THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Effects of The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Volume I Physical Damage Division May 1947 G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE 1 . Conditions Prior to Attack The city of Hiroshima was an excellent target for the atomic bomb from a fire standpoint : There had been no rain for three weeks; the city was highly combustible, consisting principally of Japa- nese domestic-type structures: it was constructed over flat terrain; and 13 square miles (including streets) of the 26.5-squarc-milc city was more than 5 percent built up (i. e., covered by plan ansa of buildings). The remainder of the city comprised water areas, parks and areas built up below 6 percent. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- square-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly dense, 03.0 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built up. a. Fire Department. Public fire equipment had been little improved in anticipation of wartime fires. Private fire equipment had been aug- mented somewhat but instruction to home occu- pants in its use had been limited to training in combating incendiary bombs. 13 EAST ELEVATION NORTH ELEVATION *.«■ i 4.* i te.tr , ss *r.cr jatft". , tf-8* . *— 4 6 1— =1 rfc-r^TOrr*- 5^ A±S>1 _..._ *.t FIRST • FLOOR PLAN US STRATEGIC BOMBW6 SURVEY TWO-STORY JAPANESE RESIDENCE FIGURE 6 a. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by heat directly radiated by the atomic bomb and by other ignition sources developed the following: (1) The primary lire haz- ard was present in combustible materials and iti fire-resistive buildings with unshielded wall open- ings; (2) six persons who had been in rcinforced- concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by radiant heat; (3) a few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immedi- ately after the explosion; (4) dark clothing was scorched, and, in some cases, reported to have burst into flame from flash heat; (5) but a large proportion of over 1 ,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen char- coal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits. ft. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within ten minutes after the explosion. Of the total number of buildingB investigated 107 caught fire, and, in 69 instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of the buildings or their contents was established as follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposing buildings. 14 0. Damage to /tolling Stock. Of the 123 trolley can operated by the company, 20 percent were damaged by fire and 45 percent by blast. Of the 86 motor busses, fire damaged 21 percent and blast 26 percent. Radiant heat from the bomb ignited cam and busses within 1, 500 feet of GZ. Total damage to cars extended a maximum of 5,700 feet from GZ, heavy damage to 8,400 feet and alight damage to 12,500 feet. Musses wen* totally damaged at 4,000 feet and heavily damaged 5,600 feet from GZ. d. Damage to Orerhead Sy*teut. Blast and fire damaged 11.4 miles of the overhead transmission system including damage to 500 wood and 100 steel poles. No damage occurred to concrete poles, the nearest of which were 6.000 feet from GZ. Wood poles wen* damaged at a maximum distance of 4,500 feet from GZ, and steel poles at 3,600 feet. Overhead transmission cable was downed by blast at 8,000 feet. 21 3. Conditions on Morning of Attack a. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with a small amount of clouds at high altitude*. Wind was from the south with a velocity of ahout 4\* miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles. 6. Ail air-raid "alert" was sounded throughout Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours. Reports of the number of planes causing this alert were con- flicting. The governor of the prefecture stated that four B-29s were sighted, while the Kure Naval District reported three large planes. c. The aircraft apparently came out over Hiroshima from the direction of Bungo Suido and Kunisaki Peninsula, circled the city, and withdrew in the direction of Harima-Nada at 0725 hour*. "All-clear" was sounded at 0731 hours. d. The following circumstances account in part for the high number of casualties resulting from the, atomic bomb: (1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid shelters after the "all-clear" sounded. (2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the approach of the planes involved in the atomic- bomb attack. (3) The explosion occurred during the morning rush hours when people had just arrived at work or were hurrying to their places of business. This concentrated the population in the center of the city where the principal business district was located. (4) Many persons residing outside the city were present for reasons of business, travel and pleasure*. (5) National volunteer and school units were mobilized and engaged in evacuation operations. 84 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY The Effects of The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Volume II Physical Damage Division Dates of Survey: 14 October-26 November 1945 Date of Publication May 1947 A. OHKT OF STUDY The object of this fire stu4y was to determine the exten t of fire i n Hiwishfma resulting from the exptosion of the atomic bomb on 6 August 1946, end to analyxe the contributing factors. B. SUMMARY This section presents a picture of factors pertain- ing to fire in Hiroshima before, during and after the atomic-bomb attack. Part C describes fire con- ditions prior to the attack and analyses the effec- tiveness of precautionary fire measures; Part D relates the story of the fire; Part E presents a detailed analysis of fire in selected fire-resistive, noncombustible, and combustible buildings, and their contents; Part P discusses the cause and extent of fire in bridges; and Part G present con- clusions and recommendations. 1. The city of Hiroshima, like other Japanese cities, was poorly prepared to combat a conflagra- tion of large-scale proportions. Private fire equip- ment had been augmented and home occupants had been given limited instructions and training in combatting incendiary bombs. Public fire equip- ment had been little improved to fight wartime fires. 2. The public water system was fairly adequate for normal fire conditions, although pressure was very low on dead-end mains at the south end of the city. No improvements had been made for war- time emergencies. 3. The Ota River and its six branches divided the city into nine distinct areas. The river courses and 41,000 feet of firebreak lanes which had been prepared by removing combustible buildings on one or both sides of fairly wide streets formed an extensive network of firebreaks. 4. The city, consisting principally of Japanese do- mestic structures, was highly combustible and densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- square-mile city area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly dense, 94 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built up. All the large industrial plants were loca ted on the south and southeast edges of the city. 5. Precautionary fire measures were ineffective largely because widespread damage was caused by blast, the populace suffered severe casualties, innumerable fires were started throughout the city on both sides of natural and man-made firebreaks, and the public fire department sustained almost a 6. One major break occurred in a 16-inch water main when Bridge 29 which carried it was col- lapsed by blast This and a large number of breaks in small pipes above ground in cottapaed buildings reduced water pressure in the system, but the reservoir never ran dry and lack of water was not a factor in the extent of the fire. 7. The temperature resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb was of great intensity but of extremely short duration. At ground zero, 2,000 feet from the center of heat, the temperature probably exceeded 3,500° C. for a fraction of a second. Only directly exposed surfaces were flash burned. 8. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by directly radiated heat from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources was obtained by interrogation and visual inspec- tion of the entire city. Six persons who had been in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by flash heat. A few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immediately after the explosion. Dark clothing was scorched and, in some cases, was reported to have burst into flame from flash heat. A large proportion of over 1,000 persons ques- tioned was, however, in agreement that a great majority of the original fires were started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires. Other sources of secondary fire were industrial-process fires and electric short circuits. 9. There had been practically no rain in the city for about 3 weeks. The velocity of the wind on the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not more than 5 miles per hour. A fire storm, includ- ing both wind and rain, began to develop soon after the start of the initial fires. The fire wind, which blew always toward the burning area, reached a maximum velocity of 30 to 40 miles per hour 2 to 3 hours after the explosion, and inter- mittently light and heavy rain fell over the1 north and west portions of the city. 10. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within 10 minutes after the explosion. ■I f| ?! spilt1" 5s 8= 9? ±! | H CO o H 8 '< D. THE CONFLAGRATION 1. Start of Fir* a. Source of Evidence. Because of the practi- cally total combustion which prevailed in the burned-over area of 4.4 square miles in the heart of the city, most of the evidence relative to igni- tion by radiant heat from the bomb and secondary sources of heat was necessarily obtained by inter- rogation which, wherever possible, was checked by field inspection. Also, since the heaviest casual- ties occurred closer in, a majority of the persons questioned were 3,000 feet or more from ground zero (GZ) at the time of the explosion. Most people who had been within 2,000 feet of GZ (2,800 feet from air zero) were utterly confused as to what had happened immediately after the detonation and for some time thereafter, although several were located who could give reasonably coherent stories. Because the distance of a point on the ground from air zero (AZ) was important from an ignition standpoint and the distance from GZ was' important from a fire spread standpoint, the relationship between the two has been shown on Figure 2. b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. (1) Six persons were found who bad been in rein forced- concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of AZ at the time of the explosion and who stated that black cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few sec- onds later. In two cases it was stated that thin rice paper on desks close to open windows facing AZ also burst into flame immediately, although heavier paper did not ignite. No incidents were recounted to the effect that furniture or similar objects within buildings were ignited directly by radiated heat from the bomb. (2) Straw-thatched roofs were illegal within the city limits, but a number were erected outside. A few persons stated that they had seen 'this type of roof burst into flame directly from heat radiated by the bomb but the stories were inconsistent ex- cept in two instances where the persons could point to specific building sites. Both of these locations were almost due north of AZ, the first approximately 12,700 feet and the second approxi- mately 13,900 feet. Despite the strong eyewitness accounts of the persons interrogated, there is con- siderable doubt in the minds of the investigators that these buldings were ignited directly by radi- ated heat from the bomb. This doubt is predi- cated chiefly upon three considerations, namely: (I) Buildings, including many with straw-thatched roofs 3,200 feet nearer AZ (1 0,700 feet) , suffered no fire damage; (2) fanners working in an open field only 800 feet beyond (14,700 feet) suffered no burns of any kind although they felt a wave of warm air pass over them almost simultaneously with the sound of the explosion; and (3) the roofs of these buildings collapsed as a result of the blast and may have been ignited by charcoal braziers. (3) One dwelling which had a cedarbark-shingle covering that was reported ignited by the flash heat from the bomb was found approximately 6,700 feet northeast from AZ and slightly over 200 feet beyond the fringe of the burned-over area. This house was of the frame and stucco type com- mon to the area and was one of several forming a small group within an enclosure formed by an 8- foot masonry and wood wall. All houses within the enclosure had tile-covered roofs, but one of the group also had a small section covered with highly inflammable cedarbark shingles which showed fire damage, although the fire had been extinguished before the entire roof was consumed (Photos 28 and 29). The owners of the property, including a son who was a university graduate, insisted that the roof covering burst into flame immediately with the bomb explosion. Their story could not be shaken. - The chief of the fire department stated that he had heard of two or three cases where the cedarbark-covered roofs, also not permitted within the city limits, had been ignited directly by the bomb, and thought the reports credible. A number of buildings with unburncd cedarbark roof shingles were found at a rayon plant approximately 11,000 feet southwest from AZ. (4) About 600 feet east of the dwelling described above and about 365 feet from the nearest burned building, a wood pole which had apparently car- ried electric wires, probably 220 volts AC, was found with 3 to 4 feet of its top burned off and rather heavy flash bums on the side facing AZ (Photo 30). Several residents of the area stated that this pole had been seen burning about 5 or 10 minutes after the bomb explosion. It is entirely possible that ignition of this pole was caused directly by heat radiation from the bomb^AThe pole was capped with a light steel plate of dark color and it may be that the steel absorbed suf- ficient heat and retained it long enough to ignite dry rot which probably was present under the metal cap. An attempt to determine from utility company records whether or not the pole had been burned previously was unsuccessful. Many wood 21 poles within the fire perimeter were burned, but it ui impassible to state with certainty whether the source of ignition was direct heat from the bomb or heat and flying embers from nearby buildings. Other evidence, however, leads to the conclusion that exposed wood was seldom ignited by radiated heat from the bomb. (5) A cemetery about 2,500 feet from AZ was found cluttered with pieces of very light wood (excellent kindling) which showed no evidence of flash or other bums (Photo 31). It is believed that this debris must have been blown by the blast from the interior or other unexposed portions of structures and this accounts for the lack of flash-burn marks. It is interesting that none of this material was ignited by flying embers, as it was very close to the center of the burned-over area of the city. Photos 32 and 33 also show un burned combustible buildings at 3,800 and 5,000 feet from AZ. (6) One of the graves in the cemetery was en- closed with a wood fence. The fence was com- posed of four corner poles extending about 30 inches above the ground and supporting two horizontal pieces, about 12 inches apart. Bamboo pickets (about IX by %«-inch) were lashed to the fence with vegetable-fibre rope. The corner poles showed deep charring which later proved to have been done according to Japanese custom when they were erected. The horizontal pieces apparently were not charred, but when the lashing for the pickets was removed very definite evidence of flash-burn showed. The bamboo pickets showed light flash-burn marks. The rope lashing for the pickets showed no evidence of having been on fire, but was singed. (7) At the Red Cross Hospital, 5,300 feet south from AZ, three chairs with backs and seats up- holstered with a pile fabric (apparently mohair) were near a window which was exposed to AZ. The backs of the chairs showed moderate to deep singeing except for the lower part which had been shielded by the concrete wall and showed no dis- coloration. Parts of the seats of the chairs showed light flash-burns where the seats had not been shielded by the chair backs. No part of the up- holstery was burned through (Photo 34). Next to the chairs was a varnished wood door which showed definite evidence of flash- burn except for a very small spot adjacent to the door knob which shielded it. The door did not catch fire (Photo 35) . A cotton jacket worn by one of the nurses was charred across one breast. The outer material of the jacket was burned away in part, but the padded cotton lining directly underneath was not burned through (Photo 35). The nurse who had worn the jacket was severely injured by the blast and was not available for questioning. It was stated that her body was not burned through the coat. Testimony at the hospital indicated that several coats had burned similarly, but the others could not be produced for examination. Further- more, nobody at the hospital was certain that these coats had actually burst into flame, and, in fact, the concensus was that they had only smoldered. There was no other evidence of fire in the hospital. (8) Scores of persons throughout all sections of the city were questioned concerning the ignition of clothing by the flash from the bomb. Replies were consistent that white silk seldom was af- fected, although black, and some other colored silk, charred and disintegrated. Numerous in- stances were reported in which designs in black or other dark colors on a white silk kimono were charred so that they fell out, but the white part was not affected. These statements were con- firmed by United States medical officers who had been able to examine a number of kimonos avail- able in a hospital. Ten school boys were located during the study who had been in school yards about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, re- spectively, from AZ. These boys had flash burns on the portions of their faces which had been directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys' stories were consistent to the effect that their clothing, apparently of cotton materials, "smoked," but did not burst into flame. Photo 36 shows a boy's coat that started to smolder from heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ. (9) Three automobile trucks, powered with internal combustion motors using fuel generated by burning charcoal (no gasoline or similar volatiles used), which were parked in a clearing about 7,800 feet north from AZ were said to have been ignited immediately after the bomb ex- plosion. Fire damage to the vehicles was total. Conversely, however, a sedan showing no fire damage1 was examined where it had been aban- doned as a result of severe blast damage on a wide street about 5,800 feet southeast from AZ. (10) A private garden covering an area of slightly over 5 acres and located about 5.000 feet northeast from AZ showed no evidence of having been on fire, although there was some flash-burn damage on the edge of the area facing AZ. 24 PHOTO 3ft IX. S*tmw« partly Inirnvri cvat «»f •-> alio «ra» in of*rti near CUy Hall (BitUfttiw 38) 3.800 feci fiom AZ. 3800 feet from air zero; -27~ 3300 feet from ground zero PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD IN VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF BUILT- UPNESS O s. I 1 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 — * s / / / / / Ind Bu ustriol Idings^ ■® • Dome Buildii Stic igs . / S / / / / 1 t 1 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Probability of Fire Spreod- Percent U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY FIRE SPREAD VS. BU1LT-UPNESS HIROSHIMA, JAPAN FIGURE 4 -IT 42 130 120 110 100 90 S 80 l TO o 60 50 40 90 to 10 PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD ACROSS VARIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 Probability of Fire Spread- Percent 90 100 U. S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY FIRE SPREAD VS. EXPOSURE OSTANCES HIROSHWA, JAPAN FIGURE 5 *JX *:'. Table 5- — Fire-resistive building data (fire) 4H 411 5H 50 5H 5H 5H 511 511 5H 511 5H 5H 5H 511 5H 5U 5H AH OH 611 fill fill 6H 6H 611 6H «H 6H 5H 51 5H 5H 511 5H 5H 6H 511 51 51 51 51 51 < I 3,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2100 2,100 2,100 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,400 2.400 3,000 3,100 3.800 5,300 5,100 6,200 5.000 4,700 5,000 5,200 5,300 5,600 2,900 3,200 3,200 2,600 2,800 2,700 2,700 3,100 3.300 3,600 3,600 3.700 4.500 4,000 700 800 600 600 600 600 600 700 700 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,300 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 2,300 2400 3,300 4,900 4,700 4,800 4,600 4,200 4,600 4,800 4,900 5,300 2,100 2.500 2,500 1,700 2000 1,800 1,800 2300 2600 3,000 3,000 3,200 4,100 3,400 51 4,100 3,000 31 5,300 4,900 31 5.300 4,950 3H 5.000 4,600 3H 6,300 6,000 SO 6,200 5,900 30 6,100 5,800 4G 3,800 3,300 50 2,800 2,000 fiO 2,500 1,800 4G 2,300 1,200 5Q 2,000 400 SO 2,100 800 SO 2,600 1,700 71 7,700 7,400 5J 6,700 6,400 30 6,000 5,600 60 5,700 5.400 5J 6,200 5,900 4J 6,300 6.000 5J 6,800 6,500 Occupancy Fire shutters on wall open- ings Office do.. do Bank do... Office do... do do Bank do Office Bank Office do Bank Art museum Office Library Office Hospital Classrooms Library Classrooms-laboratories. Classrooms. Laboratory Kitchen Laboratory Office . ...do ...do , Department store Classrooms Telephone exchange Department store Bank Beer hall Hospital Office Newspaper plant Bank Office No... No- Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. No ... No... Part.. Yes.. Part.. Yes.. Part.. No... Yes.. Part.. Part.. Part.. No... No... No .... Yes.. No... No No.... No.... No... Part.. No.... No.. No_. Part Yes. Yes. No.. No.. Part. No .. Part. Part Radio station ! No... No.. No.. No.. Yes- No... Yes.. Yes- Yes.. No... Yes.. No... No... No... Yes.. No... Yes.. No... Yes- No... Residence Hospital Office Monitions storage Electrical laboratory. . . Warehouse do Telephone exchange Classrooms Warehouse Classrooms ... Clothing store Office Warehouse Cigarette manufacture. . Bank do... Warehouse Mercantile Office Yes Bank. Unprotected wall openings exposed to AZ at zero hour Part Yea Yes Yes Probably no . Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes... Yes Probably no. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes... Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes... Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes.. No Yes Yes Yes Probably no.. Probably bo.. No Yes Yes Yes Probably no.. Yes Probably no... Yes No Yes Yes Yes Probable cause of initial ignition 0 20 10 6 10 10 10 30 10 10 20 10 15 10 10 25 10 10 25 50 75 26 5 30 30 12 0 6 90 20 10 50 20 35 5 0 20 6 90 40 30 15 0 30 30 125 30 0 6 125 126 0 30 10 0 5 60 5 12 0 0 60 100 Fire spread. do do. do do Fire spread. Primary... Primary. Fire spread... Primary. Secondary. Fire spread {Primary. Fire spread... Primary.. Fire spread.... Primary .... Fire spread. No fire Fire spread. do do Secondary.. No fire Fire spread- Fire spread . No fire Fire spread. No Are Fire spread. —do .—do No fire Fire spread... No fire Fire spread ... ....do Secondary Fire spread. ... ....do —do —do —do —do Primary ....do B-2 B-3 B-3 2 3 B-3 2 3 B-3 B-5 B-4 3 2 4 B-7 B-3 2 B-5 4 B-4 B-3 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 B-4 B-3 4 B-7 B-3 3 3 3 B-3 2 7 3 B-3 B-3 2 2 B-2 4 1 B-2 1 3 2 B-3 B-3 2 2 1 2 B-2 B-l 4 3 B-2 Stories burned (after blast damage) 1-2 60% B, 100% 1-3- - 70% B, 100% 1-3. .. 1-2 1-3 1-3 1-2... 1-3 B-3 B-5 75% 1-2, 100% 3-4. 1-3 1-2— 1-4 1-7 5% 2, 100% 3 1-2 40% B, 100% 1-5... 1-4 80% B-l, 100% 2-4. None 1-2 1-2 1-3 1-3 1 None 1-2.. None.. B-3 1-4 B-7 75% B, 100% 1-3 ... 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-2 1-7 1-3. 15% B, 100% 1-3 . . None.. 1-2 1-2 Second only 50% 1-3, 90% 4 None 70% B-l, 100% 2... 1 1-2. 26% second only ... . None 1-2 B-3 1-3 1-2 1-2 None None.. None.. B-l 1-4 80% 1,100% 2-3 Areas in thousands square feet 4.2 27.3 16.6 5.7 9.0 4.9 2.5 9.8 15.8 46.4 29.9 4.5 7.3 20.4 43.3 32.8 5.4 62.0 13.4 93.4 88.6 2.8 3.7 103.3 39.5 2.0 3.0 3.8 62.6 10.4 32.0 78.9 26.4 36.1 4.3 8.0 15.3 2.9 14.7 24.5 26.7 16.2 8.3 2.2 15.9 83.4 1.7 13.2 15.9 14.4 14.2 11.5 2.9 49.5 12.4 3.0 4.3 54.6 5.1 16.2 15.0 3.0 4.8 None I 9.0 a 1 3.5 24.3 15.3 5.7 9.0 4.2 2.5 9.8 18.8 46.4 25.2 4.5 7.3 20.4 39.0 5.2 5.4 46.5 13.4 84.9 0 2.8 3.7 103.3 39.5 2.0 3.0 3.8 0 10.4 32.0 78.9 25.1 36.1 4.3 8.0 13.2 2.9 14.7 24.5 19.2 0 8.3 2.2 5.3 80.0 0 10.6 15.9 14.4 1.1 0 2.9 49.6 9.3 3.0 4.3 0 0 0 15.0 3.0 4.5 0 83 89 92 100 100 86 100 100 100 100 84 100 100 100 90 16 100 88 100 91 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 95 100 100 100 86 100 100 100 72 100 100 33 60 0 80 100 100 8 0 100 100 75 100 100 0 0 0 100 100 94 0 SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan," vol. 2 Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3 had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes. (4) It was reported that a cotton black-out curtain at an unprotected window in the east stair tower of Building 85 (3,800 feet from AZ) smoked and was scorched by radiated heat from the bomb but it did not burst into flames. All windows other than those in the stair tower were pro- tected by* closed steel-roller shutters. There was fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the second story but this was caused by electrical short circuits when debris from windows was blown into the equipment by blast. (5) A man who was in the third story of building 26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiated heat from the bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at unprotected windows in the west wall and thin rice paper on desks. According to his recollec- tion, all stories were afire five minutes after the attack. On the other hand, two men who were working in Building 28 (3,800 feet from AZ) stated that there was no primary fire in this building, the windows of which were not equipped with fire shutters. Black-out curtains at all windows were drawn back and no fires started in them. Accord- ing to the same men, fire spread into the building by flying brands from the south nearly two hours after the attack. 47 (10) Fire fighting with water buckets was re- ported inside only four buildings (24, 33, 59, and 122) and probably prevented extensive fire damage in them. In Building 24, fire was started in contents of a room at the southwest corner of the second story by sparks from trees on the south side about 1 H hours after the attack. Men inside the building extinguished the fire and probably prevented further damage in the first and second stories (Photo 85). A little later, contents in the third story were ignited by sparks from the outside and were totally damaged. This fire was beyond control before it was discovered, but did not spread downward through open stairs. At Build- ing 33, sparks from the west exposure, which burned in early evening, set fire to black-out curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in the fourth story of the northwest section of the building. Twenty persons were on guard in the building awaiting such an occurrence and the fires were quickly extinguished while in the incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks from the south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in the first and third stories and black-out curtains in the first story about 2 hours after the attack. These fires were extinguished by men inside ami negligible damage resulted. A few window frames in the east and west walls and 2 or 3 desks in the first story of Building 122 were ignited by radiated heat and sparks from the west and northeast exposures. These fires were extinguished quickly and damage was negligible. 58 A. SUMMARY 1 . The atomic bomb detonated at Hiroshima was an extremely effective and powerful blast weapon. Blast effect was essentially similar to that pro- duced by a large charge of high explosive except that it was on a much larger scale; thus, damage was characterized by distortion or crushing of entire buildings rather than collapse of a single truss or rupture of a single wall. 2* Usual blast phenomena such as shielding, re- flection, and diffraction were observed. The positive phase of the blast of the atomic bomb is believed to have been of comparatively longer duration that that of high explosives. 3. The primary cause of damage to buildings was blast. In many instances the fire which swept the central portion of the city increased distortion of the building frames, and consumed the combus- tible contents and interior trim and finish of most of the fire-resistive buildings located within the burned-over area. Blast damage to wood-frame buildings extended well beyond the limits of the burned-over area and it is probable that all wood- frame structures within the burned-over area suffered structural damage initially by blast. 4. The mean areas of effectiveness (MAE) of the atomic bomb for structural damage about ground zero (GZ) and the radii of the MAE's for the several classes of buildings present wore computed to be as follows: MAE's in square miles Radii of MAE's in feet Multistory, earthquake-resistant _ Multistory, steel- and reinforced- concrete frame (including both earthquake- and non-earthquake- resistant construction) _ 0.03 .05 3.4 3.6 6.0 8.5 9.5 6.0 500 700 1-story, light, steel-frame 5,500 Multistory, load-bearing, brick-walk. 1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall Wood-frame industrial-commercial (dimension-timber construction) Wood-frame domestic buildings (wood-pole construction) 5,700 7,300 8,700 9,200 Residential construction 7,300 Of the values listed above, those for wood-frame and residential construction are peculiar to Japan and are not applicable to any other locality. 5. MAE's for similar, high, air-burst atomic bombs against Occidental construction were esti- mated to be approximately: BfmnmOn Multistory, steel- and rein forced-concrete- a 06 Very light, steel-frame one-story, low-cost industrial and storage 3.4 Multistory, load-bearing, brick wall 3. 6 One-story, load-bearing, brick wall 6 0 MAE values against other types of Occidental construction, including moderate to heavy, steel- frame, industrial construction, could not be esti- mated because buildings of comparable construc- tion were not present in Hiroshima. 6. Fire was the principal cause of damage to contents. In multistory frame construction fire caused the major part of all contents' damage, suffering only slight to moderate initial damage from blast and debris. Contents in light, steel- frame buildings suffered moderate initial damage from blast and, subsequently, in the burned-over area, almost total damage by fire. Outside the burned-over area there was some exposure damage. Blast and debris were the major causes of damage to contents of brick buildings, additional damage resulting from fire and exposure. Throughout the burned-over area practically all contents of wood-frame buildings were destroyed by fire. Beyond the limits of the fire there was slight to moderate damage to contents from blast, debris, and exposure. 7. Except for multistory, steel- and concrete- frame buildings, contents and structural damage to buildings were generally of similar extent at corresponding distances from air zero (AZ). 8. Had the bomb detonated at a somewhat lower altitude, damage to multistory, steel- and rein- forced-concrete frame buildings which were clus- tered relatively near GZ probably would have been greater. The effect of such an explosion upon the extent of damage to other classes of buildings is uncertain, but probably would not have been great. 9. Comparison of the atomic bomb with high- explosive weapons results, at best, in very rough approximations because of the assumptions neces- sary. Based upon damage to load-bearing, brick- wall structures, an equivalent bare charge of ap- proximately 4,400 tons of TNT was estimated. 10. Because of the large area through which damage extended, particularly to load-bearing brick construction which constitutes a large pro- portion of the residential and older industrial sec- tions of occidental cities, the air-burst atomic 96 Table 1. — Building data, steel- and reinforced-concrete-frame [Areas in thousands of square feet] O Occupancy i j 1 00 > i M SB | n > 1 2 1 < s i I a o Building damage— floor area Content damage $ Structural damage Superficial damage 1 i a a 1 ft* 1 1 m hi o 1 4H 4H 3H 8H 6H 6H 3H 8H 6H 8H 5H 5H 6H 6H 3H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H 8H 31 8H 8H 8H 3H 5B 51 51 51 81 31 51 31 31 an so 40 5G 4G SO 7J 7J 7J 7J 3J 5H 3H &H 5H 511 SO 50 SO 4J 3H 3G 71 n 5K 5K Office El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 El A24 A2 4 A1.2 A1.2 A24 A1.2 1.7 8,3 5.1 5.3 2.1 4.6 10.1 8.8 1.5 5.5 4.7 5.4 10.fi 0.2 5.3 21.3 27.5 1.4 1.0 34.4 13.2 11.2 26 15.5 0.0 7.2 16.3 2.6 4.8 2.1 10.3 0.0 4.8 4.2 1.1 68 20.8 6.6 7.7 4.8 8.8 124 4.1 23.7 23.7 23.7 23.7 26 4.5 1.6 3.3 .0 1.3 1.8 1.5 22 0.0 1.7 15.0 54.6 54.0 21.1 11.6 2 2/3 3 1/3 2/3 3 5/2 4 3 1/2 4 7 3 3 2/4 4 3/4 2 2 3 3 4 3 3/4 7 3 2/3 1/3 3 7 2/3 1/3 2/3 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-3 V-3 V-3 v-s \-3 V-3 V-3 V-3 V^3 V-4 V-4 V-i V-4 V-l V-4 R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R N/R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R N R N/C R R R R N/C R R R R R R 2100 2200 2100 2100 2>0Q 2100 2200 2200 2 200 2300 2300 2300 2400 3,000 3,100 3.800 5,300 5,100 5,200 5,000 4,700 5,600 2000 2200 3,200 2600 2800 2700 3.100 2600 3,600 3,700 4.500 4.000 4,100 5.300 5.300 6,300 6,100 3.800 2800 2300 2000 8.800 8. COO 0.000 0,200 6.700 2100 3,100 2400 2800 3,300 2500 2100 2600 6,600 5,000 6,200 7,700 7,800 8,000 0.000 4.2 27.3 16.6 0.0 4.0 0.8 45.0 20.0 4.6 7.3 20.4 43.3 328 520 12 4 03.4 88.6 28 27 103.3 30.3 626 10.4 320 78,0 26.4 36.1 4.3 15.3 14.7 24.5 26.7 16.2 8.3 22 15.0 83.4 12 2 14.4 14.2 11.0 40.5 12 4 71.1 71.1 71.1 71.1 5.1 15.8 4.1 5.4 1.0 20 20 3.0 4.3 14.0 1.7 15.0 54.6 54.9 21.1 11.6 1.8 1.1 5.3 10 21 1.9 27 .1 .1.7 1.6 4.6 3 5 24.3 15.3 9.0 4.2 9.8 46,4 25.2 4.5 7.3 20.4 39.0 5.2 46.5 124 84.0 0 28 27 102 3 30.5 0 10.4 320 78,0 25.1 36.1 4.3 12 2 14.7 24.5 10.2 0 23 22 5.3 50.0 10.6 14.4 1.1 0 40.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 15.8 25 5.4 1.0 20 20 20 4.3 14.0 0 15.0 0 0 0 0 00 00 05 100 00 100 100 00 100 100 100 90 30 00 100 06 25 100 100 100 100 15 100 100 100 96 100 100 80 100 100 80 10 100 100 40 70 80 100 50 30 100 75 0 0 0 0 0 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10 100 0 0 0 0 Fire. 2 do Do. « 8 do Bank Do. Do. » Office Do. 11 do Bank Do. 18 Do. 10 do.. Office. Do. 20 Do. 21 Bank Mixed. 22 Office 21 Fire. 28 do Bank D->. 24 Mixed. 2« Office .2 Fire. 27 Library 0.8 Do. 2B Office.... Do. XI Hospital Debris. 32A Classrooms Fire. S2B Library Classroom laboratory . Classrooms Do. S2D Do. 32E Do. S3 Office Blast 'de- 38 do.- do bris. Fire. SB 4.4 Do. 40 Department store Classrooms Do. 41 Do. 48 Telephone eichange. . . Department store Beerhall ... • Do. 44 1.7 Do. 47 Do. 40 Office Do. 80 Newspaper Do. 31 Bank Office Do. 30 Blast. 01 Radio station Fire. 02 Residence Do. 64 Hospital Mixed. 65 Office Do. 74 Electrical laboratory . . . Warehouse Fire. 70 0.9 23 Do. 88 Telephone exchange. . Classrooms Mixed. 80 Debris. 08 do Clothing store 0.5 29 3.0 Fire. 08 Do. 116A Warehouse 116B use do do U6P do 122 Bank 12 Office 10 8 0.7 4.1 21 Mixed. 1A Electric substation Art museum Do. 25 as 1.0 Fire. 4si Blown in. Iti-mnrks X K S w i.v 20' No No No No Yes y« Yes Yes CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire Probably PROBABLE exposures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: elevator. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: feet. Floor area burned: lo,300 square feet. 92 |>cr- cent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire in entire building except about 30 percent of basement. spread from up stairs and 16,000 square l.VJ U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOS DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALY8IS Shkkt No. 1 Building No.: 10 Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 000, (AS): 2,100. NAME: Nippon life Insurance Co., Hiroshima brancn, CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Load-bearing brick wall. Number of stories: See drawing. JTG class: F2. Roof: Reinforced-concrete slab 6 inch (Ji-inch ban 6-inch oe by 12 inch oe). Partitions: Major, 13-inch brick, minor, plaster and wood stud. > Walls: Brick IS- and 4-inch stone trim on front. Floors: Concrete on earth-wood beams and flooring second floor. Framing: Reinforced concrete and wood framed second floor. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Unknown. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Fair con- crete not of good quality. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Life insurance company. CONTENTS: Insurance and office equipment. DAMAGE to building: Roof partially collapsed — remain- der depressed and ruptured. Walls cracked and buckled partially collapsed. Cause: Blast. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Debris and fire (about equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA: (square feet) : 2,500. Structural damage: 2,500. Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100 percent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Entire building so out of plumb and cracked as to be in a virtual state of collapse. Note. — Building damage based on total floor arcs. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No: 10. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers. Shut: Part. Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fir* doors Automatic Effect of blast Stain: Yet Metal No Blown in. Elevators: EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks N 10* No C Yea B JaV No C Yes 8 3C No R Yes Building II do' wall between), w »' No c Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posure. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 2,500. Square feet floor area burned: 2,500. Square feet: 100 per- cent (after blast damage). REMARKS: 100 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS 5H. Distance from El. Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 18. Coordinates: (GZ): 1,000, (AZ): 2,200. NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concretc frame. Number of stories: 5 and ■ .• basement. JTG class Roof: Rcinforcod-concrete slab (metal pan). Partitions: Reinforced-concrete (5-inch). Wood lath and plaster in rear addition. Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch). Floors: Reinforced-concrete slabs (metal pan construc- tion). Framing: Reinforced concrete, heavy haunches. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Consid- erably heavier in structural framing. OCCUPANCY: Bank and office. CONTENTS: Bank equipment and furnishings. DAMAGE to building: Light steel-framed roof over rear addition destroyed by blast. Portion of roof of main building depressed, beams cracked and spa I led at haunches and center of span-steel elongated. Minor damage throughout. Cause: Blast. To contents: Destroyed. Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 46,400. tural damage: 3,200. Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: 1,400 square feet of structural damage shown above was in inferior construction. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 18. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in west 'sec- tion and in north wall only of east section. Shut: Yes. Effect of blast: Most blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast Stairs: Tart Steel nil- No None— doors open lers Elevators: Yes Steel rol- No None— doors uiwii lers EXPOSURE: Firrbrcak Fin* Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remark.'* \\ 10' 2.V 20* ur 128' No No No No Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF C FIRE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Hui Mm/ 10 04-foot wall between). 14-foot concrete wall between. Fire spread from Strue- exposure. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Hour urea: 40.600 square feet. Floor area burned: 46,400 square feet; 1(K) per- cent (after blast daman*'). REMARKS: Fires in exposures soon after Iwmb. This huildinu; well afire at 1000 hours. U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 23. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 1,200; (AZ); 2,300. NAME: Fukoku Building. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Steel core reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: 7 and basement. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced -concrete beam and slab (steel core). Partitions: Reinforced concrete. Walls: Reinforced concrete, stone trim. Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Metal lath and plaster. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Compare with usual United States buildings: OCCUPANCY: First story, commercial. Remainder, office space. CONTENT8: Office equipment and furnishings, com- munication equipment second and third floor. DAMAGE to building: Long-fipan trusses supporting roof ruptured and roof depressed. Three panels of first floor slab depressed by blast. Minor damage from fire throughout building. Cause: Blast. To contents: Almost complete destruction except in i*a>e- ment. Cause: Fire (primary): some debris damage. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 43,300. Struc- tural damage: 4,000. Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: II per- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 90 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total ll«»or urea. Contents damuge is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No, 1) Building No.: 23. Fire classification: N/R (unprotected steel in roof). WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: No (wired glass in all windows). Shut: Effect of blast: All broken. FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed St lire: K levators: Yei Yrt Fire doors Metal anil W.n. MrltltmlVV.O. Auto- matic No No Effect of Must I'art Mown oft I 'art blown nil Iti'tnarks HuiMiiiK T2. EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Huron) N 10* No It Yes K lOfT Yes C Yes S 3V No C Y«U W 125' Yea r Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determine*!. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably up stairs, eleva- tor and pipe shaft. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 13,300 square feet. Floor area burned: 39,000 square feet ; \H) |s*ree?it (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire throughout building exeepi in basement. £ Ullllll ff-BIIII| III III III III III III III III III III III III '2 14 US STRATEGY BOMBNG SURVEY BUILDING 23 HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H FIGURE 23-XA U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOK DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS SHEET NO. 1 Building No.: 24. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400. NAME: Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DE8IGN Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame (steel core). Number of Stories: 3 and basement. JTG class: El. Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath. Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch) and stone (6-inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal (exterior) wood (in- terior). Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Much stronger — steel core construction. OCCUPANCY: Bank. CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishings. DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage — top story burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two lower stories. Cause: Fire. To Contents: Destroyed in third story— moderate debris and blast damage in first and second stories, none in basement. Cause: Fire and debris (about equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 32,800. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial: — . Contents: 30 percent, REMARKS: Glass removed from skylight (20 by 20 feet) and light steel-frame structure and roof covered with 12 to 18 inches of sand and cinders. Note. — Building damage based on total floor ana. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 24. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: 8teel rollers. 8hut: Part. Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS: Stalra: Tart Steel rollers 1 ^Jo Ncoe — doors o|>en. Elevators: Yes Metal and W, O. No Bent. EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Locution Distenc* Clearance Class Ruined Remarks N 25' No C Yes 14-foot concrete wall be- tween. E 25' No R Yes nuii'iinr.v.' u-fooi wall between). S - No — No exposure. W 123' Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from cx- l>osures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 32,800 square feet. Floor area burned: 5.200 square feef; 16 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of second story and in entire third story. No fire in building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours. Fire in room in second story extinguished with water buckets. 217 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 26. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 2,300, (AZ): 3,000. NAME: Chugoku Electric Co. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Nuraher of stories: 5 and basement and penthouse JTG class: El. Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: Reinforced concrete (6-inch). Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch). Floors: Reinforced-concrete slab, parquet wood surface 3, 4, 5, and 6 floors. Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Condition, workmanship, and materials; Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Office. CONTENTS: Office equipment and furnishings. DAMAGE to building: One roof slab and girder cracked by blast. Minor damage throughout from blast and fire. Cause : Blast : To contents: Severe damage, except in west section of basement and a portion of east section of basement. Cause: Fire 75 percent. Blast and debris 15 percent. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 52,000. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 220. FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural: — . Superficial: 0.25 percent. Contents: 90 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No. : 26. Fire classification : R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north wall of west section only. Shut: Part. Effect of blast : Most blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doors Autonmilc Effectorbla.it Stain: No Elevators: Yes No EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fin' Location Distance Clearance Clana Burned Remark* N 60' Yes c Yes E 35' No (• Ye.-* se iw No (' Ye? 8 W No R Yea Building 27. W IW Yen c Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct heat radiation from Iwunb. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly upstairs and pipe shaft. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area : 52,000 square feet. Floor area burned: 46,500 square feet; 88 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in tiO per- cent of basement (no fire in basement of west section and about 25 percent of east section). Man who was in third story stated that he saw cotton blackout curtains in west wall and thin paper on desks catch fire from flash of bomb. Fire was reported to have been in all stories 5 minutes after bomb. 222 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAQE DIVISION Field Train No. 1, Him.- hi ma, .Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No. : 28. Coordinate*: 6H. Distance from (GZ) : 3,300, (AZ): 3,800. NAME: Hiroshima City Hall. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish. Number of stories: Four and basement. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish. Partitions: Reinforced concrete (5-iuch) and tile, wood wainscoats in stair halls. Walls: Reinforced concrete (10- inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete, cement finish. Framing; Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Office. CONTENTS: Furnishings and equipment for office and city administration. DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only — sash blown out, trim and finish destroyed by fire. Few tile par- titions blown out. Cause: Fire and blast. To contents: Severely damaged. Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 93,400. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial: — . Contents: 75-100 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sueet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Builiing No. 28. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Kiuli. m-(1 KirtMloorfl Automatic Effect of bla*l Stain: No Elevators: XPOSURE Firebreak Fire I-ocation Distance Clearance Clow 111] rin er- cent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire in entire building except of 20 percent of basement and first story at oast end of east section (transverse partitions were noncombustible without openings and there were no combustible construction materials and contents in the corridors at the north wall. Two men who were in building at time of bomb stated that fire spread in from south exposure by flying embers at 1000 hours. Fire started first in the third story. Ixjwer stories may have been ignited later directly by exposure fires. 2-21) U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHY8ICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 33. Coordinates: 6H. Distance from (OZ): 5,300, (AZ): 6,600. NAME: Hiroshima Postal Savings Bureau. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: 4 and basement. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish. Partitions: Reinforced concrete. Walls: Reinforced concrete, tile finish. Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal, wood (interior). Ceil- ings: Plaster on wood lath — top story. Plaster on con- crete— others. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Much stronger. OCCUPANCY: Office. CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment. DAMAGE to building: Minor — glass blown out. some sash deformed. Hung ceiling in top story 75 percent collapsed. Cause: Blast. To contents: Slight damage to furnishings and other con- tents from blast and debris. Cause: Blast and debris. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 62,600. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural: Superficial: . Contents: 15 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1 ) Building No.: 33. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north and east walls only of northeast section. Shut: Few only. Effect of blast: Bent inward slightly. FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doors Automatic KlT.it of bbst Stairs: Yea Mela) No Fart blown off. Elevators: Yes Metal No Him* ii off. EXPOSURE Flrtbrrak Kin- Location Distance Clearance Class Humci! Remarks NW 150* Yes C Yes K yn' Yes C Yes s I.W Yea C Yrs \Y IHf Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from west exposure. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: None. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: r>2.(K)0 square feet. Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Sparks from west exjM»sure ignited cotton black-out curtains in west wall at 2000 hours and waste paper in fourth story of northwest section at 2100 hours. Fires were extinguished with water buckets by 20 tin* guards who were stationed inside. Kire damage to contents was negligible. Paper records stored in wood and steel racks in northeast section of building were exposed to direct radiated heat from bomb but did r.«>t catch fire. 260 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALY8IS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 40. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 2,500, (AZ): 3,200. NAME: Fukuva Department Store. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN: Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories : 7 and baBement and one-half of eighth. JTG class: El. Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and -lab (steel trusses over theater). Partitions: Metal lath and plaster. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — large windows. Floors: Wood over reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced concrete (or protected steel). Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger than comparable United States buildings. OCCUPANCY: Department store. CONTENTS: Merchandise on display for sale. DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout — sash blown out; finish and trim, including floors, burned out. Steel trusses supporting roof over theatre show slight defor- mation. Cause: Mixed. To contents: Destroyed. Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet \ : 78.9(H). St ructural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial: — . Contents: 90-100 percent. UK MARKS: Note.— Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 40. Fire classification: R (north roof on west section). WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doom Automatic Effect of blast Stairs; Part Metal No Blown In or bent. Elevators: Yea Metal No Blown in or bent. EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Has* Burnett N B 8 W 180' INI' aw No Yes Yes Yea Yes Yea Ye* Yes Remarks Building :ttt Building 3*. Direct radiated head PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: from bomb. VERTICAL FIRE 8PREAD: Probably. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 78,900 square feet. Floor area burned: 78,900 square feet ; 100 percent (after blast damage) . REMARKS: Three persons who were questioned indi- vidually stated that this building was afire immediately or within 20 minutes after the bomb. One man who was in the building at the time stated that cotton blackout curtains in the west wall were smouldering immediately after the bomb. The entire building was afire at 1000 hours. U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 285 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team N'o. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 47. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 2.300, (AZ): 3,100. NAME: Hiroshima Kirin Beer Hall. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class* El. Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: 5-inch reinforced concrete. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete integral — large windows. Floors: 5-inch reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings. Con- siderably stronger than United States design. OCCUPANCY: Beer hall. CONTENTS: Bars, tables, etc. DAMAGE to building: Minor — sash blown out, finish and trim partly destroyed by fire. Cause: Mixed. To contents: Moderate damage from both blast (throwing furnishings around) and fire. Cause: Mixed. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 15,300. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial — . Contents: 60-80 percent. REMARKS: Building and contents contained so few combustibles that internal fire was not of great in- tensity. Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Budding No.: 47. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blunt Stairs: Part Metal and glass No Bent. Elevators: Yes Metal and glass No Blown off. EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned itcmark* X _ Yes — No oi|x>?uir«'. E TW No C Yes S — Yes — No exposure. W 64' Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 15,300 square feet. Floor area burned: 13,200 square feet; 80 |HTcent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Man who woiked in building but was not on premises at time of bomb stated that fire spread into building from east exposure about one hour aftei bomb. Entire building had fire in it except basement. Combustibility of contents was low and very little damage was done to building by tire. psfBifiti; ,w» U. 3. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL D A U AOE DIVISION Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 4H Coordinate*: 51. Distance from (GZ): 3,000, (AZ): 8,600. Name: ChOgoku Newspaper. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforeed-concrete frame. Number of 8tories: 7 and penthouse. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforeed-concrete beam and slab. Partlt ions: Reinforced concrete— lath and plaster. Walk: 7-inch reinforced concrete — large windows. Floors: 6-inch reinforeed-concrete beam and slab — small put wood overlay. Framing: Reinforced concrete (on steel frame). Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably heavier than United States. OCCUPANCY: Newspaper office — used in conjunction with Building 50. . CONTENTS: Office equipment and supplies. DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout; sash blown in, finish and trim destroyed by internal fire. Cause: Fire. To contents: Complete destruction. Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 14,700. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Contents' damage based upon interrogation as all debris was removed. Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 49. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers at first to third stories of west wall only. Shut: Part. Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS: Endow* 1 Fir* doors Automatic Effect of blast Stabs: Yes No No Elevators: Yes Metal Part blown In. EXPOSURE Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burmil Remarks N IW Yes C Yes Bud 8 V No R Yes Building 90 (unpro- tected openings). s IK.V Yes C Yes 1.10 fret beyond Build- ing SO. w DO* Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct radiated heal from bomb. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 14,700 square feet. Floor area burned: 14,700 square feet; 100 per- cent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Man who was in building at lime of bomb stated fire broke out in third and fourth stories immedi- ately after bomb flash. Head bookkeeper in bank in Building 51 stated thai then* was fire in third story of Building 49, 10 minutes after bomb flash. 312 U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOI DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 52. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (GZ): 2,800, (AZ): 3,400. NAME: Taiyo Theater. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: light steel frame. Number of stories: — . JTG class: Roof: Partitions: Walls: Floors: Framing: Window and door frames: — . Ceilings: Condition, workmanship, and materials: Compare with usual United States buildings: OCCUPANCY: CONTENT8: DAMAGE to building: Completely destroyed. Cause: Mixed. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Mixed. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): Unknown. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial: — . Contents: — percent. REMARKS: Mixed construction. Damage too severe to permit analysis of cause of damage or design of st picture. Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage if fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 52. Fire classification: C. WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of hhut Stain: Elevators: EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks N C No C Yes E IW Yes R Yes 8 0* No C Yes Buildings 40 and SO. W W No C Yea PROBABLE CAU8E OF FIRE: Not determined. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor ares: — square feet. Floor area burned: — square feet; 100 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: This building was excluded from both blast and fire studies. 321 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PSY8ICAL DAMAOE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 59. Coordinate!): 51. Distance from (GZ): 4t100, (AZ): 4,500. NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch (in use at time of bomb as the Higashi Police Station). CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: See sketch. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: 7-ineh reinforced concrete. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete monolithic— medium window. Floors: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab— parquet and tile. Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Sheet metal on wood framing. Condition, workmanship and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Appreci- ably stronger than United StPtes design. OCCUPANCY: Police station (office). CONTENTS: Office equipment. DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only— sash blown out and hung ceilings partially stripped. Cause: Blast. To contents: Slight damage to contents from !»ln>t and debris. Cause: Blast. TOTAL FLOOR AREA 'square feet): 16,200. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building. Structural: — . Superficial: Contents: 10 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based cm total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Effect la5i Bent slightly. ):• rii ,; ». Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 59. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: Steel rollers in east wall and third story of south and west walls (wired glass in all windows). Effect of blast: Blown in at west wall, bent at south wall. FLOOR OPENINGS: Auto Enclose*! Fire doors nmtlr Stairs: Yes Metal No Elevaton : EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance (Muss Burned N \bOT Yes C Yea E 6C Yes C Yes S W Partial C Yes 100' W 6C Yes C Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Moor ana: 10,200 square feet. Flooi area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Sparks from south exposure ignited fru pieces of furniture in first and third stories and col ton blackout curtains in first story about 1030 hours. Fires weie extinguished with water buckets by people inside. Negligible lire danni^e resulted. Some of exposing buildings had just lx*en removed prior to the bomb. All e\[»osiirr5 liumcd :U1 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION* Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No* 1 Building No.: 61. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (OZ): 3.400, (AZ): 4,000. NAME: Hiroshima Radio Station: CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame. Number of ator.es: 2. JTO class: El. Roof: Reinforeed-coiierete beam and slab. Partitions: 4-inch reinforced concrete H-9 inches O. C. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — moderate openings. Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced-eoncrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Unknown. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Poor, con- crete poor, reinforcement exposed in many places, form work poor. Compare with usual United States buildings: Some- what heavier than United States design. OCCUPANCY: Broadcasting studio. CONTENTS: DAMAGE to building: Small panel of fir*t floor depressed 4 to 6 inches in front of door. Two non-load-bcaring partitions blown out. Minor damage throughout. Sash blown out. trim and finish burned out. Cause: Blaxt. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Fire (may have been some debris damage). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 8,300. Structural damage: — . Superficial damage: - . FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Water pipes in second floor ruptured at one point. General condition and construction of building was very poor. Note.— Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 61. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Fire door* A u torn* tic Effect of blast Stairs: N'o Elevators: EXPOSURE: P ire break Eire location Distance Clearance Class Burned Kemarlis N E 8 W Off l.V Iff Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 8.300 square feet. Floor area burned 8.300 square feet; 100 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Some of exposing buildings wort- just being removed at time of bomb. :*47 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 80. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from (GZ): 2,000, (AZ): 2,800. NAME: Kftko Private Grammar School. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced concrete. Number of stories: Three. J TG class: El. Roof: Reinforeed-concrete slab. Partitions: 9-inch brick and 6-inch reinforced concrete. Walls: Reinforced concrete (8-10 inches). Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Wood lath and plaster. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Compare with usual united States buildings: Stronger and heavier. OCCUPANCY: School. CONTENTS: Classroom furnishings, equipment, and office furnishings. DAMAGE to building: One roof girder cracked, 9-inch brick partition in first story fractured at ceiling, hung ceiling destroyed. All sash blown out, floors and trim damaged. Outside toilet at west end of building coi- ls need. Cause: Blast. To contents: Furnishings and other contents cut by glass and debris and broken by tumbling around by blast. Cause: Blast and debris {about equally). TOTAL FLOOR A REA (square feet) : 1 1 ,500. St rucl •ml damage: 500. $ui>erficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 jsr- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 20 40 percent. REMARKS: Lean-to toilet in which all structural damage occurred, was of weaker construction than rest of building. Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damn god. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 86. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Stain: Elevators: Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast Yas No EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire f .oral Inn Distance rimmnn< Clam Iturmfi Remarks X 125' Yes C Yes E ISC* Yes C Yes Illaiik wall t\ivpt flro escB|a? exits, S lay Yes C Yes W 12*' Yes V Yes Blank wall. PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: No lire. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 1 1 ,500 square feet. Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blent damage) . REMARKS: Extended east-west axis of building would pass approximately through zero point. Kn-r wall, which faced zero point whs blank except for exit at each story to fire escape. If doors at lire c»ca|»c were closed at time of bomb, probably the interior of tin' building was shielded from direct radiated heal from tin' bomb 42G U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. I Building No.: 87- A. Coordinate*. 7F. Distance from (GZ): 8.000, (AZ): 8,200. NAME: Funairi Grammar School. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Wood frame. Number of stories: Two. JTG clam: E2. Roof: Asbestos cement on wood trass™ and wood sheathing. Partitions: Wood. Walls: Wood lath and plaster with wood exterior. Floors: Wood over wood framing. Framing: Wood. Window and door frame*: Wood. Ceiling*: Wood. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good, but design rather poor. Compare with usual United States buildings: Weaker because of very slender columns and |>oor joints. OCCUPANCY: Classrooms. CONTENTS: Classroom furnishing and equipment. DAMAGE to building: Entire building on verge of collapse, and one wing completely collapsed. Walls and columns facing blast buckled and building displaced away from blast. Cause: Blast. To contents: Most of contents were severely damaged by debris and by lieing overturned and blown nltoui by blast. Cause: Rlast and debris (abuui equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3S.400. Struc- tural damage: 3K.400. Su|>crficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100 percent. Siqicrncial: Content*: 50 percent. REMARKS: Fire walls were of reinforced concrete. Note. Building damage I«mnI on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 87-B. Coordinates: 7F. Distance from (GZ): 8,000, (AZ): 8,200. NAME: Funairi Grammar School. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Light steel frame. Number of stories: One. JTG class:- A2 2. Roof: Asbestos shingles over wood-sheathing and purlins. Partitions: None. Walls: Plaster on wood lath with wood exterior sheathing. Floors: \Vood over wood l>eams on concrete |>ost8. Framing: Light steel- trussed arch. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: None. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Slightly lighter design but generally comparable. OCCUPANCY: School auditorium. CONTENTS: Lectern, benches, tables, teaching aid*. DAMAGE to building: Roof trusses slightly deformed but probably will be used in place. Most of rooting strip|Mfl or displaced. Wall facing blast blown in. Cause: lilitst. To contents: Slight damage and that primarily due to ex|M>sure. Cause: Exposure. TOTAL FLOOR AREA i square feet): 4.0110. Structural damage: Superficial damage: l.'.HMI. FRACTION OK DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial: 100 percent. Contents: 10 percent. REMARKS: NirrK. Ruilding damage ba-ed on total tloorarea. Con- tents damage is fraction of it m t nits »erioii»1y damaged. 43!) U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS SllKKT No. 1 Building No.: 95. Coordinates: 4G. Distance from (GZ): 1,200, (AZ): 2,300. NAME: Honkawa Grammar School. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced concrete. Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class El. Roof: Reinforced concrete, cement finish. Partitions: Reinforced concrete (7-inch). Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Stronger. OCCUPANCY: School classrooms. CONTENTS: School furnishings and equipment. DAMAGE to building: Panel walls facing blast buckled. One roof girder structurally damaged and slab de- pressed. About 15 percent of roof slabs cracked and beams cracked with some spalling but usable in place. All finish, floors and trim burned out, sash and doors blown out. Cause: Blast. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Fire (primary) may have been some debris damage. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 19,500. Struc- tural damage: 500. Superficial damage: 3,000. FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 i*t- cent. Superficial: (i percent. Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building i lunume based on tot al Hour area, f 'on- tents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 95. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Stairs: I'url Elevators: Fire doors Automatic Effect of hliuit No EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Locution Distune* N li.V E S 30' Clearance Class Rurneri Kfiunrks Yes C No — - No i>\|Misurr. I'artiul ISO' C Yes All e\|K>M]re<> burned PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 49,500 square feet. Floor area burned: 49,500 square feet: 100 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: 4.-.C. U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAC1E DIVISION' Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 90. Coordinates: G5. Distance from (GZ): 400 (AZ): 2,000. NAME: Taisho Clothing Store. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced concrete. Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced-concrete slabs, cement finish. Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood. Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch), brick panels on first floor. Floors: Reinforced concrete (wood finish on sleepers, second floor). Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Conditions, workmanship, and material*: Fair. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderable stronger (larger structural members). OCCUPANCY: Mercantile. CONTENTS: Merchandise for sale DAMAGE to building: All roof slabs depressed, fractur- ing beams and girders and Bt retching steel. Panel in east wall buckled, girders in second floor rear cracked and spalled. Ninety percent of parapet demolished. All sash aud doors blown out. Finish and trim burned out. No fire in basement. Cause: Blast. To contents: Completely destroyed, except in basement Cause: Fire (primary cause probably some debris damage) . TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 12.400. Structural damage: 3,000. Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 31 per- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 7"» percent. REMARKS: Note.— Building damage based on total floor area Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. ty ¥ Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Buildiug No.: 96. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut: Effect of blast : FLOOR OPENINGS: Enclosed Ktre doors Automatic Effect of blast Stairs: No Elevators: EXPOSURE: Firebreak Fire Ijocattun Distuncv rieunuice (llass Ilurmil fti-muiks N 35' No C Yes E 10' No C Yes •S Ifr* No V Yes \V ISO* Yrs C Yes PROBABLE (Al'SE OF FIRE: Not determined. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 12.4(H) square feet. Floor area burned: 0.300 square feet ; 7") percent (after. blast damage). REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in basement SECTION "A-A" U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY BUILDING 9 6 HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H FIGURE 100 -X A •n;o U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team Xo. 1. Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building N8.: 100. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from (GZ): 800, (AZ): 2,100. NAME: Nippon Simple Fire Insurance Co. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforoed-concrete frame. Number of Btories: 2. JTG class: E2. Hoof: Reinforoed-concrete slab and beams. Partitions: None. Walls: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish. Floors: Reinforoed-concrete slab, cement finish. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Com- parable. OCCUPANCY: Office. CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment. DAM AGE to building: One roof girder cracked and s palled. Sash anl doors blown out or deformed. Trim and finish damaged by fire. Cause: Blast. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Fire (probably appreciable blast awl debris damage). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3,000. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 80. FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial: 3 percent. Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Note. — Building damage based on total floor ami, Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged. Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 100. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: No. Shut: Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS : Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast Stairs: No Elevators: EXPOSURE '■'• Firebreak Flrr Locution Distance Clearance Class Burned Kctiiurko N <>' No C Yea Door blown otT< E I.V No C Yes S 40' No C Yes w ()' No C Yes Mliink wall. PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 3,000 square feet. Floor area burned: 3,000 square feet 100 percent (after blast damage). REMARKS: East wall which faced zero point was blank and it is believed the interior of the building was shielded from direct radiated heat from the bomb. 474 U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS Sheet No. 1 Building No.: 122. Coordinate)!: 5J. Distance from (OZ): 6,400, (AZ): 6,700. NAME: Sumitomo Bank Co., Higashi Matsurara Branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Protected steel frame. Number of stories: 2. J TO class: EI. Roof: Relnforced-conerete slab on steel beams. Partitions: Plaster on metal lath. Walls: Brick panel— 13-inch. Floors: Rein forced-concrete slab and beams. Framing: Steel — protected. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United Slates buildings: Slightly heavier. OCCUPANCY: Bank with offices on second floor. CONTENTS: Office and banking equipment. DAMAGE to building: Glass blown out, few shutters facing blast deformed. Cause: Blast. To contents: None. Cause: TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 5,100. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: -. Superficial: — . Contents: REMARKS: Note. — Building damage Imsed on total Hour area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously ilatnnu* £ 5*\ Vvkr/^ *\S\\ '■ *i-^ >- 111 > ce 3 Z u (3 o 7 V m _j ur o 3 UJ i u. V"V '«C'-'I ---• z g < i luf J- 3 £^ O 2 2 or UJ ■D k • 05 > 3 7. « O C/1 I O o UJ z o ►- CD cr t- Q s < -> < 5 T tit t- U. to UJ 1 o or I u. ?s« w 'W^.MSA H2?hff * jf\ 1 f V *? * ,» f !\ HIROSHIMA AOA038738 Secondary Fires Secondary fives are those that result from airblast damage, their causes include overturned gas appliances, broken gas lines, and elec- trical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied secondary fires resulting fro* the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and compared their results with data from conventional bond- ings, explosive disasters* earthquakes* and tornadoes. Their major con* elusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overall average fre- quency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided air- blast peak overpressure is at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures. Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings. —a—— — ^ ^M»i^ m-^-*mm a— | | || DH^HIH Ilia lu»— — ■ < Hi » — — ^— — ■ — — — * IQ t^ PO ^ •% •% 00 88 CM C* -P U 0 & (D CO PQ CO CO CO ■H TJ H ■H 3 «S g ■H CO 0 H ■H K 1 si O istai rein -5 00 e 6 3 0 .g ^5 08 •^^ 08 3 rthq teel- I 08 OQ •* fc & © O o £ ^^ «4n^ .a .a c +j <+^ fM| ^— «# o 3 3 o ss I .24 oS 9 O4 .3 « 08 G 2 c •a "§ d 08 . 00 ^ © 08 «* 2. d O* 08 .3 -•* 3 oo ** *oo i i ■3 .Ad •e is oo o8 11 ..5 ; l © • a> a a. 2 a .•3 2 o © .* 00 •fig-8 s 1 © 0 I TS 08 £3 »S OS* ^ » c bS a 1 S3 OFFICE OF THE AIR SURGEON NP-3041 MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS The Report of the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI By Ashley W. Oughterson Henry L. Barnett George V. LeRoy Jack D. Rosenbaum Averill A. Liebow B. Aubrey Schneider E. Cuyler Hammond July 6, 1951 [TIS Issuance Date] Army Institute of Pathology UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, Tennessee Thi» document contain! information affect- ing the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Eipionage Act, 50 U. S. C. ?l and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. RESTRICTED Of E o UJ O z < en o AIHVIHOW 100 90 80 -70 z LJ O g 60 Q. CO o 50 > to 40 30 20 10 0 HIROSHIMA DASA1271 ALL EFFECTS DOCUMENT NP-3041 VOL TZT BUILDING DESIGNATION NO. INDIVIDUALS EXPOSED POST OFFICE 400 TELEGRAPH OFFICE 301 TELEPHONE OFFICE 474 CITY HALL 216 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 682 BRANCH POST OFFICE 346 RO. SAVINGS OFFICE 750 _J 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO 2.0 2.5 dc-p-1060 NONSEISMIC REINFORCED- CONCRETE BUILDINGS 100 i HIROSHIMA 4 6 BLAST EFFECTS 20 OVERPRESSURE (psi) 40 o _ « r2 h X <» £ +j CO .C i boo, °o • ■•-• >>S JS « 2 J co Ph < !Z •a o 3.2 •2 c co n Jh 3 0) 3) C cd CO « . u J? *3 c c o P O rH > tn » « a, Q ■ ■ . . w 60 MEMORANDUM RM-3079-PR 1963 403 337 DISASTER AND RECOVERY: A HISTORICAL SURVEY Jack Hirshleifer PREPARED FOR: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND MilD. *7& rvTl I I L7$M^*f *- X c o a> a E *— * 0) <— ^ D O u "55 0 O) a 40 40 • BB c • BB ■D £ • ■■■■ 0 c • BB C D £ "D 0) 40 ;£ > _C O O • ^H CN E ^ _C c >s • BB D E ^ 40 o E u 40 5= C o r^ D O c o >* > E E o BB 40 -5 o • BB 0) a "D a -Q • BB E ■"■ 40 V> a o u *0 o CO D) c • BB D 0) o ■D c ■— C o c o 0 "55 a > D) c ^^B ^^B • BB 10 0 ^ •fc t^z "™" D • BB c • BB E -Q ,^ S o E O c • BB 3 to o • c o • o a> "3 > < 5 D a 0) O a o -Q o "O 4) *- en o m - 5 O D <3^ CO $ 5 o o o <2 c c C CO CO Q_ < 0 O en "5> J2 O 3 > Q> ■D o s O o ^B o GO o o <0 O m o o o CVJ jj liU9UJaoD|ds!a |D|oi 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 25 20 = 15 2 10 £ 9 s 5 8 a. 2.5 1.5 \ H- ! T— 1 1 — T " 1 — T" 1 — T " I — i — T r- i I I I I nr 1 v rean overpres- ireaK dynamic iyi aximum wma - sure (nttunds ver treasure (vounds velocity (miles \ i square inch) per square inch) per hour) \ 72 80 1,170 50 40 940 30 16 670 20 8 470 10 2 290 ; a 2 ~ 0. i 1 1UU 70 | 1 — ■i~: cili oto n sur face 1 >ur St \ — , — ,, — lt, — V — — ~ — ■ — . — FREE (BASH AIR Id on JURS 2W A ssu 4PT ION > V 1 1 \" \ \ 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.3 0.4 0,5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (MILES) Scaling. For yields other than 1 KT, the range to which a given overpressure extends scales as the cube root of the yield 1000 100 - «/> LU Q£ Q£ LU > o < 100 1000 1/3- 1 0,000 DISTANCE, FEET FOR 1 KT (SCALED BY YIELD ' w) WT-1469 and DASA-1777 AD638342 TEST (BOTH ON 700 FT TOWERS) 37 KT PRISCILLA GROUND RANGE 5320 FT 44 KT SMOKY 3406 FT Static pressure Dynamic pressure Prone dummy Upright dummy 5.3 psi 0.7 psi 0 21.9 ft Movement u'Ci PRECURSOR 255.7ft PRECURSOR Prone dummy Upright dummy Velocity 0 21.4 ft/sec max. at 0.45 sec Prone dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA Upright dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA 165 lb dummy lying prone at 5.3 psi overpressure from Priscilla was unmoved, but standing dummy was translated 13 ft in air and then rolled for 9 ft. 5 6 7 8 DISPLACEMENT, FT O (/> 01 UJ £ a: o a. u- m O < a) m i H O o s *i-t +-> CO t-t d) i a) f— I o CO is<$ -amssaaj c r o 99 98 95 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 5t- 2 I 10 I I llll Kg? Impact with concrete \\zu 53 Human Free- Fall Cases Number of cases li o - LDfco54.4ft/sec DNA-2738T (AD734208) » llll I? II 20 40 70 100 Impact Velocity , ft/sec o o O oooooo o o O (^ 00 S (0 in ^ rO O oas/w • (iffi!)oz «A^po|aA |dwu| pa|D0S 9/iv S9I ' ■ fO O O CVJ O ro O ^ O * o m 3 -9 o ^~ o IT) <£ E CO ^ o < o 1 0.1 T 1 — I I I I I 1.885 1 i i — i i i i i 50% BREAKAGE Source: DNA-5593T ( AD Al 05824), H 1980, Fig. 3 PG = Plate glass SG = Sheet glass k 1 PSI = 6.9 kPa (Single strength) Windows are face-on to blast wave i i i i i i i ■ i i ■ i 0.3 1 10 PEAK INCIDENT OVERPRESSURE (kPa) AECU-3350 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS By I- Gerald Bowen Donald R. Richmond Mead B. Wetherbe Clayton S* White Table 5, 1 Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data for Missiles from Traps at Various Ranges from Ground Zero 30 kt TEAPOT-APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955 Distance from Ground Zero, ft Maximum overpressure, psi Number ot traps Total number of glass missiles Geometric mean missiles mass, gms Standard geometric deviation in mass Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec Standard geometric deviation in velocity Per cent of total missiles expected to penetrate A verage number of missiles per sq ft Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate 4,700 5,500 10,500 5,0 3,8 1.9 6 2 5 2129 320 37 0. 133 0.580 1.25 3. 01 3.47 3,35 170 168 103 1,27 1,25 1.25 3,9* 12,8* 0.4* 100.9 45.5 2. 1 3,9* 5,3* 0. 006* ^Computed from individual evaluation of each missile AD Al 05824 DNA5593T GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS BROKEN BY AIRBLAST E. Royce Fletcher Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki. 3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1m behind the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave: 10 fragments /ver for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure 100 fragments/m2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure 1,000 fragments /m^ for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure Figure 10 10 0) c u 5 - i -I -I -l ^ - 4 K) -0 EFFECTIVE PEAK OVERPRESSURE ON THE WINDOW, kPe all -cotton tee shirt (145 gm/nr) cotton-sateen material (285 gm/m*) s/ui '(%OS)A 'AiinrNI %0S ilOd Q3Q33N A1I0O13A O rN - o ai i I — 8. O 0J C w ■ — 1 5 o 00 o i£ TO TO £ ^ E The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1964) GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY Probability of penetration (percent) Mass of glass fragments (grams) 0. 1 1.0 50 99 Impact velocity (ftfsec) 235 410 730 140 245 430 GLASS Peak overpressure (psi) 1.9 5.0 Median velocity (ftfsec) 108 170 Median mass (grams) 1.45 0. 13 Maximum number per sqft 4.3 388 M 2»000 Cm ffl O « H-l W a 1,000 Peak o 0 1,000 2,000 DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET) overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst E. R. Fletcher, et al., "Airblast Effects on Windows in Buildings and Automobiles on the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 1 1 tons of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,210 ft (0.54 psi incident, 1.1 psi reflected, 0.158 sec) 1000 500 : — i — ( — i i | i 1 1 1| — i — | — i — r] i ni| — i — \ — i — r o 200 «» If* *•>■*. ^» *^ 100 > m >- »— 50 O O UJ o 20 10 TTT rr • I ' ,,,1 Curves indicate the probability af a fragments penetrating 1 cm of soft tissue. Glass Fragments trapped from approximately 1/4 -inch' thick panes at a ground rarge of 1210 ft Vgo : 52/ ft/sec 2 - Regression Line: In V* 4 464-0244 In M SEE.: 0.431 In Units Number of Fragments IT€ Symbol Cubical Pones 1 Mill 1 J L- J 1111 1 a O G J L 81 82 S3 Pf and P2 PI and P2 PI and P2 i i 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 0.1 0.2 0.5 2 5 10 20 50 FRAGMENT MASS, M, gm 100 200 500 1000 1000 L I 500 ^ 200 ^ 100 o o 50 > 20 h- UJ 3E 101— 200 >- h- O o — 1 100 UJ :> i- z UJ 50 2 o •^ or 20 t — r i ' ' u i — > — i — > — • — r Curves indicate the probability of a fragment's penetrating t cm or soft tissue r m t T T | \ i i r. Glass Fragments trapped from approximately 1/4 - inch-__ thick pones at a ground range of 1700 ft Symbol Cubical Panes B5 B€ B7 PiondP2 PlandP2 PI ondP2 (0 0.1 Mso:747gm Vx :3B4 ft/sec 1 Regression Line: lnV= 4 125-0.237 In M SEE: 0579 In Units N umber of Fragments: 30 JL. J I mm 02 0.5 2 5 10 FRAGMENT MASS, M,gm 20 50 100 1000 c — I — p I I f ' "M i i i t i r Gtoss Frogments Hepped from opproKimofrff f/B-mdt- thick pom* eta ground range of 1700 ft Symbol Cubical fjme O B€ P3 ♦ B€ P4 500 > 200 o ut > or 1 00 50 20 JO 1 1 TTTJ T Curves indicoto tho probability <>1 o fragment's panatroting t em of soft tissua. Regression Una: in V* 4.205 -0.248 In M SEE.: 0.391 In Units Number of Fragments: 72 ft/sac J_± I I ' i i i ' ' I ■ « 1 i i i il i I i 1,1 ■ Il.lt 1 — I 1 — I I 1.1 1 l. 001 002 0.05 01 0 2 0 5 I 2 FRAGMENT MASS, M, 9m 10 20 50 100 Report to the Test Director WT-1468 SECONDARY MISSILES GENERATED BY NUCLEAR-PRODUCED BLAST WAVES «• A 40-ft concrete-block wall was built 2750 ft from GZ on shot Galileo, 11 kt 1?-.V>'urV-- v > '■.»;:^ uL - ,-. - Concrete -block wall (64 in. high, 40 ft long, and 7.5 in. thick) broad side of the wall was oriented toward GZ. Photograph illustrating the scatter of blocks from the wall 8.4 psi peak overpressure — -100 1528 fragments from concrete wall Numbers indicate fragments in IOOft2Area Galileo, 11 kt -50 50 .z •■ .> J •x .■ M50 = 1.366 lbs psi peak overpressure -100 ■50 50 100 150 200 Spatial distribution of all fragments with masses over 0.1 lb from the concrete -block wall. CO I- ui Ul GO U. O co o CO _£ o o o o o 10 » c E ^ o o O E o» 1 o o CM J_I_L 1 1 o o o 10 o CM 10 X ai T> cr> -O a> O GO O o> T3 C 10 o> O 0 0> H 0 0) a> GO -J P ■0 a> O 0 CO 0 0 0. m CO O Q O a> ro c a> O CVJ 6 o> 0 O ii 10 o a> 0. y ,Xp *90UD4S!Q piHMUMOQ en ffj r* o* B«i 0) U 3 o in a* u § s (4 ■♦-» 0) O o a 4 a o u 6 O O ORNL-TM-3396 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson, R. L. French, F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. Straker Table 8. Fission-Product Gamma Ray Exposure During the First 60 Seconds from a Typical TN Weapon at a 100-M Burst Height Slant Range Shock Arrival Percent Before Percent After (m) (sec) Shock Shock 100 KT 538 0.3678 13.8 86.2 740 0.8187 20.4 79.6 1030 1.822 36.2 63.8 1446 4.055 63.1 36.9 2097 11.02 300 KT 95.7 4.3 771 0.5488 13.7 86.3 1060 1.221 20.5 79.5 1472 2.718 38.6 61.4 206S 6.049 69.8 30.2 2995 16.44 1MT 98.8 1.2 1146 0.8187 11.1 88.9 1576 1.822 18.3 81.7 2190 4.055 38.2 61.8 3075 9.024 75.3 24.7 4458 24.53 99.8 0.2 ORNL-TM-3396 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE-FIELD ENVIRONMENT REGOMENDED FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burs on, R« L, French, F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A, Straker 0 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 05 0.6 0.7 0.8 Q.9 1.0 FRACTION OF Aw SOLID ANGLE, *' Figure 9. Angular Distribution of Neutron and Secondary Gamma 1200 m from a Thermonuclear Weapon HIROSHIMA John Mersey New Yorker of 31 August, 1946 i A NOISELESS FLASH At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima, Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors He was one step beyond an open window when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese would, " Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave !" Just then (the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was wearing flew off his face ; the bottle of blood crashed against one wall ; his Japanese slippers zipped out from under his feet — but otherwise, thanks to where he stood, he was untouched. Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon and rushed around to the man's office and found him terribly cut by glass. Starting east and west from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September, made new measurements, and the highest radiation they found this time was 3.9 times the natural " leak." id UJ Q o 111 UJ ID UJ X UJ _ {-- UJ - IU tf > UJ ^ UJ z < CO o CO y UJ I- UJ IP LL X ■ LL - ^ in o g k ° m ^ Q ^ Uj y D DQ § £ ID V 19 ^ ■ UJ 8 tD CO 3 O B -j ^k. > -j 2 1 ^ ■ #% • in (¥ ID - ■ 2 Q LU ~r z X 111 P i U o 3| DC Li) CD in id 111 31 y h- -» UJ 1 ; ~ =C O h- 111 1A :;::::>::>W::::v> ■: m • : • • • • ;■ • : -': ■ « • . . ■« ■ ••. • - . ■ ■■•.■ • • : =■*■- :•.' ■'*. II m 19 z \- HI O [tf ttf ID U- CD Q_ >; UJ U O CD UJ 01 8 D o u H- St o Q. UJ > D Z 1 ID UJ Q ^ Ol K X ^» Ui O ID UJ CD ^ ^ ^ o in cd u I- ui P « 58 w ZL "• £ < | in UJ tS O w 5 £ in , < m o£ ui uj o in i* in ui r D I Q CD H ? < «H in z Q H - ? Q O O Z D/ Q to i m v h~ ^ u D s o U)"OQ W H v/ O X 3 ^ ^ Q o V» • • • • • • • .VVW /ii.im..;»»» ♦ •»•»••••• • • • /• •••••••••••• »♦♦»•» • • • •*• /♦•»»**«••«•••• • •»♦•••»• ♦ • • • *• •••••»•* • • • • • ••••♦• * • • • • v •*•#••*♦••••••' surviva OPERATION CUf A.E.C. NEVADA TEST SITE MAY 5, 1955 ■■'-$\ S? '"■ X s-^sf US*' ~ ' .'4§ W':- fc: ■». ' ■ ,...:,- ■ ■ f - ,> P^-: SUllF? ^mm ■ i> _; ■■'■ . :: ■- ■ ' '1 " J^^^^^l m- -^ •SlS'SiS? -■■ - ■* •■"•IS • '*;'■"' . ■f^-'ii^ it.*- '■'";. ::;:: '!■: A report by the FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN, Director j Atomic Test Operations, PCD A The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a given point. 92 BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION by dr. Herman elwyn pearse, Professor of Surgery at the Uni- versity of Rochester. Consultant to several Government depart- ments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiro- shima. 140 Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and we found again that the wounds healed in the same manner as those that we had produced in the laboratory. There was isome difference in these lesions from the ordi- nary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experi- ments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing. 142 For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers, you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first degree burns at 107 calories. 143 If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent thousands and thousands of burns. . . . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree burns on bare skin required 4 calories. When we put 2 layers of cloth in contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters, about a fifth of an inch, and it increases, the protective effect 5 times. The energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second- degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you are better off than if your wear tight clothing. 144 OSTI ID: 4411414 bm& STUDIES OH FLASH BURNS: THE PROTECTION AFFORDED W 2, k MB 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS George Mixter, Jr0, M0 Do and Herman ED Pearse, Mo D„ THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER ABSTRACT Fabric interposed between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ turns. For the 2, k and 6 layers of fabric studied this increase vas 3*6, 38 and over 10*4- cal/cm2 respectively -when the inner layer of fabric vas in contact with the skin. Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 mm increased the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 70k to 29 cal/cm2, provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation0 If the outer layer was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the thermal burn, INTRODUCTION In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study of flash burns in unshielded skin* It is well known from the atomic bombing in Japan that this type of burn was modified by clothing „ A laboratory analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun (5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com- binations,, i. 2 Layers 20 h Layers ae light green oxford olive green sateen knitted cotton underwear thin cotton oxford wool-nylon shirting b. light green oxford (HPM) knitted cotton underwear knitted cotton underwear 6 layers olive green sateen thin cotton oxford mohair frieze rayon lining wool-nylon shirting knitted wool underwear i? Jo Ho j Kingsley* Ho D„, asd Pearse, H. EOJ "Studies on Flash Burns i The Protective Effect© of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology aM Obstetrics^ <&> ^97~5©1 (April 1952) o II IULH I IML y*tvui vw«* * ttV»*U9 WT-770 Copy No. CO CD CQ UPSHOT-KNOTHO NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS TKHWOM n of the DFJT.NSE K< A60« AUb ! March -June 1953 Project 8.5 THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED TEST X| -y. _ ASSEMBLIES » This document contains restpMBgps&ta as defined in the Atomic^jj^pmct of 1954. Its transmittal c^rarrffsclosure of its contents in ajwsfemer to an unauthorized pen HEAOQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT SANOIA 8ASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO mussnB WT-770 This document consists of 64 pages 1 QP No. - ^ ° of 295 copies, Series A OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Project 8.5 THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR by REORaOCU BY authority OfW.J:^U^Z€j^^^/^?^U As ^striotedj^rtn Foreign hi iPWIH 1*11 III VRmtaM^^ontalns restricted data as dennea Jn^nWI^fci^^jrgyAct of 1954. Its transmittal or^^WH(ta^of its contents in any manner to an unHfccized 111 | in in li iiiiilMIHIi III 3^^ Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories Army Medical Service Graduate School Walter Reed Army Medical Center University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project D CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION 4#1 ANTICIPATED AMD OBSERVED RESULTS 4.1.1 protection Afforded by the Various Uniform Assemblies Perhaps the most outstanding result of these tests was the degree of thermal protection afforded the test animals by the various uniform assemblies. At the higher levels of radiant energy, where laboratory tests (with the carbon arc) indicated that the animals should have sustained at least 2+ burns, (?) an unexpected degree of protection was found in the field. In the laboratory, thermal energies as low as 44 cal/cm2 (delivered In 2 sec.) were sufficient to produce burns in pigs1 skin under the four layers of the Temperate ensemble. In the field the maximum level at which any animals, clothed in the Temperate uniform, were recovered alive on Shots 9 and 10 was 26.0 cal/cm2 and one at 48 cal/cm2 (calc.) on Shot 2. Although no animals were recovered alive at the maximum exposure level of 75 cal/cm2, there was a complete lack of any evidence to indicate that the animals would have suffered burns from the primary effects of the thermal radiation. Some of the animals wearing the Temperate uniform not treated for fire resistance sustained minor skin burns, but these resulted from exo- thermic reactions (flame or glow) and occurred only at the more dis- tant stations. Damage to the fabric itself from direct thermal radiation was also less serious than expected, being limited to the two outer layers, whereas in the laboratory three of the lavers were damaged and the underwear layer discolored at 40 to 60 calAm2. The two-layer HW 50/50 and HWFR 50/50 assemblies had not been tested in the laboratory with the carbon arc, although tests in con* nection with napalm studies had Indicated that the wool/cotton under* wear of this combination might be, quite effective* The outstanding results obtained In the field with these fabric assemblies, however, exceeded the most optimistic anticipations. Exceptionally good thermal protection was observed up to the closest stations from which data were obtained! 41*0 cal/cm2 for HW 50/50 and 33.5 cal/cm2 for HWFR 50/50. Severe burns were sustained by the majority of the pigs wearing the two-layer HW and HWFR assemblies. However, even these thin cotton fabrics were of considerable protective value as can be seen by com- paring these results with the bare-skin exposures of the porthole 44 pigs (Section 3*4)* The degree and extent of burns noted beneath these assemblies were less than would have been expected on the basis of previous laboratory experience, especially at the higher calorie levels* 4«1«2 Factors Contributing to the Greater Degree of Thermal Protection in the Field. There are several conditions encountered in the field, espe- cially at the higher energy levels, but not duplicated in the labora- tory (at least not up to the present time) that may account for the fact that like amounts of thermal energy did not produce comparable results in the laboratory and in the field. First, the thermal energy is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb than it is in the laboratory • Second, due to smoke obscuration the animals in the field actually received a smaller percentage of the total energy delivered than they did in the laboratory* Third, the blast wave following the explosion tended to extinguish flames and remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laboratory tests* Fourth, where the heat reached the fabric layer next to the skin, uniform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field* (1) In comparing field with laboratory results, considera- tion must be given to irradiance, which expresses the time- intensity of the thermal pulse (cal/cm^/sec). At the highest calorie levels labora- tory irradiances were much lower than field irradiances* The reason for this is that an atomic explosion delivers a high quantity of thermal energy per unit area in a much shorter time than the same quantity can be delivered over a practical exposure area (1*7 cm diam) with existing laboratory equipment. For example, approximately 2 sec are required to deliver 75 cal/cm2 in the laboratory with the carbon arc operating at peak capacity, an irradiance of 37*5 cal/cmr/sec. 3n the field this much energy was delivered at the forward stations in both Shots 9 and 10 in approximately 0*5 sec, an irradiance of 150 cal/cm2/sec* Irradiances have been varied within the limits possible in the laboratory, and it has been found that certain levels of thermal energy will produce a more serious lesion if applied slowly than if applied rapidly. (18) Beneath the HVf assembly spaced 5 mm from the skin, for example, a 2* burn was produced when a thermal energy of 17 cal/cm2 was applied in 2 sec (8*5 cal/cm2/sec) but no burn, or at the most a mild 1+ burn, resulted when the same energy was applied in 0.5 sec (34 cal/cm2/sec). With lower irradiances the fabric may be scorched or charred but remain intact and thus act as a heat reservoir from which heat can subsequently be transmitted to the skin. With higher irradiances, laboratory results indicate that all or part of the thermal input may be dissipated by an endothermic decomposition of the fabric* In the field, especially at the closer stations where irradiances exceeded 35 cal/cm?/sec, conditions were favorable for such dissipation of energy* (2) Motion pictures of clothed animals, exposed to 50*0 and 33*5 cal/cm2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouds U5 of black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ma of the explosion. There is reason to believe that, in view of the short tine within which most of the radiant energy from the explosion was delivered, much of this energy was prevented from reaching the animals by this smoke* In the laboratory tests* because the exposure area was so much smaller and the time of energy application at the high calorie levels so much longer* smoke obscuration appears to be of little or no significance* (3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not been duplicated in laboratory applications of thermal energy* has two possible protective effects* First* it can be expected to extinguish flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated for fire resistance, thus removing a source of high heat. Although the blast wave may not actually extinguish the flame in all cases,* it can be expected in general to have this effect* Second* the blast wave would tend to remove any char which* if allowed to remain* would act as a heat reservoir and increase the likelihood of a severe bum* (4>) The drape of the uniform may have contributed to a reduction of thermal injury in the field* in the case of the two- layer Hot-Wet assemblies* Laboratory tests upon which estimates of protec- tion in the field were based consisted of the application of energy to fabrics in tight contact with the animal's skin. Other tests on cotton fabrics have indicated that spacing the fabric away from the skin would increase the protection afforded* In the uniforms* although some fabric areas were in close skin contact, many were spaced away in normal drape* This fact undoubtedly gave the uniforms an additional protective value as compared to laboratory tests where fabrics were held in close skin contact* 4.2 THE ROLE OP THE FLAMEPR00FING TREATMENT One of the major problems designated for study at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was to determine whether materials actually did flame under the conditions of the test and* if sof how much protection could be afforded by fire resistant treating the outer layer* The results of the test show conclusively that flaming and probably glow did occur in many instances The principal value of the fire retardant used in these tests j brcninated triallyl phosphate, lay in its prevention of these exothermic reactions* In seme cases it also seemed to give additional protection against the primary thermal effects of the ex- plosion, although in other cases the untreated fabrics gave better protection than the treated* The peculiar pebbly, blistered* weeping edema noted in these tests occurred only in pigs wearing the fire resistant uniforms* ♦The occurrence of persistent flame type burns that require longer to produce (according to laboratory tests) than the blast arrival time may indicate that the blast wave does not always extinguish the f3ame. On the other hand such burns may have been induced by glow. 46 m B •3 s o e i o I s o I b u Si C U Jl IS1 o o its CO M ^ u © 0) oo UMA O o $ IA CM *A*A OO O H O <0 tO O tO Q O ^ O 0^ oooo tO *AU\tO GK C^ lO ^N *A V\*AO O CM H 8 tO tO tO «A oc^oo si a Ik II1 © CD co h5 © 0) 1 c o\ •H O €> Q 5 o u 1* IS 4> C cod o © I 9 $ in WNCMCM WNO O O H HOh1> £S^°^ cn. tOt0^VQt0^AM>t0^t0WMrvt0 OtOtOtOtp Q\ o Qv o 0s O O O* O* 0^ tO On 0v O On 0s On O • O WN CM H •a to CMOOOOOOOO OQIAOQ^AWVPO O 0^ O On u> ^- fr* c*- fr- U\ WMAO © 5 tO «f\WMA © tO *A OO 88 ia On § OOQQUNQUNOO tOtOUMAtptOtOUNO oo^ooooooo R8 AIA *8&8 o H H s o O O & 3 WMAWN • ♦ • (ACM cl O NO IA IA*A 3$ o CM 5$ -.8 A o o UI > 55 in • 0 Q VI 5 -1 O UJ o o o o >4 o ^ m • 0 o • o » • 0 M £ • 0 #s • ^ 1 1 1 1 o • o O o o CO o o o tf> * M o otio pttodxa jo uoipnj|iiQ % s 1 I .8 52 • • « i O <\> 1 o o lO e o c . o^ ♦ -J o o o O o «* o *—* o o o o o o «0 o CM 8 c • o o 3#jd pttodxt JO UOipni|f«Q % otio pttodvt jo uoipni|t»c % .8 i O o o o o •e 10 cr v> o o O tg * m **»• o * «o *— UJ. m • *~ 1 «* • 0 *~*Z • 0 UJ % 0 0 8 # 0 " UJ • i 8 u~ —J _l_ - -L -..;... L_ l E 8* o o o O O o 10 o o o o o o 94 08jd pttodvt jo uoipniJttQ •/• o»io p9iodx» ;o uo||onj|t0O -h S i u o o 1 IS to Cm ^1 00 CO OPERATION WT-1441 f his Jocunent consists tf 50 paps. Ni. ' it 185 cepies. Secies A PLUMB BOB MEVADA TEST SITE MAY-OCTOBER 1957 oi the/ 7 M/r/965 . .- «.-_■■ •■ y- Project 8.2 AVAILABLE COPY WILL NOT HSRMTT FULLY LEGIBLE RPPJ-'DtCTiO"?/'"' !u?fiODUCTION' WILL 2£ ***•■ && HEQUESTED BY USERS Gc DDC. PREDICTION of THERMAL PROTECTION of UNIFORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U) Issuance Date: May 2, 1960 HEADOUARTEftS HELD COMMAND DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY SANDIA 8ASE. AlBUGUERQUE. NEW MEXICO »>-*,,-*., -. •:V JUN7 >*& XiSlA Q This material contains Information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 16, U. S. C, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In anv manner u: *n unauthorised person 1. ?- hiblter) uy taw. 1.2.2 Comparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burns to Ptge. The improved NML skin simulant, molded from silica -powder -filled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded at a depth of 0.05 cm in order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment. The basic criterion is a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human skin or for a 2+ mild bum to pig skin. This criterion is based on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mild burn In pig skin) to a second-degree burn In human skin, (2) an initial skin temperature of 31 C, and (3) correspondence of the thermal pro- perties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of tndlcent radiant exposure is estimated to be ± 10 percent. A skin-simulant temperature rise of 20 C or greater Is estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate pig skin burn, and a rise of 35 C is estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild pig burn. The latter estimations, probably accurate to ± 20 percent, are based on pig-burn data obtained at the Uni- versity of Rochester (Reference 6). 12 CONFIDENTIAL TABLE 2.1 RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS Specimen Radiant Absorptancc Skin simulant, bare Skin simulant, blackened Poplin, Shade 116, 5-oz/yd2 Sateen, gray, 9'Oz/yd2 0.72 0.95 0.63 0.91 15 CONFIDENTIAL 0.4 at .o Tim, toMownum.Steondt 4 8 12 IS 20 Equivalent Field Rodiont Exposure, col /cm1 DC- P- 1060 31 UNSHIELDED PERSONS 20 40 THERMAL EXPOSURE (cal/cm2) 100 20 H 18 - 3 16 or S | 14 £ 12 ■ I 10 8 - 6 - 4 - 2 - Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI) I Aamori • \ \ * Barmen % Freiberg » • Hiroshima • Fukui \ . Solingen . Friedrickihafen I • Aachen . uim " Toyama ■ Chosi . Nagasaki ,Fukuyama Heilbrann /. Hamburg Dresden . / / INTENSE / FIRESTORMS I I Darmstadt \ * \ Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec. 1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) ■ energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water = 252 calories Severe firestorms require 600 BTU/sq. mile/second FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES i i i 100 700 800 200 300 400 500 600 AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second) T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction Proceedings of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation; October, 1967. CO Q < < w CO W 2 < Q Z < z < w o o w o w 2 w d X w 42 cm CO o O CM "35°? CO Q no c u -^ 3 s or to 09 *d » sJ *M c o o 4-» • •-# or V u *3 u a 0> o Oh 0« CO o (0 > o 0) ^ W) ^. ; o +J +* CO +J CO tft ^.QV • • • m Tt« n n •r-» •** $4 VM V-i •r-» **4 ^ NO ID «« O 00 • • • • *-• ^ o o o o o o CO CO o o o o o o o o o o o o CO I c CO 2! o 0) 3 CD When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re- sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more water loss and the more heat or energy loss. How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished? Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462 August 2008 By Patrice Wendling Elsevier Global Medical News CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit. The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association. "Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap for burn wounds," he said. Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal. "I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral base." Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial- and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed. Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital, Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll to expose a clean surface. LAWRENCE LIVERMORE N A T 10 N A L LABORATORY UCRL-TR-231593 Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Environments R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock June 7, 2007 Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6]. We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a "radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux. 6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment 2007," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt, R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review. 11 Addendum No. 1 for DNA 1240H-2, Part 2 HANDBOOK OF UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 21 January 1974 M. J. Dudash DAS1AC General Electric Company* TEMPO 816 State Street Santa Barbara, CA 93102 CHAPTER TITLE VOLUME 2 - PART 2 18 SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL PAGE 18-1 1? August 1973 CHAPTER 18 18.7 THERMAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS ON SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL 18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria Table 18-2 CDC NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION CRITERIA New Thermal Radiation Criteria ■ ■i-i m im m i — — ■ — — — — m i i i Rtek Criteria for Burns Under Summer Uniforms to Warned » Exposed Personnel 7. Incidence Mechanism tOKT cal/cm' 100KT cal/cm2 lOOOiCT cal/cm2 Negligible Moderate Emergency 2.5 5 5 1 burn 1 burn 2° burn 3.1 3.7 6.3 4.2 5.0 8.8 5.8 6.8 12 Time to Ineffectiveness 24.hr Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns % Incidence 10KT cal/cm2 100KT cal/cm2 50 38 53 1000KT cal/cm4 73 Personnel Risk and Casualty Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects ACN 4260, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear Studies, August 1971 EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46 NM 006-015 25 April 1955 by E. L. Alpen C.P. Butler S.B. Martin A.K. Davis U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY San Francisco 24, California For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for production of a standard burn are the following: .tA, .tBi •Ci itiri , \ = 0.42/;, r = 24.4 + 3.5 per cent, Q = 3.20 + 0.37cal/cm2; IDftX filter ' filter ' filter ■ filter * filter • The ranges shown are standard deviations. , X = 0.55^, r = 40.9 + 3.8 per cent, Q = 3.25 ± 0.28cal/cm2; , Xmav = 0.65/x, r = 56.9 ± 2.5 per cent, Q = 9.9 ± 2.1 cal/cm2; , X_ = 0.85«, r = 53.4 + 2.2 per cent, Q = 14.0 + 1.1 cal/cm2; max ^ ~ * FM, \ = 1.7/i, r = 17 + 0.60 per cent, Q = 2.50 cal/cm2 (approx.) uldX The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0.7 to 1.0 has been presented. SUMMARY The Problem How does the critical energy for the production of standard burns in both rats and humans vary with the wavelength of radiant energy? Findings The critical radiant energy, corrected for spectral reflectance, re- quired for production of standard burns in both rat and human skin varies as much as 4^old depending on the wavelength. AD689495 MASS BURNS Proceedings of a Workshop 13 - 14 March 1968 Sponsored by The Committee on Fire Research Division of Engineering National Research Council and the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army Published by National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. 1969 Dr. Edward L. Alpen (U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory); About this question of the spectral dependence of radiant energy, I think Dr. Haynes may have given you the impression that white light does the trick. There is later work which tends to refute that. The work done at Virginia used cut-off filters. The effectiveness of all energy above a certain wave length or below a certain wave length was measured. At the upper end the most effective and the least effective were mixed together and made it appear that infrared was not too good in producing burns. When you subdivide the spectrum, the most effective energy in producing a flash burn is the infrared above about 1.2 microns. The importance of this, and the only reason I make an issue of it, is that a very important source of flash burn, both in civilian life and under wartime disaster conditions, is radiant energy burns from flaming sources. We have done a great deal of research on this subject for the U. S. Forest Service, because radiant energy burns are important in forest fires. Energy in the wave lengths of 0.6 to 0.8 micron is about one- eighth as destructive as the rest of the spectrum. But long wave length radiation above one micron is extremely destructive, and the most effective of all. 49 Dr. Alpen; Anything that shields out radiation above one micron is extremely effective in preventing burns to the skin. 50 RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE Durham, North Carolina Final Report R-85-l CRASH CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM STUDY by AD0403071 *•*- 0 o Li >> o > l-t cd O 0) o X 9 m r-t O & 3 a» ci 01 > u co ai he * m 3 A -H co -a •HO U a sj of * a sc 0) © r-t I © 22 N CI (O 0 o c o to to 01 in c a (0 © V O (A *■> O 0) w o «H rt O to m CO ■a c tn 3 0) g to ITS CI to u 0 hi g •M 0 ti 2 V) *) -M r-* (0 OJ rH J3 0 ^-t V *4 A 0) 0 £ PI a -m 3 *H a tn c » X! 3 O 0 tfi *J 9 r-« ** 3 01 A u bo L, at a> . i-t c cd - > ■ § cd •H O T3 cd JZ to 0) eo 0 0 0 t* 10 ^H 4J J-l 3 43 Q) u & a (0 cd ■H a cd K a cj> 3 O d C a cd 3 0 0 O a +j 4) •O +j a> »H c CO 44 T3 «ri *-» u O •(-t * Lt to O O bfi O T> J5? ,^ u ^ 2 « a to 10 cd j- bfi 0> (A hi J to (0 o u ■o c C o hi § cd cd 10 o> hi i (A a> o hi B-73 Martin, S. B. , On Predicting the Ignition Susceptibility of Typical Kin- dling Fuels to Ignition by the Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Det- onations, Tech. Report 367, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif., April 1959. (U) A SURVEY OF THE WEAPONS AND HAZARDS WHICH MAY FACE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WARTIME Harold L. Brode P-3170 June 1965 -15- Host exposed surfaces in the city are non- combustible and much of the rssiainder is not ignitable by thermal flash. Although many fires could simultaneously start wherever build- ing interiors are illuminated by the bomb thermal energy, they are not likely to be immediately beyond control , and will often go out unattended as they exhaust the available fuel (as in trash barrels or isolated wood piles or even pieces of paper on tables or floors) . Hanging non-flaomable shields over window openings and removing likely fuels from exposed positions could also help. RAND CORPORATION 100 i UJ U It 8 « a- z x - ^ 5 < t ac — a: o < 50 1 — I i M II II WIND REL. - M.PH. HUMIDITY - I I 50% -Z I 50% - 3 I 50% 4 0 42% H 5 I 50% 6 I 50% Mill 10 IKT REALISTIC CITY HUMIDITY .(UNLIKE NEVADA DESERT) — ^— — - - -• j I. WEATHERED CHEAT GRASS m ^-L 3. RAYQN. CHARCOAL CO I I o I— z LU O 0£ ■No Fire fighting 7.5% of population respond I0 minutes after detonation 7.5% of population, immediate response 20 40 60 80 MINUTES AFTER DETONATION 100 I20 ^^H ^^k s^Am :l»hki^:[»hTTTno Folded newspapers may not take f i re, but loosely crumpled ones will. The* answer? Get rid of trash. A wet mop or broom will snuff out small fires. So will a burlap bag or a small rug soaked in water. Buckets of water and sand are essential. Water is an effective fire fight- ing agent because it smothers and cools at the same time. FIRE-BOMBS rained on London They did not all tall on roads P^^S^fl l^j^fl L 1 8 ^■b^-*. .^ , af ^to«M?* .^uid^^E Jv^ 0** • *3BS THE LUFTWAFFE SOUGHT A KNOCK-OUT BLOW. The first impact of the attack fell on the docks. The great day raid of 7th September, 1940, which was continued through- out the night and renewed on many nights after, left miles of fires blazing along either bank of the Thames. This is St. Katherine's Dock on the night of nth September. Amended Reprint June, 1940 Crown Copyright Reserved Am Raid Precautions HANDBOOK No. 9 {1st edition) INCENDIARY BOMBS AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS Issued by the Ministry of Home Security LONDON PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb 15 Seconds After Ignition. 45 Seconds Fire Controlled by Water Clothing on fire. Never allow a person whose clothes are on fire to remain standing for a moment. Fatalities nearly always arise from shock of burning about the face and head. If the person starts to run, trip him up at once. Roll him on the floor or in a coat or blanket if you have one handy. If your own clothes catch fire, clap your hand over your mouth, and lie down and roll. 3 I Fig. i — Typical Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb. sheet Plug. magnesium alloy JSafefypin 'Fuse, magnesium alloy Fig- 2— Typical Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb. Sectional Drawing. Restricted For Official Use Civil Defence training pamphlet no, 2 (3rd Edition) OBJECTS DROPPED FROM THE AIR Issued By the Ministry of Home Security Crown Copyright Reserved LONDON HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1944 Price 6d. net Copies will be sold only on written application by a Clerk to a local authority, a Chief Constable, a principal of a public utility company, or by County Secretaries of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, British Red Cross Society, and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association to H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at any of the following addresses: York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh; 39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 80 Chichester Street, Belfast. TAIL UNIT INCENDIARY UNIT DlA.I-96- t RECESS USUALLY FILLED WITH INSULATING TAPE. FUZE 1 DELAYED ACTION EXPLOSIVE UNIT ._JN FLAMMABLE ^ALLOY CASE r MAIN INCENDIARY FILLING :AP (PRIMER) WHICH FIRES MAIN INCENDIARY FILLING. DETONATOR WHICH FIRES CAR TO INCENDIARY FILLING ANO TRAIN LEADING TO fTIME fuze; WHICH FIRES DETONATOR WHICH IN TURN FIRES MAIN EXPLOSIVE HAROC STEEL EXPLOSIVE ►CONTAINER NOSE COVER Figure 12A. — German Incendiary Bomb with Explosive Nose TECHNICAL GUIDANCE To obtain some protection from the heat it is necessary to move out of the direct path of the rays from the fireball; any kind of shade will be of some value. A fire-storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily built up with buildings containing plenty of combustible material and where at least every other building in the area had been set alight. It is not considered that the initial density of fires, equivalent to one in every other building, would be caused by a nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that due to shielding, a much smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to the heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the centres of most British cities are now more fire-resistant and more widely spaced than they were 30 to 40 years ago. This low risk of fire-storms would be reduced still further by the control of small initial and secondary fires. 3 A HOME OFFICE GUIDE P-3026 FIREBALL PHENOMENOLOGY Harold L. Brode The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica , California This paper was prepared for presentation at The Tripartite Technical Cooperation Panel Meeting, Panel N3, held at the Joint Fire Service College, Dorking, England, 5-9 October 1964. The papers are to be published by Defense Atomic Support Agency. Fig. 20— Surface burst features influencing thermal radiation TRINITY (19 KT AT 100 FT ALTITUDE, 16 JULY 1945) SHOCK WAVE 0.025 SEC. N 100 METERS MACH STEM INSTRUMENT HUTS CINNIENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL TM 23200 BEPARTMENTOFTHENAVY OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400 IB DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFL 136"1 MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS NAVMC 1104 REV CAPABILITIES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS (U) Prepared by Armed Forces Special Weapons Project DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957 CINNIENTIAL 46NMDLNIIAL Personnel in structures. A major cause of personnel casualties in cities is structural collapse and damage. The number of casualties in a given situation may be reasonably estimated if the structural damage is known. Table 6-1 shows estimates of casualty production in two types of buildings for several damage levels. Data from Section VII may be used to predict the ranges at which specified structural damage occurs. Dem- olition of a brick house is expected to result in approximately 25 percent mor- tality, with 20 percent serious injury and 10 percent light injury. On the order of 60 percent of the survivors must be extricated by rescue squads. Without rescue they may become fire or asphyxi- ation casualties, or in some cases be subjected to lethal doses of residual radiation. Reinforced concrete struc- tures, though much more resistant to blast forces, produce almost 100 percent mortality on collapse. The figures of table 6-1 for brick homes are based on data from British World War II expe- rience. It may be assumed that these predictions are reasonably reliable for those cases where the population is in a general state of expectancy of being subjected to bombing and that most personnel have selected the safest places in the buildings as a result of specific air raid warnings. For cases of no prewarning or preparation, the number of casual ties is expected to be considerably higher. 6-2 Glass breakage extends to considerably greater ranges than almost any other structural damage, and may be expected to produce large numbers of casualties at ranges where personnel are relatively safe from other effects, particularly for an unwarned population. Table 6-1. Estimated Casualty Production in Structures for Various Degrees of Structural Damage 1-2 story brick homes (high ex- plosive data): Severe damage Moderate damage Light damage Killed outright Percent 25 <5 Serious injury (hospi- taliza- tion) Percent Percent Light injury (No hos- pitaliza- tion) 20 10 <5 10 5 <5 Note. These percentages do not include the casualties which may result from fires, asphyxiation, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped personnel. The numbers represent the estimated percentage of casualties expected at the mutamm range where the specified structural damage occurs. Personnel in a prone position are less likely to be struck by flying mis- siles than those who remain standing. 6-3 Table 6-2. Critical Radiant Exposures for Burns Under Clothing (Expressed in cal/cm7 incident on outer surface of cloth) Clothing Summer Uniform (2 layers) Winter Uniform, (4 layers) Burn 1° 1 KT 100 KT 8 11 2° 20 25 1° 60 80 2° 70 90 10 MT 14 35 100 120 6-4 CMtfWCtlliAL 2.1c (1) FIGURE 2-6 GROWTH OF THE MACH STEM Region of Moch Reflection Region of Regular Reflection FIGURE 2-7 MACH STEM HEIGHT (I KT) ^-^-^ 1000 "^^E eoo rE I 600 r.. --=rrJ •;..-= . ../ =ZT: * €00 5i o 200 1000 eoo 400 *.--==--* —J -z=^J. 400 - 200 200 400 600 600 1000 Horizontal Range (yards) 1200 1400 CQHrHENTUL 3.1 SECTION III THERMAL RADIATION PHENOMENA 3.1 General For a surface burst having the same yield as an air burst, the presence of the earth's surface results in a reduced thermal radiation emission and a cooler fireball when viewed from that surface. This is due primarily to heat transfer to the soil or water, the distortion of the fireball by the reflected shock wave, and the partial obscuration of the fireball by dirt and dust (or water) thrown up by the blast wave. fUMH'IVLNIIAL 3-1 Measurements from the ground of the total thermal energy from surface bursts, although not as extensive as those for air bursts, indicate that the thermal yield is a little less than half that from equivalent air bursts. For a surface burst the thermal yield is assumed to be one-seventh of the total yield. 3-2 n 3.16X10" W (T) .. , . , v C=» js cal/sq cm (air burst). and n 1.35X 1loii tv.ili) 9 Olive Tears on flexing 8 14 22 Draper \ Fabrics Ravon gabardine 6 Black Ignites 9 20 26 Rj>on-acetaie draper) 5 Wine Ignites 9 22 28 Ra>on gabardine 7 Cold Igniies •• 24* 28* Rj\on twili Inline 3 Black Ignites 7 17 25 Rayon twill lining 3 Biege Ignites 13 20 2S Aceiaie-shamung 3 Black Ignites 10* 22+ 35+ Cotton l*e*v\ dt aperies 13 Djrk colors Igniies IS 18 34 Tent Fabric* Canvas (cotton 1 12 White Ignites 13 28 51 Canvas 12 Olive drab Ignites 12 18 28 Other Fabrics • Cotton chenille bedspread Light blue Ignites •* 11+ 15+ Cotton Venetian blind lape. White Ignites 10 18 ■»-> +■*- ditty Cotton Venetian blind tape White Ignites 13+ 27+ 31+ Cotton muslin window shade 8 Green Ignites 7 13 19 ^ft Radiant exposures for the indicated responses levcept where marked ♦ I are estimated to be valid to t}$% under Hdjid bbotaioi) conditions. Under typical field conditions the values are estimated to be valid within ±50% with a greater likelihood of hajher rather than lower values. Foe materials multcd t* «A>i*on levels are tsimuud to be valid within ±505 undet laborator) conditions and within ±104?* undet field conditions. For low air bursts, values of t^^ of 0,2. 1.0. and 3.2 sec correspond roughly to yields of 40 kt, 2 Ml, and 24 Ml. rteptctivel) \ [ftau are not available oj appfopiiiie scaling not known. * 9-26 3-2 Bangs Effects As the thermal energy propagates away from the fireball, the divergence that results from the increasing area through which it passes causes the radiant exposure to decrease as the inverse square of the slant range. At a slant range R centimeters from the source, the thermal energy is distributed over a spherical area of 4nR2 . Since the thermal yield in calories is 101 2 Wf , where W is the yield in kilotons, the radi- ant exposure at a distance J? cm in a clear atmo- sphere is Q = — cal/cm2. 4*RZ Adding the transmittance factor to the equations given in paragraph 3-2 gives Q e 7.96 WfT ^ *km *kni * x82 w7va The scattering and absorption properties of the atmosphere depend partly on the wave- length of the radiant energy. Wavelength is often measured in microns (1 micron =10** meter), for which the symbol is jt. Wavelengths in the visible spectrum may be identified by the rela- tion between wavelength and color: light with a wavelength of 0.7 ft is red; 0.58 §i light is yellow; and 0.48 p Tight is blue. White light is a mixture containing all wavelengths in the visible spec- trum, which extends from 038 to 0.78 m* The infrared spectrum consists of radiant energy at wavelengths longer than 0.78 jt, and the ultra- violet spectrum consists of radiant energy at wavelengths shorter than 0.38 p. The energy transport properties of atmo- spnenc particles may be expressed in terms of scattering and absorption cross sections, which are fictitious areas that are a measure of the probability that scattering or absorption will occur. Particles that are small compared to the wavelength of light have scattering cross sections that are inversely proportional to the fourth power of the wavelength. Therefore, air mole- cules scatter light from the extreme blue end of the visible spectrum (wavelength = 038 m) about 16 times as effectively as they scatter light from the red end of the spectrum (wavelength = 0.78 M). The sky is blue because most of the scat- tering at high altitudes is by air molecules, which scatter blue light more efficiently than they scat- ter other colors of the visible spectrum. A dis- tant mountain appears blue on a clear day for the same reason. The principal absorber of thermal energy usually is water vapor, which has strong absorp- tion bands in the infrared spectrum. Dry air transmits infrared energy more efficiently than humid air. Carbon dioxide and other gases pres- ent in the atmosphere in small amounts also absorb infrared energy. Ultraviolet energy is absorbed most strongly at the shorter wavelengths: the limiting wavelength that air in the lower atmosphere will transmit is about 0.2 micron. Ozone, appreciable quantities of which are found between roughly 60,000 and 80,000 feet, absorbs ultraviolet radiation with wavelengths shorter than 0.29 micron. As a result of these absorption bands ultraviolet energy that reaches the earth from the sun is almost entirely limited to the spectral band between 0.38 micron (the violet edge of the visible spectrum) and 0.29 micron. The attenuation for light of 0.65 micron wavelength was used to specify r - 1 » - - - 1 : " - » - m • 1 . .J --, 1 I | 1 0.2 0.4 0.6 O.t 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.* 1.8 2.0 RATIO OF SLANT RANGE TO VISUAL RANGE (RW, 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 Thermal flash on forest leaf canopy produces smoke-screen (in Nevada and Pacific nuclear tests), shadowing dry leaf litter Fuels seldom burn vigorously, regardless of The high degree of shading by tree crowns wind conditions, when fuel moisture content ex- ana stems for detonations at or below the canopy ceeds about 16 percent. This corresponds to an level often may be offset by scattering of burn- equilibrium moisture content for a condition of ing debris ignited within the fireball. 15-59 80 percent relative humidity. 15-50 Figure 15-41. 30 40 50 ELEVATION ANGLE (degrees) Probability of Exposure of Forest Floor for Different Levels of Tree Density Table 15-13 Burning Durations by Fuel Type Violent Burning Residual Burning Fuel Type Time (min) Energy Release (percent) Time (min) Energy Release (percent) Total Burning Time Grass 1.5 90 0.5 10 30 min Light Brush (12 tons/acre) 2. 60 6. 40 16 hr Medium Brush (25 tons/acre) 6. 50 24. 50 36 hr Heavy Brush (40 tons/acre) 10. 40 70. 60 72 hr Timber 24. 17 157. 83 7 days Table 15-11 Criteria of "No-Spread" of Fires Fuel Type Criteria All forest fuels Grass Brush or hardwoods Conifer timber Over I inch of snow on the ground at the nearest weatherstations. Relative humidity above 80 percent. 0.1 inch of precipitation or more within the past 7 days and: Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 60 percent or higher, or Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 75 percent or higher, or Wind 1 1 -25 mph; relative humidity 85 percent or higher. 1 . One day or less since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and: Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 50 percent higher, or Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 75 percent higher, or Wind 1 1-25 mph; relative humidity 85 percent or higher. 2. Two to three days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and; Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 60 percent or higher, or Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 80 percent or higher, or Wind 1 1-25 mph; relative humidity 90 percent or higher. 3. Four to five days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 80 percent or higher. 4. Six to seven days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 90 percent or higher. shielding from the wind and shading from sun- light by the canopy. The spread or no-spread criteria are summarized in Table 15-11. This table lists the conditions under which fire would noUje expected to spread. ■ I The criteria of Table 15-11 have been compared to the records of 4378 wild land fires. Of the fires for which "no spread" would be pre- dicted, 97.8 percent did not spread; only 40 per- cent of the fires that were predicted to spread actually did spread (at a rate of 0.005 mph or faster). This failure to spread often may be at- tributable to lack of fuel continuity around the ooint of origin. I ■ The criteria of Table 15-11 are considered tone reliable for American forests and suitably conservative to assure a low level of hazard to friendly forces. On the other hand, the criteria are probably not overly conservative to predict conditions for which enemy forces may be denied forested areas because of fire whenever the local weather history and conditions at the time of 15-61 14*10 Fire Damage Damage to equipment by fire is referred to in some damage reports. Although some 20 occurrences have been noted, they involved only a very small percentage of the equipment ex- posed. Most fires appealed to be secondary in nature, that is, they were not started by direct thermal radiation ignition. Two equipment items were burned during nuclear tests under exposure conditions in which they could have received virtually no thermal radiation. In addition, a I /4-ton true* exposed at a 100-ton high explo- sive test (in which thermal radiation was neg- ligible) also burned. The damage to a 6-kVA generator ex- posed on a U.K. test is particularly interesting. In the damage report the notation is made, "Fire may have stamd from fuel from broken car- buretor spilling on hot muffler." U.K. practice at nuclear tests was to expose running equip- ment, that is, the engines were running at the time of the explosion. The six recorded occur- rences of fires on U.K. tests represents a consid- erably larger percentage (about 10 percent) of all U.K. equipment exposed than does the num- ber of fires recorded on U.S. tests. Since this may be due to the U.K. practice of running engines during a test, the incidence of secondary fires in an operational situation may be higher than the U.S. test data indicate. Seager, E. R. Drake, R. F. C. Butler, Operation TOTEM Group 12 Report: Effects on a Landmrer (car, 3 CWT, 4x4) and Generating Sets AWRE Report T 79/54(x), FWE- 131, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, Berks, England, September 1956 14-67 SURVIVAL IN FIRE AREAS The best documented fire storm in his- tory'(but not the one causing the greatest loss of life) occurred in Hamburg, Germany during the night of July 27-28, 1943, as a result of an incendiary raid by Allied forces. Factors that contributed to the fire included the high fuel loading of the area and the large number of b^^igs ignited within a short period of time. ^ The main raid lasted about 30 minutes. Since the air raid warning and the first high ex- plosive bombs caused most people to seek shel- ter, few fires were extinguished during the at- tack. By the time the raid ended, roughly half the buildings in the 5 square-mile fire storm area were burning, many of them intensely. The fire storm developed rapidly and reached its peak in tw^r three hours. mm Many people were driven from their snelters and then found that nearly everything was burning. Some people escaped through the streets; others died in the attempt; others return- ed to their shelters and succumbed to carbon «xide poisoning. i Estimates of the number that were killed range from about 40,000 to 55,000. Most of the deaths resulted from the fire storm. Two equally heavy raids on the same city (one occurred two nights earlier; the other, one night later) did not produce tire storms, and they resulted in death rates that have been estimated to be nearly an order of magnitude lower. »More surprising than the number killed number of survivors. The population Of the fire storm area was roughly 280,000. Esti- mates have been made that about 45,000 were rescued, 53,000 survived in non-basement shel- ters, and 140,000 either survived in basement shelters or escaped by their own initiative. 9-25 Causes of Death The evidence that can be reconstructed from such catastrophes as the Hamburg fire storm indicates that carbon monoxide and ex- cessive heat are the most frequent causes of death in mass fires. Since the conditions that offer protection from these two hazards gener- ally provide protection from other hazards as well, the following discussion is limited to these two causes of death. » Carbon Monoxide. Burning consists of a of physical and chemical reactions. For most common fuels, one of the last of the reac- tions is the burning of carbon monoxide to form carbon dioxide near the tips of the flames. If the supply of air is limited, as it is likely to be if the fire is in a closed room or at the bottom of a pile of debris from a collapsed building, the carbon monoxide will not burn completely. Fumes from the fire will contain a large amount of this taste- less^dorless, toxic gas. p During the Hamburg fire, many base- ment shelters were exposed to fumes. Imperfect- ly fitting doors and cracks produced by explod- ing bombs allowed carbon monoxide to pene- trate these shelters. The natural positions of many of the bodies recovered after the raid indi- cated that death had often come without warn- ing, as is frequently the case for carbon, mon- oxide poisoning. I ■ Carbon monoxide kills by forming a more stable compound with hemoglobin than either oxygen or carbon dioxide will form. These latter are the two substances that hemo- globin ordinarily carries through the blood stream. Carbon monoxide that is absorbed by the blood reduces the oxygen carrying capacity of the blood, and the victim dies from oxygen deficiency. Jm As a result of the manner that carbon noxide acts, it can contribute to the death of a person who leaves a contaminated shelter to attempt escape through the streets of a burning city. A person recovering from a moderate case of carbon monoxide poisoning may feel well while he is resting, but his blood may be unable 9-28 to supply the oxygen his body needs when he exerts himself. After the air raid at Hamburg, victims of carbon monoxide poisoning, appar- ently in good health, collapsed and died from the strain of walking away from a shelter. It is suspected that many of the people who died in the streets of Hamburg were suffering from incipient carbon monoxide poisoning. mm Meat. The body cools itself by perspira- tion. When the environment is so hot that this method fails, body temperature rises. Shortly thereafter, the rate of perspiration decreases rapidly, and. unless the victim finds immediate relief from the heat, he dies of heat exhaustion. Death from excessive heat may occur in an in- adequately insulated shelter: it also may occur in the streets if a safe area cannot be located in a short time. 9*26 Shelters The results of the Hamburg fire storm illustrate the value of shelters during an intense mass fire. The public air raid shelters in Ham* burg had very heavy walls to resist large bombs. Reinforced concrete three feet thick represented typical walls. Some of these shelters were fitted with gas proof doors to provide protection from poison gas. These two features offered good pro- tection from the heat and toxic gases generated by the fire storm. fi The public shelters were of three types: Bunkers. These were large buildings of several shapes and sizes, designed to with- stand direct hits by large bombs. The fire storm area included 1 9 bunkers designed to hold a total of about 15,000 people. Prob- ably twice this number occupied the bunkers during the fire storm, and all of these people survived. • Splinterproof Sttelters. These were long single story shelters standing free of other buildings and protected by walls of rein- forced concrete at least 2-1/2 feet thick. No deaths resulting from the fire storm were reported among occupants of these shelters. These structures were not gas- proof. Distance from burning structures and low height of the shelters probably provided protection from carbon mon- oxide. • Basement Shelters, The public shelters that were constructed in large basements had ceilings of reinforced concrete 2 to 5 feet thick. Although reports indicate that some. of the occupants of these shelters survived and some did not, statistics to indicate the chance of survival in such structures are not available. • Private Basement Shelters. Private base- ments were constructed solidly, but most of them lacked the insulating value of very thick walls and the protection of gas-tight construction. Emergency exits (usually leading to another shelter in an adjacent building) could be broken if collapse of the building caused the normal exit to be blocked. As a result of the total destruction in the fire storm area, this precaution was of limited value. Many deaths occurred in these shelters as a result of carbon mon- oxide poisoning, and the condition of the bodies indicated that intolerable heat fol- lowed the carbon monoxide frequently. In some cases, the heat preceded the poison- ous gas and was the cause of death. Gen- erally, these shelters offered such a small amount of protection that the occupants were forced out within 1 0 to 30 minutes. Most of these people were able to move through the streets and escape. Others were forced out later when the fire storm was nearer its peak intensity, and few of these escaped. A few people survived in private basement shelters. 9-29 Air Blmt from Weapon* with Enhanced Radiation Outputs COLD WEAPON lkeV«ll,600.000°K 1 keV HOT WEAPON lOkeV hi o DISTANCE FROM BURST Figure 2-67 Energy Deposition in Air Rough calculation may be made, However, by applying the following rule of thumb to weapons with enhanced outputs: blast calculations for a given radius may be based on a weapon yield that is equal to the amount of energy contained in the sphere defined by that radius. As this rule implies, the blast wave, as it propagates outward, picks up hydrodynamic energy from the heated air through which it 2-140 THE THERMAL PULSE SPECIAL WEAPONS FROM As stated in paragraph 2-45, Chapter 2, weapons that have enhanced radiation out- puts, i.e., weapons that produce a large fraction of their output in the form of neutrons, gamma rays^rX-rays ■ BviU, in most "cases, generate a weaker olas^Jave than a nominal weapon of the same yield. Similarly, the thermal pulse from such special weapons may be weaker than that from a nominal weapon. The explanation for the re- duced thermal output is the same as the explana- tion for a weaker blast wave: neutrons, gamma rays, ana . . ~ r, energy X-rays travel much farther through the atmosphere than the energy from a conventional weapon; therefore, a large portion of the weapon energy may be absorbed by air far from the burst. This air will not become suf- ficiently hot to contribute effectively to either the blast wave or to the thermal pulse. ^^^^ The terms "nominal weapon" and "conventional weapon" used in the preceding paragraph refer to a nuclear weapon that radi- neari rcent of its energy as X-rays ^^^land re- ariy an 01 tne remaining energy as ther- mal and kinetic energy of the weapon debris (see paragraph 4-4, Chapter 4). 3-17 Effective Thermal Yield of Special Weapons The modified thermal effects pro- duced by weapons with enhanced outputs may be calculated in terms of an effective thermal yield. This is defined as the yield that a nominal warhead would have in order to radiate the same thermal energy as the special weapon. 3-67 Effective thermal yield is roughly the amount of energy that the nuclear source de- posits within a sphere the size of the fireball at the time of the principal minimum. This radius is 29 W036 nun (p/Po>f 0L22 meters, where W is the weapon yield in kOotons, p is the ambient air density at the burst altitude, and p0 is the ambient density at sea level Energy that is deposited beyond the radius Rmin is assumed to make a negligible contribu- tion to the energy radiated by the fireball Since the size of the fireball is deter- mined by the thermal energy it contains, it would be logical to let W represent effective thermal yield rather than total weapon yield. To do this requires a trial-and-error approach. The components of energy deposited with- in Rmin of the burst are added together Jo Obtain the effective thermal yield UJ H u. U O u z o UJ CO CO < K> I0f PHOTON ENERGY (ktV) Figure 4-4. Mass Attenuation Coefficients for Air 300 AMOUNT OF AIR TRAVERSED Igmfcnf) Figure 5-7. Neutron Energy Build-Up Factors for Various Monoenergetic Sources in Homogeneous Air SECTION V X-RAY DAMAGE EFFECTS NTRODUCTION Nuclear weapons as X-ray sources and the environments they produce are de- scribed in Chapter 4. Cold X-rays (typically 1 to 3 keV black body temperatures) are absorbed in a thin surface layer. At sufficiently higli fluence. a short pulse of X-rays can heat the surface rapid- ly and may cause it to vaporize and blow off. This results in: (I) an impulse imparted to the total structure; and (2) generation of a strong shock wave that propagates into the structure. and which may cause spallation of material at free boundaries and internal fracture of ma- terials and bonds. These latter effects are pro- duced by shock wave propagation through the thickness of a surface structure such as the ther- mal protection shell of a reentry vehicle. The former effects may produce damage by whole yelifck: modes of response to the net impulse. The hot X-rays are more penetrat- ing. They can cause: (1) thermally generated shock waves in the vehicle structural materials and internal components; (2) melting and vapor- ization of the substructure: (3) internal deposi- tion of energy in electronic components produc- ing transient or permanent damage (see Chapter 6 and Section 7 of this chapter): or (4) produce Internal EMP signals (see Chapter 7). While some nuclear weapons emit only cold X-rays, all hot X-ray weapons have a cold component. Hence, for exoatmospheric events the hot X-ray effects are accompanied by cold X-ray effects. On the other hand, for endo- atmospheric explosions, the cold X-rays have short mean free paths, and the X-ray effects be- yond distances of a few tens of meters are pro- duced by hot X-rays alone. 9-67 All vulnerability analyses follow similar computational steps: 1 . The X-ray energy deposition is computed using known processes for the materials and structure. This energy is assumed most often to be deposited instantaneously. 2. From the calculated energy deposition and the equation of state for the materials in the structure (if known) for the liquid, solid, and vapor phases of the material, a stress wave, which propagates through the surface structure, is calculated. 3. Damage to the surface structure tha* re- sults from the stress wave (spallation, internal fracturing, delamination and debonding), is determined. 4. The response of the whole structure that results from the impulse imparted to it is deter- mined. X-RAY ENERGY DEPOSITION CALCULATIONS The starting point of all X-ray vulner- ability analysis is a calculation of the X-ray energy deposition. 9-33 X-ray Cross Sections The probability of a photon of energy hv traversing a distance of absorbing material x is e*MX, where a is the linear attenuation coef- ficient. This probability also can be written as ^-(m/p)pxj wnere jui/p is the mass attenuation coefficient for the material (see paragraph 4-3). In this representation, p/p is in cm2/gm and pa- is the thickness in gm/cm2, i.e., the mass of ma- terial in the column of 1 square centimeter cross section and x centimeters long. If the monoenergic X-ray fluence inci- dent normal (perpendicular) to the material sur- u> — 1000 hMkeV) Figure 9-31. Photon Cross Sections in Tungsten h»(kcV) E E u LJ C o O < UJ < — 2 1000 h*> (keV) Figure 9*32. Photon Cross Sections in Uranium 9*35 X-ray Energy Deposition Summary The methods described in paragraphs 9-33 and 9-34 and illustrated in Problems 9-3 and 9-4 allow the calculation of curves that show approximations of energy deposition as a function of depth for black body spectra inci- dent on any material, if the cross sections, are known for the material1 INITIAL PRESSURIZATION OF MATERIALS DUE TO X-RAY DEPOSITION An immediate consequence of the deposition of X-ray energy is the rapid heating of the material. This heating causes an initial pressure distribution as a function of depth in the structure. The initial pressurization generates shock waves that propagate through the thick- ness of the shell of the structure. The heating can result in a solid material changing phase, that is, melting or vaporizing. The melting and vaporization cause blowoff, which imparts an impulse to the structure and excites whole struc- ture modes of response. 9-36 Phase Changes Induced by X-ray Heating In most nuclear weapon X-ray environ- ments, the X-ray energy is deposited in a very short time, a few nanoseconds to a few hundred nanoseconds. The material cannot expand appreciably during this time, so the energy deposition process can be considered to occur at a constant volume or at normal material density, p0 . Rapid melting and vaporization are accom- panied by enormous pressure increases. Values 9-93 for enthalpy changes for melting and vaporiza- tion for the metals discussed in the previous sub- section are given in Table 9-17. These values are for one atmosphere pressure. In most X-ray problems of interest the material is initially at very high pressure, so these values can be con- sidered to be only approximate. This approach is not correct for ablators as a class although it might apply to carbon phenolic in a cold en- vironment. Confining the discussion to metals will not restrict the transfer of principles;* I I The rising pressure that results from heating at constant density is illustrated in Fig- ures 9-39 and 9-40 where isoenergy lines of aluminum are shown in pressure-density plots. If the interna! energy is above tne critical energy. 3.016 cal/gm for aluminum, the material can be considered as a vapor. Figure 9-40 shows the high pressure, high energv intercepts with the normal density abscissa (p0 = 2.7gm/cm3). The release adiabats for expansion from density p0 to low density and pressure also are shown in this figure. Expansion along the adiabat results in decreasing internal or potential energy as the material develops kinetic energy during "blow- off." For example, a 6,000 cal/gm energy depo- sition in aluminum at p0 « 2.7 gm/cm3 results in a pressure of about 1.5 megabars (Mb). The aluminum would expand from that state to low pressure and density, with final internal energy of about 3,000 cal/gm and about 3,000 cal/gm of kinetic energy. The 3,000 cal/gm of internal or potential energy is used to overcome the physical and chemical forces that bind the atoms together in the solid. This leads to the concept of heat of sublimation. The heat of sublimation at absolute zero, £$0 , is the energy required to form the saturated vapor from the solid at a temperature of absolute zero. Thus, £JO does not include any energy of kinetic motion. The energy of sublimation generally is a function of temperature becoming larger for larger deposi- tion energies (temperatures). if problem of phase changes in a composite heat shield ablator is more complicated since different deposition profiles, material enthalpy, and thermal conductivities are involved in the calcula lions. While some materials, eg., tape-wrapped carbon phenolic, may behave like metals in a cold environment, the techniques described here generally are not applicable to the description of the Wowoff process in the broad category of com* posite materials that use three dimension (3-D) weaves for heat shields or for X-ray shields that use dispersed high Z materials for loading. Table 9-17. Enthalpy Change for Selected Metals (> 0.139 0.175 0.318 1.15 0.969 Cn 2.(H' 0.0S2 0.1 1<> 0.250 1.10 0.950 w 1.4?- ■ 0.177 0.230 0.350 1.56 13 t 2.0s 0.076 0.102 0:273 0.946 0.7*2 liic pre>sure> as*o«.iiited with these chances at ambient density, i.e.. when p ■ p0 . and P (Mb) = G'g *Mb>, are shown in Table 9-20. From Tabic 9-2Q. aluminum has a sutf nrnauon pressure of about 0.7 Mb at ambient density, corresponding to sublimation energy of. about 2.900 cal g;n (Table 9-17). This point is shown in Figure 9-40. labeled t\ at about 3.000 cal gm. Table 9-20 indicates that the pressure.* associated with vaporization of metaU at ambient density are with some exceptions about 1 Mb. A survey of more than 30 common metal elements indicates that an average of 1 Mb for vaporization is a good approximation, especially if the Griineisen value for the material is uncer- tain. Since a bjr corresponds to 14.7 psi a Mb is the enormous pressure of about 1.45 x 10' psi. Thus, tremendous forces are involved in the pressure gradients associated with metaJ* vapori- zation at ambient density. Table 9-17 shows that vaporization usually involves several thousand calories per gram of energy. High explosive ma- terials (TNT. etc.) release about 1.000 cal/gm. Therefore, on a mass basis there is more energy associated with metal vaporization than with high explosives. Generally, the thicknesses of material evaporated by X-ray absorption is small, and. the total mass of material that is vaporized generally is small. SHOCK WAVE PROPAGATION AND DAMAGE PREDICTIONS The sequence of events for the gen- eration and propagation of a stress wave through the thickness of an aerospace shell and the dam- age produced is illustrated in Figure 9-41 . Cold X-rays are deposited primarily in a relatively thin sheet of material at the front surface (Fig- ure 9-4 la). After the energy is deposited a com- pression wave propagates inward from the front surface, followed by a rarefaction that causes the vapor and liquid to blow off (Figure 9-41 b). This rarefaction also may cause a spall of solid material from the front surface (Figure 9-4 lc). Later the compression wave reflects from the back surface and returns as a rarefaction wave. This rarefaction wave, or the coincidence of this wave with the rearward moving rarefaction may cause the rear surface to spall (Figure 9-4 Id), or may cause fracturing or debonding. This process occurs within the order of a microsecond and generally is complete before the overall struc- tural motion occurs. Hie shock effects are MOS ABSORBED RADIANT ENERGY OR INITIAL PRESSURIZATION (a) RADIATION DURING DEPOSITION OEPTH STRESS (b) 111 " "5 < S t s * .- S J . I f f * /■/ VAPOR AND FLUID BLOW-QPF VAPOR FLUID SOLID STRESS L (C) r * / ■ ' / FIRST SOLID SPALL-FRONT SURFACE STRESS L (d) ym , S S r s * * r A . , S S . , , *■ ,1 u 1 PRECEDING REAR J SURFACE SPALL 2ND SPALL ! Figure 9*41. Sequence of Spallation Following Radiation Deposition 9-104 0.10 DISTANCE INTO TARGET (cm) (IMAGE RESTORED TO DELETED IMAGE OF 1989 DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF EM-1 USING THE DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF DIAGRAM IN THE 1996 UNCLASSIFIED JOHN NORTHROP EM-1 EXTRACTS HANDBOOK.) Figure 9-35PVHIV Energy Deposited in Aluminum by Black Body Spectra 9-94 & I 8 1 o o 81**1 3 & a 8. 8 8 * > 9 3 1 1 a o J2 3 •i 2 1= -ag^>^ c & 3 ft Si It S 1 % 1. 4 i % 4 % % i MXXXXMXXK K • K K K K K M K 55 ft fi © ** S M r* -* «n oo N en r» 4 q *i q i n V> M O 00 *© 00 vo ^ I I I I n i - © 1 i 3 co vo n© m -^ •■* Q MQOONO^tM^OO .2 ■8 J .6 1 10 30 10 29 10 20 I027 H- 1 — io26 u UJ (rt > UJ I028 5 *-* UJ A24 H 10 < tr > o cr .o23 UJ UJ IO22 h- 10 IO20 h- 10 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A PROMPT — \ INELASTIC SCATTERING OF NEUTRONS \ BY NUCLEI OF AIR ATOMS — >- \ \ \ ^W ISOMERIC DECAYS vs. — ™ ^~ \x. "^~ \ >k NEUTRON CAPTURE V \ IN NITROGEN V \ v \ \ \ very high altitude ""^^v — FISSION PRODUCT \. 1 1 11(1111 -8 -7 10 10 Figure 5-8. (0-6 |0-5 ^4 ..-3 ..-2 10 -I I 10 10 10 TIME (SEC) Calculated Time Dependence of the Gamma Ray Output from a Large Yield Explosion, Normalized to 1 kt 10 10 Table 9-26. IB Failure Thresholds for Typical MOS Digital Microcircuits Failure Level Designation Function Gamma, (rads(Si)) Neutron.* (n/cm2 » SC 11"! NAND gate 2 x 10*t — MEM 529 Binary element 14 x icy5* - SC JJ7> Binary element 1. JO5* - MEM 50) Shift register 1. x 10* § — MEM 590 Chopper Not measured** 3 X 1014 SC 1149 Flip-Flop Not measured** 8 x JO14 MC J155 AND/OR gate 2 x 105 (Cobalt*60)++ 3300 25-bit static shift register >5 x 103 (FXR)tJ >8 x 104 (TRlGA)tt 3003 100-bit shift register >2 x JO4 (FXR)tt >5 x JO4 (TRlGA)Jt 1406 100-bit shift register >105 (FXR)« <2.5 x JO4 (TR1GA) 1101 256-random access memory 4 x 104 (FXRV 2 x 104 (TRIQA) 3 x 10n Neutron flu ence- specif led as (E > 10 keV, fission). Suppl) voltage - 20 volts. Supply voltage - 15 volts. Clock voltage - 1 0 volts. Supply voltage - 10 volts. Type of facility in which test was performed. So failures at these levels. 9-109 1600 SLANT RANGE tyardi) Figure 5-1 8. Neutron-Induced Gamma Dose Rate as a Function of Slant Range at a Reference Time of 1 Hour After Burst LIBERIA SOIL " 1 1 ' 1 1 T - - - \ i \ 1 ™ — \ - \ :; \ 1 — \ , V \ \ \ ■ — \l 1 ' ' \ = v ^ 1 1 1 1 1 5 "2 ■ _ o en o UJ I < 5: o o -5= O x •s m m ^ fO <\i dHltH IV 31VM 3SO0 I 3wTI IV 3S0Q ■cf Itf 10" lil ui to o a ui 10' 10' 10 i: - - - i ■ - ■ ■ i - i ■ < ■■ ^\ +\ & — :— — T \~ — i ■ - - j \ ^ ^ - I i \ 11 > i - — »■ -— ' f T — — f ~~*"^ . 2 min - » 1 > ■ ^\3 min ► + ^ 4 — 3 ^5 min. — i — / y ^^ f^\ 7 min " V^^' i * LlS min m J M M if ^\ \ \ \ \ 1 TK30 min "f"T \ T~ \ \ \l \ WvJ 2000 4000 6000 RADIAL DISTANCE FROM SOURCE AXIS (yordt) Figure 547. ^ Base Surge Radiation Exposure Rate 15 Feet Above the Water Surface from a 10 kt Explosion on the Bottom in 65 Feet of_ Water, No-Wind Environment D o (A X < UJ o o (A O UJ u z (A -I < 5 s li. in § «t * U L? «= «a | 5*5 e Eu- | |g.s£ 5 6*' 1^ § i CL fe 0 3 POO 2|1 Si Is — O (JM/l) 31VU 3«nS0dX3 © o — CO O g CO w 5 o *- ai |o < * ^ IO c S c E 4D S 1 So1" S^ £ x o t= o " c C • 5 - g-s o 8 If II < to ~ *- c 2 8 2 m it — s 8U 2* £ & o £ x ~- 5 uj ■£ q a jl 0 . S c r x ifi LU 5- a> O O-" to S 5 o 2 o o c Jls 9 r qj I; o ©-" s «» IS O < ^ - Q» ^ E LL « C a» O IOU. ± o c * O HI ** ••- c & ° £ w •£ *3 "5 * o £ 2 • S c ** CO — ■k o 6 o c ►" £ «> 8 «*-n CO to E £ 2 ♦2 CD i/> to 0> oi o> £ LL > O o V ai C a> ** = u- • 5 Q» O ID "- | *~ © C Q) O) Ul - 00 S ti £ *•- c & ° e — a> o | a 2 *> o .— = 3 e c 5 *;* o a ° c ^ £ 10 0 8 5- E 3 *- CM — -. (A *^ IX g 8 -6 © < ID I S E S 10 if 2 S - = u O « UJ f 3 5 £ - * *■ o >* o c jE |5 JO s ID « id E o 1000 c 100 c w to o TRANSIT TIME THROUGH CLOUD (min.) Figure 5-79. Dose Received While Flying Through a Nuclear Cloud as a Function of Transit Time Through the Cloud (a) Blue Gill Taken From Burst Locale 50 km altitude (b) Teak Taken From Maui (1300 km Away) 77 km altitude (c) Check Mate Taken From Burst Locale 147 km altitude The length along the jreomapnetic field is about 1,000 kilo feet. The heated air within the fireball is highly ionized, with many stria tions oriented along the geomagnetic field. (The dark spots within the fireball are rocket trails.) Figure 1-4. Photographs of High Altitude Bursts, t = 100 sec Chapter 7 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EM?) PHENOMENA The nuclear electromagnetic pulse. (EMP ) is the time-varying electromagnetic radia- tion resulting from a nuclear burst. It has a very broad frequency spectrum, ranging from near dc to several hundred MHz. The generation, of EMP from a nuclear detonation was predicted even before the initial test, but the extent and potentially serious de- gree of EMP effects were not realized for many years. Attention slowly began to focus on EMP as a probable cause of malfunction of electronic equipment during the early 1950s, Induced cur- rents and voltages caused unexpected equipment failures during nuclear tests, and subsequent analysis disclosed the role of EMP in such fail- ures. Finally in 19o0 the possible vulnerability of hardened weapon systems to EMP was/offi- cially recognized. Increased knowledge of the electric and magnetic fields became desirable for both weapons diagnostics and long-range, detec- tion of nuclear detonations. For all these reasons a more thorough investigation of EMP was undertaken. Theoretical and experimental efforts were expanded to study and observe EMP phe- nomenology and to develop appropriate descrip- tive models. A limited amount of dataljad been gathered on the phenomenon and its "threat to military systems when all aboveground testing was halted in 1 962. From this time reliance has been placed on underground testing, analysis of existing atmospheric test data, and nonnuclear simulation for experimental knowledge. Extend- ed efforts have been made to improve theoreti- cal models and to develop associated computer codes for predictive studies. At the same time, efforts to develop simulators capable of produc- ing threat-level pulses for system coupling and resnonse studies have been expanded. This chapter describes the EMP genera- tion mechanism and the resulting environment for various burst regimes. The description is largely qualitative, since the complexity of the calculations .requires that heavy reliance be. placed on computer code calculations for spe- cific problems. Some results of -computer code calculations are presented, but generalization of these results is beyond the scope of this chapter! More complete treatments of the EMP phenome- na may be. found in tne "DNA EMP i Electro- magnetic Pulse ) Handbook (IT (see biblio- graphy ). ENVIRONMENT -GENERAL DESCRIPTION 7-1 Weapon Gamma Radiation The gamma radiation output from a nu- clear burst initiates the processes that shape the development of an electromagnetic pulse. The gamma radiation components important in EMP generation are the prompt, air inelastic, and iso- meric gammas (see Chapter 5). Briefly, the prompt gammas arise from the fission or fusion reactions taking place in the bomb and from the inelastic collisions of neutrons with the weapon materials. The fraction of the total weapon en- ergy' that may be contained in the prompt gam- mas will .vary nominally from about QA% for high yield weapons to about 0.5% for low yield weapons, depending on weapon design and size. Special designs might increase the gamma frac- tion, whereas massive, inefficient designs would decrease it. Change 1 7-1 Compton Current Figure 7-1. (U) The Compton Effect (U) CURRENT E FIELD NET VERTICAL ELECTRON CURRENT DUE TO AIR GRADIENT CAUSES WEAK RADIATED FIELDS DEPOSITION REGION BOUNDARY GAMMA ENERGY INTERACTS WITH AIR AND FORMS RADIAL ELECTRIC FIELD MAX EM RADIATION INTENSITY ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION REGION Figure 7-6. Simple Illustration of Air-Burst EMP Net return "conduction current" TIME Net Compton electron current , TIME i (/*S) Figure 7-8 Comparison of General Waveforms for an Air Burst Radiated field is proportional to time-derivative of current GAMMA HAYS INTERACT WITH AIR AND PROOUCE A RADIAL ELECTRIC FIELD IN ENTIRE DEPOSITION REGION THE VECTOR SUM OF ALL ELECTRON CURRENTS IS IN THE VERTICAL DIRECTION CAUSING A RADIATED AND 80 PULSE DEPOSITION REGION BOUNDARY CURRENT LOOPS FORMED BY ELECTRON FLOW OUTWARD IN AIR AND RETURN THROUGH OR NEAR GROUND CAUSING AZlMUTriAL MAGNETIC FIELD NEAR THE SURFACE (Where ground conductivity exceeds air conductivity, electrons return through ground, causing current loop) Figure 7-9 Simple Illustration of Surface Burst EMP The magnitude of the peak value of the radiated electric waveform for a surface burst is a weak function of yield, varying from about K300 volts per meter at R0 for a 4.2 TJ (1KT) explosion to about 1,670 volts per meter for a 4.2 x 104 TJ (10 MT) explosion. For most cases, a value of 1 ,650 volts per meter may be assumed. At ranges along the surface beyond R0. the peak radiated electric field varies inversely with the distance from the burst. Thus, the magnitude of the peak radiated electric field along the surface may be estimated from the equation R E-— E * R o ' where R0 is the range to the beginning of the radiation region, R is the distance along the sur- face to the point of interest, E0 is the peak value of the radiated field at R0 (assumed to be about 1.650 volt* per meter), and E is peak value of the radiated field at R. 10 kilometers from a 1 MT surface bum £« fe£\ (1,650)% 1,200 v/m. 10 kilometers from a 100 KT surface burst E " (i?) (lf650) % 95° v/m OVERPRESSURE (psi) •f IO5 r l(T r 10s IO2 fi — Ground Conductivities and Yitldt . .o-1 : ----- 1 io'4 — — — 0.1 10"* Figgr«7.27 ~ ■ ■ ' ""' ' ■ ■ ■ tml | IO* IO5 IO6 I07 OVERPRESSURE (poicalt) OVERPRESSURE (pti) 10 F ■* C o z < < Hi CL OVERPRESSURE (poscols) F igure 7-25 Peak Magnetic F Md R; Venus Overpressure for Varying Ground Conductivities and Yields OVERPRESSURE (psi) UJ O -I UJ tZ o E o -J lii -I < 5 < o: UJ CL K? I06 OVERPRESSURE (potcols) Figure 7*26 Peak Radial Electric Field Er Versus Overpressure for Varying Ground Conductivities and Yields SECTION Mil ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) DAMAGE MECHANISMS As described in Chapter 7, the nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is part of a com- plex environment produced by a nuclear envi- ronment. The EMP contains only a very small part of the total energy produced by a nuclear explosion; however, under the proper circum- stances, EMP is capable of causing severe dis- ruption and sometimes damage to electrical and electronic systems at distances where all other effects are absent. ^[ I As with the EMP generation described in Chapter 7, the complexity of the calculation of EMP damage mechanisms requires that heavy reliance be placed on computer code calcula- tions for specific problems, and even these calcu- lations must be supplemented by testing in most cases. Consequently, the information presented herein is largely qualitative and will only serve as an introduction to the subject. More complete treatments of EMP damage mechanisms may be found in the "DNA EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) Handbook" (see bibliography). f| ^ Figure 7-18, Chapter 7, provides a marnx that provides some indication of whether EMP constitutes a threat in a given situation relative to the hardness of a system to blast over- pressure. This section provides a brief descrip- tion of EMP energy coupling, component dam- age, EMP hardening, and testing. ENERGY COUPLING 9-56 Basic Coupling Modes I I There are three basic modes of coupling the energy contained in an electromagnetic wave into the conductors that make up an electric or electronic system: electric induction, magnetic induction, and resistive coupling. Electric induction arises as the charges in a conductor move under the influence of the tangential component of an impinging electric field. The overall result is that of a voltage source distribution along the conductor. One such point-voltage source is shown in Figure 9-65 for a simple conducting wire, where the current I is produced as a result of the tangential component £i of the incident electric field COPPER WIRE CHARGE SEPARATION figure 9*65. ^( Electric Induction in a Copper Wire Magnetic induction occurs in conductors shaped to form a closed loop when the compo- nent of the impinging magnetic field perpen- dicular to the plane of the loop varies in time, causing charges to flow in the loop. This effect is illustrated in Figure 9-66 for a simple wire loop. Here the magnetic field is shown coming out of the plane of the loop. The loop need not be circular, and magnetic induction may occur with any set of conducting components assembled so as to form a loop. I I Resistive coupling comes about indi- rectly as a conductor that is immersed in a con- ducting medium, such as ionized air or the ground, is influenced by the currents induced in the medium by the other coupling modes. In effect the conductor shares part of the current as an alternate conducting path. This effect is illustrated in Figure 9-67 for the simple case of a 9-170 LOOP ANTENNA Figure 9-66. WW Magnetic Induction in a Simple Loop conductor immersed in the ground. The tangen- tial component of the incident electric field E% induces a current density / in the ground. A distributed voltage drop appears along the wire as a result of the current flow in the ground, and this incremental voltage causes current flow 1 in the wire. Current also may be induced in the wire directly by the tangential component of the refracted electric field, shown as E . The re- flected EjMP, £r fir> is also shown in Figure 9-67. The potential importance of these re- flected fields is discussed below. 9*57 Resonant Configurations ■ Hie coupling of energy to a conductor is particularly efficient when the maximum dimen- sion of the conductor configuration is about the same size as the wavelength of the radiation. In tliis event the voltages that are induced along the conductor at various points are all approximate- ly in phase, so the total voltage induced on the conductor is a maximum. The conductor is said to be resonant, or to behave as an antenna, for Figure 9-67. ^B Resistive Coupling as a Result of Currents in the Ground frequencies corresponding to near this wave- length. Since EMP has a broad spectrum of fre- quencies (see Chapter 7), only a portion of this spectrum will couple most efficiently into a specific conductor configuration. Thus, a par- ticular system of interest must be examined with regard to its overall configuration as well as its component configuration. Eash aspect will have characteristic dimensions that determine what part of the pulse (strength and frequencies) con- stitutes the principal threat. * Gross system features that are not nor- considered antennas, such as structural features, beams, girders, buried cable, overhead conduit or ducting, wings, fuselage, missile skins, and any wall apertures, must be considered to be potential collectors and conductors of energy into the system. In particular, radiation that a-171 Table 9-27. Minimum Observed Joule Energy to Cause Burnout Type Minimum Joule Energy Material Other Data 2N36 2N327A 2NJ04J 4.0 x i.6 x 1 2.0 x icr2 io*2 I0*2 Ge Si Ge PNP Audio Transistor PNP Audio Transistor PNP Audio Transistor 2NI308 2N706 2N594 5.0 x 6.0 x 6.0 x 1 to5 o-5 o*3 Ge Si Ge NPN Switching Transistors NPN Switching Transistors NPN Switching Transistors 2N398 2N240 8.0 x ] 1.0 x 1 IO'4 a2 Ge Ge PNP Switching Transistors PNP Switching Transistors MC7I5 8.0 x 1 0'5 Si Data Input Gate Integrated Circuit 2N4220 2N4224 1.0 x 1 3.0 x o*5 IO'5 Si Si RF General Purpose FET VHF Amp and Mixer FET 1N3659 8.0 x 1 to*3 Si Automotive Rectifier Diode JN277 2.0 x IO'5 Ge High Speed Switching Diode JN3720 1N238 5.0 x 1.0 x icr4 icr7 Si Tunnel Diode Microwave Diode 2N3528 3.0 x IO'3 Si Silicon Controlled Rectifier 67D-5010 1.0 x IO*4 G.E. Varistar (30-joule Rating) 6AF4 66N8 J.O x 2.0 x 10° 10° UHF Oscillator Vacuum Tube General Purpose Triode Vacuum Tube 9-174 Table 9-28. Minimum Joule Energy to Cause Permanent Degradation Indicated Designation Minimum Joule Energy ■ Malfunction Other Data Relay 2 x Iff3 Welded Contact Potter'Brurmleld (539) low-current relay Relay ] x Iff1 Welded Contact Sigma (IIF) one-ampere - relay Microammeter 3 x I0"3 Slammed Meter Simpson Microammeter (Model I2I2C) Explosive Boll 6 x ]0T4 Ignition EBW 8. amp. for 10 *tsec detonator, MK1 Squib 2 x 10r5 Ignition Electric Squib. "NS 3.5 watts for 5 /isec detonator Fuel Vapors 3 x Iff3 Ignition Propane-air mixture. 1,75 mm ignition gap second pulses. Capacitors are also fairly hard components. The approximate energies required for degradation of several common components are shown in Table 9-28. M m The minimum energy necessary for oper- auOTial upset is a factor of 10 to 100 less than that which is required to damage the most sensi- tive semiconductor component. Table 9-29 shows the levels required to cause operational upset to some common components to illustrate this factor. ■ ^A gross comparison of the energy re- curred to damage several classes of electrical equipment is provided in Figure 9-69. M m The large range of damage levels empha- sizes the fact that it is important to consider EMP damage criteria early during the design stage of any piece of equipment that might be susceptible. It is also important to realize that energy collected in one part of a system may be transmitted to other parts of the system as a result of the currents that are induced. Thus, it is not necessary that the EMP couple directly to a sensitive component; energy coupled to vari- ous parts of a system may ultimately reach a particular component in sufficient quantity to cause malfunction. With the current state of the art in EMP vulnerability evaluation, the design and hardening of complicated systems requires the joint efforts of systems engineers and profes* sional EMP effects personnel. EMP HARDENING 9-60 System Analysis A general approach to the examination * 9-175 Table 929. Minimum Joule Energy to Cause Circuit Upset or Interference Designation Minimum Joule Energy Malfunction Other Data Logic Card 3 x. i k. O re *- u ffi D 3? co i_ w a> ♦" < re .X k. Q 0) ■s D. c D E 0 CM 8 8 I 8 I i (c/|iVu) i$an*iomd3a f 3 to i- . . .**.-» j .***•* 9-12 July 1973 DNA 3054F *AD763750* URS 7049-lC Rev. 1 AD763750 FOREST BLOWDOWN FROM NUCLEAR AIRBLAST by Phillip J. Morris for Headquarters DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20305 Contract No. DNA-001-72-C-0021 A sensitivity analysis is performed on a computer model of tree response to airblast loading. This effort was undertaken, with success, to reduce the number of input parameters required by the model to those available to the field commander. Based on the results of this analysis, a new prediction technique was developed which determines the extent of tree blowdown and the resultant effects on troop and vehicle movement. The technique was developed for inclusion in DNA Effects Manual Number 1. URS RESEARCH COMPANY AURSSytttmsAftlliatt Mm 7049-10 s LU i < I D> CM LU i < CO I 33 24 ■h o w o A X CQ Q) OS ' s +* CQ 16 8 1 1 1 Rain forest (data) 1 i - • A Data points for — _ _„_ • rain forest ,r \ / • v. __ ./ \ _ •/ \ \ « * / / w \ ' / / V. \ ■ r / k. • / • i s / • • V > > / , ^■Coniferous forest VN. • "** i M (calculated) *■ 1 f t\I . 1 . 1 \ •v •*«* 1 ^%l 400 800 1200 1600 2000 GROUND RANGE (ft) Fig. 8 15-8. Stem-ft per Acre Comparison Between a Rain Forest and a Coniferous Forest, 1 KT 5 M 6 Q M 2 _, \ V 1 1 - \ • \ Coniferous forest — \ \ \ (calculated) \ > • - .Rain for*** - (data) > • • > • • * • \ ' r^ ^m "^ • • - X Data points for rain forest \ \ — \ \ - 1 1 I • \ 1 \ 400 800 1200 1600 GROUND RANGE (ft) 2000 -1. Fig. 15-9. Average Diameter of Stems Down, Comparison Between Ol a Rain Forest and a Coniferous Forest, 1 KT B-14 oooe 7049-10 Fig. 15-46 in DNA-EM-1 (1972) OS w w w o OOOT * aaoB/^j - j^axS en (D J3 o -p E © > •H -P c Q) Vi U a* Q •H CO •H In O d •H i be B-17 000@ 7049-10 Fig. 15-37 in DNA-EM-1 (1972) 18 16 14 12 o o 2 io 2 o 8 Wheeled vel 4 8 12 16 20 AVERAGE STEM DIAMETER (in.) Fig. 15-11. Debris Characteristics Preventing Radial Movement of Vehicles B-18 csnk: • iPP^'v^lf^ £ TECHNICAL LIBRARY of the ARMED FORCES STEC.IAJi WEAPONS PROJECT 5T i ri*«=S»* GH . Dato HANDBOOK O >4 O 00 00 V V on CAPABILITIES of ATOMIC WEAPONS interval; • o . AU'i'- *' j' . . ."* r-tiY n CONFIDENTIAL SECRET 10.3 Damage Criteria 10.31 The tables presented in this section show various target items, their criteria for different degrees of damage and pertinent remarks. The items are listed in alphabetical order for each type of military operation* An attempt is made to give the source of the data by use of numbers to the right of the damage criteria* The key of this numbering system is indicated below: a. Fall-scale test data (including Hiroshima and Nagasaki • .(1) b. Estimates made from scale experiments • ••••••••• (2) c# Theoretical analysis •••••• «(3) d. Consensus of qualified persons ••••••••• (h) 10.32 For those items not included in Table VIII, select the listed item most similar in those characteristics- discussed previously as being the important factors in determining the extent of. damage to be expected. Perhaps the most important item to be remem- bered when estimating effects on personnel is the amount of cover actually involved. This cover depends on several items$ however, one factor is all important , namely, the degree of forewarning, of an impending atomic attack. It is obvious that only a few seconds warning is necessary under most conditions in order to take fairly effective cover. The large number of casualties in Japan resulted for the most part from the lack of warning. • 61 - SEOET 8 M 0? M O a 9 BBS S5 « sis 3 e 8 o o> w •35 ~< * * 9 -rttO O o o o -p «p -p 0} 0) 3fc 2 2 9 « »A I s to a Sf CO Q) Q) 0) bO bO to •# M #f to a »3 »n 0) 22- J3BB »▼ WW WW co ss^ &8^ 2 O (It N cSSd 5J o M 8 -p q *H CD H rH •H Tl B P H *tf «^» r4 •H H | a) *H iH (0 Q ^ jQ a) •§ 3-3^ Q) o 0) no a wi ti .h ng c p p cd b ^ co a, 08 o) h a> a) ca a) CO g W\Q Q<^W 0) 22- $1$ CO p CQ P (0 c o § I I • • to "0 o a CO 8. rH O O 0) *H * >* O w\ 8»l 3 § CO •0*0 CO h CO rH 4 isms Dims PS S3§ 92 co a 88 u G O rH O O *OQnO JSf 1' -a 0 o9 8 -P 8% §11 ££3 > * « a O r w ■p w H to cti H 3252 83 to *C' m v>to CM H 0) SB I" 8 p !-• 0 ^ 3 5 I * lis Bf 51 0.M I* §! on ■d co £ » 1-1 CD fe H to *H O «rt >> 1 &« w *-n^*^ ^*»*-s^> A^y^ "">*"> ^ J r4r4H t-4 H r* ri H <-* H ri r-i CN ^1^^ %^%m*'**' %■**••*-* S^^*****-* *■"• 0J IS (P g en «o, O CO On Q) 1 3 3 TO tO <$1 S3 E §1 co a« 5 I g & I **£ -P cd *-*-* -tvt-4 *8S 88" »OQnO H H | 2 2 u sar sis ^ *? H 9 si "8 *8i CO & J§ « PQ «M & TO H ttj « o m co s* ecus I p 13H33S 3 u •a o u p u J 80 § 5 b O • P « f) O W) «H ;* 0) «H Jj (J 0) 'd H O H C> (B P O ~ ** Xj -P r* r> w bo *rt H °8 i-j © ^ ctf xi *h « a co a ** « -p *o o »a co 8 «y « g£.p . 2* CO 6 c o 'H P o E P CO 0) ap o JJ Jh P ax: bo (0 So II t 8 a-P O ** r 2 ti •s i-' ■rl r. 0' u. c •H P O E P CO CD TJ 0) P ,3 c .-: CO £88 *8 w* $ is! gas 5 j aa.3 «saa «sa^ <\ f^-4" >*^-* »-4 rH rH tO lf\ V\ 5 H H -P fHr-l rH 8§g 3 8B I, R'RS o"X'r? *—"ws«»» OOC* fSt**>* » »A«A * CO 0) 61 3<3 to A P -P it lit J* Effect of irradiation on rate of growth of granulation tissue 100* % 90' 80- 70 60« o AREA COVERED 50 40< 20" lO- ta unirradiated control 1500r radiation exposure 4 3000r 10 30 40 20 TIME - DAYS O. H. Blair, H. A. S. van den Brenk, J. B. Walter and D. Slome, "Experimental Study of Effects of Radiation on Wound Healing", in D. Slome, Editor, "Wound Healing: Proceedings of a Symposium 12-13 Nov., 1959, Royal College of Surgeons", Pergamon, 1961, pp. 46-53. Accession Number : AD0689495 Title : PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON MASS BURNS, 13 - 14 MARCH 1968, Online Information for the Defense Community Corporate Author : NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WASHINGTON D C Personal Author(s) : Walter,Carl W. ; Phillips,Anne W. Report Date: 1969 Pagination or Media Count : 409 Abstract : This workshop was organized to review the problem of burns, and to marshal data that will permit experts in systems analysis, logistics, mass behavior, and government to apply their skills in planning for the defense of an isolated community that has been largely destroyed by a disastrous fire. Participants have been instructed to focus on the education of a non-medical audience, whose principal interest is civilian defense, and on what to expect from thermal trauma; how to recognize the potential survivors, what measures of self-help can decrease the severity of the illness, how and what to provide in terms of food and water supplies, space and personnel, how to educate the public and train surviving personnel during the weeks or months necessary for the devastated community to reorganize itself and become self-sustaining. (Author) Descriptors : * BURNS (INJURIES), SYMPOSIA, PATHOLOGY, CASUALTIES, INFECTIOUS DISEASES, CHEMOTHERAPEUTIC AGENTS, TRANSPLANTATION, PROTECTION, THERAPY, RADIATION INJURIES, POPULATION. Subject Categories : Medicine and Medical Research Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE MASS BURNS Proceedings of a Workshop 13 - 14 March 1968 Sponsored by The Committee on Fire Research Division of Engineering National Research Council and the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army Published by National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. 1969 DC-P-10G0-1 PREDICTION OF URBAN CASUALTIES AND TIIE MEDICAL LOAD FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST L, Wayne Davis Paper prepared under Contract No. N0022867C2276 (Work Unit No. 241 1H) Sponsored by Office of Civil Defense Office of the Secretary of the Army through Technical Management Office U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory Delivered at Workshop on Mass Burns National Academy of Sciences Washington, D. C. March 13-14, 1968 The Dikewood Corporation 1009 Bradbury Drive, S. E. University Research Park Albuquerque, New Mexico 37106 PREDICTION OP UK BAN CASUALTIES AND THE MEDICAL LOAD FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY This work is the result of Dikewood's second iteration at pre- dicting urban casualties due to high-yield nuclear bursts as based on the Japanese nuclear- casualty data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on the casualties experienced from the detonation of the ammonium- nitrate fertilizer on board a ship docked at Texas City in 1947. (The first iteration was published in DC-FR-1028, Ref. 1, and DC-FR-1041, Ref. 2. ) The Japanese data base has now been more than doubled, and much more information is available on the breakdown of casualties segregated by shielding category. (See DC-FR- 1054, Ref. 3.) Urban casualty predictions are made for nuclear detonations in the yield range from 1 to 50 Mt for scaled burst heights of 0, 300, 585, and 806 feet. (See DC-FR-1060, Ref. 4, to be published. ) All casualty curves are given in terms of a reference 12. 5-kt surface burst; they must be scaled to the megaton-yield range by the use of scaling curves which are also provided. It is not presently a field manual for easy casualty predictions. Although calculations may be performed by hand, a computer solution is recommended to facilitate the computations for any but the simplest problems. Plans arc underway to develop the com- puter program. -6- II. CASUALTY CURVES FOR PERSONS IN OR SHIELDED BY STRUCTURES A. DEVELOPMENT OF "BLAST" MORTALITY CURVES FROM JAPANESE AND TEXAS CITY DATA A great deal of new information has been gathered concerning the biological effects of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War IL The data from over 35, 000 case histories were col- lected on magnetic tape, and the results of the analysis were published in DC-FR-1054 (Ref. 3). The Japanese mortality curves for people in or shielded by struc- tures are plotted as a function of overpressure in Figs. 1 and 2 for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. These curves are based on a yield for Hiroshima of 12. 5 kt burst at a height of 1870 feet (scaled height of 806 feet) and a yield for Nagasaki of 22 kt burst at a height of 1640 feet (scaled height of 585 feet). The mortality curves from the Texas City disaster of 1947, separated by shielding category, are given as a function of overpressure in Fig. 3. This surface burst " has been estimated to be equivalent to a nuclear yield of 0. 67 kt. The next step was to develop a set of "blast" mortality curves for a reference 12. 5-kt surface burst. Of course, the ultimate goal was Ammonium-nitrate fertilizer exploded within the hold of a ship wlrtHi was tied up at a pier. -10- to separate all of the biological damage according to the particular weapons effect which caused it (such as blast, prompt- thermal radiation! or initial-nuclear radiation). Then, each effect could be scaled sepa- rately to the higher yield of interest, and the results could be recombined Joint effects cannot be scaled directly. For people in or shielded by structures in Japan, the blast and initial-nuclear radiation were the dominant immediate effects. However, when one scales the results to the megaton range, the lethal effects of the initial-nuclear radiation drop out because the blast effects scale to greater ranges. Thus, the blast mortality curves are the set of greatest interest for persons in or shielded by structures. (Similarly, thermal mortality curves are the ones of greatest interest for the outside- unshielded persons. ) By examining a set of theoretical initial-nuclear-radiation mortality curves developed for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and comparing them with the total mortality curves, it could readily be seen that the initial-nuclear radiation played a large role in the deaths of thermally- shielded people located fairly close-in (at the high mortality levels) in the light structures. It is also an important effect even in the concrete structures. By further comparing the mortality curves for Hiroshima and Nagasaki plotted as a function of overpressure (Figs. 1 and 2), it can -11- readily be seen that the initial- nuclear radiation was more important or dominant in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki. (It requires more overpressure in Nagasaki to produce the same percent mortality for the equivalent shielding category. ) Thus, one would expect the pure blast mortality curves (with no initial-nuclear radiation present) to lie to the right (higher overpressures) of the equivalent Nagasaki curves. As another boundary condition, the Texas City mortality curves, given in Fig. 3, show the results of blast alone for a lower yield of 0. 67 kt. Since a set of blast-mortality reference curves for a 12. 5-kt surface burst is the immediate goal, they would appear to lie to the left (lower overpressures) of the equivalent Texas City curves. Of course, this shift is due to the effect of the longer positive-phase duration at the higher yield; it requires less overpressure to produce the same damage at the higher yield. Thus, by scaling the pertinent shielding categories in Texas City up to 12. 5 kt and by using the Nagasaki curves as the lower pressure boundaries, the pure blast mortality curves for the reference 12. 5-kt surface burst were developed and are shown in Fig. 4. These blast mortality curves for the reference surface burst are drawn as a smooth function of overpressure since this weapons effects parameter is considered to be the controlling factor in determining the mortality level. * It is felt that any deaths in the Japanese data due to the secondary effects of fire have been eliminated by this process. -7- u. CO o £ CO > D o 2 JS (|utDi»d) AjLIIVldOh -8- CVJ e> u. < CO < < (0 Ul > CT O 2 ? 8 (4u»3jtd) Aj.nvj.aoH -9- 10 6 CO < X £ s > o: !j -J lllllilllllllllllllllllllliiillllllflllllllllillilllllllllllllllllil ==f llliflllliilllllliililillllillllilllllillllillilillllllllllllllll 8 :=:::::::::: 8 8 8 e 8 9 8 (♦utDJtd) A4I1UH0II o o CM — -12- co IaJ QC CT H > CD O UJ o -I UJ CO CK 1- O z CD ^™ cr 3 O >- H -1 < ►- cr o 2 H co iiiiilii>£i£§iiliiili|i£iiiii§liliiiiii: illllllilH--^s§-^^^lliiiiillillililillliliilillisl5$i5iili55sll5lili§illlil?llilIlisl.'-. IaJ to en in cc 00 Q. CC i if !iiiss § o w u S S S2ii*3SI3 •I * * s o s (4u»0i»d) A1I1VXU0W -19- CO 3 111 O 2 K D CO o CO co > 2 IK O 3 =* K ^ O >- UJ UJ K O ui CO UJ CO o: £ x:::c::== =;3::r=:rr===r:rr:==:=r::=rr::=ie::=;:r==5 • IIIMI IIMIII IIMIII IIMIII lllllll IIIIMI • ■MM) IIIIIM IIMIII iiiiiii IIMIII ■••••■I lllllll lllllll lllllll lllllll lllllll lllllll lllllll IIMIII IMIIII IIIMII IMIIII IIMIII IIMIII IIIMII IIIMII ••••III IIMIII lllllll IIIMII IIMIII lllllll IIMIII IIIIIM lllllll • •Mil) ••••III IIMIII IIIMII IIMIII IMIIII IIMIH IIIIMI IIIIIM 8 8 (|U»9»d) AXI1V1U0M -24- <0 UJ h- UJ tc o z o o I o UJ o a: o UJ QC O CO UJ CO q: 01 (0 UJ z o § D cr (0 o U. ►- 2 UJ i m o (0 3 CO cr UJ > CO UJ > tr U >- h- -J < CO < o (*u9Dj»d) xnvnsvo -46- HL PROMPT-THERMAL CASUALTIES K>lt OUTSTOE-UNSIUELDED PERSONS A. PROMPT-THERMAL MORTALITY CURVE FOR OUTSIDE- UNSHIELDED PERSONS This curve was much easier to develop than the blast mortality curves (complicated by the effects of the initial-nuclear radiation in Japan) since the prompt- thermal radiation producing flash burns was the dominant effect in Japan as well as for high yields for outside-unshielded persons. Since the predictions of the prompt-thermal exposures in Nagasaki did not correlate well with the burns received, apparently caused by problems in determining the transmissivity, only the new Hiroshima data were used to draw the prompt- thermal mortality curve given in Fig. 19 as a function of 2 the prompt-thermal exposure (cal/cm ) for the 12. S-kt reference burst. This curve, which is also equivalent to the total mortality curve, can be scaled to higher yields according to the method to be described shortly, B. PROMPT-THERMAL INJURY CURVE FOR OUTSIDE-UNSHIELDED PERSONS Before drawing the curves for the surviving injured, all of the data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki were replotted as a function of the 2 appropriate weapons effects levels (cal/cm for prompt-thermal injuries). However, the Hiroshima results were considered to be more reliable than the Nagasaki results for prompt-thermal injuries. -47- 0) CO cr D 00 OJ o 2 cr D CO I c\i § cr UJ x 0. O cr en z o UJ Q. Q UJ Q -I UJ FIG. RVES CO z 3 3 O i UJ Q MB > CO »- 1- _J D < O 3 CO < cr o o u. §S8£S8S8S (iu*9i*d) AwnpNi ao Ainvmow -61- 'H'HWUtrfWIUtUltmf ■t^"tt""TtnTTi''TTtit-- CO I- & 111 o < It CO CO o 2 €C § III 14. Q CO 111 III O > J cc UJ * 3 csi O X • tn z i «J lil < O K CO oe h» o 5 2 o -1 tt < o 2 Gl oc hi X H i H Q. 2 O 3 O >- < O UJ z~ o gl I o - s \ ° cm 2 a: I- . iffa O CO , 8i°! J \ 9 ^^^^^* i z o \ b 3 \ _J O \ V :. O \ 1 3 \^ X. 1 ■ < i i i ** • CM 8 CM CM 8 00 v 2 o 8? M <0 — Z UJ Q §0C UJ o § UJ Q. 8 8 CM 8 8 8 O 12 8 Ainvid o o o CM -75- 3) Light Construction a) Brick Residential Buildings b) Wood- Frame Buildings (Basements) 4) Outside a) Outside -Shielded Category b) Outside-Unshielded Category # 22 20 - 18 - « 16 J 14 a £ 12 1 10 2 £ 8 6 T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, "A macroscopic view of fire phenomenology and mortality prediction/' Dikewood Corp., report DC- TN-1058-1, December 1966 (Paper presented at the Symposium on Mass Fire Research conducted February 6-9, 1967 under the auspices of the Panel N-3, Thermal Radiation, of the Technical Cooperation Program). NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI) Heilbrann /, / Dresden • Hamburg INTENSE FIRESTORMS (GERMAN CELLARS) \ Aamorl Barmen \ Freiberg . Hiroshima * Fukui . Solingen . Friedrlckshefen I Aachen . uim " Toyama • Chosi . Nagasaki 'Fukuyama Darmstadt \ ' \ Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy Over 2,9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec. 1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) = energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water = 252 calories Severe firestorms require 600 BTU/sq. mile/second FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES i i i 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second) Lommasson and Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Predictions, Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1, December 1966. T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction, Proceedings of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation; October, 1967. * If basements arc unavailable, this mortality curve probably lies midway between those for light construction and the outside category, between those for medium and light construction. THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS 327 Figure 7,33a. Thermal effects on wood-frame house 1 second after explosion (about 25 cal/sq cm) . Figure 7.33b. Thermal effects on wood-frame house about % second later. -79- LIST OF REFERENCES 1. L. Wayiie Davis, Donald L. Summers, Milton E. Jenkins, Francis J. Wall, and William L. Baker, Prediction of Urban Casualties from the Immediate Effects of a Nuclear Attack, DC- FK- 102 8, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1963. (Classified) 2. L. Wayne Davis, Francis J. Wall, and Donald L, Summers, Develop- ment of "Typical" Urban Areas and Associated Casualty Curves, DC- FR-1041, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1965. 3. L. Wayne Davis, William L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers, Anal- ysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data, DC-FR-1054, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966. 4. L. Wayne Davis, Donald L. Summers, William L. Baker, and James A. Keller, Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from a High- Yield Nuclear Burst, DC-FR-1060, The Dikewood Corporation; to be published. (Classified) 5. Ashley W. Oughterson, et al. , Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs, NP-3036 to NP-3041 (Vols. I-VI), Army Institute of Pathology; 1951. 6. The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, Report No. 92 (Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi- sion; May, 1947. 7. Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, Report No. 93 (Vols. I-III), U, S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi- sion; June, 1947. 8. J. Rotz, et al. , Effects of Fire on Structural Debris Produced by Nuclear Blast, URS 639-9, URS Corporation; January, 1965. 9. Willard L. Derksen, et al. , Output Intensities and Thermal Radiation Skin Injury for Civil Defense Shelter Evaluation, Special Report for Blast and Thermal Subcommittee of the National Academy of Science, U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; October 16, 1967. 10. Samuel Gladstone (Editor), The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission; 1957 and 1962. 11. J. Bracciaventi, W. Derksen, et al. , Radiant Exposures for Ignition of Tinder by Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Weapons, Kinal Report on DASA Subtnsk 12.009, U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; July 5, 1966. -80- LIST OF REFERENCES (Continued) 12. S. B. Martin and N. J. Alvares, Ignition Thresholds for Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons, USNRDL-TR-1007, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory; April 11, 1966. 13. T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction Proceedings of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation; October, 1967. 14. J. A. Keller, A Study of World War II German Fire Fatalities, DC-TN-1050-3, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966. 15. R. Schubert, Examination of Building Density and Fire Loading in the Districts Eimsbuettel and Hammerbrook of the City of Hamburg in the Year 1943 (20 volumes, in German), Stanford Research Institute; January, 1966. 16. G. H. Tryon (Editor), Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition, National Fire Protection Association, Boston; 1962. 17. C. C. Chandler, T. Storey, and C. Tangren, Prediction of Fire Spread Following Nuclear Explosions, PSW-5, U. S. Forest Service, Forest and Range Experiment Station, Berkeley, California; 1963. 18. Kathleen F. Earp, Deaths from Fire in Large- Scale Air Attack, with Special Reference to the Hamburg Firestorm, CD/SA 28, Home Office, Scientific Advisers1 Branch, London; April, 1953. rr H O 03 Ou O 3 H» fD H« CO Hi H1 H- fD H* 18 3 fD S 3- rr > o rt 0 H rr O rt H o fD H- 3 3 n H* rr 3 3 fD 3 o O 3* cr H O Hi 3* 3" 03 3" • CO 3 0Q *3 cr g Hi »• fD H 03 fD H fD H» o • fD fD rr fD rr H« & o> fD rr rr 0Q 3* o u g fD H ♦o fD CO H 7T co 3 3 Hi crv- O > rr rr •1 fD H* OQ H 3 OQ *- rr W fD ri 3 3* W »-»• H1 fD 3" 3* rr O Hi 03 CO H ^< O 3 H ^ 3- rr a 3 H» CO fD < CO O "O i-h W 03 rt H ' 3 3* O, H- fD O 3* O rr C CL 3 3* 03 Hi fD 9 fD Hi ■i CU 3 03 CL rr fD H« 3 X 3- 03 3 (D i-{ 3* 03 OQ O ri H» n fD 3 fD 03 CO 3 fD rr Hi 3 3* 3 O fD • cr fD • »-*• H rt P« 3 fD H VJ CL above In. • • O CL O h- 3 03 H« H« CL o rr CO CL 3" 3 H* CO fD H» M rr H- Cu 0Q H- H 3 3 rr 3 •3 3 < 03 H 3^ fD OQ CL rr *» 0 03 Hi H- 03 fD 3 OQ Ou T3 H OQ rr > fD rr H- 03 ►Q f 3* rr < rr CO *< rr fD 03 O O O rr O VJ 3 • Hi rr ? 03 fD O rr Ou CL M O o 3 O 3 3 H 3 S fD 03 O H rr 3- O H CO rr H-« 3 3 fD fD rr Hi O fD a H 03 H 3 H- 3 3* fD fD OQ H- T3 fD O <• H fD CO 03 3" 03 rr rr CO • O H ^< O 3 CO fD H H* H 3 O fD CO O H« < 3" O H- 0) cr H- 3" fD rr fD rr fD OQ • H 3 rr 3 ^ 03 3 3 03 H» 03 fD O rr 3 3 H» o < C/3 CO H- H- 73 03 H- fD V- 0) rt 3 r-» H, 3 H« OQ r-» < fD < fD Hi • • 3 3 O 03 03 "O H« 03 *l O •~\ 3 v: H* O O H o 3 • fD H- fD *3 H) 9 3 (D 3 fD 3" Hi a CL /-N 03 03 CL 3 H- 03 »i ^ O Hi O- H 3 03 • O CL rr 03 OQ O CO fD o as O- H rr H« fD ^ CO H- < rt 1 H < CL cr H« 3 3 CO H fD H« rr 3- 03 3 3 fD 03 fD CO fD 3* C/J 0) 3* 3 fD CO H» fD rr • fD CO 03 H« CO 03 3 < 3- fD • O < 3 03 H* rr H- 3* J—1 fD 3 0Q CO 3" 03 3 CO 3-v: 3- 3- fD H*0Q 7? 3* O 3 rr rt • fD 3 fD rr 03 CO rr «• O fD O 03 H» CO 2: fD 03 fD CL M CO CO CO H- < rr cr 3 rr I—1 3 rr < *a 03 rr CO 03 3 V extreme! 50 O H Cfl fD fD CO 03 3 H- 3* fD rr fD fD fD < 03 fD O 1 3" H- 0 M fD rr fD H O 3 H CO rr fD 3 i M 3 O 03 «.% S < Hi O 3 rr fD o CD 3" H Ou 3 a 3 3 OQ O rr H» co S fD 3" 3 fD 3* CL 3 rr CO < O O H £ 03 3 rr Hi ^ ^ H o rr v < fD rr fD fD H O Hi >— » rr Hi fD fD H* fD O rr rr 3 O H» Hi h o fD 3 H-» v- H« rr 3* fD H« H O H» 3 OQ 3" 3* 03 O 3" H* h-» CO fD CO rr O 03 03 CO 03 3 3* 03 O o CO 3* 3 3- H* (D fD H« 03 O 03 3- > 3 3 •a 3 rr «• CO *1 Hi fD rr rr K ■ *o fD O VJ rr c O 3 0 fD fD O CO 3" fD H H« rr ri 3 03 < fD *• 3 fD C I—1 O fD a H- 03 03 CO H* < 03 fD fD o H» K»« as 3 rr CO H* rt 3* 3 ro *< rr • 00 fD CO cr CO H ♦a 3 fD H 3 CO fD rr n fD 03 O rr • CL H H 03 3 O fD fD Hi O 3- D- CO O fi> fD H 3* 2 D- 3 3 03 i-1 M ^ 3 3- O H 03 fD fD CO H» O fD H« OQ H fD fD cr fD 3 a. 03 3 rr 03 3 H O Hi Hi 3 (D C X fD H-C 3 CO • H* H« O CL «« M 03 H H 3- rr fD rr 3 fD 03 CO 3 OQ rr Hi i*l rr O H O 3 03 Hi H« cr 3 fD a> Hi O H 3 H» H« O *• H» h-« CO rr 3* 03 •"J 3 03 cr 3 o 3 CL rr H* Hi rr 03 CO ri 3 *< 3 O O h fD < fD 3 rr H« 3 0Q C w rr H 3 o 03 < «• 3* 3 fD H 3* 3- fD OQ «# O OQ O o c fD rr rr *r fD ^ fD O fD 03 H- •a N-/ H 3 H rr rr rr rr fD CO 3- fD rr 03 c rr Hi rr 03 r1 0) rr H» 3* H- H* 3 fD fD 03 3- CO H» 03 H« 3 3 03 CO 03 3* 0) CO H- O CO 3" r* fD H» O- co < t-» CO fD 03 3 H> 03 cr fD fD < < rr K rr cr CO O fD 3* Hi ri fD O 3 0) cr o o rr H OQ H O fD H 3 3 o 3 3 3 O 03 CO fD fD 3 fD 3" H» fD O H 03 OQ H O H« cr H* Hi 3* O 3 03 0Q ^ 3*0Q vj O H- CO rr o CO rr rr H-1 fD fD CO rr rr 3" fD 3 fD 03 rr fD CO CO CO 9 •0 03 3 r-» 03 H- CO OQ 3* 3 CL § cr c o 3 cr < H« CO 3 i— • • rr rr O fD 3 Hi OQ CO 03 r-{ rr h-» OQ O H • rt 0 ?r 3 fD fD O rt 3 < O 3 fD H 3 h-» fD ro fD O Hi rr O • H» ^ v$ 3- rr rr CO I-* 3- O c rr rr fD 3 rr H H- Hi fD 3- Hi OQ N* v— /» fD 0) • O a> 3" CO 3* 3 03 O 3 HiOQ O 3" • ■ 3 K rt rt 3 CO fD H« CO 3 Hi H- fD O rr ^ 03 H rr M Hi O H- 3" 1 03 03 O O O H* 03 1— » 3- 0) fD rt fD H H rr 3- < CO H» fD O 3* CD fD O 3 CO r* < fD fD fD m CL H- rt o »i H« 03 THE BURN SURFACE AS A PARASITE WATER LOSS, CALORIC DEMANDS, AND THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS Carl Jelenko, III, M.D. Department of Surgery University of Maryland School of Medicine and Hospital Baltimore, Maryland Water is Lost through Burned Skin* A burn may be thought of as a parasite, drawing from its host water, protein, and other substances which the host needs for its survival. An uninjured person who is not perspiring may lose from 1.15 to 2.0 quarts of fluid a day through his lungs and skin, »2»^>5>1^ depending on the temperature of his environment. The fluid losses from a burn wound are far in excess of those from intact skin and may amount to 2 gallons per day, or more if the burn is large enough. 2, 5, 6, 17,21 If, during the first 48 hours after injury, no more fluid is given to an extensively burned patient than he would need in health, the un- compensated loss of fluid from his circulation may cause shock, and if sufficiently severe, death. After the first 48 hours, the danger of shock is lessened, but inordinate fluid losses will continue from the burn surface. Heat is Lost Necessitating a High Food Intake To make matters worse, evaporation of moisture from the wound surface saps not only the body's water stores but its energy stores as well. When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re- sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more water loss and the more heat or energy loss.** *The majority of the paragraph headings in this article were supplied by the editors. **Al though the core temperature of the human body approximates 39.5 C, the body surface averages only 32 C. At any given temperature, water can be evaporated by applying a certain number of heat calories. At 32 C, one gram of water can be evaporated if 0.579 large calories of heat is invested. 68 How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished? Unfortunately, we do not possess at present any practical means of reducing the loss of water from a burn to the level of loss from intact skin on a scale suitable for use following a holocaust. Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462 August 2008 By Patrice Wendling Elsevier Global Medical News CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit. The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association. "Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap for burn wounds," he said. Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal. "I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral base." Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial- and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed. Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital, Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll to expose a clean surface. 69 EVAPORATION OF WATER FROM 3RD DEGREE BURNS AREAS mgm/cm'/hr LH20 lots mgm/cmyhr N days from the literature 40 22 days from current studies Fig. 2. Schema Illustrating the gradual decrease in eschar transmissivity with time. SOME PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION AGAINST BURNS FROM FLAME AND INCENDIARY AGENTS Janice A. Mendelson, M. D. , M. M. Sc, (LTC, MC, U. S. Army)* Chief, Biomedical Department Biophysics Laboratory Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland I. Flame Agents A, Their Nature Flame agents are special blends of petroleum products, usually in thickened form, that ignite easily and can be projected to a target. Methods for the throwing of flame were devised by the Greeks in 429 B.C. (Siege of Plataea) when destructive flammable mixtures of pitch and sul- fur were used. "Greek fire" composed of pitch, sulfur, and naptha, to- gether with a method of projecting it through brass tubes or in red-hot balls of stone or iron, were developed about 670 A.D. in the arsenals of Constantinople. A type of flame thrower used on ships was constructed, with pressure furnished by a water engine. It is thought by some that this contained an igniting substance (quicklime or phosphide) that acted in the presence of water, but this has not been proven. The Germans in World War I were the first to use flame projectors. All combatting nations developed and used flame throwers extensively in World War II. Fire bombs were first used in the second world war. 178 Ml (Napalm). Ml thickener is a coprecipitated aluminum soap. The name was derived from the naphthenic and palmitic acids that were its major constituents. Napalm B, used by the Air Force, is intended as a replace- ment for the M2 thickener. It is not true napalm, being com- posed of polystyrene, gasoline, and benzene. It is not a gel, but is a sticky, visco-elastic liquid. It has a longer burning time than the Ml, M2, and M4 thickened fuels, and, therefore, possibly better incendiary action. Unlike the Ml, M2, and M4 thickeners, which can be quite easily brushed off the skin, the Napalm B is sticky and the polystyrene itself burns, its burning time being longer than that of the petroleum products. Therefore, this does have the required characteristics to produce more severe burns than unthickened fuel. 180 B. Defense Against Flame Agents (Protective Coverings) The primary objective of individual defense against flame5 is to keep particles of burning fuel off the person. The use of almost any available cover when a flame attack appears imminent is recommended. Troops are instructed to remain covered with no skin exposed until after the flash and flame in the high heat zone have been dissipated and then throw off the cover and remove any burning particles from their clothing. Blankets or items such as an army field jacket have been shown to give real protection. Two thicknesses of the Army shelter half tent will hold burning fuel for more than 10 seconds. Tent canvas and truck tarpaulins which have been treated with fire-resistant material will withstand direct hits with burning fuel and will hold the burning particles for sufficient time (more than 30 seconds) to permit personnel to escape. Foxhole covers improvised of brush with as little as 2 inches of earth on top will successfully withstand burning fuel. The Army plastic poncho is not a satisfactory cover because it melts rapidly and burns when hit with flaming fuel. This would increase the severity of burns received by an individual. Foxholes and weapon positions can be modified to afford adequate protection for anything except a direct hit with a fire bomb. II. Incendiaries: 1" A. Their Nature Incendiary agents are compositions of chemical substances designed for use in the planned destruction of buildings, property, and materiel by fire. They burn with an intense localized heat. They are very diffi- cult to extinguish and are capable of setting fire to materials that nor- mally do not ignite or burn readily. Although there are tactical appli- cations for incendiary munitions, they have played primarily a strategic role in modern warfare. The first practical model of an incendiary artillery shell was developed by the French in 1878. The mechanics of fire-starting involve three essentials in addition to a source of oxygen: (1) Source of heat acting as a "match" to in- itiate the fire, (2) A combustible material which serves as the kindling, and (3) The fuel. The incendiary supplies the match and the kindling, and the target supplies the fuel. Modern military incendiaries may be divided into three categories: (1) Oil, (2) Metal, and (3) Combination of oil and metal. The incendiary bomb (as distinguished from the fire bomb filled with thickened fuel) has been considered a strategic rather than a tacti- cal weapon and has been used mainly against rear-area and supply installa- tions. Incendiary shells and incendiary grenades are primarily tactical weapons, as are the flame munitions (fire bombs and flame throwers). Large incendiary bombs are used against point targets such as air bases and factories. Small incendiary bombs are usually dropped in clusters. 181 2. Metal incendiaries include those consisting of magnesium in various forms, and powdered or granular aluminum mixed with powdered iron oxide. Magnesium is a soft metal which, when raised to its ignition temperature (623° = 1,150°F), burns vig- orously in air. Magnesium has a burning temperature of about 1,982°C (3,600°F) depending upon the rate of heat dissipation, rate of burning, and other factors. Its melting point is 651°C, so it melts as it burns. The liquid metal, burning as it flows, drops to lower levels, igniting combustible materials in its path. Burning stops if oxygen is prevented from reaching the metal or if the metal is cooled below the ignition temperature. Magnesium does not have the highest heat of combustion of the metals, but none of the other metals have been successfully used singly as air-combustible incendiaries. In massive form, magnesium is difficult to ignite. Therefore, a hollow core in the bomb is packed with thermate and an easily ignited mix- ture which supplies its own oxygen and burns at a very high temperature. ^ a. Thermite incendiaries . ^ Thermite is essentially a mixture of about 73 per cent powdered ferric oxide (Fe203) and 27 per cent powdered or granular aluminum. The aluminum has a higher affinity for oxygen than iron has, and if a mixture of iron oxide and aluminum powder is raised to the combustion temperature of aluminum, an intense reaction occurs: Fe203+2AL-* AL203+Fe + heat. Under favorable conditions, the thermite reaction pro- duces temperatures of about 2,200°C (3,922°F). This is high enough to turn the newly formed metallic iron into a white hot liquid which acts as a heat reservoir to prolong and to spread the heat or igniting action. b. Thermate incendiaries . ^ The thermate mixture com- posed of thermite with various additives is used as a com- pouenc in igniter compositions for magnesium bombs and as a filler in incendiary hand grenades. There are several different types of thermate. The more recent ones con- tain barium nitrate as an oxidizer. The thermate core is ignited by the primer. This burning core then melts and ignites the magnesium alloy body. The incendiary action is localized, since there is little scattering action. 182 B. Defense Against Incendiaries (Fire Fighting) Defense against incendiaries, as outlined in a U.S. Army publication is summarized as follows: Incendiary bomb clusters may contain a per- centage of high explosive incendiary bombs so precautions should include this possibility. A brick wall offers adequate protection against small explosive incendiary bombs. Incendiary bombs can be scooped up with shovels and thrown into a place where no damage will be done. Sandbags and sandmats can smother bombs and reduce effects of fragmentation. Loose sand helps to smother fires started by the bomb. Whether or not sandbags and sandmats are used, water or fire extinguishers are employed immediately. Water extinguishers should not be used directly on oil, because this tends to spread the fire, but water can be used against in- cendiaries such as phosphorus. Water confines the spread of the fire by wetting down the surrounding area, but despite some published advice to the contrary, water should not be used on magnesium incendiaries, be- cause of the resulting explosive effect. If hot enough, phosphorus par- ticles ignite when exposed to oxygen in the air. Control them by keeping them covered, preferably with water. III. White Phosphorus White phosphorus is often classified as an incendiary, but is ac- tually used primarily as a screening smoke or as an igniter for other munitions. At a sufficiently high temperature, it reacts with air and water vapor to produce a dense cloud of phosphorus pentoxide, a very effective screen. It has two disadvantages for this use. One is that because of its high heat of combustion, it tends to rise in a pillar- like mass, especially in still air. The other is that it is very brittle, and the exploding munitions in which it is used break it into very small particles that burn very rapidly. These disadvantages were somewhat overcome by the development of plasticized white phosphorus (PWP). PWP is produced by melting WP and stirring it into cold water, resulting in a slurry of WP granules about 0.5 mm in diameter. The slurry is then mixed with a very viscous solution of synthetic rubber, thus coating the granules with a film of rubber and separating them from each other. When PWP is dispersed by exploding munitions, it does not break into such small particles, the burning rate is slowed, and the tendency of the smoke to pillar is reduced. Despite the fact that the characteristics of WP and PWP somewhat limit their applications as screening smokes, their military uses include incendiary and anti- personnel effects, because burning particles of WP can start fires in many combustible materials and can produce burns. 183 IV. Medical Aspects The one agent about which the most confusion seems to exist is white phosphorus. Its melting point is very low, 44°C (111°F). When it is placed in munitions it is in solid form, and when the munition detonates some will be liquified because of heat. When white phosphorus is exposed to air, it burns if the temperature is over 34°C (93°F). Burning white phosphorus yields phosphorus pentoxide which combines with water to yield phosphoric acid. In practice, white phosphorus particles are removed, and the burns treated as any burns. It is often stated or implied that white phos- phorus burns are much "more severe11 than other burns, but this depends on the method of quantitation and the form of the white phosphorus encountered. Particulate white phosphorus will indeed cause third-degree burns, but these may be scattered small burns. There are few other burns that are combined with explosive fragmentation wounds. Liquid white phosphorus is difficult to remove, penetrates clothing and indeed can cause severe burns. However, unignited particulate white phosphorus can easily be brushed off by the alert individual unless it is partly imbedded. 184 In 1945, Walker £t a_l. , studied the effects of ignited 25 mg. white phosphorus pellets. ^9 These burned for about 22 seconds on both glass and the skin of an anesthetized pig. They found that when WP was burned on glass, 79 per cent of the phosphorus was found in the smoke, and when burned on skin, 66 per cent of the phosphorus was in the smoke. The residue on glass contained 9 per cent of the phosphorus as acid, while on the skin, 24 per cent was acid. On glass, about 33 per cent of this acid was orthophosphoric acid, whereas on skin, 93 per cent was ortho- phosphoric acid. These differences were attributed to available water. About 2.0 mg of the WP was converted to red phosphorus on glass, and about 1.8 mg on skin. An average of 2.7 mg of the phosphorus entered the skin as orthophosphoric acid. 185 ro h-» sO SO as Cn pd p. »rj • • • • ( T> 9 >i hh O to rt ^ 9 |^l to H H O 2 > fi 9*T3 9* to to to »i to to rt • h-» (D o *o 9 3 9 »§ z to 9* rr • «< O CO CL > • CO w to to to O »i ti • *rj CO < hh W 9 * C to 1 s U o 2 w to W) to to M 9 ii 9 C_ 9 hh h** H» CO D ft* to • z Co - CL Z rt H» CO h»» * 5 • ^ rt i O o *<: < • rr CL H« zr & zr S 9* to : to s: >^ n> o to to to o rt to k. ° 9 9 3 hh to H- X H* rr > v H» • h*» 9 W < h-» ii co to ii O - O H« CL cl fl> to i ii 3 a Q) << to h-* to 9 oo n *4 ro^ 3 i-» L-i. o to j> * o •— ■o S — c o C 0 ii Ln O to rt w •i M O to c_ O * 9* 9 • O ro oo h»« M O i-» • to to M l-» H« to to o-v- -as 1 o CO o co to to h»« rt hh Co ■P* h- rt > H- 3 h-"0 CO 9" o o ri H- •i co CL so rt ft to rt to M fJQ to < CO as • ii 9" 9 H* CO to 0) O PC CO «< > a. X O G 9 hh h»- • O H- CL to h to to h- hh to H > O XJ h- rt O h- rtf h-» 9 H- I-* • v* h» rr %• jj* *♦ rt CL nj H 9 *• 9 H- O 9* O co to 00 O £ *o • CD O »i *i rt a 9 9 ^ 5* o o to to CL hh • zr > to to ii n >a 1 3 o f E* B ~ O CO rt 52 O to H • >i p- to • • C 3 ** M C o h-» S O to SO CD 8F *d to so H o h- to co •P* 1 O M Ln to hh to 3 Cn o cl ►1 ^ O O to V- 03 • O H« O > • 9" to rt ii 9 o to 00 • t* zr O < rr to to rt to O i-h to to »-* m rt O • to »i H- ii > H> rt v< 9 a 9 CD a O ii to zr r* H- C • to hh ^ CO to oo 9 < to z ►i » co ii 00 H- *-* ft w to to to CO o H 9* • to o H« Co to O to I-* z to rt § o Cn n so 00 9 cn rt i-1 > as to CL •o l • h-» 3 as o 9 H. o !* >sj as B • to rt hh § CD W O N> *< ^3 co hh -o hh i rt • to a o o i-* H • »i CO n to rt i to to rr *v 9" h-* o O 9 *i rt to »• zr Ht* O o 2! od m to i O • • l-K > »i 8 rt cr ro c to »i oo a> to 3 o h** CO CO II cr* ^i to to S o § o hh ii to CL O O CL O to CO *o zr to to rt to 9 rt co to 9 co O < ro cr o *o to O to *a 9 ii *V rt rt h- to H- H o o to rt to £ co h-» CL H- to co to < to to to ft I-* to CL O • to co to a ii to *a o ii rt to CL o hh zr to 3 o h-* CO H« CO CO o to rt 3 o CO rt O zr rt to to rr *0 rt zr zr zr o to to co ri v- >o H- 9* o to ii to o 0Q to 9 to to co O ii 9 co O to rt o O o *a 9 "O •• to H CO ii C to h-» CL hh p. CD ft rt h- to O 9 rt to ii h-« to h-« to *< rt C ii to CO CL rt to • zr 9 to rt ft H'H hh 9* 00 9 §• to i 9* O co 9* O ri C CO I cr c n o o 9 CO to co CL o to o 9 to CL ft co ri to rt zr to •o < ii to c to CL 9* < «• H« to ft 9 to to rt 9 to CL 1J CL 9* • »o O ri CO to *a H < zr zr to o to 9 M n rt c to co co Cn 9 rt to o »i h> e s. to 9* 9 H- rt rt to O O *9 ^O zr *o o to co ii no 9* CO O C ri h- C hh CO to rt p- to 9 co c O ri H* r* 9 to rt co h«» O to 9 9 CL 9* D) h»« CO ft CO cr to o to q 9 1 I J3 E J t .2 e a* u c 8 S 5 o o H B - i o I H '1 •\ y. .' 1 1 '. LLVM X *+ • ' e # fa/d ^ SAlO **<£!• !LJ *4 »'LL^ t > A OfAi \? C7 % J sV>'i s§* ^ ■ r* -*> ♦ ? v*^ >/*» y, ■■>* w Lti •* _ • -» -•'jm.W h-^SjTr-Tn' S3 .». -v ': ^i* 0B ■MM '/ ~d>- 'yJ. '**r * •431 N-J - ^V- J: ',.. £ 5K :^«j *Vr .7 ■?'** r'J <- •*-* >** . * YM *,* ■ * 'H **~ x «-* .i_ W5 ^ ' . :& - +M K 'i^«r* hi s£ #*-. V 4 £i ♦ ^ \ ->*t BW *- *if - ** »«^ 1> **" >•*•■$* MP ^1 aitf *- r ^?«*< &*', A *v! ><2l ^ **fc m*d 5K s -"*:* ^ • r i^„.*J K*' nrviy #^i **' »5?^ NAGASAKI NP-3036 MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS Chinlei Middle School before the explosion. %•«* Chinzel Middle School after the explosion. 500 meters from the center* COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES 243 Figure 5.9 1. At left and back of center is a multistory, steel-frame building (0.85 mile from ground zero at Nagasaki). ....... . i| 2 cms The National Archives ins ■ 1 T 2 ' | */.: HO TlSJUb c 3rd October, 1963- nCSTRICTEP HOME OFFICE £W ?^ HOxxs|nfc SCffiNTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH CD/SA 116 HBSBARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS With Special Reference to the Peg of London Tubes as Shelter by F. H. Pavry Summary and Conclusions The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises many problems, and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken place from time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were avail- able - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide relatively safe shelter or not. The more recent research here described showed for the first time that a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure on^y about ^ as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground, (in addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.) Large-Scale Field Test (1/40) at Suf field, Alberta (6) The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. reportv~'. The decision of the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E. used the 100-ton explosion in 1961 to test, among other items, the model length of the London tube, at 1/40th scale, that had already been tested at V117 scale. Blast Entry from Stations There was remarkable agreement with the ■/ 11 7th scale trials: ••maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of ^rd the corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pres- sures in the stations were about ^/6th those in the corresponding incident blast w. (6) /40th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System. A.W.R.E. Report K2/G2. (Official Use Only.) 100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London Underground tube at Suf field, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961 Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "l/40th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System" , Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.) 200 FT FROM GROUND ZERO 400 FT FROM GROUND ZERO 100 PSI OUTSIDE 30 PSI IN TUBES 15 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS 20 PSI OUTSIDE 7.2 PSI IN TUBES 4.3 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS Aldwych Underground tube station as Blitz shelter, 8 October 1940 ■**M fte : »' ; «***V* > f * ~m /S%*3^ •t * s \ THOSE WHO WENT TO SHELTERS began a new kind of ni^ht-liie. Some took over the 'lubes, camping out in this fashion — Elephant and Castle Station, iith November. 1940. CO < CO H O § § Pi CO 1 0 1 .2 "8 «•* ,2 CO i s R CO CM CD w _ CD 3 s « | i« fi to 3 JO g o ■3 3 o g o CM <3> lO CO lO CM GO CM CO If) CO 00 fH ^« GO ^COOiOCQIOCOO H HOM^U) t* MOOWOCONOJCD «H CM CM CO CO ■*• IO CO t> rH rH CM CM CO b- 00 b- CM 00 00 00 • •••••* OHN^^(D00H N«50tt)03MOW • •*■•••• Nrjl O O o o o o o o CO I I o ft) g a £ I Q TRINITY GROUND ZERO 8000 R/hr at 1 hour 1.4 R/hr at 57 days 11 Sept. 1945 0> o o t/> o a x a> 5 o o o ■o c D u a> •■IB ■a «. o a> M "0 C D o o "5 II f T5 ~ * 5 hs 0 5 "D c to 0) > c CO 5 o 0 0 0 -Q 0 D a> M u O O z U "5 o c CO 00 • -C ,J_ c 0 k. Q£ E 0 J> £ ^^ -Q «/» a> o 0 mm 0 D _D t/> O >* a> D 0 ■*" .Q ■D > LU $ c 5 ■D to JU D 0 £ 0 "o * u mm "55 to -S5 -o 0 «c D "5 c VI <•> £ i— o •^» Q- •, I • J* mm i— CD < to "5 > o a> to 0 ■n u u o to c E I 0 0 i— k." *il a 0 0) o o 0 Nl ZmZ -»— • c t/> 0) 3 5 c o ■a 0 O o u c to D • > a ._ o 0 0 -* vi u 0 "ai u 0 h- o £ <^» «* SANDIA REPORT SAND2009-3299 Unlimited Release Printed May 2009 Analysis of Sheltering and Evacuation Strategies for an Urban Nuclear Detonation Scenario Larry D. Brandt, Ann S. Yoshimura Executive Summary A nuclear detonation in an urban area can result in large downwind areas contaminated with radioactive fallout deposition. Early efforts by local responders must define the nature and extent of these areas, and advise the affected population on strategies that will minimize their exposure to radiation. These strategies will involve some combination of sheltering and evacuation actions. Options for shelter-evacuate plans have been analyzed for a 10 kt scenario in Los Angeles. Results from the analyses documented in this report point to the following conclusions: • When high quality shelter (protection factor -10 or greater) is available, shelter-in-place for at least 24 hours is generally preferred over evacuation. • Early shelter-in-place followed by informed evacuation (where the best evacuation route is employed) can dramatically reduce harmful radiation exposure in cases where high quality shelter is not immediately available. • Evacuation is of life-saving benefit primarily in those hazardous fallout regions where shelter quality is low and external fallout dose rates are high. These conditions may apply to only small regions within the affected urban region. • External transit from a low quality shelter to a much higher quality shelter can significantly reduce radiation dose received if the move is done soon after the detonation and if the transit times are short. a*30 x -a III g 20 O 3 "5 i^ a. o O 10 Evacuation From SF«10 i i •> 150 rem »>300 rem £ 0 2 4 6 8 10 Time Evacuation Begins (hrs) Figure 12. Departure time sensitivities for informed evacuations from shelters with SF=4 Mj) Sandia National Laboratories Radiation protection factors in modern city buildings DCPA Attack Environment Manual, ch> 6, panel 18 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REPCRT - AFSWP NO. 507 RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FRCM SURFACE BURSTS OF VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS by D . C . Borg L. D. Gates T. A. Gibson, Jr. R. W. Paine., Jr. MAY 195^ HEADQUARTERS , ARMED FCECES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT WASHINGTON 13, D. C. e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drasti- cally reduce the lethally hazardous areas* A course of action involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take shelter before fall-out commences. f . Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub-basement of a large building could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will permit this to be done safely. vii Total Isodose Contour Table II : 500r from Fall- -out to H+50 Hours Yield (MT) 15 1 10 60 Downwind extent (mi) Area (mi ) 180 5^00 52 V70 152 3880 3^0 17,900 BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR HEARIiN GS BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON BADIATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEBGY COMEESS 01 THE UNITED STATES EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGKESS FIRST SESSION ON BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959 PART 1 Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 43338 WASHINGTON : 1959 H O J J < fa H CO D W u V 6 o m m o o 00 u %) a 4) *-• h »* <* 5: c ^ H (Vj H H r-l H M > 3 « o o "0 d o a (M CO H D 0 fa H CO p « u V g ~ in o o m in o ^>o ^f en >o ^ o d o o o »-. d W > 73 i* 0 a »—* CM i— t ^H i-H t-H 00 00 33 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 197 the induced radiation in uranium 238. We can refer to a British report which indicates that around 60 percent of the total activity at 4 ciavs— activity m this case is the number^f_disintegrations — is due to the uranium 239 and neptunium 239~that are produced, as the ^British say, m either large or small weapons. I believe part of the hump on the curves m tiie early times, say around 4 days, is largely (lue to this. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 205 Dr. Tkiffet. Yes. I thought this might be an appropriate place to comment on the variation of the average energy, it is clear when you think of shielding, because the eft'ectivenessoTshielding depends directly on the average energy radiation from the deposiCTmatgmll As 1 mentioned, IJr. (Jook at our laboratory has done quite a bit_o£ work on this. What it amounts to is that at one hour the average energy is about one Mev. This appears, by the way, in the tables that are in my written statement but that I did not present orally. Representative Holxeteld. Mev. means? Dr. Triffet. Million electron volts. At 2 hours it drops to 0.95. At a half day, to 0.6. At 1 week it drops to 0.35. Then it begins to go up again. At 1 month, it is 0.65, 2 months 0.65. The meaning of this is simply that there is a period around 1 week when if induced products are important m the bomb, there are a lot of radiations "emanatTng from these, but the energy is low §o it operates to recface the average energy in this period and shielding is immensely more "effective. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 217 Strontium 90, for example, has 33-second krypton as its birth predecessor ; cesium 137 derives from a fission chain headed up by 22-second iodine, followed by 3.9-minute xenon. Because of their vola- tile or gaseous ancestry in the fireball or bomb cloud a number of the high- yield fission products are formed in finely divided particles. Some of these are so small that they are not subject to gravitational settling, and in fact they remain suspended in the earth's atmosphere for many years, providing8 that they reach the stratosphere at the proper latitude. In any event such fission products would be depleted in the local fallout. For example, the irradiation of uranium238 with Jjow, neptunium 239,7a- 1^^^I^35^^^SlB[^EI^^^_^^E "e^sHmaTesT*^ oOS^sidual ^ctijity^ajEaw^^days, afterlTbomb alFf onffipnT" At_higher neutron energies, such as certain types of thermonuclear weapons ■produce" naturaT~uranium undergoes an^nT^nj ^reaction whicfi"Lco'mpetes "witn Tast ^fission in T?^_ The data of B. jrHowertonTshow ^thatjp238 hajsjiffesion OTp^s^sectic^^O^GJbarn from 2 to 6 Mev., thereafter climbing to a plateau jffiue'oOTbarnffir neuftfe is a threshouTToF ffie Ln'2Q0^ctmn and the reaction" has a_cross7section of 1.4 barns in the range of 10 MevT^rhe jgjjdy identification of U237_in fallout polntsTo f ast~Bision_ oF "u2^ as a main energy ^51ir^e~nThTgh-yield megaton-class weapons. 6 See E. A. Mar tell, "Atmospheric Circulation; and Deposition of Strontium 90 Debris," Air Force Cambridge Research Center paper (July 1958). See also W. P. Libby, "Radio- active Fallout," speech of Mar. 13, 1959. 1 Variation of Gamma Radiation Rates for Different Elements Following an Underwater Nuclear Detonation," J. Colloid. Science, 13 (1958), p. 329. 8 "Reaction Cross Sections of U238 in the Low Mev. Range," UCRL 5323 (Aug. 15, 1958). RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN pages 1689-1691 A. B. R. E. HP/R 2017 ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT The Radiological Dose to Persons in the U. K. Due to Debbis From Nuclear Test Explosions Prior to January 1956 By N. G. Stewart, R. N. Crooks, and Miss E. M. R. Fisher Activity from Neutron Capture Although several different radioactive elements may be created by the capture of neutrons in materials close to the reacting core of a weapon, the only signifi- cant reactions to produce gamma-ray emitters are those associated with the natural uranium which may be used as the tamper material of the bomb. neutron (low energy) + U-238 U-239 Np-239 Chemical analysis of the debris shows that in general about one neutron is captured in this way for every fission that occurs, both in nominal bombs and in thermonuclear explosions. The U239 decays completely before reaching the U.K. but at four days after time of burst the Np239 disintegration rate reaches a peak relative to that of the fission products and accounts for about 60% of the observed activity at that time. In addition to this, a smaller number of the neutrons in a thermonuclear explosion undergo an (n,2n) reaction with U238 to form 6.7 day U237 which is also a (£,?) emitter. neutron (high energy) + U-238 2 neutrons + U-237 o H 40 <. O o tc Id Q. T— Is- o ° z<-> ,. CM 00 O-g o — w 0 Q_ QT CtT Z "F n LO 1> RATEI SlabS o Q_ GO CC 00 • — uj S 03 CO o CO* CM DOS oncre 0 CO Q_ CO > < a - < o 0 -C 2 i- 03 0 csi ** < CO 0 o •4—1 LU X >\ — \~ P '> 1— /4 CO ODUC tion Fa b 05 > 03 0 Q_ o O o (iii > < a 00 o — ION PR Attenua CO <: CO cc / CO >- < CN zi CN Q CO Q ~b 03 CO LO — CO co o CO CO > *""*"'*'*'- / '/ // ^f lO = CO - CM 5 Ll 0 o ft/I J t/Jj ■ O 0 ._ ATEDU B. Chilt 03 0 < CO DC LU U? E i- Q Z z LU h- LU rr O z o o to — . LL. co CO LU z LO b CM O CO I o i o LO I o to o aoiovd N0iivnN3iiv i i 1 i removed) i o 1- CM CO CO O o > — tO o to < LL O CO LU < a O o LU (0 A . •• . •• • * ... A . " - • . . a . » r-i:v.i.\%%?>?g.i.-*..rf^..v't1^ a- ■* ■ * i i • i air*- • • 'A • :--/.!>.vv.-%7:,.::v'.^ yTHZL A, «SW / CONCRETE SLABS, EACH ~ 3-1/4 lit. THICK o — DETECTORS The lead shield prevents fallout material from settling directly on detector "A," while at the same time shielding against the intercepted material IO{ 10' I0; UJ CO o 10 0.1 Dose rates from test-shot "Shasta" — p=q ' X \ •A V -»«■=- ■B *c- • D *E -F SH ■G 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 TIME* hr o CN CO 0 n u O C£ s < ^ LU >+C I- D 5 "3 3 c M O ■— D a: -S id a> O D 2 -c O of uj D If o % < £ y Ik. < CD uj ■— Hi ^■^^ ^ ■ \ ^Er4 * v> E*j o a* ^* CK *—> c o o E*J • • lO * * oo • ^^^ H roducts): .53 0 o o o "5 c o o a. c o • • CM • u o o #«2 CN CM * • B4 ao o o o tO *^ o o I c o to CD > 0) o E to oo rs. ^r CD a. o > E*j of volatile 0.4 • o 00 • o 00 • o o "5 C 0 o c o "5 K* ° 3 « o CM CO *fr ^ "O CD ■ •J • o oo • o oo • o oo • o o 2, 1 CD a CD "O (J "5 a o to 0 a E K2 O GO !— o o u ■•j c <* ^ ^ 00 "O CO h*l tO CD a E d d d U o O o 3 o o K3 •w* c K2 S ^ CO a* CD 1 to lO o u • o CN d a E a */> "O 0 to O a "to 3^_ *o n ■o "O ■o TJ o D ■rt O D D D D D (J 0 a oo ^ ■3 c o £0 o o o o o S 5 B*J o u u o ^^ o Z O ■ u o o D to LL_ -i- E c E "O ■7 6? feS fe< 6? to o fe? feS Ktt v> r>. 00 o t/> •■■1 rv v> E ■" CO rv in ^ "O CO <- hi o 0 o _0 ^^H ss O c O H o o oo in * o * in 00 in * o **— i- oo o in • * HI ii ^ 00 W) • o 00 o in oo ^^ o ^ o ^H L> k. *■" ■* **-^ o o to ^r CN "O "O CN 00 ^* 0 a o £ E a CD •*— E 3 o to E o CM Q. E O to o c o "5 U D "D 0 to O) O *^ O "O 0 L. a E E o o C 0) a E E o 0 C D u o D) 0 to D) >* o E O O 1— o> ••— o 0 CD c C ■•" 00 "O to CD o to 0 ^ w CM if 9 0) Q. O 3 a o c O) E o to CD to SI o z o c to "O CD u to c O D cd CD E CD D U "5, 00 CM o • •a, c o u c c u 0 to a "D O 0 o c •+— • ^. ^^" CD n D D o E O CD c a > to c o O o o 0 CD > ^ "55 E D o 2 0 D "O c o Q. 0 "to C "to 0 "5 0 "O C o E O M— o C o 0 o o c a c J^ D o o O to T3 »^— JQ CD 3 h^ u o Ik. O U o 00 CN u- M-i rt a •* CO 9^ !_l <^ z D X Q a. en _Q CD -; — ■ _*: CD CD 03 O CD Q_ C/) 03 E E 03 CD en Z3 _Q CD -; — ■ 03 03 E o CD Q_ CO 03 03 O 03 O 3. "D CD H > 03 O 03 CD > H — • 03 CD CD O 03 _Q 03 CD 00 o5 o 3. ~o CD H — • 03 c= CD H — ' o 03 CD > -i — > 03 CD CD O 03 "D _Q 03 CO C/5 0s O O C\J 6s O O CM o 0) ct 6s o LO LO LO o LO 6s O 0s O O CM 6s O O LO of «£P CM LO of 0s O LO LO a> of #s£P LO d LO of O LO cc ■^ l CD E 03 q 03 ^ cz CO N LO N CO CD CM CD CM i- O O CO LO Is- ^t CD CM d d o d o a> Is*. o LO o o o CO CD co r^ co o o o o o o CO *~ S CM °> ^ CM g^ Jj CM O o "" o o d LO o o o o o o 00 CM O LO CD Is- 00 CD CM CO i- CO o CO CD LO Tfr o o o d LO o o o LO CM 00 £ CD CD CO CD CM O O O d 00 CM o CM O O CM Is- CO T- ^ ~ ~ O O o o o o o o o o o o o CD CM O O O o ^ 0 LO CO O LO CO $ £j CO CM ^ ^ rtl o o ^ CO CO CM odd o o o o o 0 „ TT CO CXI cm Is- o o LO Is- CO CO d d o o o o d CM o o CO CD CO CD CD O co ^r i- o CM o o o o Is- T- i- o Is- CO o o o o d d CD LO °> °° en en CO CO ;£ o in n °° ^ *-* txl CD ^T T- O o o o o o o o ^1- co o o o o o CM o o o o o LO o ww v-" rr> en *— ' LO Is- 2- CM ^ O O Is- 00 o o LO CM o o LOT-LocMLOcpLq^t olo^locmlocolo ddT^i^CMCMCOCO o o CM o o o o o o CO CD LO o o LO CM o o o o CD LO Is- o o Is- LO CD 03 .2 o J5 E - £ 03 " O DC a) 03 CD CM LO CO 00 "si" 00 CD CD CO Is- ^j- "ni- "ni- "nI- CD LO 00 Is- O 00 Is- CD Is- O Is- d a) 03 ^ > CD £ CD o CD T3 o XJ - a (L> ^5 CD N S s fl ^2 (/3 •^ 2 -4-» O CD +3 s ^ cd 03 CN i CD c CD CM) S & ^ tj g ^ IS.g a § ^ O CM >^ g CM .5 O Oh , CD H -a ^ o a ' — ^ cc CD II ^ fl LO > 0 O) ^^ 4— > «U « CD CD a, CZJ 4— > O tZ3 3 CO O CD CD O 00 G O H . — P CD O > e ^ 13 ■4— » Oh ^ b o ■ H s >1 &J0 C c cd Co • 1— 1 t/3 *~4 ^o C^ o3 CO 5-H o o O o o O > o CO CN i— 1 i-H ^H CN CN CN ^ C3 i o o o o o O Z t/3 t/3 'o ^o ^o CN ^f ^H ^D o o en o CO In ^ un in in ^o r- xh en m ^H t-H o ■4— » cd S: «y o o o o o o o o o o o Q -a — ,3 ON CJ t/3 S3 ^ cd #g b f 1 o Cfl - 4=> #o -(— i CO -^ P -a cS _o ■4-J 1h 13 fl <+H OO TD CO o *35 ^ CO C/3 (N !/2 R O o CO 'a o &0 to T3 o +^ o o o o o TD CO cu o o OO xr ^H CN un i> o o o C ^g 1* S3 ^ T— 1 ^o VO o> t> ^H OO ^H 1 — 1 ^H CO -o +^ c^S a & 5-H a a o -4— » o C/3 CO CO T3 +-» ES u S3 +-> ■4— » ■4— » 3 ^o CO 5-H OO ■4— » OO ■4—* M O -4— > % en ^h -4— * $ 3 <4-H =1 CO (N 13 s ^0 CN CN ^ T— 1 G\ wn o 00 \o ^o _C o c t/3 ^H \6 en un ^-H ^H o 3 '-+H c^ C3 cd H ^ oo 5-1 o -4— » 5-H o 5-H 5-H '— 5-H CD CD CO 5-1 • H NO CO 5-H CO to o CJ CD D ^H 00 OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO 13 C Nj c o Oh <0 en en en cn en en en m en 1 CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN cd O ID P P D D P & D 13 CO a c GO 13 4=) O Q « 4J rD O -£ to Q Oo 3 CO so SO :§ so ' — i ©0 g so 4^ GO GO to ^3 co > on o CO o ■t— > 5-H 1 s CO t/3 CO -O ■4-J to g SJ to to to to ^3 ^3 Q ^2 s cd o C £ 3 3 rQ ^ r^ r^3 U O U O CO a •X- X p 'CO ring are TJ • ff cd >» cd X) fN •FN cd b o> ^ | a 2 g ^ t5 c « 03 ^0 -x- a cd Vh — _G © S ~ fO 0) S3 • FN S3 00 0 00 00 ^0 0\ i — 1 cn - On On CN in OO CN On °^ in' 0 ^0 0 in en + ■vf O 3 O in ^ • -H ^ *'H J ^ - F^ C f- 1 -FH fll rO r*i O cd S H 'El ^ ^ f3 4— • O fO cd $w cvo > C S >^ cd 0 0 b ° CO o F*» "-I3 S3 fh 0) CO O 3 03 S3 oo R =5 a. +- » R ^t 0 m m r^ 00 o> ^H OO cd ^S o> ^ .9 -2 ^ « 0< 00 en cm 6 § •S oc m in in F^ F— 1 CN OO c^> O _3 1 SO ^c (N 0 O O O O O O CN O 1 Of -= ■+■» S3 03 f-h t>) O 0 O O O O O O O F^ O O ^O VO o> ON ^ a 3 0 Id (O 0 § 0 ^ '- * Si w Ohh ".So CO C/3 in oo m ^ O 1 d 0 d O d O d O d O d O d O d O d O d O d CN d en d en d O d O d 0 lo ^j 3 3 ■fH 0 TJ f3 co ,cd O 3 *53 05 1 ^ .^ ^ ^O .S ^O H H 1 3 1 1 « I q i .3 a g i-J 43 cd cd ^^^^ F-l q 0 fh g r-. c^ ° nuclear exp the fallout* R ?H 1^ — H ^1- ^D 0 * ■5f ^0 r5-1 "O fV c/i -M CO cd 2 (N •^^^ 1^ F( J_) O 3 3 • 3 co O T3 cd 0 r— 1 r— 1 O m cn CN a> ON m ^h CN 0 in m o> S3 en 1 I O r-H O 0 O O 0 f-H i> ^j- en in 0 f-H f-H 0 0 0^3 en i— i 0 d O d O d O d 0 d O d O d 0 d CN d O O d d O d O d CN d en d en d O d O d 13 -fh cd fh ^ O c<: +^ +-T j. ^ 0 =2 S3 cd © FC) Ki T3 3 5i ^ H-J -f. O 2 .R ^ f§ fq a ^ 3 !- F-J Dh ^ f3 ^° i • S ?5 =- •FN 0 c S a a H 4h CC 5 OJ cd 53 -3 ,H *H . *fH fj S3 © • FN 5/5 ?-( '0 3 R 1 cd -g 3 ^ ^3 N Oh O fC ^ cd CO c-j t3 c>0 5-1 n^ -x "is s — ' fB-II 000,0 -, CJ , CU 00 R O . jy fh » u^23§f:^^ S3 Of Of =5 C-h +- » *2 ^3 ^t 0 m CN cn 0 00 en -f § % % £ f-h a f^ cd O -H .H ^ H f3 2 _cd Oh .- « 2 fi z ^ ^ ■g -9 3 O d ON t3 a 1 P3 Ft? .2 ^ 5_ ^ P ^ tin 0 $1 CO ' S3 O ^3 CO T3 =5 O CO T3 CO c3 CD O >.fC ^ O CO' T3 'CO 5h O T3 • H c -c =5 O =5 •fH a en ^ ^ S "§ fO "FH ^ CTA "FH u 2 c H>~> CO f-h CO 2 E f5 m CN 1^ 0 00 in CN in CN T3 CN OO CN T3 in 0 ^ ^t fC CN in en ^0 Tr' u 3 a 3 N ^ 3 CO H-> QJ U S3 t/5 03 Of CO CD H • fH CO CD Q -H cN n «n c^ in F-H CN in 1 0 U OO in 6 U in r-l 0 ^ 6 i u u CN CN CN 1 — 1 1 fO *o 00 -xf O CN 00 1 — i t — i 1 1 in H f-H CN 00' f-H 1 H in en O CN fO <6 cn m ^h 0 a> 0 l> On en O ^f en en CN ^f CN FH , ^_; _> '^ H t, ^ 3 c oj co 2s ^s s " ^ i f-h jn \o H ^ * O jzi cd •-0 *- -3 W 3 "^ cd -3 co fo C © 03 O +^ a> Li 03 03 03 Li 9 03 Li 03 Li 03 03 OJD O Cm si .05 ^m in •fl in OJD Li 2 o a> p >* o 03 Li 03 O O in in (N (N m in ^o i> o o o o o o 5 03 o o cd > od ^3 • ^ 5 *— O 5-H CD go CD T^ O O cd H o t o U t> cd in ^h , .3 O 5-H C0 ^ < I 1 g| % § „ CD ° 2 ^ J= ^ (D ^3 P^ cd >^ n a ^ MH a) a CD cd 5-H J Strontium-89 Krypton-90 ~ g » Rubidium-90 v short^ Strontium-90 31 As expected from the earlier discussion, strontium exhibits very definite fractionation. On one series of air samples collected at 1*0,000 feet at Operation CASTLE after the Bravo shot, the R value for strontium-89 was 0.35* For a fall-out sample collected on land at ap- proximately 80 miles from the burst point, the R value for strontium-89 was O.lU. The R value for strontium-90 using the same fall-out sample was 0.29. 33 10 16 10 15 E o 10 14 10 13 Radioactivity in the Marine Environment (1971), page 13. Specific activity of 15 Mt Bravo fallout Rongelap samples Ba-140 \ Mo-99 (not volatile) \ Mo-99 Sr-89 (volatile precursor in decay chain) Fractionation (depletion of volatile decay chains) 10 10' Fallout particle diameter (microns) 10' 8 .* ■3 O 0 % Cfl £ 9 O AM o o c CO ^ CM cN ^ vO ^ ^ o o o q p o c o £ * n p E o c 5 o o o o © o *co O e a £ o £ o X -*> S H o z °" a e UJ «-^ s C/3 a CO s CO o s < >■*" ^ *o O i** f- en vO *o £ ?i o N ^ ^ lO ^ *h c oc c J2 • O (7) •^* *3 *c3 o < w+ o * 1 U w 9 o z ^^n C8 $ e V c* u 0 o UJ 3 r^ oo co r^ r^ ^ co oo cm r^ <^ o* 0£ Q — — , rs» vo DHCLISSIFIEB AD232901 Copy No. RADIOCHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL FALLOUT PARTICLES ^SStfX? Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-386 17 September 1958 J. L. Mackin P.E. Zigman D. L. Love D. MacDonald D. Sam U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY TABIS 2 (ZUNI, barge YFNB-29; see Table B8 in WT-1317) Weight, Activity* and Fission Values for the Sized Fractions From the 1QDX Sample (YFNB29, 17 km from ZUNI) Size Vela ht Fissions Range Grams Percent Percent Total For Gram 00 of Total of Total (101*) >iooo 37*70 ttl.8 15.8 21. 0.56 500-1000 U1.91 k6.k W.O 60. l.h 250- 500 *.9T 5.5 19*8 26. loo- 250 3.51 3-9 10.7 1*. 50- 100 O.60 0.9 2.3 3.0 3.8 <50 I.38 1.5 5-* 7.1 5.1 Total 90*27 131* 1.5 TABUft V (ZUNI: BIKINI/HOW ISLAND, YFNB29, YA640; TABLE 3 . 9 IN WT-1317) Keam Values for Several Quantities, for Altered and Unaltered Particles Melted coral sand Unmelted coral sand Quantity Altered Unaltered Ko. of No. of Samples Value Samples , Value fles/gm(xl0^) $ 3-8 4* 3.1 £ 0.09Q * 0O2, BajM>-R value 5 0.090 + 0.068 8 2.1 ? 1.2 Sr^-K value 7 0.018 + 0.010 10 O.65 + 0.17 The data of Table k show that the value of fie? ions/gram vae much larger la the altered particles than In the unaltered particles. The R value data Indicates that the altered particles vera markedly depleted in Balto-Lalto, whereas the unaltered particles were enriched in BalnO-La11^ R values With respect to fractionation of radionuclides it has long been accepted that the mass 69 and mass 1**0 chains which exist for long time periods as nchle gases,, halogens and alkali metals* would condense late and therefore disproportionate with respect to less volatile: elements . On the "basis of long-lived gaseous precursors it would he predicted that the altered or melted particles would exhibit low R values for both chains, with the 89 smaller of the two* This was verified by the mean R values given in Table H, which were 0*090 and 0.018 for the 1M0 and 89 chains, respectively. The corresponding values for the unaltered particles of 2.1 and 0.65 indicate that this latter class of particles may be important as a scavenger of these nuclides* Xt is also ef Interest to compare R values obtained in this study with values obtained on gross fallout samples. The latter data gave Ba12*0 R values and Sr*^ R values of 0.10 and 0.0* respectively** in the lagoon samples. The low R values for the gross sample from the lagoon area are similar to R values obtained with altered particles and suggests a lagoon fallout composed primarily of altered particles. This suggestion is sup- ported by the VH3X sample fission/gram data (described above) . * Baito is formed by the decay of the radioelemeata Xa^AO (l6-sec half- life) and Cal1*0 ( 66-sec half -life); Sr89 i8 fomsd by the decay of the redioelements Kx& (3.16-min half -life) end R&89 (l^.fc-min half -life) . ** P.D. LaRiviere, USEFUL, personal communication. O "0 D C o o c o u o o D C I O u M I O z Q v> 0) u o t/> O u CO in CO UOI|DUOj43DiJ 10 2 0- -3 10 2 h- -4 1 Tote/ fission yields add up to 200% (2 fission fragments per fission) 2. Minimum (at mass ~115) is shallower for higher neutron energies 3. Data apply to fission by the lowest possible energy (thermal) neutrons The reason for the peaks at masses -100 and -140 was discovered by Marie Goeppert Mayer in 1948: nuclei with "magic numbers" of 2, 8, 20, 50, 82, or 126 neutrons or protons have high stability due to closed shells of 2, 6, 12, 30, 32, and 44 nucleons (nucleons, unlike electrons, have spin-orbital interaction) -J I I I I I I I I I i i i 76 82 88 94 100 106 112 118 124 MASS NUMBER 130 136 142 148 154 160 1 1 1 \ \ O4 - ^ .*' ^ < < \ 'Y p- >\ to/ *l o I / • ,-' ■ ^^s^^ ' > \ ^^ ^*!*j ^ / ^^ ^55^^ 0) > Q) m 0) \;> . 0,^^ ^S*^ c "^ £/ ■o o \ ^v -v ^ 7 Jh- o -a "^ nL/ Cj 00 CO CM ■ •o c o CO CO c ^ v\ XX \*>*"" *-*\ ^^v^"-^^*"1 f-'/y ■ ,0*"^ v\r 3 irv en % — *H C _ § 1- cc j CJ " 1 § a a — -H t - § 1- a a ^ ^c^Z^s CO * / * Si m y p i, o I \ vC. 0) z D o \\ ^ #/ Y o \ & 3 551 >^ OC o o* z CO 4 m ro M t ^\ V tfC*^ » \L^ — v ^1M _ji/ v / \IB O *Y (AV u l_ c V $/ §S\ 3 O r^ «/> \VN^ Ik 5 %s V ' \ s V c^^ 6\ pr \ \ \ en cr o < p- u 8 "I = ° 31VH 3anSOdX3 1VI01 10 lN30d3d 10 10 TIME (HR) 43 TBI's indicated, on the average, 0.85 ±25 percent of the survey meter readings 60 observed/calculated ratio varies from 0.45 at 11.2 hours to 0.66 from 100 to 200 hours, to 0.56 between 370 and 1,000 hours. Station Location HOW ISLAND PLATFORM F HOW ISLAND MONITORING PTS Detector TIR %• •» CUTIE PIE-O Height 25 FT 3 FT Station F at How Island 2.08 x 1014 fissions/ft2 (Table B.27) TABLE B. 1 Tilt TIME SINCE ZUNI (HR) WT" 1317 Figure B.7 Gamma-ionization-decay rate, Site How. LAND SURFACE BURST A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the Eniwetok Peoving Ground E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif. 2.36 g/cu cm irregular in shape Falling speeds (feet/hour) Altitude 75 fj. 100 m 200 fj, 350 jx 0 8,060 3,360 3,870 4,200 8,910 5,040 5,980 6,910 7,700 6,960 11,700 14,400 18,600 24,400 27,800 21,600 27,100 35,300 47,200 61,900 20 40. 60 80 5 megaton Tewa Comparison of fallout forecast with test results NAUTICAL MILES HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT) 5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 7.84 STAT. MILES WSW 5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 59.3 STAT. MILES NW 1 150 300 450 600 750 900 12 17 22 27 32 TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR) TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN) Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout WATER SURFACE BURST A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the Eniwetok Peoving Ground E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif. Time variation of the winds aloft In most of the observations made at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the winds aloft were not in a steady state. Significant changes in the winds aloft were observed in as short a period as 3 hours. This variability was probably due to the fact that proper firing conditions which required winds that would deposit the fallout north of the proving ground, occurred only during an unstable synoptic situation of rather short duration. / n / .^ \ PARTICLE E LINES 4.5 megaton Navajo FORECAST "HOT LINE' 80,000 FORECAST AREA OF FALLOUT SURFACE ZERO MEASURED ISODOSE RATE CONTOURS 15,000 Comparison of fallout forecast with test results 20 40 60 NAUTICAL MILES HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT) 4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 7.54 STAT. MILES W 4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 21.0 STAT. MILES N 100 200 300 400 500 TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN) 600 1U 1 6 11 16 21 26 TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR) Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout, Project 2.63 CO O 0) E o U o y o o •^ ■D O ■o c o o o s o u (B3ITW) 83Ue^8TQ PUTM SSOJO o o z < CO o < u 02 I 02 02 < U 2 Q ILI ILI ILI CO Q. X iij CO z 02 < 02 ILI 9 < Z ILI < u U u- ILI 5 CO Z o 00 Q£ CO 0 o _■ 02 o ILI ILI to 02 ILI I— Q Z ILI u < 02 o o 5 £ o 02 < CO ^j o o_ ik ILI CO z o z o X 02 o Q ILI CO 02 CO 0 ILI 00 o o < o Q 3 IL CO CO ^— O M 2 z 52 ILI a_ 02 O UJ — > z o o ILI ^ > =! O Z U lu o > P o 2 z a z 0. o s 02 ILI < E CO Q 0 Z < = CO o Q D2 >.N z < • ^^ < -r co ± LED BAGS BANK EAI \Triy = Q ^ Z o < Z m ^ U co z ACE JTRA iHEET RUNK STIC EET 1ftV< A Z x 02 < «rj |— < x 7^g < <~> Q (J o ? ** ^6tc 02 t Z i= z UP?*01 Q PLAS OR A O n>u.« 02 IL. I O B x Q UNK WIT HONFL H "ip v 1 ^ Z ^S^i^^Wf»B S CO NK ILI Q O O 02 < u O 02 < DTRI EART fi TRENCH EP B z E o Bf CM u 1— < o 9* H- 1* |# --JK Q LU 0 O O \ \*. CO 5 < Ef LU S q K LU I s 1 < 1 u z < COVER FLO PLACE 1 FO ^ KENNEDY A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM THE PRESIDENT The White House September 7, 1961 My Fellow Americans: Nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war are facts of life we cannot ignore today. I do not believe that war can solve any of the problems facing the world today. But the decision is not ours alone. The government is moving to improve the protection afforded you in your communities through civil defense. We have begun, and will be continuing throughout the next year and a half, a survey of all public buildings with fallout shelter potential, and the marking of those with adequate shelter for 50 persons or more. We are pro- viding fallout shelter in new and in some existing federal buildings. We are stocking these shelters with one week's food and medical supplies and two weeks' water supply for the shelter occupants. In addition, I have recommended to the Congress the establishment of food reserves in centers around the country where they might be needed following an attack. Finally, we are developing improved warning systems which will make it possible to sound attack warn- ing on buzzers right in your homes and places of business. More comprehensive measures than these lie ahead, but they cannot be brought to completion in the immediate future. In the meantime there is much that you can do to protect yourself— and in doing so strengthen your nation. I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of LIFE. The security of our country and the peace of the world are the objectives of our policy. But in these dangerous days when both these objectives are threatened we must prepare for all eventualities. The ability to survive coupled with the will to do so therefore are essential to our country. yJAy^ (f~ Jlaaskask. John F. Kennedy V Fallout Shelters YOU COULD BE AMONG THE 97% TO SURVIVE IF YOU FOLLOW ADVICE ON THESE PAGES . . . HOW TO BUILD SHELTERS . . . WHERE TO HIDE IN CITIES . . . WHAT TO DO DURING AN ATTACK Proceedings of the Symposium held at Washington, D. C. April 19-23, 1965 by the Subcommittee on Protective Structures, Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council Protective Structures for CIVILIAN POPULATIONS 1966 THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION AFFORDED BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL BRITISH HOUSE Daniel T. Jones Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London Protective Factors in a Sample of British Houses (Windows Blocked) Protective Factor Percentage of Houses < 26 26-39 40-100 > 100 36% 28% 29% 7% 1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used. 2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand- bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags were used. 3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used. "A very much improved protection could be obtained by constructing a shelter core. This means a small, thick- walled shelter built preferably inside the fallout room itself, in which to spend the first critical hours when the radiation from fallout would be most dangerous. "W The full-scale experiments were carried out at the Civil Defense School at Falf ield Park. <2) In the staircase construction, the shelter con- sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags being placed on treads above and at the sides. A 93 curies cobalt-60 source was used. J ZZZZJ2- -tTf M»MMWMfWWn DINING ROOM \>J*******J*********rrwJjfariri E2 SITTMG ROOM 9 in. brick walls The windows and doors were not blocked contribution r/hr/c/ft2 Protective Factor Position Ground Roof House only E2 15.0 8.4 21 Lean-to E2 10.4 2.4 39 Staircase cupboard: Stairs only sandbagged Stairs and outer wall sandbagged Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall and corridor partition sandbagged N2 N2 N2 29.2 16.4 8.8 5.3 4.6 1.8 14 24 47 sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 in. x 9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand. Lean -to shelter partition wall between sitting and dining rooms 1. Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, HMSO, 1963. 2. Perryman, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117. Li 85 polythene sandbags two doors, 6 ft 6 in. x 2 ft 8 in. floor area 21 sq ft. BLAST AND OTHER THREATS Harold Brode The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Chemical High-Explosive Weapons As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable of extensive damage only when delivered in large numbers and with high accuracy. Biological Warfare Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce; their effective dissemination over hostile territories remains the chief deterrent to their effective employ- ment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are quite perishable in normal open-air environments. Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can be quite effective against biological agents, there is less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance of limited employment on population concentrations —perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with adequate filtering could insure rather complete protection to those inside. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly insurmountable logistics problems on delivery. Although chemical agents produce casualties more rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does not hold promise of the development of significantly more toxic chemicals for future use. Radiological Weapons The advantages of such modifications are much less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is very important. If the total payload is not to be in- creased, then the inclusion of inert material to be activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear explosives, then more fission -fragment activity can be created, and it is the net difference in activity that must be balanced against the loss of explosive yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most efficient generator of activity, and greater total doses are not achieved by injecting special inert materials to be activated. Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support Agency Field Command, June 1960. The Neutron Bomb The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliber- ate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neu- trons, would necessarily be limited to rather small yields— yields at which the neutron absorption in air does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small yields against large -area targets again runs into the delivery problems faced by chemical agents and ex- plosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a less stringent problem for delivery systems in most applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and to create little local fallout but still kill the populace, it would be necessary to use large numbers of care- fully placed neutron -producing weapons burst high enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, how- ever, adequate radiation shielding for the people would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the attack to be futile. The thermal radiation from a surface burst is expected to be less than half of that from an air burst, both because the radiating fireball surface is truncated and because the hot interior is partially quenched by the megatons of injected crater mate- rial. SUPERSETS MIC GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA (AT 5-FT DEPTH) Vertical acceleration: avm ~340 APS/CL ± 30 per cent. Here acceleration is measured in g's and over- pressure (APS) in pounds per square inch. An em- pirical refinement requires Cl to be defined as the seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil. OUTRUNNING GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA (AT -10-FT DEPTH) Vertical acceleration: a m~2xl03/CLr' Acceleration is measured in + factor 4 or -factor 2 g's, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r = R/W1/3 kftAmt)1/3. Data taken on a low air -burst shot in Nevada indicate an exponential decay of maximum displacement with depth. For the particular case of a burst of — 40 kt at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry lake bed, which led to the following approximate decay law, according to Perret. 6 = 6Q exp (-0.017D), where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace- ment induced at depth D, 6q is the maximum dis- placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet. MODEL ANALYSIS Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIES Suffield Experimental Station Canadian Defense Research Board Ralston, Alberta, Canada Nuclear- Weapon Tests In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effec- tively a "nominal" weapon, at Monte Bello, off north- west Australia. To the blast loading from this weapon we exposed a number of reinforced- concrete cubicle structures that had been designed for the dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made the best analysis of response we were competent to make at that time. Our estimates of effects were really a dismal failure. The structures were placed at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we ex- pected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with some petaling of the front face, and extensively cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had occurred along both diagonals, and the four tri- angular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi level, where we had three cubicles, each with a different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we ob- served only light cracking in the front face of that cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.)- The other two structures were apparently undamaged, as was the single structure at the 6-psi level. In 1957, the first proposals were made for the construction of the underground car park in Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was inter- ested in this project since, in an emergency, the structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a structure that would be resistant to a blast loading of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model scale. Using the various load- deformation curves obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the response of the structure to blast loading. Of par- ticular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta. 34p.s.i. Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles. A total of seven more models was made; six were shipped to Canada and placed with the top surface of the roof flush with the ground and at positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60, 50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model was kept in England for static testing at about the time of firing. The results were not as expected. In the field, the four models farthest from the charge were apparantly undamaged; we could see no crack- ing with the eye, nor did soaking the models with water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the roof panels and beams, and one of the columns showed slight spalling at the head. This model had been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi. Davies, I. LI., Effects of Blast on Reinforced Concrete Slabs, and the Relationship with Static Loading Characteristics (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFFALO - Target Responcc Tests, AWRE Report T U6/57 ( OONFIDEaiTIAL report), August 1957 . Wood, A. J., The Effect of Earth Covers on the Resistance of Trench Shelter Roofs (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFFAIP- Target Response Target Response Tests, AWRE Report T ^7/57 (CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957* OfBrien, T. P., Rowe, R. D., and Hance, R. J., Tho Effect of Atomic Blast on Wall Panels (U). United Kingdom, PWE-36 (CONFIDENTIAL report), April 1955. Walley, F., Operation TOTEM Group 13 Report: Civil Defense Structures (U)^ United Kingdom, FWE-111 (CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1957. Davies, I. LI., and Thumpston, N. S., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast (U). United Kingdom, FWE 35 (UNCLASSIFIED report), March 1955. Davies, I. 11., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast: IV Final Report on Experiments with Reinforced Models of Heavily Protective Citadel Shelter Type CD12 (U). United Kingdom, IVB-101 (CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1956. Davies, I. LI., Performance Test on Model Oarage - Shelter Roof System. SES lOO^Ton TOT Trial-Suf field, Alberta, August 1961 (U). United Kingdom, AWRE Report No. E 2/63 (TOR OJTICIAL USE ONLY), March 1963. Worsfold, W. E., Effects of Shielding a Building from Atomic Blast ( U) . United Kincdom, JWE-16U ( CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1958. Trimer, A., and Maskell, E. G. B., Operation BUiTAIO Target Response Tests - Structures Group Report: The Effect on Field Defenses (U). United Kingdom, ITO-2M (CONFIDENTIAL report), December 1959* United Kingdom, The Effects of Atomic Weapons on Structures and Military Equipment (U). FWE-S (SECRET report), July 1951*. HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE Volume I PAMPHLET No. 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1956 Practical protection 88 Large buildings with a number of storeys, especially if they are of heavy construction, provide much better protection than small single- storey structures (see Figure 4). Houses in terraces likewise provide much better protection than isolated houses because of the shielding effect of neighbouring houses. GOOD PROTECTION Solidly constructed multi-storeyed building with occupants well removed from fall-out on ground and roof. The thickness of floors and roof overhead, and the shielding effect of other buildings, all help to cut down radiation FALL OUT wxmmtt VVASf/AVAVAVAWAVAVAW • t • I 1 1 • T I U III 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 II I '^ BAD PROTECTION Isolated wooden bungalow ,$& FALL OUT MM«.^^^3a«♦M»^^Mft»5^^^&&^s^^&6fr^^M«M^: •Yii Yivrri Yi • • • • • • • • • • • •••• •VTYrtYrrrrivriViVi Figure 4 Examples of good and bad protection afforded by buildings against fall-out. 89 It is estimated that the protection factor (the factor by which the out- side dose has to be divided to get the inside dose) of a ground floor room in a two-storey house ranges from 10 to about 50, depending on wall thickness and the shielding afforded by neighbouring buildings. The corresponding figures for bungalows are about 10-20, and for three-storey houses about 15-100. An average two-storey brick house in a built-up area gives a factor of 40, but basements, where the radia- tion from outside the house is attenuated by a very great thickness of earth, have protection factors ranging up to 200-300. A slit trench with even a light cover of boards or corrugated iron without earth overhead gives a factor of 7, and if 1 ft. of earth cover is added the 37 factor rises to 100. If the trench can be covered with 2 or 3 feet of earth then a factor of more than 200-300 can be obtained (see Figure 5). FALL OUT With corrugated iron or boards overhead With I ft. of earth overhead With 3 ft. of earth overhead FIGURE 5 Protection factors in slit trenches (the factor by which the outside dose is divided to get the inside dose). Choosing a refuge room 90 In choosing a refuge room in a house one would select a room with a minimum of outside walls and make every effort to improve the pro- tection of such outside walls as there were. In particular the windows would have to be blocked up, e.g. with sandbags. Where possible, boxes of earth could be placed round an outside wall to provide additional protection, and heavy furniture (pianos, bookcases etc.) along the in- side of the wall would also help. A cellar would be ideal* Where the ground floor of the house consists of boards and timber joists carried on sleeper walls it may be possible to combine the high protection of the slit trench with some of the comforts of the refoge room by constructing a trench under the floor. Once a trap door had been cut in the floor boards and joists and the trench had been dug, there would be no further interference with the peace-time use of the room. Estimated under-co ver doses in the fall-out area 91 Taking an average protective factor of 40 for a two-storey house in a built-up area, the doses accumulated in 36 hours for the ranges referred to in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Report (paragraph 84) would have been: — i^- *A- ^a^~ 190 miles downwind 7*r F^ M*}*****? 160 „ „ 12*r e**routf5t+ 140 „ „ 20r which are all well below the lowest figure of 25r referred to in Table 1 . At closer ranges along the axis of the fall-out, the doses accumulated in 36 hours would have been much higher, but over most of the con- taminated area — with this standard of protection — the majority of those affected would have been saved from death, and even from sick- ness, by taking coyer continuously for the first 36 hours. 38 9" solid brick wall British pre-war house design Ridge Tile Floor Joists Walling ™. Brick Noting 5. Radiation sickness Assume dose incurred in a single shift (3-4 hours) by the "average" man, over the whole body: — 25 roentgens — No obvious harm. 100 „ — Some nausea and vomiting. 500 n —Lethal to about 50 per cent, people (death up to 6 weeks later). 800 „ or more— Lethal to all (death up to 6 weeks later). Note: If dose spread uniformly over 2-3 days, then 60 roentgens could be incurred with no more effect than 25 roentgens in a single exposure of 3-4 hours. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people DISTANCE FROM G.Z. IN MILES * 20 BLAST (BUILDING DAMAGE) DEBRIS BLOCKAGE FIRE HEAT EFFECTS (EXPOSED PEOPLE) IMMEDIATE GAMMA RADIATION (EXPOSED PEOPLE) < N.B. Effects of residual radiation (fall-out) NOT shewn. Figure 11 Combined effects (excluding residual radioactivity) from a 10 megaton ground burst bomb. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people. 55 HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE Volume I PAMPHLET No. 2 RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT PROVISIONAL SCHEME OF PUBLIC CONTROL LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1956 s S3 o S3 © c o U « G © c/i '£ O 0< -« "sii ., WO CS o 42 ° "3,-d S2 o^ U o oo ft o «-s > o «• S ■sgSS's y oi r1 5i t, O CO t^ OjCSTJcm .3 C<« O « I- O « ft §■3 S S3 ^ cvS S>a iv,,d w u g.^ >v*o 5. « o d J\ o « 3^ +-• o «-• M"3 52 •O r-^3 *-» C* iu,H o « *3 S 2 * S 3 o,fd o (^ a o © 00 u u. u. JH©Q© J. J. i • ©©©¥-> 4-» •♦-» +-» ■•-» « d ** M O ,« ,« 3 &3 ^* O *° 4> K g «f <& 1" ' - " B B r! 3 - is o2 — j oj _,Jd ^S8 s£8 0 43 «^-i ♦* Q d »S^. Q „ " n o J3 ■°^Sg ^|§3nMfl «--5 ° 2 5s oj^1 o ♦* utJd 3 0) n g* U 1) *» S> H *3 c 3 9 0 0*0 £*o d S •« Ufl g-3 CS > O 3 «j5 g V 4)td *0 O-y te 3iifvl.2 o«c«d O *j_j — +J jj 4) . o^gd Rl ^ © © 00 o © 00 00 xj 15 00 ■»-» Xi cS O. 45 u, D. en u, © ro 1 Li d n d X 00 00 at at .3 J3 O. d. u< u. en © Ui 3 O 1— 1 © > O JO 00 q 5? O o nt 3 S^- 4> 1 ra «j — § « S O-O "O'eo-o 4>t3 3 d •-' ti *t3 - O SB > 9"£ 5 q o 00 0 a rt ^ o> o K 11 H w O o d o „'d OS o*1 » 83£o£ 60 X3 OO 3 « 4) •"« ■- M 9-3^2- d2- ^22«i J*-S 00 o 3 00 li- ft © N 3 ft 2 o d o N. .yja' •a at a 11 1 Center Thick- Wind Yield height ness Radius speed (ktj (m) (km/hr) 1 2,840 1760 10 7,000 3060 100 11,700 5340 920 39.6 2400 70.2 6000 72.0 RAINOUT Precipitation required to de- posit the vertical integral on the ground. Amount of precipitation (cm) 1-kt cloud 10-kt cloud 100-kt cloud -1 >-2 0.18 100 2 4 6 3 10 12 14 Vertical integral gamma radiation Height at stabilization time — km UCRL-51164 December 26, 1971 I I 1000 Distance from ground zero — km FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M. (E.S.T.) TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1955 A REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ON THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FALLOUT PATTERN OF 1954 TEST IN THE PACIFIC 19. Data from this test permits estimates of casual- ties which would have been suffered within this contaminated area if it had been populated. These estimates assume: (1) that the people in the area would ignore even the most ele- mentary precautions; (2) that they would not take shelter but would remain out of doors completely exposed for about 36 hours; and (3) that in consequence they would receive the maximum exposure. Therefore, it will be recognized that the estimates which follow are what might be termed extreme estimates since they assume the worst possible conditions. PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT 26. In an area of heavy fallout she greatest radio- logical hazard is that of exposure to external radiation. Simple precautionary measure? can greatly recTuce the hazard to life. Exposure can be reduced by taking shelter and by utilizing simple decontamination measures until such times as persons can leave the area. Test data indicate that the radiation level, i.e., the rate of exposure, indoors on the first floor of an ordinary frame house in a fallout area would be about one-half the level out of doors. Even greater protection would be afforded by a brick or stone house. Taking shelter in the basement of an average residence would reduce the radiation level to about one-tenth that experienced out of door 9. 29. If fallout particles come into contact with the skin, hair or clothing, prompt decontamination precautions such as have been outlined by the Federal Civil Defense Ad- ministration will greatly reduce the danger. These include such simple measures as thorough bathing of exposed parts of the body and a change or clothing. 30. If persons in a heavy fallout area heeded warning or notification of an attack and evacuated the area or availed themselves of adequate protective measures, the percentage of fatalities would be greatly reduced even in the zone of heaviest fallout. Foreword If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distri- buted to every household as part of a public information campaign which would include announcements on tele- vision and radio and in the press. The booklet has been designed for free and general distribution in that event. It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to know what they would be advised to do at such a time. May 1980 Protect and Survive ISBN o 1 1 3407289 If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be. If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the weapons and the resultant fall-out. The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can be reduced if you do as this booklet describes. If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or holes. If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter. FIRST CASUALTIES OF THE H-BOMB by DWIGHT MARTIN Five weeks out of Yaizu, her home port 120 miles southeast of Tokyo, the 99-ton tuna trawler Fukuryu Maru ("Fortunate Dragon") hove to at a position 166°30' east longitude and 11*52' north latitude. She dropped an- chor and cast her nets at 5:30 a.m. on March 1. The Fortunate Dragons position, though her skipper and crew did not realize it, was 71 miles east-northeast of Bikini atoll and 14 miles out- side the boundary of the restricted zone of the U.S. government's atomic testing area. A calm sea was running and the weather was clear. Sunrise was at 6:09 a.m. and visibility was excellent. The Fortunate Dragon % skipper, AT HER DOCK the unfortunate Fortunate Drag- on, still radioactive, floats untended by crewmen. "We made port in Yaizu at 6 a.m. on March 14. We were now quite sick and frightened, and we went to see Dr. Toshisuke Oii at Kyo- ritsu hospital. He said we had severe burns and gave us some white ointment/9 24-year-old Tadaichi Tsutsui, was standing watch on the bridge, and eight crewmen were enthusiastically hauling in their first nets. Aft- er nearly three weeks of poor catches near Midway Island, the Fortunate Dragon had finally run into luck in more southern waters and her hold was already filled with 16,500 pounds of fat tuna. It was just a few seconds before 6:12 a.m. "Then," said Crewman Sanjiro Masuda lat- er, "we saw flashes of fire, as bright as the sun itself, rising to the sky. They rose about 10 degrees from the horizon and the sky around them glowed fiery red and yellow. But Captain Tsutsui was getting more and more uneasy: "I thought, The bomb tests were being conducted over coral reefs. It could be pulverized coral ash, couldn't it?' " He thought some more about shi no hai, then ordered the crew to up anchor. The trawler steamed for home, 2,000 miles away. "On the first night," said Radioman Aikichi Kuboyama, "we were unable to eat our sup- per. We tried drinking some sake (rice wine) to improve our appetites, but our appetites would not improve and the sake did not make us drunk. We were very depressed. Some of the crew grumbled 'pikadon but others said it couldn't be. I think someone said it was probably dust from some volcanic explosion/9 SOME EFFECTS OF Ionizing Radiation ON HUMAN BEINGS from the Naval Medical Research Institute Bethesda 14, Maryland U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory San Francisco, California and Medical Department Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York Edited by E. P. Cronkite V. P. Bond and C. L. Dunham A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radiation from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being UNITED STATES Report TID-5358 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION JULY 1956 Extensive lerion* in IS year old boy at 45 days post-exposure. Cast $6. 67 8 Plate 5. — Hyper pig merited raised plaques and bullae on dorsum of feet and toes at 28 days. One lesion on left foot shows deeper involvement. Feet were painful at this time. Plate 8. — Same case as in Plate 6, six months later. Foot lesions have healed with repig mentation, except depigmented spots persist in small areas where deeper lesions were. Plate 17. — Epilation in 7 yr. old girl at $8 days. Caselt. Plate 18. — Same case as in Plate 17, six months after exposure showing complete regrowth of normal hair. EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION Figure 1.1 — Typical construction of the Marshallese homes to illustrate the exposure environment of the Marshallese and the lack of shielding from gamma radiation. \— 2 \ 2 ^^r EVACUAT r AT 51 HR — — — iiii A i i i I I I 1 1 I i 1 -i ^"^ V 21 A Is 1 • J eg* H IIII o O o to cr i cr O I i I cr tu t- < — UJ o CJ Si O © ■** s e § 2 2 o to O o o in (J) HIV Nl 3S0Q "1V101 dflOdO "IViOl JO 1N33 d3d DESCRIPTION OF EXPOSED GROUPS 7 On Rongerik (Group III) a set of film badge readings were obtained which constitute the only direct evidence of total dose. Several badges worn both outdoors and inside lightly constructed buildings on the island read about 50 to 65 r, and one badge which re- mained outdoors over the 28.5 hour period read 98 r. Another group of badges, kept indoors inside a steel refrigerator, read 38 r. A long fallout probably would not be uni- formly heavy throughout, the first portion being the most intense and the balance de- creasing with time. The total phenomenon would thus tend toward the effect of a shorter fallout. This is supported by moni- tor data from other nuclear events, where initially heavy fallout is reported to produce a peak of air-borne radioactivity soon after arrival, with the airborne activity level then decreasing. 16 EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION Itching and burning of the skin occurred in 28 percent of Group I (Eongelap), 20 percent of Group II (Ailinginae), 5 percent of Group III (Americans), and none of Group IV (Utirik). Three people in Group I and one in Group II complained of itching and burning of the eyes and lacrimation. About two-thirds of Group I were nauseated during the first 2 days and one-tenth vomited and had diarrhea. One individual in Group II was nauseated. In Groups III and IV there were no gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms. Between The 33rd and 43rd post-exposure days, 10 percent of the individuals in Group I had an absolute granulocyte level of 1000 per cubic millimeter or below. The lowest count ob- served during this period was TOO granulocytes/ mm.8 Less striking fallout described as "mist-like" was observed on Ailinginae and Rongerik. Fallout was not visible on Utirik, which was contaminated to only a mild degree. The se- verity of the skin manifestations was roughly proportional to the amount of fallout observed. Group Fallout Observed Skin Lesions and Epilation Rongelap _ _ Ailinginae- _ Rongerik. _ _ Utirik Heavy (snowlike) Moderate (mistlike) _ Moderate (mistlike) _ None. Extensive. Less extensive. Slight. No skin lesions or epilation. During The First 24-48 hours after exposure, about 25 percent of the Marshallese in the two higher exposure groups experienced itching and a burning sensation of the skin. 27 28 EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION Skin lesions in the lesser exposed Ailinginae and Kongerik groups developed approximately one week after those in the Rongelap group, and were less severe and extensive. The Utirik group did not develop any lesions which could be attributed to irradiation of the skin. The incidence of ulcerating lesions in the different groups reflected the relative severity of the skin injury. Twenty percent of the Eongelap people developed ulcerative lesions while only five per- cent of the Ailinginae and none of the Rongerik people developed ulcerative lesions. Ninety percent of the Rongelap and Ailinginae groups developed lesions, compared to only forty per- cent of the Rongerik group. There were more lesions per individual in the Rongelap group than in the Ailinginae or Rongerik groups. A comparison of the incidence and time of appear- ance of epilation and neck lesions in the two groups is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1. SKIN LESIONS AND EPILATION 35 a. Shelter. Those individuals who remained indoors or under the trees during the fallout period developed less severe lesions. b. Bathing. Small children who went wad- ing in the ocean developed fewer foot lesions. Most of the Americans, who were more aware of the danger of the fallout, took shelter in aluminum buildings, bathed and changed clothes and consequently developed only very mild beta lesions. c. Clothing. A single layer of cotton material offered almost complete protection, as was demonstrated by the fact that lesions developed almost entirely on the exposed parts of the body. 3.54 Factors Favoring the Development of Lesions a. Areas of more profuse perspiration. Lesions were more numerous in areas where perspiration is abundant such as the folds of the neck, axillae, and antecubital fossae. b. Delay in decontamination. There was a delay of 1 or 2 days before satisfactory decon- tamination was possible. t QQ O J 3 SC Best E mate TOTA Qamm Dose Air (] &o o 00 <<* l> CO i-H t>» »-H 09 i l^ O* G5 00 + + + + 9^ • • • ENT Dos .ATIO E B go r afcM "*? M b 00 2 CQ "^-. CO P~ PS Q s^s >> g >> b ►» c3 o3 c o3 £s io *d o •^ O 'C T3 2 °o t- o 00 O CO i-H CN -^ s~*> ^-v E 0> 0) ^■^ ^b4 ^^ E ^ a a o o o 0) 0? fl c b oo P w Ph O CD 00 i-H Tf K io -r SEE io ^ -g 0) * 1-4 Eh O i-H oo "5 IC S + + + K ffi W 00 ^ «- o> CMCO-g- + + g | gsS CO CO u g SSgg o o OO ^.a. PPROXI ME OF INCEME Fallo + 5 + • CO CN 5+ + w w a « ^ 00 00 t^ CO ^H #o co *s c ensive s exten c CO www W J CO O 2 «t s_ C *tA cd -d bo cd -o ^ iO O^ 00 ^ © (n t> ^ N ^ •«-> (U "8 X-N^4 ^ V S ^5 E ^ ♦-» 4-» ^2 CO CO ■8 Is 'i 0 C ',",■ ■ ■ ■ ■ * ■ ■ * ■■■■ ■■■■,%** »..\^ IUWIJ0UOOO(XXX>JOCOOOCO<> « « » . > USNRDL-TR-IQ49 29 July 198b 4D64I480 REMOVAL OF 6IMULATE0 FALLOUT FROM ASPHALT STREETS 8Y FIREHOSING TECHNIQUES by L.L.Wiltshire W.L.Owen In general; removal effectiveness Improves with increased particle size range and increased mass loading. For the expenditure of an effort of 4 nozzle-minutes (12 nan-minutes) per 10^ ft , results ranged as follows: Particle Size Range Nominal Mass loading Removal Effectiveness Ql} (fl^ftr) (Residual Fraction) 44-88 4.0 0.16 24.0 0.07 350 - 700 4.0 0.005 24.0 0.003 U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOOICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY SAN FRANCISCO * CALIFORNIA 94135 5xl04 CO ia4 c o o: CO 00 o T3 10 10 u u < 10 RM-1676-ABC k~±&-tfi -13- Stanley M. Greenfield, et aL, 'A Catalog of Fallout Patterns", RAND Corp RM-U76-AEC J I i m ml I I M I I III 10 10" 10° Area covered by at least o given dose (sq n mi ) Fission yield of weapon, surface burst (MT) 10 4 Approximate scaling relationship between 48-hr dose rate and normalized area n CO &*• en ri o c o o 05 V 0 o « r-l *« -•-> r-l •H r-l •H r-l 01 ■P c o « £ e e B fOfO covo • • ON «— • h O ■ ON ONOI (XI o o -* Q "^ i/\ o oj —i o o o . h- e^ r-l no fc -rf VO -* ih vo ir\ Of „ roiH o\ • o 8 o • OS * lACVI i O • • • • • • • OOO0OO0O0O0 O r-l IT* O O O hojiaOO o o o 88 «* «* •* •* HOIOt- c U Hi £ CO > £ 9 Q a. s o u e CD 3 u CO c ■a c o •i) a U CO S31IW '3DNVXSIQ 2>s «* CN 62 --• *** *» • 0 IOO too 500 400 i " \ \ \ i ■ / l I \ \ v 1 • - *' — 1000 " > *• ^^ \ \ \ \ u V \ ^ "* N \ \ \ V \ s 4 « I \ \ \ s ** * • t \ \ \ \ * IOO 1 ,•*' X ,*■» — » x \ 10 ,\ \ . 1 \ \ 900 too IOO o too too DUtQoct From G2* fttt 300 400 500 Figure 329. OPERATION SUNBEAM - S*iUl Boy GZ area contours In R/hr at H+l hour The contours were corrected to H+l hour usln^ a decay constant of 1.27. to o < < o ^< O So to I- *o u< ri> < to *^B Ih ** *, 0£ 3 ^> So >- ^ ■— 2* •It ^ o CM CM < to ■ s* £ to O • • 0) O W) i- D -O 3 o ^-O %n O 2 N o E o VI s o - CO iTi o CM O UJ M O O 2 O U si u> 5000 1000 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I 1 1 1 1 Gamma dose rate activity in the - fallout pattern, as a function of median fallout (includes fractionation) — dw= 880 h 500 < a 100 50 10 dM= 210 M d,0= 23 p CONF-765 SMALL BOY SHOT FALLOUT CARL F. MILLER and JAMES D. SARTOR » ' I I I I 0.5 2 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 98 99.5 ACTIVITY ON PARTICLES WITH LESS THAN INDICATED DIAMETERS, % f-i 1 1 i i i i r |ii i i i i i — r - CO -H <© 00 CO o a w w c 43 IP - O (/> «/» < > "'II i L I" I ' ' ' I L c •H •o •H - a - 10* 10* 10 15 20 25 DAYS AFTER FALLOUT 30 35 CONF-765 Fig. 8 — Hypothetical concentrations of 13iI on pasture plants, in cow milk, and in human thyroids following environmental contamination by a single fallout event. CT5 CO W Q O D O S < fa o CO O H W g 2 g < K U i Q O O fa m O O « w CO U CO CO 73 > "c3 o a >> S 0) o a 4-> •™* 4~ •^4 be— ■ bo a co 4- s a ft CO X a >> o i> o >> CO s-s Sm . io T3 CD 00 IO CO 00 • m to • i—i ^H rf« (M i— 1 f— 1 o J- O 0) a be — o t— 1 bo OQ ■1— s a «« CO >> X o cd ° £ cd o ai3 • o *o cc lO ^H IC • o o • CO ^ 00 i-H CM lO o « •^* O >> o s J3 ex *-> •*. oT bO CO d 1 4-J CO o c ** CO • cd *^ CM »-3 «£; ^»J c cd Q^ p^I cd u 2 £ 3 o c W - -C o n< c *-> on pj ons i X E CO •a •** ^^^ • *■* CO w ^ « *-» » bO c cd <*-> cd *i *^ o u 3 ^O II £ o S i o centrat concen Id 4-> c *-> cd JJ cd o r ii o cd c o § £ cd E « o CO T3 itial c aximu £ ■ — < o c 2 o Id o 0) 00 cd OQ £2 H *5 H CONF765 CESIUM-137 AND STRONTIUM-90 RETENTION FOLLOWING AN ACUTE INGESTION OF RONGELAP FOOD EDWARD P. HARDY, Jr.,* JOSEPH RIVERA,* and ROBERT A. CONARDt * Health and Safety Laboratory, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, New York, New York, and tBrookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York. * : 40 - 10 n i i i i i i I i i i i i r Percent retention oj i37Cs from Ronge lap food. BY WHOLE-BODY COUNTER FROM EXCRETION DATA biological half-life of 74 days J_l I I I I I I I l_L 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 DAYS AFTER INGESTION 50 - LU z < 30 8 20 10 FROM EXCRETION DATA Percent retention of 90Sr from Rongelap food 25% retained at the end of 190 days J i ' ■ i i i i i i 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 DAYS AFTER INGESTION Survival of Food Crops and Livestock in the Event of Nuclear War Proceedings of a symposium held at Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, Long Island, New York September 15-18, 1970 Sponsored by Office of Civil Defense U. S. Atomic Energy Commission U. S. Department of Agriculture Editors David W. Bensen Office of Civil Defense Arnold H. Sparrow Brookhaven National Laboratory December 1971 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Office of Information Services THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LONG-LIVED NUCLIDES AFTER A NUCLEAR WAR R. SCOTT RUSSELL, B. O. BARTLETT, and R. S. BRUCE Agricultural Research Council, Letcombe Laboratory, Wantage, Berkshire, England ABSTRACT The radiation doses from the long-lived nuclides 90Sr and l37Cs, to which the surviving population might be exposed after a nuclear war, are considered using a new evaluation of the transfer of 9 ° Sr into food chains. As an example, it is estimated that, in an area where the initial deposit of near-in fallout delivered 100 R/hr at 1 hr and there was subsequent worldwide fallout from 5000 Mt of fission, the dose commitment would be about 2 rads to the bone marrow of the population and 1 rad to the whole body. Worldwide fallout would be responsible for the major part of these doses. In view of the possible magnitude of the doses from long-lived nuclides, the small degree of protection that could be provided against them, and the considerable strain any such attempt would impose on the resources of the community, it seems unrealistic to consider remedial measures against doses of this magnitude. Civil-defense measures should be directed at mitigating the considerably higher doses that short-lived nuclides would cause in the early period. O O) k_ CO s o Q. z o < I- z LU U z o u 30 -III I I A 1 1 1 1 1 1 - / J Cumulative 1 u / J 1 I 1 I \ \ \ "' \ deposit 1 I \ \ — — 1 I \ \ 20 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 1 ' / ' / • * ' / / J' \ \ \ V \ \ \ ^ \ \ V \ \ \ \Milk — 10 0 - /k t ¥ ..-■' // \ \ \ L/r ,•■"■" VS. \ \ ^y! ^"O/ \ Annual \ y / / \deposit >_ 0 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1" — 20 — 180 CM E S o E — 10 55 — CO O Q_ LU O < r- 5 z — 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 Fig. 1 Strontium-90 in fallout and milk in the United Kingdom 0 — ' CN E 6 E 40 20 CO O Q_ LU G UJ > < RADIATION EFFECTS ON FARM ANIMALS: A REVIEW M. C. BELL UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee ABSTRACT Hematopoietic death would predominate in food-producing animals exposed to gamma radiation under fallout conditions leaving animal survivors. Gamma-radiation doses of about 900 R would be lethal to 50% of poultry, and about half this level would be lethal for cattle, sheep, and swine. Grazing cattle and sheep would suffer most from combined radiation effects of skin-beta and ingested-beta radioactivity plus the whole-body gamma effects. The LD50/60 for combined effects in ruminants is estimated to be at a gamma exposure of around 200 R in an area where the forage retention is 7 to 9%. Either external parasites or severe heat loss could be a problem in skin irradiated animals. Contrary to early reports, bacterial invasion of irradiated food-producing animals does not appear to be a major problem. Productivity of survivors of gamma radiation alone would not be affected, but, in an area of some lethality, the productivity of surviving grazing livestock would be severely reduced owing to anorexia and diarrhea. Sheltering animals and using stored feed as countermeasures during the first few days of livestock exposure provide much greater protection than shielding alone. 80 > < \- cc O 40 0 D. G. Brown, UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory — O JD + 6 ° Co at a dose rate between 0.5 and 1 R/min. cattle 4 9 5% confidence interval llo-l 400 600 800 DOSE, R 1000 FALLOUT PROPERTIES IMPORTANT TO AGRICULTURE 89 o q SDNOD dO V3HV "IV101 dO !N30H3d © 3 o c c D T3 1c T3 w jo C 0> t/i 4-> T3 c to £ RADIONUCLIDE BODY BURDENS 139 10 100 POSTDETONATION TIME, hr 1000 Radioactivity from 1-Mt explosive with a fission-to-fusion ratio of 1.0. Local Fallout from Nuclear Test Detonations (U). DASA 1251-series (5 volumes with 9 separately-bound parts), by U.S. Army Nuclear Defense Laboratory for the Defense Atomic Support Agency: Volume I. Indexed Bibliography of United states and British Documents on Characteristics of Local Fallout (U), DASA 1251-1 (AD 329971), 237 pp., 27 June 1961. (C) Volume II. Compilation of Fallout Patterns and Related Test Data (U): Part 1 - Trinity Through Redwing (U), DNA 1251-2-1 (AD 349123), 468 pp., August 1963. (SRD) Part 2 - Plumbbob Through Hardtack (U). DASA 1251-2-2 (AD 329124), 456 pp., August 1963. (SRD) Part 3 - Nougat Through Niblic (U), DASA 1251-2-3 (AD 371725), 226 pp., March 1966. (SRD) Supplement , Foreign Nuclear Tests (U), DASA 1251 (AD 358417L), 77 pp., October 1964. (SRD) Volume III. Annotated compendium of Data on Physical and Chemical Properties of Fallout (U). DASA 1251-3 (AD 381963L), 770 pp., November 1966. (SRD) Volume IV. Annotated compendium of Data on Radiochemical and Radiation Characteristics of Fallout (U); Part 1 - Specific Activity, Activity-Size Distribution. Decay (U), DASA 1251-4-1 (AD 500919L) , 643 pp., September 1968. (SRD) Part 2 - Radiochemical Composition, Induced Activity, Gamma Spectra (U), DASA 1251-4-2 (AD 523385), 570 pp., 31 May 1972. (SRD) Volume V, Transport and Distribution of Local (Early) Fallout from Nu- clear Weapon Tests (U). DASA 1251-5 (AD 362012), 580 pp., May 1965. (SRD) 1.2 kt JANGLE -Sugar Surface burst 19 Nov 1951 CLOUD TCP HEIGHT: 15,000 ft MSL CRATER TATA: Diameter: 90 ft maximum dose rate: 7500 r/hr at H+l Depth: Maximum dose rate Distance Value from (r/hr) GZ (ft) Maximum contour distance from GZ (ft) 500 r/hr 300 r/hr 100 r/hr 540 900 2200 4900 12,500 21 ft at crater lip hour Contour area (sq mi) ^^ -jjjjj- Laurino, R. K., and I. G. Poppoff, 1951: Contamination r/hr patterns at Operation JANGLE. U. S. Nav. Rad. Def. 0.05 0.15 0.55 Lab. Rep. USNRDL-399, 28 pp. 500 r/hr 500 r/hr •000 0i» tones From 62 ,Yortf« 18 mph mean wind speed 12 11 10 — |— TTTnni "| I | M| M| | i | M| U| residual radiation from fission products from 1 minute after the explosion i 1 1 1 1 t« < 1 — r TT TT — — - - - — — - - - — — — - - - — - - — i 1 1 II — L- -11 JLL U .JLL -11 u JJ. 11 L. -LI 1L 0 0.01 0.04 0.1 -1.2 (t decay law) 0.4 1 4 10 40 100 TIME AFTER EXPLOSION (HOURS) 400 1,000 1.2 kt SUGAR test (Nevada surface burst) Source: weapon test report WT-414 Gamma dose rate (R/hr) Gamma dose (R) 610 m- Downwind distance I 914 m i 1220 m 1 3350 m ^'•r^-' j 4650 m ^.V ] 1830 m-| 2440 m 610 m "914 m 3350 m 4650 m 1220 m 1830 m 10 100 1000 10* Time after burst (seconds) 1.2 kt UNCLE test (5.2 m underground, Nevada) 1000 o.ooi I i i dim o.i 1220 m 1830 m 10 100 1000 Time after burst (seconds) Robbins, Charles; et al. "Airborne Particle Studies , JANGLE Project 2.5a-l." (In: Operation JANGLE, Particle Studies, WT-371-KX, 417 pages.) Army Chemical Center. Washington, D. C. : AFSWP. WT-394-EX. October 1979. 198 Pages. AD/A995 072 OPERATION JAHGLB Project 2.5*-l AIRB0RN3 PARTICLE STUDIES Lt. Col. Charles Robbins Chemical Corps Major Hugh R. Lehaan David R. Powers tf. S. Air Force Chemioal Corns James D. Wiloox Cheoiosl Corps July 1952 CHEMICAL A!fD RADIOLO&ICXL LABORATORIES Army Chemioal Center , Maryland ■o -a FRCJiCT 2.J:a-l _ JJj Jr r* r i T FBrira is 6 88 _.t a • w-Jjj. .&. -. O cr o CO z o o UJ M CO UJ o 2 *o in eg o a> "o In. a. CO Q ° o> 93 oi 5><& 9 5 ot o> 01 01 *3Zi9 031V1S NVK1 SS31 AXIALLOV JLN3083d 3AUVTfV:nO CI 43 c c IS * £ S 00 o - (Or e a % CO § CO M •H CO ,3 3 t & o c o •H 4> O I 1 PROJECT 2,5a-l 2 3 DISTANCE (I04FIET) Figure 5»1 Concentration of Activity in the Clou* as a Function of Distance on the Down- wind Leg* Filter Sampler Data, Activity was corrected to time at which cloud passed each station* - 122 - PROJECT 2.5a-l 5#5 STUDY OF FRACTIONATION 5»5»1 Radiocherajstrv The data concerning the nuclide activity p8r unit mass of active material as a function of particle sizo, irhich is con- tainod in Table 4.15, provided a method of investigating the mechanism whereby particles acquire activity. The data for Sr8* and ZR9* have been plotted in Figs. 5. h and 5.5 • Referring to Fig. 5.4, it appears that a straight line with a slope of -1 may be fitted to the data, whereas this is not possible with the data in Fig. 5.5.^ Allowing for some over-simplification , it appears that the Sr89 activity is a function of particle surface, whereas that for Zr9^ tends to be more of a volume function. Ba*40 gives a plot similar to the Sr8? pi0t, while Ce1^ is similar to Zr95# Further study is being made of these data, particularly with respect to the question of whether the activity of Zr?5 and Ce^ ±a concentrated in a shell rather than a volume. Exaiaination of the decay chains of these four nuclides provides a plausible reason why there should bo a difference in the mechanism for acquiring radioactivity. The decay chains are as follows^: Kr89 2.*y Kb89 15.^ Sr89 Kr95 shor^ Rb95 short, Sr95 shorty T95 10.5a, Zr95 Xe _lfa>.Ce 66a x Ba140 It may be seen that Ba1^0 and Sr89 both have gaseous precursors that have half-lives long in comparison with the lifetime of the fireball, s^noe gases such as krypton and xenon are not significantly subject *> adsorption above liquid air temperatures, it is logical to supoose «*t while the Zr*5 and C*LU> chains passed the rare gas stage early •nough to be adsorbed during the particle growth process, no appreci- able amount of Kr*** and XeW° decayed before the particles had ceased *° grow. Hence the Sr89 and Ba1/;tr activities were confined to the outermost surfaces of the particles. C. D. Coryell & N. Sugarman, op cit, pp. 1996-2001 - 137 - weapon test report WT-414 g#o INHALATION STTOISS Dogs and sheep were exposed on. the ground surface and in foxhole? at distances of 2500 to 6000 feet in the predicted dovnvind direction from each shot, The purpose of the exposure vas to allow the assessment of hazards due to inhalation of radioactire dusts associated vita these detonations and to compare internal and external radiation dosegoe, Total body activity for animals exposed in the underground test ranged from Z to 31 mlcrocuries corrected to time of sacrifice. Tor lunj tissuei integrated dosage doe to beta emission ranged betveon 0,2 and 9*0 rep, Radloautographa of lung tissues indicated the presence of a fev alpha emitting particles. Bone analyses indicated cone uptdo of Balto and Sr90^ The amounta of activity taken up by the combined action of irhalrv- tioa and ideation are not considered to to physiologically significant even for animals rocoiving cumulative extomal gama riialr/ticn docc^cs up to several thousand roentgens, 77 9.3 CLOTHIEG lECOHTAKINAIIOtf AM) STALUAIIQg OP LADF1QY METHODS Standard and special U, S. Army Quartermaster Corps laundering nethods and standard laundry equipment were evaluated for field decern-* tamination of clothing and selected fabrics, No clothing worn by personnel became contaminated to a significant degree during this operation. Therefore, this project vas carried out with clothing deliberately contaminated with radioactive material from the fall-out area. The project evaluated the standard and several special laundering formulae, various types of clothing materials, and monitoring instruments (Project 6*7) • ^e significant result of this project is the indication that .clothing contamination resulting from vork in areas contaminated by atomic bomb detonations will not produce even minor injury to per- sonnel. This conclusion is based on consideration of the data on saturation values of deliberate clothing contamination reduced to one hour after detonation, The resultant exposure to personnel vould be less than that required to produce even slight skin irritation (cos*- parable to mild sunburn). Other conditions, such as muddy terrain and ouch higher specific activity, could increase the amount of contamination received by clothing, but an increase in level of neveral orders of magnitude vould be required to produce injury. In these cases it is certain that routine standards of cleanliness vould effective?.^- prevent injury from this cause. SEjCl AD482985 W T - 393 Copy O/h&UtftOH *»«jW»Ww*ifi»!'tsM*¥»r:i JANGLE NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS OCTOBER -NOVEMBER 1951 Project 2,3-2 FOXHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION EACH TRANSMITTAL OF THIS DOCUMENT OUTSIDE THE AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C, 20301. IRESTRICTED DATA VATOMtC ENERGY ACT 1946 ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT ,ap-™« WASHINGTON D.C. :vyHEff „yi'Secur)tt Information MIHF'I1 ■ ' ' Ia 7| SSJCBBS Srartty tsf veitin PBOJBCT 2.3-2 TASB 3.1 Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Surface Burst) Range (ft) Location Twonnan Foxhole One-man \ Foxhole doll Pipe 2000 36p Above Surface Surface 16W Below Surface 32" Below Surface US" Below Surface 800 r 700 230 205 105 2k 58 136 12.8 22 62 2500 3fi» Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32" Below Surface 1|8* Below Surface 230 r 220 35 60 85 7 15 26 k 8.5 13.3 3000 36*1 Above Surface Surface 16° Below Surface 32" Below Surface U8n Below Surface 110 r 90 23 36 55 7.6 12.U 19.1* 2.5 1.8 6.7 6.6 2.5 1.6 $$ 6.6 2.1» 1 73 r 10 0.5 0 3500 36" Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32* 'Below Surface li8" Below Surface tar 3 ~ 9.7 1.6 2.8 3.k .5U .99 1.9 1(000 36" Above Surface Surface 16* Below Surface 32* Below Surface 18* Below Surface 17 r 9.6 1.6 3 5.6 0.6 1.12 1.62 - 0.5L 0.57 oT39 ol35 17 r 0.17 Woo 36* Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32" Below Surfaoe li8* Below Surface 9.8 r k.6 1 1.8 3.5 0.5 0.7 1.0b 0.21 O.li 0.57 5000 36* Above Surface Surface 16* Below Surfaoe 32* Below Surfaoe i8* Below Surfaoe U.8 r 2.7 0.6 0.99 2.95 0.3 0.5 0.75 0,17 0f2 0.J8 RESTIUCTCODAtA Atoftie cncrot act it* PROJECT 2.3-2 TABIE 3.2 Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Underground Burst) Range (ft) Location Two-man Foxhole One -nan Foxhole "SoET Pipe 2000 36" Above Surface 16" Below 32" Below k9n Below Surface Surface Surface Surface 3850 r 2300 USO — 300 700 1000 555 200 200 200 2560 36n Above Surface I6n Below 32« Below U8" Below Surface Surface Surface Surface 1000 — 550 r 78 78 98 U5 U3 56 50 73.U 9U 96 3000 36* Above Surface 16" Below 32" Below U8* Below Surface Surface Surface Surface 175 r 103 30 1*2 37 22 23 20 U3»5 U5 5U 20 15 Ja 75 11 il 155 r 7 3 35bo 36» Above Surface 16" Below ^2» Below 8" Below Surface Surface Surface Surface 12 9 31 W 17 10 11 15 9 22 llOOO 36" Above Surface Surface 16* Below Surface * Below Surface » BeMjf Surface s 6 5 6 32r 22 7 3.U 8.k 15 7.2 6.6 7 I-7 u 2.8 28 r 2 0 -2*1 Woo 36" Abora Surfaoa Surf tot 16* Balow Surf act " Balow Surf aca * Briar Surf act S U 5.8 22 r 10 2.8 -2*2. 5 2.6 5ooo 36* Abort Surface Surf to* 16* Balow Surfaoa * Balow Surfaoa * Btlflf Surf Mi IS 15 21.5 1 73 r 23 15 22.6 a 67 15 2L r<- -7- AXOmLJhMmf ACT te*t CHAPTER J> CONCLUSIONS 5,1 POIHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION 5*1*1 Surface Detonation Standard foxholes provide excellent protection to personnel from the gamma radiation emitted during the detonation of ma atomic weapon on the surface of the ground* The results from the comparatively small sized weapon employed in Operation JANGEB show that 2000 feet from the burst, the location of the closest foxhole doses of about 60r were measured at the bottom of a f oxhole, less than 10 per cent of the dose measured 3 feet above the surface of the ground* Due to the location of the foxhole in the crosswind direction, the dose at the bottom was caused primarily by scattered prompt radia- tion plus a small contribution from the residual activity of the fis- sion products on the surface of the ground* In the downwind direction there would be a contribution from matter that falls out from the cloud Into the foxhole in addition to the above mentioned* This fall- out will depend on the wind velocity for a given sized weapon, and although it is expected to increase the dose in the foxholes, es- pecially in those located close to the detonation* it is relatively unimportant in comparison to the prompt and residual activity since it can be easily shoveled out of the foxhole in a short tiw* 5*1*2 fltaderground Detonation With the possible exception of those located in the area close to the point of detonation where extensive fall-out occurs* foxhole* also provide effective shielding In the case of an under- ground detonation* Even within this area of extensive fall-out, which at Operation JJU10I2 extended approximately 2000 feet, the high doses recorded in the foxholes could be greatly reduced by digging out the radioactive matter that fell into the hole* It is highly probable that one-half the doses reoorded in the foxholes located within 2500 feet of the detonation at Operation JANOB were directly attributable to this type of fall-out and most likely a higher percentage at dis- tances greater than 2500 feet* •19- JBREI KSTRtCTTO MTU TQPSB3RET UK National Archives PREM 11/560, 12 July 1951 PRIME KOTSTER ** Clan dog tine Use of Atomic Weapons The Chiefs of Staff have hem considering ths possibility that the enemy might open the next war with an atomic attack on London on the model of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - without warning and before any formal declaration of hostilities, The most effective method of making such an attack would be to drop an atomic bomb from a military aircraft. If the control and reporting system were fully manned and alert in a period of tension, there would be some chance that hostile aircraft approaching this country could, be intercepted and driven off. At any rate, there are no special measures, outside the normal measures of air defence, whioh we could take in peace-time to guard against this type of attack. 2. It is, however, possible that the enemy might use other means of surprise attack with atomic weapons* A clandestine attack oould be made in either of the following ways:- (1) A complete atomic bomb oould be concealed in the hold of a merchant ship coming from the Soviet Union or a satellite oountry to a port in the United Kingdcm: (ii) An atomic bomb might be broken dom into a number of parts and introduced into this country in about fifty wll packages of moderate wei^it. None of these packages could be detected by instruments as containing anything dangerous or explosive, and even visual inspection of the contents of the packages would not make identification certain, Iftiese packages could be introduced either as ordinary merchandise from Soviet ships, or possibly as diplomatic freight. The bomb could subsequently be assembled in any premises with the sort of eaulpaent usual in a small garage, provided that a small team of skilled fitters was available to do the job* OPERATION HURRICANE— THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION 25 KT BURST IN SHIP FIG. 72 NORTH WEST IftLANO I HOUR AFTER EXPLOSION ROENTGENS, PER HOUR T uo DASA-1251: WIXD DATA Altitude Direction Speed T—t degrees mph 1,000 158.5 17.2 2*000 l*i 1.5 16.7 3.000 133.0 17.1 i»,000 129.0 11. 0 5.000 123.0 12.9 6,000 117.5 12.2 7,000 117.5 11.6 6,000 122.0 10.6 9.000 129.5 138.0 9.7 10,000 9.1 200 , * 600 1,000 . , - ■'«» .100-'' — - ^£-^r*~ — --* i*«oo-^- " - ___- ^1,000 Dose-rate Area (r/hr) at one hour (Sq. Miles) 2,000 _---' ^ - 6,000 ^10,000 AWRE-Tl/54, ~ 27 Aug. 1954 ipoovos **%&? 5,000 4,000 3,000 o >* 2,000 N O £ o 1,000 it U I 0 Q tpoo 2,000 3,000 _ Baker r/hr at H+l " » » I M ' ' ' I t I I 1 I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I Operation HARDTACK I - Umbrella cumulative dose to 6 hours 150 ft under vater Water depth 150 ft WT-1316 (EX) EXTRACTED VERSION OPERATION REDWING Project 2.62a Fallout Studies by Oceanographic Methods Pacific Proving Grounds May- July, 1956 Defense Atomic Support Agency Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico February 6, 1961 NOTICE This is an extract of WT-1316. Operation REDWING, Project 2.62a, which remains classified Secret) Restricted Data as of this date. Extract version prepared for: Director DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20305 1 February 1980 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. TAB 2.11 Navajo Tewa «m^ Total Yield, Mt 4.50 Fission proportion 5% 5.01 87% H + 1 Hour Dose Area (mi2) Rate (r/hr) Within Contour 1,000 25 450 500 55 1,050 300 80 1,550 100 310 3,500 Two -day Area (mi2) Dose, R Within Contour 1,000 20 520 500 30 1,050 300 45 1,500 100 350 3,000 CLEAN BOMB: 3.53 MT (15% FISSION) ZUNI WT-1316 DIRTY BOMB: 5.01 MT (87% FISSION) TEWA WT-1316 Accumulated dose )6'4« Figure 2.44 t65» toH + 50 X o 2 MM i a ZUNI (3.53 MT, 15% FISSION) ♦ FLATHEAD (0.365 MT, 73% FISS.) * NAVAJO (4.5 MT, 5% FISSION) © TEWA (5.01 MT, 87% FISSION) REDWING TEST DOSE RATES id— SCALED TO 5 MT FISSION YIELD WT-1344 (ADA995132), FIG. 3.17 J I L_ 10' o* AREA (SQUARE MILES) I0J 3 o I 03 O O o J* OS 0) a 8- V •r-4 ■•-> o 03 ed 6 s tuo -t-> o C o •ft +■> o I0°c lO-'fcr io-2t io-3t 10 -4 T — I I I llll| 1 — I I I l!ll| JANGLE S jj i ni| 1 — r TEAPOT ESS ASYMPTOTE FOR Fc AS Z~0 PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL Fc CURVE FOR I kt ASYMPTOTE FOR NO DYNAMIC VENTING BLANCAl UCRL-12125 i »iii ml ml | | | | mil I I MINI i mum - 10' 10 10' 10' 10' DEPTH/W173 (ft/ktl/3) UCRL-12125 Event W, kt z, ft F Medium Sedan 100 635 0.10 Alluvium Teapot ESS 1.2 67 0.46 Alluvium Jangle U 1.2 17 0.64 Alluvium Neptune 0.115 100 0.005 Tuff Jangle S 1.2 0 0.50 Alluvium Danny Boy 0.43 109 0.04 Basalt Blanca 19 835 0.0005 Tuff UCRL-12125 10 10 Sedan, 104 kt (30% fission) 90% activity was trapped in crater 8% was in main cloud 2% was in base surge lo-'t- PREDICTED OBSERVED At 24 hours, 52% of gamma radiation was neutron induced tungsten pusher 10 -2 1 1 1 1 1 10 20 30 40 50 DISTANCE, NAUTICAL MILES 60 70 TEAPOT-ESS: 5 SEC. (1.2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1955) TEAPOT-ESS: 3 MIN. (1 .2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1 955) m 7000 6000 8000 4000 3000 TEAPOT - Ess 23 Mar 1955 1 .2 kt at 67 ft depth, Nevada soil, 20 mph wind (Fallout on Banded Mountain spread over slopes, reducing dose rates.) N o 2000 6 o jj 1000 1000 2000 3000 I000r/h? line 2000 r/hr 3000r/hc 5000 r/hr 6000r/hr llllllIM 3000 2000 1000 4000 5000 6000 7000 DAS A 1251 0 1000 2000 3000 Olitanct from GZ, Yards CRATER DATA: diameter: 292 ft HEIGHT OP BURST: -6'f ft Depth: 96 ft Maximum Dose Rate: 6000 r/hr at CIOUD TOP HKIGHT: 12,000 ft MSL H+l hour at crater lip UCRL-51440 (1973) H+l hr 500 rad/hr 100 rad/hr 50 rad/hr 10 rad/hr 5 rad/hr ^TBanded % Mt. N 5 rod/ hr Teapot-ESS RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN 104 RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN (May- June 1957 Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) STATEMENT OP DK. W. W. KELLOGG, BAND CORP. Atmospheric Transport and Close-in Fallout of Radioactive Debris From Atomic Explosions In the case of an air burst in which the white-hot fireball never reaches the surface, the radioactive fission products never come into close contact with the surface material; they remain as an exceedingly fine aerosol. At first sight this might be thought to be an oversimplification, since there have been many cases in which the fireball never touched the ground, but the surface material was observed to have been sucked up into the rising atomic cloud. Actually, how- ever, in such cases a survey of the area has shown that there has been a negligible amount of radioactive fallout on the ground. Though tons of sand and dust may have been raised by the explosion, they apparently did not become contaminated by fission products. The explanation for this curieus fact prabably lies in a detailed consideration of the way fn which the surface material is sucked up into the fireball of an air burst. Within a few seconds from burst time, the circulation in the atomic fireball develops a toroidal form, with an updraft in the middle and downdraft around the outside. Most of the fission products are then confined to a dough- nut-shaped region, and may be thought of as constituting a smoke ring. When the surface debris Is carried into the fireball a few seconds after the detonation, it passes up along the axis of the cloud, through the middle, and can often be seen to cascade back down around the outside of the cloud. In its passage through the cloud, it has passed around the radioactive smoke ring but has never mixed with it s000' ' ■ ' | I I I | » r/hr at H+l hour tooo I IOOO 1000 tooo *000 15 kt UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE - arable 25 May 1953 FIREBALL Radius at 2nd naximura: 557*6 HEIGHT OF BURST: $2k ft TYPE OF BURST AND PIACEMEHT: Airburst of guntype veapon CLOUD TOP HEIGHT: 35,000 ft MSL CLOUD BOTTOM HEIGHT: 23,000 ft MSL ENCORE, 27 KT AIR BURST AT 2,423 FT 1000 500 8 $00 I .10 o 1000 1500 1000 500 0 500 Distance From GZ, Yards 1000 1500 LAPLACE 1 kt 750 ft balloon air burst S iooo 8000 000 Distance From GZ, yards OWENS 9.7 kt 500 ft balloon air burst DOPPLER 1 1 kt 1500 ft balloon air burst 2000 1000 0 1000 Distance From 62, yards tooo 2000 Doppler. r/hr nt H+l hour. U t I 1 * I ' I I * » I > 1000 0 1000 Dittanot From GZ, yards tooo Harold F. Per la and Harry Haller (Holmes and Narver, Inc.)* Engi- neering Study of Underground Highway and Parking Garage and Blast Shelter, OENL-TM-1381 (March 1966). ESEB UPPER AND LOWER PARKING AREAS '■■'■» UPPER PARKING AREAS EZZ2I LOWER PARKING AREAS l|lff I BLAST OOORS AND PEDESTRIAN BYPASS MANHATTAN AQUEDUCT TRAFFIC TUBES PARKING LOT ACCESS AND EXITS QUEENS Boslc Concept; Transportation Use Only Shelter for 600 thousand Persons 1.2 million 1.8 million ^ BROOKLYN $ 546 million Cost/ Person $ 395 $ 339 $ 322 s^ £ASTIjmaNNel WELFARE ISLAND HUDSON RtVER (NORTH RIVER) Proposed Dual -Use Shelters for Manhattan* (interconnecting Traffic Tubes and Underground Parking Areas) Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense July 1, 1958 Report R-322-RC THE RAND CORPORATION II. Population Shelters The first big question that must be raised about non-military defense is whether people can in fact be protected from modern nuclear weapons. Protection involves not only provision of shelters capable of withstanding blast and fallout effects, but also arrange- ments for getting people into the shelters in response to different kinds of warnings. It should be stated at the beginning that it is impossible to provide reliable protection for all the population, and that the fraction of the population effectively protected depends greatly on the essentially uncertain nature of the enemy attack. There appear to be a number of possibilities for protective systems, how- ever, and under plausible assumptions about the enemy attack and the civilian response, significant — and in some cases dramatic — reductions in civilian casualties appear to be obtainable. TYPES OF SHELTERS Improvised fallout shelters, even if only capable of reducing radia- tion to &© or Ho of the radiation outside, could have a significant effect in reducing casualties among people outside the areas of blast damage. There seem to be many possibilities of identifying and pre- paring such shelters in existing buildings in small cities and towns. For example, a location in the center of the basement of a 40,000- square-foot building (a typical large office, store, or school building) may provide an attenuation to about Ko. Moreover, a foot of earth gives a reduction to about %0, and sandbags distributed in advance could be quickly filled and placed to provide this type of shielding. Even buildings whose structural characteristics provide smaller attenuation factors could be quite useful, with arrangements for washing down or sweeping the roofs and surrounding areas (ex- posure to carry out the decontamination being rationed among the shelter inhabitants). 20 A STUDY OF NON-MILITARY DEFENSE Table 2 ESTIMATED LONG-TERM RADIATION AFTER VARIOUS ATTACKS 1500 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (50-CITY ATTACK) Average Maximum Minimum Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 0.4 8,3 0.003 Radiation rate after 90 days with counter- measured (miiliroentgens per hour) 0.46 10 0.0035 Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 3.4 73 0.026 Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) .. 40 830 0.3 Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with- out countermeasures (microcuries) 2 42 0.015 20,000 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (AREA ATTACK) Average Maximum Minimum Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 5.3 36 0.04 Radiation rate after 90 days with counter- measures0 (miiliroentgens per hour) 6.5 43 0.049 Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 48 310 0.36 Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) . . 530 3600 4 Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with- out countermeasures (microcuries) 26 180 0.2 a Assumes that radiation rates are reduced to ^oo of the level computed with the r-1-2 formula, because of decontamination, shielding and time-rationing, and inaccuracy in the formula. Area around ground zero at Nagasaki before and after explosion (1,000-foot radius circles are shown). THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI v REPORT OF THE BRITISH MISSION TO JAPAN PUBLISHED FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE LONDON 1946 o r-O CO o £ c •l-H > o O M co P o a p CO O > O a o 66 8 o CO en O Ih > CD \ N co * 2 43 O *rt co 13 • --■* Cy > *t3 o o CO *0 CO ■+■■* * CO O a o c & cd S o x> 43 cO H > o % O a O 0) 43 H &« cd a) H 42 is cd 12 ^ GO d> g s .s s in " o a 0 " W .9 P s o ^ MirL 43 CO 43 •i-H •c PQ S3 KJ CO O •a ft^^3 O CA Cl £> O CO J H 9 JA ftg S C2 ^ -d g § 5; o ,2 «§ 'aid 9 8 § S S3 ^ © ft H ST r\ W •-< *§ SI ftu ° 3 co *- o 00 SJ CD „ GO GO §4^ o DO • fH cd w *»H Ph Gfl ^ 43 o CO n3 O 6 GO C3 o CO 0 ^ is .O I S o o Cm cG GO CO d ft P o o O 1-i *r* o a o Ih GO P CO O Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA, Typical, part below ground, earth- covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to " flashburn." Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have caused casualties. Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas* nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of damage. EARTH ARCHING USED TO STRENGTHEN SHELTERS ORNL-5037 ■■•«■» Mound height = v half trench width A familiar example of effective earth arching is its use with sheet metal culverts under roads. The arching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walled culvert prevents it from being crushed by the weight of heavy vehicles. UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2 ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP) AWRE-Tl/54, 27 Aug. 1954 SECRET -GUARD ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT (formerly of Ministry of Supply) SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE (Monte Bello Islands, Australia — October, 1952) 130 x 10' 77 x 106 13-5x 1Q3 p~ R3 + R2 + R p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet Fig. 12. 1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship shown in the photo, moored 400 yards off shore. " Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right: Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 27 60 ft. 12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shehers At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3. At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of the explosion owing to intervening sandhills. SECRET-GUARD 29 13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash 13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit Trenches 13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most important results of the trial. 13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards. The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz- fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance, with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded by open and covered trenches. In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand. Table 13.1 Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench Rectan- Rectangular gular Circular open Rectangular Type of trench broadside-on end-on broadside-on open open covered Distance (yards) 1,300 943 733 1,300 1,300 943 943 733 Surface dose 300 3,000 14,000 300 300 3,000 3,000 14,000 (Roentgens] 1 Depth below grounc I level (inches) 6 150 1,000 — 230 214 1,200 (75) — 12 75 430 — 150 120 545 47-6 — 24 33-3 150 584 60 54-5 188 25 (140) 36 23 70 216 31-6 30 86 13 (56) 48 (20) 43 100 20 17-7 48-5 7-7 (31) 60 (37-5) 61 13-6 10-7 (33-3) 5 (23) 72 1 ~~~ (46-7) (8-6) 7 •" ■ (3-5) Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates. CM CM O U DC < < z g < w w o R a) I cms The National Archives ins n Ref.: (-10 23-5/17-- CSOQSqH- ] ?«H (SSeUMENT HAS BEEN **r T" i^f t • t"t >• •* - ii iii i * i i*Ti 11 iiiiniiira >^ •*+*■ ~- ■» >• »»»• t>»w .Jp/^.fj:. a^i HOME^OFFICE CD/SA 12 £irp* .NO S. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER A CCMPABIQON BSTDSEN TOB NUUBSR Of PEOPLE KILLED PJER TONUS OF BCMBS PPKENG WORLD «AR I AND WOULD WAR II BOMB SIZES For World War II the average bomb ?/eight was between 150 - 200 kg, (R.C# 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were 12 or 50 kg. TABLE 5 Relative safeties in World War II deduced from "population and casualty distribution-""™ In the open Under cover In shelter Population exposure Location people killed Relative safety RELATIVE DANGER! 2 72f9 60$ 1% 1C# ( 1 ) A house about 3^ times as safe as in the open. (2; A shelter about twice as safe as a house. Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 191 6, in which the total number killed was 59, 69»5?S of the people killed in the City were in the open. HOME OFFICE AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS DIRECTIONS FOR THE ERECTION AND SINKING OF THE GALVANISED CORRUGATED STEEL SHELTER (ANDERSON SHELTER) February 1939 Crown Copyright Rgurvid London family who survived in Anderson shelter during Blitz, when the shelter absorbed the blast (earth was blown off) in 1 940 A.R.P. (O) 10 1 %^7 3 / *. .*^ V \ \ \ \\\ \ \ \ \ I CLIP FIXING POR REMOVABLE j SHEET XL- Back, side sheets. Back, centre bottom sheet. Back, angle section. Back, centre top sheet (Removable sheet) rved sheets of centre arch. Curved sheets of back arch. Curved sheets of front arch. Frontfcentre top sheet. Front angle section \ i -^ s i ktechanh^l |te Encjl tl^e sectKDns.-vA SHEET FIXING Nut— *^ Washe FRAME FIXK^G \ \ \ Rivet \ ^ Front, side sheets': \ v Front, oentre bottom sheet handle for use as a tommy bar. pIG# 3 —The Individual Parts. • \ h Fig. 4. — Stage 12. Covering the Shelter with Earth. Fig. 4. — Stage 13. The Shelter Complete with Earth Cover. Anderson shelter survives hit: Norwich 27 April 1942 Anderson shelter survives, Croydon, October 1 940 > \., Proof that the Anderson garden shelter could withstand a house collapsing on It can be teen In this picture Mr and Mrs Claque bless their insistence on going to ground whan their homes and those of their neighbours were >ducad to rubbta. Anderson shelter survives at Latham Street, Poplar, London, 1941: And They Came Out of It Alive . . . The edge o! this bomb crater, 30ft. dtep, In * household garden near London, U only 4ft. from the Anderson shelter. But the two people in the shelter during London's six hour raid - Mrs. Clark and Miss C'&rk—were unhurt. You see Miss Clark In the picture examining the damage to the structure. « 2 S J— O* 2 D) •"= < D Q CO LJ CM UK National Archives: CAB 167 1917 27 fTHIS DOCUMENT IS ffCB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJE8TY'8 GOVERNMENT ). 81 Z&JjtfS&Jl* COPY NO. 6^ January 16th. 1941. WAR CABINET, AIR RAID SHELTER POLICY. Memorandum by the Minister cf Home Security. 6. Shelter in the home; The Anderson shelter was originally intended for indoor usobut for a number of reasons including the danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted. Experience has shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought and two designs have been produced which can be erected indoors without support. Those new types, although they may give sllghtlj less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors, would fill the needs of a largo section of the public , especially the middle class. One design allows the use of the shelter as part of the furniture of the room. 7. I regard shelters of this typo as of the first importance and wish to provide them on a big scale* Each shelter will use over 3 cwt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to two children to sloop inside. For on outlay of about 65,000 tons of steel, as a first instalment , I could therefore produce 400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000 persons. I should wish to complete such a programme within the first three months of production and thoreafter at a similar or increasing rate. From enquiries I bolieve that manufacture can bo arranged provided steel is supplied and if the Cabinet approves my policy I shall require thoir direction that the steel be made available. 10* Conclusions. I ask for a general endorsoment of the polioy I have outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of my colleagues: (i) that proposals for building shelters of massive construction should be rejected; (ii) that steel should bo made available to carry out the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the provision of stool shelters indoors; (iii) that the limit of income for the provision of free shelter for insured persons should be raised from £850 to £550 per annum* H.M. MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY, January 15th. 1941. CO 0) > •H o a rt eg O r- ■H OS rt O o o H O 8 CO to •H I •ft! a o o o « i co d ^ 8rf -P 6 ■PHO O tI Q> -O 000 >* CO .3 h « -d . •P-P h^i 0? T< E o "B-SS £•52 o Or-j 09 o ^ ft 2 • +> .ISP & ^^-^ o m w 0 o 4?-P 3 o November 1940 design by C. A. Joy, M. Inst. Me. & C. E., Bexley Borough Engineer (UK National Archives: HO 205/257) ANDERSON SHELTER (Indoors to avoid groundwater flooding, damp and cold) 4.5" partition wall 9" wall Floor boards and joists 4" x 2" 4.5" sleeper wall 6" site concrete MORRISON SHELTER (indoor table shelter) 4" x 2" floor joists Table shelters allowed escape from any side easily, reducing fire risks Patent specification by Prof. John Fleetwood Baker, Ministry of Home Security (National Archives HO 356/10) Structural Defense, 1945, by D. G0 Christopher son, Ministry of Home Security, RC 450, (1946),- Chapters VIII and IX (Confidential) Chapter VIII summarizes the literature on the design and types of British shelters and analyzes their effectiveness. National Archives HO 195/16 SHELTER at home ' a r-t? « ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY ILLUSTRATION NO. 8. The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris. In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out unaided. 0 E o o (0 Morrison shelter survives direct hit in York 1942 o HOME OFFICE THE PROTECTION OF YOUR HOME AGAINST AIR RAIDS READ THIS BOOK THROUGH THEN KEEP IT CAREFULLY THINGS TO DO NOW HOW TO CHOOSE A REFUGE-ROOM Almost any room will serve as a refuge-room if it is soundly constructed, and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its windows should be as few and small as possible, preferably facing a building or blank wall, or a narrow street. If a ground floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open ground is chosen, the windows should if possible be specially protected (see pages 30 and 31). The stronger the walls, floor, and ceiling are, the better. Brick partition walls are better than lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling is better than a wooden one. An internal passage will form a very good refuge-room if it can be closed at both ends. The best floor for a refuge-room A cellar or basement is the best place for a refuge-room if it can be made reasonably gas-proof and if flooded by a neighbouring river that may burst its banks, or by a burst water-main. If you have any doubt £*"£ °'basement is the b^ m J m J ^VI~L position for a refuge-room if it about tne risk or flooding ask for con be made reasonably ga$- advice from your local Council Proof Offices. Alternatively, any room on any floor below the top floor may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided as they usually do not give sufficient protection overhead from small in- cendiary bombs. These small bombs would probably penetrate the roof but be stopped by the top floor, though In a house with only two floors they might burn through to the floor and witho^ Q ce/tor, choose a , / .jf • *i j 1 -1 room on the ground floor so than below if not quickly dealt with. you have protection overhead Page 8 IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR Strengthening the room If your reftige-room is on the ground floor or in the base- ment, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above. How to support a ceiling The illus- tration below shows the detail of how to fix the props you will a piece of The smaller illustration shows how the posts are held in position at the top by two blocks of wood on the ceiling beam. The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot, driven in opposite ways. Do not drive these wedges too violendy, otherwise you may lift the ceiling and damage it. If the floor of your refuge-room is solid, such as you might find in a basement, not need a plank across the whole floor, but only wood a foot or so long under each prop. Page 17 EXTRA PRECAUTIONS EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST EXPLOSIVE BOMBS trenches. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air raid wardens will also be able to advise, sandbags. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick. Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If you can completely close the window opening with a wall of sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window must still be sealed inside against gas. ' I .'. ',',"T XI 5 w 5 L -2&I X rJ | 4 -y^ .^-t - xS ; j ■ j ]CP^r E^SSn j [ j ■ i ' \ 'r1^ lit i^xgrrp—i f-r i I t | I i"TX~r r^\[\\\[> r555? 5 £u_£_3 A basement window protected by boxes of earth Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for cement, will do for sandbags. But if they are large, don't fill Page 30 UK National Archives: CAB / 67 / 9 / 44 ± q g THIS DOCUMENT IS THB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1941. MOST SECRET. Copy No. W.P. (O) (41) 44. May 5, 1941. TO BE KEPT UNDER LOOK AND KEY. It it requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document. WAR CABINET. AIR RAIDS ON LONDON, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1940. Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security. Framed buildings. Most valuable information has been gained on the effects of bombs on framed buildings. Such buildings are practically immune to anything but a direct hit. Blast damage from bombs outside is usually confined to windows and internal partitions. Even parachute mines falling immediately outside (he building or exploding on the roof produce negligible damage to structure or floors. Relation of Casualties to Bombs Dropped. From a knowledge of the number of bombs dropped and the casualties occurring in different boroughs, some idea can be gained of the effectiveness of bombs in producing casualties. The number of casualties per bomb varies widely from 1-59 in the least to 6 * 94 in the most populated boroughs, but it follows closely the apparent densities of population as shown in figure 1. The number of casualties per bomb is roughly a twelfth of the number of persons per acre, and the number of deaths per bomb about 1 /60th of the number of persons per acre. From this it can be deduced that the mean distance at which injury from a bomb is likely to occur is 35 ft., and that at which the bomb is lethal is 15 ft. The casualties per bomb in Central London fell steadily from an average of 3*7 in September to 2-7 in October and 1-7 in November. This corresponds to the considerable fall in population in most of the boroughs concerned. Conclusion. We may now say that we have a good general understanding, both qualitative and quantitative, of the effects of bombs on buildings and on cities. New types of bombs, particularly heavier bombs, may be used, but we can anticipate no startling change in the effects apart from increase in minor damage. With bombing of the present type the results of our work are to show that in urban areas, such as that of the County of London, for one ton of bombs approximately 10 houses will be destroyed or will need pulling down. 25 more will be temporarily uninhabitable, and another 80 will be slightly damaged. 80 people will be made temporarily homeless and 35 will lose their homes permanently. 25 people, mostly among the latter category, will be wounded, the greater part of them slightly, and 6 will be killed or die from wounds. Contact detonator Electronic control V2 IRBM (intermfedrate range ballistic missile) 2JD0 miles range, 1 ton warhead Warhead / A Warhead 1.7\m long, 0.9 m diameter Guidance system Steel frame Launch cradle Double walled alcohol pipe Firing control (60 m safe range) Gyroscopes Alcohol tanl Liquid oxygen tanc ?n filling pipe Launch position Plumbing ^ Hydraulics ne pump Combustion chamber Control vanes Support jack Steel blast shield Aldwych, 30 June 1944, VI attack ~ ** lr \J W 1 1 * -~ I ! V-2 ATTACK at Smithfield Market, London, where 110 people were killed and 123 seriously injured when pavements were crowded CIVIL DEFENCE RESCUE MANUAL LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1952 CHAPTER XI. USE OF HEAVY MECHANICAL PLANT IN RESCUE, DEMOLITION AND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS In the last war it was found that at major incidents the use of heavy mechanical plant was frequently necessary in support of rescue opera- tions. Such equipment was used to help in the quick removal of debris ; to lift heavy blocks of brickwork or masonry ; to take the weight of collapsed floors and girders so that voids could be explored and casualties extricated ; to haul off twisted steelwork and other debris and to break up sections of reinforced concrete. In future all these tasks may be required and heavy clearance may have to be effected to enable rescue and other Civil Defence vehicles 8 March 1 945 Fjg 2o 1 ton of TNT equivalent Using heavy mechanical plant at the Smithfield Market V.2 incident. 97 to approach within measurable distance of their tasks. The problem of debris will in fact be a major factor in Civil Defence operations. Heavy mechanical plant may be required for the following purposes : (a) To assist in the removal of persons injured or trapped. At this stage mainly heavy plant is needed, particularly mobile cranes with sufficient length of boom or jib to reach for long distances over the wreckage of buildings. (A) To force a passage for Civil Defence vehicles and fire appliances to enable them to reach areas where major rescue and other problems exist and require urgent operational action. (c) To take certain safety measures — e.g., to pull down unsafe structures. (d) To clear streets and pavements to help restore communications and to afford access for the repair of damaged mains and pipes beneath the streets. (e) For the final clearance of debris and the, tidying of sites. This is a long term and not an operational requirement Urgent Rescue Operations During rescue operations in London in the last war the machines used with great success included heavy 3 J-5 ton mobile cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 30-40 ft. jib ; medium heavy 2-3 J ton mobile cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 26 ft. jib j heavy crawler tractor bulldozers ; medium crawler tractor bulldozers ; mechanical shovels and compressors, three stage, mounted on road wheels. In the case of a large or multiple incident where access was obstructed by considerable quantities of scattered debris, a bulldozer or tractor was first employed in order to clear one or more approaches by which other equipment and personnel could reach the scene of operations. Next, all debris of manhandling size was loaded into one-yard skips and discharged by the crane into lorries, giving increased manoeuvring space to the Services operating on the site. Heavy mobile cranes were then brought up to the incident where, used under the skilled direction of the rescue party Leader, they were invaluable for removing girders and large blocks of masonry which obstructed access to casualties or persons trapped. The necessary chains and wire ropes for these operations formed part of the standard equipment of the heavy and medium-heavy mobile cranes. The work was, of course, carried out in close co-operation with the Rescue Parties who also used various forms of light mechanical equip- ment, such as jacks and ratchet lifting tackle for work in confined spaces. Compressors sometimes proved valuable for breaking up large masonry such as fallen walls, into sections of a size and weight within the handling and lifting capacity of the cranes. This method was only used when it was known that there were no casualties under the masonry* HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT CIVIL DEFENCE HANDBOOK No. 7 Rescue This Handbook is a revised edition of, and replaces, the Civil Defence Rescue Manual LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1960 CHAPTER 6 Types of Damage from Modern Air Attack General Characteristics 6.1 When a nuclear weapon explodes an immense amount of energy is released almost instantaneously and the contents are transformed into a rapidly expanding white hot ball of gas at a temperature as high as that on the sun. From this "fireball" a pulse of intense light and heat is radiated in all directions. The materials in the fireball are also a source of radioactivity in various forms. As the fireball expands and cools, a powerful blast wave develops. As it cools still further, it shoots upwards to a height of many thousands of feet, billowing out at the top to give the appearance of a huge mushroom or cauliflower on its stalk. 6.2 The three forms of energy released in the explosion, namely, light and heat, radioactivity, and blast, all produce effects in different ways and in different proportions according to the position of the explosion in relation to the surface underneath. This chapter, however, deals primarily with the damage caused to buildings by the blast effect. 6.3 With nuclear weapons (as opposed to high explosive weapons), blast pressure rather than "impulse" tends to be the criterion of damage. If the effective blast pressure exceeds the static strength of the structure, failure must be expected. If it is less, no failure can occur however long the duration of the blast. In fact, nuclear bomb blast is more like a strong wind than the sudden blow of high explosive blast, and many of the failures observed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in subsequent tests resemble closely the kind of damage that might be done to build- ings by a hurricane. 6.4 The scarcity of suction damage from the nominal bombs in Japan was due to the high blast pressures produced and to the fact that these were three or four times as great as the blast suction. With all such large explosions, if a building does not fail from blast pressure it is unlikely to fail under the lower stresses in the suction phase. Effect of blast on structures 6.5 The type of damage which long duration blast (from nuclear weapons) causes to structures can possibly best be appreciated by considering the forces to which a simple building is subjected during the passage of a horizontal blast wave. When the blast "front" strikes the front wall it is reflected back, and the pressure in the wave front builds up to more than double the original pressure. However, this build-up only lasts for a very short time and is mainly important for large flat surfaces such as walls of big buildings. 16 Fig. 39 (a). Using a door as a stretcher Fig. 39 (b). Using a door as a stretcher 71 CHAPTER 15 Principles of Levering and Jacking 15.1 The principles of levering and jacking are, in a variety of differing ways, brought into most aspects of rescue work. The purpose of lifting appli- ances is to gain power so as to lift a large load with a small force suitably applied. Levers 15.2 The simplest appliance for gaining power is the lever, of which an improvised version made of laminated timber or an ordinary crowbar are most frequently used by rescue workers. There are two principal ways in which a lever can be used, as illustrated in the diagrams. In each case the advantage gained depends on the distance of (A), the centre of the load, and (C) the points where the push or force is applied from (B), the heel or fulcrum. force* Fig. 68. Lever (downward force) Lever (upward force) 15.3 The relation between the load and the amount of force required to lift it is in the same ratio as the length BC is to AB, where AB and BC are the distances of the weight and the force respectively from the fulcrum. A man using a 10-foot lever and bearing down at C with half his weight, say, 6 stone or 84 lb., against a fulcrum 1 foot from the other end of the lever, can lift a weight of 84 x 9 = 756 lb. because the length from fulcrum to hand is nine times the length from pivot to weight. If B is only 6 inches away from the weight the ratio is increased to 19 times its own weight. Fulcrum blocks 15.4 A fulcrum block should be of wood (hardwood if possible), never of brick or other crushable material. It must be resting on a firm base, which should be as large as possible so as to distribute the weight to be lifted. The fulcrum must be placed as near to the weight as is possible under the circumstances, and it should never be placed at any point where there is a possibility of a casualty being buried immediately below. 100 WEEF >ySj£; In 12 months. 1940-1, the Blitz stray dog Rip (discovered by civil defence rescuers in Poplar, East London after an air raid) sniffed out 100 trapped casualties in London rubble. Irma. Margaret Griffin used Irma and Psyche to find 233 trapped persons STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STANFORD, CALIFORNIA June, 1953 Final Report IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR 11$ SEI£CTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING Evaluation of Source Materials I* Robert 0. Shreve SRI Project 669 Prepared for Federal Civil Defense Administration Washington, D. C« Approved : (M. %0 rilliam J* PIt*lt, Chairman Industrial Manning Research Weldon B, Gibson, Director Economics Research Division For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U. 8. Government Printing Office Wuhtafton 25, I). C. • Price 16 cents Table 1 Report Outline - USSBS Project IMPACT OP AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II: SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING Division I - PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONS Volume 1 Summary of Civil Defense Experience Volume 2 Analytical Studies (Restricted) Volume 3 Causes of Fire from Atomic Attack (Secret) — VITAL! ! The documents which should be given wide distribution for civil defense use are listed below, with a brief description: a. USSBS Reports Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan (3 volumes)* Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan (3 volumes). These reports constitute two case studies of atomic bombing. Civil defense planners should be aware of the facts these documents record in great detail. Their distribution to all civil defense planners and analysts is highly desirable ♦ =2= Effects on Labor in Clydebank of Clydeside Raids of March 1941. (REN 234) USSBS Target Int. (REN 236) Ministry of Home Security A study of the effects on labor of bombing in a town of 50,000 people in which 76% of houses were rendered uninhabitable, 73# of the popula- tion homeless. An equivalent of 65 city days was utilized in the reconstruction. -22- Ministry of Home Security Effects of German Air Force Raids on Coventry (REN 441) The city, the attack, casualties, repairs and reconstruction (cost), absenteeism, population movements, and housing occupancy. Six pages and charts and graphs. Twenty percent of houses rendered uninhabi- table or destroyed, a total reconstruction cost of h 3,492,000. Average time lost by worker after November raid was eleven days} average after April raid was 7 days. Nine percent of the workers evacuated to points within roach of the city. a 9 D §892 r s 2 S§ K^ .9£ 1 o £ ° A O * M «> O ^ m o too • * * * • 00 *0 * * ■ * * o CM Q 8 t3 1 3 § Effectiveness of Some Civil Defense Actions in Protecting Urban Populations (u) Appendix B of Defense of the US ogoinst Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u) QRO-R-17 (App B) 0R0-R.17, Appendix B 6 8 10 12 14 DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES 16 23 -"1 20 Kig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance from Center of City for Three Evacuation TimeB NONMILITARY DEFENSE FOR THE UNITED STATES STRAT EGIC, OPERATIONAL, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS William K. Chipman A publication of the National Security Studies Group at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, May, 1961. In Britain, by early 1940, the government had issued free, to fami- lies of low income, some 2. 3 million bomb shelters, enough to shelter over one -fourth of the population. But by the same time -- after Munich had brought home to the British people the peril in which they stood, even after the war had begun -- less than 1000 shelters had been purchased. This was under 0. 04 per cent of the total number in place, despite the fact that the shelters were sold at cost. ? For protection against chemical and biological attack, our National Plan proposes that protective (gas) masks be made "... available to the people through regulated commercial distribution. ... "^ or in a word, sold. That too is nonsense. In Britain, in contrast, the government had decided by 1935 that it would be futile to expect the population to buy their own masks. During the Munich crisis, 38 million gas masks were issued free to the people of Great Britain. 9 The British government of that time could scarcely be called war-minded or over-prepared for war. Still less, it appears, are we prepared in 1961. 7. O'Brien, Terence H. , Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 335. In 1939 the government had decided to issue Anderson (corrugated steel) shelters free to householders with incomes of not over -fc 250 a year. ^** * 188. 8. OCDM National Plan, Annex 24, "National Biological and Chemical Warfare Defense Plan, " at 6. 9. O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 7 at 165. -- The Argument That Increased Spending for Nonmilitary and Other Defenses May Cause an Economic Decline A celebrated statesman not many years ago elegantly put (or rather, asserted) the argument for "national bankruptcy": CHAMBERLAIN IN LATE 1936 WHEN CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER If we were now to follow [X's] advice and sacrifice our commerce to the manufacture of arms, we should inflict a certain injury on our trade from which it would take generations to recover, we should destroy the con- fidence which now happily exists, and we should destroy the revenue. ... 33 And, a comment on that argument, It was held very strongly that financial stability was our fourth, and final, military arm, that we must bal- ance [the national budget], and avoid interference. . . with trade. . . . ^ The statement quoted was not made in 1949, when not muscle but fat was being pared from our military budgets. It was not made in 1955 or I9 60. It was made, rather, in the 1930's. The statesman who so anxiously viewed the dangers to be apprehended from increased expenditure for arms was- Neville Chamberlain. "X" was Winston Churchill. Britain was, if not "generations," at any rate half a generation in paying the bill for Chamber- lain's economics. Only recently have her trade, revenue and financial stability recovered from the economies of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. 10 33. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, Macmillan, 1946 at 314. Quotation reproduced by kind permission of the author . MacMillan & Company Ltd. and St. Martin's Press, Inc. 34, Id. at 316. --The Question of Public Apathy- -British Experience Before World War II Compared The view is often expressed that the population is apathetic, or even hostile, towards nonmilitary defense, and that nothing can be done to dev- elop these defenses until public apathy changes to concern. This view was succinctly put by a member of the House committee which passes on budget requests for OCDM. He said in March, 1959, that, "The Congress is not going to shove something down the throats of the people that they are not interested in. If you did, the Members of Congress would not be here very long. "46 13 A nation-wide opinion survey by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, made in 1957, revealed, among other things, that 68 per cent of the population favored planning to evacuate cities, and that 90 per cent favored constructing shelters for people who lived in areas that might be attacked. 4? Whatever the present reaction of the public might be to a program for nonmilitary defense, it is nearly certain that after a frightening crisis had occurred, the public would not only demand these programs, but would be highly critical of a government which had not taken the necessary action. This, at least, was the experience in Britain. Munich, however, changed all that. War seemed so imminent that the government ordered day and night digging on trenches in parks and open areas. It issued gas masks to some 38 million citizens. 50 Then, when fitting gas masks and digging trenches had given the citizens personal proof of the threat which hung over them, "Fatalism about providing effective pro- tection against air attack was. . . replaced by a feeling that this could be done, if" the authorities showed enough will and energy. "51 H 46. U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 486. 47. Pohlenz, D. Dean, "Problems of Civil Defense Preparedness -- A Policy for Today, " Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces Student Exercise M57-83 (1957) at 33. 49. O'Brien, Terence H. , History of the Second World War: Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1954 at 93, 99 and 104. 50. Id. at 161 and 165. 51. Id. at 166. Bertrand Russell, for example, wrote in 1959 that. On the most favourable hypothesis, [the postwar world] would consist of destitute populations, mad- dened by hunger, debilitated by disease. . . incapable of supporting educational institutions, and rapidly sinking to the level of ignorant savages. This, I repeat, is the most optimistic forecast which is in any degree plausible. bl [Emphasis added. ] This notion of the extinction of civilization, or even of all life, is a comforting one. uo Most important, it ensures that a nuclear war will never be fought, since no sane (or perhaps even moderately insane) national leader would consider thermonuclear war as an instrument of policy. Also, if there is really nothing that can be done to mitigate the effects of nuclear war, rational men need not trouble themselves about the problems of pre- paring nonmilitary defenses -- or of paying for them. The theory that thermonuclear war automatically results in world an- nihilation has had, and still has, some highly respectable adherents. In 1955, for example, fifty-two Nobel laureates subscribed to the statement that unless all nations renouncedthe use of force, they would simply ". . . cease to exist. "64 Writers on disarmament in 1961 continue to point out that it would be impossible to "... protect [civilians not killed by the initial attack on cities] against fallout and starvation, "65 and that "Propo- nents of the arms race are willing to risk the destruction of civilized so- ciety. . . ."66 --The View That Natio nal Security Can Best Be Achieved by Buy: tng Only Offe nsive and Active Defensive Weapons 17 61. Russell, Bertrand, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, London, copyright (C) 1959 by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , quotation re- produced by kind permission of Simon and Schuster, Inc. The notion of mutual extermination is also alluded to at 32, and tie survivors are characterized as starving and debilitated at 26. 62. On Thermonuclear War, 35. 63. Id. at 11. 64. Id. at 9. Compare Bertrand Russell's views, supra note 61. 65. ^ohn, Louis 157^ "Security Through Disarmament," 192 The Nation ra9M^8^LJ re3(February 25, 1961). 66. Melman, Seymour, "The 'Arms -Control' Doctrine," 192 The Nation 114-116 at 116 (5re^uary 11, 1961). Clark, Grenville andC^ouis B. Sohi^) World Peace Through World Law (2d ed. ), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960. -- The Argument That Nonmilitary Defense Would Destabilize the Balance of Terror To take any steps to protect the population would be to do them a dis- service, since it might make war "thinkable" again. And whatever steps were taken, millions or tens of millions would be sure to die. A variant of the hostage theory is that if we were to embark on a serious program for nonmilitary defense, we should inescapably spread war- mindedness among the American people. '^ Once they were awakened to the possibility, or worse the "thinkability, " of war, they would inevitably become more hostile towards the source of the danger, namely, the USSR. They might then be expected, with the American penchant for grasping nettles (those, at any rate, recognized as nettles), to press for a first strike against the Soviet Union. But other countries, not least the Soviet Union, do have non- military defense programs of substantial value. It is not, in any case, self-evident that a nonmilitary defense program would have a destabilizing (or unbalancing) effect upon American psychology. If anything, a program which included, for example, building fallout shel- ters or issuing radiation meters, might, by bringing home the threat of war to the American people in a highly personal way, incline them rather to a sober and pacific than to a war-like psychology. City dwellers might reflect upon the fact that their shelters, at least under any program the United States is likely to undertake in the next five years, would give them not a certainty but only a fair to good chance of survival. Rural residents might reflect upon the prospect of an incursion of refugees from the cities. 19 71. Letter from Dean David F. Cavers, Harvard Law School, New York Times, March 20, I960, page 10E, column 6. See too Brown, Harrison and James Real, Community of Fear, Santa Barbara, California, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960. This whole problem of psychological response to nonmilitary defense clearly requires detailed study by experts. British experience in the Munich and post-Munich period may not be without relevance. '^ --Would A Nonmilitary Defense Program Injure Prospects for Arms Control? Finally, there is the question whether a program for nonmilitary de- fense is compatible with plans for arms control or even disarmament. the reverse, it should not hazard the success of any arms control or dis- armament negotiations in which the Soviets are seriously interested, and it would stabilize any arms control agreement that might be concluded. 20 73. See, for example, O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 49 at 329 on response to the anti-gas program, and Titmuss, Richard M. , Problems of Social Policy, London, HMSO, 1950 at 29-39 on response to evacua- tion plans and programs. Strategy for the Thermonuclear Age Thermonuclear war is a grisly topic. It is, however, one about which we would do well to think. The argument might be made that research on war may make it somewhat more likely to occur. It is more probable, however, that the reverse is true, that not thinking about thermonuclear war may make it easier to blunder into one --or what might be even worse, to lose one. It would be well indeed if nuclear war would be unmistakably so an- nihilating as to be unthinkable, at least for sane men, as Bertrand Russell and others hold. But it would be unfortunate if this view prevailed only in the West and not in Moscow and Peiping. There is good evidence that it does not, especially in the latter. There is in any case something of schizo- phrenia about spending tens of billions each year on thermonuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and then refusing to think about the ways and conditions in which they might be used, or (more hopefully) the ways in which we can best assure, short of surrender, that they will not be used. The best study to date is Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, published late in 1960. * Most of what follows in this chapter draws heavily upon Kahn's work, though it is impossible to do it justice in so 21 small a space. He analyzes, so far as possible in a quantitative way, the probable or possible causes, courses and effects of thermonuclear wars which might occur in the next decade. Kahn's work has been bitterly at- tacked, although to date in no very temperate or reasoned fashion. It has been called "a moral tract on mass murder," "permeated with a blood- thirsty irrationality," and its quantitative approach a "Higher Incoher- ence. " •* It has been said to show "narrowness of vision, " and to have about it an "air of unreality. " But coherent criticism, reasoned rather than stated, marked by broadness of vision or an air of reality, has yet to appear, certainly in more than fragmentary form. 80 77. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1960. On U.S. national strategy see too Rowen, op. cit. supra note 36, and Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re- search, Johns Hopkins University, Study for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy, 85th Cong. , 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1959). 78. Newman, James R. , "A Moral Tract on Mass Murder," The Washing ton Post, February 26, 1961, page E7, columns 5-8. The level of coherence of Mr. Newman's critique is best left unstated. 79. Wolff, Robert Paul, "The Game of War," 144 The New Republic (February 20, 1961)9-13. 80. The usual criticism of Kahn's work is that it does not sufficiently take into account political problems. Careful, or even casual, read- ing of On Thermonuclear War, however, shows that Kahn has a better grasp of political problems than most of his political- scientist cri- tics have of strategy. We may expect Soviet or Chinese support for "pro- gressive, revolutionary national liberation wars"83 in such areas as Algeria or the Congo. We may see guerilla action in Southeast Asia or other areas on the periphery of the "Socialist camp. " We may even see limited wars, fought without or perhaps even with tactical nuclear weapons. Soviet missiles may be rattled again, as they have been rattled on behalf of Nasser and Castro. (American missiles might also be rattled, though this seems unlikely during the next few years, at least. ) Finally, even negotia- tions for arms control or disarmament may be devices of cold war conflict, as they have too largely been to date. What Are We Trying to Deter? Kahn points out that it is critically important to distinguish between deferring an attack upon the United States and attacks or major provoca- tions at other points, for example, a "squeeze" or even armed attack on Berlin. The same weapons, dispositions of weapons, and strategies do not suffice for both ends. 22 83. This was promised in the manifesto issued by the leaders of 81 Communist parties after their meeting in Moscow in late 1960. New York Times, December 7, 1960, pages 14 to 17, with the "progres- sive revolutionary significance" of "national- liberation wars" noted at page 17, column 7. Premier Khrushchev also adverted to the in- evitability of "national liberation wars" in a report delivered January 6, 1961. New York Times, January 19, 1961, page 6, column 4. 84. Berlin was noted as a "seat of international provocation" in the late- 1960 manifesto. New York Times, December 7, 1960, page 15, column 2. (Any Western posture other than abject surrender is doubt- less "provocative" in the communist lexicon. ) As Kahn has put it, history has a disconcerting way of being "... richer and more imaginative than any scholar. "°" 86. On Thermonuclear War at 557. 23 It is a fearsome thing to contemplate the risk of 10 or 20 or 120 million Americans, or Americans and Britons, being killed in a war, for example, over two and one -half million West Berliners. 24 --Devices to Tide Us Over the Earlier 1960's The Soviets might not, of course, decide to risk everything, or at any rate a great deal of capital and some millions of their citizens, on our succumbing to postattack coercion. If the Marxist- Leninist dialectic condemns spurning the opportunities offered by history, it also condemns taking excessive risks, a sin termed "adventurism. "109 What can we do to increase the risks to be apprehended from an attack on the United States? 30 109. See, for example, Garthoff, Raymond, Soviet Strategy in the Nu- clear Age, New York, Praeger, 1958 at 5. --A $100 Billion Program Including Blast Shelters and Extensive Preparation for Economic Recuperation The "splendid," $100 billion or more, program is the one which might raise some reasonable Soviet appreherision that we might strike first. This program, including blast shelters into which the urban population could "duck" in a matter of twenty or thirty minutes, would in fact be part of a credible strategic posture allowing us to make a first strike. (Expensive deep shelters create "Maginot Line" delusions : Hitler simply adapted plans to go around obstructions. Similarly , shelters in Hiroshima were unoccupied due to surprise attack! If you have deep shelters, an enemy will plan surprise attack. It takes 20 min to get into shelters , but only 3 minutes for SLBM submarine missile attack from offshore!) 45 --History and Arms Control The lessons of history, for what they may be worth, include those of 1914, when Europe stumbled into a major war which no power wanted, as a result of a minor war about which only Austria or Serbia were really serious. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, there are disturbing analogies between the years before 1914 and those in which we now live. 158 (Wrong: the German Kaiser did WANT war and had been planning since 1912 to use any excuse for starting war, implementing Schlieffen's plan!) --Arms Control for the 1960's At all events, it is clear that the problems of arms control must have more intelligent, more intensive, and more sustained attention than they have yet had, if we are to avoid repeating something like the disasters of either 1914 or 1933-1939. Views on the approaches required, as noted above, vary widely. 47 158. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 368-370. It would plainly be futile, in view of the vigorous Soviet pacification of Hungary, or of the Chinese liberation of Tibet, to rely upon "world opinion " (whatever that is) to deter violations. • . . One sanction might be the prospect of a renewed arms race, triggered by the discovery of violations. But this might not deter cheating, particu- larly if the party bent on violation believed it could secure a commanding position before the injured party could catch up. (Here we might remember the belated but futile efforts of the British to regain air parity, after Hitler's rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe. )*'6 50 176. See, for the history of that dismal episode in the history of the West, Sir Winston Churchill's The Gathering Storm, chapter 7. Kahn points out that if one side obtained a significant lead because of evasion or rapid rearmament after the agreement broke down, it might then ". . .feel compelled to perform a great public service by arranging to stop the arms race before a dangerous balance of terror was restored. It could do this most reliably by stopping the cause of the arms race -- its opponent. Most writers ignore this situation. . . . " On Thermonuclear War at 230. Is Nonmilitary Defense Possible? If nonmilitary defense is necessary, is it possible? In the discussion to this point, it has been assumed that it is. But can one say, with any measure of confidence, that nonmilitary defenses could in fact ensure the survival of most or all of the population? Even if a shelter program could preserve the lives of most Americans against fallout or even blast, would they emerge into a world worth living in, or indeed, possible to live in? What of the genetic effects of war? Would all children be born deformed? What of leukemia, of cancer, or of a shortened span of life? What of strontium-90? What of the standard of living? Would the survivors, and their descendants, be reduced to grubbing out a wretched existence, with our economy shattered beyond hope of repair? What of the social impact of attack? Could we expect that the survivors, as Bertrand Russell has predicted, would "rapidly sink to the level of ignorant savages"? 54 Further, nonmilitary defense must be designed to cope with widely varying conditions. The nature of the postattack environment would depend upon the weight and pattern of the enemy's attack- -which might in turn be influenced by the nonmilitary defense measures we had taken. The areas contaminated by fallout would of course be determined by the winds pre- vailing on the day of attack, as well as by the enemy's attack pattern. Anti- aircraft and antimissile defenses would also affect the nature of the post- attack environment. The major systems analyses of nonmilitary defense so far published are the Rand Report and a more detailed work done by Mr. John Devaney's OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military 55 Defense . "*** Both of these studies give some ground for sober confidence that the United States could survive thermonuclear wars in the 1960's and even beyond, given appropriate levels of nonmilitary defense preparation. But much more detailed research remains to be done. There are still major areas of uncertainty in the performance of nonmilitary defense systems. The principal policy suggestion of the Rand study was therefore that the United States undertake a broad program of research and develop- ment on nonmilitary defense problems, to cost some $200 million over two or three years. 187 186. OCDM, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan, 1959. 187. Kahn, Herman, et^aL , R-322-RC 184 at 44. (This is about fifty times the present OCDM annual research appropriation. ) R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense —Long-Term Effects of Fallout- -Genetic Effects and Life -Shortening, and the Strontium-90 Problem Even if fallout at first decays rapidly, so that fallout shelters could protect most of the population from immediate death or illness due to radiation, would the longer-term effects of radiation make life as we know it either impossible or insupportable for the survivors? Despite the rapid initial decay of fallout, a relatively small amount of contamination would remain in the environment for a long time. This would include strontium-90, a long-lived isotope produced by nuclear fission. The Rand Report states that about four per cent of babies are at preset stillborn or die shortly after birth, two per cent are malformed and two per cent develop later troubles attributable to genetic defects. 200 jf as the result of nuclear war, both parents had been exposed to about 250 roentgens, spread over a long period, their chances of producing a seriously defective living child might increase from four per cent to five per cent. 2°1 58 199. Testimony of Dr. James F. Crow, Professor of Genetics, Univer- sity of Wisconsin, in 1957 fallout hearings, ojj^ cit. supra note 193 at 1013. More recent experiments show that there is a possibility that radiation received over an extended period may not have as much genetic effect as radiation received over a short period. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 1566. 200. Kahn, _et al_. , op. cit. supra note 184 at 16. 201. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 46. Strontium-90, produced by fission, falls out over crop and pasture lands, is taken up by plants, and can eventually find its way into human bones, where it may cause bone cancer or, in smaller amounts, cause bone lesions and interfere with bone growth, particularly in children. 204 204. See generally Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 63-72. All of these long-term effects of nuclear war are serious, particularly the strontium-90 problem. It appears, however, that with proper prepara- tion, it should be possible to alleviate them. In chapter 2 the subject of decontamination, or removal of radioactive debris, is discussed. In chapter 3 is discussed a scheme suggested by Herman Kahn to ensure that relatively contaminated food be consumed only by older persons, whom it will not much affect, with the least contaminated food reserved for children and pregnant women. The Rand Report concludes that ". . .long-term radiation problems are a less critical threat to the survival of a population than the central short-term problem, namely, how to protect a substantial fraction of the population from the immediate disaster of a nuclear war. "205 59 205. Kahn, et al. , R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense at 21. Economic Recovery from Thermonuclear War Even if the medical effects of nuclear war might not be insoluble, there remains the problem of economic recovery. Would the survivors be condemned to lives without hope, with standards of living, for most, similar to those of the early years of the industrial revolution? 59 In the absence of reliable predictions of social response to thermo- nuclear attack, there is a tendency to lurid speculation. One can too easily visualize society collapsing, with the survivors organizing themselves into robber bands and struggling for the few economic resources remaining, or masses of city dwellers suffering crippling mental breakdown, or man- kind rejecting science and technology and reverting to a hunting-and-gather- ing or at best pastoral existence. Others speculate upon the probability of mass panic or of widespread looting and other criminal behavior. Just such speculations were made in Britain before the war, and made by sober scientists, government officials and soldiers. The Army Council instructed General Officers Commanding that "the initial preoccupation" of the troops would be "to sustain public morale. "214 At the time of Munich, when evacuation was being considered, "... discussions were held on the question of drafting regular troops into London to keep order and prevent panic. . . . "215 Gloomiest of all were the predictions of the psychiatrists, who thought that mental casualties might outnumber physical casualties bv two or three to one: 216 . . . the experts foretold a mass outbreak of hysterical neurosis among the civilian population. It was expected that the conditions of life brought about by air raids would place an immediate and overwhelming strain upon the individual. Under this strain, many people would regress to an earlier level of needs and desires. They would behave like frightened and unsatisfied children, and they would demand with the all-or-none vehemence of infants the security, food and warmth which the mother had given in the past. None of this, of course, occurred. Rather than a dramatic increase in neurosis or mental illness, there was in fact a decrease. Statistics for insanity, suicide, drunkenness and disorderly behavior fell by as much as half. 21 ' Workers absented themselves from their factories after heavy bombing only when their houses had been damaged or destroyed, and then only for an average of six days. 21° 62 214. Titmuss, op. cit. supra note 73 at 19. 215. Id. at 30. 216. Id. at 338-339. 217. Id. at 340-341. 218. Id. at 341. Individual and group protection against chemical attack poses great problems. In World War I, gas was considered one of the most effective means for producing casualties, 1X ' even though the CW agents used then were far less lethal than the nerve gases developed in Germany prior to World War II. A seven-ton load of nerve gas can reportedly cause cas- ualties over an area fifteen miles wide and twenty-five to fifty miles long, and death over an area of 100 square miles, H9 given weather conditions favorable to the spread of gas clouds. **0 j^ew non-lethal gases are under development, including the so-called psychochemicals, related to com- pounds used to simulate mental disease, and other incapacitating agents. These agents affect victims by upsetting normal behavior patterns or phy- siological processes, *21 though their short-term effectiveness appears to suit them more to tactical use against troops than to attack of civilian pop- ulations. 117. Rothschild, Brig. Gen. J. "Germs and Gas, the Weapons Nobody Dares Talk About" 218 Harper1 u Magazine 29 at 30 (June 1959). This article also states, ibid, that 26. 8 per cent of AEF casualties were caused by gas. FCDA Technical Bulletin 11- 25, "Introduction to Chemical Warfare" (1957) states that mustard gas and other blister gases produced more than 400, 000 casualties in the last 16 months of World War L» more than were caused by any other weapon then in uae. U. S* House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Research in CBR, House Report No. 815, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) states at 4 that some 9 million artillery shells filled with mustard gas produced about 400* 000 casualties, which effect was about five times that produced by high explosive shell, on a casualty per ton of shell basis. One should also note that CW casualties in World War I included few deaths. About one-third of U.S. casualties were caused by gas, but only 2 per cent of these died, as compared with 25 percent of nongas casualties. Ibid. 119 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense Program, 84th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1955) Part 2 at 800 The 100 square mile figure also appears in ACS, ^d. at 3. 120. "Inversion" conditions, where air temperatures increase with increase in altitude, are most favorable to the spread of gas clouds, and obtain on clear nights and early mornings until about one hour after sunrise. U. S. Department of the Army, Technical Manual 3-240, Field Behavior of Chemical Agents, Washington, 1951, at 16. 121. US. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Depart- ment of Defense Appropriations for 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) Part 6 at 364-365 and 426-436. In Great Britain, in contrast, some 44 million masks were dis- tributed by the outbreak of World War n, virtually one per inhabitant, and 1. 4 million infants' respirators and 2 million children's masks by January, 1940; 13? 55 million masks are now stockpiled in Britain for issue to civi- lians. 138 (They are 1950 designed civilian C7 respirators . ) Procuring 100 million masks for that part of our population concentra- ted in urban areas might cost $250 million, at $2.50 per mask, and exten- sive training in defense against BW and CW would also be required. 90 137, O'Brien, Terence, Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 330. Note that as early as 1935 the British government decided that masks would have to be issued free of charge. _Id. at 61. 138. Interview Col. Francis B. Stewart, FCDA (now OCDM), Battle Creek, Michigan, January 30, 1958. 3000 roentgens per hour intensity at one hour 12, 000 roentgens outdoor dose in the first year 10, 000 r in the first two weeks (emergency phase) 2000 r in the remaining fifty weeks (reclamation phase) EMERGENCY PHASE RECLAMATION PHASE (10, 000 r) (2000 Decontamination r) Shelter 10, 000 r dose effectiveness 2000 r dose attenuation reduced to (reduction to) 90% (1/10) reduced to 1/100 100 200 1/1000 10 99% (1/100) 20 Radiological decontamination involves no very mysterious or sophis- ticated techniques. In general, fallout material can be swept or flushed off 91 Evacuation Contrary to popular belief, the effectiveness of tactical evacuation is by no means destroyed by the ICBM. While it is clear that no tactical evacua- tion could even be started during the 30-minute flight of an ICBM, it is also true, as the Rand Report points out, that cities are not likely to be at- tacked with the enemy's first ICBM salvo, and it is quite possible that most cities might not be attacked at all. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, a national evacuation capability could be of the greatest importance in time of international crisis: If the Soviets evacuated their cities, they would have made it highly credible that they were prepared to go to war unless we backed down. 155 93 155. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J. , Princeton University Press, 1960 at 213-214, also 132. Objec- tions to evacuation and other nonmilitary defense measures are dealt with at 641-651, with objections bearing on evacuation in particular at 648-651. The Bureau of Roads in 1956 prepared a report 160 on national evacua- tion capabilities for 161 urban target areas, containing 90. 7 million people, about 55 per cent of the population. The report assumed orderly and disci- plined movement, making maximum use of escape routes, and the findings included the following: 1 61 (1) In 1 1/2 hours, 32 million persons could be evacuated at least 15 miles from the centers of target areas, over existing highways and streets; (2) In 4 1/2 hours, 72 million persons could be evacuated at least 15 miles from target area centers; (3) In 2 hours, 22 million persons could be evacuated at least 25 miles; (4) In 5 hours, 33 million persons could be evacuated at least 25 miles; (5) Evacuation of the largest cities within reasonable time 1 units would not be possible. In sum, four hours' warning would allow substantial clearance of all but the largest cities, and even in these cities, this warning would allow eva- cuation of some 9 million of their 48 million inhabitants. 162 160. Reprinted and ds cussed in U. S. House, Committee on Govern- ment Operations, Hearings, New Civil Defense Legislation, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) at 111-136. 161. Discussed^d. at 124-126. 162. OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Nonmilitary Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan, 1959 at 169. 94 Since 1956 Great Britain has had a simple scheme for classifying rad- iation zones by intensity and for evacuating the most dangerous zone, of 1000 r/hr and upwards at H / 1. 171 Such a program is dependent on a monitor- ing system, so that fallout zones may be delineated and appropriate instruc- tions given their inhabitants. It requires sophisticated and technically com- petent control, related to the area affected by fallout, not to preattack poli- tical subdivisions. Remedial evacuation also requires detailed arrangements for traffic control, if existing transport within the most dangerous area is relied on for evacuation. 96 171. Home Office, Radioactive Fall-out, Provisional Scheme of Public Control, London, HMSO, 1956. The requirement for rescue forces would depend upon the number of survivors trapped or incapacitated in areas which could be approached by rescue teams. OCDM estimated that in the 1446-megaton attack assumed for the 1959 JCAE hearings, 11.5 million people would have been fatally injured by blast and heat effects and 6. 3 million nonfatally injured. Fall- out would have caused a further 10. 7 million fatal and 10. 9 million nonfatal injuries. *•* Many of the blast casualties would require to be rescued and, together with fallout casualties, to be transported from the danger area. Other casualty estimates, however, show markedly fewer blast injuries, on the order of one -fourth of those estimated in the JCAE hearings. x ''e (JCAE hearings used gross Hiroshima casualty data, which applies to people watching the B-29 deliver bomb, i.e. no proper "duck and cover" for elayed blast behind windows . ) 99 175. 1959 JCAE Hearings, Effects of Nuclear War, at 651. 176. SRI calculations show only 1. 6 million blast casualties from a 15 00 -megaton attack 177. Note that casualty effects are extrapolated from experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were attacks with air-bursted kiloton weapons. U, S. Atomic Energy Commission, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, 1957, at 456. Factors which may affect casualty numbers include yield, height of burst, strength of buildings (or shelters, ) and the weather at the time of attack. Ibid. It is interesting to note that prewar British estimates of casualties from aerial attack, based on limited experience from World War I, turned out in the event to have been too high by 6 times* Finally, fallout would limit rescue operations. Fallout from surface bursts far upwind might make operations impossible, if radiation levels were so high that rescue crews could not work without accumulating harm- ful radiation doses. Even if rescue groups could approach damaged areas from upwincU rescue of severe blast and burn casualties from within six or nine miles of ground zero would not be possible to a significant extent, since the level of contamination even upwind of a surface burst would be so high as to prevent rescue parties from working in these areas for several days at least, by which time most of the seriously injured would have died. 178 It might be possible, however, to organize rescue operations on the first day from upwind into the areas of lighter damage, perhaps fifteen miles from the center of a 20-megaton burst, where numbers of casualties would have resulted due to burns and partial collapse of frame houses. Rota- tion of rescue teams could allow exposure to higher radiation intensities, and hence earlier rescue operations, but would increase the requirement for rescue forces. If weapons were airbursted, so that little fallout contam- ination resulted, rescue forces could enter blast areas soon after the deton- ation. 99 (NOTE: severe upwind fallout in the blast damaged area was measured after 10 megaton surface burst MIKE in 1952, see weapon test report WT-615 and AFSWP-507. However, this upwind fallout was a fluke due to the 82 -ton steel bomb "case shock" which embedded itself deep into the crater, increasing the activity on large fallout flakes around ground zero. Data from weapons with lighter casings in Castle 1954 and Redwing 1956 disproved the MIKE upwind fallout data for practical, deliverable weapons, WT-1317. MIKE upwind fallout data was given in Glass tone ENW 1957 but was replaced with Redwing upwind fallout data in Glasstone 1962, so light upwind fallout permitted rescue.) 178. U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, Survival in Public Shelters , 1957, at 5-9. 179. Id. at 7-8. The Corps of Engineers analysis of requirements for rescue squads is in U. S. Army Engineer School, Extension Subcourse 321, Civil Defense and Disaster Recovery, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia (May 1958) at 3-3 to 3-4, This document states that about 25 per cent of persons surviving in blast -damaged areas will be lightly trapped and 5 per cent heavily trapped. About 2 man-hours are required to release persons lightly trapped and 20 man-hours for those heavily trapped. Trapped casualties can survive for 4 days, and rescue squads can each produce some 768 man-hours of efficient rescue work in this time. Thus in a city where 100, 000 persons remained in blast areas, about 25, 000 people would be lightly trapped and 5000 heavily trapped. This would require 65 light rescue squads and 130 heavy squads, each composed of 26 men with appropriate equipment. The total rescue force require- ment is thus 5070 persons, or about 50 per 1000 of target area population at the time of detonation. 439 One promising avenue for reducing vulnerability is to put selected in- Mustries underground. The Rand Report suggests that if we had put some- thing like twenty per cent of our manufacturing capital underground by 1970, that economy ought to be able to withstand a 20, 000-megaton, 150-city at- tack somewhat better than our undispersed economy in 1960 could withstand a 1500-megaton, 50-city attack. 252 A 1956 study by the Corps of Engin- eers discussed in some detail the problems of constructing underground industrial plants. The study pointed out that some sixty per cent of Ameri- can industry lay in a quadrangle from Boston to Kansas City, and that about two-thirds of existing mine sites, suitable for underground plants, also lay in this quadrangle. *5o Experience both with underground plants in Sweden and Germany and with windowless, fully air-conditioned surface plants in this country indicates that no major personnel problems are likely to arise from working underground. ^54 109 252. Kahn, Rand Report, og. cit. supra note 62 at 29-30 and 11. 253. U. S. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Underground Plants for Industry, Washington, GPO, 1956 at 7; see toojd. at 19. 254. Id. at 37-38 and 7. For discussion of an underground metal processing and fabricating plant in Norway see Skarsgaard, Olav K.," "The Largest Underground Industry in the World.11 The Fifteen Nations (Number 16) at 124-125. u jSJ^ 1979 l)cP^- CIVIL DEFENSE FOR THE 1 gap's-- CURRENT ISSUES Presidential Decision (PD) 41, September 1978, established new policies for U.S. civil defense: that it should "enhance deterrence and stability and. . . reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension," and "include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis." The PD 41 policies are in marked contrast to previous rationales for CD, dating from 1961, which were to the effect that the program should provide "insurance" In the unlikely event of a failure of deterrence. President Kennedy 1n 1961: But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century, 1s sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an Irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of escalation 1n which the stakes by each side grad- ually Increase to the point of maximum danger which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. It 1s on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable— as Insurance for the civilian population 1n case of an eneny miscalculation. It 1s Insurance we trust will never be needed— but Insurance which we could never forgive our- selves for foregoing 1n the event of catastrophe. 18/ 18/ President John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs, A Special Message to Congress," May 25, 1961. More light was shed on Issues of credibility by a national -sample survey conducted for DCPA in late 1978, Involving in-depth Interviews with 1620 adult Americans. 31/ The results suggest that the public remains favorable 1n general to civTl defense, and 1s receptive to crisis relocation in particular: 67% believe there could be crisis circumstances under which the President might urge people to evacuate high risk areas 78% believe the U.S. should have crisis relocation plans 70% say that 1f the President directed relocation, they would comply. (And additional people Indicate they might well leave spontaneously, before any direction to do so) 75% believe the nation's communities would be helpful to evacuees 82% believe their own communities would be helpful, if asked to host evacuees. (In fact, 73% say they'd be willing to take evacuees into their own homes) 3l/Nehnevasja, Jiri, Issues of Civil Defense: Vintage 1978— Summary Results of the 1978 National Survey, University of Pittsburgh, 1979. It 1s significant that on September 1-3, 1939 the British moved some 1.5 million women and children from London and a few other large cities 1n what was a crisis evacuation, for Britain did not declare war until September 3. (Also of interest are the facts that some 2 million additional persons spontaneously evacuated at their own initiative, and that this was unsuspected at the time by the British government.) It is also worthy of note that in Hurricane Carla, in 1961, between half and three-quarters of a million people were evacuated from Gulf Coast cities without a single fatality or a major reported accident .32/ 32/Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearings, tTvil Defense, 95th Congress, 2d Session (January 1979) at 51-52. In 1939. Hitler attacked Poland, thouqh it appears he calculated (mistakenly) that he had good chances of achieving his objectives without triggering World War II, based upon his earlier successes. In 1941 he attacked the USSR, anticipating the destruction of Bolshevism and not, eventually, of the Third Reich. In 1941 the leaders of Japan attacked the U.S., not anticipating the defeat of the empire 1n 1945. —Presidential Decision 41 At all events, the PD 41 policies lay 1t down clearly that U.S. civil defense should ". . . enhance deterrence and stability, and contribute to perceptions of the overall U.S. /Soviet strategic balance and to crtsis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of crisis." Civil Defense and the Cuban Crisis In a 1978 interview, Steuart L. Pittman, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense in 1961 to 1964, pointed out: [I]t 1s Interesting that President Kennedy personally raised the civil defense question during the Cuban crisis. He was considering conventional military action against Cuba to knock out the missile sites. I understand he was the only one of the "Conrnittee" to raise the issue of civil defense, which tells us something. He asked whether it would be practical to evacuate Miami and other coastal cities in Florida. ... I was called into the marathon crisis meeting and had to tell him that 1t would not be practical; we did not have any significant evacuation plans. ... The President dropped the idea, but shortly after the crisis was over, his personal concern over Ms limited civil defense options led him to sign a memorandum directing a significant speedup in the U.S. civil defense preparations. (Emphasis added. )93/ While history seldom repeats Itself exactly, it does indeed "tell us something" that in the only overt nuclear confrontation the world has 93/Sullivan, Roger J. et al, The Potential Effects of Crisis Relocation on Crisis Stability, System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, September 1978 at 152-153. yet seen, the American President was concerned about dv11 defense— and that the Idea of population relocation during the crisis was one of his specific concerns. Certainly it is clear that in 1962, the notion of vulnerability being stabilizing held little attraction for the Chief Executive. There is an historical precedent for a relatively rapid buildup of CD capabilities. At the time of the 1938 Munich crisis, Britain had developed civil defense plans but had little capability for actual operations. Spurred by the belief that war had become not only not unthinkable but not unlikely, Britain mounted an intensive effort. By the time Germany attacked Poland the next September, the British were able to evacuate 1.5 million women and children from major target cities. And by the time of the August 1940 "blitz," the CD system was able to contribute substantially to Britain's ability to "take it" and to continue the war. Following the Munich crisis, which found Britain as unprepared in civil defense as in all other areas of defense, the working of the civil defense services was reviewed by the House of Commons during a censure debate: Members were in a worried and critical mood, and among the charges made it was maintained that the Government had neither policy nor plans for evacuation when the country was on the verge of war. . . . [T]here was much uneasiness 1n Whitehall. 102/ In short, there will be no public outcry for civil defense in normal times. There will be modest political profit, if any, for an Adminis- tration proposing enhanced civil defense, or a Congress approving it; the subject is not a congenial one. But should a frightening crisis find civil defense in disarray, the people (and the Congress) would surely demand to know what had been done in "the years that the locust hath eaten. "103/ Summary The PD 41 policies provide that the U.S. civil defense program should enhance deterrence and stability, and reduce the possibility of Soviet coercion during a crisis. 10Z/Titmuss7"KTchard M., Problems of Social Policy, HMSO, London, 1950 at 30. 103/ Joel 2; 25. This phrase, according to Churchill, was used by Sir Thomas Inskip in referring to the period 1931-1935: The Gathering Storm, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1948 at 66. Arguments Against Civil Defense and a Rebuttal ~~ Some of the arguments made against civil defense were parodied as follows in a piece in the Harvard Crimson in 1962: Reconmendations by the Committee for a Sane Navigational Policy: It has been brought to our attention that certain elements among the passengers and crew favor the installation of lifeboats on this ship. These elements have advanced the excuse that such action would save lives in the event of a maritime disaster such as the ship striking an iceberg. Although we share their concern, we remain unalterably opposed to any consideration of their course of action for the follow- ing reasons: 1. This program would lull you into a false sense of security. 2. It would cause undue alarm and destroy your desire to continue your voyage 1n this ship. 3. It demonstrates a lack of faith in our Captain. 4. The apparent security which lifeboats offer will make our navi- gators reckless. 5* These proposals will distract our attention from more Important things, e.g., building unslnkable ships. They may even lead our builders to false economies and the building of ships which are actually unsafe. 6. In the event of being struck by an iceberg (we will never strike first) the lifeboats would certainly sink along with the ship. 7. If they do not sink, you will only be saved for a worse fate, inevitable death on the open sea. 8. If you should be washed ashore on a desert island, you could not adapt to the hostile environment and would surely die of exposure 9. If you should be rescued by a passing vessel, you would spend a Hfe of remorse mourning your lost loved ones. 10. The panic caused by a collision with an Iceberg would destroy all semblance of civilized human behavior. We shudder at the prospect of one man shooting another for the possession of a lifeboat. 11. Such a catastrophe 1s too horrible to contemplate. Anyone who does contemplate it obviously advocates 1t. HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ence By T. H. O'BRIEN 4 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION The point is of importance for students of the subject in an era in which marked 'progress' has been made in the technique of air warfare by the invention of the atomic bomb. This invention has given fresh currency to the view that 'nowadays every war is different from the one before' — which, if it were valid, would abolish any need to learn the lessons of past experience, THE WAR OF 1914-1918 9 But in May 191 7 the Germans began a series of assaults with twin-engined aircraft, called Gothas, which soon became severe. The daylight attack of 13th June on London by fourteen Gothas was the worst single attack of the war measured in casualties, which numbered 162 killed and 426 injured; 118 high explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on the City and the East End. 10 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION The Government only gave in gradually and reluctantly to demands for public warnings in London. In July 1917 a system was introduced, under the control of the Commissioner of Police, which to those accustomed to the sirens of 1939-45 may appear somewhat primitive. Warnings were distributed partly by maroons (or sound bombs) fired into the air, and partly by policemen on foot, on bicycles or in cars carrying Take Cover placards and blowing whistles or sounding horns. THE WAR OF 1914-1918 11 during 19 14-18 There were in all 103 bombing raids (51 by airships and 52 by aeroplanes) ; and about 300 tons of bombs were dropped causing 4,820 casualties, 1,413 of which were fatal. These totals appear small; but when they are broken down into details many different pictures emerge. The two heavy raids on London of June and July 1917, for example, together caused 832 casualties (216 fatal), which amounted to 121 casualties for each ton of bombs dropped; and these casualty figures were to have much significance for the planning authorities of the future. 13 June London raid: 118 bombs, 162 killed, 426 injured. 7 July London raid: 54 killed, 190 injured 121 casualties/ton, 31 killed/ton (Air raids by twin-engined Gothas began in May 1 91 7) 12 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION The Committee of Imperial Defence, created in 1904 In November 1921 the Committee asked the principal Service experts to report on the problem of possible future air attack on the United Kingdom. This report, which appeared the next year, accepted the conclusions of the Air Staff about future air attack, which were briefly as follows. France's Air Force could drop an average weight of 1,500 tons of bombs on Britain each month by using only twenty bombing days in the month and only fifty per cent of its aircraft. London, which would be an enemy's chief objective, could be bombed on the scale of about 150 tons in the first 24 hours, 1 10 tons in the second 24 hours, and 75 tons in each succeeding 24 hours for an indefinite period. It was to be anticipated that an enemy would put forth his maximum strength at the outset. Page 14: on 15 May 1924, the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Sub- Committee first met, chaired by Sir John Anderson. THE SCALE OF A TTACK 15 The serious picture thus presented assumed its darkest tones when the Air Staff proceeded to estimate casualties. The 300 tons of bombs dropped in the 1914-18 attacks, the experts pointed out, had caused 4,820 casualties, or 16 per ton of bombs. The 832 casualties of the two big daylight attacks on London in the summer of 191 7, however, 16 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935) produced an average of 121 casualties per ton; and sixteen night raids on London in 191 7-18 gave an average of 52 casualties per ton.1 After weighting these figures with various factors, the experts concluded that 50 casualties (one-third of which would be fatal) per ton formed a reasonable estimate of casualties caused by air attacks of the future on densely-populated areas. For other areas this figure should be reduced in proportion to the actual density of population. 30 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935) In March 1927 the committee was faced with two matters Royal Charter incorporating the British Broadcasting Corporation, Wireless Broadcasting, Cmd* 2756, 1926. PROGRESS, 1926-1929 31 The Chemical Warfare Research Department had been making experiments to determine how long persons could remain under certain conditions in a 'gas-proof room; and had prepared a handbook, The Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, now on sale to the public. The first of the matters just referred to was a broadcast in February by Professor Noel Baker, on 'Foreign Affairs and How They Affect Us\ This, read in cold print at a distance of twenty years, appears as an attempt to rouse the British public to realisation of the horrors of future war, and to enlist its support for the disarmament negotia- tions at Geneva. The Professor quoted Mr Baldwin's speech to the Classical Association in the Middle Temple hall, 'Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the West and the civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?' He painted a picture of gas attack from the air in another war and claimed, 'all gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civil population from this form of attack'. The Chemical Warfare Research Department emphatically disputed the accuracy both of the details of the picture and of this general statement. They considered it unfortunate that statements of this nature should have been broadcast to the public, particularly after the Cabinet's decision that the time was not ripe for education of the public in defensive measures. The committee discussed whether to draw the B.B.C.'s attention to this talk. The Corporation, only a few months old, was then prohibited by the Postmaster-General's instructions from broad- casting 'matter on topics of political, religious or industrial con- troversy'; but the Post Office representative pointed out this did not mean that his Department was prepared to undertake censoring programmes. The committee, not wishing to incur the obligation! to approve in advance all proposed broadcasts relating to their field of study, decided to take no action with respect to the talk in question. 68 CL III: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937) Gas was the risk most prominently associated in the public mind with future air attack, as was demon- strated a few weeks before the school opened by British reaction to Italy's use of mustard and other gases against Abyssinia.4 * According to the Annual Register, 1936 (p. 27), 'feeling in England could hardly contain itself when the Italians were reported to be using poison gas against both soldiers and civilians9. SPECIAL PROBLEMS 81 A final matter which concerned gas-masks belongs perhaps more properly to the topic of public reactions to A.R.P. Early in 1937 some scientific workers at Cambridge University, who described themselves as the 'Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group' and their function as that of acting as 'a technical and advisory body to national and international peace movements', published a book attacking the Government's A.R.P. plans.1 This body had studied the official advice about the 'gas-proofing' of rooms, the civilian mask, and extinguishing incendiary bombs, and then conducted some experiments. It claimed to have shown that the measures officially proposed were ineffective or inadequate, and implied that these constituted deception of the public. It has been noticed that as 1937 opened the Government was taking steps to make A.R.P. plans more widely known to the public;* and this deliberate challenge found a sympathetic echo in various quarters, and caused it some concern. Questions about the Cam- bridge experiments were asked in Parliament, for example on the occasion of the announcement of the new Wardens' Service; sections of the Press began a critical campaign, and questions were put to officials trying to build up A.R.P. services over the country. The Government's reply was that the experiments were academic (in the sense of removed from reality), and based on fallacious assump- tions about the conditions likely to be met in actual warfare.8 In spite of pressure the authorities refused to engage in technical con- troversy with the scientists in question and within a few months the agitation subsided. At the close of the year, however, a report on the official experiments (in supervision of which the Chemical Defence Committee had been helped by eminent scientists not in Government employment) was circulated to local authorities and otherwise made public. 1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack (Left Book Club Topical Book, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937.) *p. 71. 8 H. of C. Deb., Vol. 320, Col. 1348, 18th February 1937. 86 Ch. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT (1935-1937) A demonstration of how to deal with the light incendiary bomb had been included in the Anti-Gas School curriculum in November 1936; and in February 1937 the Home Office Fire Adviser staged a demonstration at Barnes at which bombs were successfully controlled and fires extinguished by teams of girls with only short training. At an exercise held later at Southampton a group of air raid wardens carried out this function with such success that the Department concluded it must aim to train all householders in the handling of incendiary bombs. 96 Ck. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937) Air Staff had raised their estimate of the weight of bombs which an enemy (now Germany) might drop on Britain during the first stages of an attack from 150 tons per diem to no less than 600 tons. The committee proceeded, as their predecessor of 1924 had done, to question the experts and then to accept their hypothesis.1 The estimate of over 600 tons of bombs per diem during the first few weeks (which took account of Britain's various potential forms of counter- offensive) also embraced the possibility of a special bombing effort on the part of the enemy in the first 24 hours which might amount to 3,500 tons. Consideration had to be taken not only of this greatly increased weight of attack but of new methods of attack for which past experience afforded no precedents. The measure offered by the accepted air raid casualty figure of 1914-18 (50 per ton of bombs, 17 of which were killed and 33 wounded) was subject to the caveat that modern bombs were more effective. The committee pointed out that an arithmetical computation on this basis for the scale of attack at 600 tons per diem would indicate casualties of the order of 200,000 a week, of which 66,000 would be killed. 1 The new estimated scale of attack had been referred to the Home Defence Com- mittee, and was not approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence until 28th October 1937. ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT, & OTHER SUPPLIES 139 The 25 million civilian gas-masks accumulated by the opening of 1938 were, from various points of view, one of the most tangible assets of the A.R.P. Service. SHELTERS; CIVIL DEFENCE ACT, 1939 187 The invention of a practical household shelter — to be quickly known as the * Anderson' — had transformed the possibilities hitherto envisaged for protection of homes against air attack. The Govern- ment had undertaken to supply these shelters, as well as steel fittings for strengthening basements, free to some 2& million families. The 'Anderson* had originally been conceived as a shelter to be erected inside the average small working-class home. But the experts soon discarded this idea as open to various objections, including the probability that occupants would be trapped by the fall of their house and killed by fire or escaping coal-gas. During Munich householders had been advised to dig trenches in their yards or gardens, and now, by an extension of this plan, the 'Anderson' was designed as an outdoor or surface shelter. It con- sisted of fourteen corrugated steel sheets weighing, with other components, about 8 cwt. A corrugated steel hood, curved for greater strength, would be sunk some two feet in the ground and covered with earth or sandbags. 196 Ch. V: THE NEW ARM OF CIVIL DEFENCE The programme for manufacture and distribution by the end of 1939-40 of 2 J million c Andersons' to protect about 10 million citizens was being steadily carried through. SHELTERS 371 householders in May in the form of a booklet, Your Home as an Air Raid Shelter.1 This stated that an ordinary soundly-built house would offer very substantial protection; and it gave those unable to build some form of shelter much detailed guidance on the preparation of refuge rooms, the protection of windows and so on. 1 H.S.C. 98/40, 22nd May 1940. 416 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE 16 April 1941: heaviest London air raid of WWII: On the night of 1 6th- 17th some 450 aircraft made the heaviest raid so far on the capital, dropping 446 tons of high ex- plosive and 150 tons of incendiaries and causing more casualties — about 1,180 killed and 2,230 badly injured — than in any previous attack.1 Over 2,250 fires were started; and the centre and south of the metropolis bore the brunt of the attack. 1 German records show the much higher' figures of 685 aircraft, 890 tons of H.E. and 4,200 incendiary canisters dropped. This attack proved the worst on London of the war in terms of weight of bombs dropped, casualties inflicted and the number of fires caused. 438 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE 194& These occasions apart, the attack was predominantly of the tip and run or — as it was sometimes called — 'the scalded cat9 variety. The worst single incident of the year took place on 3rd March at Bethnal Green Tube shelter when, ironically enough, no attack was in progress on this particular area. A night attack of moderate proportions was being made on London, and warnings had sounded. A woman among the crowd entering this shelter, encumbered by a baby and a bundle, fell, causing those pressing behind her to tumble in a heap and the death by suffocation of no less than 178 persons. 3 March 1 943 508 Ch. XII: SHELTERS In London a periodical count was made of shelterers, usually once a month; but this took place on a single night which was not neces- sarily typical. In addition, the population was continually fluctuating owing to evacuation, the call-up to the Forces and war damage. The first shelter census in Metropolitan London, taken early in Nov- ember 1940, showed that 9 per cent, of the estimated population spent the night in public shelters, 4 per cent, in the Tubes and 27 per cent, in household shelters — in all, only 40 per cent, in any kinds of official shelter. In September and October this proportion was probably a good deal higher. Later, as the London public became accustomed to raids, the figures dropped. STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 527 Experience of raids also led to the introduction of an entirely new type of household shelter. 'Andersons', though structurally satis- factory, had not originally been intended for sleeping and became in many cases unfit for winter occupation. Domestic surface shelters were very cramped when used for sleeping and were in some places not popular, and strengthened domestic basements had been neither very successful nor widely used. After night raiding had ceased to be a novelty, many people preferred to stay in their houses rather than to go out of doors even to their own domestic shelters. The 'Anderson', it will be recalled, had at first been envisaged as an indoor shelter. Since many people were now determined to remain in their homes, it had become necessary to introduce some indoor shelter which might reduce the risk of injury from falling masonry and furniture. The fact that many who had hitherto sheltered under their staircases or furniture had been rescued unhurt from the wreckage of houses suggested that extra protection might be given by a light structure on the ground floor. By the end of 1940 two designs had been produced. The first, later known as the •Morrison* shelter, had a rectangular steel frame- work 6 ft. 6 in. long, 4 ft. wide and about 2 ft. 9 in. high. The sides were filled in with wire mesh, the bottom consisted of a steel mattress and the top was made of steel plate an eighth of an inch thick, fastened to the framework by bolts strong enough to withstand a heavy swinging blow. The shelter, which could be used as a table in the daytime, could accommodate two adults and either two young children or one older child, lying down. Experiments showed that it would carry the debris produced by the collapse of two higher floors. 528 Ch. XII: SHELTERS The Prime Minister showed great interest in these shelters the first of which, in fact, were erected in No. 10 Downing Street.1 In January 1 941 the Cabinet approved the manufacture of 400,000, providing protection for perhaps 1,200,000 people.8 In February contracts had been placed for 270,000 shelters, and another order for the same number was placed in April (thus exceeding the 400,000 originally approved). Two further orders for 270,000 were placed at the end of July and the end of September. 1 Instructions were given in a pamphlet, How to put up your Morrison shelter, on sale to the public. 1 One with a flat top and one with a curved top were erected in No. 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister was at first inclined to favour the curved design but he afterwards recognised the advantages of the flat top, which would allow the shelter to be used as a table, and gave his approval to both designs. * It was estimated that each 'Morrison' would use over g cwt. of steel, and that about 65,000 tons would be needed for the 400,000 shelters. This proved to be an under- estimate since the table shelter, as finally designed, actually weighed 4.43 cwt. STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 529 In June a revised version of Tour Home as an Air Raid Shelter was issued with the title Shelter at Home. This included informa- tion about three types of shelter which could be put inside refuge rooms — the 'Morrison', a commercially made steel shelter, and a timber-framed structure designed by the Ministry of Home Security. 546 Ch. XII: SHELTERS It was assumed that to be effective in attacks by pilotless aircraft or long-range rockets, shelters would have to be easily accessible. Yet a review of London shelter in the summer of 1943 had shown that large numbers still had no domestic shelter, and that many thousands would be unable to reach a public shelter quickly. Though the obvious solution to the problem was the 'Morrison', production of these had stopped twelve months before; and in order to build up a reserve issue had been discontinued in various areas, including London. At the beginning of October it was decided that another 100,000 'Morrisons' should be manufactured and that the reserves held in Scotland, the North of England, the Midlands and North Wales should be moved to the vicinity of London and to the Reading and Tunbridge Wells Regions, from where they could, if necessary, be used to supply London. Large-scale redistribution of 'Morrisons' and the procurement of new ones called for a substantial administrative effort. Nonetheless, most reserves were transferred during the autumn, and by the end of January 1944 some 12,000 had deen distributed to London householders. At the beginning of this year, however, preparations for the Allied invasion of Europe began to choke the railways with more important traffic, and it became impossible to transport new shelters from manufacturers in the north of England. This diffi- culty, combined with delays in the production of spanners and nuts, meant that no new shelters could be delivered before late February or early March, when it was expected that the V-weapon attacks would have begun. Arrangements were made for some to be shipped coastwise to London; but in mid-February the contract for the remaining 'Morrisons' (about 20,000) was cancelled. y2 THREAT: 648 Ch. XV: CHALLENGE OF '7' WEAPONS On nth September the War Cabinet considered the need for a revival of the plan (known as the 'black move') to evacuate a pro- portion of the staffs of Government Departments from London. The numbers now involved in such an exodus of the war-expanded Departments would be high, and difficulties of communications, transport, accomodation and billeting again seemed overwhelming; it was, therefore, agreed that the more practical course would be to devise measures such as 'citadel' accommodation to enable essential work to continue in London. The production of the further 100,000 'Morrison' shelters and the work on the reinforcement of street shelters proposed by the Home Secretary were also authorised. PLANNING AGAINST NEW WEAPONS 651 As far as shelter policy was concerned, orders had been placed in September 1943 for an additional 100,000 indoor table shelters and existing stocks were moved into the areas of probable attack. Difficulties of manufacture and transport had led to poor deliveries of 'Morrisons', and it seemed unlikely that more than half of the additional shelters ordered would be available by the time attacks were likely to begin. As the remainder would probably arrive too late to be of any use, contracts for the shelters were to be reduced by about 25,000. On the question of deep Tube shelters it had been agreed earlier that priority in the allocation of space would have to be given to the essential machinery of government. The Ministry of Works worked out a plan to shelter those government staffs not already provided for in the strengthened basements of their own steel-framed buildings. All shelter plans, the reader will recall, were given valuable impetus by the resurgence of 'conventional' attack on London and the south in the 'Little Blitz' of early 1944. VI flying bomb.THE ■ V. 1 s ATT A CKS 659 Flying glass was a special danger and people were warned to take cover on the sound of a bomb diving or the engine stopping, and later on the sounding of imminent danger warnings. The vast damage to houses inevitably caused great domestic upheavals. To begin with there was a definite decline in production in London, due to an increase in the rate of absenteeism, to loss of time in actual working hours through workers taking shelter and to lowered efficiency through loss of sleep and anxiety. The extension of the industrial alarm system and the increase in the labour force repairing damaged property, however, soon reduced these early signs of disturbance. Within a few weeks evacuees were returning to London, shelters were less full and most people were going about their normal tasks as usual. For the civil defence services the new weapon demanded new tactics. In many ways these attacks were much easier to contend with than ordinary bombing. Firsdy, most of the incidents were isolated, so that services could be directed in strength to the affected area without constant competing demands on the personnel at every turn. Secondly, the fall of the bombs could be spotted within a matter of seconds by high-placed observation posts either by night or by day, so that rescue and first aid squads could be on the spot very quickly. Thirdly, the penetrative power of this weapon was slight so that incidents rarely involved die complications of broken gas, electricity or water mains, and there was also little tendency for fires to break out. On the other hand the bombs could fall at any time in crowded thoroughfares; the proportion of casualties in the streets was much higher than ever before while the proportion of trapped casualties was lower. At night time, since there were no German eyes above, the use of artificial light was less restricted and searchlights could be used for rescue work. 8.8 IS a 3 SI'S* M 2 3 I'd "I 1 ao^Sf ITS i| 3Hf ITS 1 s ?! 111 IU- ill Mill K si . |J. . t.f*. gSflfe. I 2 o 5 o o 3 8 |- • • I MB- §•• *< 8 **; **, 8S ST I srS- n I-I H M OO « W CJi CJi cow ^1 ^1 00<£> 10 OS 10 10 00 CO M M 00 00roughs the pre-war population of 800,000 had fallen to 582,000 before the blitz began ; for four months it had dropped steadily to 444,000 ; by 3 1 st December a fall of 23 per cent. These figures do not spell panic, and a further substantial fall in 1941, after con- tinuous heavy raiding had ceased, completes the evidence that those who went did so in cold blood, for practical reasons as valid for their hard-pressed city as for their private selves. But what did all this mean to the average Londoner ? In November, inner London (the county) contained some 3,200,000 people. Not more than 300,000 of these were in public shelter of any kind, half of that number at most in those larger shelters on which the limelight shone so exclusively Nor is this all ; in domestic shelter (Ander- sons, small brick shelters and private rein- forced basements) there were no more than 68 FRONT LINE 1,150,000 people. Thus of every hundred Londoners living in the central urban areas, nine were in public shelter (of whom possibly four were in " big " shelters), 27 in private shelter, and 64 in their own beds — possibly moved to the ground floor — or else on duty. Particular big shelters, and for a few nights the tubes, were overcrowded, but there was public shelter for twice the number who made use of it. In outer London, with a population of some 4,600,000, there were in November 4 per cent, in public shelter, 26 per cent, in domestic shelter, and 70 per cent, at home or on duty. In the last great war there had been out- bursts of hate against the distant enemy, and shops with German names had been wrecked. This time the citizens did not stop for such things. After the first shock of realisation they found no more need for direct recrimination than does the soldier. Like him, they got on with the job and waited their chance. Neither in this nor in any other way was there a sign of instability ; no panic running for shelter, no white faces in the streets (though plenty of taut, grim ones), no nerve disease. In all London, the month of October saw but twenty-three neurotics admitted to hospital. The mind- doctors had rather fewer patients than usual. BLOCKED ROADS. The morning of 12th May: each raid sets the police still another traffic problem. ENORMOUS CRATERS. At the Bank, where the road collapsed into the subway beneath. A temporary bridge was thrown right across it. CITY OF COVENTRY [ II **- in view of p#**%t*nt damage to DRAINAGE communication* in the City. %p**ctat precaution* agafn%t TypttoMl Fever are advt%*:4 BOIL ALL DRINKING WATER The outcome may be seen in the following table, which shows coastal bombing to November, 1941, in round figures. Town. ( Number. ■>f Raids. Civilians Killed. Houses Damaged. Fraserburgh 18 40 700 Peterhead • * * 16 36 Aberdeen « * * 24 68 2,000 Scarborough * » * . 17 30 2,250 Bridlington • • • 30 2U 3,000 Grimsby ... • • * 22 18 1,700 Gt. Yarmouth # * • 72 110 1 1 ,500 Lowestoft 54 94 9,000 Clacton ... • » ■ 31 10 4,400 Margate • • •> 47 19 8,000 Ramsgate 41 71 8,500 Deal • » » 17 12 2,000 Dover ... 53 (and shelling) 92 9,000 Folkestone • • • 42 52 7,000 Hastings ... • ft ■ 40 46 6,250 Bexhill ... • • * 37 74 2,600 Eastbourne 49 36 3,700 Brighton Hove } 25 1 27 4,500 Worthing ... 29 20 3,000 Bournemouth 33 77 4,000 Weymouth ... 42 48 3,600 Falmouth • • • 33 31 1,100 A PENGUIN SPECIAL THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND COURAGE BY EDWARD GLOVER (Published for Blitz air raids in 1 940) PENGUIN BOOKS HARMONDS WORTH MIDDLESEX ENGLAND 41 EAST 28TH STREET NEW YORK U.S.A. ON BEING AFRAID Real knowledge, for example, is one of the best antidotes to unreal fear. Useful action is also an excellent pre- ventive, and vigorous preparation to meet real danger will enormously reduce unreal fear. The strength of a common purpose will do the rest. Knowledge, a common purpose, and preparedness for action. These are the remedies for faintness of heart in the face of danger. 22 Now as to preparation. You may recall that when Napoleon was asked how he was always able to give an instant decision in a crisis, he replied : " Because I constantly prepare every detail in advance." Here is a discipline you can readily cultivate. Always make a point of knowing beforehand exactly what you are going to do in an air raid; whether you find yourself in house, street, train, bus or shelter. Have it word perfect. 23 A stray crowd packed into a cinema is likely to panic at the cry of "Fire." There are no common bonds between the people concerned; and there are no leaders. Each one is for himself. 34 Already we have the advantage that we are fighting not only for our lives and homes but for the immemorial cause of human liberty. But that is not enough. Pro- vided we are united with our leaders in a common effort, real danger will never sap our morale. The greatest danger to our morale is unreal fear. 36 i\. Xv* Jr. (Air Raid Precautions) by J. B. S. HALDANE, F.R.S. (Co-inventor of 1915 gas masks) LONDON VICTOR GOLLANGZ LTD 1938 88 A.R.P. keyholes and cracks in the wall or between the floor- boards are to be filled with putty or sodden newspaper. The windows must be specially protected against breakage by blast or splinters. (Plastic sheets and duct tape for broken windows) How far are these precautions effective? In 1937 a committee of the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group published a book1 in which it was stated that no ordinary room is anywhere near gas-proof. 1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack. Error of Cambridge Scientists' Anti War Group: 94, A.R.P. The real criticism is as follows. It is unlikely that there would be a lethal concentration of _gas_out_of doors for a long period. "The wind carries gas away, ana in cities tnere are vertical^ air^urrents even in calm weather. 11 many tons of bombs could^be droppei in the same small area either at once or in succession this would not be so. .But given any sort^ of_defence bombs will be dropped more or less at random. Suppose we~Ka 200 MINUTES 300 Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-3 DECAY OF ANTHRAX, <50% HUMIDITY Decay occurs faster in humid air 30 20 10 Twilight Bright Sunlight 0 100 200 MINUTES 300 U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-l. Chemical and biological contamination avoidance, FM 3-3 (1992) 10 grams/square meter TABLE 1-2. Chemical Ageru Persistency in Hours on CARC Painted Surfaces. Temperature GA/ GF1 GB2'3 GD2'3 HD1 VX2'3 C° F° -30 -22 • 110.34 436.69 # * • # » -20 -4 1 • 45.26 145.63 » • • •• -10 14 • 20.09 54.11 • • • • • 0 32 • 9.44 22.07 • • • •• 10 50 1.42 4.70 9.78 12 1776 20 68 0.71 2.45 4.64 6.33 634 30 86 0.33 1.35 2.36 2.8 241 40 104 0.25 0.76 1.25 2 102 50 122 0.25 0.44 0.70 1 44 55 131 0.25 I 0.34 0.51 1 25 NOTE 1 For grassy terrain moltiply the number in the chart by 0.4. 2 For grassy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 1.75. 3 For sandy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 4.5. • Agent persistency time is less than 1 hour. *• Agent is in a frozen state and will not evaporate or decay. ••• Agent persistency time exceeds 2,000 hours. - COMPARATIVE VOLATILITY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS Agent Volatility (mg/m3) at 25°C Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) 1,000,000 Sarin (GB) 22,000 Soman (GD) 3,900 Sulfur mustard 900 Tabun (GA) 610 Cyclosarin (GF) 580 VX 10 VR ("Russian VX") 9 Data source: US Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds. Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, DN, DAF; December 12, 1990. Field Manual 3-9. Naval Facility Command P-467. Air Force Regulation 355-7. co u CU •d • iH > o h M P^H 0) en u ** r* nj u CO IN s ^ o Mh & O 0) W> s CO -M ©JD 0) G In ts 0) o Oh & 0> cu *Q E 3 2 CO d o( • lH u »lH CO ^ E rd & 4-* IT> « TH CO cu ■M 45 d n CU <+H O « CU a WD C CU cu CU u 1-1 !h *J CU o 45 CU £ •fi s d z s o ** Cm s >% CD fcs? & ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ CO T— 1 CO o IT) ON H O +-> a Ml o M-H M o 2 in G o • 1—1 •MJ g O M-H .s o 2 T- 1 00 co CN i— 1 NO LC (N ON ^h CN ^O v© CN LO CO H r^ ^ Sfc « ^ r> CO ts CO IN LO CN T— 1 00 ^ G o • 1—1 CO 03 CU Ml O G S £§ co co CU •a co 1 03 CU g Oh CO Q £ a g g g o o o o o os B o 03 O H H 03 CU co 03 2 CO CO CU g • 1—1 N N 03 u u O O o o o o o 2 2 2 2 2 03 r-M CU CO O 2 >, -r- u OS d CU >, bo os H CU £ S •s CU CO g o 03 ^ MM 44' 03 o •" ■* • H g CU OS •4-t X »i— I -M ro Oh O o H 4-» CO s CU •rH u •rH M-H > o s 13 o -M S-i • I— 1 M-l a CO CO ^H O o ffi Cm OS -b > •i— i CO C m CU > •rH S-I OS CO ■a o p M-» CU cu CO •" o is g- OS oj "co Cm Cm3h O g o IS -4_* Ml S g -f co [Ms >, d CO ,J cu h Mi cd O CD MM -M CU OS H CO Mi ja Mi O ^^ s. os co co m o ^^ ^^ o ™ cu C OS -M OS Q cu to OJ •rH Oh CO O X 13 c o •S cn S OS +-> OJ M 05 CO . Mi o v »h C 03 >* s ^ ^^? Ml H cu cu S? r-H^ OS y > g •i— i Mi os CO CO J"! OS E OS 4-» -M OS rH • I— I Ml OS CO >^ os CO o o M-i tS o M SrS d H CO O cu 5 £?< 03 os CO 1 — I 03 u • rH cu OS T3 Ch O o cu LO 13 cu 03 £ 03 N O s • I— I X, LO CO" OS m3 N LO n3 Mi S 3 OS cu 03 r3 ft N « SI HSVP rj \D B ^ 3 °° _Q On 7? ON CO ^ IN rH I CO I oo o o CU 03 no W OS 00 CJ u> On ■ CU CO s ^ o < Oh ^T to be cu r- Ml ta ^ «U S os rH , , O CN CJ CO O X 03 U 6 0) rC u Mi pS os S -"S ■H co hS ° CO hC vcu >^> -a ■■= 3 co i — I QJ -H > '53 G CO hJ ^§ LO P Kg OS CN N CO O O 2 ^ _ T— I ^^ io a s 03 q p a 0) CN CO ^ O os Oi&H to C CD bO 03 *-< n r- 03 B g cu e Mt CU -M CO d co O en u CD Dh CO < u •rH CU Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) Medical Management of Chemical Toxicity in Pediatrics TABLE 21-3 MANAGEMENT OF MILD TO MODERATE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURES Management Antidotes Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs) Nerve Agents Symptoms Age Dose Age Dose • Tabun • Sarin • Cyclosarin • Soman • VX • Localized sweating • Muscle fasciculations • Nausea • Vomiting • Weakness /floppiness • Dyspnea • Constricted pupils and blurred vision • Rhinorrhea • Excessive tears • Excessive salivation • Chest tightness • Stomach cramps • Tachycardia or bradycardia Neonates and infants up to 6 months old Young children (6 months old-4 yrs old) Older children (4-10 yrs old) Adolescents (> 10 yrs old) and adults Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IOtomax 4 mg or 0.25 mg AtroPen+ and 2-PAM 15 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IOtomax 4 mg or 0.5 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IOtomax 4 mg or 1 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IOtomax 4 mg or 2 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slow- ly to max 2 g/hr Neonates Young children (30 days old-5 yrs old) Children (> 5 yrs old) Adolescents and adults Diazepam 0.1-0.3 mg/ kg/ dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lora- zepam 0.05 mg/kg slow IV Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/dose or Loraze- pam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/dose or Loraze- pam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg Diazepam 5-10 mg up to 30 mg in 8 hr period or Lorazepam 0.07 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg 2-PAM: 2-pralidoxime IM: intramuscular IO: intraosseous IV: intraveneous PDH: Pediatrics Dosage Handbook *In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 minutes until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. fMeridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term. Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtropPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi- cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook, 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio; Lexi-Comp Inc: 2006. Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare TABLE 21-4 MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURE Management Antidotes4 Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs) Nerve Agents Severe Symptoms Age Dose Age Dose • Tabun • Convulsions • Sarin • Loss of consciousness • Cyclosarin • Apnea • Soman • Flaccid paralysis • VX • Cardiopulmonary arrest • Strange and confused behavior • Severe difficulty breathing • Involuntary urination and defecation Neonates and infants up to 6 months old Young children (6 months old-4 yrs old) Older children (4^10 yrs old) Adolescents (s 10 yrs old) and adults Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IM/IV/IOor3doses of 0.25mg AtroPen* (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark If kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IOor3doses of 0.5mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IOor3doses of lmg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/ kg IM or IV slowly, 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 7, 2 Mark I kits for ages > 7-10 yrs Atropine 6 mg IM or 3 doses of 2 mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 1800 mglV/ IM/IO,or2Mark I kits (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 14, 3 Mark I kits for ages a 14 yrs Neonates Young children (30 days old-5 yrs and adults Children (^ 5 yrs old) Adolescents and adults Diazepam 0.1-0.3 mg/kg/ dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lorazepam 0.05 mg/ kg slow IV Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/ dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/ dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg Diazepam 5-10 mg up to 30 mg in 8-hr period, or Lora- zepam 0.07 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg IM: intramuscular IO: intraosseous IV: intravenous ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^— *In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 min until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. ^Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term. Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtroPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi- cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook. 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio: Lexi-Comp Inc; 2006. French family at Marbache, Meurthe et Moselle, France, September 1918. Gas masks were compulsory in the village, due to nearby gas attacks. Photo is the frontispiece of the October 1921 reprint of Will Irwin's book "The Next War" (Dutton, N.Y. , 19th printing Oct 1921; first published April 1921.) J. Davidson Pratt, "Gas Defence from the Point of View of the Chemist" (Royal Institute of Chemistry, London, 1937): "... during the Great War, French and Flemish . . . living in the forward areas came unscathed through big gas attacks by going into their houses, closing the doors - the windows were always closed in any case - and remaining there ..." London 1941 baby gas mask drill Hand pumped (asthmatic) Hospital patient's Police Civilian Soldier's /warden until 1942 Small child's (mickey mouse) An eminent chemist gives the facts about poison gas and air bombing t He freely / THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS h 7 antes JCtnaall M.A., D.Sc. F.R.S. Professor of Chemistry, University of Edinburgh The civilian has been told that he will have to bear the brunt of another war, that within a few hours from the outset enemy bombers will destroy big cities and exterminate their inhabitants with high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs. What is the truth? Here, in this book, written in language everyone can understand, is the considered opinion of an authority on chemical warfare. Breathe Freely ! THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS JAMES KENDALL M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S. Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh ; formerly Lieutenant-Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, acting as Liaison Officer with Allied Services on Chemical Warfare J938 52 GAS IN THE LAST WAR CASUALTIES IN INITIAL GAS ATTACKS Amount Lethal Used Concentra- Non-fatal Gas Date In Tons tion * injuries Deaths Chlorine Apr. 22, 191 5 168 56 i5sooo 5,000 Phosgene Dec. 19, 19 15 88 05 1,069 120 Mustard July 12, 191 7 125 015 2,490 87 (* mg/litre for 10 minutes exposure unprotected) between September 15 and November 11, 1918, 2,000,000 rounds of gas shell, containing 4,000 tons of mustard gas, were fired against the advancing British troops ; our losses therefrom were 540 killed and 24,363 injured. Gas defence had progressed to the point where it took nearly 8 tons of mustard gas to kill a single man ! A GAS ATTACK ON LONDON 109 The first salvo_ofgas shells often reaches the trenches before the occupantlTddirtheir masks, whereas the Londoner will receive ample warning of the approaching danger. IIO GAS IN THE NEXT WAR The alarmist and the ultra-pacifist love to quote the fact that one~toh of mustard gas is sufficient to kill 45,000,000 people. This would indeed be true if the 45,000,000 people all stood in a line with their tongues out waiting for the drops to be dabbed on, but they are hardly likely to be so obliging. One steam- ronef~woulclrsuffice to flatten out all' the inhabitanfcTof Londoin^f^they lay down in rows in front of it, but nobody panics at the sight of a steam-roller. 11 Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have I>een delugmgTEcT long-suffering British public with lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination These three classes are pure sensa- tionalists, ultra-pacifists andTmilitary experts7 12 PANIC PALAVER perpetrators of such articles may not recognize them- selves that what they are writing is almost entirely imaginary, "but theyjio want jojget their manuscript "accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the Weekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the horrors thick, and they certainly do their best The amount of damage done by such alarmists can- not be calculated, b^tlTislindoubtedly very great. poison gas has a much greater laews^value. It is still a new and mysterious form of warfare, it is something which people do not under- stand, and what they do not understand they can readily be made to fear. The recent film Things to Come, in particular, has provided a picture of chemical warfare of the future which shows how simply and rapidly whole populations will be wiped out. Millions of people, perhaps, have been impressed by the authority and reputation of Mr. H. G. Wells into believing that this picture repre- sents the plain truth. Exhibit 'B* is the work of the ultra^^acifist. He abominates war and everything connected with war to such an extent that he paints a highly coloured picture of its horrors,Tirthe most extreme Surrealistic style, with the objecF of frightening the public to the point where they will relinquish, in the hope of escaping war, even the right of self M— o >> /i» o &M < ■ LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO E as a. CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj T3 O O O d d d d d d d d F §■ 3 o o o o O _2 ■D 0 O) 2- c 0 ■ LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO E ™ o i_ CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj CNj h? Q. X & O O O d d d d d d d d 3 LU CD 0 ^r LO 0 o < CO LO O CNj CO ^r LO CO ^r CD CD LO o CO CO CD CNI 0 o o O o c 0 > c O as "^ c 0 0 &- LL C O c 0) LL C 0 o ,_ 0 o c as LL > o 0 > 1 *b> c 2 0 o "B o E 0 0 CO z c 0 c |5 c |5 c |5 '5 0 > o 3 o o o o Q. O a. O — "5 CD "5 CD — "(/) < (/> (0 (0 (0 3 CD .5 c as > 5 o 5 o 5 o 5 o c 0 2 as c o c 0 c 0 "55 "0 (0 "^ £ £ 5 i 2 2 0 o as as '35 '55 c 2 S CO 0 0 o 0 a: a: z > o ■£ c 8 S 0 CN (VJ C (VJ 0 *- C =5 o if) tl S > X LU LU LU .^ a: -a -a i- 0 0 ■ ■ to O 3 "7 CO CO 0 ~Z. o o = < < =i £ 0 o 0 > o I 1 1 "CO 03 00 .3 00 J? LU 3 "D T— C . (VJ O CO c 0 q6 0 >% !c D) 0 O > O >. ■ ^^ CO 75 (VJ o (M ©ml MARTIN MAfllETTA ENERGY for the mmn states ORNL/TM-10423 Technical Options for Protecting Civilians from Toxic Vapors and Gases C V, Chester Date Published - Hay 1988 OF ENERGY Prepared for Office of Program Manager for CHEMICAL MUNITIONS Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland ORNL-DWG 88M-7585 DOWN WIND DISTANCE (km) Fig. 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some Very Toxic Gases ORNL-DWG 88M-7584 100 - 10 1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 CLOUD PASSAGE (h) 8 Fig* 2 Protection Factor of Leaky Enclosures CO in I CO CO C3 a o at a> CO o in o> o a? 0> o >- u o o U o CD z en O 111 M~ h- ^ O o o CJ 40 CO LLI o CC n3 LO LL C o LU o ^r > 4-> o h- CO < ■r-* o _l *4- CM ID 2 C i — i O 3 CO T~ O en — U) — CM CD (L-M) 31Vd 30NVH0X3-HIV ORNL/TM-2001/154 Energy Division Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work? Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place John H. Sorensen Barbara M. Vogt Date Published— August 2001 Prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Prepared by OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6285 managed by UT-BATTELLE, LLC for the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall. Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil (0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink- wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance. 3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN? Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical warfare agents. 3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of 10 mil (0.01 -in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organoposphorous pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that "duct tape exhibits reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP (210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents" (Pal et al. 1993, p. 140). hd p H n> s O 3 < TO o o CD CO 5r Qrq hU 5" I — o o *^ TO 5: II i TO rt ^ ^ §> 00 ^ P 3^ TO ._ c" Cu O ^ P wj c« 50 J? > H O 00 O O © © o o o o o* GO oo o -J U> < DO -s fD pa H SB ST ft s S3 o ■a sr o c Grq 9^ fD fD ^+ a TO SO fD 3 J << o x 5" I- fD THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM AERIAL ATTACK Being A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE HOME OFFICE by THE CAMBRIDGE SCIENTISTS' ANTI-WAR GROUP First published February isth ig3j Second impression February zsth ig^y LONDON VICTOR GOLLANCZ LTD 1937 GAS-PROOF ROOMS 21 the time taken for the eras to leak out to half its i . nr-— — *— " ■'■■■■ >*^*>**hi««m>>.*— ^h»— -^- — Ti.if in n«- t^t^M>>j»i*»MI^»l' iiMiiW i ■ i*"' — — " ■■■■ » nt^tfi i n iimi. iiibmium rm iwnmn -~w.»^-.— ..... . .|M -n ■ ■ -■-■■ ■■ , original value was measured in four rooms — the base- v+m+—ifH*4m*+m***M** ■■»■>■■■, ment of a shop, the dming-room of a semi-detached house, the sitting-room of a Councflnouse and the wf- y -1-* ■»*•-*- ■-»<■-.■ 4> 174, 1934 Comple'teXCies : bombs are dropped, not cylinders, EngelKardTs 1934 article in the Nazi controlled "Gas protection and air protection" journal is snemy propaganda; the Nazis kept the facts secret INCENDIARY BOMBS 59 As, however, our experiments on the "gas-proof" room illustrate quite clearly that the ordinary dwelling-house is quite incapable of affording protection71I"proT3ably wilTnot matter much what a civil population does under a gas and incendiary attack. l^FIslFproEtaHe to argue^vvHetHer the gas or incen- "diary bombTs the more devastating^ as_it js necessary to "contemplate an air attack in which both will be employed, with a sprinkling of high explosive bombs, which will considerably heighteiT^ effect." This is the type of attack which people in large towns must expect if war breaks out ; our task in this section is to discuss the proposals of the Home Office for dealing with incendiary bombs, remembering that whoever deals with them will require, almost certainly, simultaneous protection against gas. fAtNtD 1M£*MM 68 INCENDIARY B OMBS *pfUffr fafitfl extreme lightness and cheapness ofjfthe incendiary bomb must be borne in mind, Mr. Noel-Baker cites the case of a single aeroplane carrying a load of less than a ton of bombs which succeeded in starting three hundred fires, ancTlFwe^ take a specimen raid of nine bombers, each carrying a thousand " kilo " bombs, nine thousand of these could be dropped on an area of two square miles. If very generous allowances are made for failures to function^nd~fbTl3or^s fanihg^ri non- inflammable sites, in an urban area one fifth at least of these bombs should cause EresT This makes one thousand eight hundred fires. The danger of fire spreading over sev^al^locksjof buildings as in the San Francisco (1906) and Tokyo (1933) earthquakes, mak- ing the centre of the conflagration quite unapproach- able by fire brigades is obvious. To summarise this section, we reach the conclusion : (a) That for individuals the cost of making buildings impenetrable to incendiary bombs is proHIbitive. (b) That, bearing in mind the probability of com- bined incendiary^ will have considerable difficulty in extinguishing fires caused by incendiary bombs in private houses, unless (c) That the fires caused by a raid such as is outlined above would very likely be impossible to deal with, even with the improved fire brigade organisation envisaged by the Home Office, because of the probable amalgama- tion of separate outbreaks into a vast conflagration. FM 3-10 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FEBRUARY 1962 Line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Munition Agent Shell, M2A1 Shell, M360 Shell, M60 Shell, M121 Shell, MHO Shell, T (M121). Shell, M122 Shell, M104 Shell, Gas, 175-mm. Shell, Gas, 175-mm. Shell, T174 Shell, T174 Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT).. Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT).. Warhead, M79, 762-mm (HON- EST JOHN). Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm (HONEST JOHN). Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm (HONEST JOHN). Warhead, E20, 318-mm (LIT- TLE JOHN). Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT).. Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT).. Bomb, M34A1, 1000-lb, Cluster.. Bomb, MC-1, 750-lb Projectile, 5"/38, MK53, MOD O. Projectile, 5"/54, MK54, MOD O. Warhead, Rocket, 5" MK40, MOD O. Warhead, Rocket, 5", MK40, MOD O. Bomb, MK94, MOD O Bomb, M70A1. Mine, Land, Chemical, M23 Mine, Land, Chemical, One- Gallon. HD GB HD GB HD VX GB HD GB VX GB VX GB VX GB GB VX GB GB VX GB GB GB GB GB HD GB HD VX HD Delivery system 4.2-inch Mortar. 105-mm Howitzer, M2A1, M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52. 105-mm Howitzer, M2A1, M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52. 155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1, M44. 155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1, M44. 155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1, M44. 155-mm Gun, M2, M53 155-mm Gun, M2, M53. M107Gun (SP) M107 Gun (SP) 8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1, M55. 8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1, M55. Launcher, M91 Launcher, M91. Rocket, M31A1C Launcher, M386. Rocket, XM50 Launcher, M386. Rocket, XM50 Launcher, M386. Rocket, XM51 Launcher, XM80. Rocket, Launcher Rocket, Launcher. Fighter, Bomber.. Fighter, Bomber.. 5-inch Gun 5-inch Gun Launcher, MK 105 Rocket, M40, MOD O. Launcher, MK 105 Rocket, M40, MOD O. Fighter, Bomber Fighter, Bomber. N/A. N/A. User Employment data (a) Range (1) (Meters) (2) (b) US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC USMC Maximum USMC. US ARMY US ARMY US ARMY USMC US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY USMC. US ARMY. US ARMY. USAF. USAF. 3,930. 11, 140. 11, 140. 14, 950. 14, 950. 14,950. 23,500. Minimum 180. 862. 31,500. 31,500. 16,930. US NAVY. US NAVY. US NAVY. US NAVY. US NAVY. US NAVY. US ARMY. US ARMY. 16,930.. 10,970.. 10,970- 24,960.- 33,830.. 33,830- 18,290.. 139 km.... 139 km.... Range of Aircraft. Range of Aircraft. 16,450. 19,200. 4,200-. 180. 180. 4,200. Range of Aircraft. Range of Aircraft. N/A N/A 2,740.. 2,740.. 8,500- 8,500- 8,500- 3,200 J. 50 km. 50 km. N/A. N/A. Error (c) Fuze (Capability) t $ to a s 2 f S g 03 a i « -t-> O X M8PD M508PD... M51A5PD. M508PD... M51A5PD. T76E6VT >. M508PD... M51A5PD. VT-M514A1. M51A5PD.. 304m. 304m.. I a a N/A N/A T2061VT M417PD T2061VT T2075 Mech Time... . T2075MechTime.... T2075 Mech Time.... T2075 Mech Time— Preset Radar Preset Radar M152E3 Mech Time. M905BD— MK29MOD3PD. MK30MOD3PD. MK30MOD3PD. MK30MOD3PD. AN-M103A1ND M195 BD (IM- PACT). AN-M158ND (IM- PACT). See notes at end of figure. 16 Figure 6. Chemical munitions and delivery systems. Employment data— Continued Functioning and physical characteristics of CML munitions (d) Time for delivery (1) Preplanned (2) Target of opportunity 1-3 min. 1-3 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. (e) Organization 6 Mort/Plt 8Mort/Btry 6 How/Btry H-6hr. H-6hr.. 30 min.. 30 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 120 min. 120 min. 15 min +flight time. 15 min +night time. 6 How/Btry . 6 How/Btry. 6 How/Btry. 6 How/Btry . 4 Gun/Btry. 4 Gun/Btry. 4 Gun/Btry . 4 Gun/Btry. 4 How/Btry. (f) Rate of fire per weapon 30Rds/2min... 105 Rds/15 min 6Rds/Hmin... 18 Rds/4 min 6 Rds/H min... 18 Rds/4 min 3Rds/Hmin... 12 Rds/4 min 3 Rds/H min... 12 Rds/4 min 3Rds/Hmin... 12 Rds/4 min 2 Rds/H min... 8 Rds/4 min 2Rds/Hmin... 8 Rds/4 min 4 How/Btry. 36 Lchr/Bn.. 36 Lchr/Bn.. 2 Lchr/Bn... 2 Lchr/Btry. 2 Lchr/Btry. 4 Lchr/Btry. 4 Lchr/Bn... 4 Lchr/Bn 6 Rds/4 min... 10 Rds/10 min 6 Rds/4 min 10 Rds/10 min. 45 Rkt/Lchr/16 sec. (g) Height of burst GND. GND. GND. GND. GND. 20m >.. GND. GND. GND. GND. GND. (h) (a) Diameter (meters) of impact area (single rd) * Weight of munition (kg) 16. 27. 11. 49. 20. 45Rkt/Lchr/15sec. 2/Hr 2/Hr 2/Hr 2/Hr 2/Day 2/Day 2-6/Ftr„... 4-18/Bmbr. 2-6/Ftr 4-27/Bmbr. 48 Rkt/Lchr/. 1 min 48 Rkt/Lchr/. 1 min 20m » GND 20m i Variable Variable Variable Variable Intervals of 1,524m. Intervals of 1,524m. Variable — GND GND GND GND GND GND GND 76. 46. Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable. 170 127 90. 29. 10.8 16.1 15.2 45.9 42.0 45.9 45.9 43.0 66.8 66.8 97.0 97.0 26.4 26.2 737 568 568 119 744 744 513 322 25.1 29.1 22.9 (b) Weight agent (kg) 222 58.0 10.50 5.45 2.72 .739 1.22 2.95 4.4 2.95 2.95 5.31 6.68 6.04 7.12 7.12 4.80 4.54 177.5 210 210 30 190 190 89.6 99.9 1.47 2.02 2.18 (c) Effective weight of agent (kg) 3 49.8 272 5.23 4.50 (d) Function- ing effi- ciency of munition (percent) 104.8 171 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 (e) Agent dissemi- nation efficiency 90 62 per- cent. 86 per- cent. 1 Estimated. * Instantaneous a«jent area coverage 30 seconds after detonation. » Vali.es are the product of values given in columns 6(6), 6(d), and 6(e). Since values for 6(e) are not available, values for 6 (c)cannot be computed at this time. Figure 5. — Continued 626007 O— 6S 17 Agent— GB. Wind speed — 5 knots (approx 9 km/hr). Temperature gradient — inversion. Temperature— 60° F. (15.5° C.). Terrain — open, level, scattered vegeta- tion. Precipitation — none. Time limitations on the delivery of agent on target — 4 minutes or less. Casualty level desired — 20 percent. Find: Whether or not the mission can be fired with a 105-mm howitzer battery. Solution: (a) Using figure 11, convert 20 percent cas- ualties among protected personnel to the corresponding casualty level among unprotected personnel. This is 80 percent. (b) Using the "GB (over 30-sec attack)" column of figure 12, determine the total effects components to be 3.21 as follows: Inversion 1. 09 Wind speed, 9 km/hr 1. 00 Temperature, 60° F. (15.5° C.) .12 Open terrain .30 No precipitation .70 quired. Since the target is twice as large as the dispersion pattern of a 105-mm battery (par. 31c(3)(c) and 41c/), a shift of fires should be made. Figure 9 gives a time of 30 seconds for shifting of fires. On this basis the battery could fire twenty-four rounds on half the target in a little less than 30 seconds, take 30 seconds to shift fires, and have ample time to deliver the remaining twenty-four rounds on the other half of the target. The firing should be completed in less than 2 minutes. 3. 21 (c) Using figure 13, place a hairline between 80 percent on the percent casualties scale and 12 hectares on the target area scale. On the point of intersec- tion on the reference line, pivot the hairline until it intersects 3.21 on the effects components scale. On the mu- nitions expenditure scale, read 12 as the number of 155-mm equivalents required. (d) To find the number of 105-mm rounds required to fire the mission, multiply 12 by a factor of four (obtain this factor from figure 8); the product is 48 rounds. (e) From figure 9, it is evident that one battery of six howitzers can easily fire the mission if no shift of fires is re- 28 Munition Munition expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents OB vx HD 155-mm Shell 1 0.25 2.40 1 2. 17 1 105-mm Shell. 0.28 8-inch Shell 4.2-inch Mortar Shell _ .62 175-mm Shell 2. 1 1. 6 60 71 10 65 30 35 .50 . 68 .74 17 2. 1 1. 6 M55 Rocket - M79 Warhead— HONEST JOHN E19R2 Warhead— HON- EST JOHN 71 10 65 LITTLE JOHN SERGEANT M34A1 1000-lb Cluster MCI 750-lb Bomb. 5"/38 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5"/54 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5" Gas Rocket (Navy) 500-lb Gas Bomb 115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy) 6.2 Figure 7. Munitions expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents. (The figures given are an estimate of the number of 155-mm howitzer rounds required to give the same effect as one round of the specified munition. Dissemination efficiency has not been considered.) Weapon 105-mm Howitzer 155-mm Howitzer 155-mm Gun 8-inch Howitzer 4.2-inch Mortar M91 Launcher (M55 Rocket) Maximum rate (rounds) 30 sec 6 3 2 1 10 45 (15 sec) Munition Conversion factor GB vx HD 155-mm Shell 1 4 0.41 1 0.45 1 105-mm Shell . 3.6 8-inch Shell 4 2-inch Mortar Shell 1. 61 175-mm Shell .. .48 .61 .017 .014 .098 .016 .033 .029 2.00 1.46 1. 35 . 059 .48 . 61 M55 Rocket M79 Warhead— HONEST JOHN _. E19R2 Warhead— HON- EST JOHN. .014 . 098 .016 LITTLE JOHN SERGEANT M34A1 1000-lb Cluster MCI 750-lb Bomb 5' 738 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5'754 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5" Gas Rocket (Navy) 500-lb Gas Bomb 115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy) * . 164 Figure 8. Conversion factors for converting 155-mm munitions to other munitions. Rates of fire for chemical fire missions without shifting or relaying of the piece (rounds) lmin 10 5 4 2 16 2min 14 7 6 3 30 (max) 4min 18 12 8 6 50 lOmin 40 30 12 10 80 15min 60 40 18 15 105 Estimated time to shift fires 30 sec 30 sec 60 sec 60 sec 30 sec Launcher must relocate after firing each ripple. Figure 9. Approximate rates of fire for division cannon artillery, mortars, and multiple rockets firing chemical rounds. (Rates of fire for other weapons are given in figure 5.) 30 UJ o CO OT UJ Q. Q UJ O UJ o a. 3 O o < CO UJ < CO < o UJ o UJ a. -99 -90 -80 -70 ^60 -50 r40 -30 -25 IT20 — 15 I — i -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 — 3 -F .MASKS IN PLACE (Exact level of protection dependent on condition of masks and training of troops) 2 — UJ ' h- o or a. +- MASKS AVAILABLE (Troops well trained) -MASKS AVAILABLE (Troops poorly trained) UJ > UJ -U- — NO MASKS If the target personnel had protection available, the following factors would be applied to the percent casualties for unprotected personnel : Degradation Level of protection factors Masks in place 0. 05 Masks available, troops well trained .10 Masks available, troops poorly trained .25 The above are estimates for GB. L_ I 3— 4 — 5- 6- 7- 8- 9- 10- 15- 20- 25t 30- 40-= 50-5 60 — 70 ~ 80— 90— 99_ UJ z z o CO a: UJ o. o UJ O UJ O o z o < CO UJ !: < CO < o z UJ o or UJ Q. Figure 11. Nomogram for conversion of percent GB casualties for protection of personnel in the target area. 32 Meteorological and terrain conditions Effects components GB» (surprise attack) GB (over 30-sec attack) VX HD 1. Temperature Gradient Inversion Neutral Lapse 0.67 .57 .30 1.09 .69 .09 1.89 1.89 1.89 2. Wind Speed (km/hr) 0to5-_. __ 6to 10__ _. 11 to 16 17 to 26 27 to 52 3. Temperature (° F.) a. 0to39 (-18° to 4° C.)__. 40 to 79 (5° to 26° C.) 80 and up (27° C. and up). b. 30 to 49 (-l°to9° C.)--- 50 to 69 (10° to 21° C.)--- 70 and up (22° C. and up). 4. Terrain Open, level, scattered vegetation. Rugged, mountainous 20 50 70 55 30 12 23 30 1.30 1.00 .70 .30 0 0 . 12 .23 .30 '0 0 *0 0.69 .54 .32 .87 .70 .60 .48 0 0 .70 1.00 30 1 0 5. Precipitation None Moderate rain. .70 70 70 >0 »0 i Estimated. * Tentative figures not yet verified. Figure 12. Effects components. 0 '0 Note: paragraph 105 on page 82 states that the "safe entry times" after bio attacks are: NU (Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus) , AB (bovine brucellosis) , and UL (tularemia) : 2 hrs sun or 8 hrs cloudy OU (Q fever) : 2 hrs sun or 18 hrs cloudy Cloudy conditions also apply to nighttime 626007 O— 62- 33 cr IS! O UJ h- O A |— 99 — 95 —90 80 70 60 50 40 30 gE IF O co UJ UJ u E 20 10 I — I CO o z o W s E E «*> m or UJ CD UJ I o UJ B 1—10,000 - 5,000 - 4,000 - 3,000 -2,000 — 1,000 -500 -400 -300 -200 — 100 5 4 Z — 50 UJ or — 40 3 K — 30 Q 2 2 UJ a. — 20 2 O 3 USE SCALES A and a and B and B I TOGETHER — 9 — 8 — 7 — 6 UJ UJ u z UJ or UJ u. UJ tr. — 2 1.0 10 5 4 3 2 -I i—o Figure IS. Target area, casualty level, munitions requirement nomogram. 4.0 - 20,000— — 10,000 3.5 3.0 2.5 — 4 2.0 — 3 1.5 5,000 — 4,000 — 3,060—3 2,000 — ,000 CO I- z UJ 500 ? 400 CO o UJ UJ 200 100 50 40 30 20 10- O 300-^ CO UJ or s UJ < UJ or < UJ CD < 34 o x KILOGRAMS Per METER ijjH 8 o oo o o o ^ - S " |l| I [li/l'llUl'llUl |tTfTTT| I |lll\|iU/li!i||| |'l|l||| I [llllllM/lli||| ['l|l|/| I |iil\|lllllllil||| |l[| JE§§8 § j> °SSS 8 8 | *••••» A Ik ,,«, • » 4 I SS5 W POUNDS Per METER REFERENCE NUMBER I1IIH"I|MII| 'I'l'l'l |||HHIIIII|HII| I |l|l|l| [||llllllll|[llll| I |l|l|l| H|""lml[MM| I |1|I|I||||MII|I[1|I||||||I11|| l|l «X m » 10 «K O O o o 00 I OOOO 00 I I 0 000 o 00b "» o M M «» •*- O OOOO OO o © o O OOO o o oo „ 0000 o «••»*«» «K o o O O OOO 2 OOOO g OOOO 2 o o 0.0.0008 00-^- g 0-°-5°; REFERENCE LINE IE 2< (A * u Sw III ' I ' I fc. < K fy, Mi<9 M> N — o o UJ < l.lll.limllllH.I.I.L.llllll.l.l.lnnlllllU.1 £ (SH3i3WCniM Nl) H19N31 30dnOS o o 8 C3 A 3NH 3DN3d3J3d g I © _ «»«■> M - j3 n+m n T «}«.*iej. .• OOOO Q 5» IlluLl I 3NI~I 3DN3d3d3d E . I« • E * I dflOH J»d SH313W0TIX • E • ° PUI O K Z INI! CD O u. _ * t!2 o o o S 00 0000 2 _r~**^*",c lii 1 1 himn ■ ■ 1 1 1 hhl 1 1 1 Inn In nil I lililil .L.T. 1 1 M.T.TtT ■ LmL.mJ O < o ui o »- (H313H aiano j»d ssinNiw-wvdomm ni) sovsoa 00 o _ „ °. OO O 5 o 40 DOWNWIND DISTANCE NOMOGRAM II 10 =-20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 cr u GO 100 200 300 400 500 -600 700 - — 1,000 LU o z UJ Or Ul U. UJ =- 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 •7,000 - 10,000 — 20,000 30,000 -40,000 -50,000 100,000 — 200,000 •300,000 - 400,000 500,000 1,000,000 LINE SOURCE B m -n m m z o m TEMPERATURE GRADIENT NOTE: A to D B B to Temperature Gradient =-.2 —.3 — .4 — 5 t-.6 — .7 CO oc UJ S_2 UJ 2 — 3 O -J 4 * — 5 2 — 6 V— * — 7 UJ O IC z _ < K — co a E-20 a z p-30 $ — 40 z — 50 * — 60 o 70 o 1 IC D too — 70 - 60- 50- 40- 30- 20 — d 10 i: 5- 4- 3" 2-E ^ m .7 H .6 m .5 3J CO .4 *~* .3—= .2^ — .07- .06 .05- 04 03 .02 .01 — CO O c 3) o m m Figure 15. Downwind distance nomogram II. 41 USACGSC RB 3-1 REFERENCE BOOK CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON EMPLOYMENT U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1 May 1968 This reference book supersedes RD 3-1, 1 May 1967 CHAPTER 2 TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS 1. Characteristics and Effects a. General. The following antiperson- nel chemical agents are used for College instruction in chemical weapon employ- ment: nerve agents GB and VX; blister agent HD (mustard); and incapacitating agent BZ. Actual or assumed character- istics of these agents are described in the following paragraphs for instructional purposes only and are summarized in figure 1. b_. Nerve Agent GB. GB is a quick acting, nonpersistent lethal agent that produces casualties primarily by inhala- tion. (1) Inhalation effects. Inhaled GB vapor can produce casualties within min- utes. As an example, 50 percent of a group of unprotected troops engaged in mild activity, breathing at the rate of about 15 liters per minute, and exposed to 70 milligrams of GB per cubic meter of air for 1 minute will probably die if they do not receive medical treatment in time. This is the median lethal dosage (50) and is expressed as 70 mg-min/m3. For troops engaged in activities that in- crease their breathing rate, the median lethal dosage can be as low as 20 mg-min/m3. The median incapacitating dosage of GB vapor by inhalation is about 35 mg-min/m3 for troops engaged in mild activity. Incapacitating effects con- sist of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and difficulty with vision, followed by muscu- lar twitching, convulsions, and partial paralysis. Dosages of GB less than the median incapacitating dosage cause gen- eral lowering of efficiency, slower reac- tions, mental confusion, irritability, severe headache, lack of coordination, and dimness of vision due to pinpointing of the eye pupils. (2) Percutaneous effects. Percu- taneous effects refer to those effects produced by the absorption of the agent through the skin. GB vapor absorbed through the skin can produce incapaci- tating effects. Sufficient GB liquid ab- sorbed through the skin can produce incapacitation or death. The effectiveness of the liquid or vapor depends on the amount absorbed by the body. Absorption varies with the original amount of agent contamination, the skin area exposed and the exposure time, the amount and kind of clothing worn, and the rapidity in removing the contamination and /or con- taminated clothing and in decontaminating affected areas of the skin. (3) Maj or considerations in the employment of nerve agent GB. The em- ployment of GB is based primarily on achieving casualties by inhalation of the nonpersistent vapor (or aerosol) of the agent. Major considerations in the em- ployment of this agent are: (a) Time to incapacitate. The onset of incapacitation resulting from inhalation of casualty-producing doses is rapid, the average time being approx- imately 3 minutes. To allow for the time required for the agent cloud to reach the individual, 10 minutes is used as the mean time to achieve incapacita- tion. Nonlethal casualties from GB will be incapacitated for 1 to 5 days. (b) Persistency. Persistency is defined as the length of time an agent remains effective in the target area after dissemination. Nerve agent GB is con- sidered nonpersistent. GB clouds capable of producing significant casualties will dissipate within minutes after dissemina- tion. Some liquid GB will remain in chemical shell or bomb craters for peri- ods of time varying from hours to days, depending on the weather conditions and type of munition. Because of this con- tinuing but not readily discernible threat, GB can also be highly effective in har- assing roles by causing exposure to low concentrations of the vapor. Rounds fired sporadically may compel the enemy to wear protective masks and clothing for prolonged periods, thereby impairing his effectiveness as a result of fatigue, heat stress, discomfort, and decrease in per- ception. -7- (c) Level of protection. The weapon system requirements for positive neutralization of masked personnel by GB are too great to be supported except for important point or small area tar- gets. A major factor affecting casualties resulting from GB attacks of personnel equipped with masks but unmasked at the time of attack is the time required for enemy troops to mask after first de- tecting a chemical attack. Therefore, surprise dosage attack is used to estab- lish a dosage sufficient to produce the desired casualties before troops can mask. Casualty levels for surprise dos- age attack that are tabulated in the weap- on system effects tables (app A) are based on an assumed enemy masking time of 30 seconds. (Refer to FM 3-10 series manuals for operational data for masking times less than 30 seconds.) A total dosage attack is used to build up the dosage over an extended period of time and is normally employed against troops who have no protective masks available. Dosages built up before troops can mask inside foxholes, bunkers, tanks, buildings, and similar structures will generally be less than dosages attained during the same period of time in the open, thereby reducing the effects on occupants from surprise dosage attacks. Total dosage effects are essentially the same inside or outside. c. Nerve Agent VX. VX is a slow- acting, lethal, persistent agent that pro- duces casualties primarily by absorption of droplets through the skin. (1) Effects. VX acts on the nerve systems of man; interferes with breath- ing; and causes convulsions, paralysis, and death. (2) Maj o r considerations in the employment of nerve agent VX. (a) General. Agent VX dissemi- nated in droplet (liquid) form provides maximum duration of effectiveness as a lethal casualty threat. VX will remain effective in the target area for several days to a week depending on weather conditions. Because of its low volatility, there is no significant vapor hazard downwind of a contaminated area. Except when disseminated by aircraft spray tanks, meteorological conditions have little effect on the employment of VX, although strong winds may influence the distribution of the agent and heavy rain- fall may wash it away or dissipate it. (b) Employment to cause cas- ualties. Agent VX is appropriate for direct attack of area targets containing masked personnel in the open or in foxholes without overhead protection, for causing severe harassment by the con- tinuing casualty threat of agent droplets on the ground or on equipment, and for creating obstacles to traversing or occu- pying areas. Casualties produced by agent VX are delayed, occurring at times greater than 1 hour after exposure. Al- though this agent can be used relatively close to friendly forces, it should not be used on positions that are likely to be occupied by friendly forces within a few days. Because of this continuing hazard, areas in which agent VX has been used should be recorded in a manner similar to minefields or fallout areas so that necessary precautions can be taken. d. Blister Agent HP. HD, sometimes referred to as mustard, is a persistent slow-acting agent that produces casual- ties through both its vapor and liquid effects. (1) Vapor effects. (a) The initial disabling effect of HD vapor on unmasked troops will be injuries to the eyes. Temporary blind- ness can be caused by vapor dosages that are insufficient to produce respira- tory damage or skin burns. However, skin burns account for most injuries to masked troops. The vapor dosages and the time required to produce casualties (4 to 24 hours) vary with the atmospheric conditions of temperature and humidity and with the amount of moisture on the skin. Depending on their severity, skin burns can limit or entirely prevent movement of the limbs or of the entire body. •8- INVERSION NEUTRAL LAPSE J) WARMER AIR (Stable) COOLER AIR NO CHANGE (Moderately stable) NO CHANGE Increase in temperature with increase in altitude. Stable atmospheric conditions near the ground. Very little or no change in tempera- ture with increase in altitude. Moderate- ly stable atmospheric conditions near the ground. \\l// COOLER AIR f t (Unstable) ^ JJf WARMER AIR^ ^ j&Z Decrease in temperature with altitude. Unstable atmospheric condi tions near the ground. Figure 2. Temperature gradients. Surprise dosage GB attacks are influ- enced only slightly by the temperature gradient except when made with the spray tank. Downwind vapor hazards to both enemy and friendly forces will be most significant during inversion and neutral conditions. Employment of VX is not affected by the temperature gradient. Temperature gradients Time 1. Inversion From sunset to sunrise. 2. Neutral 2 hours before sunset to sunset, sunrise to 2 hours after sunrise, or any time windspeed is 15 kmph or greater* 3. Lapse 2 hours after sunrise to 2 hours before sunset. Figure 3. Estimated times that temperature gradients will prevail. (Use when meteorological data are not available.) (3) When actual or predicted mete- orological conditions are not available for a target analysis, 70* F is used for temperature, 9 kmph is used as wind- speed, and the temperature gradient is approximated from figure 3. d. Windspeed and Direction. (1) Air moving over the earth !s surface sets up eddies, or mechanical turbulences, that act to dissipate a chem- ical cloud. A condition of calm will limit the merging of the individual gas clouds. Both of these conditions may reduce the effectiveness of a chemical agent attack. High winds increase the rate of evaporation of HD and dissipate chemical clouds more rapidly than low winds. Moderate winds are desirable for chemical employment. Large -area non- persistent chemical attacks are most effective in winds not exceeding 28 kmph. Small-area nonpersistent chemical attacks with rockets or shell are most effective in winds not exceeding 9 kmph. However, if the concentration of chemical agent can be established quickly, the effects of high windspeed can be partially offset. -12- CHAPTER 4 EMPLOYMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 1. General a. Antipersonnel biological agents are micro-organisms that produce disease in man. These agents can be used to in- capacitate or kill enemy troops through disease. They may cause large numbers of casualties over vast areas and could require the enemy to use many personnel and great quantities of supplies and equipment to treat and handle the casual- ties. Many square kilometers can be effectively covered from a single air- craft or missile. The search capability of biological agent clouds and the rela- tively small dose required to cause in- fection among troops give biological munitions the capability of covering large areas where targets are not precisely located. b^. A biological attack can occur with- out warning since biological agents can be disseminated by relatively unobtrusive weapon systems functioning at a con- siderable distance from the target area and relying upon air movement to carry the agent to the target. c. Biological agents do not produce effects immediately. An incubation period is required from the time the agent enters the body until it produces disease. Some agents produce the desired casualty levels within a few days, whereas others may require more time to produce useful casualty levels. A variety of effects may be produced, varying from incapacitation with few deaths to a high percentage of deaths, depending on the type of agent. 2. Methods of Dissemination a. The basic method of disseminating antipersonnel biological agents is the generation of aerosols by explosive bomblets and spray devices. Because exposure to sunlight increases the rate at which most biological agent aerosols die and thereby reduces their area cov- erage, night is the preferable time for most biological attacks. However, if troop safety is a problem, an attack may be made near sunrise to reduce the distance downwind that a hazard to friendly forces will extend. Conversely, to extend the downwind cloud travel and the area coverage from spray attack, a biological agent may be employed soon after sundown. b. Missile -delivered Biological Munitions. Missile-delivered biological munitions are used for attack of large - area targets. A typical biological missile system consists of the following com- ponents: (1) A missile vehicle and its launching equipment. (2) A warhead that can be opened at a predetermined height to release biological bomblets over the target area. The warhead is shipped separately for assembly to a missile at the launching site. (3) A warhead shipping container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit. (4) Biological bomblets consisting of an agent container and a central burster that functions on impact. The bomblets have vanes that cause them to rotate in flight, thereby achieving lateral dispersion during their free fall and resulting in random distribution as a circular pattern. c . Aircraft Spray Tank. Biological agents released from an aircraft spray tank cover a large area downwind of the line of release. A typical spray tank consists of the following components: (1) An agent reservoir section that is shipped separately in an insulated shipping and storage container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit. (2) A discharge nozzle assembly that can be mechanically adjusted to vary the agent flow rate. 9PL8-2790-RETKUOJ -27- Table 1. Chemical Weapons Data 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Delivery system Range (meters) Agent Munition No of weapons per delivery unit Weapon rate of fire RT max (meters)1 2 Reference (table) Fire unit Total dosage Surprise dosage Casualty threat Casualty threat Min Max 10% 30% 10% 30% 4. 2- in mortar 180 4,500 HD Cartridge, M2A1 4/Plat 50 rd/3 min 105 rd/ 15 min 18 19 105-mm howitzer 11,100 GB Cartridge, M360 6/btry 5 rd/30 sec 30 rd/3 min 66 rd/15 min 1 btry3 200 100 100 50 2 3 lbn3 300 300 200 100 HD Cartridge, M60 18 19 155-mm howitzer 14,600 GB Projectile, M121 6/btry 2 rd/30 sec 12 rd/3 min 24 rd/15 min 1 btry3 300 200 100 0 4 5 lbn3 500 400 300 100 HD Projectile, MHO 18 19 VX4 Projectile, M121 1 btry3 400 200 NA NA 13 lbn3 500 400 8-in howitzer 16,800 GB VX4 Projectile, M426 4/btry 1 rd/30 sec 4 rd/3 min 10 rd/15 min 1 btry3 300 200 200 0 6 7 lbn3 500 400 300 100 1 btry3 400 200 NA NA 14 lbn3 500 400 115-mm multiple rocket launcher, M91 2,740 10,600 GB4 Rocket, M55 (THE BOLT) 45 rkt/lchr/15 sec llchr 1,000 750 500 200 8 3 Ichr 1,000 1,000 750 400 6 Ichr 1,000 1,000 1,000 750 9 Ichr 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 VX4 llchr 300 0 NA NA 15 3 Ichr 750 300 6 Ichr 1,000 400 9 Ichr 1,000 750 762-mm rocket, Honest John 8,500 38,000 GB4 Warhead, M190 (M139 bomblets) 2/btry 2 rkt/lchr/hr llchr 600 600 600 400 9 2 Ichr 600 600 600 400 Sergeant missile 46,000 139,000 GB4 Warhead, M212(M139 bomblets) 2/bn 2 msl/lchr/hr 1 msl 600 400 600 200 10 2 msl 600 600 600 400 Aircraft Dependent on type aircraft GB4 Bomb, MC-1, 750- lb Dependent on type aircraft 1 bomb 50 11 6 bombs 300 200 300 50 12 bombs 500 300 400 200 24 bombs 500 300 500 300 GB4 Spray tank, 100-gal 1 spray tank RT max =750 meters (one-half effective spray release line length) 12 2 spray tanks VX4 1 spray tank RT max=500 meters (one-half effective spray release line length) 16 BZ4 Bomb, 150- lb 17 Bomb, 700-lb RT max is largest target radius for which indicated casualty threat is tabulated for appropriate fire unit. Division of target into subtargets NOT considered. All windspeeds, temperature gradients, and protection categories considered. 3 RT max computed for maximum number of volleys for which data are tabulated. 4Weapon system capabilities derived from tables composed of hypothetical data for INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY at U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. For actual data, refer to FM 3-10. the -39- 105-MM HOW/GB BTRY FIRE Table 2. Estimated Fractional Casualty Threat From 105-mm Howitzer, GB Projectile, Battery Fire 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Target radius- radius of effect (meters) Range to target (km) No of volleys Windspeed3 4 kmph 9 kmph 28 kmph Surprise4 Total dose5 Surprise4 Total dose5 Surprise4 Total dose5 1 N L 1 N L 1 N L 50 <7.5 1 .10 .25 .20 .15 .10 .15 .10 .10 2 .20 .45 .40 .30 .15 .30 .25 .20 .10 .05 .05 3 .30 .60 .60 .35 .30 .50 .45 .30 .10 .20 .15 .10 4 .30 .75 .70 .45 .30 .55 .45 .35 .10 .25 .20 .10 5 .35 .90 .85 .55 .35 .60 .50 .40 .15 .30 .25 .15 >7.5 1 .05 .15 .15 .10 .05 .10 .05 .05 2 .15 .30 .25 .15 .10 .20 .15 .10 .05 .05 3 .15 .30 .30 .25 .10 .20 .20 .15 .10 .05 .05 4 .20 .40 .35 .25 .15 .30 .30 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 5 .25 .45 .45 .30 .25 .40 .35 .25 .10 .20 .20 .10 100 <7.5 1 .05 .15 .15 .10 .05 .10 .05 .05 2 .10 .30 .30 .15 .10 1.20 .15 .10 3 .15 .40 .35 .20 .15 .25 .25 .15 .05 .10 .05 4 .15 .40 .35 .30 .15 .30 .30 .15 .05 .10 .10 .05 5 .20 .45 .40 .35 .20 .35 .35 .20 .10 .15 .15 .10 >7.5 1 .05 .10 .10 .05 .05 .05 2 .10 .20 .20 .10 .05 .15 .10 .05 3 .10 .25 .25 .15 .10 .15 .15 .10 .05 .05 4 .10 .30 .25 .20 .10 .25 .20 .15 .10 .05 5 .15 _35 .30 .25 .15 .30 .25 .15 .05 .15 .10 .05 200 Any 1 .05 .05 2 .10 .10 .05 .05 .05 3 .05 .15 .15 .05 .10 .05 4 .05 .15 .15 .10 .10 .10 5 .05 .20 .20 .10 .05 .15 .10 .05 Blank spaces indicate fractional casualties are below 0.05. If the target is predominately wooded, use a windspeed of 4 kmph and neutral temperature gradient for total dose attack; use a windspeed of 4 kmph for surprise attack. 3 For wind speeds other than those shown, use data given for the nearest windspeed. 4 . Multiply the figures given in the table by the appropriate factor to obtain the fractional casualties from surprise dose attack: Troops in open foxholes: 0.7 Troops in covered foxholes or bunkers: 0.6 l = inversion, N = neutral, L = lapse. -40-