, 2006, p. 307).

‘The expression of dissenting views may not seem like much of a threat to a powerful organization, yet sometimes it triggers an amazingly hostile response. The reason is that a single dissenter can puncture an illusion of unanimity. ... Among those suppressed have been the engineers who tried to point out problems with the Challenger space shuttle that caused it to blow up. More fundamentally, suppression is a denial of the open dialogue and debate that are the foundation of a free society. Even worse than the silencing of dissidents is the chilling effect such practices have on others. For every individual who speaks out, numerous others decide to play it safe and keep quiet. More serious than external censorship is the problem

of self-censorship.’ — Professor Brian Martin, University of Wollongong, 'Stamping Out Dissent', Newsweek, 26 April 1993, pp. 49-50

In 1896, Sir James Mackenzie-Davidson asked Wilhelm Rontgen, who discovered X-rays in 1895: ‘What did you think?’ Réntgen replied: ‘I did not think, I investigated.’ The reason? Cathode ray expert J. J. Thomson in 1894 saw glass fluorescence far from a tube, but due to prejudice (expert opinion) he avoided investigating that X-ray evidence! ‘Science is the organized skepticism in the reliability of expert opinion.’ - Richard Feynman, in Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, Houghton-Mifflin, 2006, p. 307.

Mathematical symbols in this blog: your computer’s browser needs access to standard character symbol sets to display Greek symbols for mathematical physics. If you don’t have the symbol character sets installed, the density symbol 'p' (Rio) will appear as 'r' and the 'z' (Pi) symbol will as 'p', causing confusion with the use of 'r' for radius and 'p' for momentum in formulae. This problem exists with Mozilla Firefox 3, but not

with Microsoft Explorer which displays Greek symbols.

About Me Name: nige

Currently designing secure active server page (ASP) front ends for client SQL databases. In 1982 I began programming in basic, and at college learned Fortran while a physics undergraduate a decade later. Afterwards, I switched from mainstream physics and mathematical education to part-time programming student, while working in a series of jobs including four years in credit control. www.quantumfieldtheory.org http://glasstone.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/capabilities-of-nuclear-weapons.html/ http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=273#comment- 5322. http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/? p=353 &cpage=1#comment-8728. http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/? p=215#comment-4082.

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From 1945-62, America tested 216 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 154 megatons, with a mean yield of 713 kilotons From 1949-62, Russia tested 214 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 281 megatons, with a mean yield of 1.31 megatons From 1952-8, Britain tested 21 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 10.8 megatons, with a mean yield of 514 kilotons From 1960-74, France tested 46 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 11.4 megatons, with a mean yield of 248 kilotons From 1964-80, China tested 23 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 21.5 megatons, with a mean yield of 935 kilotons

In summary, from 1945-80, America, Russia, Britain, France and China tested 520 nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, totalling 478.7 megatons,

with a mean yield of 921 kilotons

Mean yield of the 5,192 nuclear warheads and bombs in the deployed Russian nuclear stockpile as of January 2009: 0.317 Mt. Total yield: 1,646 Mt.

Mean yield of the 4,552 nuclear warheads and bombs in the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile as of January 2007: 0.257 Mt. Total yield: 1,172 Mt.

For diffraction damage where damage areas scale as the two-thirds power of explosive yield, this stockpile's area damage potential can be compared to the 20,000,000 conventional bombs of 100 kg size (2 megatons of TNT equivalent total energy) dropped on Germany during World War II: (Total nuclear bomb blast diffraction damaged ground area)/(Total conventional blast diffraction damaged ground area to Germany during World War ID) = [4,552*(0.257 Mt)*3]/[20,000,000*(0.0000001 Mt)*>] = 1,840/431 = 4.3. Thus, although the entire U.S. stockpile has a TNT energy equivalent to 586 times that of the 2 megatons of conventional bombs dropped on Germany in World War II, it is only capable of causing 4.3 times as much diffraction type damage area, because any given amount of explosive energy is far more efficient when distributed over many small explosions than in a single large explosion! Large explosions are inefficient because they cause unintended collateral damage, wasting energy off the

target area and injuring or damaging unintended targets!

In a controlled sample of 36,500 survivors, 89 people got leukemia over a 40 year period, above the number in the unexposed control group. (Data:

Radiation Research, volume 146, 1996, pages 1-27.) Over 40 years, in 36,500 survivors monitored, there were 176 leukemia deaths which is 89 more

than the control (unexposed) group got naturally. There were 4,687 other cancer deaths, but that was merely 339 above the number in the control (unexposed) group, so this is statistically a much smaller rise than the leukemia result. Natural leukemia rates, which are very low in any case, were increased by 51% in the irradiated survivors, but other cancers were merely increased by just 7%. Adding all the cancers together, the total was 4,863 cancers (virtually all natural cancer, nothing whatsoever to do with radiation), which is just 428 more than the unexposed control group. Hence, the total increase over the natural cancer rate due to bomb exposure was only 9%, spread over a period of 40 years. There was no increase

whatsoever in genetic malformations.

There should be a note here about how unnatural radioactive pollution is (not) in space: the earth's atmosphere is a radiation shield equivalent to being protected behind a layer of water 10 metres thick. This reduces the cosmic background radiation by a factor of 100 of what it would be without the earth's atmosphere. Away from the largely uninhabited poles, the Earth's magnetic field also protects us against charged cosmic radiations, which are deflected and end up spiralling around the magnetic field at high altitude, in the Van Allen trapped radiation belts. On the Moon, for example, there is no atmosphere or significant magnetic field so the natural background radiation exposure rate at solar minimum is 1 milliRoentgen per hour (about 10 microSieverts/hour) some 100 times that on the Earth (0.010 milliRoentgen per hour or about 0.10 microSieverts/hour). The Apollo astronauts visiting the Moon wore dosimeters and they received an average of 275 milliRoentgens (about 2.75 milliSieverts) of radiation (well over a year's exposure to natural background at sea level) in over just 19.5 days. It is a lot more than that during a

solar flare, which is one of the concerns for astronauts to avoid (micrometeorites are another concern in a soft spacesuit).

The higher up you are above sea level, the less of the atmosphere there is between you and space, so the less shielding you have to protect you from the intense cosmic space radiations (emitted by thermonuclear reactors we call 'stars', as well as distant supernovae explosions). At sea level, the air above you constitutes a radiation shield of 10 tons per square metre or the equivalent of having a 10 metres thick water shield between you and outer space. As you go up a mountain or up in an aircraft, the amount of atmosphere between you and space decreases, thus radiation levels increase with altitude because there is less shielding. The normal background radiation exposure rate shoots up by a factor of 20, from 0.010 to 0.20 milliRoentgens per hour, when any airplane ascends from sea level to 36,000 feet cruising altitude. (The now obsolete British Concorde supersonic transport used to maintain radiation-monitoring equipment so that it could drop to lower-altitude flight routes if excessive cosmic radiation due to solar storms were detected.) Flight aircrew get more radiation exposure than many nuclear industry workers at nuclear power plants. Residents of the high altitude city of Denver get 100 milliRoentgens (about 1 milliSievert) more annual exposure than a resident of Washington, D.C., but the

mainstream anti-radiation cranks don't campaign for the city to be shut to save kids radiation exposure, for mountain climbing to be banned, etc.! 1994 revised Introduction to Kearny’s Nuclear War Survival Skills, by Dr Edward Teller, January 14, 1994:

‘If defense is neglected these weapons of attack become effective. They become available and desirable in the eyes of an imperialist dictator, even if his means are limited. Weapons of mass destruction could become equalizers between nations big and small, highly developed and primitive, if defense is neglected. If defense is developed and if it is made available for general prevention of war, weapons of aggression will become less desirable. Thus defense makes war itself less probable. ... One psychological defense mechanism against danger is to forget about it. This attitude is

as common as it is disastrous. It may turn a limited danger into a fatal difficulty.’

Advice of Robert Watson-Watt (Chief Scientist on the World War II British Radar Project, defending Britain against enemy attacks): ‘Give them

the third best to go on with, the second best comes too late, the best never comes.’

From Wikipedia (a source of groupthink): ‘Groupthink is a type of thought exhibited by group members who try to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas. Individual creativity, uniqueness, and independent thinking are lost in the pursuit of group cohesiveness, as are the advantages of reasonable balance in choice and thought that might normally be obtained by making

decisions as a group. During groupthink, members of the group avoid promoting viewpoints outside the comfort zone of consensus thinking. A

variety of motives for this may exist such as a desire to avoid being seen as foolish, or a desire to avoid embarrassing or angering other members of the group. Groupthink may cause groups to make hasty, irrational decisions, where individual doubts are set aside, for fear of upsetting the

group’s balance.’ Links

© Google News

Dr Carl E. Baum's EMP theory and interaction notes

& >

The Atomic Heritage Foundation

© Radiation Effects Research Foundation lumps data together to cover up benefits of low dose radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Life Span Study!

© DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) Nuclear testing histories (PDF files)

© Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan

© Carl F. Miller's fallout research at nuclear tests

© British Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch

© Samuel Cohen's book about the collateral damage averting, invasion-deterring neutron bomb he invented, and the lying political attacks he endured as a result

© Jerry Emanuelson's review of EMP facts, including the direct dependence of the EMP on the Earth's natural magnetic field strength at the burst location

© Essays by 1950s American nuclear weapon effects test (and neutron bomb design) experts, discrediting anti-civil defence propaganda

© Neutron bomb inventor Samuel Cohen's 2006 book on the history of the neutron bomb, the most moral weapon ever invented due to its purely military deterrent capabilities, and the pesudo-scientific propaganda war he has had to endure from the enemies of deterrence

© Karl-Ludvig Grenhaug's EMP reports page with useful PDF downloads on prompt EMP and MHD-EMP measurements from nuclear tests (Norwegian language)

© Colonel Derek L. Duke's factual book on nuclear weapons accidents, Chasing Loose Nukes, as told to Fred Dungan

© The H-Bomb and the birth of the Universe: 'For 100 Million years after time began, the universe was dark as pitch. The clouds of hydrogen condensed into huge nuclear fireballs. That moment-when the universe first lit up-was the moment of creation that matters...'

© American EMP Interaction manual: comprehensive theory of both the EMP source mechanism and the EMP pick-up in cables and antenna by electromagnetic inductance (30 MB PDF file)

© British Mission to Japan, The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1946 (high quality 42.5 MB pdf file).

© 1950 edition (high quality 82.7 MB PDF file) of U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Atomic Weapons

© 1957 edition (high quality 90.8 MB PDF file) of subsequently deleted sections on nuclear tests of civil defense countermeasures from U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

© 1957 edition (low quality 30.6 MB PDF file) of entire U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

© 1962/64 edition (high quality 188 MB PDF file) of major revised sections in the U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

© 1962/64 edition (high quality 43.8 MB PDF file) of 74 pages of subsequently deleted material dealing with thermal ignition of houses at nuclear tests and civil defense countermeasures chapter, from the U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

© 1977 edition (single 36.8 MB PDF file) of U.S. Department of Defense book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

© Bill Forstchen, "One Second After" book about EMP attack risk and its effects on USA.

© U.S. Department of Energy Opennet Documents Online (includes many Nevada and Pacific nuclear test reports as PDF files)

© Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)'s Scientific and Technical Information Network (STINET) Service (other declassified Nevada and Pacific test reports)

© Highlights from ABM testing history

© THAAD Goes Another ABM Test © Alex Wellerstein's Restricted Data blog contains some interesting news (but beware of his uncritical use of unobstructed dry desert and nude skin thermal radiation and other effects predictions from the 1977 edition of Glasstone and Dolan; he deletes critically objective comments and pretends that honest criticisms of propaganda as being ignorant deception are rude as an excuse for ignoring the facts and refusing to engage in objective discussion of controversial aspects of this topic; basically if you pay homage and engage in groupthink bias you may be tolerated). © Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapon Archive (it contains errors from Chuck Hansen's compilation, and it is concentrated on bomb building, not on civil defence countermeasure evaluations done at nuclear tests; note that Chuck Hansen's books and CDs give a false quotation from Neil O' Hines's book Proving Groundson the effects of the 1952 Mike explosion on nearby Engebi Island, where Hines later in the book states that the native rats in fact survived the intense close-in blast, heat and fallout under a few unches of soil, despite the initial ignorant belief that they could not have survived!!!)

Quantum Field Theory

Los Alamos Science journal

Excellent particle physics gauge theory (fundamental force interaction) issue of Los Alamos Science journal

Millions of books, audiobooks, magazines, documents, sheet music, and more for free.

ORNL/TM- 10423

Technical Options for Protecting Civilians from Toxic Vapors and Gases

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BANK OF JAPAN BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA survivors extinguished fire with water buckets.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan Suet No. 2 Building No.: 24, Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400. The For NAME; Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforeed-conerete frame (steel core).

REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of ibe comged I

second story and in entire third story, No fire it) poste building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours. , Fire in room in second story extinguished with water

buckets,

hime.ne

http www, hiroshima-navi.or jp/enisightseeing/hibaku_ireihitatemonol2 1383 php

The Bank of Japan, Hiroshima, survived 380 m from Ground Zero, within the firestorm area, when fires were extinguished by water buckets by its survivors, the majority of people in the building having survived. Secret US Strategic Bombing Survey report proves civil defense for modern concrete buildings is effective. The building was reopened as a bank on 8 August, merely two days after nuclear attack, and continued in use as a bank until 1992. It remains in Hiroshima. This beautifully designed and sturdy reinforced concrete building was designed in 1936 by Nagano Uheiji. Cook’s law: ”Any man called Godwin who claims it is immoral to learn the lessons from the results of Nazi racist eugenics pseudoscience and to apply those lessons to those terrible media dominating celebrity-taboo-lovers who appease, cover-up, or defend the continuation of an evil, irrational pseudoscience which is causing unnecessary suffering today, is defending injustice, inhumanity and irrational consensus evil and is not behaving as a humane, objective, person. We need to ensure that the worst mistakes of the past are never repeated, if we are just, moral and caring towards our fellow human beings who do not deserve to be fed lies and dangerously complacent one-sided, biased propaganda based on a populist love of obsolete dogma, and/or a hatred of the search for objective fact, by pseudo-educationalists who prefer to live in utopia than in the real world of their fellow folk!”

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: (1). Thank you to http://www.militarystory.org/nuclear-detonations-in-urban-and-suburban-areas/ for re-blogging a

typical post from this glasstone.blogspot.com blog, kicking out the lies from under secrecy obsessed loons who want disarmament to start WWIII.

(2). Thank you to https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/02/are-nuclear-weapons-100-times-less.html for reblogging: "Are [strategic, not tactical] Nuclear Weapons 100 times Less Effective Than Supposed? Nigel B. Cook’s Glasstone.Blogspot Blog has beautiful coverage of many nuclear topics here. http://glasstone.blogspot.co.uk/ Cook is a master researcher who digs up incredible piles of research on all topics nuclear and the following is digest of various writings of his gathered for easy access centered on the remarkable thesis that the effects of nuclear weapons, while literally

awesome, have been exaggerated or misunderstood to an even greater extent, with perhaps very considerable military consequences."

TIPS: There is compendium debunking commonplace anti-nuclear CND disarmament propaganda, exaggerations and fake news on nuclear weapons effects and deterrent capabilities linked here. Also, each post on this blog can be viewed in either a simple format, e.g. for this current post, https://glasstone.blogspot.com/2022/02/analogy-of-1938-munich-crisis-and.html is the simple (faster loading) format, or you can view it (slower loading) in a fancy format by adding: ?m=1 to the end of the URL, e.g. https://glasstone.blogspot.com/2022/02/analogy-of-1938-munich-crisis-

and. html?m=1

"The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances ... at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary on 5 December 1994 ... signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States ... prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As a result of

other agreements and the memorandum, between 1993 and 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons." - Wiki.

NATO needs to come to its senses and rearm to deter WWIII instead of stupidly leaving Putin with more nuclear weapons than anyone else, to intimidate like Hitler (see 1930s newspapers below, which spell out the problem plainly). The problem is, the media is dominated by nuclear liars just as it was dominated by gas war liars in the 1930s, who encouraged war while pretending to be doing the opposite. Fighting a conventional war using Ukraine as proxy, while having an inferior nuclear stockpile, is hardly credible nuclear deterrence (please click here for our brief declassified data debunking Glasstone's lying data on nuclear weapons effects) . Also see the compendium linked here for more detail on the actual declassified

effects found in Hiroshima, contrary to Glasstone's very deceptive treatment!