THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
The Effects
of
The Atomic Bomb
on
Hiroshima, Japan
Volume I
Physical Damage Division
May 1947
G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE
1 . Conditions Prior to Attack
The city of Hiroshima was an excellent target
for the atomic bomb from a fire standpoint : There
had been no rain for three weeks; the city was
highly combustible, consisting principally of Japa-
nese domestic-type structures: it was constructed
over flat terrain; and 13 square miles (including
streets) of the 26.5-squarc-milc city was more
than 5 percent built up (i. e., covered by plan
ansa of buildings). The remainder of the city
comprised water areas, parks and areas built up
below 6 percent. Sixty-eight percent of the 13-
square-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built up
and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly
dense, 03.0 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent
built up.
a. Fire Department. Public fire equipment had
been little improved in anticipation of wartime
fires. Private fire equipment had been aug-
mented somewhat but instruction to home occu-
pants in its use had been limited to training in
combating incendiary bombs.
13
EAST ELEVATION
NORTH ELEVATION
*.«■ i 4.* i te.tr , ss
*r.cr
jatft".
, tf-8* .
*— 4 6 1— =1 rfc-r^TOrr*-
5^
A±S>1
_..._ *.t
FIRST • FLOOR PLAN
US STRATEGIC BOMBW6 SURVEY
TWO-STORY JAPANESE
RESIDENCE
FIGURE 6
a. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible
structures and materials by heat directly radiated
by the atomic bomb and by other ignition sources
developed the following: (1) The primary lire haz-
ard was present in combustible materials and iti
fire-resistive buildings with unshielded wall open-
ings; (2) six persons who had been in rcinforced-
concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero
stated that black cotton black-out curtains were
ignited by radiant heat; (3) a few persons stated
that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched
roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immedi-
ately after the explosion; (4) dark clothing was
scorched, and, in some cases, reported to have
burst into flame from flash heat; (5) but a large
proportion of over 1 ,000 persons questioned was in
agreement that a great majority of the original
fires was started by debris falling on kitchen char-
coal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric
short circuits.
ft. Hundreds of fires were reported to have
started in the center of the city within ten minutes
after the explosion. Of the total number of
buildingB investigated 107 caught fire, and, in 69
instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of
the buildings or their contents was established as
follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the
bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources
and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposing buildings.
14
0. Damage to /tolling Stock. Of the 123 trolley
can operated by the company, 20 percent were
damaged by fire and 45 percent by blast. Of the
86 motor busses, fire damaged 21 percent and
blast 26 percent. Radiant heat from the bomb
ignited cam and busses within 1, 500 feet of GZ.
Total damage to cars extended a maximum of
5,700 feet from GZ, heavy damage to 8,400 feet
and alight damage to 12,500 feet. Musses wen*
totally damaged at 4,000 feet and heavily damaged
5,600 feet from GZ.
d. Damage to Orerhead Sy*teut. Blast and fire
damaged 11.4 miles of the overhead transmission
system including damage to 500 wood and 100
steel poles. No damage occurred to concrete
poles, the nearest of which were 6.000 feet from
GZ. Wood poles wen* damaged at a maximum
distance of 4,500 feet from GZ, and steel poles at
3,600 feet. Overhead transmission cable was
downed by blast at 8,000 feet.
21
3. Conditions on Morning of Attack
a. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with
a small amount of clouds at high altitude*. Wind
was from the south with a velocity of ahout 4\*
miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles.
6. Ail air-raid "alert" was sounded throughout
Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours. Reports of
the number of planes causing this alert were con-
flicting. The governor of the prefecture stated
that four B-29s were sighted, while the Kure Naval
District reported three large planes.
c. The aircraft apparently came out over
Hiroshima from the direction of Bungo Suido and
Kunisaki Peninsula, circled the city, and withdrew
in the direction of Harima-Nada at 0725 hour*.
"All-clear" was sounded at 0731 hours.
d. The following circumstances account in part
for the high number of casualties resulting from
the, atomic bomb:
(1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid
shelters after the "all-clear" sounded.
(2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the
approach of the planes involved in the atomic-
bomb attack.
(3) The explosion occurred during the morning
rush hours when people had just arrived at work
or were hurrying to their places of business. This
concentrated the population in the center of the
city where the principal business district was
located.
(4) Many persons residing outside the city were
present for reasons of business, travel and pleasure*.
(5) National volunteer and school units were
mobilized and engaged in evacuation operations.
84
THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
The Effects
of
The Atomic Bomb
on
Hiroshima, Japan
Volume II
Physical Damage Division
Dates of Survey:
14 October-26 November 1945
Date of Publication
May 1947
A. OHKT OF STUDY
The object of this fire stu4y was to determine
the exten t of fire i n Hiwishfma resulting from the
exptosion of the atomic bomb on 6 August 1946,
end to analyxe the contributing factors.
B. SUMMARY
This section presents a picture of factors pertain-
ing to fire in Hiroshima before, during and after
the atomic-bomb attack. Part C describes fire con-
ditions prior to the attack and analyses the effec-
tiveness of precautionary fire measures; Part D
relates the story of the fire; Part E presents a
detailed analysis of fire in selected fire-resistive,
noncombustible, and combustible buildings, and
their contents; Part P discusses the cause and
extent of fire in bridges; and Part G present con-
clusions and recommendations.
1. The city of Hiroshima, like other Japanese
cities, was poorly prepared to combat a conflagra-
tion of large-scale proportions. Private fire equip-
ment had been augmented and home occupants
had been given limited instructions and training in
combatting incendiary bombs. Public fire equip-
ment had been little improved to fight wartime
fires.
2. The public water system was fairly adequate
for normal fire conditions, although pressure was
very low on dead-end mains at the south end of the
city. No improvements had been made for war-
time emergencies.
3. The Ota River and its six branches divided the
city into nine distinct areas. The river courses
and 41,000 feet of firebreak lanes which had been
prepared by removing combustible buildings on
one or both sides of fairly wide streets formed an
extensive network of firebreaks.
4. The city, consisting principally of Japanese do-
mestic structures, was highly combustible and
densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13-
square-mile city area was 27 to 42 percent built up
and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly
dense, 94 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built
up. All the large industrial plants were loca ted on
the south and southeast edges of the city.
5. Precautionary fire measures were ineffective
largely because widespread damage was caused by
blast, the populace suffered severe casualties,
innumerable fires were started throughout the city
on both sides of natural and man-made firebreaks,
and the public fire department sustained almost a
6. One major break occurred in a 16-inch water
main when Bridge 29 which carried it was col-
lapsed by blast This and a large number of
breaks in small pipes above ground in cottapaed
buildings reduced water pressure in the system,
but the reservoir never ran dry and lack of water
was not a factor in the extent of the fire.
7. The temperature resulting from the explosion
of the atomic bomb was of great intensity but of
extremely short duration. At ground zero, 2,000
feet from the center of heat, the temperature
probably exceeded 3,500° C. for a fraction of a
second. Only directly exposed surfaces were
flash burned.
8. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible
structures and materials by directly radiated heat
from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources
was obtained by interrogation and visual inspec-
tion of the entire city. Six persons who had been
in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet
of air zero stated that black cotton black-out
curtains were ignited by flash heat. A few persons
stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs,
thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were
afire immediately after the explosion. Dark
clothing was scorched and, in some cases, was
reported to have burst into flame from flash heat.
A large proportion of over 1,000 persons ques-
tioned was, however, in agreement that a great
majority of the original fires were started by debris
falling on kitchen charcoal fires. Other sources of
secondary fire were industrial-process fires and
electric short circuits.
9. There had been practically no rain in the city
for about 3 weeks. The velocity of the wind on
the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not
more than 5 miles per hour. A fire storm, includ-
ing both wind and rain, began to develop soon
after the start of the initial fires. The fire wind,
which blew always toward the burning area,
reached a maximum velocity of 30 to 40 miles per
hour 2 to 3 hours after the explosion, and inter-
mittently light and heavy rain fell over the1 north
and west portions of the city.
10. Hundreds of fires were reported to have
started in the center of the city within 10 minutes
after the explosion.
■I f| ?! spilt1"
5s 8= 9? ±! |
H
CO
o
H
8
'<
D. THE CONFLAGRATION
1. Start of Fir*
a. Source of Evidence. Because of the practi-
cally total combustion which prevailed in the
burned-over area of 4.4 square miles in the heart
of the city, most of the evidence relative to igni-
tion by radiant heat from the bomb and secondary
sources of heat was necessarily obtained by inter-
rogation which, wherever possible, was checked by
field inspection. Also, since the heaviest casual-
ties occurred closer in, a majority of the persons
questioned were 3,000 feet or more from ground
zero (GZ) at the time of the explosion. Most
people who had been within 2,000 feet of GZ
(2,800 feet from air zero) were utterly confused as
to what had happened immediately after the
detonation and for some time thereafter, although
several were located who could give reasonably
coherent stories. Because the distance of a point
on the ground from air zero (AZ) was important
from an ignition standpoint and the distance from
GZ was' important from a fire spread standpoint,
the relationship between the two has been shown
on Figure 2.
b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. (1) Six
persons were found who bad been in rein forced-
concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of AZ at the
time of the explosion and who stated that black
cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few sec-
onds later. In two cases it was stated that thin
rice paper on desks close to open windows facing
AZ also burst into flame immediately, although
heavier paper did not ignite. No incidents were
recounted to the effect that furniture or similar
objects within buildings were ignited directly by
radiated heat from the bomb.
(2) Straw-thatched roofs were illegal within the
city limits, but a number were erected outside. A
few persons stated that they had seen 'this type of
roof burst into flame directly from heat radiated
by the bomb but the stories were inconsistent ex-
cept in two instances where the persons could
point to specific building sites. Both of these
locations were almost due north of AZ, the first
approximately 12,700 feet and the second approxi-
mately 13,900 feet. Despite the strong eyewitness
accounts of the persons interrogated, there is con-
siderable doubt in the minds of the investigators
that these buldings were ignited directly by radi-
ated heat from the bomb. This doubt is predi-
cated chiefly upon three considerations, namely: (I)
Buildings, including many with straw-thatched
roofs 3,200 feet nearer AZ (1 0,700 feet) , suffered no
fire damage; (2) fanners working in an open field
only 800 feet beyond (14,700 feet) suffered no
burns of any kind although they felt a wave of
warm air pass over them almost simultaneously
with the sound of the explosion; and (3) the roofs
of these buildings collapsed as a result of the blast
and may have been ignited by charcoal braziers.
(3) One dwelling which had a cedarbark-shingle
covering that was reported ignited by the flash
heat from the bomb was found approximately
6,700 feet northeast from AZ and slightly over 200
feet beyond the fringe of the burned-over area.
This house was of the frame and stucco type com-
mon to the area and was one of several forming a
small group within an enclosure formed by an 8-
foot masonry and wood wall. All houses within
the enclosure had tile-covered roofs, but one of the
group also had a small section covered with highly
inflammable cedarbark shingles which showed fire
damage, although the fire had been extinguished
before the entire roof was consumed (Photos 28
and 29). The owners of the property, including
a son who was a university graduate, insisted that
the roof covering burst into flame immediately
with the bomb explosion. Their story could not
be shaken. - The chief of the fire department
stated that he had heard of two or three cases
where the cedarbark-covered roofs, also not
permitted within the city limits, had been ignited
directly by the bomb, and thought the reports
credible. A number of buildings with unburncd
cedarbark roof shingles were found at a rayon
plant approximately 11,000 feet southwest from
AZ.
(4) About 600 feet east of the dwelling described
above and about 365 feet from the nearest burned
building, a wood pole which had apparently car-
ried electric wires, probably 220 volts AC, was
found with 3 to 4 feet of its top burned off and
rather heavy flash bums on the side facing AZ
(Photo 30). Several residents of the area stated
that this pole had been seen burning about 5 or 10
minutes after the bomb explosion. It is entirely
possible that ignition of this pole was caused
directly by heat radiation from the bomb^AThe
pole was capped with a light steel plate of dark
color and it may be that the steel absorbed suf-
ficient heat and retained it long enough to ignite
dry rot which probably was present under the
metal cap. An attempt to determine from utility
company records whether or not the pole had been
burned previously was unsuccessful. Many wood
21
poles within the fire perimeter were burned, but it
ui impassible to state with certainty whether the
source of ignition was direct heat from the bomb
or heat and flying embers from nearby buildings.
Other evidence, however, leads to the conclusion
that exposed wood was seldom ignited by radiated
heat from the bomb.
(5) A cemetery about 2,500 feet from AZ was
found cluttered with pieces of very light wood
(excellent kindling) which showed no evidence of
flash or other bums (Photo 31). It is believed
that this debris must have been blown by the
blast from the interior or other unexposed portions
of structures and this accounts for the lack of
flash-burn marks. It is interesting that none of
this material was ignited by flying embers, as it
was very close to the center of the burned-over
area of the city. Photos 32 and 33 also show
un burned combustible buildings at 3,800 and
5,000 feet from AZ.
(6) One of the graves in the cemetery was en-
closed with a wood fence. The fence was com-
posed of four corner poles extending about 30
inches above the ground and supporting two
horizontal pieces, about 12 inches apart. Bamboo
pickets (about IX by %«-inch) were lashed to the
fence with vegetable-fibre rope. The corner
poles showed deep charring which later proved to
have been done according to Japanese custom
when they were erected. The horizontal pieces
apparently were not charred, but when the lashing
for the pickets was removed very definite evidence
of flash-burn showed. The bamboo pickets showed
light flash-burn marks. The rope lashing for
the pickets showed no evidence of having been on
fire, but was singed.
(7) At the Red Cross Hospital, 5,300 feet south
from AZ, three chairs with backs and seats up-
holstered with a pile fabric (apparently mohair)
were near a window which was exposed to AZ.
The backs of the chairs showed moderate to deep
singeing except for the lower part which had been
shielded by the concrete wall and showed no dis-
coloration. Parts of the seats of the chairs showed
light flash-burns where the seats had not been
shielded by the chair backs. No part of the up-
holstery was burned through (Photo 34). Next to
the chairs was a varnished wood door which showed
definite evidence of flash- burn except for a very
small spot adjacent to the door knob which
shielded it. The door did not catch fire (Photo 35) .
A cotton jacket worn by one of the nurses was
charred across one breast. The outer material of
the jacket was burned away in part, but the
padded cotton lining directly underneath was not
burned through (Photo 35). The nurse who had
worn the jacket was severely injured by the blast
and was not available for questioning. It was
stated that her body was not burned through the
coat. Testimony at the hospital indicated that
several coats had burned similarly, but the others
could not be produced for examination. Further-
more, nobody at the hospital was certain that
these coats had actually burst into flame, and, in
fact, the concensus was that they had only
smoldered. There was no other evidence of fire
in the hospital.
(8) Scores of persons throughout all sections of
the city were questioned concerning the ignition
of clothing by the flash from the bomb. Replies
were consistent that white silk seldom was af-
fected, although black, and some other colored
silk, charred and disintegrated. Numerous in-
stances were reported in which designs in black or
other dark colors on a white silk kimono were
charred so that they fell out, but the white part
was not affected. These statements were con-
firmed by United States medical officers who had
been able to examine a number of kimonos avail-
able in a hospital. Ten school boys were located
during the study who had been in school yards
about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, re-
spectively, from AZ. These boys had flash burns
on the portions of their faces which had been
directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys'
stories were consistent to the effect that their
clothing, apparently of cotton materials,
"smoked," but did not burst into flame. Photo
36 shows a boy's coat that started to smolder from
heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ.
(9) Three automobile trucks, powered with
internal combustion motors using fuel generated
by burning charcoal (no gasoline or similar
volatiles used), which were parked in a clearing
about 7,800 feet north from AZ were said to have
been ignited immediately after the bomb ex-
plosion. Fire damage to the vehicles was total.
Conversely, however, a sedan showing no fire
damage1 was examined where it had been aban-
doned as a result of severe blast damage on a wide
street about 5,800 feet southeast from AZ.
(10) A private garden covering an area of
slightly over 5 acres and located about 5.000 feet
northeast from AZ showed no evidence of having
been on fire, although there was some flash-burn
damage on the edge of the area facing AZ.
24
PHOTO 3ft IX. S*tmw« partly Inirnvri cvat «»f •-> alio
«ra» in of*rti near CUy Hall (BitUfttiw 38) 3.800 feci
fiom AZ.
3800 feet from air zero;
-27~ 3300 feet from ground zero
PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD
IN
VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF BUILT- UPNESS
O
s.
I
1
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
— * s
/
/
/
/
/
Ind
Bu
ustriol
Idings^
■®
•
Dome
Buildii
Stic
igs
.
/
S
/
/
/
/
1
t
1
1
10
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
100
Probability of Fire Spreod- Percent
U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
FIRE SPREAD VS. BU1LT-UPNESS
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
FIGURE 4 -IT
42
130
120
110
100
90
S 80
l TO
o
60
50
40
90
to
10
PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD
ACROSS
VARIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES
10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80
Probability of Fire Spread- Percent
90 100
U. S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
FIRE SPREAD VS. EXPOSURE OSTANCES
HIROSHWA, JAPAN
FIGURE 5 *JX
*:'.
Table 5- — Fire-resistive building data (fire)
4H
411
5H
50
5H
5H
5H
511
511
5H
511
5H
5H
5H
511
5H
5U
5H
AH
OH
611
fill
fill
6H
6H
611
6H
«H
6H
5H
51
5H
5H
511
5H
5H
6H
511
51
51
51
51
51
<
I
3,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2100
2,100
2,100
2,200
2,200
2,200
2,300
2,300
2,300
2,400
2.400
3,000
3,100
3.800
5,300
5,100
6,200
5.000
4,700
5,000
5,200
5,300
5,600
2,900
3,200
3,200
2,600
2,800
2,700
2,700
3,100
3.300
3,600
3,600
3.700
4.500
4,000
700
800
600
600
600
600
600
700
700
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,300
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
2,300
2400
3,300
4,900
4,700
4,800
4,600
4,200
4,600
4,800
4,900
5,300
2,100
2.500
2,500
1,700
2000
1,800
1,800
2300
2600
3,000
3,000
3,200
4,100
3,400
51
4,100
3,000
31
5,300
4,900
31
5.300
4,950
3H
5.000
4,600
3H
6,300
6,000
SO
6,200
5,900
30
6,100
5,800
4G
3,800
3,300
50
2,800
2,000
fiO
2,500
1,800
4G
2,300
1,200
5Q
2,000
400
SO
2,100
800
SO
2,600
1,700
71
7,700
7,400
5J
6,700
6,400
30
6,000
5,600
60
5,700
5.400
5J
6,200
5,900
4J
6,300
6.000
5J
6,800
6,500
Occupancy
Fire
shutters
on wall
open-
ings
Office
do..
do
Bank
do...
Office
do...
do
do
Bank
do
Office
Bank
Office
do
Bank
Art museum
Office
Library
Office
Hospital
Classrooms
Library
Classrooms-laboratories.
Classrooms.
Laboratory
Kitchen
Laboratory
Office
. ...do
...do ,
Department store
Classrooms
Telephone exchange
Department store
Bank
Beer hall
Hospital
Office
Newspaper plant
Bank
Office
No...
No-
Yes..
Yes..
Yes..
Yes..
Yes..
No ...
No...
Part..
Yes..
Part..
Yes..
Part..
No...
Yes..
Part..
Part..
Part..
No...
No...
No ....
Yes..
No...
No
No....
No....
No...
Part..
No....
No..
No_.
Part
Yes.
Yes.
No..
No..
Part.
No ..
Part.
Part
Radio station ! No...
No..
No..
No..
Yes-
No...
Yes..
Yes-
Yes..
No...
Yes..
No...
No...
No...
Yes..
No...
Yes..
No...
Yes-
No...
Residence
Hospital
Office
Monitions storage
Electrical laboratory. . .
Warehouse
do
Telephone exchange
Classrooms
Warehouse
Classrooms ...
Clothing store
Office
Warehouse
Cigarette manufacture. .
Bank
do...
Warehouse
Mercantile
Office Yes
Bank.
Unprotected
wall openings
exposed to
AZ at zero
hour
Part Yea
Yes
Yes
Probably no .
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes...
Yes
Probably no.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes...
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes...
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes..
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Probably no..
Probably bo..
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Probably no..
Yes
Probably no...
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Probable
cause of
initial
ignition
0
20
10
6
10
10
10
30
10
10
20
10
15
10
10
25
10
10
25
50
75
26
5
30
30
12
0
6
90
20
10
50
20
35
5
0
20
6
90
40
30
15
0
30
30
125
30
0
6
125
126
0
30
10
0
5
60
5
12
0
0
60
100
Fire spread.
do
do.
do
do
Fire spread.
Primary...
Primary.
Fire spread...
Primary.
Secondary.
Fire spread
{Primary.
Fire spread...
Primary..
Fire spread....
Primary ....
Fire spread.
No fire
Fire spread.
do
do
Secondary..
No fire
Fire spread-
Fire spread .
No fire
Fire spread.
No Are
Fire spread.
—do
.—do
No fire
Fire spread...
No fire
Fire spread ...
....do
Secondary
Fire spread. ...
....do
—do
—do
—do
—do
Primary
....do
B-2
B-3
B-3
2
3
B-3
2
3
B-3
B-5
B-4
3
2
4
B-7
B-3
2
B-5
4
B-4
B-3
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
B-4
B-3
4
B-7
B-3
3
3
3
B-3
2
7
3
B-3
B-3
2
2
B-2
4
1
B-2
1
3
2
B-3
B-3
2
2
1
2
B-2
B-l
4
3
B-2
Stories burned (after
blast damage)
1-2
60% B, 100% 1-3- -
70% B, 100% 1-3. ..
1-2
1-3
1-3
1-2...
1-3
B-3
B-5
75% 1-2, 100% 3-4.
1-3
1-2—
1-4
1-7
5% 2, 100% 3
1-2
40% B, 100% 1-5...
1-4
80% B-l, 100% 2-4.
None
1-2
1-2
1-3
1-3
1
None
1-2..
None..
B-3
1-4
B-7
75% B, 100% 1-3 ...
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-2
1-7
1-3.
15% B, 100% 1-3 . .
None..
1-2
1-2
Second only
50% 1-3, 90% 4
None
70% B-l, 100% 2...
1
1-2.
26% second only ... .
None
1-2
B-3
1-3
1-2
1-2
None
None..
None..
B-l
1-4
80% 1,100% 2-3
Areas in
thousands
square feet
4.2
27.3
16.6
5.7
9.0
4.9
2.5
9.8
15.8
46.4
29.9
4.5
7.3
20.4
43.3
32.8
5.4
62.0
13.4
93.4
88.6
2.8
3.7
103.3
39.5
2.0
3.0
3.8
62.6
10.4
32.0
78.9
26.4
36.1
4.3
8.0
15.3
2.9
14.7
24.5
26.7
16.2
8.3
2.2
15.9
83.4
1.7
13.2
15.9
14.4
14.2
11.5
2.9
49.5
12.4
3.0
4.3
54.6
5.1
16.2
15.0
3.0
4.8
None I 9.0
a
1
3.5
24.3
15.3
5.7
9.0
4.2
2.5
9.8
18.8
46.4
25.2
4.5
7.3
20.4
39.0
5.2
5.4
46.5
13.4
84.9
0
2.8
3.7
103.3
39.5
2.0
3.0
3.8
0
10.4
32.0
78.9
25.1
36.1
4.3
8.0
13.2
2.9
14.7
24.5
19.2
0
8.3
2.2
5.3
80.0
0
10.6
15.9
14.4
1.1
0
2.9
49.6
9.3
3.0
4.3
0
0
0
15.0
3.0
4.5
0
83
89
92
100
100
86
100
100
100
100
84
100
100
100
90
16
100
88
100
91
0
100
100
100
100
100
0
100
0
100
100
100
95
100
100
100
86
100
100
100
72
100
100
33
60
0
80
100
100
8
0
100
100
75
100
100
0
0
0
100
100
94
0
SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan,"
vol. 2 Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3
had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes.
(4) It was reported that a cotton black-out
curtain at an unprotected window in the east stair
tower of Building 85 (3,800 feet from AZ) smoked
and was scorched by radiated heat from the bomb
but it did not burst into flames. All windows
other than those in the stair tower were pro-
tected by* closed steel-roller shutters. There was
fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the
second story but this was caused by electrical
short circuits when debris from windows was
blown into the equipment by blast.
(5) A man who was in the third story of building
26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiated heat
from the bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at
unprotected windows in the west wall and thin
rice paper on desks. According to his recollec-
tion, all stories were afire five minutes after the
attack. On the other hand, two men who were
working in Building 28 (3,800 feet from AZ) stated
that there was no primary fire in this building, the
windows of which were not equipped with fire
shutters. Black-out curtains at all windows were
drawn back and no fires started in them. Accord-
ing to the same men, fire spread into the building
by flying brands from the south nearly two hours
after the attack.
47
(10) Fire fighting with water buckets was re-
ported inside only four buildings (24, 33, 59, and 122)
and probably prevented extensive fire damage in
them. In Building 24, fire was started in contents
of a room at the southwest corner of the second
story by sparks from trees on the south side about
1 H hours after the attack. Men inside the building
extinguished the fire and probably prevented
further damage in the first and second stories
(Photo 85). A little later, contents in the third
story were ignited by sparks from the outside and
were totally damaged. This fire was beyond
control before it was discovered, but did not
spread downward through open stairs. At Build-
ing 33, sparks from the west exposure, which
burned in early evening, set fire to black-out
curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in
the fourth story of the northwest section of the
building. Twenty persons were on guard in the
building awaiting such an occurrence and the
fires were quickly extinguished while in the
incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks from the
south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in
the first and third stories and black-out curtains
in the first story about 2 hours after the attack.
These fires were extinguished by men inside ami
negligible damage resulted. A few window frames
in the east and west walls and 2 or 3 desks in the
first story of Building 122 were ignited by radiated
heat and sparks from the west and northeast
exposures. These fires were extinguished quickly
and damage was negligible.
58
A. SUMMARY
1 . The atomic bomb detonated at Hiroshima was
an extremely effective and powerful blast weapon.
Blast effect was essentially similar to that pro-
duced by a large charge of high explosive except
that it was on a much larger scale; thus, damage
was characterized by distortion or crushing of
entire buildings rather than collapse of a single
truss or rupture of a single wall.
2* Usual blast phenomena such as shielding, re-
flection, and diffraction were observed. The
positive phase of the blast of the atomic bomb is
believed to have been of comparatively longer
duration that that of high explosives.
3. The primary cause of damage to buildings was
blast. In many instances the fire which swept the
central portion of the city increased distortion of
the building frames, and consumed the combus-
tible contents and interior trim and finish of most
of the fire-resistive buildings located within the
burned-over area. Blast damage to wood-frame
buildings extended well beyond the limits of the
burned-over area and it is probable that all wood-
frame structures within the burned-over area
suffered structural damage initially by blast.
4. The mean areas of effectiveness (MAE) of the
atomic bomb for structural damage about ground
zero (GZ) and the radii of the MAE's for the
several classes of buildings present wore computed
to be as follows:
MAE's
in square
miles
Radii of
MAE's
in feet
Multistory, earthquake-resistant _
Multistory, steel- and reinforced-
concrete frame (including both
earthquake- and non-earthquake-
resistant construction) _
0.03
.05
3.4
3.6
6.0
8.5
9.5
6.0
500
700
1-story, light, steel-frame
5,500
Multistory, load-bearing, brick-walk.
1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall
Wood-frame industrial-commercial
(dimension-timber construction)
Wood-frame domestic buildings
(wood-pole construction)
5,700
7,300
8,700
9,200
Residential construction
7,300
Of the values listed above, those for wood-frame
and residential construction are peculiar to Japan
and are not applicable to any other locality.
5. MAE's for similar, high, air-burst atomic
bombs against Occidental construction were esti-
mated to be approximately:
BfmnmOn
Multistory, steel- and rein forced-concrete- a 06
Very light, steel-frame one-story, low-cost
industrial and storage 3.4
Multistory, load-bearing, brick wall 3. 6
One-story, load-bearing, brick wall 6 0
MAE values against other types of Occidental
construction, including moderate to heavy, steel-
frame, industrial construction, could not be esti-
mated because buildings of comparable construc-
tion were not present in Hiroshima.
6. Fire was the principal cause of damage to
contents. In multistory frame construction fire
caused the major part of all contents' damage,
suffering only slight to moderate initial damage
from blast and debris. Contents in light, steel-
frame buildings suffered moderate initial damage
from blast and, subsequently, in the burned-over
area, almost total damage by fire. Outside the
burned-over area there was some exposure damage.
Blast and debris were the major causes of damage
to contents of brick buildings, additional damage
resulting from fire and exposure. Throughout
the burned-over area practically all contents of
wood-frame buildings were destroyed by fire.
Beyond the limits of the fire there was slight to
moderate damage to contents from blast, debris,
and exposure.
7. Except for multistory, steel- and concrete-
frame buildings, contents and structural damage to
buildings were generally of similar extent at
corresponding distances from air zero (AZ).
8. Had the bomb detonated at a somewhat lower
altitude, damage to multistory, steel- and rein-
forced-concrete frame buildings which were clus-
tered relatively near GZ probably would have been
greater. The effect of such an explosion upon the
extent of damage to other classes of buildings is
uncertain, but probably would not have been great.
9. Comparison of the atomic bomb with high-
explosive weapons results, at best, in very rough
approximations because of the assumptions neces-
sary. Based upon damage to load-bearing, brick-
wall structures, an equivalent bare charge of ap-
proximately 4,400 tons of TNT was estimated.
10. Because of the large area through which
damage extended, particularly to load-bearing
brick construction which constitutes a large pro-
portion of the residential and older industrial sec-
tions of occidental cities, the air-burst atomic
96
Table 1. — Building data, steel- and reinforced-concrete-frame
[Areas in thousands of square feet]
O
Occupancy
i
j
1
00
>
i
M
SB
|
n
>
1
2
1
<
s
i
I
a
o
Building damage— floor area
Content damage
$
Structural damage
Superficial
damage
1
i
a
a
1
ft*
1
1
m
hi
o
1
4H
4H
3H
8H
6H
6H
3H
8H
6H
8H
5H
5H
6H
6H
3H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
8H
31
8H
8H
8H
3H
5B
51
51
51
81
31
51
31
31
an
so
40
5G
4G
SO
7J
7J
7J
7J
3J
5H
3H
&H
5H
511
SO
50
SO
4J
3H
3G
71
n
5K
5K
Office
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
El
E2
E2
E2
E2
E2
E2
E2
E2
El
A24
A2 4
A1.2
A1.2
A24
A1.2
1.7
8,3
5.1
5.3
2.1
4.6
10.1
8.8
1.5
5.5
4.7
5.4
10.fi
0.2
5.3
21.3
27.5
1.4
1.0
34.4
13.2
11.2
26
15.5
0.0
7.2
16.3
2.6
4.8
2.1
10.3
0.0
4.8
4.2
1.1
68
20.8
6.6
7.7
4.8
8.8
124
4.1
23.7
23.7
23.7
23.7
26
4.5
1.6
3.3
.0
1.3
1.8
1.5
22
0.0
1.7
15.0
54.6
54.0
21.1
11.6
2
2/3
3
1/3
2/3
3
5/2
4
3
1/2
4
7
3
3
2/4
4
3/4
2
2
3
3
4
3
3/4
7
3
2/3
1/3
3
7
2/3
1/3
2/3
2
2
2
4
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1/2
1
1
1
1
1
1
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-l
V-3
V-3
V-3
v-s
\-3
V-3
V-3
V-3
V^3
V-4
V-4
V-i
V-4
V-l
V-4
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
N/R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
N
R
N/C
R
R
R
R
N/C
R
R
R
R
R
R
2100
2200
2100
2100
2>0Q
2100
2200
2200
2 200
2300
2300
2300
2400
3,000
3,100
3.800
5,300
5,100
5,200
5,000
4,700
5,600
2000
2200
3,200
2600
2800
2700
3.100
2600
3,600
3,700
4.500
4.000
4,100
5.300
5.300
6,300
6,100
3.800
2800
2300
2000
8.800
8. COO
0.000
0,200
6.700
2100
3,100
2400
2800
3,300
2500
2100
2600
6,600
5,000
6,200
7,700
7,800
8,000
0.000
4.2
27.3
16.6
0.0
4.0
0.8
45.0
20.0
4.6
7.3
20.4
43.3
328
520
12 4
03.4
88.6
28
27
103.3
30.3
626
10.4
320
78,0
26.4
36.1
4.3
15.3
14.7
24.5
26.7
16.2
8.3
22
15.0
83.4
12 2
14.4
14.2
11.0
40.5
12 4
71.1
71.1
71.1
71.1
5.1
15.8
4.1
5.4
1.0
20
20
3.0
4.3
14.0
1.7
15.0
54.6
54.9
21.1
11.6
1.8
1.1
5.3
10
21
1.9
27
.1
.1.7
1.6
4.6
3 5
24.3
15.3
9.0
4.2
9.8
46,4
25.2
4.5
7.3
20.4
39.0
5.2
46.5
124
84.0
0
28
27
102 3
30.5
0
10.4
320
78,0
25.1
36.1
4.3
12 2
14.7
24.5
10.2
0
23
22
5.3
50.0
10.6
14.4
1.1
0
40.5
0.3
0
0
0
0
0
15.8
25
5.4
1.0
20
20
20
4.3
14.0
0
15.0
0
0
0
0
00
00
05
100
00
100
100
00
100
100
100
90
30
00
100
06
25
100
100
100
100
15
100
100
100
96
100
100
80
100
100
80
10
100
100
40
70
80
100
50
30
100
75
0
0
0
0
0
100
50
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
10
100
0
0
0
0
Fire.
2
do
Do.
«
8
do
Bank
Do.
Do.
»
Office
Do.
11
do
Bank
Do.
18
Do.
10
do..
Office.
Do.
20
Do.
21
Bank
Mixed.
22
Office
21
Fire.
28
do
Bank
D->.
24
Mixed.
2«
Office
.2
Fire.
27
Library
0.8
Do.
2B
Office....
Do.
XI
Hospital
Debris.
32A
Classrooms
Fire.
S2B
Library
Classroom laboratory .
Classrooms
Do.
S2D
Do.
32E
Do.
S3
Office
Blast 'de-
38
do.-
do
bris.
Fire.
SB
4.4
Do.
40
Department store
Classrooms
Do.
41
Do.
48
Telephone eichange. . .
Department store
Beerhall ...
•
Do.
44
1.7
Do.
47
Do.
40
Office
Do.
80
Newspaper
Do.
31
Bank
Office
Do.
30
Blast.
01
Radio station
Fire.
02
Residence
Do.
64
Hospital
Mixed.
65
Office
Do.
74
Electrical laboratory . . .
Warehouse
Fire.
70
0.9
23
Do.
88
Telephone exchange. .
Classrooms
Mixed.
80
Debris.
08
do
Clothing store
0.5
29
3.0
Fire.
08
Do.
116A
Warehouse
116B
use
do
do
U6P
do
122
Bank
12
Office
10 8
0.7
4.1
21
Mixed.
1A
Electric substation
Art museum
Do.
25
as
1.0
Fire.
4si
Blown in.
Iti-mnrks
X
K
S
w
i.v
20'
No
No
No
No
Yes
y«
Yes
Yes
CAUSE OF
FIRE: Fire
Probably
PROBABLE
exposures.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:
elevator.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area:
feet. Floor area burned: lo,300 square feet. 92 |>cr-
cent (after blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire in entire building except about 30
percent of basement.
spread from
up stairs and
16,000 square
l.VJ
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOS DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALY8IS
Shkkt No. 1
Building No.: 10 Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ):
000, (AS): 2,100.
NAME: Nippon life Insurance Co., Hiroshima brancn,
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Load-bearing brick wall.
Number of stories: See drawing. JTG class: F2.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete slab 6 inch (Ji-inch ban 6-inch
oe by 12 inch oe).
Partitions: Major, 13-inch brick, minor, plaster and wood
stud. >
Walls: Brick IS- and 4-inch stone trim on front.
Floors: Concrete on earth-wood beams and flooring second
floor.
Framing: Reinforced concrete and wood framed second
floor.
Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Unknown.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Fair con-
crete not of good quality.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderably stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Life insurance company.
CONTENTS: Insurance and office equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Roof partially collapsed — remain-
der depressed and ruptured. Walls cracked and buckled
partially collapsed.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Debris and fire (about equally).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA: (square feet) : 2,500. Structural
damage: 2,500. Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100
percent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS: Entire building so out of plumb and cracked
as to be in a virtual state of collapse.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor arcs.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No: 10. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers.
Shut: Part.
Effect of blast: Blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fir* doors Automatic Effect of blast
Stain: Yet Metal No Blown in.
Elevators:
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks
N 10* No C Yea
B JaV No C Yes
8 3C No R Yes Building II do' wall
between),
w »' No c Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex-
posure.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 2,500. Square
feet floor area burned: 2,500. Square feet: 100 per-
cent (after blast damage).
REMARKS:
100
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
5H. Distance from
El.
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 18. Coordinates:
(GZ): 1,000, (AZ): 2,200.
NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concretc frame.
Number of stories: 5 and ■ .• basement. JTG class
Roof: Rcinforcod-concrete slab (metal pan).
Partitions: Reinforced-concrete (5-inch). Wood lath and
plaster in rear addition.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch).
Floors: Reinforced-concrete slabs (metal pan construc-
tion).
Framing: Reinforced concrete, heavy haunches.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Consid-
erably heavier in structural framing.
OCCUPANCY: Bank and office.
CONTENTS: Bank equipment and furnishings.
DAMAGE to building: Light steel-framed roof over rear
addition destroyed by blast. Portion of roof of main
building depressed, beams cracked and spa I led at
haunches and center of span-steel elongated. Minor
damage throughout.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Destroyed.
Cause: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 46,400.
tural damage: 3,200. Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural
cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS: 1,400 square feet of structural damage shown
above was in inferior construction.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 18. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in west 'sec-
tion and in north wall only of east section.
Shut: Yes.
Effect of blast: Most blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast
Stairs: Tart Steel nil- No None— doors open
lers
Elevators: Yes Steel rol- No None— doors uiwii
lers
EXPOSURE:
Firrbrcak Fin*
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned
Remark.'*
\\
10'
2.V
20*
ur
128'
No
No
No
No
Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF
C
FIRE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hui Mm/ 10 04-foot
wall between).
14-foot concrete wall
between.
Fire spread from
Strue-
exposure.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Hour urea: 40.600 square
feet. Floor area burned: 46,400 square feet; 1(K) per-
cent (after blast daman*').
REMARKS: Fires in exposures soon after Iwmb. This
huildinu; well afire at 1000 hours.
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 23. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from
(GZ): 1,200; (AZ); 2,300.
NAME: Fukoku Building.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Steel core reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories: 7 and basement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced -concrete beam and slab (steel core).
Partitions: Reinforced concrete.
Walls: Reinforced concrete, stone trim.
Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Metal lath
and plaster.
Condition, workmanship, and materials:
Compare with usual United States buildings:
OCCUPANCY: First story, commercial. Remainder,
office space.
CONTENT8: Office equipment and furnishings, com-
munication equipment second and third floor.
DAMAGE to building: Long-fipan trusses supporting roof
ruptured and roof depressed. Three panels of first
floor slab depressed by blast. Minor damage from fire
throughout building.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Almost complete destruction except in i*a>e-
ment.
Cause: Fire (primary): some debris damage.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 43,300. Struc-
tural damage: 4,000. Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: II per-
cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 90 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based on total ll«»or urea.
Contents damuge is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No, 1)
Building No.: 23. Fire classification: N/R (unprotected
steel in roof).
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: No (wired glass in all
windows).
Shut:
Effect of blast: All broken.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed
St lire:
K levators:
Yei
Yrt
Fire doors
Metal anil W.n.
MrltltmlVV.O.
Auto-
matic
No
No
Effect of Must
I'art Mown oft
I 'art blown nil
Iti'tnarks
HuiMiiiK T2.
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Huron)
N 10* No It Yes
K lOfT Yes C Yes
S 3V No C Y«U
W 125' Yea r Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determine*!.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably up stairs, eleva-
tor and pipe shaft.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 13,300 square
feet. Floor area burned: 39,000 square feet ; \H) |s*ree?it
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire throughout building exeepi in basement.
£
Ullllll
ff-BIIII|
III III III III
III III III III
III III III III
'2 14
US STRATEGY BOMBNG SURVEY
BUILDING 23
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H
FIGURE 23-XA
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOK DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
SHEET NO. 1
Building No.: 24. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from
(GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400.
NAME: Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch.
CONSTRUCTION AND DE8IGN
Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame (steel core).
Number of Stories: 3 and basement. JTG class: El.
Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch) and stone (6-inch).
Floors: Reinforced concrete.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal (exterior) wood (in-
terior). Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Much
stronger — steel core construction.
OCCUPANCY: Bank.
CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishings.
DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage — top story
burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two
lower stories.
Cause: Fire.
To Contents: Destroyed in third story— moderate debris
and blast damage in first and second stories, none in
basement.
Cause: Fire and debris (about equally).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 32,800. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:
Superficial: — . Contents: 30 percent,
REMARKS: Glass removed from skylight (20 by 20
feet) and light steel-frame structure and roof covered
with 12 to 18 inches of sand and cinders.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor ana.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 24. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: 8teel rollers.
8hut: Part.
Effect of blast: Blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Stalra: Tart
Steel rollers
1
^Jo Ncoe — doors o|>en.
Elevators: Yes
Metal and W,
O. No Bent.
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Locution Distenc* Clearance Class
Ruined Remarks
N 25'
No C
Yes
14-foot concrete wall be-
tween.
E 25'
No R
Yes
nuii'iinr.v.' u-fooi wall
between).
S -
No
—
No exposure.
W 123'
Yes C
Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from cx-
l>osures.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 32,800 square
feet. Floor area burned: 5.200 square feef; 16 percent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of
second story and in entire third story. No fire in
building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours.
Fire in room in second story extinguished with water
buckets.
217
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION
Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 26. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from
(GZ): 2,300, (AZ): 3,000.
NAME: Chugoku Electric Co.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Nuraher of stories: 5 and basement and penthouse JTG
class: El.
Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete (6-inch).
Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch).
Floors: Reinforced-concrete slab, parquet wood surface
3, 4, 5, and 6 floors.
Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings:
Condition, workmanship, and materials; Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderably stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Office equipment and furnishings.
DAMAGE to building: One roof slab and girder cracked
by blast. Minor damage throughout from blast and
fire.
Cause : Blast :
To contents: Severe damage, except in west section of
basement and a portion of east section of basement.
Cause: Fire 75 percent. Blast and debris 15 percent.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 52,000. Struc-
tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 220.
FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural: — .
Superficial: 0.25 percent. Contents: 90 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No. : 26. Fire classification : R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north wall of
west section only.
Shut: Part.
Effect of blast : Most blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire doors Autonmilc Effectorbla.it
Stain: No
Elevators: Yes No
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak
Fin'
Location Distance Clearance
Clana
Burned
Remark*
N 60'
Yes
c
Yes
E 35'
No
(•
Ye.-*
se iw
No
('
Ye?
8 W
No
R
Yea
Building 27.
W IW
Yen
c
Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct heat radiation
from Iwunb.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly upstairs and pipe
shaft.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area : 52,000 square feet.
Floor area burned: 46,500 square feet; 88 percent (after
blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in tiO per-
cent of basement (no fire in basement of west section
and about 25 percent of east section). Man who was in
third story stated that he saw cotton blackout curtains
in west wall and thin paper on desks catch fire from
flash of bomb. Fire was reported to have been in all
stories 5 minutes after bomb.
222
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAQE DIVISION
Field Train No. 1, Him.- hi ma, .Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No. : 28. Coordinate*: 6H. Distance from (GZ) :
3,300, (AZ): 3,800.
NAME: Hiroshima City Hall.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish.
Number of stories: Four and basement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete (5-iuch) and tile, wood
wainscoats in stair halls.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (10- inch).
Floors: Reinforced concrete, cement finish.
Framing; Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings:
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderably stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Furnishings and equipment for office and
city administration.
DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only — sash blown
out, trim and finish destroyed by fire. Few tile par-
titions blown out.
Cause: Fire and blast.
To contents: Severely damaged.
Cause: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 93,400. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .
Superficial: — . Contents: 75-100 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sueet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Builiing No. 28. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Kiuli. m-(1 KirtMloorfl Automatic Effect of bla*l
Stain:
No
Elevators:
XPOSURE
Firebreak Fire
I-ocation Distance Clearance
Clow
111] rin er-
cent (after blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire in entire building except of 20 percent
of basement and first story at oast end of east section
(transverse partitions were noncombustible without
openings and there were no combustible construction
materials and contents in the corridors at the north
wall. Two men who were in building at time of bomb
stated that fire spread in from south exposure by flying
embers at 1000 hours. Fire started first in the third
story. Ixjwer stories may have been ignited later
directly by exposure fires.
2-21)
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHY8ICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 33. Coordinates: 6H. Distance from
(OZ): 5,300, (AZ): 6,600.
NAME: Hiroshima Postal Savings Bureau.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories: 4 and basement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete.
Walls: Reinforced concrete, tile finish.
Floors: Reinforced concrete.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal, wood (interior). Ceil-
ings: Plaster on wood lath — top story. Plaster on con-
crete— others.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Much
stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Minor — glass blown out. some
sash deformed. Hung ceiling in top story 75 percent
collapsed.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Slight damage to furnishings and other con-
tents from blast and debris.
Cause: Blast and debris.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 62,600. Struc-
tural damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural:
Superficial: . Contents: 15 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1 )
Building No.: 33. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north and
east walls only of northeast section.
Shut: Few only.
Effect of blast: Bent inward slightly.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed
Fire doors Automatic
KlT.it of bbst
Stairs:
Yea
Mela) No
Fart blown off.
Elevators:
Yes
Metal No
Him* ii off.
EXPOSURE
Flrtbrrak Kin-
Location Distance Clearance Class Humci!
Remarks
NW
150*
Yes C Yes
K
yn'
Yes C Yes
s
I.W
Yea C Yrs
\Y
IHf
Yes C Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from west
exposure.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: None.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: r>2.(K)0 square
feet. Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: Sparks from west exjM»sure ignited cotton
black-out curtains in west wall at 2000 hours and waste
paper in fourth story of northwest section at 2100 hours.
Fires were extinguished with water buckets by 20 tin*
guards who were stationed inside. Kire damage to
contents was negligible. Paper records stored in wood
and steel racks in northeast section of building were
exposed to direct radiated heat from bomb but did r.«>t
catch fire.
260
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALY8IS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 40. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from
(GZ): 2,500, (AZ): 3,200.
NAME: Fukuva Department Store.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN:
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories : 7 and baBement and one-half of eighth.
JTG class: El.
Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and -lab (steel trusses
over theater).
Partitions: Metal lath and plaster.
Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — large windows.
Floors: Wood over reinforced concrete.
Framing: Reinforced concrete (or protected steel).
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderably stronger than comparable United States
buildings.
OCCUPANCY: Department store.
CONTENTS: Merchandise on display for sale.
DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout — sash blown
out; finish and trim, including floors, burned out. Steel
trusses supporting roof over theatre show slight defor-
mation.
Cause: Mixed.
To contents: Destroyed.
Cause: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet \ : 78.9(H). St ructural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .
Superficial: — . Contents: 90-100 percent.
UK MARKS:
Note.— Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 40. Fire classification: R (north roof on
west section).
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire doom Automatic Effect of blast
Stairs; Part Metal No Blown In or bent.
Elevators: Yea Metal No Blown in or bent.
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Has* Burnett
N
B
8
W
180'
INI'
aw
No
Yes
Yes
Yea
Yes
Yea
Ye*
Yes
Remarks
Building :ttt
Building 3*.
Direct radiated head
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE:
from bomb.
VERTICAL FIRE 8PREAD: Probably.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 78,900 square
feet. Floor area burned: 78,900 square feet ; 100 percent
(after blast damage) .
REMARKS: Three persons who were questioned indi-
vidually stated that this building was afire immediately
or within 20 minutes after the bomb. One man who was
in the building at the time stated that cotton blackout
curtains in the west wall were smouldering immediately
after the bomb. The entire building was afire at 1000
hours.
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
285
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team N'o. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 47. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from
(GZ): 2.300, (AZ): 3,100.
NAME: Hiroshima Kirin Beer Hall.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class* El.
Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: 5-inch reinforced concrete.
Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete integral — large windows.
Floors: 5-inch reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings. Con-
siderably stronger than United States design.
OCCUPANCY: Beer hall.
CONTENTS: Bars, tables, etc.
DAMAGE to building: Minor — sash blown out, finish and
trim partly destroyed by fire.
Cause: Mixed.
To contents: Moderate damage from both blast (throwing
furnishings around) and fire.
Cause: Mixed.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 15,300. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:
Superficial — . Contents: 60-80 percent.
REMARKS: Building and contents contained so few
combustibles that internal fire was not of great in-
tensity.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Budding No.: 47. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blunt
Stairs: Part Metal and glass No Bent.
Elevators: Yes Metal and glass No Blown off.
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned itcmark*
X _ Yes — No oi|x>?uir«'.
E TW No C Yes
S — Yes — No exposure.
W 64' Yes C Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex-
posures.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 15,300 square
feet. Floor area burned: 13,200 square feet; 80 |HTcent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: Man who woiked in building but was not
on premises at time of bomb stated that fire spread
into building from east exposure about one hour aftei
bomb. Entire building had fire in it except basement.
Combustibility of contents was low and very little
damage was done to building by tire.
psfBifiti;
,w»
U. 3. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL D A U AOE DIVISION
Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 4H Coordinate*: 51. Distance from
(GZ): 3,000, (AZ): 8,600.
Name: ChOgoku Newspaper.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforeed-concrete frame.
Number of 8tories: 7 and penthouse. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforeed-concrete beam and slab.
Partlt ions: Reinforced concrete— lath and plaster.
Walk: 7-inch reinforced concrete — large windows.
Floors: 6-inch reinforeed-concrete beam and slab — small
put wood overlay.
Framing: Reinforced concrete (on steel frame).
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderably heavier than United States.
OCCUPANCY: Newspaper office — used in conjunction
with Building 50. .
CONTENTS: Office equipment and supplies.
DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout; sash blown
in, finish and trim destroyed by internal fire.
Cause: Fire.
To contents: Complete destruction.
Cause: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 14,700. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .
Superficial — . Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS: Contents' damage based upon interrogation
as all debris was removed.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 49. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers at first to
third stories of west wall only.
Shut: Part.
Effect of blast: Blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Endow*
1 Fir* doors
Automatic Effect of blast
Stabs:
Yes
No
No
Elevators:
Yes
Metal
Part blown In.
EXPOSURE
Firebreak
Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class
Burmil
Remarks
N
IW
Yes C
Yes
Bud 8
V
No R
Yes
Building 90 (unpro-
tected openings).
s
IK.V
Yes C
Yes
1.10 fret beyond Build-
ing SO.
w
DO*
Yes C
Yes
PROBABLE
CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct radiated heal
from bomb.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 14,700 square
feet. Floor area burned: 14,700 square feet; 100 per-
cent (after blast damage).
REMARKS: Man who was in building at lime of bomb
stated fire broke out in third and fourth stories immedi-
ately after bomb flash. Head bookkeeper in bank in
Building 51 stated thai then* was fire in third story of
Building 49, 10 minutes after bomb flash.
312
U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOI DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 52. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (GZ):
2,800, (AZ): 3,400.
NAME: Taiyo Theater.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: light steel frame.
Number of stories: — . JTG class:
Roof:
Partitions:
Walls:
Floors:
Framing:
Window and door frames: — . Ceilings:
Condition, workmanship, and materials:
Compare with usual United States buildings:
OCCUPANCY:
CONTENT8:
DAMAGE to building: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Mixed.
To contents: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Mixed.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): Unknown. Struc-
tural damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .
Superficial: — . Contents: — percent.
REMARKS: Mixed construction. Damage too severe to
permit analysis of cause of damage or design of st picture.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage if fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 52. Fire classification: C.
WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of hhut
Stain:
Elevators:
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks
N C No C Yes
E IW Yes R Yes
8 0* No C Yes Buildings 40 and SO.
W W No C Yea
PROBABLE CAU8E OF FIRE: Not determined.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor ares: — square feet.
Floor area burned: — square feet; 100 percent (after
blast damage).
REMARKS: This building was excluded from both blast
and fire studies.
321
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PSY8ICAL DAMAOE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 59. Coordinate!): 51. Distance from (GZ):
4t100, (AZ): 4,500.
NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch (in use at
time of bomb as the Higashi Police Station).
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Number of stories: See sketch. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Partitions: 7-ineh reinforced concrete.
Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete monolithic— medium
window.
Floors: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab— parquet and
tile.
Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Sheet metal on
wood framing.
Condition, workmanship and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Appreci-
ably stronger than United StPtes design.
OCCUPANCY: Police station (office).
CONTENTS: Office equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only— sash blown
out and hung ceilings partially stripped.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Slight damage to contents from !»ln>t and
debris.
Cause: Blast.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA 'square feet): 16,200. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building. Structural: — .
Superficial: Contents: 10 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based cm total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Effect la5i
Bent slightly.
):• rii ,; ».
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 59. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: Steel rollers in east wall
and third story of south and west walls (wired glass in
all windows).
Effect of blast: Blown in at west wall, bent at south
wall.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Auto
Enclose*! Fire doors nmtlr
Stairs: Yes Metal No
Elevaton :
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Location Distance Clearance (Muss Burned
N \bOT Yes C Yea
E 6C Yes C Yes
S W Partial C Yes
100'
W 6C Yes C Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex-
posures.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Moor ana: 10,200 square
feet. Flooi area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after
blast damage).
REMARKS: Sparks from south exposure ignited fru
pieces of furniture in first and third stories and col ton
blackout curtains in first story about 1030 hours. Fires
weie extinguished with water buckets by people inside.
Negligible lire danni^e resulted. Some of exposing
buildings had just lx*en removed prior to the bomb.
All e\[»osiirr5 liumcd
:U1
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION*
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No* 1
Building No.: 61. Coordinates: 51. Distance from
(OZ): 3.400, (AZ): 4,000.
NAME: Hiroshima Radio Station:
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame.
Number of ator.es: 2. JTO class: El.
Roof: Reinforeed-coiierete beam and slab.
Partitions: 4-inch reinforced concrete H-9 inches O. C.
Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — moderate openings.
Floors: Reinforced concrete.
Framing: Reinforced-eoncrete beam and slab.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Unknown.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Poor, con-
crete poor, reinforcement exposed in many places,
form work poor.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Some-
what heavier than United States design.
OCCUPANCY: Broadcasting studio.
CONTENTS:
DAMAGE to building: Small panel of fir*t floor depressed
4 to 6 inches in front of door. Two non-load-bcaring
partitions blown out. Minor damage throughout.
Sash blown out. trim and finish burned out.
Cause: Blaxt.
To contents: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Fire (may have been some debris damage).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 8,300. Structural
damage: — . Superficial damage: - .
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:
Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS: Water pipes in second floor ruptured at one
point. General condition and construction of building
was very poor.
Note.— Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 61. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Fire door* A u torn* tic Effect of blast
Stairs: N'o
Elevators:
EXPOSURE:
P ire break
Eire
location Distance Clearance Class Burned
Kemarlis
N
E
8
W
Off
l.V
Iff
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 8.300 square
feet. Floor area burned 8.300 square feet; 100 percent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: Some of exposing buildings wort- just being
removed at time of bomb.
:*47
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 80. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from
(GZ): 2,000, (AZ): 2,800.
NAME: Kftko Private Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced concrete.
Number of stories: Three. J TG class: El.
Roof: Reinforeed-concrete slab.
Partitions: 9-inch brick and 6-inch reinforced concrete.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (8-10 inches).
Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Wood lath
and plaster.
Condition, workmanship, and materials:
Compare with usual united States buildings: Stronger
and heavier.
OCCUPANCY: School.
CONTENTS: Classroom furnishings, equipment, and
office furnishings.
DAMAGE to building: One roof girder cracked, 9-inch
brick partition in first story fractured at ceiling, hung
ceiling destroyed. All sash blown out, floors and trim
damaged. Outside toilet at west end of building coi-
ls need.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Furnishings and other contents cut by glass
and debris and broken by tumbling around by blast.
Cause: Blast and debris {about equally).
TOTAL FLOOR A REA (square feet) : 1 1 ,500. St rucl •ml
damage: 500. $ui>erficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 jsr-
cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 20 40 percent.
REMARKS: Lean-to toilet in which all structural damage
occurred, was of weaker construction than rest of
building.
Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damn god.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 86. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Stain:
Elevators:
Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast
Yas No
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
f .oral Inn Distance rimmnn< Clam Iturmfi Remarks
X 125' Yes C Yes
E ISC* Yes C Yes Illaiik wall t\ivpt flro
escB|a? exits,
S lay Yes C Yes
W 12*' Yes V Yes Blank wall.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: No lire.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 1 1 ,500 square feet.
Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blent
damage) .
REMARKS: Extended east-west axis of building would
pass approximately through zero point. Kn-r wall,
which faced zero point whs blank except for exit at
each story to fire escape. If doors at lire c»ca|»c were
closed at time of bomb, probably the interior of tin'
building was shielded from direct radiated heal from
tin' bomb
42G
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. I
Building No.: 87- A. Coordinate*. 7F. Distance from
(GZ): 8.000, (AZ): 8,200.
NAME: Funairi Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Wood frame.
Number of stories: Two. JTG clam: E2.
Roof: Asbestos cement on wood trass™ and wood sheathing.
Partitions: Wood.
Walls: Wood lath and plaster with wood exterior.
Floors: Wood over wood framing.
Framing: Wood.
Window and door frame*: Wood. Ceiling*: Wood.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good, but
design rather poor.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Weaker
because of very slender columns and |>oor joints.
OCCUPANCY: Classrooms.
CONTENTS: Classroom furnishing and equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Entire building on verge of
collapse, and one wing completely collapsed. Walls
and columns facing blast buckled and building displaced
away from blast.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Most of contents were severely damaged by
debris and by lieing overturned and blown nltoui by
blast.
Cause: Rlast and debris (abuui equally).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3S.400. Struc-
tural damage: 3K.400. Su|>crficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100
percent. Siqicrncial: Content*: 50 percent.
REMARKS: Fire walls were of reinforced concrete.
Note. Building damage I«mnI on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 87-B. Coordinates: 7F. Distance from
(GZ): 8,000, (AZ): 8,200.
NAME: Funairi Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Light steel frame.
Number of stories: One. JTG class:- A2 2.
Roof: Asbestos shingles over wood-sheathing and purlins.
Partitions: None.
Walls: Plaster on wood lath with wood exterior sheathing.
Floors: \Vood over wood l>eams on concrete |>ost8.
Framing: Light steel- trussed arch.
Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: None.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Slightly
lighter design but generally comparable.
OCCUPANCY: School auditorium.
CONTENTS: Lectern, benches, tables, teaching aid*.
DAMAGE to building: Roof trusses slightly deformed
but probably will be used in place. Most of rooting
strip|Mfl or displaced. Wall facing blast blown in.
Cause: lilitst.
To contents: Slight damage and that primarily due to
ex|M>sure.
Cause: Exposure.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA i square feet): 4.0110. Structural
damage: Superficial damage: l.'.HMI.
FRACTION OK DAMAGE: Building structural:
Superficial: 100 percent. Contents: 10 percent.
REMARKS:
NirrK. Ruilding damage ba-ed on total tloorarea. Con-
tents damage is fraction of it m t nits »erioii»1y damaged.
43!)
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
SllKKT No. 1
Building No.: 95. Coordinates: 4G. Distance from
(GZ): 1,200, (AZ): 2,300.
NAME: Honkawa Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced concrete.
Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class El.
Roof: Reinforced concrete, cement finish.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete (7-inch).
Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch).
Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Stronger.
OCCUPANCY: School classrooms.
CONTENTS: School furnishings and equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Panel walls facing blast buckled.
One roof girder structurally damaged and slab de-
pressed. About 15 percent of roof slabs cracked and
beams cracked with some spalling but usable in place.
All finish, floors and trim burned out, sash and doors
blown out.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Fire (primary) may have been some debris
damage.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 19,500. Struc-
tural damage: 500. Superficial damage: 3,000.
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 i*t-
cent. Superficial: (i percent. Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building i lunume based on tot al Hour area, f 'on-
tents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 95. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed
Stairs: I'url
Elevators:
Fire doors Automatic Effect of hliuit
No
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Locution Distune*
N li.V
E
S 30'
Clearance Class Rurneri Kfiunrks
Yes C
No — - No i>\|Misurr.
I'artiul ISO' C Yes All e\|K>M]re<> burned
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 49,500 square feet.
Floor area burned: 49,500 square feet: 100 percent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS:
4.-.C.
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAC1E DIVISION'
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 90. Coordinates: G5. Distance from
(GZ): 400 (AZ): 2,000.
NAME: Taisho Clothing Store.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced concrete.
Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete slabs, cement finish.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch), brick panels on
first floor.
Floors: Reinforced concrete (wood finish on sleepers,
second floor).
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Conditions, workmanship, and material*: Fair.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Con-
siderable stronger (larger structural members).
OCCUPANCY: Mercantile.
CONTENTS: Merchandise for sale
DAMAGE to building: All roof slabs depressed, fractur-
ing beams and girders and Bt retching steel. Panel in
east wall buckled, girders in second floor rear cracked
and spalled. Ninety percent of parapet demolished.
All sash aud doors blown out. Finish and trim burned
out. No fire in basement.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Completely destroyed, except in basement
Cause: Fire (primary cause probably some debris
damage) .
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 12.400. Structural
damage: 3,000. Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 31 per-
cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 7"» percent.
REMARKS:
Note.— Building damage based on total floor area
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
ty
¥
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Buildiug No.: 96. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast :
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclosed Ktre doors Automatic Effect of blast
Stairs: No
Elevators:
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
Ijocattun Distuncv rieunuice (llass Ilurmil fti-muiks
N 35' No C Yes
E 10' No C Yes
•S Ifr* No V Yes
\V ISO* Yrs C Yes
PROBABLE (Al'SE OF FIRE: Not determined.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 12.4(H) square feet.
Floor area burned: 0.300 square feet ; 7") percent (after.
blast damage).
REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in basement
SECTION "A-A"
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
BUILDING 9 6
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H
FIGURE 100 -X A
•n;o
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team Xo. 1. Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building N8.: 100. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from
(GZ): 800, (AZ): 2,100.
NAME: Nippon Simple Fire Insurance Co.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforoed-concrete frame.
Number of Btories: 2. JTG class: E2.
Hoof: Reinforoed-concrete slab and beams.
Partitions: None.
Walls: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish.
Floors: Reinforoed-concrete slab, cement finish.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Com-
parable.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment.
DAM AGE to building: One roof girder cracked and s palled.
Sash anl doors blown out or deformed. Trim and
finish damaged by fire.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Fire (probably appreciable blast awl debris
damage).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3,000. Struc-
tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 80.
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:
Superficial: 3 percent. Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage based on total floor ami,
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.
Sheet No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 100. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPENINGS:
Shutters:
No.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS
:
Enclosed
Fire doors
Automatic
Effect of blast
Stairs:
No
Elevators:
EXPOSURE
'■'•
Firebreak
Flrr
Locution
Distance Clearance Class Burned
Kctiiurko
N
<>'
No C
Yea
Door blown otT<
E
I.V
No C
Yes
S
40'
No C
Yes
w
()'
No C
Yes
Mliink wall.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 3,000 square
feet. Floor area burned: 3,000 square feet 100 percent
(after blast damage).
REMARKS: East wall which faced zero point was blank
and it is believed the interior of the building was shielded
from direct radiated heat from the bomb.
474
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sheet No. 1
Building No.: 122. Coordinate)!: 5J. Distance from
(OZ): 6,400, (AZ): 6,700.
NAME: Sumitomo Bank Co., Higashi Matsurara Branch.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Protected steel frame.
Number of stories: 2. J TO class: EI.
Roof: Relnforced-conerete slab on steel beams.
Partitions: Plaster on metal lath.
Walls: Brick panel— 13-inch.
Floors: Rein forced-concrete slab and beams.
Framing: Steel — protected.
Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United Slates buildings: Slightly
heavier.
OCCUPANCY: Bank with offices on second floor.
CONTENTS: Office and banking equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Glass blown out, few shutters
facing blast deformed.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: None.
Cause:
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 5,100. Struc-
tural damage: — . Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: -.
Superficial: — . Contents:
REMARKS:
Note. — Building damage Imsed on total Hour area.
Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously ilatnnu* £
5*\
Vvkr/^
*\S\\
'■ *i-^
>-
111
>
ce
3
Z
u
(3
o
7
V
m
_j
ur
o
3
UJ
i
u.
V"V
'«C'-'I ---•
z
g
<
i
luf
J- 3
£^
O
2
2
or
UJ
■D
k
•
05
>
3
7. «
O
C/1
I
O
o
UJ
z
o
►-
CD
cr
t-
Q
s
<
->
<
5
T
tit
t-
U.
to
UJ
1
o
or
I
u.
?s«
w 'W^.MSA
H2?hff
* jf\ 1 f V *?
*
,» f
!\
HIROSHIMA
AOA038738
Secondary Fires
Secondary fives are those that result from airblast damage, their
causes include overturned gas appliances, broken gas lines, and elec-
trical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied
secondary fires resulting fro* the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and compared their results with data from conventional bond-
ings, explosive disasters* earthquakes* and tornadoes. Their major con*
elusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overall average fre-
quency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided air-
blast peak overpressure is at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary
ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures.
Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings.
—a—— — ^ ^M»i^ m-^-*mm a— | | || DH^HIH Ilia lu»— — ■ < Hi » — — ^— — ■ — — — * IQ t^ PO
^ •% •%
00
88
CM
C*
-P
U
0
&
(D
CO
PQ
CO
CO
CO
■H
TJ
H
■H
3
«S
g
■H
CO
0
H
■H
K
1 si
O
istai
rein
-5
00
e
6
3
0
.g
^5
08
•^^
08
3
rthq
teel-
I
08
OQ
•*
fc
&
©
O
o
£
^^
«4n^
.a
.a
c
+j
<+^
fM|
^— «#
o
3
3
o
ss
I
.24
oS
9
O4
.3
«
08
G
2 c
•a "§
d
08 .
00
^ ©
08 «*
2. d
O* 08
.3 -•*
3 oo
** *oo
i
i
■3
.Ad
•e
is
oo o8
11
..5 ;
l © •
a> a
a. 2
a
.•3
2
o
©
.* 00
•fig-8
s
1
© 0
I
TS
08 £3 »S
OS*
^ » c
bS a
1 S3
OFFICE OF THE AIR SURGEON
NP-3041
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS
The Report of the Joint Commission for
the Investigation of the Effects of the
Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI
By
Ashley W. Oughterson Henry L. Barnett
George V. LeRoy Jack D. Rosenbaum
Averill A. Liebow B. Aubrey Schneider
E. Cuyler Hammond
July 6, 1951
[TIS Issuance Date]
Army Institute of Pathology
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Thi» document contain! information affect-
ing the national defense of the United
States within the meaning of the Eipionage
Act, 50 U. S. C. ?l and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
RESTRICTED
Of
E
o
UJ
O
z
<
en
o
AIHVIHOW
100
90
80
-70
z
LJ
O
g 60
Q.
CO
o 50
>
to 40
30
20
10
0
HIROSHIMA
DASA1271
ALL EFFECTS
DOCUMENT NP-3041 VOL TZT
BUILDING
DESIGNATION
NO. INDIVIDUALS
EXPOSED
POST OFFICE 400
TELEGRAPH OFFICE 301
TELEPHONE OFFICE 474
CITY HALL 216
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 682
BRANCH POST OFFICE 346
RO. SAVINGS OFFICE 750
_J
0
0.5 1.0 1.5
RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO
2.0
2.5
dc-p-1060 NONSEISMIC REINFORCED- CONCRETE BUILDINGS
100
i
HIROSHIMA
4 6
BLAST EFFECTS
20
OVERPRESSURE (psi)
40
o _
« r2
h X
<» £
+j CO
.C i
boo,
°o
• ■•-•
>>S
JS «
2 J
co Ph
< !Z
•a o
3.2
•2 c
co n
Jh 3
0) 3)
C cd
CO «
. u
J?
*3
c c
o P
O rH
> tn »
« a,
Q ■ ■
. . w
60
MEMORANDUM
RM-3079-PR
1963
403 337
DISASTER AND RECOVERY:
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Jack Hirshleifer
PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND
MilD.
*7& rvTl I I L7$M^*f
*-
X
c
o
a>
a
E
*— *
0)
<— ^
D
O
u
"55
0
O)
a
40
40
• BB
c
• BB
■D
£
• ■■■■
0
c
• BB
C
D
£
"D
0)
40
;£
>
_C
O
O
• ^H
CN
E
^
_C
c
>s
• BB
D
E
^
40
o
E
u
40
5=
C
o
r^
D
O
c
o
>*
>
E
E
o
BB
40
-5
o
• BB
0)
a
"D
a
-Q
• BB
E
■"■
40
V>
a
o
u
*0
o
CO
D)
c
• BB
D
0)
o
■D
c
■—
C
o
c
o
0
"55
a
>
D)
c
^^B
^^B
• BB
10
0
^
•fc
t^z
"™"
D
• BB
c
• BB
E
-Q
,^
S
o
E
O
c
• BB
3
to
o
•
c
o
•
o
a>
"3
>
<
5
D
a
0)
O
a
o -Q o "O 4) *- en
o m
- 5
O D
<3^ CO
$ 5 o
o o <2
c c C
CO CO Q_
< 0 O
en
"5>
J2
O
3
>
Q>
■D
o
s
O
o
^B
o
GO
o
o
<0
O
m
o
o
o
CVJ
jj liU9UJaoD|ds!a |D|oi
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
25
20
= 15
2 10
£ 9
s
5 8
a.
2.5
1.5
\
H-
!
T—
1
1 —
T "
1 —
T"
1 —
T "
I —
i —
T
r-
i
I I I I nr
1
v
rean overpres- ireaK dynamic iyi aximum wma -
sure (nttunds ver treasure (vounds velocity (miles
\
i
square inch) per square inch) per hour)
\
72 80 1,170
50 40 940
30 16 670
20 8 470
10 2 290 ;
a
2
~
0.
i
1
1UU
70
|
1 —
■i~:
cili
oto
n
sur
face 1
>ur
St
\
— , — ,, — lt, —
V
— — ~ — ■ —
. —
FREE
(BASH
AIR
Id on
JURS
2W A
ssu
4PT
ION
>
V
1 1
\"
\ \
0.06
0.08 0.10
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.3 0.4 0,5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (MILES)
Scaling. For yields other than 1 KT, the range to which a given
overpressure extends scales as the cube root of the yield
1000
100 -
«/>
>
LU
Q£
Q£
LU
>
o
<
100
1000
1/3-
1 0,000
DISTANCE, FEET FOR 1 KT (SCALED BY YIELD ' w)
WT-1469
and
DASA-1777
AD638342
TEST (BOTH ON 700 FT TOWERS) 37 KT PRISCILLA
GROUND RANGE 5320 FT
44 KT SMOKY
3406 FT
Static pressure
Dynamic pressure
Prone dummy
Upright dummy
5.3 psi
0.7 psi
0
21.9 ft
Movement
u'Ci PRECURSOR
255.7ft PRECURSOR
Prone dummy
Upright dummy
Velocity
0
21.4 ft/sec max. at
0.45 sec
Prone dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA
Upright dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA
165 lb dummy
lying prone at 5.3
psi overpressure
from Priscilla was
unmoved, but
standing dummy
was translated
13 ft in air and
then rolled for 9 ft.
5 6 7 8
DISPLACEMENT, FT
O
(/>
01
UJ £
a: o
a. u-
m
O
<
a) m
i
H
O
o
s
*i-t
+->
CO
t-t
d)
i
a)
f— I
o
CO
is<$ -amssaaj
c
r
o
99
98
95
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
5t-
2
I
10
I I llll Kg?
Impact with concrete \\zu
53 Human Free- Fall Cases
Number of cases li
o
- LDfco54.4ft/sec
DNA-2738T
(AD734208)
» llll I? II
20 40 70 100
Impact Velocity , ft/sec
o
o
O
oooooo o o
O (^ 00 S (0 in ^ rO
O
oas/w • (iffi!)oz «A^po|aA |dwu| pa|D0S
9/iv S9I ' ■
fO
O
O
CVJ
O
ro
O ^
O *
o
m
3 -9
o
^~
o
IT)
<£
E
CO
^
o
<
o 1
0.1
T 1 — I I I I I
1.885
1 i i — i i i i i
50% BREAKAGE
Source: DNA-5593T
( AD Al 05824), H
1980, Fig. 3
PG = Plate glass
SG = Sheet glass
k 1 PSI = 6.9 kPa
(Single
strength)
Windows are face-on to blast wave
i i i i
i i
i
■ i i ■ i
0.3 1 10
PEAK INCIDENT OVERPRESSURE (kPa)
AECU-3350
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM
BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING
MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY
ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS
By
I- Gerald Bowen
Donald R. Richmond
Mead B. Wetherbe
Clayton S* White
Table 5, 1 Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data
for Missiles from Traps at Various Ranges from Ground
Zero
30 kt TEAPOT-APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955
Distance from Ground Zero, ft
Maximum overpressure, psi
Number ot traps
Total number of glass missiles
Geometric mean missiles mass, gms
Standard geometric deviation in mass
Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec
Standard geometric deviation in velocity
Per cent of total missiles expected
to penetrate
A verage number of missiles per sq ft
Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate
4,700
5,500
10,500
5,0
3,8
1.9
6
2
5
2129
320
37
0. 133
0.580
1.25
3. 01
3.47
3,35
170
168
103
1,27
1,25
1.25
3,9*
12,8*
0.4*
100.9
45.5
2. 1
3,9*
5,3*
0. 006*
^Computed from individual evaluation of each missile
AD Al 05824 DNA5593T
GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS
BROKEN BY AIRBLAST
E. Royce Fletcher
Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki.
3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1m behind
the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave:
10 fragments /ver for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure
100 fragments/m2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure
1,000 fragments /m^ for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure
Figure 10
10
0)
c
u
5 -
i
-I
-I
-l
^
- 4
K)
-0
EFFECTIVE PEAK OVERPRESSURE ON THE WINDOW, kPe
all -cotton tee shirt (145 gm/nr)
cotton-sateen material (285 gm/m*)
s/ui '(%OS)A 'AiinrNI %0S ilOd Q3Q33N A1I0O13A
O
rN
- o ai
i
I
—
8.
O
0J
C
w
■ —
1
5
o
00
o
i£
TO
TO £
^ E
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1964)
GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY
Probability of penetration (percent)
Mass of glass
fragments
(grams)
0. 1
1.0
50
99
Impact velocity (ftfsec)
235 410 730
140 245 430
GLASS
Peak
overpressure
(psi)
1.9
5.0
Median
velocity
(ftfsec)
108
170
Median
mass
(grams)
1.45
0. 13
Maximum
number per
sqft
4.3
388
M 2»000
Cm
ffl
O
«
H-l
W
a
1,000
Peak
o
0 1,000 2,000
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET)
overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst
E. R. Fletcher, et al., "Airblast Effects on Windows in Buildings and Automobiles on
the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 1 1 tons
of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,210 ft (0.54 psi incident, 1.1 psi reflected, 0.158 sec)
1000
500
: — i — ( — i i | i 1 1 1| — i — | — i — r] i ni| — i — \ — i — r
o
200
«»
If*
*•>■*.
^»
*^
100
>
m
>-
»—
50
O
O
UJ
o
20
10
TTT
rr
• I ' ,,,1
Curves indicate the probability af a fragments
penetrating 1 cm of soft tissue.
Glass Fragments trapped from
approximately 1/4 -inch' thick
panes at a ground rarge of
1210 ft
Vgo : 52/ ft/sec
2 -
Regression Line:
In V* 4 464-0244 In M
SEE.: 0.431 In Units
Number of Fragments IT€
Symbol Cubical Pones
1 Mill
1
J L- J 1111
1
a
O
G
J L
81
82
S3
Pf and P2
PI and P2
PI and P2
i i 1 1
1
i 1 1 1
0.1 0.2
0.5
2 5 10 20 50
FRAGMENT MASS, M, gm
100 200
500 1000
1000
L I
500 ^
200
^ 100
o
o
50
> 20
h-
UJ
3E 101—
200
>-
h-
O
o
— 1
100
UJ
:>
i-
z
UJ
50
2
o
•^
or
20
t — r
i ' ' u i — > — i — > — • — r
Curves indicate the probability of a fragment's
penetrating t cm or soft tissue
r m t
T
T
| \ i i r.
Glass Fragments trapped
from approximately 1/4 - inch-__
thick pones at a ground
range of 1700 ft
Symbol Cubical Panes
B5
B€
B7
PiondP2
PlandP2
PI ondP2
(0
0.1
Mso:747gm
Vx :3B4 ft/sec 1
Regression Line:
lnV= 4 125-0.237 In M
SEE: 0579 In Units
N umber of Fragments: 30
JL.
J I
mm
02
0.5
2 5 10
FRAGMENT MASS, M,gm
20
50
100
1000 c — I — p
I I
f ' "M
i i i
t i r
Gtoss Frogments Hepped
from opproKimofrff f/B-mdt-
thick pom* eta ground
range of 1700 ft
Symbol Cubical fjme
O B€ P3
♦ B€ P4
500
> 200
o
ut
>
or
1 00
50
20
JO
1 1
TTTJ
T
Curves indicoto tho probability <>1 o fragment's
panatroting t em of soft tissua.
Regression Una:
in V* 4.205 -0.248 In M
SEE.: 0.391 In Units
Number of Fragments: 72
ft/sac
J_±
I I ' i i i ' ' I ■ « 1 i i i il i I i 1,1 ■ Il.lt 1 — I 1 — I I 1.1 1 l.
001 002 0.05 01 0 2 0 5 I 2
FRAGMENT MASS, M, 9m
10
20
50
100
Report to the Test Director WT-1468
SECONDARY MISSILES GENERATED BY
NUCLEAR-PRODUCED BLAST WAVES
«•
A 40-ft concrete-block wall was built 2750 ft from GZ on shot Galileo, 11 kt
1?-.V>'urV-- v > '■.»;:^ uL
- ,-. -
Concrete -block wall (64 in. high, 40 ft long, and 7.5 in. thick)
broad side of the wall was oriented toward GZ.
Photograph illustrating the scatter of blocks from the wall
8.4 psi peak overpressure
— -100
1528 fragments from concrete wall
Numbers indicate fragments in IOOft2Area
Galileo, 11 kt
-50
50
.z •■
.> J
•x .■
M50 = 1.366 lbs
psi peak overpressure
-100
■50
50
100
150
200
Spatial distribution of all fragments with masses over 0.1 lb from the concrete -block wall.
CO
I-
ui Ul
GO
U.
O
co o
CO
_£
o
o
o
o
o
10
» c E
^ o o
O E o»
1
o
o
CM
J_I_L
1
1
o
o
o
10
o
CM
10
X
ai
T>
cr>
-O
a>
O
GO
O
o>
T3
C
10
o>
O
0
0>
H
>
0
0)
a>
GO
-J
P
■0
a>
O
0
CO
0
0
0.
m
CO
O
Q
O
a>
ro
c
a>
O
CVJ
6
o>
0
O
ii
10 o
a>
0.
y ,Xp *90UD4S!Q piHMUMOQ
en
ffj
r* o*
B«i
0)
U
3
o
in a*
u
§ s
(4
■♦-»
0)
O
o
a
4
a
o
u
6
O
O
ORNL-TM-3396
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED
FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS
J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson, R. L. French,
F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. Straker
Table 8. Fission-Product Gamma Ray Exposure During the First 60 Seconds
from a Typical TN Weapon at a 100-M Burst Height
Slant Range
Shock Arrival
Percent Before
Percent After
(m)
(sec)
Shock
Shock
100 KT
538
0.3678
13.8
86.2
740
0.8187
20.4
79.6
1030
1.822
36.2
63.8
1446
4.055
63.1
36.9
2097
11.02
300 KT
95.7
4.3
771
0.5488
13.7
86.3
1060
1.221
20.5
79.5
1472
2.718
38.6
61.4
206S
6.049
69.8
30.2
2995
16.44
1MT
98.8
1.2
1146
0.8187
11.1
88.9
1576
1.822
18.3
81.7
2190
4.055
38.2
61.8
3075
9.024
75.3
24.7
4458
24.53
99.8
0.2
ORNL-TM-3396
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE-FIELD ENVIRONMENT REGOMENDED
FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS
J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burs on, R« L, French,
F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A, Straker
0 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 05 0.6 0.7 0.8 Q.9 1.0
FRACTION OF Aw SOLID ANGLE, *'
Figure 9. Angular Distribution of Neutron and Secondary Gamma
1200 m from a Thermonuclear Weapon
HIROSHIMA
John Mersey
New Yorker of 31 August, 1946
i
A NOISELESS FLASH
At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning,
on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment
when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima,
Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the
surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross
Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors
He was one step beyond an open window
when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic
photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down
on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese
would, " Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave !" Just then
(the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the
blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was
wearing flew off his face ; the bottle of blood crashed
against one wall ; his Japanese slippers zipped out from
under his feet — but otherwise, thanks to where he
stood, he was untouched.
Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon
and rushed around to the man's office and found him
terribly cut by glass.
Starting east and west
from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September,
made new measurements, and the highest radiation
they found this time was 3.9 times the natural " leak."
id
UJ
Q
o
111
UJ
ID
UJ
X
UJ _
{-- UJ
- IU
tf >
UJ ^
UJ
z
<
CO
o
CO
y
UJ
I-
UJ
IP
LL
X
■
LL
- ^ in
o g k
° m ^
Q ^ Uj
y D DQ
§ £ ID
V 19 ^
■ UJ
8 tD
CO
3
O
B -j
^k.
>
-j
2
1 ^
■ #%
•
in
(¥
ID -
■ 2
Q
LU
~r
z
X
111
P i
U o
3| DC
Li)
CD
in
id
111 31
y h-
-» UJ
1 ; ~ =C
O h-
111 1A
:;::::>::>W::::v>
■: m • : • • • • ;■ • : -': ■ « • . . ■« ■ ••. • - . ■ ■■•.■ • • : =■*■-
:•.' ■'*.
II
m
19
z
\-
HI
O [tf
ttf ID
U- CD
Q_
>;
UJ U
O CD
UJ
01
8
D
o
u
H-
St
o
Q.
UJ
>
D
Z
1
ID
UJ
Q ^
Ol K
X ^»
Ui O
ID
UJ CD ^
^ ^ o
in cd u
I- ui
P « 58
w ZL "•
£ < |
in
UJ
tS O
w 5 £
in , <
m o£ ui
uj o in
i* in ui
r D I
Q CD H
? < «H
in z Q
H - ?
Q O O
Z D/ Q
to i m
v h~ ^
u
D s o
U)"OQ
W H v/
O X 3
^ ^ Q
o
V» • • • • • • • .VVW /ii.im..;»»»
♦ •»•»••••• • • • /• ••••••••••••
»♦♦»•» • • • •*• /♦•»»**«••«••••
• •»♦•••»• ♦ • • • *• •••••»•* • • • • •
••••♦• * • • • • v •*•#••*♦••••••'
surviva
OPERATION CUf
A.E.C. NEVADA TEST SITE
MAY 5, 1955
■■'-$\
S?
'"■ X
s-^sf
US*' ~ '
.'4§
W':-
fc:
■». ' ■
,...:,- ■
■
f
-
,>
P^-:
SUllF?
^mm
■ i>
_; ■■'■ .
::
■- ■ ' '1
" J^^^^^l
m- -^
•SlS'SiS?
-■■ - ■* •■"•IS
• '*;'■"' .
■f^-'ii^
it.*- '■'";. ::;::
'!■:
A report by the FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN,
Director j Atomic Test Operations, PCD A
The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by
many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of
great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively
large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a
given point.
92
BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION
by dr. Herman elwyn pearse, Professor of Surgery at the Uni-
versity of Rochester. Consultant to several Government depart-
ments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of
Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special
Weapons Project
After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the
National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiro-
shima.
140
Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and we found again that
the wounds healed in the same manner as those that we had produced in
the laboratory. There was isome difference in these lesions from the ordi-
nary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experi-
ments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they
are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char
acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing.
142
For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get
much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers,
you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed
by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first
degree burns at 107 calories.
143
If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent
thousands and thousands of burns.
. . . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree
burns on bare skin required 4 calories. When we put 2 layers of cloth in
contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters,
about a fifth of an inch, and it increases, the protective effect 5 times. The
energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second-
degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you
are better off than if your wear tight clothing.
144
OSTI ID: 4411414 bm&
STUDIES OH FLASH BURNS:
THE PROTECTION AFFORDED W 2, k MB 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS
George Mixter, Jr0, M0 Do and Herman ED Pearse, Mo D„
THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
ABSTRACT
Fabric interposed between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester
White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ turns.
For the 2, k and 6 layers of fabric studied this increase vas 3*6, 38 and
over 10*4- cal/cm2 respectively -when the inner layer of fabric vas in contact
with the skin. Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 mm increased
the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 70k to 29 cal/cm2,
provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation0 If the outer layer
was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the
thermal burn,
INTRODUCTION
In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study
of flash burns in unshielded skin* It is well known from the atomic bombing
in Japan that this type of burn was modified by clothing „ A laboratory
analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun
(5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com-
binations,, i. 2 Layers 20 h Layers
ae light green oxford olive green sateen
knitted cotton underwear thin cotton oxford
wool-nylon shirting
b. light green oxford (HPM) knitted cotton underwear
knitted cotton underwear
6 layers
olive green sateen
thin cotton oxford
mohair frieze
rayon lining
wool-nylon shirting
knitted wool underwear
i? Jo Ho j Kingsley* Ho D„, asd Pearse, H. EOJ "Studies on Flash
Burns i The Protective Effect© of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology
aM Obstetrics^ <&> ^97~5©1 (April 1952) o
II IULH I IML
y*tvui vw«* *
ttV»*U9
WT-770
Copy No.
CO
CD
CQ
UPSHOT-KNOTHO
NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS
TKHWOM
n of the
DFJT.NSE K<
A60«
AUb !
March -June 1953
Project 8.5
THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED
TEST X|
-y. _
ASSEMBLIES
»
This document contains restpMBgps&ta as
defined in the Atomic^jj^pmct of 1954.
Its transmittal c^rarrffsclosure of its
contents in ajwsfemer to an unauthorized
pen
HEAOQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
SANOIA 8ASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
mussnB
WT-770
This document consists of 64 pages
1 QP
No. - ^ ° of 295 copies, Series A
OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE
Project 8.5
THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED
TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES
REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR
by
REORaOCU
BY authority OfW.J:^U^Z€j^^^/^?^U As ^striotedj^rtn Foreign
hi iPWIH 1*11 III
VRmtaM^^ontalns restricted data as
dennea Jn^nWI^fci^^jrgyAct of 1954.
Its transmittal or^^WH(ta^of its
contents in any manner to an unHfccized
111 | in in li iiiiilMIHIi III 3^^
Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories
Army Medical Service Graduate School
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project
D
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
4#1 ANTICIPATED AMD OBSERVED RESULTS
4.1.1 protection Afforded by the Various Uniform Assemblies
Perhaps the most outstanding result of these tests was the
degree of thermal protection afforded the test animals by the various
uniform assemblies. At the higher levels of radiant energy, where
laboratory tests (with the carbon arc) indicated that the animals
should have sustained at least 2+ burns, (?) an unexpected degree of
protection was found in the field. In the laboratory, thermal energies
as low as 44 cal/cm2 (delivered In 2 sec.) were sufficient to produce
burns in pigs1 skin under the four layers of the Temperate ensemble.
In the field the maximum level at which any animals, clothed in the
Temperate uniform, were recovered alive on Shots 9 and 10 was 26.0
cal/cm2 and one at 48 cal/cm2 (calc.) on Shot 2. Although no animals
were recovered alive at the maximum exposure level of 75 cal/cm2, there
was a complete lack of any evidence to indicate that the animals would
have suffered burns from the primary effects of the thermal radiation.
Some of the animals wearing the Temperate uniform not treated for fire
resistance sustained minor skin burns, but these resulted from exo-
thermic reactions (flame or glow) and occurred only at the more dis-
tant stations. Damage to the fabric itself from direct thermal
radiation was also less serious than expected, being limited to the
two outer layers, whereas in the laboratory three of the lavers were
damaged and the underwear layer discolored at 40 to 60 calAm2.
The two-layer HW 50/50 and HWFR 50/50 assemblies had not been
tested in the laboratory with the carbon arc, although tests in con*
nection with napalm studies had Indicated that the wool/cotton under*
wear of this combination might be, quite effective* The outstanding
results obtained In the field with these fabric assemblies, however,
exceeded the most optimistic anticipations. Exceptionally good
thermal protection was observed up to the closest stations from which
data were obtained! 41*0 cal/cm2 for HW 50/50 and 33.5 cal/cm2 for
HWFR 50/50.
Severe burns were sustained by the majority of the pigs wearing
the two-layer HW and HWFR assemblies. However, even these thin cotton
fabrics were of considerable protective value as can be seen by com-
paring these results with the bare-skin exposures of the porthole
44
pigs (Section 3*4)* The degree and extent of burns noted beneath
these assemblies were less than would have been expected on the basis
of previous laboratory experience, especially at the higher calorie
levels*
4«1«2 Factors Contributing to the Greater Degree of Thermal Protection
in the Field.
There are several conditions encountered in the field, espe-
cially at the higher energy levels, but not duplicated in the labora-
tory (at least not up to the present time) that may account for the
fact that like amounts of thermal energy did not produce comparable
results in the laboratory and in the field. First, the thermal energy
is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb
than it is in the laboratory • Second, due to smoke obscuration the
animals in the field actually received a smaller percentage of the
total energy delivered than they did in the laboratory* Third, the
blast wave following the explosion tended to extinguish flames and
remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laboratory tests*
Fourth, where the heat reached the fabric layer next to the skin,
uniform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field*
(1) In comparing field with laboratory results, considera-
tion must be given to irradiance, which expresses the time- intensity of
the thermal pulse (cal/cm^/sec). At the highest calorie levels labora-
tory irradiances were much lower than field irradiances* The reason
for this is that an atomic explosion delivers a high quantity of
thermal energy per unit area in a much shorter time than the same
quantity can be delivered over a practical exposure area (1*7 cm diam)
with existing laboratory equipment. For example, approximately 2 sec
are required to deliver 75 cal/cm2 in the laboratory with the carbon
arc operating at peak capacity, an irradiance of 37*5 cal/cmr/sec. 3n
the field this much energy was delivered at the forward stations in
both Shots 9 and 10 in approximately 0*5 sec, an irradiance of 150
cal/cm2/sec*
Irradiances have been varied within the limits possible in the
laboratory, and it has been found that certain levels of thermal
energy will produce a more serious lesion if applied slowly than if
applied rapidly. (18) Beneath the HVf assembly spaced 5 mm from the
skin, for example, a 2* burn was produced when a thermal energy of 17
cal/cm2 was applied in 2 sec (8*5 cal/cm2/sec) but no burn, or at the
most a mild 1+ burn, resulted when the same energy was applied in 0.5
sec (34 cal/cm2/sec). With lower irradiances the fabric may be
scorched or charred but remain intact and thus act as a heat reservoir
from which heat can subsequently be transmitted to the skin. With
higher irradiances, laboratory results indicate that all or part of
the thermal input may be dissipated by an endothermic decomposition
of the fabric* In the field, especially at the closer stations where
irradiances exceeded 35 cal/cm?/sec, conditions were favorable for
such dissipation of energy*
(2) Motion pictures of clothed animals, exposed to 50*0
and 33*5 cal/cm2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouds
U5
of black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ma of the explosion.
There is reason to believe that, in view of the short tine within which
most of the radiant energy from the explosion was delivered, much of
this energy was prevented from reaching the animals by this smoke* In
the laboratory tests* because the exposure area was so much smaller
and the time of energy application at the high calorie levels so much
longer* smoke obscuration appears to be of little or no significance*
(3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not
been duplicated in laboratory applications of thermal energy* has two
possible protective effects* First* it can be expected to extinguish
flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated for fire
resistance, thus removing a source of high heat. Although the blast
wave may not actually extinguish the flame in all cases,* it can be
expected in general to have this effect* Second* the blast wave would
tend to remove any char which* if allowed to remain* would act as a
heat reservoir and increase the likelihood of a severe bum*
(4>) The drape of the uniform may have contributed to a
reduction of thermal injury in the field* in the case of the two- layer
Hot-Wet assemblies* Laboratory tests upon which estimates of protec-
tion in the field were based consisted of the application of energy to
fabrics in tight contact with the animal's skin. Other tests on
cotton fabrics have indicated that spacing the fabric away from the
skin would increase the protection afforded* In the uniforms*
although some fabric areas were in close skin contact, many were
spaced away in normal drape* This fact undoubtedly gave the uniforms
an additional protective value as compared to laboratory tests where
fabrics were held in close skin contact*
4.2 THE ROLE OP THE FLAMEPR00FING TREATMENT
One of the major problems designated for study at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE
was to determine whether materials actually did flame under the
conditions of the test and* if sof how much protection could be
afforded by fire resistant treating the outer layer* The results of
the test show conclusively that flaming and probably glow did occur
in many instances The principal value of the fire retardant used in
these tests j brcninated triallyl phosphate, lay in its prevention of
these exothermic reactions* In seme cases it also seemed to give
additional protection against the primary thermal effects of the ex-
plosion, although in other cases the untreated fabrics gave better
protection than the treated* The peculiar pebbly, blistered* weeping
edema noted in these tests occurred only in pigs wearing the fire
resistant uniforms*
♦The occurrence of persistent flame type burns that require longer to
produce (according to laboratory tests) than the blast arrival time
may indicate that the blast wave does not always extinguish the f3ame.
On the other hand such burns may have been induced by glow.
46
m
B
•3
s
o
e
i
o
I
s
o
I
b u
Si
C U
Jl
IS1
o o
its
CO M
^ u
© 0)
oo
UMA
O o
$
IA
CM
*A*A
OO
O H O <0
tO O tO Q
O ^ O 0^
oooo
tO *AU\tO
GK C^ lO ^N
*A V\*AO O
CM H
8 tO tO tO «A
oc^oo
si
a
Ik
II1
© CD
co h5
© 0)
1
c
o\
•H
O
€>
Q
5
o
u
1*
IS
4> C
cod
o ©
I
9
$
in
WNCMCM WNO O O
H
HOh1>
£S^°^
cn.
tOt0^VQt0^AM>t0^t0WMrvt0 OtOtOtOtp
Q\ o Qv o 0s O O O* O* 0^ tO On 0v O On 0s On O
•
O WN
CM H
•a to
CMOOOOOOOO
OQIAOQ^AWVPO
O 0^ O On u> ^- fr* c*- fr-
U\ WMAO
©
5
tO «f\WMA
©
tO *A
OO
88
ia
On
§
OOQQUNQUNOO
tOtOUMAtptOtOUNO
oo^ooooooo
R8
AIA
*8&8
o
H H
s
o
O O
& 3
WMAWN
• ♦ •
(ACM cl
O
NO
IA
IA*A
3$
o
CM
5$
-.8
A
o
o
UI >
55
in •
0
Q
VI
5
-1
O
UJ o
o
o
o
>4
o ^
m •
0
o
• o
» •
0
M
£ •
0
#s
•
^
1
1 1
1
o
• o
O
o
o
CO
o o o
tf> * M
o
otio pttodxa jo uoipnj|iiQ %
s
1
I
.8
52
• • «
i
O
<\> 1
o
o
lO
e
o
c .
o^
♦ -J
o
o
o
O
o
«*
o
*—*
o
o
o
o
o
o
«0
o
CM
8
c
•
o
o
3#jd pttodxt JO UOipni|f«Q %
otio pttodvt jo uoipni|t»c %
.8
i
O
o
o
o
o
•e
10 cr
v>
o
o
O
tg
*
m
**»•
o
* «o
*—
UJ.
m
• *~
1 «* •
0
*~*Z •
0
UJ %
0
0
8
#
0 "
UJ
•
i
8
u~
—J
_l_
- -L
-..;...
L_
l
E
8*
o
o
o
O
O
o
10
o
o
o
o
o
o
94
08jd pttodvt jo uoipniJttQ •/•
o»io p9iodx» ;o uo||onj|t0O -h
S
i
u
o
o
1
IS
to
Cm
^1
00
CO
OPERATION
WT-1441
f his Jocunent consists tf 50 paps.
Ni. ' it 185 cepies. Secies A
PLUMB BOB
MEVADA TEST SITE
MAY-OCTOBER 1957
oi the/
7 M/r/965
. .- «.-_■■ •■ y-
Project 8.2
AVAILABLE COPY WILL NOT HSRMTT
FULLY LEGIBLE RPPJ-'DtCTiO"?/'"'
!u?fiODUCTION' WILL 2£ ***•■ &&
HEQUESTED BY USERS Gc DDC.
PREDICTION of THERMAL PROTECTION of
UNIFORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a
STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U)
Issuance Date: May 2, 1960
HEADOUARTEftS HELD COMMAND
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
SANDIA 8ASE. AlBUGUERQUE. NEW MEXICO
»>-*,,-*., -.
•:V
JUN7 >*&
XiSlA Q
This material contains Information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws
Title 16, U. S. C, Sees. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which In anv
manner u: *n unauthorised person 1. ?-
hiblter) uy taw.
1.2.2 Comparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burns to Ptge. The improved NML skin
simulant, molded from silica -powder -filled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded
at a depth of 0.05 cm in order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment.
The basic criterion is a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human skin or for a
2+ mild bum to pig skin. This criterion is based on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a
minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mild burn In pig skin) to a second-degree burn In
human skin, (2) an initial skin temperature of 31 C, and (3) correspondence of the thermal pro-
perties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of tndlcent
radiant exposure is estimated to be ± 10 percent. A skin-simulant temperature rise of 20 C or
greater Is estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate pig skin burn,
and a rise of 35 C is estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild pig burn. The latter
estimations, probably accurate to ± 20 percent, are based on pig-burn data obtained at the Uni-
versity of Rochester (Reference 6).
12
CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 2.1 RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN
SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS
Specimen
Radiant Absorptancc
Skin simulant, bare
Skin simulant, blackened
Poplin, Shade 116, 5-oz/yd2
Sateen, gray, 9'Oz/yd2
0.72
0.95
0.63
0.91
15
CONFIDENTIAL
0.4 at .o
Tim, toMownum.Steondt
4 8 12 IS 20
Equivalent Field Rodiont Exposure, col /cm1
DC- P- 1060
31
UNSHIELDED PERSONS
20 40
THERMAL EXPOSURE (cal/cm2)
100
20 H
18 -
3 16
or
S
| 14
£ 12
■
I 10
8 -
6 -
4 -
2 -
Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI)
I
Aamori • \
\
* Barmen %
Freiberg »
• Hiroshima • Fukui \
. Solingen . Friedrickihafen I
• Aachen . uim " Toyama ■ Chosi
. Nagasaki ,Fukuyama
Heilbrann /. Hamburg
Dresden .
/
/ INTENSE
/ FIRESTORMS
I
I
Darmstadt
\ *
\
Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered
by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood
Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading
Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy
Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.
1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) ■
energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water
= 252 calories
Severe firestorms require
600 BTU/sq. mile/second
FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES
i i i
100
700
800
200 300 400 500 600
AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second)
T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire
Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction Proceedings of the Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation;
October, 1967.
CO
Q
<
<
w
CO
W
2
<
Q
Z
<
z
<
w
o
o
w
o
w
2
w
d
X
w
42 cm
CO o
O CM
"35°?
CO Q
no
c
u -^
3 s
or to
09 *d
» sJ
*M
c
o
o
4-»
• •-#
or
V
u
*3
u
a
0>
o
Oh 0«
CO
o
(0
>
o
0)
^ W) ^.
; o
+J +* CO +J
CO tft ^.QV
• • •
m Tt« n n
•r-» •**
$4
VM V-i
•r-»
**4
^ NO
ID ««
O 00
• •
• •
*-• ^
o o
o o
o o
CO CO
o o o o
o o o o
o o o o
CO
I
c
CO
2!
o
0)
3
CD
When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re-
sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more
water loss and the more heat or energy loss.
How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?
Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for
Thermal Burns
ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News
http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462
August 2008
By Patrice Wendling
Elsevier Global Medical News
CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound
dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.
The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has
advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for
almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician,
explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association.
"Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in
an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap
for burn wounds," he said.
Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general
surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap
reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely
available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing
removal.
"I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We
started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those
criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral
base."
Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial-
and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single
layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then
secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed.
Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as
manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination
before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital,
Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll
to expose a clean surface.
LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE
N A T 10 N A L
LABORATORY
UCRL-TR-231593
Thermal Radiation from Nuclear
Detonations in Urban
Environments
R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock
June 7, 2007
Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within
buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded
estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be
greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].
We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a
"radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban
environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction
of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.
6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear
Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment
2007," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt,
R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review.
11
Addendum No. 1
for
DNA 1240H-2, Part 2
HANDBOOK OF
UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
21 January 1974
M. J. Dudash
DAS1AC
General Electric Company* TEMPO
816 State Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93102
CHAPTER TITLE
VOLUME 2 - PART 2
18 SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF
UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL
PAGE
18-1
1? August 1973 CHAPTER 18
18.7 THERMAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS ON SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL
18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria
Table 18-2
CDC NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION CRITERIA
New Thermal Radiation Criteria
■ ■i-i m im m i — — ■ — — — — m i i i
Rtek Criteria for Burns Under Summer Uniforms to Warned » Exposed Personnel
7. Incidence Mechanism tOKT cal/cm'
100KT cal/cm2 lOOOiCT cal/cm2
Negligible
Moderate
Emergency
2.5
5
5
1 burn
1 burn
2° burn
3.1
3.7
6.3
4.2
5.0
8.8
5.8
6.8
12
Time to Ineffectiveness
24.hr
Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns
% Incidence 10KT cal/cm2 100KT cal/cm2
50
38
53
1000KT cal/cm4
73
Personnel Risk and Casualty Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects
ACN 4260, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear
Studies, August 1971
EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY
ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT
Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46
NM 006-015
25 April 1955
by
E. L. Alpen
C.P. Butler
S.B. Martin
A.K. Davis
U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
San Francisco 24, California
For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for
production of a standard burn are the following:
.tA,
.tBi
•Ci
itiri
, \ = 0.42/;, r = 24.4 + 3.5 per cent, Q = 3.20 + 0.37cal/cm2;
IDftX
filter '
filter '
filter ■
filter *
filter •
The ranges shown are standard deviations.
, X = 0.55^, r = 40.9 + 3.8 per cent, Q = 3.25 ± 0.28cal/cm2;
, Xmav = 0.65/x, r = 56.9 ± 2.5 per cent, Q = 9.9 ± 2.1 cal/cm2;
, X_ = 0.85«, r = 53.4 + 2.2 per cent, Q = 14.0 + 1.1 cal/cm2;
max ^ ~ *
FM, \ = 1.7/i, r = 17 + 0.60 per cent, Q = 2.50 cal/cm2 (approx.)
uldX
The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and
the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0.7 to 1.0 has been
presented.
SUMMARY
The Problem
How does the critical energy for the production of standard burns in
both rats and humans vary with the wavelength of radiant energy?
Findings
The critical radiant energy, corrected for spectral reflectance, re-
quired for production of standard burns in both rat and human skin varies
as much as 4^old depending on the wavelength.
AD689495 MASS BURNS
Proceedings of a Workshop
13 - 14 March 1968
Sponsored
by
The Committee on Fire Research
Division of Engineering
National Research Council
and the
Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army
Published
by
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
1969
Dr. Edward L. Alpen (U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory);
About this question of the spectral dependence of radiant energy, I
think Dr. Haynes may have given you the impression that white light
does the trick. There is later work which tends to refute that. The
work done at Virginia used cut-off filters. The effectiveness of all
energy above a certain wave length or below a certain wave length was
measured. At the upper end the most effective and the least effective
were mixed together and made it appear that infrared was not too good
in producing burns. When you subdivide the spectrum, the most effective
energy in producing a flash burn is the infrared above about 1.2 microns.
The importance of this, and the only reason I make an issue of
it, is that a very important source of flash burn, both in civilian
life and under wartime disaster conditions, is radiant energy burns
from flaming sources. We have done a great deal of research on this
subject for the U. S. Forest Service, because radiant energy burns are
important in forest fires.
Energy in the wave lengths of 0.6 to 0.8 micron is about one-
eighth as destructive as the rest of the spectrum. But long wave
length radiation above one micron is extremely destructive, and the
most effective of all.
49
Dr. Alpen; Anything that shields out
radiation above one micron is extremely effective in preventing burns
to the skin.
50
RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Durham, North Carolina
Final Report R-85-l
CRASH CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM STUDY
by
AD0403071 *•*-£;
April 30, 1963
Prepared for
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- D-2 -
Feasibility
In the typical household, some materials will generally be available for
covering windows against thermal radiation. One half roll of aluminum foil would
2
cover about 25 ft and would provide very effective covering for 1 to 2 windows
(those most likely to face the blast). Sufficient quantities of either light
colored paint, Bon Ami, or whiting would be available in most households to
cover windows. Aluminum screens attenuate from 30 - 50% of the thermal radiation
and hence screens should be closed or installed*
2
Hie amount of water per square foot required to dissipate 25 cal/cm of
thermal radiation can quickly be calculated from the heat of vaporization of
water (580 cal/gm). Allowing 90% losses due to absorption or spillage, one
2
gallon of water is sufficient to wet 10 ft of material so that it can withstand
2
25 cal/cm of direct thermal radiation (i*c«, the radiation is normal to the
material surface at all points). Since the average daily water consumption per
service (Reference 3) is about 700 gallons, it is apparent that the wetting of
interior flammables (piled up curtains, furniture, etc) is feasible in most
cases when used in conjunction with the other measures,
3. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, Washington U. S,
Government Printing Office* 1962,
HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT
MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE
Volume I
PAMPHLET No. 1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956
The probable fire situation in a British city
35 Japanese houses are constructed of wood and once they were set on
fire they continued to burn even when knocked over. In this country
only about 10 per cent, of all the material in the average house is
combustible, and under conditions of complete collapse, where air
would be almost entirely excluded, it is doubtful whether a fire could
continue on any vigorous scale.
40 It seems unlikely from the evidence available that an initial density
of fires equivalent to one in every other building would be started by a
nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that a much
smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to thermal
radiation and even then it is not certain that continuing fires would
develop. Curtains may catch fire, but it does not necessarily follow that
they will set light to the room; in the last war it was found that only
one incendiary bomb out of every six that hit buildings started a
continuing fire.
From a 10 megaton bomb, with its longer lasting thermal
radiation (see paragraph 21), it takes about 20 calories per square
centimetre to start fires because so much of the heat (spread out over
the longer emission) is wasted by conduction into the interior of the
combustible material and by convection and re-radiation whilst the
temperature of the surface is being raised to the ignition point. But
the distance at which 20 calories per square centimetre can be produced
is only 11 miles, so that the scaling factor for a 10 megaton airburst
bomb is therefore 11 and not 22.
43 For a ground burst bomb, however, several other factors contribute
to a further reduction in the fire range. Apart from an actual loss of
heat by absorption into the ground and from the pronounced shielding
effect of buildings, the debris from the crater tends to reduce the
jadiating temperature or me nrepau ana a greater proportion of the"
energy is consequently radiated in the infra red region of the spectrum
r— this proportion being more easily absorbed by the atmosphere.
44 An important point in relation to personal protection against the
effects of hydrogen bomb explosions is that because the thermaT
radiation lasts so long there is more time for people who may be
caught m the open, and who may be well beyond the range of serious
danger from blast, to rush to cover and so escape some part of the
exposure. JFor example, people in the open might receive second
degree burns (blistering) on exposed skin at a range of 16 miles from a
~10 megaton ground burst bomb (8X2— see paragraph 24). If.
however, they could take cover in a few seconds they would escape
this damage. Moreover, at this range the blast wave would not arrive
for another minute and a half so that any effects due to the blast in
the open (e.g. flying glass, etc.) could be completely avoided. —
ADA383988 Nmemb" 196i
Second printing May 1964
Unclassified Version
SURVEY OF THE THERMAL THREAT
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Prepared for:
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
By: Jack C. Rogers and T. Miller
SRI Project No. MU-4021
Approved:
QoM-^-dJL^.
ROBERT A. HARKGR, DIRECTOR
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES DIVISION
OCD REVIEW NOTICE
This report represents the authors1 views, which in general are in harmony with the
technical criteria of the Office of Civil Defense. However, a preliminary evaluation
by OCD indicatos the need for further evaluation of the fire threat of nuclear weapons
and formulation of promising research and action programs.
NOTE: discrepancies are due to HUMIDITY differences.
ENCORE nuclear test (Nevada desert) humidity was ONLY 19%
A
o
d
I
Sc
o
r-t
H
g g
r-»
o
w
w
I
r-t
is
8
I
s
I
hi
o
-p
cd
hi
o
en «
Ok
rH m
*■* 10
C
• o
;*
48 o
■d
o
o 2
•H
cd q
OS S
u
2 d
o
r-t bH
C8 I
o
o
to
tfi
CO
CI
&
00
CJ
lO
o
o
CO
9
* to
ift CO
o
M
u
a
-a
to
o
ft
hi
&
cd
hi
T3
c
o
4->
0
o
Li
>> o
> l-t
cd O
0) o
X
9
m
r-t
O
&
3
a» ci
01 > u
co ai he
* m
3 A -H
co -a
•HO U
a sj of
* a sc
0)
©
r-t
I
©
22
N
CI
(O
0
o
c
o
to
to
01
in
c
a
(0
©
V
O
(A
*■>
O
0)
w
o
«H
rt
O
to
m
CO
■a
c
tn
3
0)
g
to
ITS
CI
to
u
0
hi
g
•M
0
ti 2
V)
*)
-M
r-*
(0
OJ
rH J3
0
^-t
V
*4
A 0)
0
£
PI
a -m
3 *H
a
tn
c »
X!
3
O
0 tfi
*J 9
r-«
** 3
01
A
u
bo
L,
at
a> .
i-t
c
cd -
>
■ §
cd
•H
O T3
cd
JZ
to
0)
eo
0 0
0
t* 10
^H
4J J-l
3 43
Q)
u
& a
(0
cd
■H
a
cd K
a cj>
3
O
d C
a
cd
3
0 0
O
a
+j 4)
•O
+j a>
»H
c
CO
44 T3
«ri
*-» u
O
•(-t
*
Lt to
O
O bfi
O
T>
J5?
,^
u
^
2
«
a
to
10
cd
j-
bfi
0>
(A
hi
J
to
(0
o
u
■o
c
C
o
hi
§
cd
cd
10
o>
hi
i
(A
a>
o
hi
B-73
Martin, S. B. , On Predicting the Ignition Susceptibility of Typical Kin-
dling Fuels to Ignition by the Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Det-
onations, Tech. Report 367, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory,
San Francisco, Calif., April 1959. (U)
A SURVEY OF THE WEAPONS AND HAZARDS WHICH MAY FACE
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WARTIME
Harold L. Brode
P-3170
June 1965
-15-
Host exposed surfaces in the city are
non- combustible and much of the rssiainder is not ignitable by thermal
flash. Although many fires could simultaneously start wherever build-
ing interiors are illuminated by the bomb thermal energy, they are
not likely to be immediately beyond control , and will often go out
unattended as they exhaust the available fuel (as in trash barrels or
isolated wood piles or even pieces of paper on tables or floors) .
Hanging non-flaomable shields over
window openings and removing likely fuels from exposed positions
could also help.
RAND CORPORATION
100
i
UJ U
It
8 «
a- z
x -
^ 5
< t
ac —
a:
o
< 50
1 — I i M II II
WIND REL.
- M.PH. HUMIDITY
- I I 50%
-Z I 50%
- 3 I 50%
4 0 42%
H 5 I 50%
6 I 50%
Mill
10
IKT
REALISTIC CITY HUMIDITY
.(UNLIKE NEVADA DESERT)
— ^— — -
-
-•
j
I. WEATHERED CHEAT GRASS
m
^-L
3. RAYQN. CHARCOAL
CO
I I
o
I—
z
LU
O
0£
■No Fire fighting
7.5% of population
respond I0 minutes
after detonation
7.5% of population,
immediate response
20 40 60 80
MINUTES AFTER DETONATION
100
I20
^^H
^^k
s^Am
:l»hki^:[»hTTTno
Folded newspapers may not take
f i re, but loosely crumpled ones will.
The* answer? Get rid of trash.
A wet mop or broom will snuff
out small fires. So will a burlap
bag or a small rug soaked in water.
Buckets of water and sand are
essential.
Water is an effective fire fight-
ing agent because it smothers and
cools at the same time.
FIRE-BOMBS rained
on London
They did not all tall on roads
P^^S^fl l^j^fl
L 1 8
^■b^-*.
.^ , af
^to«M?* .^uid^^E
Jv^ 0**
•
*3BS
THE LUFTWAFFE SOUGHT A KNOCK-OUT BLOW. The first impact of the attack
fell on the docks. The great day raid of 7th September, 1940, which was continued through-
out the night and renewed on many nights after, left miles of fires blazing along either
bank of the Thames. This is St. Katherine's Dock on the night of nth September.
Amended Reprint
June, 1940
Crown Copyright Reserved
Am Raid Precautions
HANDBOOK No. 9
{1st edition)
INCENDIARY BOMBS
AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS
Issued by the
Ministry of Home Security
LONDON
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
Kilo Magnesium Incendiary Bomb 15 Seconds After Ignition.
45 Seconds
Fire Controlled by Water
Clothing on fire.
Never allow a person whose clothes are on fire to
remain standing for a moment. Fatalities nearly always
arise from shock of burning about the face and head.
If the person starts to run, trip him up at once. Roll
him on the floor or in a coat or blanket if you have one
handy. If your own clothes catch fire, clap your hand
over your mouth, and lie down and roll.
3
I
Fig. i — Typical
Kilo Magnesium
Incendiary Bomb.
sheet
Plug.
magnesium
alloy
JSafefypin
'Fuse,
magnesium
alloy
Fig- 2— Typical Kilo
Magnesium Incendiary Bomb.
Sectional Drawing.
Restricted
For Official Use
Civil Defence
training pamphlet no, 2
(3rd Edition)
OBJECTS DROPPED
FROM THE AIR
Issued By the Ministry of Home Security
Crown Copyright Reserved
LONDON
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1944
Price 6d. net
Copies will be sold only on written application by a Clerk to a local
authority, a Chief Constable, a principal of a public utility company, or by
County Secretaries of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, British Red Cross
Society, and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association to H.M. STATIONERY
OFFICE at any of the following addresses: York House, Kingsway, London,
W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh; 39-41 King Street, Manchester 2;
I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 80 Chichester Street, Belfast.
TAIL
UNIT
INCENDIARY
UNIT
DlA.I-96-
t RECESS USUALLY
FILLED
WITH
INSULATING
TAPE.
FUZE
1
DELAYED
ACTION
EXPLOSIVE
UNIT
._JN FLAMMABLE
^ALLOY CASE
r
MAIN
INCENDIARY
FILLING
:AP (PRIMER)
WHICH FIRES
MAIN INCENDIARY
FILLING.
DETONATOR
WHICH FIRES
CAR TO INCENDIARY FILLING
ANO TRAIN LEADING TO
fTIME fuze;
WHICH FIRES
DETONATOR
WHICH IN TURN FIRES
MAIN
EXPLOSIVE
HAROC
STEEL EXPLOSIVE
►CONTAINER
NOSE
COVER
Figure 12A. — German Incendiary Bomb with Explosive Nose
TECHNICAL
GUIDANCE
To obtain some protection from the heat it is necessary to move out of the direct path of
the rays from the fireball; any kind of shade will be of some value.
A fire-storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily
built up with buildings containing plenty of combustible material and where at least every
other building in the area had been set alight. It is not considered that the initial density
of fires, equivalent to one in every other building, would be caused by a nuclear explosion
over a British city. Studies have shown that due to shielding, a much smaller proportion
of buildings than this would be exposed to the heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the
centres of most British cities are now more fire-resistant and more widely spaced than they
were 30 to 40 years ago. This low risk of fire-storms would be reduced still further by the
control of small initial and secondary fires.
3
A HOME OFFICE GUIDE
P-3026
FIREBALL PHENOMENOLOGY
Harold L. Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica , California
This paper was prepared for presentation at The Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Panel Meeting, Panel N3, held at the Joint Fire
Service College, Dorking, England, 5-9 October 1964. The papers are
to be published by Defense Atomic Support Agency.
Fig. 20— Surface burst features influencing thermal radiation
TRINITY (19 KT AT 100 FT ALTITUDE, 16 JULY 1945)
SHOCK WAVE
0.025 SEC.
N
100 METERS
MACH
STEM
INSTRUMENT
HUTS
CINNIENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL TM 23200
BEPARTMENTOFTHENAVY OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400 IB
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFL 136"1
MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS NAVMC 1104 REV
CAPABILITIES
OF
ATOMIC WEAPONS (U)
Prepared by
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY
AND THE AIR FORCE
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957
CINNIENTIAL
46NMDLNIIAL
Personnel in structures. A major cause of
personnel casualties in cities is structural
collapse and damage. The number of
casualties in a given situation may be
reasonably estimated if the structural
damage is known. Table 6-1 shows
estimates of casualty production in two
types of buildings for several damage
levels. Data from Section VII may be
used to predict the ranges at which
specified structural damage occurs. Dem-
olition of a brick house is expected to
result in approximately 25 percent mor-
tality, with 20 percent serious injury
and 10 percent light injury. On the
order of 60 percent of the survivors must
be extricated by rescue squads. Without
rescue they may become fire or asphyxi-
ation casualties, or in some cases be
subjected to lethal doses of residual
radiation. Reinforced concrete struc-
tures, though much more resistant to
blast forces, produce almost 100 percent
mortality on collapse. The figures of
table 6-1 for brick homes are based on
data from British World War II expe-
rience. It may be assumed that these
predictions are reasonably reliable for
those cases where the population is in a
general state of expectancy of being
subjected to bombing and that most
personnel have selected the safest places
in the buildings as a result of specific
air raid warnings. For cases of no
prewarning or preparation, the number
of casual ties is expected to be considerably
higher.
6-2
Glass breakage extends to considerably
greater ranges than almost any other
structural damage, and may be expected
to produce large numbers of casualties
at ranges where personnel are relatively
safe from other effects, particularly for
an unwarned population.
Table 6-1. Estimated Casualty Production in Structures
for Various Degrees of Structural Damage
1-2 story brick homes (high ex-
plosive data):
Severe damage
Moderate damage
Light damage
Killed
outright
Percent
25
<5
Serious
injury
(hospi-
taliza-
tion)
Percent Percent
Light
injury
(No hos-
pitaliza-
tion)
20
10
<5
10
5
<5
Note. These percentages do not include the casualties which may result
from fires, asphyxiation, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped
personnel. The numbers represent the estimated percentage of casualties
expected at the mutamm range where the specified structural damage occurs.
Personnel in a prone position
are less likely to be struck by flying mis-
siles than those who remain standing.
6-3
Table 6-2. Critical Radiant Exposures for Burns Under
Clothing
(Expressed in cal/cm7 incident on outer surface of cloth)
Clothing
Summer Uniform
(2 layers)
Winter Uniform,
(4 layers)
Burn
1°
1 KT
100 KT
8
11
2°
20
25
1°
60
80
2°
70
90
10 MT
14
35
100
120
6-4
CMtfWCtlliAL
2.1c (1) FIGURE 2-6 GROWTH OF THE MACH STEM
Region of Moch Reflection
Region of Regular
Reflection
FIGURE 2-7 MACH STEM HEIGHT (I KT) ^-^-^
1000 "^^E
eoo rE
I
600 r.. --=rrJ •;..-= . ../ =ZT:
* €00
5i
o
200
1000
eoo
400 *.--==--* —J -z=^J.
400
- 200
200 400
600 600 1000
Horizontal Range (yards)
1200 1400
CQHrHENTUL
3.1
SECTION III
THERMAL RADIATION PHENOMENA
3.1 General
For a surface burst having the same yield as an
air burst, the presence of the earth's surface
results in a reduced thermal radiation emission
and a cooler fireball when viewed from that surface.
This is due primarily to heat transfer to the soil
or water, the distortion of the fireball by the
reflected shock wave, and the partial obscuration
of the fireball by dirt and dust (or water) thrown
up by the blast wave.
fUMH'IVLNIIAL 3-1
Measurements from the ground of the total
thermal energy from surface bursts, although not
as extensive as those for air bursts, indicate that
the thermal yield is a little less than half that
from equivalent air bursts. For a surface burst the
thermal yield is assumed to be one-seventh of the
total yield.
3-2
n 3.16X10" W (T) .. , . , v
C=» js cal/sq cm (air burst).
and
n 1.35X 1loii tv.ili)
9
Olive
Tears on
flexing
8
14
22
Draper \ Fabrics
Ravon gabardine
6
Black
Ignites
9
20
26
Rj>on-acetaie draper)
5
Wine
Ignites
9
22
28
Ra>on gabardine
7
Cold
Igniies
••
24*
28*
Rj\on twili Inline
3
Black
Ignites
7
17
25
Rayon twill lining
3
Biege
Ignites
13
20
2S
Aceiaie-shamung
3
Black
Ignites
10*
22+
35+
Cotton l*e*v\ dt aperies
13
Djrk colors
Igniies
IS
18
34
Tent Fabric*
Canvas (cotton 1
12
White
Ignites
13
28
51
Canvas
12
Olive drab
Ignites
12
18
28
Other Fabrics
•
Cotton chenille bedspread
Light blue
Ignites
•*
11+
15+
Cotton Venetian blind lape.
White
Ignites
10
18
■»->
+■*-
ditty
Cotton Venetian blind tape
White
Ignites
13+
27+
31+
Cotton muslin window shade
8
Green
Ignites
7
13
19
^ft Radiant exposures for the indicated responses levcept where marked ♦ I are estimated to be valid to t}$% under
Hdjid bbotaioi) conditions. Under typical field conditions the values are estimated to be valid within ±50% with a
greater likelihood of hajher rather than lower values. Foe materials multcd t* «A>i*on levels are tsimuud to be valid
within ±505 undet laborator) conditions and within ±104?* undet field conditions. For low air bursts, values of t^^ of
0,2. 1.0. and 3.2 sec correspond roughly to yields of 40 kt, 2 Ml, and 24 Ml. rteptctivel) \
[ftau are not available oj appfopiiiie scaling not known.
*
9-26
3-2 Bangs Effects
As the thermal energy propagates away
from the fireball, the divergence that results
from the increasing area through which it passes
causes the radiant exposure to decrease as the
inverse square of the slant range. At a slant range
R centimeters from the source, the thermal
energy is distributed over a spherical area of
4nR2 . Since the thermal yield in calories is 101 2
Wf , where W is the yield in kilotons, the radi-
ant exposure at a distance J? cm in a clear atmo-
sphere is
Q = — cal/cm2.
4*RZ
Adding the transmittance factor to the
equations given in paragraph 3-2 gives
Q e 7.96 WfT ^
*km
*kni * x82 w7va
The scattering and absorption properties
of the atmosphere depend partly on the wave-
length of the radiant energy. Wavelength is often
measured in microns (1 micron =10** meter),
for which the symbol is jt. Wavelengths in the
visible spectrum may be identified by the rela-
tion between wavelength and color: light with a
wavelength of 0.7 ft is red; 0.58 §i light is yellow;
and 0.48 p Tight is blue. White light is a mixture
containing all wavelengths in the visible spec-
trum, which extends from 038 to 0.78 m* The
infrared spectrum consists of radiant energy at
wavelengths longer than 0.78 jt, and the ultra-
violet spectrum consists of radiant energy at
wavelengths shorter than 0.38 p.
The energy transport properties of atmo-
spnenc particles may be expressed in terms of
scattering and absorption cross sections, which
are fictitious areas that are a measure of the
probability that scattering or absorption will
occur. Particles that are small compared to the
wavelength of light have scattering cross sections
that are inversely proportional to the fourth
power of the wavelength. Therefore, air mole-
cules scatter light from the extreme blue end of
the visible spectrum (wavelength = 038 m) about
16 times as effectively as they scatter light from
the red end of the spectrum (wavelength = 0.78
M).
The sky is blue because most of the scat-
tering at high altitudes is by air molecules, which
scatter blue light more efficiently than they scat-
ter other colors of the visible spectrum. A dis-
tant mountain appears blue on a clear day for
the same reason.
The principal absorber of thermal energy
usually is water vapor, which has strong absorp-
tion bands in the infrared spectrum. Dry air
transmits infrared energy more efficiently than
humid air. Carbon dioxide and other gases pres-
ent in the atmosphere in small amounts also
absorb infrared energy.
Ultraviolet energy is absorbed most
strongly at the shorter wavelengths: the limiting
wavelength that air in the lower atmosphere will
transmit is about 0.2 micron. Ozone, appreciable
quantities of which are found between roughly
60,000 and 80,000 feet, absorbs ultraviolet
radiation with wavelengths shorter than 0.29
micron. As a result of these absorption bands
ultraviolet energy that reaches the earth from
the sun is almost entirely limited to the spectral
band between 0.38 micron (the violet edge of
the visible spectrum) and 0.29 micron.
The attenuation for light of
0.65 micron wavelength was used to specify
r
-
1
»
-
-
-
1
:
"
-
»
-
m
•
1
. .J --,
1
I
|
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 O.t 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.* 1.8 2.0
RATIO OF SLANT RANGE TO VISUAL RANGE (RW,
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8
Thermal flash on forest leaf canopy produces smoke-screen
(in Nevada and Pacific nuclear tests), shadowing dry leaf litter
Fuels seldom burn vigorously, regardless of
The high degree of shading by tree crowns wind conditions, when fuel moisture content ex-
ana stems for detonations at or below the canopy ceeds about 16 percent. This corresponds to an
level often may be offset by scattering of burn- equilibrium moisture content for a condition of
ing debris ignited within the fireball. 15-59 80 percent relative humidity. 15-50
Figure 15-41.
30 40 50
ELEVATION ANGLE (degrees)
Probability of Exposure of Forest Floor for Different
Levels of Tree Density
Table 15-13
Burning Durations by Fuel Type
Violent Burning
Residual Burning
Fuel Type
Time
(min)
Energy
Release
(percent)
Time
(min)
Energy
Release
(percent)
Total Burning
Time
Grass
1.5
90
0.5
10
30 min
Light Brush
(12 tons/acre)
2.
60
6.
40
16 hr
Medium Brush
(25 tons/acre)
6.
50
24.
50
36 hr
Heavy Brush
(40 tons/acre)
10.
40
70.
60
72 hr
Timber
24.
17
157.
83
7 days
Table 15-11
Criteria of "No-Spread" of Fires
Fuel Type
Criteria
All forest fuels
Grass
Brush or hardwoods
Conifer timber
Over I inch of snow on the ground at the nearest weatherstations.
Relative humidity above 80 percent.
0.1 inch of precipitation or more within the past 7 days and:
Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 60 percent or higher, or
Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 75 percent or higher, or
Wind 1 1 -25 mph; relative humidity 85 percent or higher.
1 . One day or less since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and:
Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 50 percent higher, or
Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 75 percent higher, or
Wind 1 1-25 mph; relative humidity 85 percent or higher.
2. Two to three days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and;
Wind 0-3 mph; relative humidity 60 percent or higher, or
Wind 4-10 mph; relative humidity 80 percent or higher, or
Wind 1 1-25 mph; relative humidity 90 percent or higher.
3. Four to five days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and wind 0-3 mph; relative
humidity 80 percent or higher.
4. Six to seven days since at least 0.25 inch of precipitation and wind 0-3 mph; relative
humidity 90 percent or higher.
shielding from the wind and shading from sun-
light by the canopy. The spread or no-spread
criteria are summarized in Table 15-11. This
table lists the conditions under which fire would
noUje expected to spread.
■ I The criteria of Table 15-11 have been
compared to the records of 4378 wild land fires.
Of the fires for which "no spread" would be pre-
dicted, 97.8 percent did not spread; only 40 per-
cent of the fires that were predicted to spread
actually did spread (at a rate of 0.005 mph or
faster). This failure to spread often may be at-
tributable to lack of fuel continuity around the
ooint of origin.
I ■ The criteria of Table 15-11 are considered
tone reliable for American forests and suitably
conservative to assure a low level of hazard to
friendly forces. On the other hand, the criteria
are probably not overly conservative to predict
conditions for which enemy forces may be denied
forested areas because of fire whenever the local
weather history and conditions at the time of
15-61
14*10 Fire Damage
Damage to equipment by fire is referred
to in some damage reports. Although some 20
occurrences have been noted, they involved only
a very small percentage of the equipment ex-
posed. Most fires appealed to be secondary in
nature, that is, they were not started by direct
thermal radiation ignition. Two equipment items
were burned during nuclear tests under exposure
conditions in which they could have received
virtually no thermal radiation. In addition, a
I /4-ton true* exposed at a 100-ton high explo-
sive test (in which thermal radiation was neg-
ligible) also burned.
The damage to a 6-kVA generator ex-
posed on a U.K. test is particularly interesting.
In the damage report the notation is made, "Fire
may have stamd from fuel from broken car-
buretor spilling on hot muffler." U.K. practice
at nuclear tests was to expose running equip-
ment, that is, the engines were running at the
time of the explosion. The six recorded occur-
rences of fires on U.K. tests represents a consid-
erably larger percentage (about 10 percent) of
all U.K. equipment exposed than does the num-
ber of fires recorded on U.S. tests. Since this
may be due to the U.K. practice of running
engines during a test, the incidence of secondary
fires in an operational situation may be higher
than the U.S. test data indicate.
Seager, E. R. Drake, R. F. C. Butler, Operation TOTEM Group 12 Report: Effects on a
Landmrer (car, 3 CWT, 4x4) and Generating Sets AWRE Report T 79/54(x), FWE-
131, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, Berks, England, September
1956
14-67
SURVIVAL IN FIRE AREAS
The best documented fire storm in his-
tory'(but not the one causing the greatest loss of
life) occurred in Hamburg, Germany during the
night of July 27-28, 1943, as a result of an
incendiary raid by Allied forces. Factors that
contributed to the fire included the high fuel
loading of the area and the large number of
b^^igs ignited within a short period of time.
^ The main raid lasted about 30 minutes.
Since the air raid warning and the first high ex-
plosive bombs caused most people to seek shel-
ter, few fires were extinguished during the at-
tack. By the time the raid ended, roughly half
the buildings in the 5 square-mile fire storm area
were burning, many of them intensely. The fire
storm developed rapidly and reached its peak in
tw^r three hours.
mm Many people were driven from their
snelters and then found that nearly everything
was burning. Some people escaped through the
streets; others died in the attempt; others return-
ed to their shelters and succumbed to carbon
«xide poisoning.
i Estimates of the number that were killed
range from about 40,000 to 55,000. Most of the
deaths resulted from the fire storm. Two equally
heavy raids on the same city (one occurred two
nights earlier; the other, one night later) did not
produce tire storms, and they resulted in death
rates that have been estimated to be nearly an
order of magnitude lower.
»More surprising than the number killed
number of survivors. The population Of
the fire storm area was roughly 280,000. Esti-
mates have been made that about 45,000 were
rescued, 53,000 survived in non-basement shel-
ters, and 140,000 either survived in basement
shelters or escaped by their own initiative.
9-25
Causes of Death
The evidence that can be reconstructed
from such catastrophes as the Hamburg fire
storm indicates that carbon monoxide and ex-
cessive heat are the most frequent causes of
death in mass fires. Since the conditions that
offer protection from these two hazards gener-
ally provide protection from other hazards as
well, the following discussion is limited to these
two causes of death.
» Carbon Monoxide. Burning consists of a
of physical and chemical reactions. For
most common fuels, one of the last of the reac-
tions is the burning of carbon monoxide to form
carbon dioxide near the tips of the flames. If the
supply of air is limited, as it is likely to be if the
fire is in a closed room or at the bottom of a pile
of debris from a collapsed building, the carbon
monoxide will not burn completely. Fumes from
the fire will contain a large amount of this taste-
less^dorless, toxic gas.
p During the Hamburg fire, many base-
ment shelters were exposed to fumes. Imperfect-
ly fitting doors and cracks produced by explod-
ing bombs allowed carbon monoxide to pene-
trate these shelters. The natural positions of
many of the bodies recovered after the raid indi-
cated that death had often come without warn-
ing, as is frequently the case for carbon, mon-
oxide poisoning.
I ■ Carbon monoxide kills by forming a
more stable compound with hemoglobin than
either oxygen or carbon dioxide will form.
These latter are the two substances that hemo-
globin ordinarily carries through the blood
stream. Carbon monoxide that is absorbed by
the blood reduces the oxygen carrying capacity
of the blood, and the victim dies from oxygen
deficiency.
Jm As a result of the manner that carbon
noxide acts, it can contribute to the death of
a person who leaves a contaminated shelter to
attempt escape through the streets of a burning
city. A person recovering from a moderate case
of carbon monoxide poisoning may feel well
while he is resting, but his blood may be unable
9-28
to supply the oxygen his body needs when he
exerts himself. After the air raid at Hamburg,
victims of carbon monoxide poisoning, appar-
ently in good health, collapsed and died from
the strain of walking away from a shelter. It is
suspected that many of the people who died in
the streets of Hamburg were suffering from
incipient carbon monoxide poisoning.
mm Meat. The body cools itself by perspira-
tion. When the environment is so hot that this
method fails, body temperature rises. Shortly
thereafter, the rate of perspiration decreases
rapidly, and. unless the victim finds immediate
relief from the heat, he dies of heat exhaustion.
Death from excessive heat may occur in an in-
adequately insulated shelter: it also may occur in
the streets if a safe area cannot be located in a
short time.
9*26 Shelters
The results of the Hamburg fire storm
illustrate the value of shelters during an intense
mass fire. The public air raid shelters in Ham*
burg had very heavy walls to resist large bombs.
Reinforced concrete three feet thick represented
typical walls. Some of these shelters were fitted
with gas proof doors to provide protection from
poison gas. These two features offered good pro-
tection from the heat and toxic gases generated
by the fire storm.
fi The public shelters were of three types:
Bunkers. These were large buildings of
several shapes and sizes, designed to with-
stand direct hits by large bombs. The fire
storm area included 1 9 bunkers designed to
hold a total of about 15,000 people. Prob-
ably twice this number occupied the
bunkers during the fire storm, and all of
these people survived.
• Splinterproof Sttelters. These were long
single story shelters standing free of other
buildings and protected by walls of rein-
forced concrete at least 2-1/2 feet thick.
No deaths resulting from the fire storm
were reported among occupants of these
shelters. These structures were not gas-
proof. Distance from burning structures
and low height of the shelters probably
provided protection from carbon mon-
oxide.
• Basement Shelters, The public shelters that
were constructed in large basements had
ceilings of reinforced concrete 2 to 5 feet
thick. Although reports indicate that some.
of the occupants of these shelters survived
and some did not, statistics to indicate the
chance of survival in such structures are not
available.
• Private Basement Shelters. Private base-
ments were constructed solidly, but most
of them lacked the insulating value of very
thick walls and the protection of gas-tight
construction. Emergency exits (usually
leading to another shelter in an adjacent
building) could be broken if collapse of the
building caused the normal exit to be
blocked. As a result of the total destruction
in the fire storm area, this precaution was
of limited value. Many deaths occurred in
these shelters as a result of carbon mon-
oxide poisoning, and the condition of the
bodies indicated that intolerable heat fol-
lowed the carbon monoxide frequently. In
some cases, the heat preceded the poison-
ous gas and was the cause of death. Gen-
erally, these shelters offered such a small
amount of protection that the occupants
were forced out within 1 0 to 30 minutes.
Most of these people were able to move
through the streets and escape. Others were
forced out later when the fire storm was
nearer its peak intensity, and few of these
escaped. A few people survived in private
basement shelters.
9-29
Air Blmt from Weapon* with
Enhanced Radiation Outputs
COLD WEAPON
lkeV«ll,600.000°K
1 keV
HOT WEAPON
lOkeV
hi
o
DISTANCE FROM BURST
Figure 2-67 Energy Deposition in Air
Rough calculation may be made,
However, by applying the following rule of
thumb to weapons with enhanced outputs: blast
calculations for a given radius may be based on a
weapon yield that is equal to the amount of
energy contained in the sphere defined by that
radius. As this rule implies, the blast wave, as it
propagates outward, picks up hydrodynamic
energy from the heated air through which it
2-140
THE THERMAL PULSE
SPECIAL WEAPONS
FROM
As stated in paragraph 2-45, Chapter
2, weapons that have enhanced radiation out-
puts, i.e., weapons that produce a large fraction
of their output in the form of neutrons, gamma
rays^rX-rays
■ BviU, in most "cases, generate a weaker
olas^Jave than a nominal weapon of the same
yield. Similarly, the thermal pulse from such
special weapons may be weaker than that from a
nominal weapon. The explanation for the re-
duced thermal output is the same as the explana-
tion for a weaker blast wave: neutrons, gamma
rays, ana . . ~ r, energy X-rays travel much farther
through the atmosphere than the energy from a
conventional weapon; therefore, a large portion
of the weapon energy may be absorbed by air
far from the burst. This air will not become suf-
ficiently hot to contribute effectively to either
the blast wave or to the thermal pulse.
^^^^ The terms "nominal weapon" and
"conventional weapon" used in the preceding
paragraph refer to a nuclear weapon that radi-
neari
rcent of its energy as X-rays
^^^land re-
ariy an 01 tne remaining energy as ther-
mal and kinetic energy of the weapon debris (see
paragraph 4-4, Chapter 4).
3-17 Effective Thermal Yield
of Special Weapons
The modified thermal effects pro-
duced by weapons with enhanced outputs may
be calculated in terms of an effective thermal
yield. This is defined as the yield that a nominal
warhead would have in order to radiate the same
thermal energy as the special weapon.
3-67
Effective thermal yield is roughly the
amount of energy that the nuclear source de-
posits within a sphere the size of the fireball at
the time of the principal minimum. This radius
is
29 W036
nun
(p/Po>f
0L22
meters,
where W is the weapon yield in kOotons, p is the
ambient air density at the burst altitude, and p0
is the ambient density at sea level
Energy that is deposited beyond the radius
Rmin is assumed to make a negligible contribu-
tion to the energy radiated by the fireball
Since the size of the fireball is deter-
mined by the thermal energy it contains, it
would be logical to let W represent effective
thermal yield rather than total weapon yield. To
do this requires a trial-and-error approach.
The components of energy deposited with-
in Rmin of the burst are added together Jo
Obtain the effective thermal yield
UJ
H
u.
U
O
u
z
o
UJ
CO
CO
<
K> I0f
PHOTON ENERGY (ktV)
Figure 4-4.
Mass Attenuation Coefficients for Air
300
AMOUNT OF AIR TRAVERSED Igmfcnf)
Figure 5-7. Neutron Energy Build-Up Factors
for Various Monoenergetic Sources
in Homogeneous Air
SECTION V
X-RAY DAMAGE EFFECTS
NTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons as X-ray sources
and the environments they produce are de-
scribed in Chapter 4.
Cold X-rays (typically 1 to 3 keV
black body temperatures) are absorbed in a thin
surface layer. At sufficiently higli fluence. a
short pulse of X-rays can heat the surface rapid-
ly and may cause it to vaporize and blow off.
This results in: (I) an impulse imparted to the
total structure; and (2) generation of a strong
shock wave that propagates into the structure.
and which may cause spallation of material at
free boundaries and internal fracture of ma-
terials and bonds. These latter effects are pro-
duced by shock wave propagation through the
thickness of a surface structure such as the ther-
mal protection shell of a reentry vehicle. The
former effects may produce damage by whole
yelifck: modes of response to the net impulse.
The hot X-rays are more penetrat-
ing. They can cause: (1) thermally generated
shock waves in the vehicle structural materials
and internal components; (2) melting and vapor-
ization of the substructure: (3) internal deposi-
tion of energy in electronic components produc-
ing transient or permanent damage (see Chapter
6 and Section 7 of this chapter): or (4) produce
Internal EMP signals (see Chapter 7).
While some nuclear weapons emit
only cold X-rays, all hot X-ray weapons have a
cold component. Hence, for exoatmospheric
events the hot X-ray effects are accompanied by
cold X-ray effects. On the other hand, for endo-
atmospheric explosions, the cold X-rays have
short mean free paths, and the X-ray effects be-
yond distances of a few tens of meters are pro-
duced by hot X-rays alone.
9-67
All vulnerability analyses follow similar
computational steps:
1 . The X-ray energy deposition is computed
using known processes for the materials and
structure. This energy is assumed most often to
be deposited instantaneously.
2. From the calculated energy deposition and
the equation of state for the materials in the
structure (if known) for the liquid, solid, and
vapor phases of the material, a stress wave,
which propagates through the surface structure,
is calculated.
3. Damage to the surface structure tha* re-
sults from the stress wave (spallation, internal
fracturing, delamination and debonding), is
determined.
4. The response of the whole structure that
results from the impulse imparted to it is deter-
mined.
X-RAY ENERGY DEPOSITION
CALCULATIONS
The starting point of all X-ray vulner-
ability analysis is a calculation of the X-ray
energy deposition.
9-33 X-ray Cross Sections
The probability of a photon of energy
hv traversing a distance of absorbing material x
is e*MX, where a is the linear attenuation coef-
ficient. This probability also can be written as
^-(m/p)pxj wnere jui/p is the mass attenuation
coefficient for the material (see paragraph 4-3).
In this representation, p/p is in cm2/gm and pa-
is the thickness in gm/cm2, i.e., the mass of ma-
terial in the column of 1 square centimeter cross
section and x centimeters long.
If the monoenergic X-ray fluence inci-
dent normal (perpendicular) to the material sur-
u> —
1000
hMkeV)
Figure 9-31.
Photon Cross Sections in Tungsten
h»(kcV)
E
E
u
LJ
C
o
O
<
UJ
< —
2
1000
h*> (keV)
Figure 9*32.
Photon Cross Sections in Uranium
9*35 X-ray Energy Deposition
Summary
The methods described in paragraphs
9-33 and 9-34 and illustrated in Problems 9-3
and 9-4 allow the calculation of curves that
show approximations of energy deposition as a
function of depth for black body spectra inci-
dent on any material, if the cross sections, are
known for the material1
INITIAL PRESSURIZATION OF
MATERIALS DUE TO
X-RAY DEPOSITION
An immediate consequence of the
deposition of X-ray energy is the rapid heating
of the material. This heating causes an initial
pressure distribution as a function of depth in
the structure. The initial pressurization generates
shock waves that propagate through the thick-
ness of the shell of the structure. The heating
can result in a solid material changing phase,
that is, melting or vaporizing. The melting and
vaporization cause blowoff, which imparts an
impulse to the structure and excites whole struc-
ture modes of response.
9-36 Phase Changes Induced
by X-ray Heating
In most nuclear weapon X-ray environ-
ments, the X-ray energy is deposited in a very
short time, a few nanoseconds to a few hundred
nanoseconds. The material cannot expand
appreciably during this time, so the energy
deposition process can be considered to occur at
a constant volume or at normal material density,
p0 . Rapid melting and vaporization are accom-
panied by enormous pressure increases. Values
9-93
for enthalpy changes for melting and vaporiza-
tion for the metals discussed in the previous sub-
section are given in Table 9-17. These values are
for one atmosphere pressure. In most X-ray
problems of interest the material is initially at
very high pressure, so these values can be con-
sidered to be only approximate. This approach is
not correct for ablators as a class although it
might apply to carbon phenolic in a cold en-
vironment. Confining the discussion to metals
will not restrict the transfer of principles;*
I I The rising pressure that results from
heating at constant density is illustrated in Fig-
ures 9-39 and 9-40 where isoenergy lines of
aluminum are shown in pressure-density plots. If
the interna! energy is above tne critical energy.
3.016 cal/gm for aluminum, the material can be
considered as a vapor. Figure 9-40 shows the
high pressure, high energv intercepts with the
normal density abscissa (p0 = 2.7gm/cm3). The
release adiabats for expansion from density p0
to low density and pressure also are shown in
this figure. Expansion along the adiabat results
in decreasing internal or potential energy as the
material develops kinetic energy during "blow-
off." For example, a 6,000 cal/gm energy depo-
sition in aluminum at p0 « 2.7 gm/cm3 results in
a pressure of about 1.5 megabars (Mb). The
aluminum would expand from that state to low
pressure and density, with final internal energy
of about 3,000 cal/gm and about 3,000 cal/gm
of kinetic energy. The 3,000 cal/gm of internal
or potential energy is used to overcome the
physical and chemical forces that bind the atoms
together in the solid. This leads to the concept
of heat of sublimation. The heat of sublimation
at absolute zero, £$0 , is the energy required to
form the saturated vapor from the solid at a
temperature of absolute zero. Thus, £JO does
not include any energy of kinetic motion. The
energy of sublimation generally is a function of
temperature becoming larger for larger deposi-
tion energies (temperatures).
if problem of phase changes in a composite heat shield
ablator is more complicated since different deposition profiles,
material enthalpy, and thermal conductivities are involved in the
calcula lions. While some materials, eg., tape-wrapped carbon
phenolic, may behave like metals in a cold environment, the
techniques described here generally are not applicable to the
description of the Wowoff process in the broad category of com*
posite materials that use three dimension (3-D) weaves for heat
shields or for X-ray shields that use dispersed high Z materials
for loading.
Table 9-17.
Enthalpy Change for Selected Metals
(>
0.139
0.175
0.318
1.15
0.969
Cn
2.(H'
0.0S2
0.1 1<>
0.250
1.10
0.950
w
1.4?- ■
0.177
0.230
0.350
1.56
13
t
2.0s
0.076
0.102
0:273
0.946
0.7*2
liic pre>sure> as*o«.iiited with these chances at
ambient density, i.e.. when p ■ p0 . and P (Mb) =
G'g *Mb>, are shown in Table 9-20.
From Tabic 9-2Q. aluminum has a sutf
nrnauon pressure of about 0.7 Mb at ambient
density, corresponding to sublimation energy of.
about 2.900 cal g;n (Table 9-17). This point is
shown in Figure 9-40. labeled t\ at about 3.000
cal gm. Table 9-20 indicates that the pressure.*
associated with vaporization of metaU at
ambient density are with some exceptions about
1 Mb. A survey of more than 30 common metal
elements indicates that an average of 1 Mb for
vaporization is a good approximation, especially
if the Griineisen value for the material is uncer-
tain. Since a bjr corresponds to 14.7 psi a Mb is
the enormous pressure of about 1.45 x 10' psi.
Thus, tremendous forces are involved in the
pressure gradients associated with metaJ* vapori-
zation at ambient density. Table 9-17 shows that
vaporization usually involves several thousand
calories per gram of energy. High explosive ma-
terials (TNT. etc.) release about 1.000 cal/gm.
Therefore, on a mass basis there is more energy
associated with metal vaporization than with
high explosives. Generally, the thicknesses of
material evaporated by X-ray absorption is
small, and. the total mass of material that is
vaporized generally is small.
SHOCK WAVE PROPAGATION
AND DAMAGE PREDICTIONS
The sequence of events for the gen-
eration and propagation of a stress wave through
the thickness of an aerospace shell and the dam-
age produced is illustrated in Figure 9-41 . Cold
X-rays are deposited primarily in a relatively
thin sheet of material at the front surface (Fig-
ure 9-4 la). After the energy is deposited a com-
pression wave propagates inward from the front
surface, followed by a rarefaction that causes
the vapor and liquid to blow off (Figure 9-41 b).
This rarefaction also may cause a spall of solid
material from the front surface (Figure 9-4 lc).
Later the compression wave reflects from the
back surface and returns as a rarefaction wave.
This rarefaction wave, or the coincidence of this
wave with the rearward moving rarefaction may
cause the rear surface to spall (Figure 9-4 Id), or
may cause fracturing or debonding. This process
occurs within the order of a microsecond and
generally is complete before the overall struc-
tural motion occurs. Hie shock effects are
MOS
ABSORBED
RADIANT
ENERGY
OR INITIAL
PRESSURIZATION
(a)
RADIATION
DURING
DEPOSITION
OEPTH
STRESS
(b)
111 " "5
< S t s * .- S J
. I f f * /■/
VAPOR AND
FLUID BLOW-QPF
VAPOR FLUID
SOLID
STRESS L
(C)
r * /
■ ' /
FIRST SOLID
SPALL-FRONT
SURFACE
STRESS L
(d)
ym
, S S r s * * r A
. , S S . , , *■ ,1
u
1 PRECEDING REAR
J SURFACE SPALL
2ND SPALL
!
Figure 9*41. Sequence of Spallation Following
Radiation Deposition
9-104
0.10
DISTANCE INTO TARGET (cm)
(IMAGE RESTORED TO DELETED IMAGE OF 1989 DECLASSIFIED VERSION
OF EM-1 USING THE DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF DIAGRAM IN THE
1996 UNCLASSIFIED JOHN NORTHROP EM-1 EXTRACTS HANDBOOK.)
Figure 9-35PVHIV Energy Deposited in Aluminum
by Black Body Spectra
9-94
&
I
8
1
o
o
81**1
3 &
a
8.
8
8
*
>
9
3
1 1
a
o
J2
3
•i
2
1=
-ag^>^
c
&
3
ft
Si
It
S
1 % 1. 4 i % 4 % % i
MXXXXMXXK
K
•
K K K K K M K
55 ft fi © ** S M
r* -* «n oo N en r»
4
q *i q i n
V> M O 00 *©
00 vo ^
I I
I I
n
i
- ©
1 i 3
co vo n© m -^ •■* Q
MQOONO^tM^OO
.2
■8
J
.6
1
10
30
10
29
10
20
I027 H-
1 —
io26
u
UJ
(rt
>
UJ
I028
5
*-*
UJ
A24
H
10
<
tr
>
o
cr
.o23
UJ
UJ
IO22 h-
10
IO20 h-
10
19
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A PROMPT
—
\
INELASTIC SCATTERING OF NEUTRONS
\ BY NUCLEI OF AIR ATOMS
—
>- \
\
\
^W ISOMERIC DECAYS
vs.
—
™ ^~
\x.
"^~
\ >k NEUTRON CAPTURE
V \ IN NITROGEN
V \
v \
\ \
very high altitude ""^^v
—
FISSION PRODUCT \.
1 1
11(1111
-8 -7
10 10
Figure 5-8.
(0-6 |0-5 ^4 ..-3 ..-2
10
-I
I
10 10 10
TIME (SEC)
Calculated Time Dependence of the Gamma Ray
Output from a Large Yield Explosion,
Normalized to 1 kt
10 10
Table 9-26. IB Failure Thresholds for Typical MOS Digital Microcircuits
Failure Level
Designation
Function
Gamma,
(rads(Si))
Neutron.*
(n/cm2 »
SC 11"!
NAND gate
2 x 10*t
—
MEM 529
Binary element
14 x icy5*
-
SC JJ7>
Binary element
1. JO5*
-
MEM 50)
Shift register
1. x 10* §
—
MEM 590
Chopper
Not measured**
3 X 1014
SC 1149
Flip-Flop
Not measured**
8 x JO14
MC J155
AND/OR gate
2 x 105 (Cobalt*60)++
3300
25-bit static shift
register
>5 x 103 (FXR)tJ
>8 x 104 (TRlGA)tt
3003
100-bit shift register
>2 x JO4 (FXR)tt
>5 x JO4 (TRlGA)Jt
1406
100-bit shift register
>105 (FXR)«
<2.5 x JO4 (TR1GA)
1101
256-random access memory
4 x 104 (FXRV
2 x 104 (TRIQA)
3 x 10n
Neutron flu ence- specif led as (E > 10 keV, fission).
Suppl) voltage - 20 volts.
Supply voltage - 15 volts.
Clock voltage - 1 0 volts.
Supply voltage - 10 volts.
Type of facility in which test was performed.
So failures at these levels.
9-109
1600
SLANT RANGE tyardi)
Figure 5-1 8. Neutron-Induced Gamma Dose Rate as a Function of Slant Range
at a Reference Time of 1 Hour After Burst LIBERIA SOIL
"
1
1 '
1 1
T -
-
-
\
i
\ 1
™
—
\
-
\
:;
\
1
—
\
,
V
\
\
\
■ —
\l
1
' '
\ =
v
^
1
1
1
1
1
5
"2
■
_ o
en
o
UJ
I
<
5:
o
o -5=
O x
•s
m
m
^ fO <\i
dHltH IV 31VM 3SO0
I 3wTI IV 3S0Q
■cf
Itf
10"
lil
ui
to
o
a
ui
10'
10'
10
i: - - - i
■ - ■ ■ i
- i
■
<
■■
^\ +\ & — :—
— T \~
— i
■ -
-
j \
^ ^ -
I i \
11
>
i - —
»■ -—
' f T — — f ~~*"^
. 2 min -
» 1
>
■
^\3 min
► + ^ 4 — 3
^5 min.
— i —
/ y ^^
f^\ 7 min "
V^^' i *
LlS min
m J M M if ^\ \
\ \ \ 1 TK30 min
"f"T \ T~
\ \ \l \ WvJ
2000
4000
6000
RADIAL DISTANCE FROM SOURCE AXIS (yordt)
Figure 547. ^ Base Surge Radiation Exposure Rate 15 Feet
Above the Water Surface from a 10 kt Explosion
on the Bottom in 65 Feet of_ Water,
No-Wind Environment
D
o
(A
X
<
UJ
o
o
(A
O
UJ
u
z
(A
-I
<
5
s
li.
in §
«t
* U L?
«= «a |
5*5
e Eu- |
|g.s£
5 6*'
1^ § i
CL fe 0 3
POO
2|1
Si
Is
— O
(JM/l) 31VU 3«nS0dX3
©
o
—
CO
O
g
CO
w
5 o
*- ai
|o
< * ^
IO c
S c E
4D S 1
So1"
S^ £
x o t=
o " c
C • 5
- g-s
o
8
If
II
< to ~
*- c 2
8 2
m it —
s 8U
2* £
& o £
x ~- 5
uj ■£ q
a jl
0
. S c
r x ifi
LU 5-
a> O
O-"
to S
5 o
2 o
o
c
Jls 9
r qj I;
o
©-"
s
«» IS
O
< ^ -
Q» ^ E
LL « C
a» O
IOU. ±
o c
* O HI
** ••- c
& ° £
w •£ *3
"5 * o
£ 2
• S c
** CO —
■k o
6 o c
►" £ «>
8
«*-n
CO
to
E
£ 2
♦2
CD
i/> to
0>
oi o>
£ LL
> O
o
V
ai C
a> ** =
u- • 5
Q» O
ID "- |
*~ © C
Q) O) Ul
- 00
S ti
£ *•- c
& ° e
— a> o
| a 2
*> o .—
= 3
e c
5 *;* o
a ° c
^ £ 10
0
8
5-
E
3 *-
CM
— -. (A
*^ IX
g 8
-6 ©
< ID
I
S E S
10 if 2
S - =
u O «
UJ f 3
5 £ -
* *■ o
>* o c
jE |5 JO
s
ID «
id E
o
1000 c
100
c
w
to
o
TRANSIT TIME THROUGH CLOUD (min.)
Figure 5-79. Dose Received While Flying Through a
Nuclear Cloud as a Function of Transit
Time Through the Cloud
(a) Blue Gill Taken From
Burst Locale
50 km altitude
(b) Teak Taken From Maui
(1300 km Away)
77 km altitude
(c) Check Mate Taken
From Burst Locale
147 km altitude
The length along the jreomapnetic field is about 1,000 kilo feet. The
heated air within the fireball is highly ionized, with many stria tions
oriented along the geomagnetic field. (The dark spots within the fireball
are rocket trails.)
Figure 1-4.
Photographs of High Altitude Bursts, t = 100 sec
Chapter 7
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EM?) PHENOMENA
The nuclear electromagnetic pulse.
(EMP ) is the time-varying electromagnetic radia-
tion resulting from a nuclear burst. It has a very
broad frequency spectrum, ranging from near dc
to several hundred MHz.
The generation, of EMP from a nuclear
detonation was predicted even before the initial
test, but the extent and potentially serious de-
gree of EMP effects were not realized for many
years. Attention slowly began to focus on EMP
as a probable cause of malfunction of electronic
equipment during the early 1950s, Induced cur-
rents and voltages caused unexpected equipment
failures during nuclear tests, and subsequent
analysis disclosed the role of EMP in such fail-
ures. Finally in 19o0 the possible vulnerability
of hardened weapon systems to EMP was/offi-
cially recognized. Increased knowledge of the
electric and magnetic fields became desirable for
both weapons diagnostics and long-range, detec-
tion of nuclear detonations. For all these reasons
a more thorough investigation of EMP was
undertaken.
Theoretical and experimental efforts
were expanded to study and observe EMP phe-
nomenology and to develop appropriate descrip-
tive models. A limited amount of dataljad been
gathered on the phenomenon and its "threat to
military systems when all aboveground testing
was halted in 1 962. From this time reliance has
been placed on underground testing, analysis of
existing atmospheric test data, and nonnuclear
simulation for experimental knowledge. Extend-
ed efforts have been made to improve theoreti-
cal models and to develop associated computer
codes for predictive studies. At the same time,
efforts to develop simulators capable of produc-
ing threat-level pulses for system coupling and
resnonse studies have been expanded.
This chapter describes the EMP genera-
tion mechanism and the resulting environment
for various burst regimes. The description is
largely qualitative, since the complexity of the
calculations .requires that heavy reliance be.
placed on computer code calculations for spe-
cific problems. Some results of -computer code
calculations are presented, but generalization of
these results is beyond the scope of this chapter!
More complete treatments of the EMP phenome-
na may be. found in tne "DNA EMP i Electro-
magnetic Pulse ) Handbook (IT (see biblio-
graphy ).
ENVIRONMENT -GENERAL
DESCRIPTION
7-1 Weapon Gamma Radiation
The gamma radiation output from a nu-
clear burst initiates the processes that shape the
development of an electromagnetic pulse. The
gamma radiation components important in EMP
generation are the prompt, air inelastic, and iso-
meric gammas (see Chapter 5). Briefly, the
prompt gammas arise from the fission or fusion
reactions taking place in the bomb and from the
inelastic collisions of neutrons with the weapon
materials. The fraction of the total weapon en-
ergy' that may be contained in the prompt gam-
mas will .vary nominally from about QA% for
high yield weapons to about 0.5% for low yield
weapons, depending on weapon design and size.
Special designs might increase the gamma frac-
tion, whereas massive, inefficient designs would
decrease it.
Change 1 7-1
Compton Current
Figure 7-1. (U) The Compton Effect (U)
CURRENT
E FIELD
NET VERTICAL ELECTRON
CURRENT DUE TO AIR
GRADIENT CAUSES WEAK
RADIATED FIELDS
DEPOSITION
REGION
BOUNDARY
GAMMA ENERGY INTERACTS
WITH AIR AND FORMS
RADIAL ELECTRIC FIELD
MAX EM RADIATION INTENSITY
ELECTROMAGNETIC
RADIATION REGION
Figure 7-6.
Simple Illustration of Air-Burst EMP
Net return "conduction current"
TIME
Net Compton electron current
, TIME i (/*S)
Figure 7-8 Comparison of General Waveforms for an Air Burst
Radiated field is proportional to time-derivative of current
GAMMA HAYS INTERACT
WITH AIR AND PROOUCE
A RADIAL ELECTRIC FIELD
IN ENTIRE DEPOSITION REGION
THE VECTOR SUM OF ALL
ELECTRON CURRENTS IS IN THE VERTICAL
DIRECTION CAUSING A RADIATED
AND 80 PULSE
DEPOSITION REGION
BOUNDARY
CURRENT LOOPS FORMED
BY ELECTRON FLOW OUTWARD
IN AIR AND RETURN THROUGH OR
NEAR GROUND CAUSING AZlMUTriAL
MAGNETIC FIELD NEAR THE SURFACE
(Where ground conductivity exceeds air conductivity,
electrons return through ground, causing current loop)
Figure 7-9
Simple Illustration of Surface Burst EMP
The magnitude of the peak value of the
radiated electric waveform for a surface burst is
a weak function of yield, varying from about
K300 volts per meter at R0 for a 4.2 TJ (1KT)
explosion to about 1,670 volts per meter for a
4.2 x 104 TJ (10 MT) explosion. For most cases,
a value of 1 ,650 volts per meter may be assumed.
At ranges along the surface beyond R0. the peak
radiated electric field varies inversely with the
distance from the burst. Thus, the magnitude of
the peak radiated electric field along the surface
may be estimated from the equation
R
E-— E
* R o '
where R0 is the range to the beginning of the
radiation region, R is the distance along the sur-
face to the point of interest, E0 is the peak value
of the radiated field at R0 (assumed to be about
1.650 volt* per meter), and E is peak value of
the radiated field at R.
10 kilometers from a 1 MT surface bum
£« fe£\ (1,650)% 1,200 v/m.
10 kilometers from a 100 KT surface burst
E " (i?) (lf650) % 95° v/m
OVERPRESSURE (psi)
•f IO5 r
l(T r
10s
IO2
fi — Ground Conductivities and Yitldt
. .o-1 :
----- 1 io'4
— — — 0.1 10"* Figgr«7.27 ~
■ ■ ' ""' ' ■ ■ ■ tml |
IO* IO5 IO6 I07
OVERPRESSURE (poicalt)
OVERPRESSURE (pti)
10 F
■*
C
o
z
<
<
Hi
CL
OVERPRESSURE (poscols)
F igure 7-25 Peak Magnetic F Md R; Venus Overpressure for Varying
Ground Conductivities and Yields
OVERPRESSURE (psi)
UJ
O
-I
UJ
tZ
o
E
o
-J
lii
-I
<
5
<
o:
UJ
CL
K? I06
OVERPRESSURE (potcols)
Figure 7*26
Peak Radial Electric Field Er Versus Overpressure
for Varying Ground Conductivities and Yields
SECTION Mil
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
DAMAGE MECHANISMS
As described in Chapter 7, the nuclear
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is part of a com-
plex environment produced by a nuclear envi-
ronment. The EMP contains only a very small
part of the total energy produced by a nuclear
explosion; however, under the proper circum-
stances, EMP is capable of causing severe dis-
ruption and sometimes damage to electrical and
electronic systems at distances where all other
effects are absent.
^[ I As with the EMP generation described in
Chapter 7, the complexity of the calculation of
EMP damage mechanisms requires that heavy
reliance be placed on computer code calcula-
tions for specific problems, and even these calcu-
lations must be supplemented by testing in most
cases. Consequently, the information presented
herein is largely qualitative and will only serve as
an introduction to the subject. More complete
treatments of EMP damage mechanisms may be
found in the "DNA EMP (Electromagnetic
Pulse) Handbook" (see bibliography).
f| ^ Figure 7-18, Chapter 7, provides a
marnx that provides some indication of whether
EMP constitutes a threat in a given situation
relative to the hardness of a system to blast over-
pressure. This section provides a brief descrip-
tion of EMP energy coupling, component dam-
age, EMP hardening, and testing.
ENERGY COUPLING
9-56 Basic Coupling Modes
I I There are three basic modes of coupling
the energy contained in an electromagnetic wave
into the conductors that make up an electric or
electronic system: electric induction, magnetic
induction, and resistive coupling.
Electric induction arises as the charges in
a conductor move under the influence of the
tangential component of an impinging electric
field. The overall result is that of a voltage
source distribution along the conductor. One
such point-voltage source is shown in Figure
9-65 for a simple conducting wire, where the
current I is produced as a result of the tangential
component £i of the incident electric field
COPPER WIRE
CHARGE SEPARATION
figure 9*65. ^( Electric Induction in a
Copper Wire
Magnetic induction occurs in conductors
shaped to form a closed loop when the compo-
nent of the impinging magnetic field perpen-
dicular to the plane of the loop varies in time,
causing charges to flow in the loop. This effect is
illustrated in Figure 9-66 for a simple wire loop.
Here the magnetic field is shown coming out of
the plane of the loop. The loop need not be
circular, and magnetic induction may occur with
any set of conducting components assembled so
as to form a loop.
I I Resistive coupling comes about indi-
rectly as a conductor that is immersed in a con-
ducting medium, such as ionized air or the
ground, is influenced by the currents induced in
the medium by the other coupling modes. In
effect the conductor shares part of the current
as an alternate conducting path. This effect is
illustrated in Figure 9-67 for the simple case of a
9-170
LOOP
ANTENNA
Figure 9-66. WW Magnetic Induction in a
Simple Loop
conductor immersed in the ground. The tangen-
tial component of the incident electric field E%
induces a current density / in the ground. A
distributed voltage drop appears along the wire
as a result of the current flow in the ground, and
this incremental voltage causes current flow 1 in
the wire. Current also may be induced in the
wire directly by the tangential component of the
refracted electric field, shown as E . The re-
flected EjMP, £r fir> is also shown in Figure
9-67. The potential importance of these re-
flected fields is discussed below.
9*57 Resonant Configurations
■ Hie coupling of energy to a conductor is
particularly efficient when the maximum dimen-
sion of the conductor configuration is about the
same size as the wavelength of the radiation. In
tliis event the voltages that are induced along the
conductor at various points are all approximate-
ly in phase, so the total voltage induced on the
conductor is a maximum. The conductor is said
to be resonant, or to behave as an antenna, for
Figure 9-67. ^B Resistive Coupling as a Result
of Currents in the Ground
frequencies corresponding to near this wave-
length. Since EMP has a broad spectrum of fre-
quencies (see Chapter 7), only a portion of this
spectrum will couple most efficiently into a
specific conductor configuration. Thus, a par-
ticular system of interest must be examined with
regard to its overall configuration as well as its
component configuration. Eash aspect will have
characteristic dimensions that determine what
part of the pulse (strength and frequencies) con-
stitutes the principal threat.
* Gross system features that are not nor-
considered antennas, such as structural
features, beams, girders, buried cable, overhead
conduit or ducting, wings, fuselage, missile skins,
and any wall apertures, must be considered to be
potential collectors and conductors of energy
into the system. In particular, radiation that
a-171
Table 9-27.
Minimum Observed Joule Energy to Cause Burnout
Type
Minimum
Joule
Energy
Material
Other Data
2N36
2N327A
2NJ04J
4.0 x
i.6 x 1
2.0 x
icr2
io*2
I0*2
Ge
Si
Ge
PNP Audio Transistor
PNP Audio Transistor
PNP Audio Transistor
2NI308
2N706
2N594
5.0 x
6.0 x
6.0 x 1
to5
o-5
o*3
Ge
Si
Ge
NPN Switching Transistors
NPN Switching Transistors
NPN Switching Transistors
2N398
2N240
8.0 x ]
1.0 x 1
IO'4
a2
Ge
Ge
PNP Switching Transistors
PNP Switching Transistors
MC7I5
8.0 x 1
0'5
Si
Data Input Gate Integrated Circuit
2N4220
2N4224
1.0 x 1
3.0 x
o*5
IO'5
Si
Si
RF General Purpose FET
VHF Amp and Mixer FET
1N3659
8.0 x 1
to*3
Si
Automotive Rectifier Diode
JN277
2.0 x
IO'5
Ge
High Speed Switching Diode
JN3720
1N238
5.0 x
1.0 x
icr4
icr7
Si
Tunnel Diode
Microwave Diode
2N3528
3.0 x
IO'3
Si
Silicon Controlled Rectifier
67D-5010
1.0 x
IO*4
G.E. Varistar (30-joule Rating)
6AF4
66N8
J.O x
2.0 x
10°
10°
UHF Oscillator Vacuum Tube
General Purpose Triode Vacuum Tube
9-174
Table 9-28.
Minimum Joule Energy to Cause Permanent
Degradation Indicated
Designation
Minimum
Joule
Energy
■ Malfunction
Other Data
Relay
2 x Iff3
Welded Contact
Potter'Brurmleld (539)
low-current relay
Relay
] x Iff1
Welded Contact
Sigma (IIF) one-ampere -
relay
Microammeter
3 x I0"3
Slammed Meter
Simpson Microammeter
(Model I2I2C)
Explosive
Boll
6 x ]0T4
Ignition
EBW 8. amp. for 10 *tsec
detonator, MK1
Squib
2 x 10r5
Ignition
Electric Squib. "NS
3.5 watts for 5 /isec detonator
Fuel Vapors
3 x Iff3
Ignition
Propane-air mixture.
1,75 mm ignition gap
second pulses. Capacitors are also fairly hard
components. The approximate energies required
for degradation of several common components
are shown in Table 9-28.
M m The minimum energy necessary for oper-
auOTial upset is a factor of 10 to 100 less than
that which is required to damage the most sensi-
tive semiconductor component. Table 9-29
shows the levels required to cause operational
upset to some common components to illustrate
this factor.
■ ^A gross comparison of the energy re-
curred to damage several classes of electrical
equipment is provided in Figure 9-69.
M m The large range of damage levels empha-
sizes the fact that it is important to consider
EMP damage criteria early during the design
stage of any piece of equipment that might be
susceptible. It is also important to realize that
energy collected in one part of a system may be
transmitted to other parts of the system as a
result of the currents that are induced. Thus, it
is not necessary that the EMP couple directly to
a sensitive component; energy coupled to vari-
ous parts of a system may ultimately reach a
particular component in sufficient quantity to
cause malfunction. With the current state of the
art in EMP vulnerability evaluation, the design
and hardening of complicated systems requires
the joint efforts of systems engineers and profes*
sional EMP effects personnel.
EMP HARDENING
9-60 System Analysis
A general approach to the examination
*
9-175
Table 929.
Minimum Joule Energy to Cause Circuit
Upset or Interference
Designation
Minimum
Joule
Energy
Malfunction
Other Data
Logic Card
3 x. i
k.
O
re
*-
u
ffi
D
3?
co
i_
w
a>
♦"
<
re
.X
k.
Q
0)
■s
D.
c
D
E
0
CM
8 8 I 8 I i
(c/|iVu) i$an*iomd3a
f
3
to
i-
. . .**.-» j .***•*
9-12
July 1973 DNA 3054F
*AD763750* URS 7049-lC Rev. 1
AD763750
FOREST BLOWDOWN FROM NUCLEAR AIRBLAST
by
Phillip J. Morris
for
Headquarters
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20305
Contract No. DNA-001-72-C-0021
A sensitivity analysis is performed on a computer model of tree response
to airblast loading. This effort was undertaken, with success, to reduce
the number of input parameters required by the model to those available
to the field commander. Based on the results of this analysis, a new
prediction technique was developed which determines the extent of tree
blowdown and the resultant effects on troop and vehicle movement. The
technique was developed for inclusion in DNA Effects Manual Number 1.
URS RESEARCH COMPANY
AURSSytttmsAftlliatt
Mm 7049-10
s
LU
i
<
I
D>
CM
LU
i
<
CO
I
33
24
■h o
w o
A X
CQ Q)
OS '
s
+*
CQ
16
8
1 1
1
Rain forest (data)
1 i
-
•
A
Data points for
—
_ _„_ •
rain
forest
,r \
/
• v.
__
./
\
_
•/
\
\
« *
/ /
w \ '
/ /
V. \
■
r /
k.
•
/
• i
s
/
• •
V
>
>
/ ,
^■Coniferous forest
VN.
•
"** i M
(calculated)
*■
1 f
t\I
. 1 .
1 \
•v •*«*
1
^%l
400
800 1200 1600 2000
GROUND RANGE (ft)
Fig.
8
15-8. Stem-ft per Acre Comparison Between a Rain
Forest and a Coniferous Forest, 1 KT
5
M 6
Q
M 2
_,
\
V 1 1
- \ •
\ Coniferous forest
—
\
\
\ (calculated)
\
>
•
-
.Rain for*** -
(data)
>
•
•
>
• •
* • \
' r^ ^m "^
•
•
-
X
Data points for rain forest \
\
—
\
\
-
1
1
I
•
\ 1
\
400
800 1200 1600
GROUND RANGE (ft)
2000
-1. Fig. 15-9. Average Diameter of Stems Down, Comparison Between
Ol a Rain Forest and a Coniferous Forest, 1 KT
B-14
oooe
7049-10
Fig. 15-46 in DNA-EM-1 (1972)
OS
w
w
w
o
OOOT * aaoB/^j - j^axS
en
(D
J3
o
-p
E
©
>
•H
-P
c
Q)
Vi
U
a*
Q
•H
CO
•H
In
O
d
•H
i
be
B-17
000@ 7049-10
Fig. 15-37 in DNA-EM-1 (1972)
18
16
14
12
o
o
2 io
2
o
8
Wheeled vel
4
8
12
16
20
AVERAGE STEM DIAMETER (in.)
Fig. 15-11. Debris Characteristics Preventing Radial Movement of Vehicles
B-18
csnk: •
iPP^'v^lf^ £ TECHNICAL LIBRARY
of the
ARMED FORCES
STEC.IAJi WEAPONS PROJECT
5T i
ri*«=S»*
GH .
Dato
HANDBOOK
O
>4
O
00
00
V
V
on
CAPABILITIES
of
ATOMIC WEAPONS
interval; • o . AU'i'- *' j' . . ."* r-tiY
n
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
10.3 Damage Criteria
10.31 The tables presented in this section show various target items,
their criteria for different degrees of damage and pertinent
remarks. The items are listed in alphabetical order for each
type of military operation* An attempt is made to give the source
of the data by use of numbers to the right of the damage criteria*
The key of this numbering system is indicated below:
a. Fall-scale test data (including Hiroshima and Nagasaki • .(1)
b. Estimates made from scale experiments • ••••••••• (2)
c# Theoretical analysis •••••• «(3)
d. Consensus of qualified persons ••••••••• (h)
10.32 For those items not included in Table VIII, select the listed item
most similar in those characteristics- discussed previously as
being the important factors in determining the extent of. damage
to be expected. Perhaps the most important item to be remem-
bered when estimating effects on personnel is the amount of
cover actually involved. This cover depends on several items$
however, one factor is all important , namely, the degree of
forewarning, of an impending atomic attack. It is obvious that
only a few seconds warning is necessary under most conditions
in order to take fairly effective cover. The large number
of casualties in Japan resulted for the most part from the
lack of warning.
• 61 -
SEOET
8
M 0?
M O
a
9
BBS
S5
«
sis
3
e
8
o
o> w
•35
~< * *
9 -rttO
O
o o o
-p «p -p
0} 0)
3fc
2 2
9 «
»A
I
s
to
a
Sf
CO
Q) Q) 0)
bO bO to
•# M #f
to a »3
»n
0)
22-
J3BB
»▼ WW WW
co ss^
&8^
2
O (It N
cSSd
5J o M 8 -p q
*H CD H rH
•H Tl B P H *tf «^» r4
•H H | a) *H iH (0 Q ^ jQ a)
•§
3-3^
Q) o 0)
no a wi
ti .h ng
c p p
cd b ^
co a, 08
o) h a>
a) ca a)
CO
g
W\Q
Q<^W
0)
22-
$1$
CO
p
CQ
P
(0
c
o
§
I I
• •
to "0
o
a
CO
8.
rH
O
O
0) *H * >*
O w\
8»l
3
§
CO
•0*0 CO
h CO rH
4
isms
Dims
PS
S3§
92
co
a
88
u
G
O
rH
O
O
*OQnO
JSf
1' -a
0 o9
8 -P
8%
§11
££3 > *
« a
O
r w
■p w H
to cti H
3252
83
to
*C'
m v>to
CM H
0)
SB
I"
8 p !-•
0 ^
3
5 I
* lis Bf
51
0.M
I*
§!
on
■d co
£ » 1-1
CD fe H
to *H
O «rt >>
1 &«
w
*-n^*^ ^*»*-s^> A^y^ "">*"> ^ J
r4r4H t-4 H r* ri H <-* H ri r-i CN
^1^^ %^%m*'**' %■**••*-* S^^*****-* *■"•
0J
IS
(P
g
en
«o,
O CO On
Q)
1
3
3
TO
tO <$1
S3
E
§1
co a«
5
I
g
&
I
**£
-P cd *-*-* -tvt-4
*8S 88"
»OQnO
H H
|
2 2 u
sar sis
^
*?
H 9
si
"8
*8i
CO &
J§
«
PQ
«M & TO H ttj
« o m co s*
ecus
I
p
13H33S
3
u
•a
o
u
p
u
J 80 §
5 b O • P
« f) O W)
«H ;* 0) «H
Jj (J 0) 'd H
O H
C> (B P O
~ ** Xj -P
r* r> w bo
*rt H °8 i-j ©
^ ctf xi *h «
a co a
** « -p *o
o »a co 8 «y
« g£.p .
2*
CO
6
c
o
'H
P
o
E
P
CO
0)
ap
o
JJ
Jh P
ax:
bo
(0
So
II
t 8
a-P
O
**
r 2
ti
•s
i-'
■rl
r.
0'
u.
c
•H
P
O
E
P
CO
CD
TJ
0)
P
,3
c .-:
CO
£88
*8
w*
$
is!
gas
5 j aa.3 «saa «sa^
<\ f^-4"
>*^-*
»-4 rH rH
tO lf\ V\
5
H H -P
fHr-l rH
8§g
3
8B
I,
R'RS
o"X'r? *—"ws«»» OOC*
fSt**>*
»
»A«A
*
CO
0)
61
3<3
to
A
P
-P
it
lit
J*
Effect of irradiation on rate of growth of granulation tissue
100*
%
90'
80-
70
60«
o
AREA
COVERED 50
40<
20"
lO-
ta
unirradiated
control
1500r
radiation
exposure 4
3000r
10
30
40
20
TIME - DAYS
O. H. Blair, H. A. S. van den Brenk, J. B. Walter and D. Slome,
"Experimental Study of Effects of Radiation on Wound Healing",
in D. Slome, Editor, "Wound Healing: Proceedings of a Symposium
12-13 Nov., 1959, Royal College of Surgeons", Pergamon, 1961, pp. 46-53.
Accession Number : AD0689495
Title : PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON
MASS BURNS, 13 - 14 MARCH 1968,
Online
Information for the Defense Community
Corporate Author : NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WASHINGTON D C
Personal Author(s) : Walter,Carl W. ; Phillips,Anne W.
Report Date: 1969
Pagination or Media Count : 409
Abstract : This workshop was organized to review the problem of burns, and to marshal data that
will permit experts in systems analysis, logistics, mass behavior, and government to apply their skills
in planning for the defense of an isolated community that has been largely destroyed by a disastrous
fire. Participants have been instructed to focus on the education of a non-medical audience, whose
principal interest is civilian defense, and on what to expect from thermal trauma; how to recognize
the potential survivors, what measures of self-help can decrease the severity of the illness, how and
what to provide in terms of food and water supplies, space and personnel, how to educate the public
and train surviving personnel during the weeks or months necessary for the devastated community to
reorganize itself and become self-sustaining. (Author)
Descriptors : * BURNS (INJURIES), SYMPOSIA, PATHOLOGY, CASUALTIES, INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, CHEMOTHERAPEUTIC AGENTS, TRANSPLANTATION, PROTECTION,
THERAPY, RADIATION INJURIES, POPULATION.
Subject Categories : Medicine and Medical Research
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
MASS BURNS
Proceedings of a Workshop
13 - 14 March 1968
Sponsored
by
The Committee on Fire Research
Division of Engineering
National Research Council
and the
Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army
Published
by
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
1969
DC-P-10G0-1
PREDICTION OF URBAN CASUALTIES AND TIIE MEDICAL LOAD
FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST
L, Wayne Davis
Paper
prepared under
Contract No. N0022867C2276
(Work Unit No. 241 1H)
Sponsored by
Office of Civil Defense
Office of the Secretary of the Army
through
Technical Management Office
U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
Delivered at
Workshop on Mass Burns
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D. C.
March 13-14, 1968
The Dikewood Corporation
1009 Bradbury Drive, S. E.
University Research Park
Albuquerque, New Mexico 37106
PREDICTION OP UK BAN CASUALTIES AND THE MEDICAL LOAD
FROM A HIGH- YIELD NUCLEAR BURST
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This work is the result of Dikewood's second iteration at pre-
dicting urban casualties due to high-yield nuclear bursts as based on
the Japanese nuclear- casualty data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
on the casualties experienced from the detonation of the ammonium-
nitrate fertilizer on board a ship docked at Texas City in 1947. (The
first iteration was published in DC-FR-1028, Ref. 1, and DC-FR-1041,
Ref. 2. ) The Japanese data base has now been more than doubled, and
much more information is available on the breakdown of casualties
segregated by shielding category. (See DC-FR- 1054, Ref. 3.)
Urban casualty predictions are made for nuclear detonations in
the yield range from 1 to 50 Mt for scaled burst heights of 0, 300, 585,
and 806 feet. (See DC-FR-1060, Ref. 4, to be published. ) All casualty
curves are given in terms of a reference 12. 5-kt surface burst; they
must be scaled to the megaton-yield range by the use of scaling curves
which are also provided. It is not presently a field manual for easy
casualty predictions. Although calculations may be performed by hand,
a computer solution is recommended to facilitate the computations for
any but the simplest problems. Plans arc underway to develop the com-
puter program.
-6-
II. CASUALTY CURVES FOR PERSONS IN OR
SHIELDED BY STRUCTURES
A. DEVELOPMENT OF "BLAST" MORTALITY CURVES
FROM JAPANESE AND TEXAS CITY DATA
A great deal of new information has been gathered concerning the
biological effects of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,
during World War IL The data from over 35, 000 case histories were col-
lected on magnetic tape, and the results of the analysis were published in
DC-FR-1054 (Ref. 3).
The Japanese mortality curves for people in or shielded by struc-
tures are plotted as a function of overpressure in Figs. 1 and 2 for
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. These curves are based on a
yield for Hiroshima of 12. 5 kt burst at a height of 1870 feet (scaled
height of 806 feet) and a yield for Nagasaki of 22 kt burst at a height of
1640 feet (scaled height of 585 feet).
The mortality curves from the Texas City disaster of 1947,
separated by shielding category, are given as a function of overpressure
in Fig. 3. This surface burst " has been estimated to be equivalent to a
nuclear yield of 0. 67 kt.
The next step was to develop a set of "blast" mortality curves
for a reference 12. 5-kt surface burst. Of course, the ultimate goal was
Ammonium-nitrate fertilizer exploded within the hold of a ship wlrtHi was
tied up at a pier.
-10-
to separate all of the biological damage according to the particular
weapons effect which caused it (such as blast, prompt- thermal radiation!
or initial-nuclear radiation). Then, each effect could be scaled sepa-
rately to the higher yield of interest, and the results could be recombined
Joint effects cannot be scaled directly.
For people in or shielded by structures in Japan, the blast and
initial-nuclear radiation were the dominant immediate effects. However,
when one scales the results to the megaton range, the lethal effects of
the initial-nuclear radiation drop out because the blast effects scale to
greater ranges. Thus, the blast mortality curves are the set of greatest
interest for persons in or shielded by structures. (Similarly, thermal
mortality curves are the ones of greatest interest for the outside-
unshielded persons. )
By examining a set of theoretical initial-nuclear-radiation
mortality curves developed for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and comparing
them with the total mortality curves, it could readily be seen that the
initial-nuclear radiation played a large role in the deaths of thermally-
shielded people located fairly close-in (at the high mortality levels) in
the light structures. It is also an important effect even in the concrete
structures.
By further comparing the mortality curves for Hiroshima and
Nagasaki plotted as a function of overpressure (Figs. 1 and 2), it can
-11-
readily be seen that the initial- nuclear radiation was more important or
dominant in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki. (It requires more overpressure
in Nagasaki to produce the same percent mortality for the equivalent
shielding category. ) Thus, one would expect the pure blast mortality
curves (with no initial-nuclear radiation present) to lie to the right
(higher overpressures) of the equivalent Nagasaki curves.
As another boundary condition, the Texas City mortality curves,
given in Fig. 3, show the results of blast alone for a lower yield of 0. 67
kt. Since a set of blast-mortality reference curves for a 12. 5-kt surface
burst is the immediate goal, they would appear to lie to the left (lower
overpressures) of the equivalent Texas City curves. Of course, this
shift is due to the effect of the longer positive-phase duration at the
higher yield; it requires less overpressure to produce the same damage
at the higher yield. Thus, by scaling the pertinent shielding categories
in Texas City up to 12. 5 kt and by using the Nagasaki curves as the lower
pressure boundaries, the pure blast mortality curves for the reference
12. 5-kt surface burst were developed and are shown in Fig. 4. These
blast mortality curves for the reference surface burst are drawn as a
smooth function of overpressure since this weapons effects parameter
is considered to be the controlling factor in determining the mortality
level.
*
It is felt that any deaths in the Japanese data due to the secondary effects
of fire have been eliminated by this process.
-7-
u.
CO
o
£
CO
>
D
o
2
JS
(|utDi»d) AjLIIVldOh
-8-
CVJ
e>
u.
<
CO
<
<
(0
Ul
>
CT
O
2
?
8
(4u»3jtd) Aj.nvj.aoH
-9-
10
6
CO
<
X
£
s
>
o:
!j
-J
lllllilllllllllllllllllllliiillllllflllllllllillilllllllllllllllllil
==f llliflllliilllllliililillllillllilllllillllillilillllllllllllllll
8
:=::::::::::
8 8 8 e
8 9 8
(♦utDJtd) A4I1UH0II
o o
CM —
-12-
co
IaJ
QC
CT
H
>
CD
O
UJ
o
-I
UJ
CO
CK
1-
O
z
CD
^™
cr
3
O
>-
H
-1
<
►-
cr
o
2
H
co
iiiiilii>£i£§iiliiili|i£iiiii§liliiiiii:
illllllilH--^s§-^^^lliiiiillillililillliliilillisl5$i5iili55sll5lili§illlil?llilIlisl.'-.
IaJ
to
en
in
cc
00 Q.
CC
i
if
!iiiss
§ o w u S S
S2ii*3SI3
•I * *
s
o
s
(4u»0i»d) A1I1VXU0W
-19-
CO
3
111
O
2
K
D
CO
o
CO co
> 2
IK O
3 =*
K ^
O
>-
UJ
UJ
K
O
ui
CO
UJ
CO
o:
£
x:::c::==
=;3::r=:rr===r:rr:==:=r::=rr::=ie::=;:r==5
• IIIMI
IIMIII
IIMIII
IIMIII
lllllll
IIIIMI
• ■MM)
IIIIIM
IIMIII
iiiiiii
IIMIII
■••••■I
lllllll
lllllll
lllllll
lllllll
lllllll
lllllll
lllllll
IIMIII
IMIIII
IIIMII
IMIIII
IIMIII
IIMIII
IIIMII
IIIMII
••••III
IIMIII
lllllll
IIIMII
IIMIII
lllllll
IIMIII
IIIIIM
lllllll
• •Mil)
••••III
IIMIII
IIIMII
IIMIII
IMIIII
IIMIH
IIIIMI
IIIIIM
8
8
(|U»9»d) AXI1V1U0M
-24-
<0
UJ
h-
UJ
tc
o
z
o
o
I
o
UJ
o
a:
o
UJ
QC
O
CO
UJ
CO
q:
01
(0
UJ
z
o
§
D
cr
(0
o
U.
►-
2
UJ
i
m
o
(0
3
CO
cr
UJ
>
CO
UJ
>
tr
U
>-
h-
-J
<
CO
<
o
(*u9Dj»d) xnvnsvo
-46-
HL PROMPT-THERMAL CASUALTIES K>lt
OUTSTOE-UNSIUELDED PERSONS
A. PROMPT-THERMAL MORTALITY CURVE FOR OUTSIDE-
UNSHIELDED PERSONS
This curve was much easier to develop than the blast mortality
curves (complicated by the effects of the initial-nuclear radiation in Japan)
since the prompt- thermal radiation producing flash burns was the dominant
effect in Japan as well as for high yields for outside-unshielded persons.
Since the predictions of the prompt-thermal exposures in Nagasaki did not
correlate well with the burns received, apparently caused by problems in
determining the transmissivity, only the new Hiroshima data were used to
draw the prompt- thermal mortality curve given in Fig. 19 as a function of
2
the prompt-thermal exposure (cal/cm ) for the 12. S-kt reference burst.
This curve, which is also equivalent to the total mortality curve, can be
scaled to higher yields according to the method to be described shortly,
B. PROMPT-THERMAL INJURY CURVE FOR OUTSIDE-UNSHIELDED
PERSONS
Before drawing the curves for the surviving injured, all of the
data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki were replotted as a function of the
2
appropriate weapons effects levels (cal/cm for prompt-thermal injuries).
However, the Hiroshima results were considered to be more reliable than
the Nagasaki results for prompt-thermal injuries.
-47-
0)
CO
cr
D
00
OJ
o
2
cr
D
CO
I
c\i
§
cr
UJ
x
0.
O
cr
en
z
o
UJ
Q.
Q
UJ
Q
-I
UJ
FIG.
RVES
CO
z
3
3
O
i
UJ
Q
MB
>
CO
»-
1-
_J
D
<
O
3
CO
<
cr
o
o
u.
§S8£S8S8S
(iu*9i*d) AwnpNi ao Ainvmow
-61-
'H'HWUtrfWIUtUltmf
■t^"tt""TtnTTi''TTtit--
CO
I-
&
111
o
<
It
CO
CO
o
>
2
€C
§
III
14.
Q
CO
111
III
O
>
J
cc
UJ
* 3
csi O
X
•
tn
z
i
«J
lil
<
O
K
CO
oe
h»
o
5
2
o
-1
tt
<
o
2
Gl
oc
hi
X
H
i
H
Q.
2
O
3
O
>-
<
O
UJ
z~
o
gl
I o -
s \ °
cm
2 a:
I- .
iffa
O CO ,
8i°!
J
\
9
^^^^^*
i
z
o
\
b
3
\
_J O
\
V
:. O
\
1
3
\^
X.
1
■ <
i
i
i
** •
CM
8
CM
CM
8
00
v
2 o
8?
M <0
— Z
UJ
Q
§0C
UJ
o
§
UJ
Q.
8
8
CM
8 8 8
O
12 8
Ainvid
o
o
o
CM
-75-
3) Light Construction
a) Brick Residential Buildings
b) Wood- Frame Buildings (Basements)
4) Outside
a) Outside -Shielded Category
b) Outside-Unshielded Category
#
22
20 -
18 -
« 16
J 14
a
£ 12
1 10
2
£ 8
6
T. E. Lommasson and J. A.
Keller, "A macroscopic view
of fire phenomenology and
mortality prediction/'
Dikewood Corp., report DC-
TN-1058-1, December 1966
(Paper presented at the
Symposium on Mass Fire
Research conducted
February 6-9, 1967 under the
auspices of the Panel N-3,
Thermal Radiation, of the
Technical Cooperation
Program).
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI)
Heilbrann /,
/
Dresden •
Hamburg
INTENSE
FIRESTORMS
(GERMAN CELLARS)
\
Aamorl
Barmen
\
Freiberg
. Hiroshima * Fukui
. Solingen . Friedrlckshefen I
Aachen . uim " Toyama • Chosi
. Nagasaki 'Fukuyama
Darmstadt
\ '
\
Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered
by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood
Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading
Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy
Over 2,9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.
1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) =
energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water
= 252 calories
Severe firestorms require
600 BTU/sq. mile/second
FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES
i i i
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second)
Lommasson and Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality
Predictions, Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1, December 1966.
T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire
Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction, Proceedings of the Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation;
October, 1967.
*
If basements arc unavailable, this mortality curve probably lies midway
between those for light construction and the outside category,
between those for medium and light construction.
THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS
327
Figure 7,33a. Thermal effects on wood-frame house 1 second after explosion
(about 25 cal/sq cm) .
Figure 7.33b. Thermal effects on wood-frame house about % second later.
-79-
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. L. Wayiie Davis, Donald L. Summers, Milton E. Jenkins, Francis J.
Wall, and William L. Baker, Prediction of Urban Casualties from the
Immediate Effects of a Nuclear Attack, DC- FK- 102 8, The Dikewood
Corporation; April, 1963. (Classified)
2. L. Wayne Davis, Francis J. Wall, and Donald L, Summers, Develop-
ment of "Typical" Urban Areas and Associated Casualty Curves, DC-
FR-1041, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1965.
3. L. Wayne Davis, William L. Baker, and Donald L. Summers, Anal-
ysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data, DC-FR-1054, The Dikewood
Corporation; April, 1966.
4. L. Wayne Davis, Donald L. Summers, William L. Baker, and James
A. Keller, Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from
a High- Yield Nuclear Burst, DC-FR-1060, The Dikewood Corporation;
to be published. (Classified)
5. Ashley W. Oughterson, et al. , Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs,
NP-3036 to NP-3041 (Vols. I-VI), Army Institute of Pathology; 1951.
6. The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, Report No. 92
(Vols. I-III), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi-
sion; May, 1947.
7. Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, Report No. 93
(Vols. I-III), U, S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Divi-
sion; June, 1947.
8. J. Rotz, et al. , Effects of Fire on Structural Debris Produced by
Nuclear Blast, URS 639-9, URS Corporation; January, 1965.
9. Willard L. Derksen, et al. , Output Intensities and Thermal Radiation
Skin Injury for Civil Defense Shelter Evaluation, Special Report for
Blast and Thermal Subcommittee of the National Academy of Science,
U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory; October 16, 1967.
10. Samuel Gladstone (Editor), The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, U. S.
Atomic Energy Commission; 1957 and 1962.
11. J. Bracciaventi, W. Derksen, et al. , Radiant Exposures for Ignition
of Tinder by Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Weapons, Kinal Report
on DASA Subtnsk 12.009, U.S. Naval Applied Science Laboratory;
July 5, 1966.
-80-
LIST OF REFERENCES (Continued)
12. S. B. Martin and N. J. Alvares, Ignition Thresholds for Large-Yield
Nuclear Weapons, USNRDL-TR-1007, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory; April 11, 1966.
13. T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire
Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction Proceedings of the Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation;
October, 1967.
14. J. A. Keller, A Study of World War II German Fire Fatalities,
DC-TN-1050-3, The Dikewood Corporation; April, 1966.
15. R. Schubert, Examination of Building Density and Fire Loading in the
Districts Eimsbuettel and Hammerbrook of the City of Hamburg in the
Year 1943 (20 volumes, in German), Stanford Research Institute;
January, 1966.
16. G. H. Tryon (Editor), Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition,
National Fire Protection Association, Boston; 1962.
17. C. C. Chandler, T. Storey, and C. Tangren, Prediction of Fire Spread
Following Nuclear Explosions, PSW-5, U. S. Forest Service, Forest
and Range Experiment Station, Berkeley, California; 1963.
18. Kathleen F. Earp, Deaths from Fire in Large- Scale Air Attack, with
Special Reference to the Hamburg Firestorm, CD/SA 28, Home Office,
Scientific Advisers1 Branch, London; April, 1953.
rr H
O 03
Ou
O
3
H»
fD
H«
CO
Hi
H1
H-
fD
H*
18
3
fD
S
3- rr
>
o
rt
0
H
rr
O
rt
H
o
fD
H-
3
3
n
H*
rr
3
3
fD
3
o
O 3*
cr
H
O
Hi
3*
3"
03
3"
•
CO
3
0Q
*3
cr
g
Hi
»•
fD
H
03
fD
H
fD H»
o
•
fD
fD
rr
fD
rr H«
& o>
fD rr
rr
0Q
3*
o
u
g
fD
H
♦o
fD
CO
H
7T
co 3
3
Hi
crv-
O
>
rr
rr
•1
fD
H*
OQ
H
3
OQ
*-
rr
W
fD
ri
3
3*
W
»-»•
H1
fD
3"
3*
rr
O
Hi
03
CO
H
^<
O
3
H
^
3-
rr
a
3
H»
CO
fD
<
CO O
"O
i-h
W
03
rt
H '
3
3*
O,
H-
fD
O
3* O
rr
C
CL
3
3*
03
Hi
fD
9
fD
Hi
■i
CU
3
03
CL
rr
fD
H«
3
X
3-
03
3
(D i-{
3*
03
OQ
O
ri
H»
n
fD
3
fD
03
CO
3
fD
rr
Hi
3
3*
3
O
fD
•
cr
fD
•
»-*•
H
rt
P«
3
fD
H
VJ
CL
above
In.
• •
O
CL
O
h-
3
03
H«
H«
CL
o
rr
CO
CL
3"
3
H*
CO
fD
H»
M
rr
H-
Cu
0Q
H-
H
3
3
rr
3
•3
3
<
03
H 3^
fD
OQ
CL
rr
*»
0
03
Hi
H-
03
fD
3
OQ
Ou
T3
H
OQ
rr
>
fD
rr
H- 03
►Q
f
3*
rr
<
rr
CO
*<
rr
fD
03
O
O
O
rr
O VJ
3
•
Hi
rr
?
03
fD
O
rr
Ou
CL
M
O
o
3
O
3
3
H
3
S
fD
03
O
H
rr
3-
O
H
CO
rr
H-«
3
3
fD
fD
rr
Hi
O
fD
a
H
03
H
3
H-
3
3*
fD
fD
OQ
H-
T3
fD
O
<•
H
fD
CO
03
3"
03
rr
rr
CO
•
O
H
^<
O
3
CO
fD
H
H*
H 3
O
fD
CO
O
H«
<
3"
O
H-
0)
cr
H-
3"
fD
rr
fD
rr
fD
OQ
•
H
3
rr
3
^ 03
3
3
03
H»
03
fD
O
rr
3
3
H»
o
<
C/3
CO
H-
H-
73
03
H-
fD V-
0)
rt
3
r-»
H,
3
H«
OQ
r-»
<
fD
<
fD
Hi
•
•
3
3
O
03
03
"O
H«
03
*l
O
•~\
3
v:
H*
O
O
H
o
3
•
fD
H-
fD
*3
H)
9
3
(D
3
fD 3"
Hi
a
CL
/-N
03
03
CL
3
H-
03
»i
^
O
Hi
O-
H
3
03
•
O
CL
rr
03
OQ
O
CO
fD
o
as
O-
H
rr
H«
fD
^
CO
H- <
rt
1
H
<
CL
cr
H«
3
3
CO
H
fD
H«
rr
3-
03
3
3
fD
03
fD
CO fD
3*
C/J
0)
3*
3
fD
CO
H»
fD
rr
•
fD
CO
03
H«
CO
03
3
<
3-
fD
•
O
<
3
03
H*
rr
H-
3*
J—1
fD
3
0Q
CO
3"
03
3
CO
3-v:
3-
3-
fD
H*0Q
7?
3*
O
3
rr
rt
•
fD
3
fD
rr
03
CO
rr
«•
O
fD
O
03 H»
CO
2:
fD
03
fD
CL
M
CO
CO
CO
H-
<
rr
cr
3
rr
I—1
3
rr <
*a
03
rr
CO
03
3
V
extreme!
50
O
H
Cfl
fD
fD
CO
03
3
H-
3*
fD
rr
fD fD
fD
<
03
fD
O
1
3"
H-
0
M
fD
rr
fD
H
O
3
H
CO
rr
fD
3
i
M 3
O
03
«.% S
<
Hi
O
3
rr
fD
o
CD
3"
H
Ou
3
a
3
3
OQ
O
rr
H»
co S
fD
3"
3
fD
3*
CL
3
rr
CO
<
O
O
H
£
03
3
rr
Hi
^ ^
H
o
rr v
<
fD
rr
fD
fD
H
O
Hi
>— »
rr
Hi
fD
fD
H*
fD
O
rr
rr
3
O
H»
Hi
h
o
fD
3
H-»
v-
H«
rr
3*
fD
H«
H
O H»
3
OQ
3"
3*
03
O
3"
H*
h-»
CO
fD
CO
rr
O
03
03
CO
03
3
3*
03
O
o
CO
3* 3
3-
H*
(D
fD
H«
03
O
03
3-
>
3
3
•a
3
rr
«•
CO
*1
Hi
fD
rr
rr
K
■
*o
fD
O
VJ
rr
c
O
3
0
fD
fD
O
CO
3"
fD
H
H«
rr ri
3
03
<
fD
*•
3
fD
C
I—1
O
fD
a
H-
03
03
CO
H*
<
03
fD fD
o
H»
K»«
as
3
rr
CO
H*
rt
3*
3
ro
*<
rr
•
00
fD
CO
cr
CO
H
♦a
3
fD
H
3 CO
fD
rr
n
fD
03
O
rr
•
CL
H
H
03
3
O
fD
fD
Hi
O
3-
D- CO
O
fi>
fD
H
3*
2
D-
3
3
03
i-1
M
^
3
3-
O
H
03
fD
fD
CO H»
O
fD
H«
OQ
H
fD
fD
cr
fD
3
a.
03
3
rr
03
3
H
O
Hi
Hi
3
(D
C
X
fD
H-C
3
CO
•
H*
H«
O
CL
««
M
03
H
H
3-
rr
fD
rr 3
fD
03
CO
3
OQ
rr
Hi
i*l
rr
O
H
O
3
03
Hi
H«
cr
3
fD
a>
Hi
O
H
3
H»
H«
O
*•
H»
h-«
CO
rr
3*
03
•"J
3
03
cr
3
o
3
CL
rr
H*
Hi
rr
03
CO
ri
3
*<
3
O
O
h
fD
<
fD
3
rr
H«
3
0Q
C
w
rr
H
3
o
03
<
«•
3*
3
fD
H 3*
3-
fD
OQ
«#
O
OQ
O
o
c
fD
rr
rr
*r
fD
^
fD
O
fD 03
H-
•a
N-/
H
3
H
rr
rr
rr
rr
fD
CO
3-
fD
rr
03
c
rr
Hi rr
03
r1
0)
rr
H»
3*
H-
H*
3
fD
fD
03
3-
CO
H»
03
H«
3
3
03
CO
03
3*
0)
CO
H-
O
CO
3"
r*
fD
H»
O-
co
<
t-»
CO
fD
03
3
H>
03
cr
fD
fD
<
<
rr K
rr
cr
CO
O
fD
3*
Hi
ri
fD
O
3
0)
cr
o
o
rr
H
OQ
H
O
fD
H
3
3
o
3
3
3
O
03
CO
fD
fD
3
fD 3"
H»
fD
O
H
03
OQ
H
O
H«
cr
H*
Hi
3*
O
3
03
0Q
^
3*0Q
vj
O
H-
CO
rr
o
CO
rr
rr
H-1
fD
fD
CO
rr rr
3" fD
3
fD
03
rr
fD
CO
CO
CO
9
•0
03
3
r-»
03
H-
CO
OQ
3*
3
CL
§
cr
c
o
3
cr
<
H«
CO
3
i— •
•
rr
rr
O
fD 3
Hi OQ
CO
03 r-{
rr h-» OQ
O
H
•
rt
0
?r 3
fD fD
O
rt
3
<
O
3
fD
H
3
h-»
fD
ro
fD
O
Hi
rr
O
• H»
^
v$
3-
rr
rr
CO
I-*
3-
O
c
rr
rr
fD
3
rr
H
H-
Hi
fD
3-
Hi
OQ
N*
v— /»
fD
0)
•
O
a>
3"
CO
3*
3
03
O
3
HiOQ
O
3"
• ■
3
K
rt
rt
3
CO
fD
H«
CO
3
Hi
H-
fD
O
rr
^
03
H rr
M
Hi
O
H-
3"
1
03
03
O
O
O
H*
03
1— »
3-
0)
fD
rt
fD
H
H
rr
3-
<
CO
H»
fD
O
3*
CD
fD
O
3
CO
r*
<
fD
fD
fD
m
CL
H-
rt
o
»i
H«
03
THE BURN SURFACE AS A PARASITE
WATER LOSS, CALORIC DEMANDS, AND THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS
Carl Jelenko, III, M.D.
Department of Surgery
University of Maryland School of Medicine and Hospital
Baltimore, Maryland
Water is Lost through Burned Skin*
A burn may be thought of as a parasite, drawing from its host water,
protein, and other substances which the host needs for its survival.
An uninjured person who is not perspiring may lose from 1.15 to 2.0
quarts of fluid a day through his lungs and skin, »2»^>5>1^ depending
on the temperature of his environment. The fluid losses from a burn
wound are far in excess of those from intact skin and may amount to
2 gallons per day, or more if the burn is large enough. 2, 5, 6, 17,21
If, during the first 48 hours after injury, no more fluid is given to
an extensively burned patient than he would need in health, the un-
compensated loss of fluid from his circulation may cause shock, and if
sufficiently severe, death. After the first 48 hours, the danger of
shock is lessened, but inordinate fluid losses will continue from the
burn surface.
Heat is Lost Necessitating a High Food Intake
To make matters worse, evaporation of moisture from the wound
surface saps not only the body's water stores but its energy stores
as well. When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re-
sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more
water loss and the more heat or energy loss.**
*The majority of the paragraph headings in this article were supplied
by the editors.
**Al though the core temperature of the human body approximates 39.5 C,
the body surface averages only 32 C. At any given temperature, water
can be evaporated by applying a certain number of heat calories. At
32 C, one gram of water can be evaporated if 0.579 large calories of
heat is invested.
68
How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?
Unfortunately, we do not possess at present any practical means of
reducing the loss of water from a burn to the level of loss from intact
skin on a scale suitable for use following a holocaust.
Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for
Thermal Burns
ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News
http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462
August 2008
By Patrice Wendling
Elsevier Global Medical News
CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound
dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.
The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has
advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for
almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician,
explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association.
"Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in
an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap
for burn wounds," he said.
Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general
surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap
reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely
available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing
removal.
"I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We
started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those
criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral
base."
Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial-
and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single
layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then
secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed.
Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as
manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination
before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital,
Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll
to expose a clean surface.
69
EVAPORATION OF WATER FROM 3RD DEGREE BURNS AREAS
mgm/cm'/hr
LH20 lots
mgm/cmyhr
N
days
from the
literature
40
22
days
from current
studies
Fig. 2. Schema Illustrating the gradual decrease in eschar
transmissivity with time.
SOME PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION AGAINST BURNS
FROM FLAME AND INCENDIARY AGENTS
Janice A. Mendelson, M. D. , M. M. Sc, (LTC, MC, U. S. Army)*
Chief, Biomedical Department
Biophysics Laboratory
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland
I. Flame Agents
A, Their Nature
Flame agents are special blends of petroleum products, usually in
thickened form, that ignite easily and can be projected to a target.
Methods for the throwing of flame were devised by the Greeks in 429 B.C.
(Siege of Plataea) when destructive flammable mixtures of pitch and sul-
fur were used. "Greek fire" composed of pitch, sulfur, and naptha, to-
gether with a method of projecting it through brass tubes or in red-hot
balls of stone or iron, were developed about 670 A.D. in the arsenals of
Constantinople. A type of flame thrower used on ships was constructed,
with pressure furnished by a water engine. It is thought by some that
this contained an igniting substance (quicklime or phosphide) that acted
in the presence of water, but this has not been proven. The Germans in
World War I were the first to use flame projectors. All combatting
nations developed and used flame throwers extensively in World War II.
Fire bombs were first used in the second world war.
178
Ml (Napalm). Ml thickener is a coprecipitated aluminum
soap. The name was derived from the naphthenic and palmitic
acids that were its major constituents.
Napalm B, used by the Air Force, is intended as a replace-
ment for the M2 thickener. It is not true napalm, being com-
posed of polystyrene, gasoline, and benzene. It is not
a gel, but is a sticky, visco-elastic liquid. It has a longer
burning time than the Ml, M2, and M4 thickened fuels, and,
therefore, possibly better incendiary action.
Unlike the Ml, M2, and M4 thickeners, which can be quite
easily brushed off the skin, the Napalm B is sticky and the
polystyrene itself burns, its burning time being longer than
that of the petroleum products. Therefore, this does have the
required characteristics to produce more severe burns than
unthickened fuel.
180
B. Defense Against Flame Agents (Protective Coverings)
The primary objective of individual defense against flame5 is to
keep particles of burning fuel off the person. The use of almost any
available cover when a flame attack appears imminent is recommended.
Troops are instructed to remain covered with no skin exposed until after
the flash and flame in the high heat zone have been dissipated and then
throw off the cover and remove any burning particles from their clothing.
Blankets or items such as an army field jacket have been shown to give
real protection. Two thicknesses of the Army shelter half tent will hold
burning fuel for more than 10 seconds. Tent canvas and truck tarpaulins
which have been treated with fire-resistant material will withstand
direct hits with burning fuel and will hold the burning particles for
sufficient time (more than 30 seconds) to permit personnel to escape.
Foxhole covers improvised of brush with as little as 2 inches of earth
on top will successfully withstand burning fuel. The Army plastic poncho
is not a satisfactory cover because it melts rapidly and burns when hit
with flaming fuel. This would increase the severity of burns received by
an individual. Foxholes and weapon positions can be modified to afford
adequate protection for anything except a direct hit with a fire bomb.
II. Incendiaries: 1"
A. Their Nature
Incendiary agents are compositions of chemical substances designed
for use in the planned destruction of buildings, property, and materiel
by fire. They burn with an intense localized heat. They are very diffi-
cult to extinguish and are capable of setting fire to materials that nor-
mally do not ignite or burn readily. Although there are tactical appli-
cations for incendiary munitions, they have played primarily a strategic
role in modern warfare. The first practical model of an incendiary
artillery shell was developed by the French in 1878.
The mechanics of fire-starting involve three essentials in addition
to a source of oxygen: (1) Source of heat acting as a "match" to in-
itiate the fire, (2) A combustible material which serves as the kindling,
and (3) The fuel. The incendiary supplies the match and the kindling,
and the target supplies the fuel. Modern military incendiaries may be
divided into three categories: (1) Oil, (2) Metal, and (3) Combination
of oil and metal.
The incendiary bomb (as distinguished from the fire bomb filled
with thickened fuel) has been considered a strategic rather than a tacti-
cal weapon and has been used mainly against rear-area and supply installa-
tions. Incendiary shells and incendiary grenades are primarily tactical
weapons, as are the flame munitions (fire bombs and flame throwers).
Large incendiary bombs are used against point targets such as air bases
and factories. Small incendiary bombs are usually dropped in clusters.
181
2. Metal incendiaries include those consisting of magnesium in
various forms, and powdered or granular aluminum mixed with
powdered iron oxide. Magnesium is a soft metal which, when
raised to its ignition temperature (623° = 1,150°F), burns vig-
orously in air. Magnesium has a burning temperature of about
1,982°C (3,600°F) depending upon the rate of heat dissipation,
rate of burning, and other factors. Its melting point is 651°C,
so it melts as it burns. The liquid metal, burning as it flows,
drops to lower levels, igniting combustible materials in its
path. Burning stops if oxygen is prevented from reaching the
metal or if the metal is cooled below the ignition temperature.
Magnesium does not have the highest heat of combustion of the
metals, but none of the other metals have been successfully
used singly as air-combustible incendiaries. In massive form,
magnesium is difficult to ignite. Therefore, a hollow core
in the bomb is packed with thermate and an easily ignited mix-
ture which supplies its own oxygen and burns at a very high
temperature. ^
a. Thermite incendiaries . ^ Thermite is essentially a
mixture of about 73 per cent powdered ferric oxide
(Fe203) and 27 per cent powdered or granular aluminum.
The aluminum has a higher affinity for oxygen than iron
has, and if a mixture of iron oxide and aluminum powder
is raised to the combustion temperature of aluminum, an
intense reaction occurs: Fe203+2AL-* AL203+Fe + heat.
Under favorable conditions, the thermite reaction pro-
duces temperatures of about 2,200°C (3,922°F). This is
high enough to turn the newly formed metallic iron into a
white hot liquid which acts as a heat reservoir to prolong
and to spread the heat or igniting action.
b. Thermate incendiaries . ^ The thermate mixture com-
posed of thermite with various additives is used as a com-
pouenc in igniter compositions for magnesium bombs and as
a filler in incendiary hand grenades. There are several
different types of thermate. The more recent ones con-
tain barium nitrate as an oxidizer. The thermate core is
ignited by the primer. This burning core then melts and
ignites the magnesium alloy body. The incendiary action
is localized, since there is little scattering action.
182
B. Defense Against Incendiaries (Fire Fighting)
Defense against incendiaries, as outlined in a U.S. Army publication
is summarized as follows: Incendiary bomb clusters may contain a per-
centage of high explosive incendiary bombs so precautions should include
this possibility. A brick wall offers adequate protection against small
explosive incendiary bombs. Incendiary bombs can be scooped up with
shovels and thrown into a place where no damage will be done. Sandbags
and sandmats can smother bombs and reduce effects of fragmentation.
Loose sand helps to smother fires started by the bomb. Whether or not
sandbags and sandmats are used, water or fire extinguishers are employed
immediately. Water extinguishers should not be used directly on oil,
because this tends to spread the fire, but water can be used against in-
cendiaries such as phosphorus. Water confines the spread of the fire by
wetting down the surrounding area, but despite some published advice to
the contrary, water should not be used on magnesium incendiaries, be-
cause of the resulting explosive effect. If hot enough, phosphorus par-
ticles ignite when exposed to oxygen in the air. Control them by keeping
them covered, preferably with water.
III. White Phosphorus
White phosphorus is often classified as an incendiary, but is ac-
tually used primarily as a screening smoke or as an igniter
for other munitions. At a sufficiently high temperature, it reacts
with air and water vapor to produce a dense cloud of phosphorus pentoxide,
a very effective screen. It has two disadvantages for this use. One is
that because of its high heat of combustion, it tends to rise in a pillar-
like mass, especially in still air. The other is that it is very
brittle, and the exploding munitions in which it is used break it into
very small particles that burn very rapidly. These disadvantages
were somewhat overcome by the development of plasticized white phosphorus
(PWP). PWP is produced by melting WP and stirring it into cold
water, resulting in a slurry of WP granules about 0.5 mm in diameter.
The slurry is then mixed with a very viscous solution of synthetic rubber,
thus coating the granules with a film of rubber and separating them from
each other. When PWP is dispersed by exploding munitions, it does not
break into such small particles, the burning rate is slowed, and the
tendency of the smoke to pillar is reduced. Despite the fact that the
characteristics of WP and PWP somewhat limit their applications as
screening smokes, their military uses include incendiary and anti-
personnel effects, because burning particles of WP can start fires
in many combustible materials and can produce burns.
183
IV. Medical Aspects
The one agent about which the most confusion seems to exist is white
phosphorus. Its melting point is very low, 44°C (111°F). When it is
placed in munitions it is in solid form, and when the munition detonates
some will be liquified because of heat.
When white phosphorus is exposed to air, it burns if the temperature is
over 34°C (93°F). Burning white phosphorus yields phosphorus pentoxide
which combines with water to yield phosphoric acid.
In practice, white phosphorus particles are removed, and the burns
treated as any burns. It is often stated or implied that white phos-
phorus burns are much "more severe11 than other burns, but
this depends on the method of quantitation and the form of the white
phosphorus encountered. Particulate white phosphorus will indeed cause
third-degree burns, but these may be scattered small burns. There are
few other burns that are combined with explosive fragmentation wounds.
Liquid white phosphorus is difficult to remove, penetrates clothing and
indeed can cause severe burns. However, unignited particulate white
phosphorus can easily be brushed off by the alert individual unless it
is partly imbedded.
184
In 1945, Walker £t a_l. , studied the effects of ignited 25 mg. white
phosphorus pellets. ^9 These burned for about 22 seconds on both glass
and the skin of an anesthetized pig. They found that when WP was burned
on glass, 79 per cent of the phosphorus was found in the smoke, and when
burned on skin, 66 per cent of the phosphorus was in the smoke. The
residue on glass contained 9 per cent of the phosphorus as acid, while
on the skin, 24 per cent was acid. On glass, about 33 per cent of this
acid was orthophosphoric acid, whereas on skin, 93 per cent was ortho-
phosphoric acid. These differences were attributed to available water.
About 2.0 mg of the WP was converted to red phosphorus on glass, and
about 1.8 mg on skin. An average of 2.7 mg of the phosphorus entered
the skin as orthophosphoric acid.
185
ro
h-»
sO
SO
as
Cn pd p. »rj
•
•
•
• (
T> 9 >i
hh O
to rt ^
9 |^l to
H
H
O 2
>
fi 9*T3
9*
to
to
to
»i
to to rt
• h-»
(D
o
*o
9
3
9
Ȥ z to
9*
rr
•
«<
O CO CL
>
•
CO w
to to to
O »i
ti
•
*rj
CO < hh
W 9 *
C to
1
s
U
o 2
w
to
W)
to to
M 9
ii 9 C_
9
hh
h**
H» CO
D ft*
to • z
Co -
CL Z
rt H»
CO h»» *
5 • ^
rt i O
o
*<: <
• rr
CL H«
zr & zr
S 9*
to
: to s:
>^
n> o to
to to
o
rt to
k. ° 9
9 3
hh to
H- X
H* rr
> v H»
• h*»
9
W < h-»
ii co to
ii O
- O
H« CL
cl fl> to
i ii
3 a Q)
<< to h-*
to
9
oo n
*4 ro^
3 i-»
L-i. o
to j> *
o •—
■o
S —
c o
C 0
ii Ln O
to rt w
•i M
O to c_
O * 9*
9 • O
ro oo
h»« M
O i-» •
to to
M
l-» H«
to to
o-v-
-as
1 o
CO o
co to
to h»«
rt hh Co
■P* h-
rt
> H- 3
h-"0 CO
9"
o o
ri H-
•i co CL
so rt ft
to rt to
M fJQ
to <
CO
as • ii
9" 9
H*
CO to
0) O PC
CO «<
> a.
X O
G
9 hh h»-
• O
H-
CL to
h to
to h-
hh to
H > O
XJ h-
rt O
h- rtf h-»
9
H- I-*
• v*
h» rr
%• jj* *♦
rt CL
nj H 9
*•
9 H-
O
9*
O co
to
00 O
£ *o •
CD O
»i *i rt
a 9
9
^ 5*
o o to
to CL
hh
• zr
> to
to ii n
>a
1 3
o f
E* B
~ O CO
rt 52
O to
H •
>i p-
to •
• C
3 **
M C
o
h-» S
O
to
SO CD
8F
*d to
so H
o h-
to co
•P* 1
O M
Ln to
hh to
3
Cn o
cl
►1
^ O
O
to
V- 03
• O
H«
O >
• 9"
to
rt ii
9
o
to 00
•
t*
zr
O <
rr
to
to
rt
to O
i-h to
to
»-*
m rt
O
•
to
»i
H-
ii
> H>
rt v<
9
a
9 CD
a
O
ii to
zr
r*
H-
C •
to
hh
^ CO
to oo
9
<
to z
►i
»
co ii
00
H-
*-*
ft
w to
to to
CO
o
H
9*
•
to
o
H«
Co
to
O
to
I-* z
to rt
§
o
Cn
n
so
00
9
cn
rt
i-1
>
as
to CL
•o
l
•
h-»
3
as
o
9 H.
o
!*
>sj
as
B
•
to
rt hh
§
CD
W
O
N>
*<
^3
co hh
-o
hh
i
rt
• to
a
o
o
i-*
H
•
»i
CO
n
to
rt
i
to
to
rr
*v
9"
h-*
o
O
9
*i
rt
to
»•
zr
Ht*
O
o
2!
od
m
to
i
O
•
•
l-K
>
»i
8
rt
cr
ro
c
to
»i
oo
a>
to
3
o
h**
CO
CO
II
cr*
^i
to
to
S
o
§
o
hh
ii
to
CL
O
O
CL
O
to
CO
*o zr
to to
rt
to
9
rt
co to
9
co
O
<
ro
cr
o *o to
O to *a
9 ii *V
rt rt h-
to H- H
o o to
rt
to
£ co
h-» CL H-
to
co
to
<
to
to to
ft I-*
to
CL O
• to
co
to
a
ii
to
*a
o
ii
rt
to
CL
o
hh
zr
to
3
o
h-*
CO
H«
CO
CO
o
to
rt
3
o
CO
rt
O
zr rt
to to
rr
*0
rt zr
zr zr o
to to co
ri v- >o
H- 9*
o to
ii
to
o
0Q
to
9
to
to
co
O
ii
9
co
O
to
rt o
O
o *a
9 "O
•• to
H CO
ii C
to h-»
CL hh
p. CD
ft rt
h- to
O
9 rt
to ii
h-« to
h-« to
*< rt
C
ii
to
CO
CL
rt to •
zr 9
to rt
ft H'H
hh 9*
00
9
§•
to
i
9*
O
co
9*
O
ri
C
CO
I
cr
c
n
o
o
9
CO
to co
CL
o
to o
9 to
CL ft
co
ri
to rt
zr
to
•o <
ii to c
to CL 9*
< «• H«
to ft
9 to to
rt 9
to CL 1J
CL 9*
• »o O
ri CO
to *a
H < zr
zr to o
to 9 M
n rt c
to co co
Cn 9
rt
to o
»i h>
e s.
to 9*
9 H-
rt rt
to
O
O *9
^O zr
*o o
to co
ii no
9*
CO O
C ri
h- C
hh CO
to
rt p-
to 9
co c
O ri
H* r*
9 to
rt co
h«»
O to
9 9
CL
9*
D) h»«
CO ft
CO
cr
to o
to q
9 1
I
J3
E
J
t
.2
e
a*
u
c
8
S
5
o
o
H
B
-
i
o
I
H '1
•\
y.
.'
1 1
'.
>
LLVM
X
*+
• '
e # fa/d
^
SAlO
**<£!•
!LJ
*4
»'LL^
t >
A
OfAi
\?
C7
% J
sV>'i
s§*
^
■ r* -*>
♦ ?
v*^
>/*»
y,
■■>*
w
Lti
•* _ • -»
-•'jm.W
h-^SjTr-Tn'
S3
.».
-v ':
^i* 0B
■MM
'/
~d>-
'yJ.
'**r *
•431
N-J
- ^V- J:
',.. £
5K
:^«j
*Vr
.7 ■?'**
r'J
<- •*-* >** . *
YM
*,*
■ *
'H
**~
x «-*
.i_ W5
^
' .
:&
- +M
K
'i^«r*
hi
s£
#*-.
V
4
£i
♦ ^
\
->*t
BW
*- *if
- ** »«^
1> **"
>•*•■$*
MP
^1
aitf *-
&
V\.
*s>r
^?«*<
&*',
A
*v!
><2l
^
**fc
m*d
5K
s
-"*:*
^ • r
i^„.*J
K*'
nrviy #^i
**'
»5?^
NAGASAKI
NP-3036 MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS
Chinlei Middle School before the explosion.
%•«*
Chinzel Middle School after the explosion.
500 meters from the center*
COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES
243
Figure 5.9 1. At left and back of center is a multistory, steel-frame building
(0.85 mile from ground zero at Nagasaki).
....... .
i| 2 cms
The National Archives
ins ■ 1 T
2
' | */.:
HO
TlSJUb
c
3rd October, 1963-
nCSTRICTEP
HOME OFFICE
£W ?^
HOxxs|nfc
SCffiNTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH
CD/SA 116
HBSBARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS
With Special Reference to the Peg of London Tubes as Shelter
by F. H. Pavry
Summary and Conclusions
The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises
many problems, and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken place from
time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were avail-
able - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide
relatively safe shelter or not.
The more recent research here described showed for the first time that
a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure on^y
about ^ as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground, (in
addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.)
Large-Scale Field Test (1/40) at Suf field, Alberta
(6)
The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. reportv~'. The decision of
the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high
explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was
welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E.
used the 100-ton explosion in 1961 to test, among other items, the model
length of the London tube, at 1/40th scale, that had already been tested
at V117 scale.
Blast Entry from Stations
There was remarkable agreement with the ■/ 11 7th scale trials:
••maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of ^rd the
corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pres-
sures in the stations were about ^/6th those in the corresponding incident
blast w.
(6) /40th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on
the London Underground System. A.W.R.E. Report K2/G2.
(Official Use Only.)
100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London
Underground tube at Suf field, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "l/40th Scale Experiment to
Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System" ,
Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.)
200 FT FROM GROUND ZERO 400 FT FROM GROUND ZERO
100 PSI OUTSIDE
30 PSI IN TUBES
15 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS
20 PSI OUTSIDE
7.2 PSI IN TUBES
4.3 PSI IN TUBE STATIONS
Aldwych Underground tube station as Blitz shelter, 8 October 1940
■**M fte :
»'
;
«***V* >
f
*
~m
/S%*3^
•t *
s
\
THOSE WHO WENT TO SHELTERS began a new kind of ni^ht-liie. Some took over
the 'lubes, camping out in this fashion — Elephant and Castle Station, iith November. 1940.
CO
<
CO
H
O
§
§
Pi
CO
1
0
1
.2
"8
«•*
,2
CO
i
s
R CO
CM
CD
w _
CD
3
s «
| i«
fi
to 3
JO
g o
■3
3
o
g o
CM
<3> lO CO lO CM GO
CM CO If) CO 00
fH ^«
GO
^COOiOCQIOCOO
H HOM^U) t*
MOOWOCONOJCD
«H CM CM CO CO ■*•
IO CO t>
rH rH CM CM CO
b- 00 b- CM 00 00 00
• •••••*
OHN^^(D00H
N«50tt)03MOW
• •*■••••
Nrjl O O
o o
o o
o
o
CO
I
I
o
ft)
g
a
£
I
Q
TRINITY GROUND ZERO
8000 R/hr at 1 hour
1.4 R/hr at
57 days
11 Sept. 1945
0>
o
o
t/>
o
a
x
a>
5
o
o
o
■o
c
D
u
a>
•■IB
■a
«.
o
a>
M
"0
C
D
o
o
"5
II
f
T5
~
*
5
hs
0
5
"D
c
to
0)
>
c
CO
5
o
0
0
0
-Q
0
D
a>
M
u
O
O
z
U
"5
o
c
CO
00
•
-C
,J_
c
0
k.
Q£
E
0
J>
£
^^
-Q
«/»
a>
o
0
mm
0
D
_D
t/>
O
>*
a>
D
0
■*"
.Q
■D
>
LU
$
c
5
■D
to
JU
D
0
£
0
"o
*
u
mm
"55
to
-S5
-o
0
«c
D
"5
c
VI
<•>
£
i—
o
•^»
Q-
•,
I
•
J*
mm
i—
CD
<
to
"5
>
o
a>
to
0
■n
u
u
o
to
c
E
I
0
0
i—
k."
*il
a
0
0)
o
o
0
Nl
ZmZ
-»—
•
c
t/>
0)
3
5
c
o
■a
0
O
o
u
c
to
D
•
>
a
._
o
0
0
-*
vi
u
0
"ai
u
0
h- o £ <^» «*
SANDIA REPORT
SAND2009-3299
Unlimited Release
Printed May 2009
Analysis of Sheltering and Evacuation
Strategies for an Urban Nuclear
Detonation Scenario
Larry D. Brandt, Ann S. Yoshimura
Executive Summary
A nuclear detonation in an urban area can result in large downwind areas contaminated with
radioactive fallout deposition. Early efforts by local responders must define the nature and
extent of these areas, and advise the affected population on strategies that will minimize their
exposure to radiation. These strategies will involve some combination of sheltering and
evacuation actions. Options for shelter-evacuate plans have been analyzed for a 10 kt scenario in
Los Angeles.
Results from the analyses documented in this report point to the following conclusions:
• When high quality shelter (protection factor -10 or greater) is available, shelter-in-place
for at least 24 hours is generally preferred over evacuation.
• Early shelter-in-place followed by informed evacuation (where the best evacuation route
is employed) can dramatically reduce harmful radiation exposure in cases where high
quality shelter is not immediately available.
• Evacuation is of life-saving benefit primarily in those hazardous fallout regions where
shelter quality is low and external fallout dose rates are high. These conditions may
apply to only small regions within the affected urban region.
• External transit from a low quality shelter to a much higher quality shelter can
significantly reduce radiation dose received if the move is done soon after the detonation
and if the transit times are short.
a*30
x -a
III g 20
O 3
"5 i^
a.
o
O 10
Evacuation From SF«10
i i
•> 150 rem
»>300 rem
£ 0 2 4 6 8 10
Time Evacuation Begins (hrs)
Figure 12. Departure time sensitivities for informed evacuations from shelters with SF=4
Mj) Sandia National Laboratories
Radiation protection factors in modern city buildings
DCPA Attack Environment Manual, ch> 6, panel 18
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REPCRT - AFSWP NO. 507
RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FRCM SURFACE BURSTS OF
VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
by
D . C . Borg
L. D. Gates
T. A. Gibson, Jr.
R. W. Paine., Jr.
MAY 195^
HEADQUARTERS , ARMED FCECES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
WASHINGTON 13, D. C.
e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drasti-
cally reduce the lethally hazardous areas* A course of action
involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of
the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer
the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much
as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take
shelter before fall-out commences.
f . Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground
shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub-basement of a large building
could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from
fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when
ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will
permit this to be done safely.
vii
Total Isodose Contour
Table II
: 500r from Fall-
-out to H+50 Hours
Yield (MT)
15
1
10
60
Downwind extent (mi)
Area (mi )
180
5^00
52
V70
152
3880
3^0
17,900
BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
HEARIiN GS
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON BADIATION
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEBGY
COMEESS 01 THE UNITED STATES
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
OF NUCLEAR WAR
JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959
PART 1
Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43338 WASHINGTON : 1959
H
O
J
J
<
fa
H
CO
D
W
u
V
6
o m m
o o
00
u
%)
a
4) *-• h »* <* 5: c
^ H (Vj H H r-l H
M
>
3
«
o
o
"0
d
o
a
(M
CO
H
D
0
fa
H
CO
p
«
u
V
g
~ in o o m in
o ^>o ^f en >o
^ o d o o o
»-.
d
W
>
73 i*
0
a
»—* CM i— t ^H i-H t-H
00
00
33
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 197
the induced radiation in uranium 238. We can refer to a British
report which indicates that around 60 percent of the total activity
at 4 ciavs— activity m this case is the number^f_disintegrations — is
due to the uranium 239 and neptunium 239~that are produced, as the
^British say, m either large or small weapons. I believe part of the
hump on the curves m tiie early times, say around 4 days, is largely
(lue to this.
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 205
Dr. Tkiffet. Yes. I thought this might be an appropriate place to
comment on the variation of the average energy, it is clear when
you think of shielding, because the eft'ectivenessoTshielding depends
directly on the average energy radiation from the deposiCTmatgmll
As 1 mentioned, IJr. (Jook at our laboratory has done quite a bit_o£
work on this. What it amounts to is that at one hour the average
energy is about one Mev. This appears, by the way, in the tables that
are in my written statement but that I did not present orally.
Representative Holxeteld. Mev. means?
Dr. Triffet. Million electron volts. At 2 hours it drops to 0.95.
At a half day, to 0.6. At 1 week it drops to 0.35. Then it begins to
go up again. At 1 month, it is 0.65, 2 months 0.65. The meaning of
this is simply that there is a period around 1 week when if induced
products are important m the bomb, there are a lot of radiations
"emanatTng from these, but the energy is low §o it operates to recface
the average energy in this period and shielding is immensely more
"effective.
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 217
Strontium 90, for example, has 33-second
krypton as its birth predecessor ; cesium 137 derives from a fission chain headed
up by 22-second iodine, followed by 3.9-minute xenon. Because of their vola-
tile or gaseous ancestry in the fireball or bomb cloud a number of the high-
yield fission products are formed in finely divided particles. Some of these are
so small that they are not subject to gravitational settling, and in fact they
remain suspended in the earth's atmosphere for many years, providing8 that
they reach the stratosphere at the proper latitude. In any event such fission
products would be depleted in the local fallout.
For example, the irradiation of uranium238 with Jjow,
neptunium 239,7a- 1^^^I^35^^^SlB[^EI^^^_^^E
"e^sHmaTesT*^ oOS^sidual ^ctijity^ajEaw^^days,
afterlTbomb alFf onffipnT"
At_higher neutron energies, such as certain types of thermonuclear weapons
■produce" naturaT~uranium undergoes an^nT^nj ^reaction whicfi"Lco'mpetes "witn
Tast ^fission in T?^_ The data of B. jrHowertonTshow ^thatjp238 hajsjiffesion
OTp^s^sectic^^O^GJbarn from 2 to 6 Mev., thereafter climbing to a plateau
jffiue'oOTbarnffir neuftfe is a threshouTToF
ffie Ln'2Q0^ctmn and the reaction" has a_cross7section of 1.4 barns in the range
of 10 MevT^rhe jgjjdy identification of U237_in fallout polntsTo f ast~Bision_ oF
"u2^ as a main energy ^51ir^e~nThTgh-yield megaton-class weapons.
6 See E. A. Mar tell, "Atmospheric Circulation; and Deposition of Strontium 90 Debris,"
Air Force Cambridge Research Center paper (July 1958). See also W. P. Libby, "Radio-
active Fallout," speech of Mar. 13, 1959.
1 Variation of Gamma Radiation Rates for Different Elements Following an Underwater
Nuclear Detonation," J. Colloid. Science, 13 (1958), p. 329.
8 "Reaction Cross Sections of U238 in the Low Mev. Range," UCRL 5323 (Aug. 15, 1958).
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN pages 1689-1691
A. B. R. E. HP/R 2017
ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT
The Radiological Dose to Persons in the U. K. Due to Debbis From Nuclear
Test Explosions Prior to January 1956
By N. G. Stewart, R. N. Crooks, and Miss E. M. R. Fisher
Activity from Neutron Capture
Although several different radioactive elements may be created by the capture
of neutrons in materials close to the reacting core of a weapon, the only signifi-
cant reactions to produce gamma-ray emitters are those associated with the
natural uranium which may be used as the tamper material of the bomb.
neutron (low energy) + U-238
U-239
Np-239
Chemical analysis of the debris shows that in general about one neutron is
captured in this way for every fission that occurs, both in nominal bombs and
in thermonuclear explosions. The U239 decays completely before reaching the
U.K. but at four days after time of burst the Np239 disintegration rate reaches
a peak relative to that of the fission products and accounts for about 60% of
the observed activity at that time.
In addition to this, a smaller number of the neutrons in a thermonuclear
explosion undergo an (n,2n) reaction with U238 to form 6.7 day U237 which is
also a (£,?) emitter.
neutron (high energy) + U-238
2 neutrons + U-237
o
H 40
<.
O
o
tc
Id
Q.
T—
Is-
o °
z<->
,.
CM
00
O-g
o —
w 0
Q_
QT
CtT
Z "F
n
LO
1>
RATEI
SlabS
o
Q_
GO
CC
00
• —
uj S
03
CO
o
CO*
CM
DOS
oncre
0
CO
Q_
CO
>
<
a
-
< o
0
-C
2 i-
03
0
csi **
< CO
0 o
•4—1
LU
X
>\
—
\~ P
'>
1—
/4
CO
ODUC
tion Fa
b
05
>
03
0
Q_
o
O
o
(iii
>
<
a
00
o
—
ION PR
Attenua
CO
<:
CO
cc
/ CO
>-
<
CN
zi
CN
Q
CO Q
~b
03
CO
LO
—
CO co
o
CO
CO
>
*""*"'*'*'-
/ '/ //
^f
lO =
CO -
CM 5
Ll
0
o
ft/I J
t/Jj
■ O
0
._
ATEDU
B. Chilt
03
0
<
CO
DC
LU
U?
E
i-
Q
Z
z
LU
h-
LU
rr
O
z
o
o
to
— . LL.
co
CO
LU
z
LO
b
CM
O
CO
I
o
i
o
LO
I
o
to
o
aoiovd N0iivnN3iiv
i
i
1
i
removed)
i
o
1-
CM
CO
CO
O
o
> —
tO
o
to
<
LL
O
CO
LU
<
a
O
o
LU
(0
A . •• . •• • * ... A . " - • . . a . »
r-i:v.i.\%%?>?g.i.-*..rf^..v't1^
a- ■* ■ * i i • i air*- • • 'A •
:--/.!>.vv.-%7:,.::v'.^
yTHZL
A,
«SW
/
CONCRETE
SLABS,
EACH ~ 3-1/4 lit.
THICK
o — DETECTORS
The lead shield prevents fallout material from settling directly on detector
"A," while at the same time shielding against the intercepted material
IO{
10'
I0;
UJ
CO
o
10
0.1
Dose rates from test-shot "Shasta" —
p=q
'
X
\
•A
V
-»«■=-
■B
*c-
• D
*E
-F
SH
■G
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13
TIME* hr
o
CN
CO
0
n
u
O
C£ s
< ^
LU >+C
I- D
5 "3
3 c
M O
■— D
a: -S
id a>
O D
2 -c
O of
uj D
If
o %
< £
y Ik.
< CD
uj ■—
Hi
^■^^
^ ■ \
^Er4
*
v>
E*j
o
a*
^*
CK
*—>
c
o
o
E*J
•
•
lO
*
*
oo
•
^^^ H
roducts):
.53 0
o
o
o
"5
c
o
o
a.
c
o
•
•
CM
•
u
o
o
#«2
CN CM
* •
B4
ao
o
o
o
tO
*^
o o
I
c
o
to
CD
>
0)
o
E
to
oo
rs.
^r
CD
a.
o
>
E*j
of volatile
0.4
•
o
00
•
o
00
•
o
o
"5
C
0
o
c
o
"5
K*
° 3
« o
CM
CO
*fr
^
"O
CD
■ •J
•
o
oo
•
o
oo
•
o
oo
•
o
o
2,
1
CD
a
CD
"O
(J
"5
a
o
to
0
a
E
K2
O GO
!—
o
o
u
■•j
c <*
^
^
00
"O
CO
h*l
tO
CD
a
E
d
d
d
U
o
O
o
3
o
o
K3
•w*
c
K2
S ^
CO
a*
CD
1
to lO
o
u
•
o
CN
d
a
E
a
*/>
"O
0
to
O
a
"to
3^_
*o
n
■o
"O
■o
TJ
o
D
■rt
O D
D
D
D
D
(J
0
a
oo ^
■3
c o
£0
o
o
o
o
o
S 5
B*J
o u u o
^^
o
Z O
■
u
o
o
D
to
LL_ -i-
E
c
E
"O
■7
6? feS fe< 6?
to
o
fe? feS
Ktt
v>
r>.
00
o
t/>
•■■1
rv v>
E
■"
CO
rv
in
^
"O
CO <-
hi
o
0
o
_0
^^H
ss
O
c
O
H
o o
oo
in
*
o
*
in
00
in
*
o
**—
i- oo
o in
• *
HI
ii ^
00
W)
•
o
00
o
in oo
^^
o
^
o
^H
L>
k.
*■"
■*
**-^
o
o
to
^r
CN
"O
"O
CN
00
^*
0
a
o
£
E
a
CD
•*—
E
3
o
to
E
o
CM
Q.
E
O
to
o
c
o
"5
U
D
"D
0
to
O)
O
*^
O
"O
0
L.
a
E
E
o
o
C
0)
a
E
E
o
0
C
D
u
o
D)
0
to
D)
>*
o
E
O
O
1—
o>
••—
o
0
CD
c
C
■•"
00
"O
to
CD
o
to
0
^ w
CM
if 9
0)
Q.
O
3
a
o
c
O)
E
o
to
CD
to
SI
o
z
o
c
to
"O
CD
u
to
c
O
D
cd
CD
E
CD
D
U
"5,
00
CM
o
• •a,
c
o
u
c
c
u
0
to
a
"D
O
0
o
c
•+— •
^.
^^"
CD
n
D
D
o
E
O
CD
c
a
>
to
c
o
O
o
o
0
CD
>
^
"55
E
D
o
2
0
D
"O
c
o
Q.
0
"to
C
"to
0
"5
0
"O
C
o
E
O
M—
o
C
o
0
o
o
c
a
c
J^
D
o
o
O
to
T3
»^—
JQ
CD
3
h^
u
o
Ik.
O
U
o
00
CN u-
M-i
rt
a •*
CO
9^ !_l
<^
z
D
X
Q
a.
en
_Q
CD
-; — ■
_*:
CD
CD
03
O
CD
Q_
C/)
03
E
E
03
CD
en
Z3
_Q
CD
-; — ■
03
03
E
o
CD
Q_
CO
03
03
O
03
O
3.
"D
CD
H >
03
O
03
CD
>
H — •
03
CD
CD
O
03
_Q
03
CD
00
o5
o
3.
~o
CD
H — •
03
c=
CD
H — '
o
03
CD
>
-i — >
03
CD
CD
O
03
"D
_Q
03
CO
C/5
0s
O
O
C\J
6s
O
O
CM
o
0)
ct
6s
o
LO
LO
LO
o
LO
6s
O
0s
O
O
CM
6s
O
O
LO
of
«£P
CM
LO
of
0s
O
LO
LO
a>
of
#s£P
LO
d
LO
of
O
LO
cc
■^ l CD
E 03 q
03 ^ cz
CO
N LO N
CO CD CM
CD CM i-
O O
CO LO
Is- ^t
CD CM
d d
o
d
o
a>
Is*.
o
LO
o
o
o
CO CD
co r^
co o
o
o
o
o
o
CO
*~ S CM °> ^
CM g^ Jj CM O
o ""
o
o
d
LO
o
o
o
o
o
o
00
CM O LO
CD Is- 00
CD CM
CO
i- CO
o
CO CD
LO Tfr
o o
o
d
LO
o
o
o
LO CM 00 £
CD CD CO
CD CM
O O
O
d
00
CM
o
CM
O
O
CM
Is-
CO
T- ^ ~ ~ O O
o
o
o
o
o o
o
o
o
o
o
CD
CM
O
O
O
o
^ 0 LO CO
O LO CO $ £j CO CM
^ ^ rtl o o ^
CO CO CM
odd
o o
o
o o
0 „ TT CO CXI
cm Is-
o o
LO Is-
CO CO
d d
o o o
o
d
CM
o
o
CO CD CO
CD CD O
co ^r
i- o
CM
o
o o o
Is- T-
i- o
Is- CO
o o
o o
d d
CD LO
°> °° en en
CO CO ;£ o
in n °° ^
*-* txl CD ^T
T- O
o o
o o
o o
o
^1-
co
o
o
o o o
CM
o
o
o o o
LO
o
ww v-" rr> en *— '
LO Is- 2- CM ^
O
O
Is-
00
o
o
LO
CM
o
o
LOT-LocMLOcpLq^t
olo^locmlocolo
ddT^i^CMCMCOCO
o
o
CM
o
o
o
o
o
o
CO
CD
LO
o
o
LO
CM
o
o
o
o
CD
LO
Is-
o
o
Is-
LO
CD
03
.2
o
J5 E -
£ 03 " O
DC a) 03
CD
CM
LO
CO
00
"si"
00
CD
CD
CO
Is-
^j-
"ni-
"ni-
"nI-
CD
LO
00
Is-
O
00
Is-
CD
Is-
O
Is-
d
a)
03 ^ >
CD £ CD
o
CD T3
o XJ
- a
(L>
^5
CD
N
S s
fl ^2 (/3
•^ 2
-4-» O
CD +3
s ^
cd
03
CN
i
CD
c
CD
CM)
S & ^
tj g ^
IS.g
a § ^
O CM >^
g CM .5
O Oh ,
CD H
-a ^
o a
' — ^ cc CD
II ^ fl
LO > 0
O) ^^ 4— >
«U «
CD
CD
a,
CZJ
4— >
O
tZ3 3
CO
O
CD
CD
O
00
G
O
H
. — P CD
O
>
e
^
13
■4— »
Oh
^
b
o
■ H
s
>1
&J0
C
c
cd
Co
• 1— 1
t/3
*~4
^o
C^
o3
CO
5-H
o
o
O
o
o
O
>
o
CO
CN
i— 1
i-H
^H
CN
CN
CN
^
C3
i
o
o
o
o
o
O
Z
t/3
t/3
'o
^o
^o
CN
^f
^H
^D
o
o
en
o
CO
In
^
un
in
in
^o
r-
xh
en
m
^H
t-H
o
■4— »
cd
S:
«y
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Q
-a
—
,3
ON
CJ
t/3
S3
^
cd
#g
b
f
1
o
Cfl
-
4=>
#o
-(— i
CO
-^
P
-a
cS
_o
■4-J
1h
13
fl
<+H
OO
TD
CO
o
*35
^
CO
C/3
(N
!/2
R
O
o
CO
'a
o
&0
to
T3
o
+^
o
o
o
o
o
TD
CO
cu
o
o
OO
xr
^H
CN
un
i>
o
o
o
C
^g
1*
S3
^
T— 1
^o
VO
o>
t>
^H
OO
^H
1 — 1
^H
CO
-o
+^
c^S
a
&
5-H
a
a
o
-4— »
o
C/3
CO
CO
T3
+-»
ES
u
S3
+->
■4— »
■4— »
3
^o
CO
5-H
OO
■4— »
OO
■4—*
M
O
-4— >
%
en ^h
-4— *
$
3
<4-H
=1
CO
(N
13
s
^0
CN
CN
^
T— 1
G\
wn
o
00
\o
^o
_C
o
c
t/3
^H
\6
en
un
^-H
^H
o
3
'-+H
c^
C3
cd
H
^
oo
5-1
o
-4— »
5-H
o
5-H
5-H
'—
5-H
CD
CD
CO
5-1
• H
NO
CO
5-H
CO
to
o
CJ
CD
D
^H
00
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
13
C
Nj
c
o
Oh
<0
en
en
en
cn
en
en
en
m
en
1
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
cd
O ID P P D D
P & D
13
CO
a
c
GO
13
4=)
O
Q
«
4J
rD
O
-£
to
Q
Oo
3
CO
so
SO
:§
so
' — i
©0
g
so
4^
GO
GO
to
^3
co
>
on
o
CO
o
■t— >
5-H
1
s
CO
t/3
CO
-O
■4-J
to
g
SJ
to
to
to
to
^3
^3
Q
^2
s
cd
o
C
£
3
3
rQ ^ r^ r^3
U O U O
CO
a
•X-
X
p
'CO
ring
are
TJ
• ff
cd
>» cd X)
fN
•FN
cd
b o> ^
|
a
2 g ^
t5 c «
03
^0
-x-
a
cd
Vh — _G
© S ~
fO
0)
S3
• FN
S3
00
0
00
00
^0
0\
i — 1
cn
-
On
On
CN
in
OO
CN On
°^ in'
0
^0
0
in
en
+
■vf
O
3
O
in
^ • -H ^ *'H
J ^ - F^ C
f- 1 -FH fll
rO r*i O cd
S H 'El ^ ^
f3
4— •
O
fO
cd $w cvo
> C S >^
cd 0 0 b °
CO
o
F*»
"-I3
S3
fh
0)
CO
O
3
03
S3
oo
R
=5
a.
+- »
R
^t
0
m
m
r^
00
o>
^H
OO
cd ^S o>
^ .9 -2 ^ «
0<
00
en
cm
6
§
•S
oc
m
in
in
F^
F— 1
CN
OO
c^>
O
_3
1
SO
^c
(N
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
CN
O
1
Of
-=
■+■»
S3
03
f-h
t>)
O
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
F^
O
O
^O
VO
o>
ON
^ a 3 0 Id
(O 0 § 0 ^
'- * Si w
Ohh ".So
CO
C/3
in oo
m ^
O
1 d
0
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
CN
d
en
d
en
d
O
d
O
d
0
lo ^j
3 3
■fH 0
TJ f3
co ,cd
O 3
*53
05
1
^ .^ ^ ^O
.S ^O H H
1 3 1 1 «
I q i .3 a
g i-J 43 cd cd
^^^^ F-l
q 0 fh g r-.
c^ °
nuclear exp
the fallout*
R
?H
1^
— H
^1-
^D
0
*
■5f
^0
r5-1 "O fV
c/i -M CO
cd 2 (N
•^^^
1^ F( J_)
O 3 3
• 3 co O
T3
cd
0
r— 1
r— 1
O
m
cn
CN
a>
ON
m ^h
CN
0
in
m
o> S3
en
1 I
O
r-H
O
0
O
O
0
f-H
i> ^j-
en
in
0
f-H
f-H
0
0
0^3
en i— i
0
d
O
d
O
d
O
d
0
d
O
d
O
d
0
d
CN
d
O O
d d
O
d
O
d
CN
d
en
d
en
d
O
d
O
d
13 -fh cd fh ^
O c<: +^ +-T j.
^ 0 =2 S3 cd
©
FC)
Ki T3 3 5i ^
H-J -f. O
2
.R
^ f§ fq a ^
3 !- F-J
Dh ^ f3
^° i
• S ?5 =-
•FN
0 c S a a
H 4h CC
5 OJ cd 53 -3
,H *H . *fH fj
S3
©
• FN
5/5
?-(
'0
3
R
1
cd -g 3 ^ ^3
N Oh O fC ^
cd CO c-j t3 c>0
5-1 n^ -x "is s — '
fB-II
000,0
-, CJ ,
CU
00
R
O . jy fh »
u^23§f:^^
S3
Of
Of
=5
C-h
+- »
*2
^3
^t
0
m
CN
cn
0
00
en
-f § % % £
f-h a
f^ cd O -H .H
^ H f3 2 _cd
Oh .- « 2 fi
z ^ ^
■g -9 3
O d ON
t3 a 1
P3
Ft?
.2 ^
5_ ^
P ^
tin 0
$1
CO
' S3
O
^3
CO
T3
=5
O
CO
T3
CO
c3
CD O
>.fC
^ O
CO'
T3
'CO
5h
O
T3
• H
c
-c
=5
O
=5
•fH
a
en
^ ^ S "§ fO
"FH ^ CTA "FH
u
2 c
H>~> CO
f-h CO
2 E
f5
m
CN
1^
0
00
in
CN
in
CN
T3
CN
OO
CN
T3 in
0 ^
^t
fC
CN
in
en
^0
Tr'
u 3 a
3 N ^
3 CO H->
QJ
U
S3
t/5
03
Of
CO
CD
H
• fH
CO
CD
Q
-H cN
n «n
c^
in
F-H
CN
in
1
0
U
OO
in
6
U
in r-l
0 ^
6 i
u u
CN
CN
CN
1 — 1
1
fO
*o 00
-xf O
CN 00
1 — i t — i
1 1
in H
f-H
CN
00'
f-H
1
H
in
en
O
CN
fO
<6 cn m ^h 0
a> 0
l> On en O ^f
en en CN ^f CN
FH , ^_; _> '^
H t, ^ 3
c oj co 2s ^s
s " ^ i f-h
jn \o H ^ *
O jzi cd
•-0 *- -3
W 3 "^
cd -3 co
fo
C
©
03
O
+^
a>
Li
03
03
03
Li
9
03
Li
03
Li
03
03
OJD
O
Cm
si
.05
^m in
•fl in
OJD
Li
2 o
a> p
>* o
03
Li
03
O O
in in
(N (N m in ^o i>
o o o o o o
5
03
o
o
cd
>
od
^3
• ^
5
*—
O
5-H
CD
go
CD
T^ O O
cd
H
o
t
o
U
t> cd
in ^h
, .3 O
5-H C0 ^
< I 1
g| % §
„ CD °
2 ^ J=
^ (D ^3
P^ cd >^
n a ^
MH a)
a
CD
cd
5-H
J Strontium-89
Krypton-90 ~ g » Rubidium-90 v short^ Strontium-90
31
As expected from the earlier discussion, strontium exhibits very
definite fractionation. On one series of air samples collected at
1*0,000 feet at Operation CASTLE after the Bravo shot, the R value for
strontium-89 was 0.35* For a fall-out sample collected on land at ap-
proximately 80 miles from the burst point, the R value for strontium-89
was O.lU. The R value for strontium-90 using the same fall-out sample was
0.29.
33
10
16
10
15
E
o
10
14
10
13
Radioactivity in the Marine Environment (1971), page 13.
Specific activity of 15 Mt Bravo fallout
Rongelap samples
Ba-140
\ Mo-99 (not volatile)
\
Mo-99
Sr-89
(volatile
precursor
in decay chain)
Fractionation
(depletion of volatile decay chains)
10
10'
Fallout particle diameter (microns)
10'
8
.*
■3
O
0
%
Cfl
£
9
O
AM
o
o
c
CO ^ CM cN ^ vO ^ ^
o o o q p o
c
o
£
*
n
p
E
o
c
5
o o o o © o
*co
O
e
a
£
o
£
o
X
-*>
S
H
o
z
°"
a
e
UJ
«-^
s
C/3
a
CO
s
CO
o
s <
>■*"
^
*o O i** f- en vO
*o
£
?i
o
N ^ ^ lO ^ *h
c
oc
c
J2
•
O (7)
•^*
*3
*c3
o
<
w+
o
*
1
U
w
9
o
z
^^n
C8
$
e
V
c*
u
0
o
UJ
3
r^ oo co r^ r^ ^
co oo cm r^ <^ o*
0£
Q
— — , rs» vo
DHCLISSIFIEB
AD232901
Copy No.
RADIOCHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL FALLOUT PARTICLES
^SStfX?
Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-386
17 September 1958
J. L. Mackin
P.E. Zigman
D. L. Love
D. MacDonald
D. Sam
U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
TABIS 2 (ZUNI, barge YFNB-29; see Table B8 in WT-1317)
Weight, Activity* and Fission Values for the Sized Fractions From the 1QDX
Sample (YFNB29, 17 km from ZUNI)
Size
Vela
ht
Fissions
Range Grams
Percent
Percent
Total
For Gram
00
of Total of Total
(101*)
>iooo
37*70
ttl.8
15.8
21.
0.56
500-1000 U1.91
k6.k
W.O
60.
l.h
250- 500
*.9T
5.5
19*8
26.
loo- 250
3.51
3-9
10.7
1*.
50- 100
O.60
0.9
2.3
3.0
3.8
<50
I.38
1.5
5-*
7.1
5.1
Total
90*27
131*
1.5
TABUft V (ZUNI: BIKINI/HOW ISLAND, YFNB29, YA640; TABLE 3 . 9 IN WT-1317)
Keam Values for Several Quantities, for Altered and Unaltered Particles
Melted coral sand Unmelted coral sand
Quantity Altered Unaltered
Ko. of No. of
Samples Value Samples , Value
fles/gm(xl0^) $ 3-8 4* 3.1 £ 0.09Q * 0O2,
BajM>-R value 5 0.090 + 0.068 8 2.1 ? 1.2
Sr^-K value 7 0.018 + 0.010 10 O.65 + 0.17
The data of Table k show that the value of fie? ions/gram vae much
larger la the altered particles than In the unaltered particles. The R
value data Indicates that the altered particles vera markedly depleted in
Balto-Lalto, whereas the unaltered particles were enriched in BalnO-La11^
R values
With respect to fractionation of radionuclides it has long been
accepted that the mass 69 and mass 1**0 chains which exist for long time
periods as nchle gases,, halogens and alkali metals* would condense late
and therefore disproportionate with respect to less volatile: elements .
On the "basis of long-lived gaseous precursors it would he predicted that
the altered or melted particles would exhibit low R values for both chains,
with the 89 smaller of the two* This was verified by the mean R values
given in Table H, which were 0*090 and 0.018 for the 1M0 and 89 chains,
respectively. The corresponding values for the unaltered particles of 2.1
and 0.65 indicate that this latter class of particles may be important as
a scavenger of these nuclides*
Xt is also ef Interest to compare R values obtained in this study
with values obtained on gross fallout samples. The latter data gave Ba12*0
R values and Sr*^ R values of 0.10 and 0.0* respectively** in the lagoon
samples. The low R values for the gross sample from the lagoon area are
similar to R values obtained with altered particles and suggests a lagoon
fallout composed primarily of altered particles. This suggestion is sup-
ported by the VH3X sample fission/gram data (described above) .
* Baito is formed by the decay of the radioelemeata Xa^AO (l6-sec half-
life) and Cal1*0 ( 66-sec half -life); Sr89 i8 fomsd by the decay of the
redioelements Kx& (3.16-min half -life) end R&89 (l^.fc-min half -life) .
** P.D. LaRiviere, USEFUL, personal communication.
O
"0
D
C
o
o
c
o
u
o
o
D
C
I
O
u
M
I
O
z
Q
v>
0)
u
o
t/>
O
u
CO
in
CO
UOI|DUOj43DiJ
10
2 0-
-3
10
2 h-
-4
1 Tote/ fission yields add up to 200% (2 fission fragments per fission)
2. Minimum (at mass ~115) is shallower for higher neutron energies
3. Data apply to fission by the lowest possible energy (thermal) neutrons
The reason for the peaks at masses -100 and -140 was discovered by Marie
Goeppert Mayer in 1948: nuclei with "magic numbers" of 2, 8, 20, 50, 82, or
126 neutrons or protons have high stability due to closed shells of 2, 6, 12, 30,
32, and 44 nucleons (nucleons, unlike electrons, have spin-orbital interaction)
-J I I I I I I I I I i i i
76 82 88 94 100
106 112 118 124
MASS NUMBER
130 136 142 148 154 160
1
1
1
\
\
O4
-
^
.*'
^
<
<
\
'Y
p-
>\
to/
*l
o
I
/
•
,-'
■ ^^s^^
' >
\
^^
^*!*j
^
/
^^
^55^^
0)
>
Q)
m
0)
\;>
.
0,^^ ^S*^
c
"^
£/
■o
o
\ ^v
-v
^
7
Jh-
o
-a
"^
nL/
Cj
00
CO
CM
■
•o
c
o
CO
CO
c
^
v\
XX \*>*""
*-*\
^^v^"-^^*"1
f-'/y
■
,0*"^
v\r
3
irv
en
%
— *H
C
_ §
1-
cc
j
CJ
" 1
§
a
a
— -H
t
- §
1-
a
a
^
^c^Z^s
CO
*
/
*
Si
m y
p
i,
o
I
\
vC.
0)
z
D
o
\\
^
#/
Y
o
\
&
3
551 >^
OC
o
o*
z
CO
4
m
ro
M
t
^\
V
tfC*^
» \L^ — v
^1M
_ji/ v
/
\IB
O
*Y
(AV
u
l_
c
V
$/
§S\
3
O
r^
«/>
\VN^
Ik
5
%s
V '
\ s
V c^^
6\
pr
\
\
\
en
cr
o <
p- u
8
"I
= °
31VH 3anSOdX3 1VI01 10 lN30d3d
10 10
TIME (HR)
43
TBI's indicated, on the average, 0.85 ±25 percent of the survey meter readings
60
observed/calculated ratio varies from 0.45 at 11.2 hours
to 0.66 from 100 to 200 hours, to 0.56 between 370 and 1,000 hours.
Station
Location
HOW ISLAND PLATFORM F
HOW ISLAND MONITORING PTS
Detector
TIR %• •»
CUTIE PIE-O
Height
25 FT
3 FT
Station F at How Island
2.08 x 1014 fissions/ft2 (Table B.27)
TABLE B. 1
Tilt
TIME SINCE ZUNI (HR)
WT" 1317 Figure B.7 Gamma-ionization-decay rate, Site How.
LAND SURFACE BURST
A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the
Eniwetok Peoving Ground
E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif.
2.36 g/cu cm irregular in shape
Falling speeds (feet/hour)
Altitude
75 fj.
100 m
200 fj,
350 jx
0
8,060
3,360
3,870
4,200
8,910
5,040
5,980
6,910
7,700
6,960
11,700
14,400
18,600
24,400
27,800
21,600
27,100
35,300
47,200
61,900
20
40.
60
80
5 megaton Tewa
Comparison of fallout forecast with test results
NAUTICAL MILES
HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES
SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS
HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT)
5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 7.84 STAT. MILES WSW
5 MT TEWA (87% FISSION), 59.3 STAT. MILES NW
1
150 300
450 600 750 900
12 17 22 27 32
TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR)
TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN)
Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout
WATER SURFACE BURST
A Fallout Forecasting Technique With Results Obtained at the
Eniwetok Peoving Ground
E. A. Schuert, USNRDL TR-139, United States Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif.
Time variation of the winds aloft
In most of the observations made at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the winds
aloft were not in a steady state. Significant changes in the winds aloft were
observed in as short a period as 3 hours. This variability was probably due to
the fact that proper firing conditions which required winds that would deposit
the fallout north of the proving ground, occurred only during an unstable synoptic
situation of rather short duration.
/ n
/ .^ \ PARTICLE
E LINES
4.5 megaton Navajo
FORECAST "HOT LINE'
80,000
FORECAST AREA
OF FALLOUT
SURFACE ZERO
MEASURED ISODOSE
RATE CONTOURS
15,000
Comparison of fallout forecast with test results
20
40
60
NAUTICAL MILES
HEIGHT LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED HEIGHT OF ORIGIN FOR VARIOUS SIZES
SIZE LINE = DESTINATIONS FOR A FIXED PARTICLE SIZE FROM VARIOUS HEIGHTS
HOT LINE = HEIGHT LINE FROM BASE OF MUSHROOM DISC (MAXIMUM FALLOUT)
4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 7.54 STAT. MILES W
4.5 MT NAVAJO (5% FISSION), 21.0 STAT. MILES N
100 200 300 400 500
TIME SINCE DETONATION (MIN)
600 1U 1 6 11 16 21 26
TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR)
Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout, Project 2.63
CO
O
0)
E
o
U
o
y
o
o
•^
■D
O
■o
c
o
o
o
s
o
u
(B3ITW) 83Ue^8TQ PUTM SSOJO
o
o
z
<
CO
o
<
u
02
I
02
02
<
U
2
Q
ILI
ILI
ILI
CO
Q.
X
iij
CO
z
02
<
02
ILI
9
<
Z
ILI
<
u
U
u-
ILI
5
CO
Z
o
00
Q£
CO
0
o
_■
02
o
ILI
ILI
to
02
ILI
I—
Q
Z
ILI
u
<
02
o
o
5
£
o
02
<
CO
^j
o
o_
ik
ILI
CO
z
o
z
o
X
02
o
Q
ILI
CO
02
CO
0
ILI
00
o
o
<
o
Q
3
IL
CO
CO
^—
O M
2 z
52
ILI a_
02 O
UJ —
> z
o o
ILI ^
> =!
O Z
U lu
o >
P o
2 z
a
z
0.
o s
02 ILI
< E
CO Q
0 Z
< =
CO o
Q D2
>.N
z <
• ^^
< -r
co ±
LED BAGS
BANK EAI
\Triy
= Q
^ Z
o <
Z m
^ U
co z
ACE
JTRA
iHEET
RUNK
STIC
EET
1ftV<
A Z x
02
<
«rj |—
< x 7^g < <~>
Q
(J o
? ** ^6tc 02 t
Z
i= z
UP?*01 Q
PLAS
OR A
O
n>u.«
02
IL.
I O
B x
Q
UNK WIT
HONFL
H "ip v
1 ^
Z
^S^i^^Wf»B
S CO
NK ILI
Q
O
O
02
<
u
O
02
<
DTRI
EART
fi
TRENCH
EP
B z
E o
Bf CM
u
1—
< o
9* H-
1*
|#
--JK
Q
LU
0
O O
\ \*.
CO
5 <
Ef LU
S q
K LU
I s
1 <
1 u
z
<
COVER FLO
PLACE 1 FO
^ KENNEDY
A MESSAGE
TO YOU FROM
THE PRESIDENT
The White House
September 7, 1961
My Fellow Americans:
Nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war are facts of
life we cannot ignore today. I do not believe that war can solve
any of the problems facing the world today. But the decision is
not ours alone.
The government is moving to improve the protection afforded
you in your communities through civil defense. We have begun, and
will be continuing throughout the next year and a half, a survey of
all public buildings with fallout shelter potential, and the marking
of those with adequate shelter for 50 persons or more. We are pro-
viding fallout shelter in new and in some existing federal buildings.
We are stocking these shelters with one week's food and medical
supplies and two weeks' water supply for the shelter occupants. In
addition, I have recommended to the Congress the establishment of
food reserves in centers around the country where they might be
needed following an attack. Finally, we are developing improved
warning systems which will make it possible to sound attack warn-
ing on buzzers right in your homes and places of business.
More comprehensive measures than these lie ahead, but they
cannot be brought to completion in the immediate future. In the
meantime there is much that you can do to protect yourself— and
in doing so strengthen your nation.
I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this
issue of LIFE. The security of our country and the peace of the
world are the objectives of our policy. But in these dangerous days
when both these objectives are threatened we must prepare for all
eventualities. The ability to survive coupled with the will to do so
therefore are essential to our country.
yJAy^ (f~ Jlaaskask.
John F. Kennedy
V
Fallout Shelters
YOU COULD BE AMONG THE 97% TO SURVIVE
IF YOU FOLLOW ADVICE ON THESE PAGES . . .
HOW TO BUILD SHELTERS . . . WHERE TO HIDE
IN CITIES . . . WHAT TO DO DURING AN ATTACK
Proceedings of the Symposium
held at Washington, D. C.
April 19-23, 1965 by the
Subcommittee on Protective Structures,
Advisory Committee on Civil Defense,
National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council
Protective
Structures
for
CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS
1966
THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION
AFFORDED BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL
BRITISH HOUSE
Daniel T. Jones
Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London
Protective Factors in a Sample
of British Houses (Windows Blocked)
Protective
Factor
Percentage of Houses
< 26
26-39
40-100
> 100
36%
28%
29%
7%
1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on
the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used.
2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sand-
bags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags
were used.
3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags
along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along
the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used.
"A very much improved protection could be obtained by
constructing a shelter core. This means a small, thick-
walled shelter built preferably inside the fallout room
itself, in which to spend the first critical hours when the
radiation from fallout would be most dangerous. "W
The full-scale experiments were carried out at the
Civil Defense School at Falf ield Park. <2)
In the staircase construction, the shelter con-
sisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags
being placed on treads above and at the sides.
A 93 curies cobalt-60 source was used.
J
ZZZZJ2-
-tTf M»MMWMfWWn
DINING ROOM
\>J*******J*********rrwJjfariri
E2
SITTMG ROOM
9 in. brick walls
The windows and doors were not blocked
contribution
r/hr/c/ft2
Protective
Factor
Position
Ground
Roof
House only
E2
15.0
8.4
21
Lean-to
E2
10.4
2.4
39
Staircase cupboard:
Stairs only sandbagged
Stairs and outer wall sandbagged
Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall
and corridor partition
sandbagged
N2
N2
N2
29.2
16.4
8.8
5.3
4.6
1.8
14
24
47
sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 in. x
9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand.
Lean -to shelter
partition
wall
between
sitting and
dining rooms
1. Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, HMSO, 1963.
2. Perryman, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117.
Li
85 polythene
sandbags
two doors,
6 ft 6 in. x
2 ft 8 in.
floor area 21 sq ft.
BLAST AND OTHER THREATS
Harold Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Chemical High-Explosive Weapons
As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles
carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable
of extensive damage only when delivered in large
numbers and with high accuracy.
Biological Warfare
Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce;
their effective dissemination over hostile territories
remains the chief deterrent to their effective employ-
ment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can
be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large
area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of
fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at
modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in
virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are
quite perishable in normal open-air environments.
Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can
be quite effective against biological agents, there is
less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a
wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance
of limited employment on population concentrations
—perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with
adequate filtering could insure rather complete
protection to those inside.
Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are
relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly
insurmountable logistics problems on delivery.
Although chemical agents produce casualties more
rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver
seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale
deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does
not hold promise of the development of significantly
more toxic chemicals for future use.
Radiological Weapons
The advantages of such modifications are much
less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by
missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is
very important. If the total payload is not to be in-
creased, then the inclusion of inert material to be
activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the
explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear
explosives, then more fission -fragment activity can
be created, and it is the net difference in activity
that must be balanced against the loss of explosive
yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most
efficient generator of activity, and greater total
doses are not achieved by injecting special inert
materials to be activated.
Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident
Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation
PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support
Agency Field Command, June 1960.
The Neutron Bomb
The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliber-
ate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neu-
trons, would necessarily be limited to rather small
yields— yields at which the neutron absorption in air
does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast
and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small
yields against large -area targets again runs into the
delivery problems faced by chemical agents and ex-
plosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a
less stringent problem for delivery systems in most
applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy
desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and
to create little local fallout but still kill the populace,
it would be necessary to use large numbers of care-
fully placed neutron -producing weapons burst high
enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low
enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, how-
ever, adequate radiation shielding for the people
would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the
attack to be futile.
The thermal radiation from a surface burst is
expected to be less than half of that from an air
burst, both because the radiating fireball surface
is truncated and because the hot interior is partially
quenched by the megatons of injected crater mate-
rial.
SUPERSETS MIC GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT 5-FT DEPTH)
Vertical acceleration: avm ~340 APS/CL ± 30 per
cent. Here acceleration is measured in g's and over-
pressure (APS) in pounds per square inch. An em-
pirical refinement requires Cl to be defined as the
seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but
as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil.
OUTRUNNING GROUND -SHOCK MAXIMA
(AT -10-FT DEPTH)
Vertical acceleration: a
m~2xl03/CLr'
Acceleration is measured in
+ factor 4 or -factor 2
g's, and r is the scaled radial distance— i.e., r =
R/W1/3 kftAmt)1/3.
Data taken on a low air -burst shot in Nevada indicate
an exponential decay of maximum displacement with
depth. For the particular case of a burst of — 40 kt
at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep
as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry
lake bed, which led to the following approximate
decay law, according to Perret.
6 = 6Q exp (-0.017D),
where 6 represents the maximum vertical displace-
ment induced at depth D, 6q is the maximum dis-
placement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet.
MODEL ANALYSIS
Mr. Ivor LI. DAVIES
Suffield Experimental Station
Canadian Defense Research Board
Ralston, Alberta, Canada
Nuclear- Weapon Tests
In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effec-
tively a "nominal" weapon, at Monte Bello, off north-
west Australia. To the blast loading from this
weapon we exposed a number of reinforced- concrete
cubicle structures that had been designed for the
dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made
the best analysis of response we were competent to
make at that time. Our estimates of effects were
really a dismal failure. The structures were placed
at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we ex-
pected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with
some petaling of the front face, and extensively
cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the
cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had
occurred along both diagonals, and the four tri-
angular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi
level, where we had three cubicles, each with a
different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we ob-
served only light cracking in the front face of that
cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.)- The other
two structures were apparently undamaged, as was
the single structure at the 6-psi level.
In 1957, the first proposals were made for
the construction of the underground car park in
Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was inter-
ested in this project since, in an emergency, the
structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently
a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons
Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a
structure that would be resistant to a blast loading
of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model
scale.
Using the various load- deformation curves
obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the
response of the structure to blast loading. Of par-
ticular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons
of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta.
34p.s.i.
Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles.
A total of seven more models was made; six
were shipped to Canada and placed with the top
surface of the roof flush with the ground and at
positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60,
50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model
was kept in England for static testing at about the
time of firing. The results were not as expected.
In the field, the four models farthest from the charge
were apparantly undamaged; we could see no crack-
ing with the eye, nor did soaking the models with
water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The
model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the
roof panels and beams, and one of the columns
showed slight spalling at the head. This model had
been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi.
Davies, I. LI., Effects of Blast on Reinforced Concrete Slabs,
and the Relationship with Static Loading Characteristics (U).
United Kingdom, Operation BUFFALO - Target Responcc Tests,
AWRE Report T U6/57 ( OONFIDEaiTIAL report), August 1957 .
Wood, A. J., The Effect of Earth Covers on the Resistance of
Trench Shelter Roofs (U). United Kingdom, Operation BUFFAIP-
Target Response Target Response Tests, AWRE Report T ^7/57
(CONFIDENTIAL report), August 1957*
OfBrien, T. P., Rowe, R. D., and Hance, R. J., Tho Effect of
Atomic Blast on Wall Panels (U). United Kingdom, PWE-36
(CONFIDENTIAL report), April 1955.
Walley, F., Operation TOTEM Group 13 Report: Civil Defense
Structures (U)^ United Kingdom, FWE-111 (CONFIDENTIAL report),
May 1957.
Davies, I. LI., and Thumpston, N. S., The Resistance of Civil
Defense Shelters to Atomic Blast (U). United Kingdom, FWE 35
(UNCLASSIFIED report), March 1955.
Davies, I. 11., The Resistance of Civil Defense Shelters to
Atomic Blast: IV Final Report on Experiments with Reinforced
Models of Heavily Protective Citadel Shelter Type CD12 (U).
United Kingdom, IVB-101 (CONFIDENTIAL report), May 1956.
Davies, I. LI., Performance Test on Model Oarage - Shelter Roof
System. SES lOO^Ton TOT Trial-Suf field, Alberta, August 1961
(U). United Kingdom, AWRE Report No. E 2/63 (TOR OJTICIAL USE
ONLY), March 1963.
Worsfold, W. E., Effects of Shielding a Building from Atomic
Blast ( U) . United Kincdom, JWE-16U ( CONFIDENTIAL report),
August 1958.
Trimer, A., and Maskell, E. G. B., Operation BUiTAIO Target
Response Tests - Structures Group Report: The Effect on
Field Defenses (U). United Kingdom, ITO-2M (CONFIDENTIAL
report), December 1959*
United Kingdom, The Effects of Atomic Weapons on Structures
and Military Equipment (U). FWE-S (SECRET report), July 1951*.
HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT
MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE
Volume I
PAMPHLET No. 1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956
Practical protection
88 Large buildings with a number of storeys, especially if they are of
heavy construction, provide much better protection than small single-
storey structures (see Figure 4). Houses in terraces likewise provide
much better protection than isolated houses because of the shielding
effect of neighbouring houses.
GOOD PROTECTION
Solidly constructed multi-storeyed building with occupants well removed from
fall-out on ground and roof. The thickness of floors and roof overhead, and the
shielding effect of other buildings, all help to cut down radiation
FALL OUT
wxmmtt
VVASf/AVAVAVAWAVAVAW
• t • I 1 1 • T I U III 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 II I '^
BAD PROTECTION
Isolated wooden bungalow
,$&
FALL OUT
MM«.^^^3a«♦M»^^Mft»5^^^&&^s^^&6fr^^M«M^:
•Yii Yivrri Yi • • • • • • • • • • • •••• •VTYrtYrrrrivriViVi
Figure 4
Examples of good and bad protection afforded by buildings against fall-out.
89 It is estimated that the protection factor (the factor by which the out-
side dose has to be divided to get the inside dose) of a ground floor
room in a two-storey house ranges from 10 to about 50, depending on
wall thickness and the shielding afforded by neighbouring buildings.
The corresponding figures for bungalows are about 10-20, and for
three-storey houses about 15-100. An average two-storey brick house
in a built-up area gives a factor of 40, but basements, where the radia-
tion from outside the house is attenuated by a very great thickness of
earth, have protection factors ranging up to 200-300. A slit trench
with even a light cover of boards or corrugated iron without earth
overhead gives a factor of 7, and if 1 ft. of earth cover is added the
37
factor rises to 100. If the trench can be covered with 2 or 3 feet of earth
then a factor of more than 200-300 can be obtained (see Figure 5).
FALL OUT
With corrugated iron
or boards overhead
With I ft. of earth
overhead
With 3 ft. of earth
overhead
FIGURE 5
Protection factors in slit trenches (the factor by which the outside dose is divided
to get the inside dose).
Choosing a refuge room
90 In choosing a refuge room in a house one would select a room with a
minimum of outside walls and make every effort to improve the pro-
tection of such outside walls as there were. In particular the windows
would have to be blocked up, e.g. with sandbags. Where possible, boxes
of earth could be placed round an outside wall to provide additional
protection, and heavy furniture (pianos, bookcases etc.) along the in-
side of the wall would also help. A cellar would be ideal* Where the
ground floor of the house consists of boards and timber joists carried
on sleeper walls it may be possible to combine the high protection
of the slit trench with some of the comforts of the refoge room by
constructing a trench under the floor.
Once a trap door had been cut in the floor boards and joists and the
trench had been dug, there would be no further interference with the
peace-time use of the room.
Estimated under-co ver doses in the fall-out area
91 Taking an average protective factor of 40 for a two-storey house in a
built-up area, the doses accumulated in 36 hours for the ranges referred
to in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Report (paragraph 84)
would have been: — i^- *A- ^a^~
190 miles downwind 7*r F^ M*}*****?
160 „ „ 12*r e**routf5t+
140 „ „ 20r
which are all well below the lowest figure of 25r referred to in Table 1 .
At closer ranges along the axis of the fall-out, the doses accumulated
in 36 hours would have been much higher, but over most of the con-
taminated area — with this standard of protection — the majority of
those affected would have been saved from death, and even from sick-
ness, by taking coyer continuously for the first 36 hours.
38
9" solid brick wall British
pre-war house design
Ridge Tile
Floor Joists Walling ™. Brick Noting
5. Radiation sickness
Assume dose incurred in a single shift (3-4 hours) by the "average"
man, over the whole body: —
25 roentgens — No obvious harm.
100 „ — Some nausea and vomiting.
500 n —Lethal to about 50 per cent, people
(death up to 6 weeks later).
800 „ or more— Lethal to all (death up to 6 weeks later).
Note: If dose spread uniformly over 2-3 days, then 60 roentgens
could be incurred with no more effect than 25 roentgens in a single
exposure of 3-4 hours.
Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people
DISTANCE FROM G.Z. IN MILES
*
20
BLAST
(BUILDING
DAMAGE)
DEBRIS
BLOCKAGE
FIRE
HEAT
EFFECTS
(EXPOSED
PEOPLE)
IMMEDIATE
GAMMA RADIATION
(EXPOSED PEOPLE) <
N.B. Effects of residual
radiation (fall-out)
NOT shewn.
Figure 11
Combined effects (excluding residual radioactivity) from a 10 megaton ground
burst bomb. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to
UNPROTECTED people.
55
HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT
MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE
Volume I
PAMPHLET No. 2
RADIOACTIVE
FALL-OUT
PROVISIONAL SCHEME OF
PUBLIC CONTROL
LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956
s
S3
o
S3
©
c
o
U
«
G
©
c/i
'£
O
0<
-«
"sii
., WO
CS o
42 °
"3,-d
S2
o^
U
o
oo
ft
o «-s
> o «• S
■sgSS's
y oi r1 5i
t, O CO t^
OjCSTJcm
.3 C<« O «
I- O « ft
§■3 S S3
^ cvS S>a
iv,,d w u
g.^ >v*o 5.
« o d J\ o
« 3^ +-• o
«-• M"3 52
•O r-^3 *-» C*
iu,H o «
*3 S 2 * S
3 o,fd o (^
a
o
©
00
u u. u.
JH©Q©
J. J. i •
©©©¥->
4-» •♦-» +-» ■•-»
« d ** M O ,« ,«
3 &3 ^*
O *°
4>
K g «f <&
1" ' - " B B r!
3 - is o2
— j oj _,Jd
^S8
s£8
0 43 «^-i ♦* Q
d »S^.
Q „ " n o
J3
■°^Sg
^|§3nMfl
«--5 ° 2 5s oj^1
o ♦* utJd 3 0) n
g* U 1) *» S> H
*3 c 3 9
0 0*0 £*o d S
•« Ufl g-3 CS >
O 3 «j5 g V
4)td *0 O-y te
3iifvl.2 o«c«d
O *j_j — +J jj 4) .
o^gd
Rl ^
©
©
00
o
©
00
00
xj
15
00
■»-»
Xi
cS
O.
45
u,
D.
en
u,
©
ro
1
Li
d
n
d
X
00
00
at
at
.3
J3
O.
d.
u<
u.
en
©
Ui
3
O
1— 1
©
>
O
JO
00
q 5? O o nt
3 S^-
4> 1 ra «j —
§ « S O-O
"O'eo-o 4>t3
3 d •-' ti *t3
- O SB >
9"£ 5 q o
00 0 a
rt ^ o> o K
11 H w O
o d o „'d
OS o*1 »
83£o£
60 X3 OO
3 « 4) •"« ■- M
9-3^2-
d2-
^22«i
J*-S
00
o
3
00
li-
ft
©
N
3
ft
2
o
d
o
N.
.yja'
•a at a
11
1
Center Thick- Wind
Yield height ness Radius speed
(ktj (m) (km/hr)
1 2,840 1760
10 7,000 3060
100 11,700 5340
920 39.6
2400 70.2
6000 72.0
RAINOUT
Precipitation required to de-
posit the vertical integral on
the ground.
Amount of
precipitation (cm)
1-kt
cloud
10-kt
cloud
100-kt
cloud
-1
>-2
0.18
100
2 4 6 3 10 12 14 Vertical integral gamma radiation
Height at stabilization time — km UCRL-51164 December 26, 1971
I I
1000
Distance from ground zero — km
FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M. (E.S.T.)
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1955
A REPORT
BY THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
ON THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
FALLOUT PATTERN OF 1954 TEST IN THE PACIFIC
19. Data from this test permits estimates of casual-
ties which would have been suffered within this contaminated
area if it had been populated. These estimates assume: (1)
that the people in the area would ignore even the most ele-
mentary precautions; (2) that they would not take shelter
but would remain out of doors completely exposed for about
36 hours; and (3) that in consequence they would receive
the maximum exposure. Therefore, it will be recognized that
the estimates which follow are what might be termed extreme
estimates since they assume the worst possible conditions.
PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT
26. In an area of heavy fallout she greatest radio-
logical hazard is that of exposure to external radiation.
Simple precautionary measure? can greatly recTuce the hazard
to life. Exposure can be reduced by taking shelter and by
utilizing simple decontamination measures until such times
as persons can leave the area. Test data indicate that the
radiation level, i.e., the rate of exposure, indoors on the
first floor of an ordinary frame house in a fallout area
would be about one-half the level out of doors. Even greater
protection would be afforded by a brick or stone house.
Taking shelter in the basement of an average residence would
reduce the radiation level to about one-tenth that experienced
out of door 9.
29. If fallout particles come into contact with the
skin, hair or clothing, prompt decontamination precautions
such as have been outlined by the Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration will greatly reduce the danger. These include
such simple measures as thorough bathing of exposed parts
of the body and a change or clothing.
30. If persons in a heavy fallout area heeded
warning or notification of an attack and evacuated the area
or availed themselves of adequate protective measures, the
percentage of fatalities would be greatly reduced even in
the zone of heaviest fallout.
Foreword
If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat
of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distri-
buted to every household as part of a public information
campaign which would include announcements on tele-
vision and radio and in the press. The booklet has been
designed for free and general distribution in that event.
It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to
know what they would be advised to do at such a time.
May 1980
Protect and Survive
ISBN o 1 1 3407289
If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not
know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be.
If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the
country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the
towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will
bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United
Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the
weapons and the resultant fall-out.
The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can
be reduced if you do as this booklet describes.
If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some
time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the
weather - using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or
holes.
If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover
as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin
and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter.
FIRST CASUALTIES OF THE H-BOMB
by DWIGHT MARTIN
Five weeks out of Yaizu, her home port 120
miles southeast of Tokyo, the 99-ton tuna
trawler Fukuryu Maru ("Fortunate Dragon")
hove to at a position 166°30' east longitude
and 11*52' north latitude. She dropped an-
chor and cast her nets at 5:30 a.m. on March 1.
The Fortunate Dragons position, though her
skipper and crew did not realize it, was 71 miles
east-northeast of Bikini atoll and 14 miles out-
side the boundary of the restricted zone of the
U.S. government's atomic testing area.
A calm sea was running and the weather was
clear. Sunrise was at 6:09 a.m. and visibility
was excellent. The Fortunate Dragon % skipper,
AT HER DOCK the unfortunate Fortunate Drag-
on, still radioactive, floats untended by crewmen.
"We made port in Yaizu at 6 a.m. on March
14. We were now quite sick and frightened,
and we went to see Dr. Toshisuke Oii at Kyo-
ritsu hospital. He said we had severe burns
and gave us some white ointment/9
24-year-old Tadaichi Tsutsui, was standing
watch on the bridge, and eight crewmen were
enthusiastically hauling in their first nets. Aft-
er nearly three weeks of poor catches near
Midway Island, the Fortunate Dragon had
finally run into luck in more southern waters
and her hold was already filled with 16,500
pounds of fat tuna. It was just a few seconds
before 6:12 a.m.
"Then," said Crewman Sanjiro Masuda lat-
er, "we saw flashes of fire, as bright as the sun
itself, rising to the sky. They rose about 10
degrees from the horizon and the sky around
them glowed fiery red and yellow.
But Captain Tsutsui was getting more and
more uneasy: "I thought, The bomb tests
were being conducted over coral reefs. It could
be pulverized coral ash, couldn't it?' " He
thought some more about shi no hai, then
ordered the crew to up anchor. The trawler
steamed for home, 2,000 miles away.
"On the first night," said Radioman Aikichi
Kuboyama, "we were unable to eat our sup-
per. We tried drinking some sake (rice wine)
to improve our appetites, but our appetites
would not improve and the sake did not make
us drunk. We were very depressed. Some of
the crew grumbled 'pikadon but others said
it couldn't be. I think someone said it was
probably dust from some volcanic explosion/9
SOME EFFECTS OF
Ionizing
Radiation
ON HUMAN BEINGS
from the
Naval Medical Research Institute
Bethesda 14, Maryland
U. S. Naval Radiological Defense
Laboratory
San Francisco, California
and
Medical Department
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York
Edited by
E. P. Cronkite
V. P. Bond
and C. L. Dunham
A Report on the
Marshallese and Americans
Accidentally Exposed to Radiation
from Fallout and a Discussion of
Radiation Injury in the
Human Being
UNITED STATES
Report TID-5358
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
JULY 1956
Extensive lerion* in IS year old boy at 45
days post-exposure. Cast $6.
67 8
Plate 5. — Hyper pig merited raised plaques and bullae on
dorsum of feet and toes at 28 days. One lesion on left
foot shows deeper involvement. Feet were painful at
this time.
Plate 8. — Same case as in Plate 6, six months later.
Foot lesions have healed with repig mentation, except
depigmented spots persist in small areas where deeper
lesions were.
Plate 17. — Epilation in 7 yr. old girl at $8 days.
Caselt.
Plate 18. — Same case as in Plate 17, six months after
exposure showing complete regrowth of normal hair.
EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION
Figure 1.1 — Typical construction of the Marshallese homes to illustrate the
exposure environment of the Marshallese and the lack of shielding from
gamma radiation.
\— 2
\ 2
^^r EVACUAT
r AT 51 HR
—
—
—
iiii
A
i i i
I I I 1
1 I i 1
-i ^"^ V
21 A
Is 1
• J
eg* H
IIII
o
O
o
to
cr
i
cr
O
I
i
I
cr
tu
t-
<
— UJ
o
CJ
Si
O
©
■** s
e §
2 2
o
to
O
o
o
in
(J) HIV Nl 3S0Q "1V101
dflOdO "IViOl JO 1N33 d3d
DESCRIPTION OF EXPOSED GROUPS 7
On Rongerik (Group III) a set of film badge
readings were obtained which constitute the
only direct evidence of total dose. Several
badges worn both outdoors and inside lightly
constructed buildings on the island read
about 50 to 65 r, and one badge which re-
mained outdoors over the 28.5 hour period
read 98 r. Another group of badges, kept
indoors inside a steel refrigerator, read 38 r.
A long fallout probably would not be uni-
formly heavy throughout, the first portion
being the most intense and the balance de-
creasing with time. The total phenomenon
would thus tend toward the effect of a
shorter fallout. This is supported by moni-
tor data from other nuclear events, where
initially heavy fallout is reported to produce
a peak of air-borne radioactivity soon after
arrival, with the airborne activity level then
decreasing.
16 EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION
Itching and burning of the skin occurred in
28 percent of Group I (Eongelap), 20 percent
of Group II (Ailinginae), 5 percent of Group
III (Americans), and none of Group IV
(Utirik). Three people in Group I and one
in Group II complained of itching and burning
of the eyes and lacrimation.
About two-thirds of Group I were nauseated
during the first 2 days and one-tenth vomited
and had diarrhea. One individual in Group
II was nauseated. In Groups III and IV there
were no gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms.
Between The 33rd and 43rd post-exposure
days, 10 percent of the individuals in Group I
had an absolute granulocyte level of 1000 per
cubic millimeter or below. The lowest count ob-
served during this period was TOO granulocytes/
mm.8
Less striking fallout described as "mist-like"
was observed on Ailinginae and Rongerik.
Fallout was not visible on Utirik, which was
contaminated to only a mild degree. The se-
verity of the skin manifestations was roughly
proportional to the amount of fallout observed.
Group
Fallout Observed
Skin Lesions and
Epilation
Rongelap _ _
Ailinginae- _
Rongerik. _ _
Utirik
Heavy (snowlike)
Moderate (mistlike) _
Moderate (mistlike) _
None.
Extensive.
Less extensive.
Slight.
No skin lesions
or epilation.
During The First 24-48 hours after exposure,
about 25 percent of the Marshallese in the two
higher exposure groups experienced itching and
a burning sensation of the skin.
27
28 EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION
Skin lesions in the lesser exposed Ailinginae
and Kongerik groups developed approximately
one week after those in the Rongelap group, and
were less severe and extensive. The Utirik
group did not develop any lesions which could
be attributed to irradiation of the skin. The
incidence of ulcerating lesions in the different
groups reflected the relative severity of the skin
injury. Twenty percent of the Eongelap people
developed ulcerative lesions while only five per-
cent of the Ailinginae and none of the Rongerik
people developed ulcerative lesions. Ninety
percent of the Rongelap and Ailinginae groups
developed lesions, compared to only forty per-
cent of the Rongerik group. There were more
lesions per individual in the Rongelap group
than in the Ailinginae or Rongerik groups. A
comparison of the incidence and time of appear-
ance of epilation and neck lesions in the two
groups is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1.
SKIN LESIONS AND EPILATION 35
a. Shelter. Those individuals who remained
indoors or under the trees during the fallout
period developed less severe lesions.
b. Bathing. Small children who went wad-
ing in the ocean developed fewer foot lesions.
Most of the Americans, who were more aware
of the danger of the fallout, took shelter in
aluminum buildings, bathed and changed
clothes and consequently developed only very
mild beta lesions.
c. Clothing. A single layer of cotton material
offered almost complete protection, as was
demonstrated by the fact that lesions developed
almost entirely on the exposed parts of the body.
3.54 Factors Favoring the Development of
Lesions
a. Areas of more profuse perspiration.
Lesions were more numerous in areas where
perspiration is abundant such as the folds of the
neck, axillae, and antecubital fossae.
b. Delay in decontamination. There was a
delay of 1 or 2 days before satisfactory decon-
tamination was possible.
t
QQ O J 3 SC
Best E
mate
TOTA
Qamm
Dose
Air (]
&o o
00 <<*
l> CO
i-H
t>» »-H
09 i
l^ O*
G5 00
+ +
+ +
9^
• •
•
ENT
Dos
.ATIO
E B
go r
afcM
"*? M b
00 2 CQ "^-. CO
P~
PS Q
s^s
>> g >> b ►»
c3 o3 c o3
£s
io *d o
•^ O 'C T3
2 °o
t- o
00 O
CO i-H
CN -^
s~*> ^-v
E
0> 0)
^■^ ^b4
^^ E ^
a a
o
o o
0) 0?
fl c b oo
P
w
Ph
O
CD 00
i-H Tf
K io -r
SEE
io ^ -g 0)
*
1-4
Eh
O i-H oo
"5 IC S
+ + +
K ffi W
00 ^ «- o>
CMCO-g-
+ + g |
gsS
CO CO
u g
SSgg
o o
OO ^.a.
PPROXI
ME OF
INCEME
Fallo
+ 5 +
• CO CN
5+ +
w w
a «
^ 00
00 t^
CO ^H
#o
co
*s
c
ensive
s exten
c
CO
www
W J CO
O
2
«t
s_
C *tA
cd -d
bo cd
-o ^
iO O^ 00 ^
© (n
t> ^ N ^
•«-> (U
"8
X-N^4 ^
V S ^5
E
^ ♦-» 4-»
^2 CO CO
■8
Is 'i
0
C ',",■ ■ ■ ■ ■ * ■ ■ * ■■■■ ■■■■,%** »..\^
IUWIJ0UOOO(XXX>JOCOOOCO<> « « » . >
USNRDL-TR-IQ49
29 July 198b
4D64I480
REMOVAL OF 6IMULATE0 FALLOUT FROM ASPHALT
STREETS 8Y FIREHOSING TECHNIQUES
by
L.L.Wiltshire
W.L.Owen
In general; removal effectiveness Improves with increased
particle size range and increased mass loading. For the expenditure
of an effort of 4 nozzle-minutes (12 nan-minutes) per 10^ ft , results
ranged as follows:
Particle Size Range Nominal Mass loading Removal Effectiveness
Ql} (fl^ftr) (Residual Fraction)
44-88 4.0 0.16
24.0 0.07
350 - 700 4.0 0.005
24.0 0.003
U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOOICAL
DEFENSE LABORATORY
SAN FRANCISCO * CALIFORNIA 94135
5xl04
CO
ia4
c
o
o:
CO
00
o
T3
10
10
u
u
<
10
RM-1676-ABC
k~±&-tfi
-13-
Stanley M. Greenfield, et aL,
'A Catalog of Fallout Patterns",
RAND Corp RM-U76-AEC
J I i m ml I I M I I III
10 10" 10°
Area covered by at least o given dose (sq n mi )
Fission yield of weapon, surface burst (MT)
10
4
Approximate scaling relationship between
48-hr dose rate and normalized area
n
CO
&*•
en
ri
o
c
o
o
05
V
0
o «
r-l *«
-•-> r-l
•H r-l
•H r-l
01
■P
c
o
«
£
e
e
B
fOfO
covo
• •
ON «— •
h
O
■
ON
ONOI (XI o o
-* Q "^
i/\ o
oj —i o o o
. h-
e^
r-l no
fc
-rf
VO -*
ih
vo ir\
Of
„ roiH
o\
• o 8
o
• OS
* lACVI
i O
•
•
• •
•
• •
OOO0OO0O0O0
O r-l IT* O O O
hojiaOO
o o o
88
«* «* •* •*
HOIOt-
c
U
Hi
£
CO
>
£
9
Q
a.
s
o
u
e
CD
3
u
CO
c
■a
c
o
•i)
a
U
CO
S31IW '3DNVXSIQ
2>s
«* CN
62
--•
***
*»
•
0
IOO
too
500
400
i "
\
\
\
i
■ /
l
I
\
\ v
1
• -
*'
— 1000 "
> *• ^^
\
\
\
\
u V
\
^ "*
N
\
\
\
V
\
s
4
«
I
\
\
\
s
**
*
•
t
\ \
\ \
* IOO
1
,•*'
X
,*■» — »
x \
10 ,\ \
. 1 \ \
900 too IOO o too too
DUtQoct From G2* fttt
300
400
500
Figure 329. OPERATION SUNBEAM - S*iUl Boy GZ area
contours In R/hr at H+l hour
The contours were corrected to H+l hour usln^ a decay constant of 1.27.
to
o
<
<
o
^<
O
So
to
I- *o
u<
ri>
< to
*^B
Ih **
*,
0£ 3
^>
So
>- ^
■—
2*
•It
^ o
CM
CM
< to
■
s*
£
to O
• •
0)
O
W) i-
D
-O 3
o
^-O
%n
O
2
N
o
E
o
VI
s
o -
CO iTi
o
CM
O
UJ
M
O
O
2
O
U
si
u>
5000
1000
1 1 1 1 1 I I I I 1 1 1 1
Gamma dose rate activity in the
- fallout pattern, as a function
of median fallout
(includes fractionation)
— dw= 880 h
500
<
a
100
50
10
dM= 210 M
d,0= 23 p
CONF-765
SMALL BOY SHOT FALLOUT
CARL F. MILLER and JAMES D. SARTOR
» ' I I I I
0.5 2 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 98 99.5
ACTIVITY ON PARTICLES WITH LESS THAN INDICATED DIAMETERS, %
f-i 1 1 i i i i r
|ii i i i i i — r
- CO
-H
<©
00
CO
o
a
w
w
c
43
IP -
O
(/>
«/»
<
>
"'II i L
I" I ' ' ' I L
c
•H
•o
•H
-
a -
10*
10*
10 15 20 25
DAYS AFTER FALLOUT
30
35
CONF-765
Fig. 8 — Hypothetical concentrations of 13iI on pasture
plants, in cow milk, and in human thyroids following
environmental contamination by a single fallout event.
CT5
CO
W
Q
O
D
O
S
<
fa
o
CO
O
H
W
g
2
g
<
K
U
i
Q
O
O
fa
m
O
O
« w
CO
U
CO
CO
73
>
"c3
o
a
>>
S
0)
o
a
4->
•™*
4~
•^4
be— ■
bo
a co
4-
s
a ft
CO
X
a >>
o
i> o
>>
CO
s-s
Sm
. io
T3
CD
00
IO
CO 00
•
m to
•
i—i ^H
rf«
(M
i— 1 f— 1
o
J-
O
0)
a
be —
o
t— 1
bo OQ
■1—
s
a ««
CO
>>
X
o cd
° £
cd
o
ai3
• o
*o
cc
lO
^H IC
•
o o
•
CO ^
00
i-H
CM lO
o
«
•^*
O
>>
o
s
J3
ex
*->
•*.
oT
bO
CO
d
1
4-J
CO
o
c **
CO
•
cd *^
CM
»-3 «£;
^»J
c
cd
Q^ p^I
cd
u
2 £
3
o
c
W -
-C
o
n< c
*->
on pj
ons i
X
E
CO
•a •**
^^^
• *■*
CO w
^
«
*-» »
bO
c cd
<*->
cd *i
*^
o u
3
^O
II
£ o
S
i
o
centrat
concen
Id
4->
c
*->
cd
JJ cd
o r
ii
o
cd
c
o
§ £
cd
E «
o
CO
T3
itial c
aximu
£
■ — <
o
c 2
o
Id
o
0)
00
cd
OQ
£2
H
*5
H
CONF765
CESIUM-137 AND STRONTIUM-90 RETENTION
FOLLOWING AN ACUTE INGESTION
OF RONGELAP FOOD
EDWARD P. HARDY, Jr.,* JOSEPH RIVERA,* and ROBERT A. CONARDt
* Health and Safety Laboratory, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, New York,
New York, and tBrookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York.
*
: 40 -
10
n i i i i i i I i i i i i r
Percent retention oj i37Cs from Ronge lap food.
BY WHOLE-BODY COUNTER
FROM EXCRETION DATA
biological half-life of 74 days
J_l I I I I I I I l_L
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
DAYS AFTER INGESTION
50 -
LU
z
<
30
8
20
10
FROM EXCRETION DATA
Percent retention of 90Sr from Rongelap food
25% retained at the end of 190 days
J i '
■ i i i i i i
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
DAYS AFTER INGESTION
Survival of Food Crops
and Livestock in the Event
of Nuclear War
Proceedings of a symposium held at
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, Long Island, New York
September 15-18, 1970
Sponsored by
Office of Civil Defense
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Editors
David W. Bensen
Office of Civil Defense
Arnold H. Sparrow
Brookhaven National Laboratory
December 1971
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Office of Information Services
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LONG-LIVED NUCLIDES
AFTER A NUCLEAR WAR
R. SCOTT RUSSELL, B. O. BARTLETT, and R. S. BRUCE
Agricultural Research Council, Letcombe Laboratory, Wantage, Berkshire, England
ABSTRACT
The radiation doses from the long-lived nuclides 90Sr and l37Cs, to which the surviving
population might be exposed after a nuclear war, are considered using a new evaluation of
the transfer of 9 ° Sr into food chains.
As an example, it is estimated that, in an area where the initial deposit of near-in fallout
delivered 100 R/hr at 1 hr and there was subsequent worldwide fallout from 5000 Mt of
fission, the dose commitment would be about 2 rads to the bone marrow of the population
and 1 rad to the whole body. Worldwide fallout would be responsible for the major part of
these doses.
In view of the possible magnitude of the doses from long-lived nuclides, the small degree
of protection that could be provided against them, and the considerable strain any such
attempt would impose on the resources of the community, it seems unrealistic to consider
remedial measures against doses of this magnitude. Civil-defense measures should be directed
at mitigating the considerably higher doses that short-lived nuclides would cause in the early
period.
O
O)
k_
CO
s
o
Q.
z
o
<
I-
z
LU
U
z
o
u
30
-III
I I
A
1
1
1 1 1
1 -
/ J
Cumulative
1 u
/ J
1 I
1 I
\
\
\
"' \
deposit
1 I
\ \
— —
1 I
\ \
20
1 I
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
* 1
' /
' / • *
' /
/ J'
\ \
\ V
\ \
\ ^
\
\
V
\
\
\
\Milk
—
10
0
- /k
t ¥
..-■' //
\
\
\
L/r ,•■"■" VS.
\
\
^y!
^"O/
\ Annual
\
y
/
/
\deposit
>_
0
I I I
1 1
1
1
1 1 1
1"
— 20
— 180
CM
E
S
o
E
— 10 55 —
CO
O
Q_
LU
O
<
r- 5 z —
1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968
Fig. 1 Strontium-90 in fallout and milk in the United Kingdom
0 — '
CN
E
6
E
40
20
CO
O
Q_
LU
G
UJ
>
<
RADIATION EFFECTS ON FARM ANIMALS:
A REVIEW
M. C. BELL
UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
ABSTRACT
Hematopoietic death would predominate in food-producing animals exposed to gamma
radiation under fallout conditions leaving animal survivors. Gamma-radiation doses of about
900 R would be lethal to 50% of poultry, and about half this level would be lethal for
cattle, sheep, and swine. Grazing cattle and sheep would suffer most from combined
radiation effects of skin-beta and ingested-beta radioactivity plus the whole-body gamma
effects. The LD50/60 for combined effects in ruminants is estimated to be at a gamma
exposure of around 200 R in an area where the forage retention is 7 to 9%.
Either external parasites or severe heat loss could be a problem in skin irradiated
animals. Contrary to early reports, bacterial invasion of irradiated food-producing animals
does not appear to be a major problem. Productivity of survivors of gamma radiation alone
would not be affected, but, in an area of some lethality, the productivity of surviving
grazing livestock would be severely reduced owing to anorexia and diarrhea. Sheltering
animals and using stored feed as countermeasures during the first few days of livestock
exposure provide much greater protection than shielding alone.
80
>
<
\-
cc
O
40
0
D. G. Brown, UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory
— O JD +
6 ° Co at a dose rate between 0.5
and 1 R/min.
cattle
4 9 5% confidence interval
llo-l
400
600 800
DOSE, R
1000
FALLOUT PROPERTIES IMPORTANT TO AGRICULTURE
89
o q
SDNOD dO V3HV "IV101 dO !N30H3d
©
3
o
c
c
D
T3
1c
T3
w
jo
C
0>
t/i
4->
T3
c
to £
RADIONUCLIDE BODY BURDENS
139
10 100
POSTDETONATION TIME, hr
1000
Radioactivity from 1-Mt explosive with a fission-to-fusion ratio of 1.0.
Local Fallout from Nuclear Test Detonations (U). DASA 1251-series (5
volumes with 9 separately-bound parts), by U.S. Army Nuclear Defense
Laboratory for the Defense Atomic Support Agency:
Volume I. Indexed Bibliography of United states and British Documents
on Characteristics of Local Fallout (U), DASA 1251-1 (AD 329971), 237
pp., 27 June 1961. (C)
Volume II. Compilation of Fallout Patterns and Related Test Data (U):
Part 1 - Trinity Through Redwing (U), DNA 1251-2-1 (AD 349123), 468
pp., August 1963. (SRD)
Part 2 - Plumbbob Through Hardtack (U). DASA 1251-2-2 (AD 329124),
456 pp., August 1963. (SRD)
Part 3 - Nougat Through Niblic (U), DASA 1251-2-3 (AD 371725), 226
pp., March 1966. (SRD)
Supplement , Foreign Nuclear Tests (U), DASA 1251 (AD 358417L), 77
pp., October 1964. (SRD)
Volume III. Annotated compendium of Data on Physical and Chemical
Properties of Fallout (U). DASA 1251-3 (AD 381963L), 770 pp., November
1966. (SRD)
Volume IV. Annotated compendium of Data on Radiochemical and Radiation
Characteristics of Fallout (U);
Part 1 - Specific Activity, Activity-Size Distribution. Decay (U),
DASA 1251-4-1 (AD 500919L) , 643 pp., September 1968. (SRD)
Part 2 - Radiochemical Composition, Induced Activity, Gamma Spectra
(U), DASA 1251-4-2 (AD 523385), 570 pp., 31 May 1972. (SRD)
Volume V, Transport and Distribution of Local (Early) Fallout from Nu-
clear Weapon Tests (U). DASA 1251-5 (AD 362012), 580 pp., May 1965.
(SRD)
1.2 kt JANGLE -Sugar Surface burst 19 Nov 1951
CLOUD TCP HEIGHT: 15,000 ft MSL
CRATER TATA: Diameter: 90 ft maximum dose rate: 7500 r/hr at H+l
Depth:
Maximum dose
rate
Distance
Value from
(r/hr) GZ (ft)
Maximum contour
distance from GZ (ft)
500
r/hr
300
r/hr
100
r/hr
540 900 2200 4900 12,500
21 ft
at crater lip
hour
Contour area
(sq mi) ^^
-jjjjj- Laurino, R. K., and I. G. Poppoff, 1951: Contamination
r/hr patterns at Operation JANGLE. U. S. Nav. Rad. Def.
0.05 0.15 0.55 Lab. Rep. USNRDL-399, 28 pp.
500
r/hr
500
r/hr
•000
0i» tones From 62 ,Yortf«
18 mph mean wind speed
12
11
10
— |— TTTnni "| I | M| M| | i | M| U|
residual radiation from fission products
from 1 minute after the explosion
i
1 1
1 1
t« <
1 — r
TT
TT
—
—
-
-
-
—
—
-
-
-
—
—
—
-
-
-
—
-
-
—
i
1 1
II
— L-
-11
JLL
U
.JLL
-11
u
JJ.
11
L.
-LI
1L
0
0.01 0.04 0.1
-1.2
(t decay law)
0.4 1 4 10 40 100
TIME AFTER EXPLOSION (HOURS)
400 1,000
1.2 kt SUGAR test (Nevada surface burst)
Source: weapon test report WT-414
Gamma dose rate (R/hr)
Gamma dose (R)
610 m-
Downwind distance
I 914 m
i 1220 m
1 3350 m
^'•r^-' j 4650 m
^.V ] 1830 m-|
2440 m
610 m
"914 m
3350 m
4650 m
1220 m
1830 m
10 100 1000 10*
Time after burst (seconds)
1.2 kt UNCLE test (5.2 m underground, Nevada)
1000
o.ooi I i i dim
o.i
1220 m
1830 m
10 100 1000
Time after burst (seconds)
Robbins, Charles; et al. "Airborne Particle Studies ,
JANGLE Project 2.5a-l." (In: Operation JANGLE,
Particle Studies, WT-371-KX, 417 pages.) Army
Chemical Center. Washington, D. C. : AFSWP.
WT-394-EX. October 1979. 198 Pages.
AD/A995 072
OPERATION JAHGLB
Project 2.5*-l
AIRB0RN3 PARTICLE STUDIES
Lt. Col. Charles Robbins
Chemical Corps
Major Hugh R. Lehaan David R. Powers
tf. S. Air Force Chemioal Corns
James D. Wiloox
Cheoiosl Corps
July 1952
CHEMICAL A!fD RADIOLO&ICXL LABORATORIES
Army Chemioal Center , Maryland
■o -a
FRCJiCT 2.J:a-l
_ JJj
Jr
r* r
i T
FBrira is 6
88
_.t
a • w-Jjj.
.&.
-.
O
cr
o
CO
z
o
o
UJ
M
CO
UJ
o
2
*o
in
eg
o
a>
"o
In.
a.
CO
Q °
o> 93 oi 5><& 9 5
ot o> 01 01
*3Zi9 031V1S NVK1 SS31 AXIALLOV JLN3083d 3AUVTfV:nO
CI
43
c c
IS
* £
S 00
o -
(Or e
a
%
CO
§
CO
M
•H
CO
,3
3 t
&
o
c
o
•H
4>
O
I
1
PROJECT 2,5a-l
2 3
DISTANCE (I04FIET)
Figure 5»1 Concentration of Activity in the Clou*
as a Function of Distance on the Down-
wind Leg* Filter Sampler Data,
Activity was corrected to time at which
cloud passed each station*
- 122 -
PROJECT 2.5a-l
5#5 STUDY OF FRACTIONATION
5»5»1 Radiocherajstrv
The data concerning the nuclide activity p8r unit mass
of active material as a function of particle sizo, irhich is con-
tainod in Table 4.15, provided a method of investigating the mechanism
whereby particles acquire activity. The data for Sr8* and ZR9*
have been plotted in Figs. 5. h and 5.5 • Referring to Fig. 5.4, it
appears that a straight line with a slope of -1 may be fitted to the
data, whereas this is not possible with the data in Fig. 5.5.^
Allowing for some over-simplification , it appears that the Sr89
activity is a function of particle surface, whereas that for Zr9^
tends to be more of a volume function. Ba*40 gives a plot similar
to the Sr8? pi0t, while Ce1^ is similar to Zr95# Further study
is being made of these data, particularly with respect to the
question of whether the activity of Zr?5 and Ce^ ±a concentrated
in a shell rather than a volume. Exaiaination of the decay chains
of these four nuclides provides a plausible reason why there should
bo a difference in the mechanism for acquiring radioactivity. The
decay chains are as follows^:
Kr89 2.*y Kb89 15.^ Sr89
Kr95 shor^ Rb95 short, Sr95 shorty T95 10.5a, Zr95
Xe _lfa>.Ce 66a x Ba140
It may be seen that Ba1^0 and Sr89 both have gaseous precursors that
have half-lives long in comparison with the lifetime of the fireball,
s^noe gases such as krypton and xenon are not significantly subject
*> adsorption above liquid air temperatures, it is logical to supoose
«*t while the Zr*5 and C*LU> chains passed the rare gas stage early
•nough to be adsorbed during the particle growth process, no appreci-
able amount of Kr*** and XeW° decayed before the particles had ceased
*° grow. Hence the Sr89 and Ba1/;tr activities were confined to the
outermost surfaces of the particles.
C. D. Coryell & N. Sugarman, op cit, pp. 1996-2001
- 137 -
weapon test report WT-414
g#o INHALATION STTOISS
Dogs and sheep were exposed on. the ground surface and in foxhole?
at distances of 2500 to 6000 feet in the predicted dovnvind direction
from each shot, The purpose of the exposure vas to allow the assessment
of hazards due to inhalation of radioactire dusts associated vita these
detonations and to compare internal and external radiation dosegoe,
Total body activity for animals exposed in the underground test
ranged from Z to 31 mlcrocuries corrected to time of sacrifice. Tor lunj
tissuei integrated dosage doe to beta emission ranged betveon 0,2 and
9*0 rep, Radloautographa of lung tissues indicated the presence of a
fev alpha emitting particles. Bone analyses indicated cone uptdo of
Balto and Sr90^
The amounta of activity taken up by the combined action of irhalrv-
tioa and ideation are not considered to to physiologically significant
even for animals rocoiving cumulative extomal gama riialr/ticn docc^cs
up to several thousand roentgens,
77
9.3 CLOTHIEG lECOHTAKINAIIOtf AM) STALUAIIQg OP LADF1QY METHODS
Standard and special U, S. Army Quartermaster Corps laundering
nethods and standard laundry equipment were evaluated for field decern-*
tamination of clothing and selected fabrics, No clothing worn by
personnel became contaminated to a significant degree during this
operation. Therefore, this project vas carried out with clothing
deliberately contaminated with radioactive material from the fall-out
area.
The project evaluated the standard and several special laundering
formulae, various types of clothing materials, and monitoring instruments
(Project 6*7) • ^e significant result of this project is the indication
that .clothing contamination resulting from vork in areas contaminated
by atomic bomb detonations will not produce even minor injury to per-
sonnel. This conclusion is based on consideration of the data on
saturation values of deliberate clothing contamination reduced to one
hour after detonation, The resultant exposure to personnel vould be
less than that required to produce even slight skin irritation (cos*-
parable to mild sunburn). Other conditions, such as muddy terrain and
ouch higher specific activity, could increase the amount of contamination
received by clothing, but an increase in level of neveral orders of
magnitude vould be required to produce injury. In these cases it is
certain that routine standards of cleanliness vould effective?.^- prevent
injury from this cause.
SEjCl
AD482985
W T - 393
Copy
O/h&UtftOH
*»«jW»Ww*ifi»!'tsM*¥»r:i
JANGLE
NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS
OCTOBER -NOVEMBER 1951
Project 2,3-2
FOXHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION
EACH TRANSMITTAL OF THIS DOCUMENT OUTSIDE
THE AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST
HAVE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY, WASHINGTON,
D.C, 20301.
IRESTRICTED DATA
VATOMtC ENERGY ACT 1946
ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
,ap-™« WASHINGTON D.C.
:vyHEff
„yi'Secur)tt Information
MIHF'I1 ■ ' ' Ia 7|
SSJCBBS
Srartty tsf veitin
PBOJBCT 2.3-2
TASB 3.1
Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Surface Burst)
Range
(ft)
Location
Twonnan
Foxhole
One-man \
Foxhole
doll
Pipe
2000
36p Above Surface
Surface
16W Below Surface
32" Below Surface
US" Below Surface
800 r
700
230 205 105
2k 58 136
12.8 22 62
2500
3fi» Above Surface
Surface
16" Below Surface
32" Below Surface
1|8* Below Surface
230 r
220
35 60 85
7 15 26
k 8.5 13.3
3000
36*1 Above Surface
Surface
16° Below Surface
32" Below Surface
U8n Below Surface
110 r
90
23 36 55
7.6 12.U 19.1*
2.5 1.8 6.7
6.6
2.5
1.6
$$
6.6
2.1»
1
73 r
10
0.5
0
3500
36" Above Surface
Surface
16" Below Surface
32* 'Below Surface
li8" Below Surface
tar
3 ~ 9.7
1.6 2.8 3.k
.5U .99 1.9
1(000
36" Above Surface
Surface
16* Below Surface
32* Below Surface
18* Below Surface
17 r
9.6
1.6 3 5.6
0.6 1.12 1.62
- 0.5L 0.57
oT39
ol35
17 r
0.17
Woo
36* Above Surface
Surface
16" Below Surface
32" Below Surfaoe
li8* Below Surface
9.8 r
k.6
1 1.8 3.5
0.5 0.7 1.0b
0.21 O.li 0.57
5000
36* Above Surface
Surface
16* Below Surfaoe
32* Below Surfaoe
i8* Below Surfaoe
U.8 r
2.7
0.6 0.99 2.95
0.3 0.5 0.75
0,17 0f2 0.J8
RESTIUCTCODAtA
Atoftie cncrot act it*
PROJECT 2.3-2
TABIE 3.2
Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Underground Burst)
Range
(ft)
Location
Two-man
Foxhole
One -nan
Foxhole
"SoET
Pipe
2000
36" Above
Surface
16" Below
32" Below
k9n Below
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
3850 r
2300
USO — 300
700 1000 555
200 200 200
2560
36n Above
Surface
I6n Below
32« Below
U8" Below
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
1000 — 550 r
78
78 98 U5
U3 56 50
73.U 9U 96
3000
36* Above
Surface
16" Below
32" Below
U8* Below
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
175 r
103
30 1*2 37
22 23 20
U3»5 U5 5U
20
15
Ja
75
11
il
155 r
7
3
35bo
36» Above
Surface
16" Below
^2» Below
8" Below
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
12
9
31
W
17
10
11
15
9
22
llOOO
36" Above Surface
Surface
16* Below Surface
* Below Surface
» BeMjf Surface
s
6
5
6
32r
22
7
3.U
8.k
15
7.2
6.6
7
I-7
u
2.8
28 r
2
0
-2*1
Woo
36" Abora Surfaoa
Surf tot
16* Balow Surf act
" Balow Surf aca
* Briar Surf act
S
U
5.8
22 r
10
2.8
-2*2.
5
2.6
5ooo
36* Abort Surface
Surf to*
16* Balow Surfaoa
* Balow Surfaoa
* Btlflf Surf Mi
IS
15
21.5
1
73 r
23
15
22.6
a
67
15
2L
r<-
-7-
AXOmLJhMmf ACT te*t
CHAPTER J>
CONCLUSIONS
5,1 POIHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION
5*1*1 Surface Detonation
Standard foxholes provide excellent protection to
personnel from the gamma radiation emitted during the detonation of
ma atomic weapon on the surface of the ground* The results from the
comparatively small sized weapon employed in Operation JANGEB show
that 2000 feet from the burst, the location of the closest foxhole
doses of about 60r were measured at the bottom of a f oxhole, less
than 10 per cent of the dose measured 3 feet above the surface of the
ground* Due to the location of the foxhole in the crosswind direction,
the dose at the bottom was caused primarily by scattered prompt radia-
tion plus a small contribution from the residual activity of the fis-
sion products on the surface of the ground* In the downwind direction
there would be a contribution from matter that falls out from the
cloud Into the foxhole in addition to the above mentioned* This fall-
out will depend on the wind velocity for a given sized weapon, and
although it is expected to increase the dose in the foxholes, es-
pecially in those located close to the detonation* it is relatively
unimportant in comparison to the prompt and residual activity since
it can be easily shoveled out of the foxhole in a short tiw*
5*1*2 fltaderground Detonation
With the possible exception of those located in the
area close to the point of detonation where extensive fall-out occurs*
foxhole* also provide effective shielding In the case of an under-
ground detonation* Even within this area of extensive fall-out, which
at Operation JJU10I2 extended approximately 2000 feet, the high doses
recorded in the foxholes could be greatly reduced by digging out the
radioactive matter that fell into the hole* It is highly probable
that one-half the doses reoorded in the foxholes located within 2500
feet of the detonation at Operation JANOB were directly attributable
to this type of fall-out and most likely a higher percentage at dis-
tances greater than 2500 feet*
•19-
JBREI KSTRtCTTO MTU
TQPSB3RET UK National Archives PREM 11/560,
12 July 1951
PRIME KOTSTER **
Clan dog tine Use of Atomic Weapons
The Chiefs of Staff have hem considering ths possibility that
the enemy might open the next war with an atomic attack on London on the
model of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - without warning and before
any formal declaration of hostilities, The most effective method of making
such an attack would be to drop an atomic bomb from a military aircraft.
If the control and reporting system were fully manned and alert in a period
of tension, there would be some chance that hostile aircraft approaching
this country could, be intercepted and driven off. At any rate, there are no
special measures, outside the normal measures of air defence, whioh we
could take in peace-time to guard against this type of attack.
2. It is, however, possible that the enemy might use other means
of surprise attack with atomic weapons* A clandestine attack oould be
made in either of the following ways:-
(1) A complete atomic bomb oould be concealed in the hold of a
merchant ship coming from the Soviet Union or a satellite oountry
to a port in the United Kingdcm:
(ii) An atomic bomb might be broken dom into a number of parts and
introduced into this country in about fifty wll packages of
moderate wei^it. None of these packages could be detected by
instruments as containing anything dangerous or explosive, and
even visual inspection of the contents of the packages would
not make identification certain, Iftiese packages could be
introduced either as ordinary merchandise from Soviet ships,
or possibly as diplomatic freight. The bomb could subsequently
be assembled in any premises with the sort of eaulpaent usual
in a small garage, provided that a small team of skilled fitters
was available to do the job*
OPERATION HURRICANE— THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE
RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION
25 KT BURST IN SHIP
FIG. 72
NORTH WEST IftLANO
I HOUR
AFTER EXPLOSION
ROENTGENS, PER HOUR
T
uo
DASA-1251:
WIXD DATA
Altitude
Direction
Speed
T—t
degrees
mph
1,000
158.5
17.2
2*000
l*i 1.5
16.7
3.000
133.0
17.1
i»,000
129.0
11. 0
5.000
123.0
12.9
6,000
117.5
12.2
7,000
117.5
11.6
6,000
122.0
10.6
9.000
129.5
138.0
9.7
10,000
9.1
200 , *
600 1,000
. , - ■'«» .100-''
— - ^£-^r*~ — --* i*«oo-^-
" - ___- ^1,000
Dose-rate Area
(r/hr) at one hour (Sq. Miles)
2,000 _---' ^ -
6,000 ^10,000
AWRE-Tl/54, ~
27 Aug. 1954
ipoovos
**%&?
5,000
4,000
3,000
o
>* 2,000
N
O
£
o 1,000
it
U
I 0
Q
tpoo
2,000
3,000
_ Baker r/hr at H+l
" » » I M ' ' ' I t I I 1
I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I
Operation HARDTACK I - Umbrella
cumulative dose to 6 hours
150 ft under vater
Water depth 150 ft
WT-1316 (EX)
EXTRACTED VERSION
OPERATION REDWING
Project 2.62a
Fallout Studies by Oceanographic Methods
Pacific Proving Grounds
May- July, 1956
Defense Atomic Support Agency
Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
February 6, 1961
NOTICE
This is an extract of WT-1316. Operation REDWING,
Project 2.62a, which remains classified Secret)
Restricted Data as of this date.
Extract version prepared for:
Director
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20305
1 February 1980
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.
TAB
2.11
Navajo
Tewa
«m^
Total Yield, Mt 4.50
Fission proportion 5%
5.01
87%
H + 1 Hour Dose
Area (mi2)
Rate (r/hr)
Within Contour
1,000
25 450
500
55 1,050
300
80 1,550
100
310 3,500
Two -day
Area (mi2)
Dose, R
Within Contour
1,000
20 520
500
30 1,050
300
45 1,500
100
350 3,000
CLEAN BOMB: 3.53 MT (15% FISSION) ZUNI
WT-1316
DIRTY BOMB: 5.01 MT (87% FISSION) TEWA
WT-1316
Accumulated dose
)6'4« Figure 2.44 t65» toH + 50
X
o
2
MM
i
a ZUNI (3.53 MT, 15% FISSION)
♦ FLATHEAD (0.365 MT, 73% FISS.)
* NAVAJO (4.5 MT, 5% FISSION)
© TEWA (5.01 MT, 87% FISSION)
REDWING TEST DOSE RATES
id— SCALED TO 5 MT FISSION YIELD
WT-1344 (ADA995132), FIG. 3.17
J I L_
10'
o*
AREA (SQUARE MILES)
I0J
3
o
I
03
O
O
o
J*
OS
0)
a
8-
V
•r-4
■•->
o
03
ed
6
s
tuo
-t->
o
C
o
•ft
+■>
o
I0°c
lO-'fcr
io-2t
io-3t
10
-4
T — I I I llll| 1 — I I I l!ll|
JANGLE
S
jj i ni| 1 — r
TEAPOT
ESS
ASYMPTOTE FOR
Fc AS Z~0
PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL
Fc CURVE FOR I kt
ASYMPTOTE FOR NO
DYNAMIC VENTING
BLANCAl
UCRL-12125
i »iii ml ml | | | | mil I I MINI
i mum
-
10'
10
10'
10'
10'
DEPTH/W173 (ft/ktl/3)
UCRL-12125
Event
W, kt
z, ft
F
Medium
Sedan
100
635
0.10
Alluvium
Teapot ESS
1.2
67
0.46
Alluvium
Jangle U
1.2
17
0.64
Alluvium
Neptune
0.115
100
0.005
Tuff
Jangle S
1.2
0
0.50
Alluvium
Danny Boy
0.43
109
0.04
Basalt
Blanca
19
835
0.0005
Tuff
UCRL-12125
10
10
Sedan, 104 kt (30% fission)
90% activity was trapped in crater
8% was in main cloud
2% was in base surge
lo-'t-
PREDICTED
OBSERVED
At 24 hours, 52% of gamma radiation
was neutron induced tungsten pusher
10
-2
1
1
1
1
1
10 20 30 40 50
DISTANCE, NAUTICAL MILES
60
70
TEAPOT-ESS: 5 SEC. (1.2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1955)
TEAPOT-ESS: 3 MIN. (1 .2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1 955)
m
7000
6000
8000
4000
3000
TEAPOT - Ess 23 Mar 1955 1 .2 kt at 67 ft depth, Nevada soil, 20 mph wind
(Fallout on Banded Mountain spread over slopes, reducing dose rates.)
N
o 2000
6
o
jj 1000
1000
2000
3000
I000r/h? line
2000 r/hr
3000r/hc
5000 r/hr
6000r/hr
llllllIM
3000 2000 1000
4000 5000 6000 7000
DAS A 1251
0 1000 2000 3000
Olitanct from GZ, Yards
CRATER DATA: diameter: 292 ft HEIGHT OP BURST: -6'f ft
Depth: 96 ft
Maximum Dose Rate: 6000 r/hr at CIOUD TOP HKIGHT: 12,000 ft MSL
H+l hour at crater lip
UCRL-51440 (1973)
H+l hr
500 rad/hr
100 rad/hr
50 rad/hr
10 rad/hr
5 rad/hr
^TBanded
% Mt.
N
5 rod/ hr
Teapot-ESS
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN
104 RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN
(May- June 1957 Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy)
STATEMENT OP DK. W. W. KELLOGG, BAND CORP.
Atmospheric Transport and Close-in Fallout of Radioactive Debris
From Atomic Explosions
In the case of an air burst in which the white-hot fireball never reaches the
surface, the radioactive fission products never come into close contact with the
surface material; they remain as an exceedingly fine aerosol. At first sight this
might be thought to be an oversimplification, since there have been many cases
in which the fireball never touched the ground, but the surface material was
observed to have been sucked up into the rising atomic cloud. Actually, how-
ever, in such cases a survey of the area has shown that there has been a negligible
amount of radioactive fallout on the ground. Though tons of sand and dust may
have been raised by the explosion, they apparently did not become contaminated
by fission products.
The explanation for this curieus fact prabably lies in a detailed consideration
of the way fn which the surface material is sucked up into the fireball of an air
burst. Within a few seconds from burst time, the circulation in the atomic
fireball develops a toroidal form, with an updraft in the middle and downdraft
around the outside. Most of the fission products are then confined to a dough-
nut-shaped region, and may be thought of as constituting a smoke ring. When
the surface debris Is carried into the fireball a few seconds after the detonation,
it passes up along the axis of the cloud, through the middle, and can often be
seen to cascade back down around the outside of the cloud. In its passage
through the cloud, it has passed around the radioactive smoke ring but has never
mixed with it
s000' ' ■ ' | I I I | »
r/hr at H+l hour
tooo
I
IOOO
1000
tooo
*000
15 kt UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE - arable 25 May 1953
FIREBALL Radius at 2nd naximura: 557*6
HEIGHT OF BURST: $2k ft
TYPE OF BURST AND PIACEMEHT:
Airburst of guntype veapon
CLOUD TOP HEIGHT: 35,000 ft MSL
CLOUD BOTTOM HEIGHT: 23,000 ft MSL
ENCORE, 27 KT AIR BURST AT 2,423 FT
1000
500
8 $00
I
.10
o
1000
1500
1000 500 0 500
Distance From GZ, Yards
1000
1500
LAPLACE 1 kt 750 ft balloon air burst
S iooo
8000
000
Distance From GZ, yards
OWENS 9.7 kt 500 ft balloon air burst
DOPPLER 1 1 kt 1500 ft balloon air burst
2000
1000 0 1000
Distance From 62, yards
tooo
2000
Doppler.
r/hr nt H+l hour.
U t I 1 * I ' I I * » I >
1000 0 1000
Dittanot From GZ, yards
tooo
Harold F. Per la and Harry Haller (Holmes and Narver, Inc.)* Engi-
neering Study of Underground Highway and Parking Garage and Blast
Shelter, OENL-TM-1381 (March 1966).
ESEB UPPER AND LOWER PARKING AREAS
'■■'■» UPPER PARKING AREAS
EZZ2I LOWER PARKING AREAS
l|lff I BLAST OOORS AND PEDESTRIAN BYPASS
MANHATTAN AQUEDUCT
TRAFFIC TUBES PARKING LOT
ACCESS AND EXITS
QUEENS
Boslc Concept; Transportation Use Only
Shelter for 600 thousand Persons
1.2 million
1.8 million
^ BROOKLYN
$ 546 million
Cost/ Person
$ 395
$ 339
$ 322
s^ £ASTIjmaNNel
WELFARE ISLAND
HUDSON RtVER (NORTH RIVER)
Proposed Dual -Use Shelters for Manhattan*
(interconnecting Traffic Tubes and Underground Parking Areas)
Report on a Study
of
Non-Military Defense
July 1, 1958
Report R-322-RC
THE RAND CORPORATION
II. Population Shelters
The first big question that must be raised about non-military
defense is whether people can in fact be protected from modern
nuclear weapons. Protection involves not only provision of shelters
capable of withstanding blast and fallout effects, but also arrange-
ments for getting people into the shelters in response to different
kinds of warnings. It should be stated at the beginning that it is
impossible to provide reliable protection for all the population, and
that the fraction of the population effectively protected depends
greatly on the essentially uncertain nature of the enemy attack. There
appear to be a number of possibilities for protective systems, how-
ever, and under plausible assumptions about the enemy attack and
the civilian response, significant — and in some cases dramatic —
reductions in civilian casualties appear to be obtainable.
TYPES OF SHELTERS
Improvised fallout shelters, even if only capable of reducing radia-
tion to &© or Ho of the radiation outside, could have a significant
effect in reducing casualties among people outside the areas of blast
damage. There seem to be many possibilities of identifying and pre-
paring such shelters in existing buildings in small cities and towns.
For example, a location in the center of the basement of a 40,000-
square-foot building (a typical large office, store, or school building)
may provide an attenuation to about Ko. Moreover, a foot of earth
gives a reduction to about %0, and sandbags distributed in advance
could be quickly filled and placed to provide this type of shielding.
Even buildings whose structural characteristics provide smaller
attenuation factors could be quite useful, with arrangements for
washing down or sweeping the roofs and surrounding areas (ex-
posure to carry out the decontamination being rationed among the
shelter inhabitants).
20 A STUDY OF NON-MILITARY DEFENSE
Table 2
ESTIMATED LONG-TERM RADIATION AFTER VARIOUS ATTACKS
1500 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (50-CITY ATTACK)
Average Maximum Minimum
Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 0.4 8,3 0.003
Radiation rate after 90 days with counter-
measured (miiliroentgens per hour) 0.46 10 0.0035
Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 3.4 73 0.026
Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) .. 40 830 0.3
Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with-
out countermeasures (microcuries) 2 42 0.015
20,000 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (AREA ATTACK)
Average Maximum Minimum
Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 5.3 36 0.04
Radiation rate after 90 days with counter-
measures0 (miiliroentgens per hour) 6.5 43 0.049
Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 48 310 0.36
Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) . . 530 3600 4
Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with-
out countermeasures (microcuries) 26 180 0.2
a Assumes that radiation rates are reduced to ^oo of the level computed with the
r-1-2 formula, because of decontamination, shielding and time-rationing, and inaccuracy
in the formula.
Area around ground zero at Nagasaki before and after
explosion (1,000-foot radius circles are shown).
THE EFFECTS OF
THE ATOMIC BOMBS
AT HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI
v
REPORT OF THE BRITISH
MISSION TO JAPAN
PUBLISHED
FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
LONDON
1946
o
r-O CO
o
£ c
•l-H
> o
O M
co
P o
a
p
CO
O
>
O
a
o
66
8 o
CO
en O
Ih >
CD \
N co
* 2
43
O *rt
co 13
• --■* Cy
> *t3
o o
CO
*0 CO
■+■■* *
CO
O
a
o
c
&
cd
S
o
x>
43
cO H
>
o
%
O
a
O
0)
43
H
&«
cd a)
H 42
is
cd
12
^ GO d>
g s .s s
in
" o a
0 " W
.9 P
s o ^
MirL
43
CO
43
>
•i-H
•c
PQ
S3
KJ
CO
O
•a
ft^^3
O
CA
Cl
£>
O
CO
J
H
9
JA ftg
S C2 ^
-d g §
5; o
,2 Ǥ
'aid 9
8 § S
S3 ^ ©
ft H ST
r\ W •-<
*§ SI
ftu
° 3
co *-
o
00
SJ
CD „
GO GO
§4^
o
DO
• fH
cd w
*»H Ph Gfl
^ 43 o
CO
n3
O
6
GO C3
o
CO
0 ^ is
.O
I S
o o
Cm cG
GO
CO
d
ft
P
o
o
O
1-i *r*
o
a
o
Ih
GO P
CO O
Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA, Typical, part below ground, earth-
covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the
right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been
structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to " flashburn."
Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have
caused casualties.
Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard
shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage,
which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas*
nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were
damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of damage.
EARTH ARCHING USED TO
STRENGTHEN SHELTERS
ORNL-5037
■■•«■»
Mound height =
v half trench width
A familiar example of effective earth arching is
its use with sheet metal culverts under roads. The
arching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walled
culvert prevents it from being crushed by the weight
of heavy vehicles.
UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2
ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR
NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP)
AWRE-Tl/54, 27 Aug. 1954
SECRET -GUARD
ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT
(formerly of Ministry of Supply)
SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE
(Monte Bello Islands, Australia — October, 1952)
130 x 10' 77 x 106 13-5x 1Q3
p~ R3 + R2 + R
p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet
Fig. 12. 1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship
shown in the photo, moored 400 yards off shore.
"
Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right:
Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 27 60 ft.
12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shehers
At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing
towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of
the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full
protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the
explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more
or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3.
At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were
displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the
effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of
the explosion owing to intervening sandhills.
SECRET-GUARD
29
13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash
13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit
Trenches
13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches
provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the
point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most
important results of the trial.
13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were
placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in
radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.
The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz-
fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance,
with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded
by open and covered trenches.
In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel
but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and
one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand.
Table 13.1
Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench
Rectan-
Rectangular
gular
Circular open
Rectangular
Type of trench
broadside-on
end-on
broadside-on
open
open
covered
Distance (yards)
1,300
943
733
1,300
1,300
943
943
733
Surface dose
300
3,000
14,000
300
300
3,000
3,000
14,000
(Roentgens]
1
Depth below grounc
I
level (inches)
6
150
1,000
—
230
214
1,200
(75)
—
12
75
430
—
150
120
545
47-6
—
24
33-3
150
584
60
54-5
188
25
(140)
36
23
70
216
31-6
30
86
13
(56)
48
(20)
43
100
20
17-7
48-5
7-7
(31)
60
(37-5)
61
13-6
10-7
(33-3)
5
(23)
72
1
~~~
(46-7)
(8-6)
7
•" ■
(3-5)
Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.
CM
CM
O
>
U
DC
<
<
z
g
<
w
w
o
R
a)
I
cms
The National Archives
ins
n
Ref.:
(-10 23-5/17-- CSOQSqH-
]
?«H (SSeUMENT HAS BEEN
**r T" i^f t • t"t >• •* - ii iii i * i i*Ti 11 iiiiniiira >^ •*+*■ ~- ■» >• »»»•
t>»w .Jp/^.fj:.
a^i
HOME^OFFICE
CD/SA 12
£irp* .NO S.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER
A CCMPABIQON BSTDSEN TOB
NUUBSR Of PEOPLE KILLED PJER TONUS OF BCMBS
PPKENG WORLD «AR I AND WOULD WAR II
BOMB SIZES
For World War II the average bomb ?/eight was between 150 - 200 kg,
(R.C# 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were
12 or 50 kg.
TABLE 5
Relative safeties in World War II deduced from
"population and casualty distribution-""™
In the
open
Under
cover
In
shelter
Population exposure
Location people killed
Relative safety
RELATIVE DANGER!
2
72f9
60$
1%
1C#
( 1 ) A house about 3^ times as safe as in the open.
(2; A shelter about twice as safe as a house.
Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each
of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on
this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 191 6, in which the total
number killed was 59, 69»5?S of the people killed in the City were in the
open.
HOME OFFICE
AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS
DIRECTIONS
FOR THE ERECTION AND SINKING
OF THE GALVANISED CORRUGATED
STEEL SHELTER
(ANDERSON SHELTER)
February 1939
Crown Copyright Rgurvid
London family who
survived in Anderson
shelter during Blitz,
when the shelter
absorbed the blast
(earth was blown off)
in 1 940
A.R.P. (O) 10
1 %^7
3 /
*. .*^
V
\
\
\
\\\
\ \
\
\ I
CLIP FIXING POR
REMOVABLE j
SHEET XL-
Back, side sheets.
Back, centre bottom sheet.
Back, angle section.
Back, centre top sheet (Removable sheet)
rved sheets of centre arch.
Curved sheets of back arch.
Curved sheets of front arch.
Frontfcentre top sheet.
Front angle section
\ i
-^
s i
ktechanh^l
|te Encjl tl^e sectKDns.-vA
SHEET FIXING
Nut— *^
Washe
FRAME FIXK^G
\
\
\
Rivet
\
^
Front, side sheets': \
v
Front, oentre bottom sheet
handle
for use as a tommy bar.
pIG# 3 —The Individual Parts.
• \ h
Fig. 4. — Stage 12. Covering the Shelter with Earth.
Fig. 4. — Stage 13. The Shelter Complete with Earth Cover.
Anderson shelter survives hit: Norwich 27 April 1942
Anderson shelter survives, Croydon, October 1 940
>
\.,
Proof that the Anderson garden shelter could withstand a house collapsing on It can be teen In
this picture Mr and Mrs Claque bless their insistence on going to ground whan their
homes and those of their neighbours were >ducad to rubbta.
Anderson shelter survives at Latham Street,
Poplar, London, 1941:
And They Came Out
of It Alive . . .
The edge o! this bomb crater,
30ft. dtep, In * household
garden near London, U only
4ft. from the Anderson shelter.
But the two people in the
shelter during London's six
hour raid - Mrs. Clark and
Miss C'&rk—were unhurt. You
see Miss Clark In the picture
examining the damage to the
structure. «
2 S
J— O*
2
D)
•"= <
D
Q CO
LJ CM
UK National Archives: CAB 167 1917
27
fTHIS DOCUMENT IS ffCB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJE8TY'8 GOVERNMENT ).
81
Z&JjtfS&Jl* COPY NO. 6^
January 16th. 1941.
WAR CABINET,
AIR RAID SHELTER POLICY.
Memorandum by the Minister cf Home Security.
6. Shelter in the home; The Anderson shelter was originally
intended for indoor usobut for a number of reasons including the
danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted. Experience has
shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson
or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought
and two designs have been produced which can be erected indoors
without support. Those new types, although they may give sllghtlj
less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors,
would fill the needs of a largo section of the public , especially
the middle class. One design allows the use of the shelter as
part of the furniture of the room.
7. I regard shelters of this typo as of the first importance and
wish to provide them on a big scale* Each shelter will use over
3 cwt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to
two children to sloop inside. For on outlay of about 65,000 tons
of steel, as a first instalment , I could therefore produce
400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000
persons. I should wish to complete such a programme within the
first three months of production and thoreafter at a similar or
increasing rate. From enquiries I bolieve that manufacture can
bo arranged provided steel is supplied and if the Cabinet approves
my policy I shall require thoir direction that the steel be
made available.
10* Conclusions.
I ask for a general endorsoment of the polioy I have
outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of
my colleagues:
(i) that proposals for building shelters of massive
construction should be rejected;
(ii) that steel should bo made available to carry out
the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the
provision of stool shelters indoors;
(iii) that the limit of income for the provision of
free shelter for insured persons should be
raised from £850 to £550 per annum*
H.M.
MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY,
January 15th. 1941.
CO
0)
>
•H
o
a
rt eg
O r-
■H OS
rt O
o o
H O
8
CO
to
•H
I
•ft!
a
o
o
o
«
i
co d ^
8rf -P 6
■PHO
O tI Q> -O
000
>* CO .3
h « -d .
•P-P h^i
0? T< E o
"B-SS
£•52 o
Or-j
09
o
^ ft
2 •
+>
.ISP
& ^^-^
o m w 0
o
4?-P 3 o
November 1940 design by C. A. Joy, M. Inst. Me. & C. E.,
Bexley Borough Engineer (UK National Archives: HO 205/257)
ANDERSON SHELTER
(Indoors to avoid groundwater
flooding, damp and cold)
4.5" partition
wall
9" wall
Floor boards
and joists
4" x 2"
4.5" sleeper
wall
6" site concrete
MORRISON SHELTER
(indoor table shelter)
4" x 2" floor joists
Table shelters allowed escape from any
side easily, reducing fire risks
Patent specification by Prof. John Fleetwood Baker,
Ministry of Home Security (National Archives HO 356/10)
Structural Defense, 1945, by D. G0 Christopher son, Ministry of
Home Security, RC 450, (1946),- Chapters VIII and IX (Confidential)
Chapter VIII summarizes the literature on the design and
types of British shelters and analyzes their effectiveness.
National Archives
HO 195/16
SHELTER at home
'
a
r-t? «
ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY
ILLUSTRATION NO. 8.
The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel
table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to
reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The
whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris.
In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It
would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out
unaided.
0
E
o
o
(0
Morrison shelter survives direct hit in York 1942
o
HOME OFFICE
THE PROTECTION
OF YOUR HOME
AGAINST AIR RAIDS
READ THIS BOOK THROUGH
THEN
KEEP IT CAREFULLY
THINGS TO DO NOW
HOW TO CHOOSE A REFUGE-ROOM
Almost any room will serve as a refuge-room if it is soundly
constructed, and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its
windows should be as few and small as possible, preferably
facing a building or blank wall, or a narrow street. If a ground
floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open
ground is chosen, the windows should if possible be specially
protected (see pages 30 and 31). The stronger the walls, floor,
and ceiling are, the better. Brick partition walls are better than
lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling
is better than a wooden one. An
internal passage will form a very
good refuge-room if it can be closed
at both ends.
The best floor for a refuge-room
A cellar or basement is the best
place for a refuge-room if it can be
made reasonably gas-proof and if
flooded by a neighbouring river that
may burst its banks, or by a burst
water-main. If you have any doubt £*"£ °'basement is the b^
m J m J ^VI~L position for a refuge-room if it
about tne risk or flooding ask for con be made reasonably ga$-
advice from your local Council Proof
Offices.
Alternatively, any room on any floor
below the top floor may be used. Top
floors and attics should be avoided as
they usually do not give sufficient
protection overhead from small in-
cendiary bombs. These small bombs
would probably penetrate the roof but
be stopped by the top floor, though In a house with only two floors
they might burn through to the floor and witho^ Q ce/tor, choose a
, / .jf • *i j 1 -1 room on the ground floor so than
below if not quickly dealt with. you have protection overhead
Page 8
IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR
Strengthening the room
If your reftige-room is on the ground floor or in the base-
ment, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an
additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing
this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting
to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting
on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece
of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling
joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above.
How
to support
a ceiling
The illus-
tration
below
shows the
detail of
how to fix
the props
you will
a piece of
The smaller illustration shows how the
posts are held in position at the top by
two blocks of wood on the ceiling
beam. The posts are forced tight by
two wedges at the foot, driven in
opposite ways. Do not drive these
wedges too violendy, otherwise you
may lift the ceiling and damage it. If
the floor of your refuge-room is solid,
such as you might find in a basement,
not need a plank across the whole floor, but only
wood a foot or so long under each prop.
Page 17
EXTRA PRECAUTIONS
EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST
EXPLOSIVE BOMBS
trenches. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you
can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench
provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting
bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be
given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air
raid wardens will also be able to advise,
sandbags. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your
walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on
a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick.
Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If
you can completely close the window opening with a wall of
sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an
explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window
must still be sealed inside against gas.
' I .'. ',',"T
XI
5 w 5
L
-2&I
X rJ | 4 -y^ .^-t
-
xS ; j ■ j ]CP^r
E^SSn
j [ j ■ i ' \ 'r1^
lit
i^xgrrp—i
f-r i I t | I i"TX~r
r^\[\\\[>
r555?
5
£u_£_3
A basement window protected by boxes of earth
Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for
cement, will do for sandbags. But if they are large, don't fill
Page 30
UK National Archives: CAB / 67 / 9 / 44 ± q g
THIS DOCUMENT IS THB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1941.
MOST SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (O) (41) 44.
May 5, 1941.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOOK AND KEY.
It it requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET.
AIR RAIDS ON LONDON, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1940.
Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.
Framed buildings.
Most valuable information has been gained on the effects of bombs on framed
buildings. Such buildings are practically immune to anything but a direct hit.
Blast damage from bombs outside is usually confined to windows and internal
partitions. Even parachute mines falling immediately outside (he building or
exploding on the roof produce negligible damage to structure or floors.
Relation of Casualties to Bombs Dropped.
From a knowledge of the number of bombs dropped and the casualties
occurring in different boroughs, some idea can be gained of the effectiveness of
bombs in producing casualties. The number of casualties per bomb varies widely
from 1-59 in the least to 6 * 94 in the most populated boroughs, but it follows
closely the apparent densities of population as shown in figure 1. The number of
casualties per bomb is roughly a twelfth of the number of persons per acre, and
the number of deaths per bomb about 1 /60th of the number of persons per acre.
From this it can be deduced that the mean distance at which injury from a bomb
is likely to occur is 35 ft., and that at which the bomb is lethal is 15 ft.
The casualties per bomb in Central London fell steadily from an average of
3*7 in September to 2-7 in October and 1-7 in November. This corresponds to
the considerable fall in population in most of the boroughs concerned.
Conclusion.
We may now say that we have a good general understanding, both qualitative
and quantitative, of the effects of bombs on buildings and on cities. New types of
bombs, particularly heavier bombs, may be used, but we can anticipate no startling
change in the effects apart from increase in minor damage. With bombing of the
present type the results of our work are to show that in urban areas, such as that
of the County of London, for one ton of bombs approximately 10 houses will be
destroyed or will need pulling down. 25 more will be temporarily uninhabitable,
and another 80 will be slightly damaged. 80 people will be made temporarily
homeless and 35 will lose their homes permanently. 25 people, mostly among the
latter category, will be wounded, the greater part of them slightly, and 6 will be
killed or die from wounds.
Contact detonator
Electronic
control
V2 IRBM (intermfedrate range ballistic missile)
2JD0 miles range, 1 ton warhead
Warhead / A
Warhead 1.7\m long, 0.9 m diameter
Guidance system
Steel frame
Launch cradle
Double walled
alcohol pipe
Firing control
(60 m safe range)
Gyroscopes
Alcohol tanl
Liquid oxygen tanc
?n filling
pipe
Launch position
Plumbing
^ Hydraulics
ne pump
Combustion chamber
Control vanes
Support jack
Steel blast shield
Aldwych, 30 June 1944, VI attack
~ **
lr
\J W
1
1 * -~ I
!
V-2 ATTACK at Smithfield Market, London, where 110 people were
killed and 123 seriously injured when pavements were crowded
CIVIL DEFENCE
RESCUE MANUAL
LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1952
CHAPTER XI. USE OF HEAVY MECHANICAL
PLANT IN RESCUE, DEMOLITION AND
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS
In the last war it was found that at major incidents the use of heavy
mechanical plant was frequently necessary in support of rescue opera-
tions. Such equipment was used to help in the quick removal of debris ;
to lift heavy blocks of brickwork or masonry ; to take the weight of
collapsed floors and girders so that voids could be explored and
casualties extricated ; to haul off twisted steelwork and other debris
and to break up sections of reinforced concrete.
In future all these tasks may be required and heavy clearance may
have to be effected to enable rescue and other Civil Defence vehicles
8 March 1 945 Fjg 2o 1 ton of TNT equivalent
Using heavy mechanical plant at the Smithfield Market V.2 incident.
97
to approach within measurable distance of their tasks. The problem
of debris will in fact be a major factor in Civil Defence operations.
Heavy mechanical plant may be required for the following purposes :
(a) To assist in the removal of persons injured or trapped. At
this stage mainly heavy plant is needed, particularly mobile
cranes with sufficient length of boom or jib to reach for long
distances over the wreckage of buildings.
(A) To force a passage for Civil Defence vehicles and fire appliances
to enable them to reach areas where major rescue and other
problems exist and require urgent operational action.
(c) To take certain safety measures — e.g., to pull down unsafe
structures.
(d) To clear streets and pavements to help restore communications
and to afford access for the repair of damaged mains and pipes
beneath the streets.
(e) For the final clearance of debris and the, tidying of sites.
This is a long term and not an operational requirement
Urgent Rescue Operations
During rescue operations in London in the last war the machines
used with great success included heavy 3 J-5 ton mobile cranes, mounted
on road wheels, with a 30-40 ft. jib ; medium heavy 2-3 J ton mobile
cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 26 ft. jib j heavy crawler
tractor bulldozers ; medium crawler tractor bulldozers ; mechanical
shovels and compressors, three stage, mounted on road wheels.
In the case of a large or multiple incident where access was obstructed
by considerable quantities of scattered debris, a bulldozer or tractor
was first employed in order to clear one or more approaches by which
other equipment and personnel could reach the scene of operations.
Next, all debris of manhandling size was loaded into one-yard skips
and discharged by the crane into lorries, giving increased manoeuvring
space to the Services operating on the site.
Heavy mobile cranes were then brought up to the incident where,
used under the skilled direction of the rescue party Leader, they were
invaluable for removing girders and large blocks of masonry which
obstructed access to casualties or persons trapped. The necessary
chains and wire ropes for these operations formed part of the standard
equipment of the heavy and medium-heavy mobile cranes.
The work was, of course, carried out in close co-operation with the
Rescue Parties who also used various forms of light mechanical equip-
ment, such as jacks and ratchet lifting tackle for work in confined spaces.
Compressors sometimes proved valuable for breaking up large
masonry such as fallen walls, into sections of a size and weight within
the handling and lifting capacity of the cranes. This method was only
used when it was known that there were no casualties under the
masonry*
HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT
CIVIL DEFENCE HANDBOOK No. 7
Rescue
This Handbook is a revised edition of,
and replaces, the
Civil Defence Rescue Manual
LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1960
CHAPTER 6
Types of Damage from Modern Air Attack
General Characteristics
6.1 When a nuclear weapon explodes an immense amount of energy is
released almost instantaneously and the contents are transformed into
a rapidly expanding white hot ball of gas at a temperature as high as that
on the sun. From this "fireball" a pulse of intense light and heat is
radiated in all directions. The materials in the fireball are also a source
of radioactivity in various forms. As the fireball expands and cools, a
powerful blast wave develops. As it cools still further, it shoots upwards
to a height of many thousands of feet, billowing out at the top to give
the appearance of a huge mushroom or cauliflower on its stalk.
6.2 The three forms of energy released in the explosion, namely, light and
heat, radioactivity, and blast, all produce effects in different ways and
in different proportions according to the position of the explosion in
relation to the surface underneath. This chapter, however, deals
primarily with the damage caused to buildings by the blast effect.
6.3 With nuclear weapons (as opposed to high explosive weapons), blast
pressure rather than "impulse" tends to be the criterion of damage. If
the effective blast pressure exceeds the static strength of the structure,
failure must be expected. If it is less, no failure can occur however long
the duration of the blast. In fact, nuclear bomb blast is more like a
strong wind than the sudden blow of high explosive blast, and many of
the failures observed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in subsequent
tests resemble closely the kind of damage that might be done to build-
ings by a hurricane.
6.4 The scarcity of suction damage from the nominal bombs in Japan was
due to the high blast pressures produced and to the fact that these were
three or four times as great as the blast suction. With all such large
explosions, if a building does not fail from blast pressure it is unlikely
to fail under the lower stresses in the suction phase.
Effect of blast on structures
6.5 The type of damage which long duration blast (from nuclear weapons)
causes to structures can possibly best be appreciated by considering the
forces to which a simple building is subjected during the passage of a
horizontal blast wave. When the blast "front" strikes the front wall it is
reflected back, and the pressure in the wave front builds up to more than
double the original pressure. However, this build-up only lasts for a very
short time and is mainly important for large flat surfaces such as walls
of big buildings.
16
Fig. 39 (a). Using a door as a stretcher
Fig. 39 (b). Using a door as a stretcher
71
CHAPTER 15
Principles of Levering and Jacking
15.1 The principles of levering and jacking are, in a variety of differing ways,
brought into most aspects of rescue work. The purpose of lifting appli-
ances is to gain power so as to lift a large load with a small force suitably
applied.
Levers
15.2 The simplest appliance for gaining power is the lever, of which an
improvised version made of laminated timber or an ordinary crowbar
are most frequently used by rescue workers. There are two principal
ways in which a lever can be used, as illustrated in the diagrams. In each
case the advantage gained depends on the distance of (A), the centre of
the load, and (C) the points where the push or force is applied from (B),
the heel or fulcrum.
force*
Fig. 68. Lever (downward force)
Lever (upward force)
15.3 The relation between the load and the amount of force required to lift
it is in the same ratio as the length BC is to AB, where AB and BC are
the distances of the weight and the force respectively from the fulcrum.
A man using a 10-foot lever and bearing down at C with half his weight,
say, 6 stone or 84 lb., against a fulcrum 1 foot from the other end of the
lever, can lift a weight of 84 x 9 = 756 lb. because the length from
fulcrum to hand is nine times the length from pivot to weight. If B is
only 6 inches away from the weight the ratio is increased to 19 times its
own weight.
Fulcrum blocks
15.4 A fulcrum block should be of wood (hardwood if possible), never of
brick or other crushable material. It must be resting on a firm base,
which should be as large as possible so as to distribute the weight to be
lifted. The fulcrum must be placed as near to the weight as is possible
under the circumstances, and it should never be placed at any point
where there is a possibility of a casualty being buried immediately below.
100
WEEF >ySj£;
In 12 months. 1940-1, the Blitz stray dog Rip (discovered by
civil defence rescuers in Poplar, East London after an air
raid) sniffed out 100 trapped casualties in London rubble.
Irma. Margaret Griffin used Irma and Psyche to find 233 trapped persons
STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
June, 1953
Final Report
IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR 11$
SEI£CTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING
Evaluation of Source Materials
I*
Robert 0. Shreve
SRI Project 669
Prepared for
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington, D. C«
Approved :
(M.
%0
rilliam J* PIt*lt, Chairman
Industrial Manning Research
Weldon B, Gibson, Director
Economics Research Division
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U. 8. Government Printing Office
Wuhtafton 25, I). C. • Price 16 cents
Table 1
Report Outline - USSBS Project
IMPACT OP AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II:
SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING
Division I - PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONS
Volume 1 Summary of Civil Defense Experience
Volume 2 Analytical Studies (Restricted)
Volume 3 Causes of Fire from Atomic Attack (Secret) — VITAL! !
The documents which should be given wide distribution for civil
defense use are listed below, with a brief description:
a. USSBS Reports
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan
(3 volumes)*
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
(3 volumes).
These reports constitute two case studies of atomic bombing.
Civil defense planners should be aware of the facts these
documents record in great detail. Their distribution to all
civil defense planners and analysts is highly desirable ♦
=2=
Effects on Labor in Clydebank of Clydeside Raids of March 1941.
(REN 234) USSBS Target Int. (REN 236) Ministry of Home Security
A study of the effects on labor of bombing in a town of 50,000 people
in which 76% of houses were rendered uninhabitable, 73# of the popula-
tion homeless. An equivalent of 65 city days was utilized in the
reconstruction.
-22-
Ministry of Home Security
Effects of German Air Force Raids on Coventry (REN 441)
The city, the attack, casualties, repairs and reconstruction (cost),
absenteeism, population movements, and housing occupancy. Six pages
and charts and graphs. Twenty percent of houses rendered uninhabi-
table or destroyed, a total reconstruction cost of h 3,492,000.
Average time lost by worker after November raid was eleven days}
average after April raid was 7 days. Nine percent of the workers
evacuated to points within roach of the city.
a
9
D
§892
r
s
2 S§
K^
.9£
1
o
£ ° A
O * M
«> O
^ m o too
• * * * •
00 *0
* * ■ * *
o
CM
Q
8
t3
1
3
§
Effectiveness of Some
Civil Defense Actions in Protecting
Urban Populations (u)
Appendix B of
Defense of the US
ogoinst Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u)
QRO-R-17 (App B)
0R0-R.17, Appendix B
6 8 10 12 14
DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES
16
23
-"1
20
Kig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance
from Center of City for Three Evacuation TimeB
NONMILITARY DEFENSE FOR THE UNITED STATES
STRAT EGIC, OPERATIONAL, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
William K. Chipman
A publication of the National Security Studies Group
at the University of Wisconsin,
Madison, Wisconsin, May, 1961.
In Britain, by early 1940, the government had issued free, to fami-
lies of low income, some 2. 3 million bomb shelters, enough to shelter over
one -fourth of the population. But by the same time -- after Munich had
brought home to the British people the peril in which they stood, even after
the war had begun -- less than 1000 shelters had been purchased. This
was under 0. 04 per cent of the total number in place, despite the fact that
the shelters were sold at cost. ?
For protection against chemical and biological attack, our National
Plan proposes that protective (gas) masks be made "... available to the
people through regulated commercial distribution. ... "^ or in a word,
sold. That too is nonsense. In Britain, in contrast, the government had
decided by 1935 that it would be futile to expect the population to buy their
own masks. During the Munich crisis, 38 million gas masks were issued
free to the people of Great Britain. 9 The British government of that time
could scarcely be called war-minded or over-prepared for war. Still less,
it appears, are we prepared in 1961.
7. O'Brien, Terence H. , Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 335.
In 1939 the government had decided to issue Anderson (corrugated
steel) shelters free to householders with incomes of not over -fc 250
a year. ^** * 188.
8. OCDM National Plan, Annex 24, "National Biological and Chemical
Warfare Defense Plan, " at 6.
9. O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 7 at 165.
-- The Argument That Increased Spending for Nonmilitary and Other
Defenses May Cause an Economic Decline
A celebrated statesman not many years ago elegantly put (or rather,
asserted) the argument for "national bankruptcy":
CHAMBERLAIN
IN LATE 1936
WHEN
CHANCELLOR
OF THE
EXCHEQUER
If we were now to follow [X's] advice and sacrifice
our commerce to the manufacture of arms, we should
inflict a certain injury on our trade from which it would
take generations to recover, we should destroy the con-
fidence which now happily exists, and we should destroy
the revenue. ... 33
And, a comment on that argument,
It was held very strongly that financial stability was
our fourth, and final, military arm, that we must bal-
ance [the national budget], and avoid interference. . .
with trade. . . . ^
The statement quoted was not made in 1949, when not muscle but fat
was being pared from our military budgets. It was not made in 1955 or I9 60.
It was made, rather, in the 1930's. The statesman who so anxiously viewed
the dangers to be apprehended from increased expenditure for arms was-
Neville Chamberlain. "X" was Winston Churchill. Britain was, if not
"generations," at any rate half a generation in paying the bill for Chamber-
lain's economics. Only recently have her trade, revenue and financial
stability recovered from the economies of Stanley Baldwin and Neville
Chamberlain.
10
33. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, Macmillan,
1946 at 314. Quotation reproduced by kind permission of the author .
MacMillan & Company Ltd. and St. Martin's Press, Inc.
34,
Id. at 316.
--The Question of Public Apathy- -British Experience Before World War II
Compared
The view is often expressed that the population is apathetic, or even
hostile, towards nonmilitary defense, and that nothing can be done to dev-
elop these defenses until public apathy changes to concern. This view was
succinctly put by a member of the House committee which passes on budget
requests for OCDM. He said in March, 1959, that, "The Congress is not
going to shove something down the throats of the people that they are not
interested in. If you did, the Members of Congress would not be here very
long. "46
13
A nation-wide opinion survey by the Institute for Social Research of
the University of Michigan, made in 1957, revealed, among other things,
that 68 per cent of the population favored planning to evacuate cities, and
that 90 per cent favored constructing shelters for people who lived in areas
that might be attacked. 4?
Whatever the present reaction of the public might be to a program for
nonmilitary defense, it is nearly certain that after a frightening crisis had
occurred, the public would not only demand these programs, but would be
highly critical of a government which had not taken the necessary action.
This, at least, was the experience in Britain.
Munich, however, changed all that. War seemed so imminent that
the government ordered day and night digging on trenches in parks and open
areas. It issued gas masks to some 38 million citizens. 50 Then, when
fitting gas masks and digging trenches had given the citizens personal proof
of the threat which hung over them, "Fatalism about providing effective pro-
tection against air attack was. . . replaced by a feeling that this could be done,
if" the authorities showed enough will and energy. "51
H
46. U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent
Offices Appropriations, 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 486.
47. Pohlenz, D. Dean, "Problems of Civil Defense Preparedness -- A
Policy for Today, " Washington, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces Student Exercise M57-83 (1957) at 33.
49. O'Brien, Terence H. , History of the Second World War: Civil Defence,
London, HMSO, 1954 at 93, 99 and 104.
50. Id. at 161 and 165.
51. Id. at 166.
Bertrand Russell, for example, wrote in 1959 that.
On the most favourable hypothesis, [the postwar
world] would consist of destitute populations, mad-
dened by hunger, debilitated by disease. . . incapable
of supporting educational institutions, and rapidly
sinking to the level of ignorant savages. This, I
repeat, is the most optimistic forecast which is in
any degree plausible. bl [Emphasis added. ]
This notion of the extinction of civilization, or even of all life, is a
comforting one. uo Most important, it ensures that a nuclear war will
never be fought, since no sane (or perhaps even moderately insane) national
leader would consider thermonuclear war as an instrument of policy. Also,
if there is really nothing that can be done to mitigate the effects of nuclear
war, rational men need not trouble themselves about the problems of pre-
paring nonmilitary defenses -- or of paying for them.
The theory that thermonuclear war automatically results in world an-
nihilation has had, and still has, some highly respectable adherents. In
1955, for example, fifty-two Nobel laureates subscribed to the statement
that unless all nations renouncedthe use of force, they would simply
". . . cease to exist. "64 Writers on disarmament in 1961 continue to point
out that it would be impossible to "... protect [civilians not killed by the
initial attack on cities] against fallout and starvation, "65 and that "Propo-
nents of the arms race are willing to risk the destruction of civilized so-
ciety. . . ."66
--The
View
That Natio
nal Security Can Best Be
Achieved
by
Buy:
tng Only
Offe
nsive
and Active
Defensive Weapons
17
61. Russell, Bertrand, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, London,
copyright (C) 1959 by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , quotation re-
produced by kind permission of Simon and Schuster, Inc. The notion
of mutual extermination is also alluded to at 32, and tie survivors are
characterized as starving and debilitated at 26.
62. On Thermonuclear War, 35.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 9. Compare Bertrand Russell's views, supra note 61.
65. ^ohn, Louis 157^ "Security Through Disarmament," 192 The Nation
ra9M^8^LJ re3(February 25, 1961).
66. Melman, Seymour, "The 'Arms -Control' Doctrine," 192 The Nation
114-116 at 116 (5re^uary 11, 1961).
Clark, Grenville andC^ouis B. Sohi^) World Peace Through World
Law (2d ed. ), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University
Press, 1960.
-- The Argument That Nonmilitary Defense Would Destabilize the Balance
of Terror
To take any steps to protect the population would be to do them a dis-
service, since it might make war "thinkable" again. And whatever steps
were taken, millions or tens of millions would be sure to die.
A variant of the hostage theory is that if we were to embark on a serious
program for nonmilitary defense, we should inescapably spread war-
mindedness among the American people. '^ Once they were awakened to
the possibility, or worse the "thinkability, " of war, they would inevitably
become more hostile towards the source of the danger, namely, the USSR.
They might then be expected, with the American penchant for grasping
nettles (those, at any rate, recognized as nettles), to press for a first
strike against the Soviet Union.
But other countries, not least the Soviet Union, do have non-
military defense programs of substantial value.
It is not, in any case, self-evident that a nonmilitary defense program
would have a destabilizing (or unbalancing) effect upon American psychology.
If anything, a program which included, for example, building fallout shel-
ters or issuing radiation meters, might, by bringing home the threat of
war to the American people in a highly personal way, incline them rather
to a sober and pacific than to a war-like psychology. City dwellers might
reflect upon the fact that their shelters, at least under any program the
United States is likely to undertake in the next five years, would give them not
a certainty but only a fair to good chance of survival. Rural residents might reflect
upon the prospect of an incursion of refugees from the cities.
19
71. Letter from Dean David F. Cavers, Harvard Law School, New York
Times, March 20, I960, page 10E, column 6. See too Brown,
Harrison and James Real, Community of Fear, Santa Barbara,
California, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960.
This whole problem of psychological response to nonmilitary defense
clearly requires detailed study by experts. British experience in the
Munich and post-Munich period may not be without relevance. '^
--Would A Nonmilitary Defense Program Injure Prospects for Arms
Control?
Finally, there is the question whether a program for nonmilitary de-
fense is compatible with plans for arms control or even disarmament.
the reverse, it should not hazard the success of any arms control or dis-
armament negotiations in which the Soviets are seriously interested, and it
would stabilize any arms control agreement that might be concluded.
20
73. See, for example, O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 49 at 329 on response
to the anti-gas program, and Titmuss, Richard M. , Problems of
Social Policy, London, HMSO, 1950 at 29-39 on response to evacua-
tion plans and programs.
Strategy for the Thermonuclear Age
Thermonuclear war is a grisly topic. It is, however, one about which
we would do well to think. The argument might be made that research on
war may make it somewhat more likely to occur. It is more probable,
however, that the reverse is true, that not thinking about thermonuclear
war may make it easier to blunder into one --or what might be even
worse, to lose one.
It would be well indeed if nuclear war would be unmistakably so an-
nihilating as to be unthinkable, at least for sane men, as Bertrand Russell
and others hold. But it would be unfortunate if this view prevailed only in
the West and not in Moscow and Peiping. There is good evidence that it
does not, especially in the latter. There is in any case something of schizo-
phrenia about spending tens of billions each year on thermonuclear weapons
and their delivery vehicles and then refusing to think about the ways and
conditions in which they might be used, or (more hopefully) the ways in
which we can best assure, short of surrender, that they will not be used.
The best study to date is Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War,
published late in 1960. * Most of what follows in this chapter draws
heavily upon Kahn's work, though it is impossible to do it justice in so
21
small a space. He analyzes, so far as possible in a quantitative way, the
probable or possible causes, courses and effects of thermonuclear wars
which might occur in the next decade. Kahn's work has been bitterly at-
tacked, although to date in no very temperate or reasoned fashion. It has
been called "a moral tract on mass murder," "permeated with a blood-
thirsty irrationality," and its quantitative approach a "Higher Incoher-
ence. " •* It has been said to show "narrowness of vision, " and to have
about it an "air of unreality. " But coherent criticism, reasoned rather
than stated, marked by broadness of vision or an air of reality, has yet to
appear, certainly in more than fragmentary form. 80
77. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J., Princeton
University Press, 1960. On U.S. national strategy see too Rowen,
op. cit. supra note 36, and Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re-
search, Johns Hopkins University, Study for Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Developments in Military Technology and Their
Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy, 85th Cong. , 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1959).
78. Newman, James R. , "A Moral Tract on Mass Murder," The Washing
ton Post, February 26, 1961, page E7, columns 5-8. The level of
coherence of Mr. Newman's critique is best left unstated.
79. Wolff, Robert Paul, "The Game of War," 144 The New Republic
(February 20, 1961)9-13.
80. The usual criticism of Kahn's work is that it does not sufficiently
take into account political problems. Careful, or even casual, read-
ing of On Thermonuclear War, however, shows that Kahn has a better
grasp of political problems than most of his political- scientist cri-
tics have of strategy.
We may expect Soviet or Chinese support for "pro-
gressive, revolutionary national liberation wars"83 in such areas as Algeria
or the Congo. We may see guerilla action in Southeast Asia or other areas
on the periphery of the "Socialist camp. " We may even see limited wars,
fought without or perhaps even with tactical nuclear weapons. Soviet
missiles may be rattled again, as they have been rattled on behalf of
Nasser and Castro. (American missiles might also be rattled, though this
seems unlikely during the next few years, at least. ) Finally, even negotia-
tions for arms control or disarmament may be devices of cold war conflict,
as they have too largely been to date.
What Are We Trying to Deter?
Kahn points out that it is critically important to distinguish between
deferring an attack upon the United States and attacks or major provoca-
tions at other points, for example, a "squeeze" or even armed attack on
Berlin. The same weapons, dispositions of weapons, and strategies do not
suffice for both ends.
22
83. This was promised in the manifesto issued by the leaders of 81
Communist parties after their meeting in Moscow in late 1960. New
York Times, December 7, 1960, pages 14 to 17, with the "progres-
sive revolutionary significance" of "national- liberation wars" noted
at page 17, column 7. Premier Khrushchev also adverted to the in-
evitability of "national liberation wars" in a report delivered January
6, 1961. New York Times, January 19, 1961, page 6, column 4.
84. Berlin was noted as a "seat of international provocation" in the late-
1960 manifesto. New York Times, December 7, 1960, page 15,
column 2. (Any Western posture other than abject surrender is doubt-
less "provocative" in the communist lexicon. )
As Kahn has put it, history has a disconcerting way
of being "... richer and more imaginative than any scholar. "°"
86. On Thermonuclear War at 557.
23
It is a fearsome thing to contemplate the risk of 10 or 20 or 120 million
Americans, or Americans and Britons, being killed in a war, for example,
over two and one -half million West Berliners.
24
--Devices to Tide Us Over the Earlier 1960's
The Soviets might not, of course, decide to risk everything, or at any
rate a great deal of capital and some millions of their citizens, on our
succumbing to postattack coercion. If the Marxist- Leninist dialectic
condemns spurning the opportunities offered by history, it also condemns
taking excessive risks, a sin termed "adventurism. "109 What can we do
to increase the risks to be apprehended from an attack on the United
States?
30
109. See, for example, Garthoff, Raymond, Soviet Strategy in the Nu-
clear Age, New York, Praeger, 1958 at 5.
--A $100 Billion Program Including Blast Shelters and Extensive Preparation
for Economic Recuperation
The "splendid," $100 billion or more, program is the one which might
raise some reasonable Soviet appreherision that we might strike first. This
program, including blast shelters into which the urban population could
"duck" in a matter of twenty or thirty minutes, would in fact be part of a
credible strategic posture allowing us to make a first strike.
(Expensive deep shelters create "Maginot Line"
delusions : Hitler simply adapted plans to go
around obstructions. Similarly , shelters in
Hiroshima were unoccupied due to surprise
attack! If you have deep shelters, an enemy
will plan surprise attack. It takes 20 min to
get into shelters , but only 3 minutes for SLBM
submarine missile attack from offshore!)
45
--History and Arms Control
The lessons of history, for what they may be worth, include those of
1914, when Europe stumbled into a major war which no power wanted, as
a result of a minor war about which only Austria or Serbia were really
serious. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, there are disturbing analogies
between the years before 1914 and those in which we now live. 158
(Wrong: the German Kaiser did WANT war and had
been planning since 1912 to use any excuse for
starting war, implementing Schlieffen's plan!)
--Arms Control for the 1960's
At all events, it is clear that the problems of arms control must have
more intelligent, more intensive, and more sustained attention than they
have yet had, if we are to avoid repeating something like the disasters of
either 1914 or 1933-1939. Views on the approaches required, as noted
above, vary widely.
47
158. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 368-370.
It would plainly be futile, in view of the vigorous Soviet
pacification of Hungary, or of the Chinese liberation of Tibet, to rely upon
"world opinion " (whatever that is) to deter violations. • . .
One sanction might be the prospect of a renewed arms race, triggered
by the discovery of violations. But this might not deter cheating, particu-
larly if the party bent on violation believed it could secure a commanding
position before the injured party could catch up. (Here we might remember
the belated but futile efforts of the British to regain air parity, after Hitler's
rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe. )*'6
50
176. See, for the history of that dismal episode in the history of the
West, Sir Winston Churchill's The Gathering Storm, chapter 7.
Kahn points out that if one side obtained a significant lead because
of evasion or rapid rearmament after the agreement broke down, it
might then ". . .feel compelled to perform a great public service by
arranging to stop the arms race before a dangerous balance of
terror was restored. It could do this most reliably by stopping the
cause of the arms race -- its opponent. Most writers ignore this
situation. . . . " On Thermonuclear War at 230.
Is Nonmilitary Defense Possible?
If nonmilitary defense is necessary, is it possible? In the discussion
to this point, it has been assumed that it is. But can one say, with any
measure of confidence, that nonmilitary defenses could in fact ensure the
survival of most or all of the population? Even if a shelter program could
preserve the lives of most Americans against fallout or even blast, would
they emerge into a world worth living in, or indeed, possible to live in?
What of the genetic effects of war? Would all children be born deformed?
What of leukemia, of cancer, or of a shortened span of life? What of
strontium-90? What of the standard of living? Would the survivors, and
their descendants, be reduced to grubbing out a wretched existence, with
our economy shattered beyond hope of repair? What of the social impact
of attack? Could we expect that the survivors, as Bertrand Russell has
predicted, would "rapidly sink to the level of ignorant savages"?
54
Further, nonmilitary defense must be designed to cope with widely
varying conditions. The nature of the postattack environment would depend
upon the weight and pattern of the enemy's attack- -which might in turn be
influenced by the nonmilitary defense measures we had taken. The areas
contaminated by fallout would of course be determined by the winds pre-
vailing on the day of attack, as well as by the enemy's attack pattern. Anti-
aircraft and antimissile defenses would also affect the nature of the post-
attack environment.
The major systems analyses of nonmilitary defense so far published
are the Rand Report and a more detailed work done by Mr. John Devaney's
OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military
55
Defense . "*** Both of these studies give some ground for sober confidence
that the United States could survive thermonuclear wars in the 1960's and
even beyond, given appropriate levels of nonmilitary defense preparation.
But much more detailed research remains to be done. There are still
major areas of uncertainty in the performance of nonmilitary defense
systems. The principal policy suggestion of the Rand study was therefore
that the United States undertake a broad program of research and develop-
ment on nonmilitary defense problems, to cost some $200 million over two
or three years. 187
186. OCDM, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military Defense, Battle
Creek, Michigan, 1959.
187. Kahn, Herman, et^aL , R-322-RC 184 at 44. (This is about fifty
times the present OCDM annual research appropriation. )
R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense
—Long-Term Effects of Fallout- -Genetic Effects and Life -Shortening, and
the Strontium-90 Problem
Even if fallout at first decays rapidly, so that fallout shelters could
protect most of the population from immediate death or illness due to
radiation, would the longer-term effects of radiation make life as we know
it either impossible or insupportable for the survivors? Despite the rapid
initial decay of fallout, a relatively small amount of contamination would
remain in the environment for a long time. This would include strontium-90,
a long-lived isotope produced by nuclear fission.
The Rand Report states that about four per cent of babies are at preset
stillborn or die shortly after birth, two per cent are malformed and two per
cent develop later troubles attributable to genetic defects. 200 jf as the
result of nuclear war, both parents had been exposed to about 250 roentgens,
spread over a long period, their chances of producing a seriously defective
living child might increase from four per cent to five per cent. 2°1
58
199. Testimony of Dr. James F. Crow, Professor of Genetics, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, in 1957 fallout hearings, ojj^ cit. supra note 193
at 1013. More recent experiments show that there is a possibility
that radiation received over an extended period may not have as
much genetic effect as radiation received over a short period. U.S.
Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Fallout
from Nuclear Weapons Tests, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 1566.
200. Kahn, _et al_. , op. cit. supra note 184 at 16.
201. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 46.
Strontium-90, produced by fission, falls out over crop and pasture lands,
is taken up by plants, and can eventually find its way into human bones,
where it may cause bone cancer or, in smaller amounts, cause bone
lesions and interfere with bone growth, particularly in children. 204
204. See generally Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 63-72.
All of these long-term effects of nuclear war are serious, particularly
the strontium-90 problem. It appears, however, that with proper prepara-
tion, it should be possible to alleviate them. In chapter 2 the subject of
decontamination, or removal of radioactive debris, is discussed. In
chapter 3 is discussed a scheme suggested by Herman Kahn to ensure that
relatively contaminated food be consumed only by older persons, whom it
will not much affect, with the least contaminated food reserved for children
and pregnant women.
The Rand Report concludes that ". . .long-term radiation problems
are a less critical threat to the survival of a population than the central
short-term problem, namely, how to protect a substantial fraction of the
population from the immediate disaster of a nuclear war. "205
59
205. Kahn, et al. ,
R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense
at 21.
Economic Recovery from Thermonuclear War
Even if the medical effects of nuclear war might not be insoluble,
there remains the problem of economic recovery. Would the survivors be
condemned to lives without hope, with standards of living, for most, similar
to those of the early years of the industrial revolution?
59
In the absence of reliable predictions of social response to thermo-
nuclear attack, there is a tendency to lurid speculation. One can too
easily visualize society collapsing, with the survivors organizing themselves
into robber bands and struggling for the few economic resources remaining,
or masses of city dwellers suffering crippling mental breakdown, or man-
kind rejecting science and technology and reverting to a hunting-and-gather-
ing or at best pastoral existence. Others speculate upon the probability of
mass panic or of widespread looting and other criminal behavior.
Just such speculations were made in Britain before the war, and made
by sober scientists, government officials and soldiers. The Army Council
instructed General Officers Commanding that "the initial preoccupation"
of the troops would be "to sustain public morale. "214 At the time of Munich,
when evacuation was being considered, "... discussions were held on the
question of drafting regular troops into London to keep order and prevent
panic. . . . "215 Gloomiest of all were the predictions of the psychiatrists,
who thought that mental casualties might outnumber physical casualties
bv two or three to one: 216
. . . the experts foretold a mass outbreak of hysterical
neurosis among the civilian population. It was expected
that the conditions of life brought about by air raids
would place an immediate and overwhelming strain upon
the individual. Under this strain, many people would
regress to an earlier level of needs and desires. They
would behave like frightened and unsatisfied children,
and they would demand with the all-or-none vehemence
of infants the security, food and warmth which the
mother had given in the past.
None of this, of course, occurred. Rather than a dramatic increase
in neurosis or mental illness, there was in fact a decrease. Statistics
for insanity, suicide, drunkenness and disorderly behavior fell by as much
as half. 21 ' Workers absented themselves from their factories after heavy
bombing only when their houses had been damaged or destroyed, and then
only for an average of six days. 21°
62
214. Titmuss, op. cit. supra note 73 at 19.
215. Id. at 30.
216. Id. at 338-339.
217. Id. at 340-341.
218. Id. at 341.
Individual and group protection against chemical attack poses great
problems. In World War I, gas was considered one of the most effective
means for producing casualties, 1X ' even though the CW agents used then
were far less lethal than the nerve gases developed in Germany prior to
World War II. A seven-ton load of nerve gas can reportedly cause cas-
ualties over an area fifteen miles wide and twenty-five to fifty miles long,
and death over an area of 100 square miles, H9 given weather conditions
favorable to the spread of gas clouds. **0 j^ew non-lethal gases are under
development, including the so-called psychochemicals, related to com-
pounds used to simulate mental disease, and other incapacitating agents.
These agents affect victims by upsetting normal behavior patterns or phy-
siological processes, *21 though their short-term effectiveness appears to
suit them more to tactical use against troops than to attack of civilian pop-
ulations.
117. Rothschild, Brig. Gen. J. "Germs and Gas, the Weapons Nobody
Dares Talk About" 218 Harper1 u Magazine 29 at 30 (June 1959).
This article also states, ibid, that 26. 8 per cent of AEF
casualties were caused by gas. FCDA Technical Bulletin 11-
25, "Introduction to Chemical Warfare" (1957) states that mustard
gas and other blister gases produced more than 400, 000 casualties
in the last 16 months of World War L» more than were caused by
any other weapon then in uae. U. S* House, Committee on
Science and Astronautics, Research in CBR, House Report No.
815, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) states at 4 that some 9 million
artillery shells filled with mustard gas produced about 400* 000
casualties, which effect was about five times that produced by
high explosive shell, on a casualty per ton of shell basis. One
should also note that CW casualties in World War I included few
deaths. About one-third of U.S. casualties were caused by gas,
but only 2 per cent of these died, as compared with 25 percent of
nongas casualties. Ibid.
119 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil
Defense Program, 84th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1955) Part 2 at 800
The 100 square mile figure also appears in ACS, ^d. at 3.
120. "Inversion" conditions, where air temperatures increase with
increase in altitude, are most favorable to the spread of gas
clouds, and obtain on clear nights and early mornings until
about one hour after sunrise. U. S. Department of the Army,
Technical Manual 3-240, Field Behavior of Chemical Agents,
Washington, 1951, at 16.
121. US. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations for 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess.
(1959) Part 6 at 364-365 and 426-436.
In Great Britain, in contrast, some 44 million masks were dis-
tributed by the outbreak of World War n, virtually one per inhabitant, and
1. 4 million infants' respirators and 2 million children's masks by January,
1940; 13? 55 million masks are now stockpiled in Britain for issue to civi-
lians. 138 (They are 1950 designed civilian C7 respirators . )
Procuring 100 million masks for that part of our population concentra-
ted in urban areas might cost $250 million, at $2.50 per mask, and exten-
sive training in defense against BW and CW would also be required.
90
137, O'Brien, Terence, Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 330.
Note that as early as 1935 the British government decided that
masks would have to be issued free of charge. _Id. at 61.
138. Interview Col. Francis B. Stewart, FCDA (now OCDM), Battle
Creek, Michigan, January 30, 1958.
3000 roentgens per hour intensity at one hour
12, 000 roentgens outdoor dose in the first year
10, 000 r in the first two weeks (emergency phase)
2000 r in the remaining fifty weeks (reclamation phase)
EMERGENCY PHASE RECLAMATION PHASE
(10,
000 r)
(2000
Decontamination
r)
Shelter
10, 000 r dose
effectiveness
2000 r dose
attenuation
reduced to
(reduction to)
90% (1/10)
reduced to
1/100
100
200
1/1000
10
99% (1/100)
20
Radiological decontamination involves no very mysterious or sophis-
ticated techniques. In general, fallout material can be swept or flushed off
91
Evacuation
Contrary to popular belief, the effectiveness of tactical evacuation is by
no means destroyed by the ICBM. While it is clear that no tactical evacua-
tion could even be started during the 30-minute flight of an ICBM, it is also
true, as the Rand Report points out, that cities are not likely to be at-
tacked with the enemy's first ICBM salvo, and it is quite possible that
most cities might not be attacked at all.
As Herman Kahn has pointed out, a national evacuation capability
could be of the greatest importance in time of international crisis: If the
Soviets evacuated their cities, they would have made it highly credible that
they were prepared to go to war unless we backed down. 155
93
155. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J. ,
Princeton University Press, 1960 at 213-214, also 132. Objec-
tions to evacuation and other nonmilitary defense measures are
dealt with at 641-651, with objections bearing on evacuation in
particular at 648-651.
The Bureau of Roads in 1956 prepared a report 160 on national evacua-
tion capabilities for 161 urban target areas, containing 90. 7 million people,
about 55 per cent of the population. The report assumed orderly and disci-
plined movement, making maximum use of escape routes, and the findings
included the following: 1 61
(1) In 1 1/2 hours, 32 million persons could be evacuated at least
15 miles from the centers of target areas, over existing highways
and streets;
(2) In 4 1/2 hours, 72 million persons could be evacuated at least 15
miles from target area centers;
(3) In 2 hours, 22 million persons could be evacuated at least 25
miles;
(4) In 5 hours, 33 million persons could be evacuated at least 25
miles;
(5) Evacuation of the largest cities within reasonable time 1 units
would not be possible.
In sum, four hours' warning would allow substantial clearance of all but
the largest cities, and even in these cities, this warning would allow eva-
cuation of some 9 million of their 48 million inhabitants. 162
160. Reprinted and ds cussed in U. S. House, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Hearings, New Civil Defense Legislation, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) at 111-136.
161. Discussed^d. at 124-126.
162. OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of
Nonmilitary Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan, 1959 at 169.
94
Since 1956 Great Britain has had a simple scheme for classifying rad-
iation zones by intensity and for evacuating the most dangerous zone, of 1000
r/hr and upwards at H / 1. 171 Such a program is dependent on a monitor-
ing system, so that fallout zones may be delineated and appropriate instruc-
tions given their inhabitants. It requires sophisticated and technically com-
petent control, related to the area affected by fallout, not to preattack poli-
tical subdivisions.
Remedial evacuation also requires detailed arrangements for traffic
control, if existing transport within the most dangerous area is relied on
for evacuation.
96
171. Home Office, Radioactive Fall-out, Provisional Scheme of Public
Control, London, HMSO, 1956.
The requirement for rescue forces would depend upon the number of
survivors trapped or incapacitated in areas which could be approached by
rescue teams. OCDM estimated that in the 1446-megaton attack assumed
for the 1959 JCAE hearings, 11.5 million people would have been fatally
injured by blast and heat effects and 6. 3 million nonfatally injured. Fall-
out would have caused a further 10. 7 million fatal and 10. 9 million nonfatal
injuries. *•* Many of the blast casualties would require to be rescued and,
together with fallout casualties, to be transported from the danger area.
Other casualty estimates, however, show markedly fewer blast injuries,
on the order of one -fourth of those estimated in the JCAE hearings. x ''e
(JCAE hearings used gross Hiroshima casualty data, which
applies to people watching the B-29 deliver bomb, i.e. no
proper "duck and cover" for elayed blast behind windows . )
99
175. 1959 JCAE Hearings, Effects of Nuclear War, at 651.
176. SRI calculations show only 1. 6 million blast casualties from
a 15 00 -megaton attack
177. Note that casualty effects are extrapolated from experience at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were attacks with air-bursted
kiloton weapons. U, S. Atomic Energy Commission, Effects
of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, 1957, at 456. Factors which
may affect casualty numbers include yield, height of burst,
strength of buildings (or shelters, ) and the weather at the time
of attack. Ibid. It is interesting to note that prewar British
estimates of casualties from aerial attack, based on limited
experience from World War I, turned out in the event to have
been too high by 6 times*
Finally, fallout would limit rescue operations. Fallout from surface
bursts far upwind might make operations impossible, if radiation levels
were so high that rescue crews could not work without accumulating harm-
ful radiation doses. Even if rescue groups could approach damaged areas
from upwincU rescue of severe blast and burn casualties from within six or
nine miles of ground zero would not be possible to a significant extent, since
the level of contamination even upwind of a surface burst would be so high
as to prevent rescue parties from working in these areas for several days
at least, by which time most of the seriously injured would have died. 178
It might be possible, however, to organize rescue operations on the first
day from upwind into the areas of lighter damage, perhaps fifteen miles
from the center of a 20-megaton burst, where numbers of casualties would
have resulted due to burns and partial collapse of frame houses. Rota-
tion of rescue teams could allow exposure to higher radiation intensities,
and hence earlier rescue operations, but would increase the requirement
for rescue forces. If weapons were airbursted, so that little fallout contam-
ination resulted, rescue forces could enter blast areas soon after the deton-
ation.
99
(NOTE: severe upwind fallout in the blast damaged area was
measured after 10 megaton surface burst MIKE in 1952, see
weapon test report WT-615 and AFSWP-507. However, this
upwind fallout was a fluke due to the 82 -ton steel bomb
"case shock" which embedded itself deep into the crater,
increasing the activity on large fallout flakes around
ground zero. Data from weapons with lighter casings in
Castle 1954 and Redwing 1956 disproved the MIKE upwind
fallout data for practical, deliverable weapons, WT-1317.
MIKE upwind fallout data was given in Glass tone ENW 1957
but was replaced with Redwing upwind fallout data in
Glasstone 1962, so light upwind fallout permitted rescue.)
178. U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, Survival in Public
Shelters , 1957, at 5-9.
179. Id. at 7-8.
The Corps of Engineers analysis of requirements for rescue
squads is in U. S. Army Engineer School, Extension Subcourse
321, Civil Defense and Disaster Recovery, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
(May 1958) at 3-3 to 3-4, This document states that about 25 per
cent of persons surviving in blast -damaged areas will be lightly
trapped and 5 per cent heavily trapped. About 2 man-hours are
required to release persons lightly trapped and 20 man-hours
for those heavily trapped. Trapped casualties can survive for 4
days, and rescue squads can each produce some 768 man-hours
of efficient rescue work in this time. Thus in a city where 100, 000
persons remained in blast areas, about 25, 000 people would be
lightly trapped and 5000 heavily trapped. This would require 65
light rescue squads and 130 heavy squads, each composed of 26
men with appropriate equipment. The total rescue force require-
ment is thus 5070 persons, or about 50 per 1000 of target area
population at the time of detonation.
439
One promising avenue for reducing vulnerability is to put selected in-
Mustries underground. The Rand Report suggests that if we had put some-
thing like twenty per cent of our manufacturing capital underground by 1970,
that economy ought to be able to withstand a 20, 000-megaton, 150-city at-
tack somewhat better than our undispersed economy in 1960 could withstand
a 1500-megaton, 50-city attack. 252 A 1956 study by the Corps of Engin-
eers discussed in some detail the problems of constructing underground
industrial plants. The study pointed out that some sixty per cent of Ameri-
can industry lay in a quadrangle from Boston to Kansas City, and that about
two-thirds of existing mine sites, suitable for underground plants, also lay
in this quadrangle. *5o Experience both with underground plants in Sweden
and Germany and with windowless, fully air-conditioned surface plants in
this country indicates that no major personnel problems are likely to arise
from working underground. ^54
109
252. Kahn, Rand Report, og. cit. supra note 62 at 29-30 and 11.
253. U. S. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Underground
Plants for Industry, Washington, GPO, 1956 at 7; see toojd. at
19.
254. Id. at 37-38 and 7. For discussion of an underground metal
processing and fabricating plant in Norway see Skarsgaard, Olav K.,"
"The Largest Underground Industry in the World.11 The Fifteen
Nations (Number 16) at 124-125.
u jSJ^ 1979 l)cP^-
CIVIL DEFENSE FOR THE 1 gap's-- CURRENT ISSUES
Presidential Decision (PD) 41, September 1978, established new
policies for U.S. civil defense: that it should "enhance
deterrence and stability and. . . reduce the possibility that
the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension,"
and "include planning for population relocation during times
of international crisis." The PD 41 policies are in marked
contrast to previous rationales for CD, dating from 1961,
which were to the effect that the program should provide
"insurance" In the unlikely event of a failure of deterrence.
President Kennedy 1n 1961:
But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by
rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the
history of the 20th century, 1s sufficient to remind us of the
possibilities of an Irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental
war, or a war of escalation 1n which the stakes by each side grad-
ually Increase to the point of maximum danger which cannot be
either foreseen or deterred. It 1s on this basis that civil defense
can be readily justifiable— as Insurance for the civilian population
1n case of an eneny miscalculation. It 1s Insurance we trust will
never be needed— but Insurance which we could never forgive our-
selves for foregoing 1n the event of catastrophe. 18/
18/ President John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs, A Special Message
to Congress," May 25, 1961.
More light was shed on Issues of credibility by a national -sample survey
conducted for DCPA in late 1978, Involving in-depth Interviews with 1620
adult Americans. 31/ The results suggest that the public remains favorable
1n general to civTl defense, and 1s receptive to crisis relocation in
particular:
67% believe there could be crisis circumstances under which
the President might urge people to evacuate high risk areas
78% believe the U.S. should have crisis relocation plans
70% say that 1f the President directed relocation, they would
comply. (And additional people Indicate they might well
leave spontaneously, before any direction to do so)
75% believe the nation's communities would be helpful to evacuees
82% believe their own communities would be helpful, if asked to
host evacuees. (In fact, 73% say they'd be willing to take
evacuees into their own homes)
3l/Nehnevasja, Jiri, Issues of Civil Defense: Vintage 1978— Summary
Results of the 1978 National Survey, University of Pittsburgh, 1979.
It 1s significant that on September 1-3, 1939 the British moved some
1.5 million women and children from London and a few other large cities
1n what was a crisis evacuation, for Britain did not declare war until
September 3. (Also of interest are the facts that some 2 million
additional persons spontaneously evacuated at their own initiative, and
that this was unsuspected at the time by the British government.) It
is also worthy of note that in Hurricane Carla, in 1961, between half
and three-quarters of a million people were evacuated from Gulf Coast
cities without a single fatality or a major reported accident .32/
32/Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
tTvil Defense, 95th Congress, 2d Session (January 1979) at 51-52.
In 1939. Hitler attacked Poland, thouqh it appears he
calculated (mistakenly) that he had good chances of
achieving his objectives without triggering World War II,
based upon his earlier successes. In 1941 he attacked
the USSR, anticipating the destruction of Bolshevism
and not, eventually, of the Third Reich.
In 1941 the leaders of Japan attacked the U.S., not
anticipating the defeat of the empire 1n 1945.
—Presidential Decision 41
At all events, the PD 41 policies lay 1t down clearly that U.S.
civil defense should ". . . enhance deterrence and stability, and
contribute to perceptions of the overall U.S. /Soviet strategic balance
and to crtsis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the
Soviets could coerce us in times of crisis."
Civil Defense and the Cuban Crisis
In a 1978 interview, Steuart L. Pittman, who was Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense in 1961 to 1964, pointed out:
[I]t 1s Interesting that President Kennedy personally raised
the civil defense question during the Cuban crisis. He was
considering conventional military action against Cuba to knock
out the missile sites. I understand he was the only one of the
"Conrnittee" to raise the issue of civil defense, which tells us
something. He asked whether it would be practical to evacuate
Miami and other coastal cities in Florida. ... I was called
into the marathon crisis meeting and had to tell him that 1t
would not be practical; we did not have any significant evacuation
plans. ... The President dropped the idea, but shortly after
the crisis was over, his personal concern over Ms limited civil
defense options led him to sign a memorandum directing a significant
speedup in the U.S. civil defense preparations. (Emphasis added. )93/
While history seldom repeats Itself exactly, it does indeed "tell us
something" that in the only overt nuclear confrontation the world has
93/Sullivan, Roger J. et al, The Potential Effects of Crisis Relocation
on Crisis Stability, System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Virginia,
September 1978 at 152-153.
yet seen, the American President was concerned about dv11 defense— and
that the Idea of population relocation during the crisis was one of his
specific concerns. Certainly it is clear that in 1962, the notion of
vulnerability being stabilizing held little attraction for the Chief
Executive.
There is an historical precedent for a relatively rapid buildup of CD
capabilities. At the time of the 1938 Munich crisis, Britain had
developed civil defense plans but had little capability for actual
operations. Spurred by the belief that war had become not only not
unthinkable but not unlikely, Britain mounted an intensive effort.
By the time Germany attacked Poland the next September, the British
were able to evacuate 1.5 million women and children from major target
cities. And by the time of the August 1940 "blitz," the CD system was
able to contribute substantially to Britain's ability to "take it"
and to continue the war.
Following the Munich crisis, which found Britain as unprepared in
civil defense as in all other areas of defense, the working of the
civil defense services was reviewed by the House of Commons during a
censure debate:
Members were in a worried and critical mood, and among
the charges made it was maintained that the Government
had neither policy nor plans for evacuation when the
country was on the verge of war. . . . [T]here was much
uneasiness 1n Whitehall. 102/
In short, there will be no public outcry for civil defense in normal
times. There will be modest political profit, if any, for an Adminis-
tration proposing enhanced civil defense, or a Congress approving it;
the subject is not a congenial one. But should a frightening crisis
find civil defense in disarray, the people (and the Congress) would
surely demand to know what had been done in "the years that the locust
hath eaten. "103/
Summary
The PD 41 policies provide that the U.S. civil defense program should
enhance deterrence and stability, and reduce the possibility of Soviet
coercion during a crisis.
10Z/Titmuss7"KTchard M., Problems of Social Policy, HMSO, London, 1950
at 30.
103/ Joel 2; 25. This phrase, according to Churchill, was used by Sir Thomas
Inskip in referring to the period 1931-1935: The Gathering Storm,
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1948 at 66.
Arguments Against Civil Defense and
a Rebuttal ~~
Some of the arguments made against civil defense were parodied as
follows in a piece in the Harvard Crimson in 1962:
Reconmendations by the Committee for a Sane Navigational Policy:
It has been brought to our attention that certain elements among the
passengers and crew favor the installation of lifeboats on this ship.
These elements have advanced the excuse that such action would save
lives in the event of a maritime disaster such as the ship striking
an iceberg. Although we share their concern, we remain unalterably
opposed to any consideration of their course of action for the follow-
ing reasons:
1. This program would lull you into a false sense of security.
2. It would cause undue alarm and destroy your desire to continue
your voyage 1n this ship.
3. It demonstrates a lack of faith in our Captain.
4. The apparent security which lifeboats offer will make our navi-
gators reckless.
5* These proposals will distract our attention from more Important
things, e.g., building unslnkable ships. They may even lead
our builders to false economies and the building of ships which
are actually unsafe.
6. In the event of being struck by an iceberg (we will never strike
first) the lifeboats would certainly sink along with the ship.
7. If they do not sink, you will only be saved for a worse fate,
inevitable death on the open sea.
8. If you should be washed ashore on a desert island, you could not
adapt to the hostile environment and would surely die of exposure
9. If you should be rescued by a passing vessel, you would spend a
Hfe of remorse mourning your lost loved ones.
10. The panic caused by a collision with an Iceberg would destroy
all semblance of civilized human behavior. We shudder at the
prospect of one man shooting another for the possession of a
lifeboat.
11. Such a catastrophe 1s too horrible to contemplate. Anyone who
does contemplate it obviously advocates 1t.
HISTORY OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR
ence
By
T. H. O'BRIEN
4 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION
The point is of importance for students of the subject in an era in
which marked 'progress' has been made in the technique of air warfare
by the invention of the atomic bomb. This invention has given fresh
currency to the view that 'nowadays every war is different from the
one before' — which, if it were valid, would abolish any need to learn
the lessons of past experience,
THE WAR OF 1914-1918 9
But in May 191 7 the Germans began a series of assaults with
twin-engined aircraft, called Gothas, which soon became severe. The
daylight attack of 13th June on London by fourteen Gothas was the
worst single attack of the war measured in casualties, which numbered
162 killed and 426 injured; 118 high explosive and incendiary bombs
were dropped on the City and the East End.
10 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION
The Government only gave in gradually and reluctantly to
demands for public warnings in London. In July 1917 a system was
introduced, under the control of the Commissioner of Police, which
to those accustomed to the sirens of 1939-45 may appear somewhat
primitive. Warnings were distributed partly by maroons (or sound
bombs) fired into the air, and partly by policemen on foot, on bicycles
or in cars carrying Take Cover placards and blowing whistles or
sounding horns.
THE WAR OF 1914-1918 11
during 19 14-18 There were in all
103 bombing raids (51 by airships and 52 by aeroplanes) ; and about
300 tons of bombs were dropped causing 4,820 casualties, 1,413 of
which were fatal.
These totals appear small; but when they are broken down into
details many different pictures emerge. The two heavy raids on
London of June and July 1917, for example, together caused 832
casualties (216 fatal), which amounted to 121 casualties for each ton
of bombs dropped; and these casualty figures were to have much
significance for the planning authorities of the future.
13 June London raid: 118 bombs, 162 killed, 426 injured.
7 July London raid: 54 killed, 190 injured
121 casualties/ton, 31 killed/ton
(Air raids by twin-engined Gothas began in May 1 91 7)
12 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION
The Committee of Imperial Defence, created in 1904
In November 1921 the Committee asked the principal Service
experts to report on the problem of possible future air attack on the
United Kingdom. This report, which appeared the next year,
accepted the conclusions of the Air Staff about future air attack,
which were briefly as follows.
France's Air Force could drop an average weight of 1,500 tons
of bombs on Britain each month by using only twenty bombing days
in the month and only fifty per cent of its aircraft. London, which
would be an enemy's chief objective, could be bombed on the scale of
about 150 tons in the first 24 hours, 1 10 tons in the second 24 hours,
and 75 tons in each succeeding 24 hours for an indefinite period. It
was to be anticipated that an enemy would put forth his maximum
strength at the outset.
Page 14: on 15 May 1924, the Air Raid Precautions (ARP)
Sub- Committee first met, chaired by Sir John Anderson.
THE SCALE OF A TTACK 15
The serious picture thus presented assumed its darkest tones when
the Air Staff proceeded to estimate casualties. The 300 tons of bombs
dropped in the 1914-18 attacks, the experts pointed out, had caused
4,820 casualties, or 16 per ton of bombs. The 832 casualties of the two
big daylight attacks on London in the summer of 191 7, however,
16 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935)
produced an average of 121 casualties per ton; and sixteen night
raids on London in 191 7-18 gave an average of 52 casualties per
ton.1 After weighting these figures with various factors, the experts
concluded that 50 casualties (one-third of which would be fatal) per
ton formed a reasonable estimate of casualties caused by air attacks
of the future on densely-populated areas. For other areas this figure
should be reduced in proportion to the actual density of population.
30 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935)
In March 1927 the committee was faced with two matters
Royal Charter incorporating the British Broadcasting Corporation, Wireless
Broadcasting, Cmd* 2756, 1926.
PROGRESS, 1926-1929 31
The Chemical Warfare Research Department had been making
experiments to determine how long persons could remain under
certain conditions in a 'gas-proof room; and had prepared a
handbook, The Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, now on sale to
the public.
The first of the matters just referred to was a broadcast in February
by Professor Noel Baker, on 'Foreign Affairs and How They Affect
Us\ This, read in cold print at a distance of twenty years, appears
as an attempt to rouse the British public to realisation of the horrors
of future war, and to enlist its support for the disarmament negotia-
tions at Geneva. The Professor quoted Mr Baldwin's speech to the
Classical Association in the Middle Temple hall, 'Who in Europe
does not know that one more war in the West and the civilisation of
the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?' He painted
a picture of gas attack from the air in another war and claimed, 'all
gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to
protect the civil population from this form of attack'. The Chemical
Warfare Research Department emphatically disputed the accuracy
both of the details of the picture and of this general statement. They
considered it unfortunate that statements of this nature should have
been broadcast to the public, particularly after the Cabinet's decision
that the time was not ripe for education of the public in defensive
measures.
The committee discussed whether to draw the B.B.C.'s attention
to this talk. The Corporation, only a few months old, was then
prohibited by the Postmaster-General's instructions from broad-
casting 'matter on topics of political, religious or industrial con-
troversy'; but the Post Office representative pointed out this did not
mean that his Department was prepared to undertake censoring
programmes. The committee, not wishing to incur the obligation!
to approve in advance all proposed broadcasts relating to their field
of study, decided to take no action with respect to the talk in question.
68 CL III: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937)
Gas was the risk most prominently
associated in the public mind with future air attack, as was demon-
strated a few weeks before the school opened by British reaction to
Italy's use of mustard and other gases against Abyssinia.4
* According to the Annual Register, 1936 (p. 27), 'feeling in England could hardly
contain itself when the Italians were reported to be using poison gas against both
soldiers and civilians9.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS 81
A final matter which concerned gas-masks belongs perhaps more
properly to the topic of public reactions to A.R.P. Early in 1937
some scientific workers at Cambridge University, who described
themselves as the 'Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group' and their
function as that of acting as 'a technical and advisory body to
national and international peace movements', published a book
attacking the Government's A.R.P. plans.1 This body had studied
the official advice about the 'gas-proofing' of rooms, the civilian
mask, and extinguishing incendiary bombs, and then conducted
some experiments. It claimed to have shown that the measures
officially proposed were ineffective or inadequate, and implied that
these constituted deception of the public.
It has been noticed that as 1937 opened the Government was
taking steps to make A.R.P. plans more widely known to the public;*
and this deliberate challenge found a sympathetic echo in various
quarters, and caused it some concern. Questions about the Cam-
bridge experiments were asked in Parliament, for example on the
occasion of the announcement of the new Wardens' Service; sections
of the Press began a critical campaign, and questions were put to
officials trying to build up A.R.P. services over the country. The
Government's reply was that the experiments were academic (in
the sense of removed from reality), and based on fallacious assump-
tions about the conditions likely to be met in actual warfare.8 In
spite of pressure the authorities refused to engage in technical con-
troversy with the scientists in question and within a few months the
agitation subsided. At the close of the year, however, a report on the
official experiments (in supervision of which the Chemical Defence
Committee had been helped by eminent scientists not in Government
employment) was circulated to local authorities and otherwise made
public.
1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack (Left Book Club Topical Book, Victor
Gollancz Ltd, 1937.)
*p. 71.
8 H. of C. Deb., Vol. 320, Col. 1348, 18th February 1937.
86 Ch. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT (1935-1937)
A demonstration of how to deal with the light incendiary bomb
had been included in the Anti-Gas School curriculum in November
1936; and in February 1937 the Home Office Fire Adviser staged a
demonstration at Barnes at which bombs were successfully controlled
and fires extinguished by teams of girls with only short training.
At an exercise held later at Southampton a group of air raid wardens
carried out this function with such success that the Department
concluded it must aim to train all householders in the handling of
incendiary bombs.
96 Ck. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937)
Air Staff had raised their estimate of the weight of bombs which an
enemy (now Germany) might drop on Britain during the first stages
of an attack from 150 tons per diem to no less than 600 tons. The
committee proceeded, as their predecessor of 1924 had done, to
question the experts and then to accept their hypothesis.1 The
estimate of over 600 tons of bombs per diem during the first few weeks
(which took account of Britain's various potential forms of counter-
offensive) also embraced the possibility of a special bombing effort
on the part of the enemy in the first 24 hours which might amount
to 3,500 tons. Consideration had to be taken not only of this greatly
increased weight of attack but of new methods of attack for which past
experience afforded no precedents. The measure offered by the
accepted air raid casualty figure of 1914-18 (50 per ton of bombs,
17 of which were killed and 33 wounded) was subject to the caveat
that modern bombs were more effective. The committee pointed
out that an arithmetical computation on this basis for the scale of
attack at 600 tons per diem would indicate casualties of the order of
200,000 a week, of which 66,000 would be killed.
1 The new estimated scale of attack had been referred to the Home Defence Com-
mittee, and was not approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence until 28th October
1937.
ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT, & OTHER SUPPLIES 139
The 25 million civilian gas-masks accumulated by the opening
of 1938 were, from various points of view, one of the most tangible
assets of the A.R.P. Service.
SHELTERS; CIVIL DEFENCE ACT, 1939 187
The invention of a practical household shelter — to be quickly
known as the * Anderson' — had transformed the possibilities hitherto
envisaged for protection of homes against air attack. The Govern-
ment had undertaken to supply these shelters, as well as steel fittings
for strengthening basements, free to some 2& million families.
The 'Anderson* had originally been conceived as a shelter to be
erected inside the average small working-class home. But the
experts soon discarded this idea as open to various objections,
including the probability that occupants would be trapped by the fall
of their house and killed by fire or escaping coal-gas. During
Munich householders had been advised to dig trenches in their
yards or gardens, and now, by an extension of this plan, the
'Anderson' was designed as an outdoor or surface shelter. It con-
sisted of fourteen corrugated steel sheets weighing, with other
components, about 8 cwt. A corrugated steel hood, curved for
greater strength, would be sunk some two feet in the ground and
covered with earth or sandbags.
196 Ch. V: THE NEW ARM OF CIVIL DEFENCE
The programme for
manufacture and distribution by the end of 1939-40 of 2 J million
c Andersons' to protect about 10 million citizens was being steadily
carried through.
SHELTERS 371
householders in May in the form of a booklet, Your Home as an Air Raid
Shelter.1 This stated that an ordinary soundly-built house would
offer very substantial protection; and it gave those unable to build
some form of shelter much detailed guidance on the preparation of
refuge rooms, the protection of windows and so on.
1 H.S.C. 98/40, 22nd May 1940.
416 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE
16 April 1941: heaviest London air raid of WWII:
On the night of 1 6th- 17th some 450 aircraft made the
heaviest raid so far on the capital, dropping 446 tons of high ex-
plosive and 150 tons of incendiaries and causing more casualties —
about 1,180 killed and 2,230 badly injured — than in any previous
attack.1 Over 2,250 fires were started; and the centre and south of
the metropolis bore the brunt of the attack.
1 German records show the much higher' figures of 685 aircraft, 890 tons of H.E. and
4,200 incendiary canisters dropped. This attack proved the worst on London of the war
in terms of weight of bombs dropped, casualties inflicted and the number of fires caused.
438 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE 194&
These occasions apart, the attack was predominantly of the tip and
run or — as it was sometimes called — 'the scalded cat9 variety. The
worst single incident of the year took place on 3rd March at Bethnal
Green Tube shelter when, ironically enough, no attack was in progress
on this particular area. A night attack of moderate proportions was
being made on London, and warnings had sounded. A woman among
the crowd entering this shelter, encumbered by a baby and a bundle,
fell, causing those pressing behind her to tumble in a heap and the
death by suffocation of no less than 178 persons. 3 March 1 943
508 Ch. XII: SHELTERS
In London a periodical count was made of shelterers, usually once
a month; but this took place on a single night which was not neces-
sarily typical. In addition, the population was continually fluctuating
owing to evacuation, the call-up to the Forces and war damage.
The first shelter census in Metropolitan London, taken early in Nov-
ember 1940, showed that 9 per cent, of the estimated population
spent the night in public shelters, 4 per cent, in the Tubes and 27
per cent, in household shelters — in all, only 40 per cent, in any
kinds of official shelter. In September and October this proportion
was probably a good deal higher. Later, as the London public became
accustomed to raids, the figures dropped.
STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 527
Experience of raids also led to the introduction of an entirely new
type of household shelter. 'Andersons', though structurally satis-
factory, had not originally been intended for sleeping and became
in many cases unfit for winter occupation. Domestic surface shelters
were very cramped when used for sleeping and were in some places
not popular, and strengthened domestic basements had been neither
very successful nor widely used. After night raiding had ceased to
be a novelty, many people preferred to stay in their houses rather
than to go out of doors even to their own domestic shelters. The
'Anderson', it will be recalled, had at first been envisaged as an
indoor shelter. Since many people were now determined to remain
in their homes, it had become necessary to introduce some indoor
shelter which might reduce the risk of injury from falling masonry
and furniture. The fact that many who had hitherto sheltered under
their staircases or furniture had been rescued unhurt from the
wreckage of houses suggested that extra protection might be given
by a light structure on the ground floor.
By the end of 1940 two designs had been produced. The first,
later known as the •Morrison* shelter, had a rectangular steel frame-
work 6 ft. 6 in. long, 4 ft. wide and about 2 ft. 9 in. high. The sides
were filled in with wire mesh, the bottom consisted of a steel mattress
and the top was made of steel plate an eighth of an inch thick,
fastened to the framework by bolts strong enough to withstand a
heavy swinging blow. The shelter, which could be used as a table
in the daytime, could accommodate two adults and either two
young children or one older child, lying down. Experiments showed
that it would carry the debris produced by the collapse of two
higher floors.
528 Ch. XII: SHELTERS
The
Prime Minister showed great interest in these shelters the first of
which, in fact, were erected in No. 10 Downing Street.1 In January
1 941 the Cabinet approved the manufacture of 400,000, providing
protection for perhaps 1,200,000 people.8
In February contracts had been placed for 270,000 shelters,
and another order for the same number was placed in April (thus
exceeding the 400,000 originally approved). Two further orders for
270,000 were placed at the end of July and the end of September.
1 Instructions were given in a pamphlet, How to put up your Morrison shelter, on sale
to the public.
1 One with a flat top and one with a curved top were erected in No. 10 Downing
Street. The Prime Minister was at first inclined to favour the curved design but he
afterwards recognised the advantages of the flat top, which would allow the shelter to
be used as a table, and gave his approval to both designs.
* It was estimated that each 'Morrison' would use over g cwt. of steel, and that about
65,000 tons would be needed for the 400,000 shelters. This proved to be an under-
estimate since the table shelter, as finally designed, actually weighed 4.43 cwt.
STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 529
In June a revised version of Tour Home as an Air Raid Shelter
was issued with the title Shelter at Home. This included informa-
tion about three types of shelter which could be put inside refuge
rooms — the 'Morrison', a commercially made steel shelter, and a
timber-framed structure designed by the Ministry of Home Security.
546 Ch. XII: SHELTERS
It was assumed that to be effective in attacks by pilotless aircraft
or long-range rockets, shelters would have to be easily accessible.
Yet a review of London shelter in the summer of 1943 had shown
that large numbers still had no domestic shelter, and that many
thousands would be unable to reach a public shelter quickly. Though
the obvious solution to the problem was the 'Morrison', production
of these had stopped twelve months before; and in order to build
up a reserve issue had been discontinued in various areas, including
London. At the beginning of October it was decided that another
100,000 'Morrisons' should be manufactured and that the reserves
held in Scotland, the North of England, the Midlands and North
Wales should be moved to the vicinity of London and to the Reading
and Tunbridge Wells Regions, from where they could, if necessary,
be used to supply London.
Large-scale redistribution of 'Morrisons' and the procurement of
new ones called for a substantial administrative effort. Nonetheless,
most reserves were transferred during the autumn, and by the end
of January 1944 some 12,000 had deen distributed to London
householders. At the beginning of this year, however, preparations
for the Allied invasion of Europe began to choke the railways with
more important traffic, and it became impossible to transport new
shelters from manufacturers in the north of England. This diffi-
culty, combined with delays in the production of spanners and nuts,
meant that no new shelters could be delivered before late February
or early March, when it was expected that the V-weapon attacks
would have begun. Arrangements were made for some to be shipped
coastwise to London; but in mid-February the contract for the
remaining 'Morrisons' (about 20,000) was cancelled. y2 THREAT:
648 Ch. XV: CHALLENGE OF '7' WEAPONS
On nth September the War Cabinet considered the need for a
revival of the plan (known as the 'black move') to evacuate a pro-
portion of the staffs of Government Departments from London.
The numbers now involved in such an exodus of the war-expanded
Departments would be high, and difficulties of communications,
transport, accomodation and billeting again seemed overwhelming;
it was, therefore, agreed that the more practical course would be to
devise measures such as 'citadel' accommodation to enable essential
work to continue in London. The production of the further 100,000
'Morrison' shelters and the work on the reinforcement of street
shelters proposed by the Home Secretary were also authorised.
PLANNING AGAINST NEW WEAPONS 651
As far as shelter policy was concerned, orders had been placed
in September 1943 for an additional 100,000 indoor table shelters
and existing stocks were moved into the areas of probable attack.
Difficulties of manufacture and transport had led to poor deliveries
of 'Morrisons', and it seemed unlikely that more than half of the
additional shelters ordered would be available by the time attacks
were likely to begin. As the remainder would probably arrive too
late to be of any use, contracts for the shelters were to be reduced
by about 25,000. On the question of deep Tube shelters it had been
agreed earlier that priority in the allocation of space would have to
be given to the essential machinery of government. The Ministry of
Works worked out a plan to shelter those government staffs not
already provided for in the strengthened basements of their own
steel-framed buildings. All shelter plans, the reader will recall, were
given valuable impetus by the resurgence of 'conventional' attack
on London and the south in the 'Little Blitz' of early 1944.
VI flying bomb.THE ■ V. 1 s ATT A CKS 659
Flying glass was a special danger and people were warned to take
cover on the sound of a bomb diving or the engine stopping, and
later on the sounding of imminent danger warnings. The vast
damage to houses inevitably caused great domestic upheavals. To
begin with there was a definite decline in production in London,
due to an increase in the rate of absenteeism, to loss of time in
actual working hours through workers taking shelter and to lowered
efficiency through loss of sleep and anxiety. The extension of the
industrial alarm system and the increase in the labour force repairing
damaged property, however, soon reduced these early signs of
disturbance. Within a few weeks evacuees were returning to London,
shelters were less full and most people were going about their normal
tasks as usual.
For the civil defence services the new weapon demanded new
tactics. In many ways these attacks were much easier to contend
with than ordinary bombing. Firsdy, most of the incidents were
isolated, so that services could be directed in strength to the affected
area without constant competing demands on the personnel at every
turn. Secondly, the fall of the bombs could be spotted within a matter
of seconds by high-placed observation posts either by night or by
day, so that rescue and first aid squads could be on the spot very
quickly. Thirdly, the penetrative power of this weapon was slight
so that incidents rarely involved die complications of broken gas,
electricity or water mains, and there was also little tendency for
fires to break out. On the other hand the bombs could fall at any
time in crowded thoroughfares; the proportion of casualties in the
streets was much higher than ever before while the proportion of
trapped casualties was lower. At night time, since there were no
German eyes above, the use of artificial light was less restricted and
searchlights could be used for rescue work.
8.8
IS
a
3
SI'S* M
2 3
I'd
"I 1 ao^Sf ITS i| 3Hf ITS 1 s
?! 111 IU- ill Mill K
si . |J. . t.f*. gSflfe. I
2 o 5 o o 3 8
|- • • I MB- §••
*< 8
**; **,
8S ST I
srS- n
I-I H M OO
« W CJi CJi
cow ^1 ^1
00<£>
10 OS
10 10
00 CO
M M 00
00roughs the pre-war population of 800,000
had fallen to 582,000 before the blitz began ;
for four months it had dropped steadily to
444,000 ; by 3 1 st December a fall of 23 per
cent. These figures do not spell panic, and
a further substantial fall in 1941, after con-
tinuous heavy raiding had ceased, completes
the evidence that those who went did so in
cold blood, for practical reasons as valid
for their hard-pressed city as for their
private selves.
But what did all this mean to the average
Londoner ? In November, inner London
(the county) contained some 3,200,000
people. Not more than 300,000 of these
were in public shelter of any kind, half of
that number at most in those larger shelters
on which the limelight shone so exclusively
Nor is this all ; in domestic shelter (Ander-
sons, small brick shelters and private rein-
forced basements) there were no more than
68 FRONT LINE
1,150,000 people. Thus of every hundred
Londoners living in the central urban areas,
nine were in public shelter (of whom possibly
four were in " big " shelters), 27 in private
shelter, and 64 in their own beds — possibly
moved to the ground floor — or else on duty.
Particular big shelters, and for a few nights
the tubes, were overcrowded, but there was
public shelter for twice the number who
made use of it. In outer London, with a
population of some 4,600,000, there were in
November 4 per cent, in public shelter,
26 per cent, in domestic shelter, and 70 per
cent, at home or on duty.
In the last great war there had been out-
bursts of hate against the distant enemy,
and shops with German names had been
wrecked. This time the citizens did not
stop for such things. After the first shock
of realisation they found no more need for
direct recrimination than does the soldier.
Like him, they got on with the job and
waited their chance. Neither in this nor in
any other way was there a sign of instability ;
no panic running for shelter, no white faces
in the streets (though plenty of taut, grim
ones), no nerve disease. In all London, the
month of October saw but twenty-three
neurotics admitted to hospital. The mind-
doctors had rather fewer patients than usual.
BLOCKED ROADS. The morning of 12th May:
each raid sets the police still another traffic problem.
ENORMOUS CRATERS. At the Bank, where
the road collapsed into the subway beneath.
A temporary bridge was thrown right across it.
CITY OF COVENTRY
[
II
**-
in view of p#**%t*nt damage to DRAINAGE
communication* in the City. %p**ctat precaution*
agafn%t TypttoMl Fever are advt%*:4
BOIL ALL
DRINKING
WATER
The outcome may be seen in the following
table, which shows coastal bombing to
November, 1941, in round figures.
Town.
(
Number.
■>f Raids.
Civilians
Killed.
Houses
Damaged.
Fraserburgh
18
40
700
Peterhead
• * *
16
36
Aberdeen
« * *
24
68
2,000
Scarborough
* » *
. 17
30
2,250
Bridlington
• • •
30
2U
3,000
Grimsby ...
• • *
22
18
1,700
Gt. Yarmouth
# * •
72
110
1 1 ,500
Lowestoft
54
94
9,000
Clacton ...
• » ■
31
10
4,400
Margate
• • •>
47
19
8,000
Ramsgate
41
71
8,500
Deal
• » »
17
12
2,000
Dover
... 53
(and shelling)
92
9,000
Folkestone
• • •
42
52
7,000
Hastings ...
• ft ■
40
46
6,250
Bexhill ...
• • *
37
74
2,600
Eastbourne
49
36
3,700
Brighton
Hove
}
25
1 27
4,500
Worthing
...
29
20
3,000
Bournemouth
33
77
4,000
Weymouth
...
42
48
3,600
Falmouth
• • •
33
31
1,100
A PENGUIN SPECIAL
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
FEAR AND COURAGE
BY
EDWARD GLOVER
(Published for Blitz air raids in 1 940)
PENGUIN BOOKS
HARMONDS WORTH MIDDLESEX ENGLAND
41 EAST 28TH STREET NEW YORK U.S.A.
ON BEING AFRAID
Real knowledge, for example, is one of the best antidotes
to unreal fear. Useful action is also an excellent pre-
ventive, and vigorous preparation to meet real danger
will enormously reduce unreal fear. The strength of
a common purpose will do the rest. Knowledge, a
common purpose, and preparedness for action. These are
the remedies for faintness of heart in the face of danger.
22
Now as to preparation. You may recall that when
Napoleon was asked how he was always able to give an
instant decision in a crisis, he replied : " Because I
constantly prepare every detail in advance." Here is a
discipline you can readily cultivate. Always make a point
of knowing beforehand exactly what you are going to do
in an air raid; whether you find yourself in house,
street, train, bus or shelter. Have it word perfect.
23
A
stray crowd packed into a cinema is likely to panic
at the cry of "Fire." There are no common
bonds between the people concerned; and there
are no leaders. Each one is for himself.
34
Already we have the advantage that we are fighting not
only for our lives and homes but for the immemorial
cause of human liberty. But that is not enough. Pro-
vided we are united with our leaders in a common effort,
real danger will never sap our morale. The greatest
danger to our morale is unreal fear.
36
i\. Xv* Jr.
(Air Raid Precautions)
by
J. B. S. HALDANE, F.R.S.
(Co-inventor of 1915 gas masks)
LONDON
VICTOR GOLLANGZ LTD
1938
88 A.R.P.
keyholes and cracks in the wall or between the floor-
boards are to be filled with putty or sodden newspaper.
The windows must be specially protected against
breakage by blast or splinters.
(Plastic sheets and duct tape for broken windows)
How far are these precautions effective? In 1937
a committee of the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War
Group published a book1 in which it was stated that
no ordinary room is anywhere near gas-proof.
1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack.
Error of Cambridge Scientists' Anti War Group:
94, A.R.P.
The real criticism is as follows. It is unlikely that
there would be a lethal concentration of _gas_out_of
doors for a long period. "The wind carries gas away,
ana in cities tnere are vertical^ air^urrents even in
calm weather. 11 many tons of bombs could^be droppei
in the same small area either at once or in succession
this would not be so. .But given any sort^ of_defence
bombs will be dropped more or less at random.
Suppose we~Ka 200 MINUTES 300
Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-3
DECAY OF ANTHRAX, <50% HUMIDITY
Decay occurs faster in humid air
30
20
10
Twilight
Bright Sunlight
0 100 200 MINUTES 300
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-l.
Chemical and biological
contamination avoidance,
FM 3-3 (1992)
10 grams/square meter
TABLE 1-2. Chemical Ageru Persistency in Hours on
CARC Painted Surfaces.
Temperature
GA/
GF1
GB2'3
GD2'3
HD1
VX2'3
C°
F°
-30
-22
•
110.34
436.69
# *
• # »
-20
-4
1
•
45.26
145.63
» •
• ••
-10
14
•
20.09
54.11
• •
• • •
0
32
•
9.44
22.07
• •
• ••
10
50
1.42
4.70
9.78
12
1776
20
68
0.71
2.45
4.64
6.33
634
30
86
0.33
1.35
2.36
2.8
241
40
104
0.25
0.76
1.25
2
102
50
122
0.25
0.44
0.70
1
44
55
131
0.25 I 0.34
0.51
1
25
NOTE
1 For grassy terrain moltiply the number in the chart by 0.4.
2 For grassy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 1.75.
3 For sandy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 4.5.
• Agent persistency time is less than 1 hour.
*• Agent is in a frozen state and will not evaporate or decay.
••• Agent persistency time exceeds 2,000 hours.
-
COMPARATIVE VOLATILITY OF CHEMICAL
WARFARE AGENTS
Agent
Volatility (mg/m3) at 25°C
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN)
1,000,000
Sarin (GB)
22,000
Soman (GD)
3,900
Sulfur mustard
900
Tabun (GA)
610
Cyclosarin (GF)
580
VX
10
VR ("Russian VX")
9
Data source: US Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds.
Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, DN, DAF; December 12,
1990. Field Manual 3-9. Naval Facility Command P-467. Air Force
Regulation 355-7.
co
u
CU
•d
• iH
>
o
h
M
P^H
0)
en
u
**
r*
nj
u
CO
IN
s
^
o
Mh
&
O
0)
W>
s
CO
-M
©JD
0)
G
In
ts
0)
o
Oh
&
0>
cu
*Q
E
3
2
CO
d
o(
• lH
u
»lH
CO
^
E
rd
&
4-*
IT>
«
TH
CO
cu
■M
45
d
n
CU
<+H
O
«
CU
a
WD
C
CU
cu
CU
u
1-1
!h
*J
CU
o
45
CU
£
•fi
s
d
z
s
o
**
Cm
s
>%
CD
fcs?
&
^
^
^
^
^
^
CO
T— 1
CO
o
IT)
ON
H
O
+->
a
Ml
o
M-H
M
o
2
in
G
o
• 1—1
•MJ
g
O
M-H
.s
o
2
T- 1
00
co
CN
i— 1
NO
LC
(N
ON
^h
CN
^O
v©
CN
LO
CO
H
r^
^
Sfc
«
^
r>
CO
ts
CO
IN
LO
CN
T— 1
00 ^
G
o
• 1—1
CO
03
CU
Ml
O
G
S £§
co
co
CU
•a
co
1
03
CU
g
Oh
CO
Q
£ a g g g
o o o o o
os
B
o
03
O
H
H
03
CU
co
03
2
CO
CO
CU
g
• 1—1
N
N
03
u u
O O
o o o o o
2 2 2 2 2
03
r-M
CU
CO
O
2
>,
-r-
u
OS
d
CU
>,
bo
os
H
CU
£
S
•s
CU
CO
g
o
03
^
MM 44'
03
o
•" ■* •
H
g
CU
OS
•4-t
X
»i— I
-M
ro
Oh
O
o
H
4-»
CO
s
CU
•rH
u
•rH
M-H
>
o
s
13
o
-M
S-i
• I— 1
M-l
a
CO
CO
^H
O
o
ffi
Cm
OS
-b
>
•i— i
CO
C
m
CU
>
•rH
S-I
OS
CO
■a
o
p
M-»
CU
cu
CO
•" o
is g-
OS oj
"co Cm
Cm3h
O g
o IS
-4_* Ml
S g
-f co
[Ms
>, d
CO ,J
cu h
Mi cd
O CD
MM -M
CU OS
H CO
Mi
ja
Mi
O
^^
s. os
co co
m o
^^
^^
o ™
cu C
OS
-M
OS
Q
cu
to
OJ
•rH
Oh
CO
O
X
13
c
o
•S
cn
S
OS
+->
OJ
M
05
CO
. Mi
o v
»h C 03
>* s ^
^^?
Ml H
cu
cu
S?
r-H^
OS y
>
g
•i— i
Mi
os
CO
CO J"!
OS E
OS
4-»
-M
OS
rH
• I— I
Ml
OS
CO
>^
os
CO
o
o
M-i tS
o M
SrS
d H
CO
O
cu 5
£?<
03
os
CO
1 — I
03
u
• rH
cu
OS
T3
Ch
O
o
cu
LO
13
cu
03
£
03
N
O
s
• I— I
X,
LO
CO"
OS
m3
N
LO
n3
Mi
S
3
OS
cu
03
r3
ft
N
« SI
HSVP
rj \D
B ^
3 °°
_Q On
7? ON
CO ^
IN
rH
I
CO
I
oo
o
o
CU
03
no W OS
00 CJ u>
On ■
CU
CO
s
^ o
< Oh
^T to
be cu
r- Ml
ta
^
«U
S os
rH , ,
O CN
CJ
CO
O
X
03
U
6
0)
rC
u
Mi
pS os
S -"S
■H co
hS °
CO hC
vcu >^>
-a ■■=
3 co
i — I QJ
-H >
'53 G
CO hJ
^§
LO P
Kg
OS CN
N CO
O O
2 ^
_ T— I
^^ io
a s
03 q
p a
0) CN
CO ^
O os
Oi&H
to
C CD
bO 03
*-< n
r- 03
B g
cu e
Mt
CU
-M
CO
d co
O
en
u
CD
Dh
CO
<
u
•rH
CU
Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) Medical Management of Chemical Toxicity in Pediatrics
TABLE 21-3
MANAGEMENT OF MILD TO MODERATE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURES
Management
Antidotes
Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs)
Nerve Agents Symptoms
Age
Dose
Age
Dose
• Tabun
• Sarin
• Cyclosarin
• Soman
• VX
• Localized sweating
• Muscle fasciculations
• Nausea
• Vomiting
• Weakness /floppiness
• Dyspnea
• Constricted pupils and
blurred vision
• Rhinorrhea
• Excessive tears
• Excessive salivation
• Chest tightness
• Stomach cramps
• Tachycardia or
bradycardia
Neonates and
infants up to
6 months old
Young children
(6 months
old-4 yrs old)
Older children
(4-10 yrs old)
Adolescents
(> 10 yrs
old) and
adults
Atropine 0.05 mg/kg
IM/IV/IOtomax
4 mg or 0.25 mg
AtroPen+ and 2-PAM
15 mg/kg IM or IV
slowly to max 2 g/hr
Atropine 0.05 mg/kg
IM/IV/IOtomax
4 mg or 0.5 mg
AtroPen and 2-PAM
25 mg/kg IM or IV
slowly to max 2 g/hr
Atropine 0.05 mg/kg
IV/IM/IOtomax
4 mg or 1 mg
AtroPen and 2-PAM
25-50 mg/kg IM or
IV slowly to max
2 g/hr
Atropine 0.05 mg/kg
IV/IM/IOtomax 4
mg or 2 mg AtroPen
and 2-PAM 25-50
mg/kg IM or IV slow-
ly to max 2 g/hr
Neonates
Young
children (30
days old-5
yrs old)
Children (> 5
yrs old)
Adolescents
and adults
Diazepam 0.1-0.3 mg/
kg/ dose IV to a max
dose of 2 mg, or Lora-
zepam 0.05 mg/kg
slow IV
Diazepam 0.05-0.3
mg/kg IV to a max of
5 mg/dose or Loraze-
pam 0.1 mg/kg slow
IV not to exceed 4 mg
Diazepam 0.05-0.3
mg/kg IV to a max of
10 mg/dose or Loraze-
pam 0.1 mg/kg slow
IV not to exceed 4 mg
Diazepam 5-10 mg up
to 30 mg in 8 hr period
or Lorazepam 0.07
mg/kg slow IV not to
exceed 4 mg
2-PAM: 2-pralidoxime
IM: intramuscular
IO: intraosseous
IV: intraveneous
PDH: Pediatrics Dosage Handbook
*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime
can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr)
has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 minutes until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea
decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible.
fMeridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term.
Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2)
Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtropPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert].
Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi-
cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage
Handbook, 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio; Lexi-Comp Inc: 2006.
Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare
TABLE 21-4
MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURE
Management
Antidotes4
Benzodiazepines
(if neurological signs)
Nerve Agents Severe Symptoms
Age
Dose
Age
Dose
• Tabun • Convulsions
• Sarin • Loss of consciousness
• Cyclosarin • Apnea
• Soman • Flaccid paralysis
• VX • Cardiopulmonary arrest
• Strange and confused
behavior
• Severe difficulty breathing
• Involuntary urination
and defecation
Neonates
and infants
up to 6
months old
Young
children (6
months
old-4 yrs
old)
Older
children
(4^10 yrs
old)
Adolescents
(s 10 yrs
old) and
adults
Atropine 0.1 mg/kg
IM/IV/IOor3doses
of 0.25mg AtroPen*
(administer in rapid
succession) and
2-PAM 25 mg/kg
IM or IV slowly, or 1
Mark If kit (atropine
and 2-PAM) if no
other options exist
Atropine 0.1 mg/kg
IV/IM/IOor3doses
of 0.5mg AtroPen
(administer in rapid
succession) and
2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg
IM or IV slowly, or 1
Mark I kit (atropine
and 2-PAM) if no
other options exist
Atropine 0.1 mg/kg
IV/IM/IOor3doses
of lmg AtroPen
(administer in rapid
succession) and
2-PAM 25-50 mg/
kg IM or IV slowly, 1
Mark I kit (atropine
and 2-PAM) up to
age 7, 2 Mark I kits
for ages > 7-10 yrs
Atropine 6 mg IM or 3
doses of 2 mg AtroPen
(administer in rapid
succession) and
2-PAM 1800 mglV/
IM/IO,or2Mark
I kits (atropine and
2-PAM) up to age 14,
3 Mark I kits for ages
a 14 yrs
Neonates
Young
children
(30 days
old-5 yrs
and adults
Children
(^ 5 yrs old)
Adolescents
and adults
Diazepam 0.1-0.3
mg/kg/ dose IV to a
max dose of 2 mg, or
Lorazepam 0.05 mg/
kg slow IV
Diazepam 0.05-0.3
mg/kg IV to a max
of 5 mg/ dose, or
Lorazepam 0.1 mg/
kg slow IV not to
exceed 4 mg
Diazepam 0.05-0.3
mg/kg IV to a max
of 10 mg/ dose, or
Lorazepam 0.1 mg/
kg slow IV not to
exceed 4 mg
Diazepam 5-10 mg
up to 30 mg in 8-hr
period, or Lora-
zepam 0.07 mg/
kg slow IV not to
exceed 4 mg
IM: intramuscular
IO: intraosseous
IV: intravenous ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^—
*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime
can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has
been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 min until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases
in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. ^Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term.
Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2)
Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtroPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert].
Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi-
cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage
Handbook. 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio: Lexi-Comp Inc; 2006.
French family at Marbache, Meurthe et Moselle, France, September 1918.
Gas masks were compulsory in the village, due to nearby gas attacks.
Photo is the frontispiece of the October 1921 reprint of Will Irwin's
book "The Next War" (Dutton, N.Y. , 19th printing Oct 1921; first
published April 1921.)
J. Davidson Pratt, "Gas Defence from the Point of View of the Chemist"
(Royal Institute of Chemistry, London, 1937): "... during the Great
War, French and Flemish . . . living in the forward areas came unscathed
through big gas attacks by going into their houses, closing the doors
- the windows were always closed in any case - and remaining there ..."
London 1941 baby gas mask drill
Hand pumped
(asthmatic)
Hospital patient's
Police Civilian Soldier's
/warden until 1942
Small child's
(mickey mouse)
An eminent chemist
gives the facts about poison gas
and air bombing
t He freely /
THE TRUTH
ABOUT POISON GAS
h
7 antes JCtnaall
M.A., D.Sc. F.R.S.
Professor of Chemistry, University of Edinburgh
The civilian has been told that he will have
to bear the brunt of another war, that within a few
hours from the outset enemy bombers will destroy
big cities and exterminate their inhabitants with
high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs.
What is the truth?
Here, in this book, written in language
everyone can understand, is the considered
opinion of an authority on chemical warfare.
Breathe Freely !
THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS
JAMES KENDALL
M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S.
Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh ;
formerly Lieutenant-Commander in the United
States Naval Reserve, acting as Liaison Officer
with Allied Services on Chemical Warfare
J938
52 GAS IN THE LAST WAR
CASUALTIES IN INITIAL GAS ATTACKS
Amount Lethal
Used Concentra- Non-fatal
Gas Date In Tons tion * injuries Deaths
Chlorine Apr. 22, 191 5 168 56 i5sooo 5,000
Phosgene Dec. 19, 19 15 88 05 1,069 120
Mustard July 12, 191 7 125 015 2,490 87
(* mg/litre for 10 minutes exposure unprotected)
between September 15 and November 11,
1918, 2,000,000 rounds of gas shell, containing 4,000
tons of mustard gas, were fired against the advancing
British troops ; our losses therefrom were 540 killed and
24,363 injured. Gas defence had progressed to the
point where it took nearly 8 tons of mustard gas to kill
a single man !
A GAS ATTACK ON LONDON 109
The first
salvo_ofgas shells often reaches the trenches before the
occupantlTddirtheir masks, whereas the Londoner will
receive ample warning of the approaching danger.
IIO GAS IN THE NEXT WAR
The alarmist and the ultra-pacifist love to quote the
fact that one~toh of mustard gas is sufficient to kill
45,000,000 people. This would indeed be true if the
45,000,000 people all stood in a line with their tongues
out waiting for the drops to be dabbed on, but they
are hardly likely to be so obliging. One steam-
ronef~woulclrsuffice to flatten out all' the inhabitanfcTof
Londoin^f^they lay down in rows in front of it, but
nobody panics at the sight of a steam-roller.
11
Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have
I>een delugmgTEcT long-suffering British public with
lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination
These three classes are pure sensa-
tionalists, ultra-pacifists andTmilitary experts7
12 PANIC PALAVER
perpetrators of such articles may not recognize them-
selves that what they are writing is almost entirely
imaginary, "but theyjio want jojget their manuscript
"accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the
Weekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the
horrors thick, and they certainly do their best
The amount of damage done by such alarmists can-
not be calculated, b^tlTislindoubtedly very great.
poison gas has a much greater
laews^value. It is still a new and mysterious form of
warfare, it is something which people do not under-
stand, and what they do not understand they can
readily be made to fear.
The recent film Things to Come, in particular, has
provided a picture of chemical warfare of the future
which shows how simply and rapidly whole populations
will be wiped out. Millions of people, perhaps, have
been impressed by the authority and reputation of
Mr. H. G. Wells into believing that this picture repre-
sents the plain truth.
Exhibit 'B* is the work of the ultra^^acifist. He
abominates war and everything connected with war to
such an extent that he paints a highly coloured picture
of its horrors,Tirthe most extreme Surrealistic style, with
the objecF of frightening the public to the point where
they will relinquish, in the hope of escaping war, even
the right of self
M—
o >>
/i» o
&M
<
■
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
E as
a.
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
T3
O
O
O
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
F §■
3
o
o
o
o
O
_2
■D
0 O)
2- c
0
■
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
LO
E ™
o
i_
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
CNj
h?
Q.
X
&
O
O
O
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
3
LU
CD
0
^r
LO
0
o
<
CO
LO
O
CNj
CO
^r
LO
CO
^r
CD
CD
LO
o
CO
CO
CD
CNI
0
o
o
O
o
c
0
>
c
O
as
"^
c
0
0
&-
LL
C
O
c
0)
LL
C
0
o
,_
0
o
c
as
LL
>
o
0
>
1
*b>
c
2
0
o
"B
o
E
0
0
CO
z
c
0
c
|5
c
|5
c
|5
'5
0
>
o
3
o
o
o
o
Q.
O
a.
O
—
"5
CD
"5
CD
—
"(/)
<
(/>
(0
(0
(0
3
CD
.5
c
as
>
5
o
5
o
5
o
5
o
c
0
2
as
c
o
c
0
c
0
"55
"0
(0
"^
£
£
5
i
2
2
0
o
as
as
'35
'55
c
2
S
CO
0
0
o
0
a:
a:
z
>
o
■£ c 8
S 0 CN
(VJ
C
(VJ
0
*- C
=5 o
if) tl
S >
X LU
LU LU
.^ a: -a
-a i- 0
0 ■ ■
to O
3 "7
CO
CO
0
~Z. o
o
= <
< =i £
0
o
0
>
o I
1 1
"CO 03
00 .3
00 J?
LU 3
"D
T—
C
.
(VJ
O
CO
c
0
q6
0
>%
!c
D)
0
O
>
O
>.
■ ^^
CO 75
(VJ o
(M
©ml
MARTIN MAfllETTA ENERGY
for the mmn states
ORNL/TM-10423
Technical Options for
Protecting Civilians from
Toxic Vapors and Gases
C V, Chester
Date Published - Hay 1988
OF ENERGY
Prepared for
Office of Program Manager
for
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland
ORNL-DWG 88M-7585
DOWN WIND DISTANCE (km)
Fig. 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some
Very Toxic Gases
ORNL-DWG 88M-7584
100 -
10
1
0.1
0.2
0.5 1 2
CLOUD PASSAGE (h)
8
Fig* 2 Protection Factor of Leaky Enclosures
CO
in
I
CO
CO
C3
a
o
at
a>
CO
o
in
o>
o
a?
0>
o
>-
u
o
o
U
o
CD
z
en
O
111
M~
h-
^
O
o
o
CJ
40
CO
LLI
o
CC
n3
LO
LL
C
o
LU
o
^r
>
4->
o
h-
CO
<
■r-*
o
_l
*4-
CM
ID
2
C
i — i
O
3
CO
T~
O
en
— U)
— CM
CD
(L-M) 31Vd 30NVH0X3-HIV
ORNL/TM-2001/154
Energy Division
Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work?
Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place
John H. Sorensen
Barbara M. Vogt
Date Published— August 2001
Prepared for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
Prepared by
OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6285
managed by
UT-BATTELLE, LLC
for the
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725
Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the
amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be
significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and
contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For
this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the
window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in
place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall.
Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in
weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil
(0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then
heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than
plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced
tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct
tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink-
wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance.
3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN?
Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to
effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical
warfare agents.
3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY
Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent
simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal
et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of
10 mil (0.01 -in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the
simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organoposphorous
pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave
similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be
confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that "duct tape exhibits
reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP
(210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and
DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient
material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents" (Pal et al.
1993, p. 140).
hd
p
H
n> s O
3
<
TO
o
o
CD
CO
5r
Qrq hU
5" I
— o
o *^
TO 5:
II
i TO
rt ^
^ §>
00 ^
P 3^
TO
._ c" Cu
O ^ P
wj
c«
50
J?
>
H
O
00
O O
© ©
o
o
o
o
o*
GO
oo o
-J U>
<
DO
-s
fD
pa
H
SB
ST
ft
s
S3
o
■a
sr
o
c
Grq
9^
fD
fD
^+
a
TO
SO
fD
3
J <<
o
x 5" I-
fD
THE
PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC
FROM AERIAL ATTACK
Being
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE
AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS DEPARTMENT OF
THE HOME OFFICE
by
THE CAMBRIDGE SCIENTISTS'
ANTI-WAR GROUP
First published February isth ig3j
Second impression February zsth ig^y
LONDON
VICTOR GOLLANCZ LTD
1937
GAS-PROOF ROOMS 21
the time taken for the eras to leak out to half its
i . nr-— — *— " ■'■■■■ >*^*>**hi««m>>.*— ^h»— -^- — Ti.if in n«-
t^t^M>>j»i*»MI^»l' iiMiiW i ■ i*"' — — " ■■■■ » nt^tfi i n iimi. iiibmium rm iwnmn -~w.»^-.— ..... . .|M -n ■ ■ -■-■■ ■■ ,
original value was measured in four rooms — the base-
v+m+—ifH*4m*+m***M** ■■»■>■■■,
ment of a shop, the dming-room of a semi-detached
house, the sitting-room of a Councflnouse and the
wf- y -1-* ■»*•-*- ■-»<■-.■ 4> 174, 1934
Comple'teXCies : bombs are dropped, not cylinders,
EngelKardTs 1934 article in the Nazi controlled
"Gas protection and air protection" journal is
snemy propaganda; the Nazis kept the facts secret
INCENDIARY BOMBS 59
As, however, our experiments on the
"gas-proof" room illustrate quite clearly that the
ordinary dwelling-house is quite incapable of affording
protection71I"proT3ably wilTnot matter much what a
civil population does under a gas and incendiary attack.
l^FIslFproEtaHe to argue^vvHetHer the gas or incen-
"diary bombTs the more devastating^ as_it js necessary to
"contemplate an air attack in which both will be
employed, with a sprinkling of high explosive bombs,
which will considerably heighteiT^
effect." This is the type of attack which people in large
towns must expect if war breaks out ; our task in this
section is to discuss the proposals of the Home Office for
dealing with incendiary bombs, remembering that
whoever deals with them will require, almost certainly,
simultaneous protection against gas. fAtNtD 1M£*MM
68 INCENDIARY B OMBS *pfUffr fafitfl
extreme lightness and cheapness ofjfthe incendiary
bomb must be borne in mind, Mr. Noel-Baker cites the
case of a single aeroplane carrying a load of less than
a ton of bombs which succeeded in starting three
hundred fires, ancTlFwe^ take a specimen raid of nine
bombers, each carrying a thousand " kilo " bombs,
nine thousand of these could be dropped on an area of
two square miles. If very generous allowances are made
for failures to function^nd~fbTl3or^s fanihg^ri non-
inflammable sites, in an urban area one fifth at least
of these bombs should cause EresT This makes one
thousand eight hundred fires. The danger of fire
spreading over sev^al^locksjof buildings as in the San
Francisco (1906) and Tokyo (1933) earthquakes, mak-
ing the centre of the conflagration quite unapproach-
able by fire brigades is obvious.
To summarise this section, we reach the conclusion :
(a) That for individuals the cost of making buildings
impenetrable to incendiary bombs is proHIbitive.
(b) That, bearing in mind the probability of com-
bined incendiary^
will have considerable difficulty in extinguishing fires
caused by incendiary bombs in private houses, unless
(c) That the fires caused by a raid such as is outlined
above would very likely be impossible to deal with, even
with the improved fire brigade organisation envisaged
by the Home Office, because of the probable amalgama-
tion of separate outbreaks into a vast conflagration.
FM 3-10
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
FEBRUARY 1962
Line
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Munition
Agent
Shell, M2A1
Shell, M360
Shell, M60
Shell, M121
Shell, MHO
Shell, T (M121).
Shell, M122
Shell, M104
Shell, Gas, 175-mm.
Shell, Gas, 175-mm.
Shell, T174
Shell, T174
Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT)..
Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT)..
Warhead, M79, 762-mm (HON-
EST JOHN).
Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm
(HONEST JOHN).
Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm
(HONEST JOHN).
Warhead, E20, 318-mm (LIT-
TLE JOHN).
Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT)..
Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT)..
Bomb, M34A1, 1000-lb, Cluster..
Bomb, MC-1, 750-lb
Projectile, 5"/38, MK53, MOD O.
Projectile, 5"/54, MK54, MOD O.
Warhead, Rocket, 5" MK40,
MOD O.
Warhead, Rocket, 5", MK40,
MOD O.
Bomb, MK94, MOD O
Bomb, M70A1.
Mine, Land, Chemical, M23
Mine, Land, Chemical, One-
Gallon.
HD
GB
HD
GB
HD
VX
GB
HD
GB
VX
GB
VX
GB
VX
GB
GB
VX
GB
GB
VX
GB
GB
GB
GB
GB
HD
GB
HD
VX
HD
Delivery system
4.2-inch Mortar.
105-mm Howitzer, M2A1,
M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52.
105-mm Howitzer, M2A1,
M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52.
155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1,
M44.
155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1,
M44.
155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1,
M44.
155-mm Gun, M2, M53
155-mm Gun, M2, M53.
M107Gun (SP)
M107 Gun (SP)
8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1,
M55.
8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1,
M55.
Launcher, M91
Launcher, M91.
Rocket, M31A1C Launcher,
M386.
Rocket, XM50 Launcher,
M386.
Rocket, XM50 Launcher,
M386.
Rocket, XM51 Launcher,
XM80.
Rocket, Launcher
Rocket, Launcher.
Fighter, Bomber..
Fighter, Bomber..
5-inch Gun
5-inch Gun
Launcher, MK 105 Rocket,
M40, MOD O.
Launcher, MK 105 Rocket,
M40, MOD O.
Fighter, Bomber
Fighter, Bomber.
N/A.
N/A.
User
Employment data
(a)
Range
(1) (Meters) (2)
(b)
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC
USMC
Maximum
USMC.
US ARMY
US ARMY
US ARMY
USMC
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY
USMC.
US ARMY.
US ARMY.
USAF.
USAF.
3,930.
11, 140.
11, 140.
14, 950.
14, 950.
14,950.
23,500.
Minimum
180.
862.
31,500.
31,500.
16,930.
US NAVY.
US NAVY.
US NAVY.
US NAVY.
US NAVY.
US NAVY.
US ARMY.
US ARMY.
16,930..
10,970..
10,970-
24,960.-
33,830..
33,830-
18,290..
139 km....
139 km....
Range of
Aircraft.
Range of
Aircraft.
16,450.
19,200.
4,200-.
180.
180.
4,200.
Range of
Aircraft.
Range of
Aircraft.
N/A
N/A
2,740..
2,740..
8,500-
8,500-
8,500-
3,200 J.
50 km.
50 km.
N/A.
N/A.
Error
(c)
Fuze (Capability)
t
$
to
a
s
2
f
S
g
03
a
i
«
-t->
O
X
M8PD
M508PD...
M51A5PD.
M508PD...
M51A5PD.
T76E6VT >.
M508PD...
M51A5PD.
VT-M514A1.
M51A5PD..
304m.
304m..
I
a
a
N/A
N/A
T2061VT
M417PD
T2061VT
T2075 Mech Time... .
T2075MechTime....
T2075 Mech Time....
T2075 Mech Time—
Preset Radar
Preset Radar
M152E3 Mech Time.
M905BD—
MK29MOD3PD.
MK30MOD3PD.
MK30MOD3PD.
MK30MOD3PD.
AN-M103A1ND
M195 BD (IM-
PACT).
AN-M158ND (IM-
PACT).
See notes at end of figure.
16
Figure 6. Chemical munitions and delivery systems.
Employment data— Continued
Functioning and physical characteristics of
CML munitions
(d)
Time for delivery
(1)
Preplanned
(2)
Target of
opportunity
1-3 min.
1-3 min.
1-5 min.
1-5 min.
1-5 min.
1-5 min.
1-5 min.
(e)
Organization
6 Mort/Plt
8Mort/Btry
6 How/Btry
H-6hr.
H-6hr..
30 min..
30 min..
15 min..
15 min..
15 min..
15 min..
120 min.
120 min.
15 min +flight
time.
15 min +night
time.
6 How/Btry .
6 How/Btry.
6 How/Btry.
6 How/Btry .
4 Gun/Btry.
4 Gun/Btry.
4 Gun/Btry .
4 Gun/Btry.
4 How/Btry.
(f)
Rate of fire per
weapon
30Rds/2min...
105 Rds/15 min
6Rds/Hmin...
18 Rds/4 min
6 Rds/H min...
18 Rds/4 min
3Rds/Hmin...
12 Rds/4 min
3 Rds/H min...
12 Rds/4 min
3Rds/Hmin...
12 Rds/4 min
2 Rds/H min...
8 Rds/4 min
2Rds/Hmin...
8 Rds/4 min
4 How/Btry.
36 Lchr/Bn..
36 Lchr/Bn..
2 Lchr/Bn...
2 Lchr/Btry.
2 Lchr/Btry.
4 Lchr/Btry.
4 Lchr/Bn...
4 Lchr/Bn
6 Rds/4 min...
10 Rds/10 min
6 Rds/4 min
10 Rds/10 min.
45 Rkt/Lchr/16 sec.
(g)
Height of
burst
GND.
GND.
GND.
GND.
GND.
20m >..
GND.
GND.
GND.
GND.
GND.
(h)
(a)
Diameter
(meters)
of impact area
(single rd) *
Weight
of
munition
(kg)
16.
27.
11.
49.
20.
45Rkt/Lchr/15sec.
2/Hr
2/Hr
2/Hr
2/Hr
2/Day
2/Day
2-6/Ftr„...
4-18/Bmbr.
2-6/Ftr
4-27/Bmbr.
48 Rkt/Lchr/.
1 min
48 Rkt/Lchr/.
1 min
20m »
GND
20m i
Variable
Variable
Variable
Variable
Intervals of
1,524m.
Intervals of
1,524m.
Variable —
GND
GND
GND
GND
GND
GND
GND
76.
46.
Variable.
Variable.
Variable.
Variable.
Variable.
Variable.
170
127
90.
29.
10.8
16.1
15.2
45.9
42.0
45.9
45.9
43.0
66.8
66.8
97.0
97.0
26.4
26.2
737
568
568
119
744
744
513
322
25.1
29.1
22.9
(b)
Weight
agent
(kg)
222
58.0
10.50
5.45
2.72
.739
1.22
2.95
4.4
2.95
2.95
5.31
6.68
6.04
7.12
7.12
4.80
4.54
177.5
210
210
30
190
190
89.6
99.9
1.47
2.02
2.18
(c)
Effective
weight
of agent
(kg) 3
49.8
272
5.23
4.50
(d)
Function-
ing effi-
ciency of
munition
(percent)
104.8
171
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
(e)
Agent
dissemi-
nation
efficiency
90
62 per-
cent.
86 per-
cent.
1 Estimated.
* Instantaneous a«jent area coverage 30 seconds after detonation.
» Vali.es are the product of values given in columns 6(6), 6(d), and 6(e). Since values for 6(e) are not available, values for 6 (c)cannot be computed at this
time.
Figure 5. — Continued
626007 O— 6S
17
Agent— GB.
Wind speed — 5 knots (approx 9 km/hr).
Temperature gradient — inversion.
Temperature— 60° F. (15.5° C.).
Terrain — open, level, scattered vegeta-
tion.
Precipitation — none.
Time limitations on the delivery of
agent on target — 4 minutes or less.
Casualty level desired — 20 percent.
Find: Whether or not the mission can be
fired with a 105-mm howitzer battery.
Solution:
(a) Using figure 11, convert 20 percent cas-
ualties among protected personnel to
the corresponding casualty level among
unprotected personnel. This is 80
percent.
(b) Using the "GB (over 30-sec attack)"
column of figure 12, determine the
total effects components to be 3.21 as
follows:
Inversion 1. 09
Wind speed, 9 km/hr 1. 00
Temperature, 60° F. (15.5°
C.) .12
Open terrain .30
No precipitation .70
quired. Since the target is twice as
large as the dispersion pattern of a
105-mm battery (par. 31c(3)(c) and
41c/), a shift of fires should be made.
Figure 9 gives a time of 30 seconds
for shifting of fires. On this basis the
battery could fire twenty-four rounds
on half the target in a little less than
30 seconds, take 30 seconds to shift
fires, and have ample time to deliver
the remaining twenty-four rounds on
the other half of the target. The
firing should be completed in less than
2 minutes.
3. 21
(c) Using figure 13, place a hairline between
80 percent on the percent casualties
scale and 12 hectares on the target
area scale. On the point of intersec-
tion on the reference line, pivot the
hairline until it intersects 3.21 on the
effects components scale. On the mu-
nitions expenditure scale, read 12 as
the number of 155-mm equivalents
required.
(d) To find the number of 105-mm rounds
required to fire the mission, multiply
12 by a factor of four (obtain this
factor from figure 8); the product is 48
rounds.
(e) From figure 9, it is evident that one
battery of six howitzers can easily fire
the mission if no shift of fires is re-
28
Munition
Munition expressed in terms
of 155-mm chemical equivalents
OB
vx
HD
155-mm Shell
1
0.25
2.40
1
2. 17
1
105-mm Shell.
0.28
8-inch Shell
4.2-inch Mortar Shell _
.62
175-mm Shell
2. 1
1. 6
60
71
10
65
30
35
.50
. 68
.74
17
2. 1
1. 6
M55 Rocket -
M79 Warhead— HONEST
JOHN
E19R2 Warhead— HON-
EST JOHN
71
10
65
LITTLE JOHN
SERGEANT
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster
MCI 750-lb Bomb.
5"/38 Gas Projectile (Navy).
5"/54 Gas Projectile (Navy).
5" Gas Rocket (Navy)
500-lb Gas Bomb
115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy)
6.2
Figure 7. Munitions expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical
equivalents. (The figures given are an estimate of the
number of 155-mm howitzer rounds required to give the
same effect as one round of the specified munition.
Dissemination efficiency has not been considered.)
Weapon
105-mm Howitzer
155-mm Howitzer
155-mm Gun
8-inch Howitzer
4.2-inch Mortar
M91 Launcher (M55 Rocket)
Maximum rate
(rounds)
30 sec
6
3
2
1
10
45 (15 sec)
Munition
Conversion factor
GB
vx
HD
155-mm Shell
1
4
0.41
1
0.45
1
105-mm Shell .
3.6
8-inch Shell
4 2-inch Mortar Shell
1. 61
175-mm Shell ..
.48
.61
.017
.014
.098
.016
.033
.029
2.00
1.46
1. 35
. 059
.48
. 61
M55 Rocket
M79 Warhead— HONEST
JOHN _.
E19R2 Warhead— HON-
EST JOHN.
.014
. 098
.016
LITTLE JOHN
SERGEANT
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster
MCI 750-lb Bomb
5' 738 Gas Projectile (Navy).
5'754 Gas Projectile (Navy).
5" Gas Rocket (Navy)
500-lb Gas Bomb
115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy) *
. 164
Figure 8. Conversion factors for converting 155-mm
munitions to other munitions.
Rates of fire for chemical fire missions without shifting or
relaying of the piece (rounds)
lmin
10
5
4
2
16
2min
14
7
6
3
30 (max)
4min
18
12
8
6
50
lOmin
40
30
12
10
80
15min
60
40
18
15
105
Estimated
time to
shift fires
30 sec
30 sec
60 sec
60 sec
30 sec
Launcher must relocate after firing each ripple.
Figure 9. Approximate rates of fire for division cannon artillery, mortars, and multiple rockets firing chemical rounds. (Rates
of fire for other weapons are given in figure 5.)
30
UJ
o
CO
OT
UJ
Q.
Q
UJ
O
UJ
o
a.
3
O
o
<
CO
UJ
<
CO
<
o
UJ
o
UJ
a.
-99
-90
-80
-70
^60
-50
r40
-30
-25
IT20
— 15
I — i
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
— 3
-F
.MASKS IN PLACE
(Exact level of protection
dependent on condition of
masks and training of troops)
2 —
UJ '
h-
o
or
a.
+-
MASKS AVAILABLE
(Troops well trained)
-MASKS AVAILABLE
(Troops poorly trained)
UJ
>
UJ
-U- — NO MASKS
If the target personnel had protection
available, the following factors would
be applied to the percent casualties
for unprotected personnel :
Degradation
Level of protection factors
Masks in place 0. 05
Masks available, troops well
trained .10
Masks available, troops poorly
trained .25
The above are estimates for GB.
L_ I
3—
4 —
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10-
15-
20-
25t
30-
40-=
50-5
60 —
70 ~
80—
90—
99_
UJ
z
z
o
CO
a:
UJ
o.
o
UJ
O
UJ
O
o
z
o
<
CO
UJ
!:
<
CO
<
o
z
UJ
o
or
UJ
Q.
Figure 11. Nomogram for conversion of percent GB casualties for protection of personnel in the target area.
32
Meteorological and terrain conditions
Effects components
GB»
(surprise
attack)
GB
(over 30-sec
attack)
VX
HD
1. Temperature Gradient
Inversion
Neutral
Lapse
0.67
.57
.30
1.09
.69
.09
1.89
1.89
1.89
2. Wind Speed (km/hr)
0to5-_. __
6to 10__ _.
11 to 16
17 to 26
27 to 52
3. Temperature (° F.)
a. 0to39 (-18° to 4° C.)__.
40 to 79 (5° to 26° C.)
80 and up (27° C. and up).
b. 30 to 49 (-l°to9° C.)---
50 to 69 (10° to 21° C.)---
70 and up (22° C. and up).
4. Terrain
Open, level, scattered vegetation.
Rugged, mountainous
20
50
70
55
30
12
23
30
1.30
1.00
.70
.30
0
0
. 12
.23
.30
'0
0
*0
0.69
.54
.32
.87
.70
.60
.48
0
0
.70
1.00
30
1 0
5. Precipitation
None
Moderate rain.
.70
70
70
>0
»0
i Estimated.
* Tentative figures not yet verified.
Figure 12. Effects components.
0
'0
Note: paragraph 105 on page 82 states
that the "safe entry times" after bio
attacks are:
NU (Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus) ,
AB (bovine brucellosis) , and
UL (tularemia) : 2 hrs sun or 8 hrs cloudy
OU (Q fever) : 2 hrs sun or 18 hrs cloudy
Cloudy conditions also apply to nighttime
626007 O— 62-
33
cr
IS!
O
UJ
h-
O
A
|— 99
— 95
—90
80
70
60
50
40
30
gE
IF
O
co
UJ
UJ
u
E
20
10
I — I
CO
o
z
o
W
s
E
E
«*>
m
or
UJ
CD
UJ
I
o
UJ
B
1—10,000
- 5,000
- 4,000
- 3,000
-2,000
— 1,000
-500
-400
-300
-200
— 100
5
4
Z
— 50
UJ
or
— 40
3
K
— 30
Q
2
2
UJ
a.
— 20
2
O
3
USE SCALES
A and a
and
B and B
I
TOGETHER
— 9
— 8
— 7
— 6
UJ
UJ
u
z
UJ
or
UJ
u.
UJ
tr.
— 2
1.0
10
5
4
3
2
-I i—o
Figure IS. Target area, casualty level, munitions requirement nomogram.
4.0
- 20,000— —
10,000
3.5
3.0
2.5
— 4
2.0
— 3
1.5
5,000 —
4,000 —
3,060—3
2,000 —
,000
CO
I-
z
UJ
500
? 400
CO
o
UJ
UJ
200
100
50
40
30
20
10-
O 300-^
CO
UJ
or
s
UJ
<
UJ
or
<
UJ
CD
<
34
o
x KILOGRAMS Per METER
ijjH 8 o oo o o o ^ - S
" |l| I [li/l'llUl'llUl |tTfTTT| I |lll\|iU/li!i||| |'l|l||| I [llllllM/lli||| ['l|l|/| I |iil\|lllllllil||| |l[|
JE§§8 § j> °SSS 8 8 | *••••» A Ik ,,«, • » 4 I SS5
W POUNDS Per METER
REFERENCE NUMBER
I1IIH"I|MII| 'I'l'l'l |||HHIIIII|HII| I |l|l|l| [||llllllll|[llll| I |l|l|l| H|""lml[MM| I |1|I|I||||MII|I[1|I||||||I11|| l|l
«X m » 10 «K O O o o 00 I OOOO 00 I I 0 000 o 00b
"» o M M «» •*- O OOOO OO o © o O OOO o o oo „ 0000
o «••»*«» «K o o O O OOO 2 OOOO g OOOO
2 o o 0.0.0008 00-^- g 0-°-5°;
REFERENCE LINE IE
2<
(A * u
Sw III ' I ' I fc.
< K
fy, Mi<9 M> N —
o
o
UJ
<
l.lll.limllllH.I.I.L.llllll.l.l.lnnlllllU.1
£ (SH3i3WCniM Nl) H19N31 30dnOS
o
o
8
C3
A 3NH 3DN3d3J3d g
I
©
_ «»«■> M - j3
n+m n T «}«.*iej. .• OOOO Q 5»
IlluLl
I 3NI~I 3DN3d3d3d
E .
I«
• E
* I
dflOH J»d SH313W0TIX • E
• °
PUI O K Z
INI!
CD O u. _ *
t!2 o o o S
00 0000 2 _r~**^*",c
lii 1 1 himn ■ ■ 1 1 1 hhl 1 1 1 Inn In nil I lililil .L.T. 1 1 M.T.TtT ■ LmL.mJ O < o ui o »-
(H313H aiano j»d ssinNiw-wvdomm ni) sovsoa
00 o _ „
°. OO O 5 o
40
DOWNWIND DISTANCE NOMOGRAM II
10
=-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
cr
u
GO
100
200
300
400
500
-600
700
- — 1,000
LU
o
z
UJ
Or
Ul
U.
UJ
=- 2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
•7,000
- 10,000
— 20,000
30,000
-40,000
-50,000
100,000
— 200,000
•300,000
- 400,000
500,000
1,000,000
LINE SOURCE
B
m
-n
m
m
z
o
m
TEMPERATURE
GRADIENT
NOTE:
A to D
B
B to Temperature Gradient
=-.2
—.3
— .4
— 5
t-.6
— .7
CO
oc
UJ
S_2
UJ
2
— 3
O
-J
4
*
— 5
2
— 6
V— *
— 7
UJ
O
IC
z
_
<
K
—
co
a
E-20
a
z
p-30
$
— 40
z
— 50
*
— 60
o
70
o
1 IC
D
too —
70 -
60-
50-
40-
30-
20 — d
10
i:
5-
4-
3"
2-E
^
m
.7
H
.6
m
.5
3J
CO
.4
*~*
.3—=
.2^
—
.07-
.06
.05-
04
03
.02
.01 —
CO
O
c
3)
o
m
m
Figure 15. Downwind distance nomogram II.
41
USACGSC
RB 3-1
REFERENCE BOOK
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPON EMPLOYMENT
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1 May 1968
This reference book supersedes RD 3-1, 1 May 1967
CHAPTER 2
TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS
1. Characteristics and Effects
a. General. The following antiperson-
nel chemical agents are used for College
instruction in chemical weapon employ-
ment: nerve agents GB and VX; blister
agent HD (mustard); and incapacitating
agent BZ. Actual or assumed character-
istics of these agents are described in
the following paragraphs for instructional
purposes only and are summarized in
figure 1.
b_. Nerve Agent GB. GB is a quick
acting, nonpersistent lethal agent that
produces casualties primarily by inhala-
tion.
(1) Inhalation effects. Inhaled GB
vapor can produce casualties within min-
utes. As an example, 50 percent of a
group of unprotected troops engaged in
mild activity, breathing at the rate of
about 15 liters per minute, and exposed
to 70 milligrams of GB per cubic meter
of air for 1 minute will probably die if
they do not receive medical treatment
in time. This is the median lethal dosage
(50) and is expressed as 70 mg-min/m3.
For troops engaged in activities that in-
crease their breathing rate, the median
lethal dosage can be as low as 20
mg-min/m3. The median incapacitating
dosage of GB vapor by inhalation is about
35 mg-min/m3 for troops engaged in
mild activity. Incapacitating effects con-
sist of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and
difficulty with vision, followed by muscu-
lar twitching, convulsions, and partial
paralysis. Dosages of GB less than the
median incapacitating dosage cause gen-
eral lowering of efficiency, slower reac-
tions, mental confusion, irritability,
severe headache, lack of coordination,
and dimness of vision due to pinpointing
of the eye pupils.
(2) Percutaneous effects. Percu-
taneous effects refer to those effects
produced by the absorption of the agent
through the skin. GB vapor absorbed
through the skin can produce incapaci-
tating effects. Sufficient GB liquid ab-
sorbed through the skin can produce
incapacitation or death. The effectiveness
of the liquid or vapor depends on the
amount absorbed by the body. Absorption
varies with the original amount of agent
contamination, the skin area exposed and
the exposure time, the amount and kind
of clothing worn, and the rapidity in
removing the contamination and /or con-
taminated clothing and in decontaminating
affected areas of the skin.
(3) Maj or considerations in the
employment of nerve agent GB. The em-
ployment of GB is based primarily on
achieving casualties by inhalation of the
nonpersistent vapor (or aerosol) of the
agent. Major considerations in the em-
ployment of this agent are:
(a) Time to incapacitate. The
onset of incapacitation resulting from
inhalation of casualty-producing doses
is rapid, the average time being approx-
imately 3 minutes. To allow for the
time required for the agent cloud to
reach the individual, 10 minutes is used
as the mean time to achieve incapacita-
tion. Nonlethal casualties from GB will
be incapacitated for 1 to 5 days.
(b) Persistency. Persistency is
defined as the length of time an agent
remains effective in the target area after
dissemination. Nerve agent GB is con-
sidered nonpersistent. GB clouds capable
of producing significant casualties will
dissipate within minutes after dissemina-
tion. Some liquid GB will remain in
chemical shell or bomb craters for peri-
ods of time varying from hours to days,
depending on the weather conditions and
type of munition. Because of this con-
tinuing but not readily discernible threat,
GB can also be highly effective in har-
assing roles by causing exposure to low
concentrations of the vapor. Rounds fired
sporadically may compel the enemy to
wear protective masks and clothing for
prolonged periods, thereby impairing his
effectiveness as a result of fatigue, heat
stress, discomfort, and decrease in per-
ception.
-7-
(c) Level of protection. The
weapon system requirements for positive
neutralization of masked personnel by
GB are too great to be supported except
for important point or small area tar-
gets. A major factor affecting casualties
resulting from GB attacks of personnel
equipped with masks but unmasked at the
time of attack is the time required for
enemy troops to mask after first de-
tecting a chemical attack. Therefore,
surprise dosage attack is used to estab-
lish a dosage sufficient to produce the
desired casualties before troops can
mask. Casualty levels for surprise dos-
age attack that are tabulated in the weap-
on system effects tables (app A) are
based on an assumed enemy masking
time of 30 seconds. (Refer to FM 3-10
series manuals for operational data for
masking times less than 30 seconds.) A
total dosage attack is used to build up
the dosage over an extended period of
time and is normally employed against
troops who have no protective masks
available. Dosages built up before troops
can mask inside foxholes, bunkers, tanks,
buildings, and similar structures will
generally be less than dosages attained
during the same period of time in the
open, thereby reducing the effects on
occupants from surprise dosage attacks.
Total dosage effects are essentially the
same inside or outside.
c. Nerve Agent VX. VX is a slow-
acting, lethal, persistent agent that pro-
duces casualties primarily by absorption
of droplets through the skin.
(1) Effects. VX acts on the nerve
systems of man; interferes with breath-
ing; and causes convulsions, paralysis,
and death.
(2) Maj o r considerations in the
employment of nerve agent VX.
(a) General. Agent VX dissemi-
nated in droplet (liquid) form provides
maximum duration of effectiveness as a
lethal casualty threat. VX will remain
effective in the target area for several
days to a week depending on weather
conditions. Because of its low volatility,
there is no significant vapor hazard
downwind of a contaminated area. Except
when disseminated by aircraft spray
tanks, meteorological conditions have
little effect on the employment of VX,
although strong winds may influence the
distribution of the agent and heavy rain-
fall may wash it away or dissipate it.
(b) Employment to cause cas-
ualties. Agent VX is appropriate for
direct attack of area targets containing
masked personnel in the open or in
foxholes without overhead protection, for
causing severe harassment by the con-
tinuing casualty threat of agent droplets
on the ground or on equipment, and for
creating obstacles to traversing or occu-
pying areas. Casualties produced by
agent VX are delayed, occurring at times
greater than 1 hour after exposure. Al-
though this agent can be used relatively
close to friendly forces, it should not
be used on positions that are likely to
be occupied by friendly forces within a
few days. Because of this continuing
hazard, areas in which agent VX has
been used should be recorded in a
manner similar to minefields or fallout
areas so that necessary precautions can
be taken.
d. Blister Agent HP. HD, sometimes
referred to as mustard, is a persistent
slow-acting agent that produces casual-
ties through both its vapor and liquid
effects.
(1) Vapor effects.
(a) The initial disabling effect
of HD vapor on unmasked troops will
be injuries to the eyes. Temporary blind-
ness can be caused by vapor dosages
that are insufficient to produce respira-
tory damage or skin burns. However,
skin burns account for most injuries to
masked troops. The vapor dosages and
the time required to produce casualties
(4 to 24 hours) vary with the atmospheric
conditions of temperature and humidity
and with the amount of moisture on the
skin. Depending on their severity, skin
burns can limit or entirely prevent
movement of the limbs or of the entire
body.
•8-
INVERSION
NEUTRAL
LAPSE
J)
WARMER AIR
(Stable)
COOLER AIR
NO CHANGE
(Moderately stable)
NO CHANGE
Increase in temperature with increase
in altitude. Stable atmospheric conditions
near the ground.
Very little or no change in tempera-
ture with increase in altitude. Moderate-
ly stable atmospheric conditions near
the ground.
\\l//
COOLER AIR
f t (Unstable)
^ JJf
WARMER AIR^ ^ j&Z
Decrease in temperature with
altitude. Unstable atmospheric condi
tions near the ground.
Figure 2. Temperature gradients.
Surprise dosage GB attacks are influ-
enced only slightly by the temperature
gradient except when made with the spray
tank. Downwind vapor hazards to both
enemy and friendly forces will be most
significant during inversion and neutral
conditions. Employment of VX is not
affected by the temperature gradient.
Temperature
gradients
Time
1. Inversion
From sunset to sunrise.
2. Neutral
2 hours before sunset to sunset, sunrise
to 2 hours after sunrise, or any time
windspeed is 15 kmph or greater*
3. Lapse
2 hours after sunrise to 2 hours before
sunset.
Figure 3. Estimated times that temperature gradients will
prevail. (Use when meteorological data are not
available.)
(3) When actual or predicted mete-
orological conditions are not available
for a target analysis, 70* F is used for
temperature, 9 kmph is used as wind-
speed, and the temperature gradient is
approximated from figure 3.
d. Windspeed and Direction.
(1) Air moving over the earth !s
surface sets up eddies, or mechanical
turbulences, that act to dissipate a chem-
ical cloud. A condition of calm will
limit the merging of the individual gas
clouds. Both of these conditions may
reduce the effectiveness of a chemical
agent attack. High winds increase the
rate of evaporation of HD and dissipate
chemical clouds more rapidly than low
winds. Moderate winds are desirable for
chemical employment. Large -area non-
persistent chemical attacks are most
effective in winds not exceeding 28 kmph.
Small-area nonpersistent chemical
attacks with rockets or shell are most
effective in winds not exceeding 9 kmph.
However, if the concentration of chemical
agent can be established quickly, the
effects of high windspeed can be partially
offset.
-12-
CHAPTER 4
EMPLOYMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
1. General
a. Antipersonnel biological agents are
micro-organisms that produce disease in
man. These agents can be used to in-
capacitate or kill enemy troops through
disease. They may cause large numbers
of casualties over vast areas and could
require the enemy to use many personnel
and great quantities of supplies and
equipment to treat and handle the casual-
ties. Many square kilometers can be
effectively covered from a single air-
craft or missile. The search capability
of biological agent clouds and the rela-
tively small dose required to cause in-
fection among troops give biological
munitions the capability of covering large
areas where targets are not precisely
located.
b^. A biological attack can occur with-
out warning since biological agents can
be disseminated by relatively unobtrusive
weapon systems functioning at a con-
siderable distance from the target area
and relying upon air movement to carry
the agent to the target.
c. Biological agents do not produce
effects immediately. An incubation period
is required from the time the agent
enters the body until it produces disease.
Some agents produce the desired casualty
levels within a few days, whereas others
may require more time to produce useful
casualty levels. A variety of effects may
be produced, varying from incapacitation
with few deaths to a high percentage of
deaths, depending on the type of agent.
2. Methods of Dissemination
a. The basic method of disseminating
antipersonnel biological agents is the
generation of aerosols by explosive
bomblets and spray devices. Because
exposure to sunlight increases the rate
at which most biological agent aerosols
die and thereby reduces their area cov-
erage, night is the preferable time for
most biological attacks. However, if
troop safety is a problem, an attack may
be made near sunrise to reduce the
distance downwind that a hazard to
friendly forces will extend. Conversely,
to extend the downwind cloud travel and
the area coverage from spray attack, a
biological agent may be employed soon
after sundown.
b. Missile -delivered Biological
Munitions. Missile-delivered biological
munitions are used for attack of large -
area targets. A typical biological missile
system consists of the following com-
ponents:
(1) A missile vehicle and its
launching equipment.
(2) A warhead that can be opened
at a predetermined height to release
biological bomblets over the target area.
The warhead is shipped separately for
assembly to a missile at the launching
site.
(3) A warhead shipping container
equipped with a heating-cooling element
and a temperature control unit.
(4) Biological bomblets consisting
of an agent container and a central
burster that functions on impact. The
bomblets have vanes that cause them to
rotate in flight, thereby achieving lateral
dispersion during their free fall and
resulting in random distribution as a
circular pattern.
c . Aircraft Spray Tank. Biological
agents released from an aircraft spray
tank cover a large area downwind of the
line of release. A typical spray tank
consists of the following components:
(1) An agent reservoir section that
is shipped separately in an insulated
shipping and storage container equipped
with a heating-cooling element and a
temperature control unit.
(2) A discharge nozzle assembly
that can be mechanically adjusted to
vary the agent flow rate.
9PL8-2790-RETKUOJ
-27-
Table 1. Chemical Weapons Data
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Delivery
system
Range
(meters)
Agent
Munition
No of
weapons
per
delivery
unit
Weapon
rate of
fire
RT max (meters)1 2
Reference
(table)
Fire
unit
Total
dosage
Surprise
dosage
Casualty
threat
Casualty
threat
Min
Max
10%
30%
10%
30%
4. 2- in mortar
180
4,500
HD
Cartridge,
M2A1
4/Plat
50 rd/3 min
105 rd/ 15 min
18
19
105-mm howitzer
11,100
GB
Cartridge,
M360
6/btry
5 rd/30 sec
30 rd/3 min
66 rd/15 min
1 btry3
200
100
100
50
2
3
lbn3
300
300
200
100
HD
Cartridge,
M60
18
19
155-mm howitzer
14,600
GB
Projectile,
M121
6/btry
2 rd/30 sec
12 rd/3 min
24 rd/15 min
1 btry3
300
200
100
0
4
5
lbn3
500
400
300
100
HD
Projectile,
MHO
18
19
VX4
Projectile,
M121
1 btry3
400
200
NA
NA
13
lbn3
500
400
8-in howitzer
16,800
GB
VX4
Projectile,
M426
4/btry
1 rd/30 sec
4 rd/3 min
10 rd/15 min
1 btry3
300
200
200
0
6
7
lbn3
500
400
300
100
1 btry3
400
200
NA
NA
14
lbn3
500
400
115-mm multiple
rocket
launcher, M91
2,740
10,600
GB4
Rocket, M55
(THE BOLT)
45 rkt/lchr/15 sec
llchr
1,000
750
500
200
8
3 Ichr
1,000
1,000
750
400
6 Ichr
1,000
1,000
1,000
750
9 Ichr
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
VX4
llchr
300
0
NA
NA
15
3 Ichr
750
300
6 Ichr
1,000
400
9 Ichr
1,000
750
762-mm rocket,
Honest John
8,500
38,000
GB4
Warhead,
M190 (M139
bomblets)
2/btry
2 rkt/lchr/hr
llchr
600
600
600
400
9
2 Ichr
600
600
600
400
Sergeant
missile
46,000
139,000
GB4
Warhead,
M212(M139
bomblets)
2/bn
2 msl/lchr/hr
1 msl
600
400
600
200
10
2 msl
600
600
600
400
Aircraft
Dependent on
type aircraft
GB4
Bomb, MC-1,
750- lb
Dependent on
type aircraft
1 bomb
50
11
6 bombs
300
200
300
50
12 bombs
500
300
400
200
24 bombs
500
300
500
300
GB4
Spray tank,
100-gal
1 spray
tank
RT max =750 meters
(one-half effective spray
release line length)
12
2 spray
tanks
VX4
1 spray
tank
RT max=500 meters
(one-half effective spray
release line length)
16
BZ4
Bomb, 150- lb
17
Bomb, 700-lb
RT max is largest target radius for which indicated casualty threat is tabulated for appropriate fire unit. Division of
target into subtargets NOT considered.
All windspeeds, temperature gradients, and protection categories considered.
3
RT max computed for maximum number of volleys for which data are tabulated.
4Weapon system capabilities derived from tables composed of hypothetical data for INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY at
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. For actual data, refer to FM 3-10.
the
-39-
105-MM HOW/GB
BTRY FIRE
Table 2. Estimated Fractional Casualty Threat From 105-mm Howitzer,
GB Projectile, Battery Fire
1 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7| 8
9
10
11 12
13
14
15
Target
radius-
radius
of effect
(meters)
Range
to
target
(km)
No of
volleys
Windspeed3
4 kmph
9 kmph
28 kmph
Surprise4
Total dose5
Surprise4
Total dose5
Surprise4
Total dose5
1
N
L
1
N
L
1
N
L
50
<7.5
1
.10
.25
.20
.15
.10
.15
.10
.10
2
.20
.45
.40
.30
.15
.30
.25
.20
.10
.05
.05
3
.30
.60
.60
.35
.30
.50
.45
.30
.10
.20
.15
.10
4
.30
.75
.70
.45
.30
.55
.45
.35
.10
.25
.20
.10
5
.35
.90
.85
.55
.35
.60
.50
.40
.15
.30
.25
.15
>7.5
1
.05
.15
.15
.10
.05
.10
.05
.05
2
.15
.30
.25
.15
.10
.20
.15
.10
.05
.05
3
.15
.30
.30
.25
.10
.20
.20
.15
.10
.05
.05
4
.20
.40
.35
.25
.15
.30
.30
.15
.05
.15
.15
.05
5
.25
.45
.45
.30
.25
.40
.35
.25
.10
.20
.20
.10
100
<7.5
1
.05
.15
.15
.10
.05
.10
.05
.05
2
.10
.30
.30
.15
.10
1.20
.15
.10
3
.15
.40
.35
.20
.15
.25
.25
.15
.05
.10
.05
4
.15
.40
.35
.30
.15
.30
.30
.15
.05
.10
.10
.05
5
.20
.45
.40
.35
.20
.35
.35
.20
.10
.15
.15
.10
>7.5
1
.05
.10
.10
.05
.05
.05
2
.10
.20
.20
.10
.05
.15
.10
.05
3
.10
.25
.25
.15
.10
.15
.15
.10
.05
.05
4
.10
.30
.25
.20
.10
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
5
.15
_35
.30
.25
.15
.30
.25
.15
.05
.15
.10
.05
200
Any
1
.05
.05
2
.10
.10
.05
.05
.05
3
.05
.15
.15
.05
.10
.05
4
.05
.15
.15
.10
.10
.10
5
.05
.20
.20
.10
.05
.15
.10
.05
Blank spaces indicate fractional casualties are below 0.05.
If the target is predominately wooded, use a windspeed of 4 kmph and neutral temperature
gradient for total dose attack; use a windspeed of 4 kmph for surprise attack.
3
For wind speeds other than those shown, use data given for the nearest windspeed.
4 .
Multiply the figures given in the table by the appropriate factor to obtain the fractional
casualties from surprise dose attack:
Troops in open foxholes: 0.7
Troops in covered foxholes or bunkers: 0.6
l = inversion, N = neutral, L = lapse.
-40-