THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Effects

of The Atomic Bomb

on Hiroshima, Japan

Volume I

Physical Damage Division May 1947

G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE

1 . Conditions Prior to Attack

The city of Hiroshima was an excellent target for the atomic bomb from a fire standpoint : There had been no rain for three weeks; the city was highly combustible, consisting principally of Japa- nese domestic-type structures: it was constructed over flat terrain; and 13 square miles (including streets) of the 26.5-squarc-milc city was more than 5 percent built up (i. e., covered by plan ansa of buildings). The remainder of the city comprised water areas, parks and areas built up below 6 percent. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- square-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly dense, 03.0 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built up.

a. Fire Department. Public fire equipment had been little improved in anticipation of wartime fires. Private fire equipment had been aug- mented somewhat but instruction to home occu- pants in its use had been limited to training in combating incendiary bombs.

13

EAST ELEVATION

NORTH ELEVATION

*.«■ i 4.* i te.tr , ss

*r.cr

jatft".

, tf-8* .

*— 4 6 1— =1 rfc-r^TOrr*-

5^

A±S>1

_..._ *.t

FIRST • FLOOR PLAN

US STRATEGIC BOMBW6 SURVEY

TWO-STORY JAPANESE

RESIDENCE FIGURE 6

a. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by heat directly radiated by the atomic bomb and by other ignition sources developed the following: (1) The primary lire haz- ard was present in combustible materials and iti fire-resistive buildings with unshielded wall open- ings; (2) six persons who had been in rcinforced- concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by radiant heat; (3) a few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immedi- ately after the explosion; (4) dark clothing was scorched, and, in some cases, reported to have burst into flame from flash heat; (5) but a large proportion of over 1 ,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen char- coal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits.

ft. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within ten minutes after the explosion. Of the total number of buildingB investigated 107 caught fire, and, in 69 instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of the buildings or their contents was established as follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposing buildings.

14

0. Damage to /tolling Stock. Of the 123 trolley can operated by the company, 20 percent were damaged by fire and 45 percent by blast. Of the 86 motor busses, fire damaged 21 percent and blast 26 percent. Radiant heat from the bomb ignited cam and busses within 1, 500 feet of GZ. Total damage to cars extended a maximum of 5,700 feet from GZ, heavy damage to 8,400 feet and alight damage to 12,500 feet. Musses wen* totally damaged at 4,000 feet and heavily damaged 5,600 feet from GZ.

d. Damage to Orerhead Sy*teut. Blast and fire damaged 11.4 miles of the overhead transmission system including damage to 500 wood and 100 steel poles. No damage occurred to concrete poles, the nearest of which were 6.000 feet from GZ. Wood poles wen* damaged at a maximum distance of 4,500 feet from GZ, and steel poles at 3,600 feet. Overhead transmission cable was downed by blast at 8,000 feet.

21

3. Conditions on Morning of Attack

a. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with a small amount of clouds at high altitude*. Wind was from the south with a velocity of ahout 4\* miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles.

6. Ail air-raid "alert" was sounded throughout Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours. Reports of the number of planes causing this alert were con- flicting. The governor of the prefecture stated that four B-29s were sighted, while the Kure Naval District reported three large planes.

c. The aircraft apparently came out over Hiroshima from the direction of Bungo Suido and Kunisaki Peninsula, circled the city, and withdrew in the direction of Harima-Nada at 0725 hour*. "All-clear" was sounded at 0731 hours.

d. The following circumstances account in part for the high number of casualties resulting from the, atomic bomb:

(1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid shelters after the "all-clear" sounded.

(2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the approach of the planes involved in the atomic- bomb attack.

(3) The explosion occurred during the morning rush hours when people had just arrived at work or were hurrying to their places of business. This concentrated the population in the center of the city where the principal business district was located.

(4) Many persons residing outside the city were present for reasons of business, travel and pleasure*.

(5) National volunteer and school units were mobilized and engaged in evacuation operations.

84

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Effects of

The Atomic Bomb

on

Hiroshima, Japan

Volume II

Physical Damage Division

Dates of Survey:

14 October-26 November 1945

Date of Publication

May 1947

A. OHKT OF STUDY

The object of this fire stu4y was to determine the exten t of fire i n Hiwishfma resulting from the exptosion of the atomic bomb on 6 August 1946, end to analyxe the contributing factors.

B. SUMMARY

This section presents a picture of factors pertain- ing to fire in Hiroshima before, during and after the atomic-bomb attack. Part C describes fire con- ditions prior to the attack and analyses the effec- tiveness of precautionary fire measures; Part D relates the story of the fire; Part E presents a detailed analysis of fire in selected fire-resistive, noncombustible, and combustible buildings, and their contents; Part P discusses the cause and extent of fire in bridges; and Part G present con- clusions and recommendations.

1. The city of Hiroshima, like other Japanese cities, was poorly prepared to combat a conflagra- tion of large-scale proportions. Private fire equip- ment had been augmented and home occupants had been given limited instructions and training in combatting incendiary bombs. Public fire equip- ment had been little improved to fight wartime fires.

2. The public water system was fairly adequate for normal fire conditions, although pressure was very low on dead-end mains at the south end of the city. No improvements had been made for war- time emergencies.

3. The Ota River and its six branches divided the city into nine distinct areas. The river courses and 41,000 feet of firebreak lanes which had been prepared by removing combustible buildings on one or both sides of fairly wide streets formed an extensive network of firebreaks.

4. The city, consisting principally of Japanese do- mestic structures, was highly combustible and densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13- square-mile city area was 27 to 42 percent built up and the 4-square-mile city center was particularly dense, 94 percent of it being 27 to 42 percent built up. All the large industrial plants were loca ted on the south and southeast edges of the city.

5. Precautionary fire measures were ineffective largely because widespread damage was caused by blast, the populace suffered severe casualties, innumerable fires were started throughout the city on both sides of natural and man-made firebreaks,

and the public fire department sustained almost a

6. One major break occurred in a 16-inch water main when Bridge 29 which carried it was col- lapsed by blast This and a large number of breaks in small pipes above ground in cottapaed buildings reduced water pressure in the system, but the reservoir never ran dry and lack of water was not a factor in the extent of the fire.

7. The temperature resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb was of great intensity but of extremely short duration. At ground zero, 2,000 feet from the center of heat, the temperature probably exceeded 3,500° C. for a fraction of a second. Only directly exposed surfaces were flash burned.

8. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible structures and materials by directly radiated heat from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources was obtained by interrogation and visual inspec- tion of the entire city. Six persons who had been in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton black-out curtains were ignited by flash heat. A few persons stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs, thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were afire immediately after the explosion. Dark clothing was scorched and, in some cases, was reported to have burst into flame from flash heat. A large proportion of over 1,000 persons ques- tioned was, however, in agreement that a great majority of the original fires were started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires. Other sources of secondary fire were industrial-process fires and electric short circuits.

9. There had been practically no rain in the city for about 3 weeks. The velocity of the wind on the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not more than 5 miles per hour. A fire storm, includ- ing both wind and rain, began to develop soon after the start of the initial fires. The fire wind, which blew always toward the burning area, reached a maximum velocity of 30 to 40 miles per hour 2 to 3 hours after the explosion, and inter- mittently light and heavy rain fell over the1 north and west portions of the city.

10. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the center of the city within 10 minutes after the explosion.

■I f| ?! spilt1"

5s 8= 9? ±! |

H CO

o

H

8

'<

D. THE CONFLAGRATION

1. Start of Fir*

a. Source of Evidence. Because of the practi- cally total combustion which prevailed in the burned-over area of 4.4 square miles in the heart of the city, most of the evidence relative to igni- tion by radiant heat from the bomb and secondary sources of heat was necessarily obtained by inter- rogation which, wherever possible, was checked by field inspection. Also, since the heaviest casual- ties occurred closer in, a majority of the persons questioned were 3,000 feet or more from ground zero (GZ) at the time of the explosion. Most people who had been within 2,000 feet of GZ (2,800 feet from air zero) were utterly confused as to what had happened immediately after the detonation and for some time thereafter, although several were located who could give reasonably coherent stories. Because the distance of a point on the ground from air zero (AZ) was important from an ignition standpoint and the distance from GZ was' important from a fire spread standpoint, the relationship between the two has been shown on Figure 2.

b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. (1) Six persons were found who bad been in rein forced- concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of AZ at the time of the explosion and who stated that black cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few sec- onds later. In two cases it was stated that thin rice paper on desks close to open windows facing AZ also burst into flame immediately, although heavier paper did not ignite. No incidents were recounted to the effect that furniture or similar objects within buildings were ignited directly by radiated heat from the bomb.

(2) Straw-thatched roofs were illegal within the city limits, but a number were erected outside. A few persons stated that they had seen 'this type of roof burst into flame directly from heat radiated by the bomb but the stories were inconsistent ex- cept in two instances where the persons could point to specific building sites. Both of these locations were almost due north of AZ, the first approximately 12,700 feet and the second approxi- mately 13,900 feet. Despite the strong eyewitness accounts of the persons interrogated, there is con- siderable doubt in the minds of the investigators that these buldings were ignited directly by radi- ated heat from the bomb. This doubt is predi- cated chiefly upon three considerations, namely: (I) Buildings, including many with straw-thatched

roofs 3,200 feet nearer AZ (1 0,700 feet) , suffered no fire damage; (2) fanners working in an open field only 800 feet beyond (14,700 feet) suffered no burns of any kind although they felt a wave of warm air pass over them almost simultaneously with the sound of the explosion; and (3) the roofs of these buildings collapsed as a result of the blast and may have been ignited by charcoal braziers.

(3) One dwelling which had a cedarbark-shingle covering that was reported ignited by the flash heat from the bomb was found approximately 6,700 feet northeast from AZ and slightly over 200 feet beyond the fringe of the burned-over area. This house was of the frame and stucco type com- mon to the area and was one of several forming a small group within an enclosure formed by an 8- foot masonry and wood wall. All houses within the enclosure had tile-covered roofs, but one of the group also had a small section covered with highly inflammable cedarbark shingles which showed fire damage, although the fire had been extinguished before the entire roof was consumed (Photos 28 and 29). The owners of the property, including a son who was a university graduate, insisted that the roof covering burst into flame immediately with the bomb explosion. Their story could not be shaken. - The chief of the fire department stated that he had heard of two or three cases where the cedarbark-covered roofs, also not permitted within the city limits, had been ignited directly by the bomb, and thought the reports credible. A number of buildings with unburncd cedarbark roof shingles were found at a rayon plant approximately 11,000 feet southwest from AZ.

(4) About 600 feet east of the dwelling described above and about 365 feet from the nearest burned building, a wood pole which had apparently car- ried electric wires, probably 220 volts AC, was found with 3 to 4 feet of its top burned off and rather heavy flash bums on the side facing AZ (Photo 30). Several residents of the area stated that this pole had been seen burning about 5 or 10 minutes after the bomb explosion. It is entirely possible that ignition of this pole was caused directly by heat radiation from the bomb^AThe pole was capped with a light steel plate of dark color and it may be that the steel absorbed suf- ficient heat and retained it long enough to ignite dry rot which probably was present under the metal cap. An attempt to determine from utility company records whether or not the pole had been burned previously was unsuccessful. Many wood

21

poles within the fire perimeter were burned, but it ui impassible to state with certainty whether the source of ignition was direct heat from the bomb or heat and flying embers from nearby buildings. Other evidence, however, leads to the conclusion that exposed wood was seldom ignited by radiated heat from the bomb.

(5) A cemetery about 2,500 feet from AZ was found cluttered with pieces of very light wood (excellent kindling) which showed no evidence of flash or other bums (Photo 31). It is believed that this debris must have been blown by the blast from the interior or other unexposed portions of structures and this accounts for the lack of flash-burn marks. It is interesting that none of this material was ignited by flying embers, as it was very close to the center of the burned-over area of the city. Photos 32 and 33 also show un burned combustible buildings at 3,800 and 5,000 feet from AZ.

(6) One of the graves in the cemetery was en- closed with a wood fence. The fence was com- posed of four corner poles extending about 30 inches above the ground and supporting two horizontal pieces, about 12 inches apart. Bamboo pickets (about IX by %«-inch) were lashed to the fence with vegetable-fibre rope. The corner poles showed deep charring which later proved to have been done according to Japanese custom when they were erected. The horizontal pieces apparently were not charred, but when the lashing for the pickets was removed very definite evidence of flash-burn showed. The bamboo pickets showed light flash-burn marks. The rope lashing for the pickets showed no evidence of having been on fire, but was singed.

(7) At the Red Cross Hospital, 5,300 feet south from AZ, three chairs with backs and seats up- holstered with a pile fabric (apparently mohair) were near a window which was exposed to AZ. The backs of the chairs showed moderate to deep singeing except for the lower part which had been shielded by the concrete wall and showed no dis- coloration. Parts of the seats of the chairs showed light flash-burns where the seats had not been shielded by the chair backs. No part of the up- holstery was burned through (Photo 34). Next to the chairs was a varnished wood door which showed definite evidence of flash- burn except for a very small spot adjacent to the door knob which shielded it. The door did not catch fire (Photo 35) . A cotton jacket worn by one of the nurses was charred across one breast. The outer material of

the jacket was burned away in part, but the padded cotton lining directly underneath was not burned through (Photo 35). The nurse who had worn the jacket was severely injured by the blast and was not available for questioning. It was stated that her body was not burned through the coat. Testimony at the hospital indicated that several coats had burned similarly, but the others could not be produced for examination. Further- more, nobody at the hospital was certain that these coats had actually burst into flame, and, in fact, the concensus was that they had only smoldered. There was no other evidence of fire in the hospital.

(8) Scores of persons throughout all sections of the city were questioned concerning the ignition of clothing by the flash from the bomb. Replies were consistent that white silk seldom was af- fected, although black, and some other colored silk, charred and disintegrated. Numerous in- stances were reported in which designs in black or other dark colors on a white silk kimono were charred so that they fell out, but the white part was not affected. These statements were con- firmed by United States medical officers who had been able to examine a number of kimonos avail- able in a hospital. Ten school boys were located during the study who had been in school yards about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, re- spectively, from AZ. These boys had flash burns on the portions of their faces which had been directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys' stories were consistent to the effect that their clothing, apparently of cotton materials, "smoked," but did not burst into flame. Photo 36 shows a boy's coat that started to smolder from heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ.

(9) Three automobile trucks, powered with internal combustion motors using fuel generated by burning charcoal (no gasoline or similar volatiles used), which were parked in a clearing about 7,800 feet north from AZ were said to have been ignited immediately after the bomb ex- plosion. Fire damage to the vehicles was total. Conversely, however, a sedan showing no fire damage1 was examined where it had been aban- doned as a result of severe blast damage on a wide street about 5,800 feet southeast from AZ.

(10) A private garden covering an area of slightly over 5 acres and located about 5.000 feet northeast from AZ showed no evidence of having been on fire, although there was some flash-burn damage on the edge of the area facing AZ.

24

PHOTO 3ft IX. S*tmw« partly Inirnvri cvat «»f •-> alio «ra» in of*rti near CUy Hall (BitUfttiw 38) 3.800 feci

fiom AZ.

3800 feet from air zero; -27~ 3300 feet from ground zero

PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD

IN VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF BUILT- UPNESS

O

s.

I

1

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

					— * s / / /
					/ /
	Ind Bu	ustriol Idings^	■®			•
				Dome Buildii	Stic igs	.

/	S /
/ / / 1
t 1 1

10

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

Probability of Fire Spreod- Percent

U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

FIRE SPREAD VS. BU1LT-UPNESS

HIROSHIMA, JAPAN FIGURE 4 -IT

42

130

120

110

100

90

S 80 l TO

o

60

50

40

90

to

10

PROBABILITY OF FIRE SPREAD

ACROSS

VARIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES

10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80

Probability of Fire Spread- Percent

90 100

U. S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

FIRE SPREAD VS. EXPOSURE OSTANCES HIROSHWA, JAPAN FIGURE 5 *JX

*:'.

Table 5- — Fire-resistive building data (fire)

4H 411 5H 50 5H 5H 5H 511 511 5H 511 5H 5H 5H 511 5H 5U 5H AH OH 611 fill fill 6H 6H 611 6H «H 6H 5H 51 5H 5H 511 5H 5H 6H 511 51 51 51 51 51

<

I

3,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2100 2,100 2,100 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,400 2.400 3,000 3,100 3.800 5,300 5,100 6,200 5.000 4,700 5,000 5,200 5,300 5,600 2,900 3,200 3,200 2,600 2,800 2,700 2,700 3,100 3.300 3,600 3,600 3.700 4.500 4,000

700 800 600 600 600 600 600 700 700 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,300 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 2,300 2400 3,300 4,900 4,700 4,800 4,600 4,200 4,600 4,800 4,900 5,300 2,100 2.500 2,500 1,700 2000 1,800 1,800 2300 2600 3,000 3,000 3,200 4,100 3,400

51	4,100	3,000
31	5,300	4,900
31	5.300	4,950
3H	5.000	4,600
3H	6,300	6,000
SO	6,200	5,900
30	6,100	5,800
4G	3,800	3,300
50	2,800	2,000
fiO	2,500	1,800
4G	2,300	1,200
5Q	2,000	400
SO	2,100	800
SO	2,600	1,700
71	7,700	7,400
5J	6,700	6,400
30	6,000	5,600
60	5,700	5.400
5J	6,200	5,900
4J	6,300	6.000
5J	6,800	6,500

Occupancy

Fire shutters on wall open- ings

Office

do..

do

Bank

do...

Office

do...

do

Bank

do

Office

Bank

Office

do

Bank

Art museum

Office

Library

Office

Hospital

Classrooms

Library

Classrooms-laboratories.

Classrooms.

Laboratory

Kitchen

Laboratory

Office

. ...do

...do ,

Department store

Classrooms

Telephone exchange

Department store

Bank

Beer hall

Hospital

Office

Newspaper plant

Bank

Office

No... No- Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. Yes.. No ... No... Part.. Yes.. Part.. Yes.. Part.. No... Yes.. Part.. Part.. Part.. No... No... No .... Yes.. No...

No

No.... No.... No... Part.. No....

No.. No_. Part Yes. Yes. No.. No.. Part. No .. Part. Part

Radio station ! No...

No.. No.. No.. Yes- No... Yes.. Yes- Yes.. No... Yes.. No... No... No... Yes.. No... Yes.. No... Yes- No...

Residence

Hospital

Office

Monitions storage

Electrical laboratory. . .

Warehouse

do

Telephone exchange

Classrooms

Warehouse

Classrooms ...

Clothing store

Office

Warehouse

Cigarette manufacture. .

Bank

do...

Warehouse

Mercantile

Office Yes

Bank.

Unprotected

wall openings

exposed to

AZ at zero

hour

Part Yea

Yes

Probably no .

Yes

Yes...

Yes

Probably no.

Yes

Yes...

Yes

No

Yes

Yes-

Yes

Yes...

Yes

Yes..

No

Yes

Probably no.. Probably bo..

No

Yes

Probably no..

Yes

Probably no...

Yes

No

Yes

Probable

cause of

initial

ignition

0

20

10

6

10

30

10

20

10

15

10

25

10

25

50

75

26

5

30

12

0

6

90

20

10

50

20

35

5

0

20

6

90

40 30 15

0

30

125

30

0

6 125 126

0 30 10

0

5 60

5 12

0

0 60 100

Fire spread.

do

do.

do

Fire spread. Primary...

Primary.

Fire spread...

Primary.

Secondary.

Fire spread

{Primary. Fire spread...

Primary..

Fire spread....

Primary ....

Fire spread.

No fire

Fire spread.

do

Secondary..

No fire

Fire spread-

Fire spread .

No fire

Fire spread.

No Are

Fire spread.

—do

.—do

No fire

Fire spread...

No fire

Fire spread ...

....do

Secondary

Fire spread. ...

....do

—do

Primary

....do

B-2

B-3

2

3

B-3

2

3

B-3

B-5

B-4

3

2

4

B-7

B-3

2

B-5

4

B-4

B-3

2

3

1

2

B-4

B-3

4

B-7

B-3

3

B-3

2

7

3

B-3

2

B-2

4

1

B-2

1

3

2

B-3

2

1

2

B-2

B-l

4

3

B-2

Stories burned (after blast damage)

1-2

60% B, 100% 1-3- - 70% B, 100% 1-3. ..

1-2

1-3

1-2...

1-3

B-3

B-5

75% 1-2, 100% 3-4.

1-3

1-2—

1-4

1-7

5% 2, 100% 3

1-2

40% B, 100% 1-5...

1-4

80% B-l, 100% 2-4.

None

1-2

1-3

1

None

1-2..

None..

B-3

1-4

B-7

75% B, 100% 1-3 ...

1-3

1-2

1-7

1-3.

15% B, 100% 1-3 . .

None..

1-2

Second only

50% 1-3, 90% 4

None

70% B-l, 100% 2...

1

1-2.

26% second only ... .

None

1-2

B-3

1-3

1-2

None

None..

B-l

1-4

80% 1,100% 2-3

Areas in thousands square feet

4.2 27.3 16.6 5.7 9.0 4.9 2.5 9.8 15.8 46.4 29.9 4.5 7.3 20.4 43.3 32.8 5.4 62.0 13.4 93.4 88.6 2.8 3.7 103.3 39.5 2.0 3.0 3.8 62.6 10.4 32.0 78.9 26.4 36.1 4.3 8.0 15.3 2.9 14.7 24.5 26.7 16.2 8.3

2.2 15.9 83.4

1.7 13.2 15.9 14.4 14.2 11.5

2.9 49.5 12.4

3.0

4.3 54.6

5.1 16.2 15.0

3.0

4.8 None I 9.0

a 1

3.5

24.3

15.3

5.7

9.0

4.2

2.5

9.8

18.8

46.4

25.2

4.5

7.3

20.4

39.0

5.2

5.4

46.5

13.4

84.9

0

2.8 3.7 103.3 39.5 2.0 3.0 3.8 0

10.4

32.0

78.9

25.1

36.1

4.3

8.0

13.2

2.9

14.7

24.5

19.2

0

8.3

2.2 5.3 80.0 0

10.6 15.9 14.4 1.1 0

2.9 49.6 9.3 3.0 4.3 0 0 0

15.0 3.0 4.5 0

83

89

92

100

86

100

84

100

90

16

100

88

100

91

0

100

0

100

0

100

95

100

86

100

72

100

33

60

0

80

100

8

0

100

75

100

0

100

94

0

SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan," vol. 2 Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3

had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes.

(4) It was reported that a cotton black-out curtain at an unprotected window in the east stair tower of Building 85 (3,800 feet from AZ) smoked and was scorched by radiated heat from the bomb but it did not burst into flames. All windows other than those in the stair tower were pro- tected by* closed steel-roller shutters. There was fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the second story but this was caused by electrical short circuits when debris from windows was blown into the equipment by blast.

(5) A man who was in the third story of building 26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiated heat from the bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at unprotected windows in the west wall and thin rice paper on desks. According to his recollec- tion, all stories were afire five minutes after the attack. On the other hand, two men who were working in Building 28 (3,800 feet from AZ) stated that there was no primary fire in this building, the windows of which were not equipped with fire shutters. Black-out curtains at all windows were drawn back and no fires started in them. Accord- ing to the same men, fire spread into the building by flying brands from the south nearly two hours after the attack.

47

(10) Fire fighting with water buckets was re- ported inside only four buildings (24, 33, 59, and 122) and probably prevented extensive fire damage in them. In Building 24, fire was started in contents of a room at the southwest corner of the second story by sparks from trees on the south side about 1 H hours after the attack. Men inside the building extinguished the fire and probably prevented further damage in the first and second stories (Photo 85). A little later, contents in the third story were ignited by sparks from the outside and were totally damaged. This fire was beyond control before it was discovered, but did not spread downward through open stairs. At Build- ing 33, sparks from the west exposure, which burned in early evening, set fire to black-out curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in the fourth story of the northwest section of the building. Twenty persons were on guard in the building awaiting such an occurrence and the fires were quickly extinguished while in the incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks from the south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in the first and third stories and black-out curtains in the first story about 2 hours after the attack. These fires were extinguished by men inside ami negligible damage resulted. A few window frames in the east and west walls and 2 or 3 desks in the first story of Building 122 were ignited by radiated heat and sparks from the west and northeast exposures. These fires were extinguished quickly and damage was negligible.

58

A. SUMMARY

1 . The atomic bomb detonated at Hiroshima was an extremely effective and powerful blast weapon. Blast effect was essentially similar to that pro- duced by a large charge of high explosive except that it was on a much larger scale; thus, damage was characterized by distortion or crushing of entire buildings rather than collapse of a single truss or rupture of a single wall.

2* Usual blast phenomena such as shielding, re- flection, and diffraction were observed. The positive phase of the blast of the atomic bomb is believed to have been of comparatively longer duration that that of high explosives.

3. The primary cause of damage to buildings was blast. In many instances the fire which swept the central portion of the city increased distortion of the building frames, and consumed the combus- tible contents and interior trim and finish of most of the fire-resistive buildings located within the burned-over area. Blast damage to wood-frame buildings extended well beyond the limits of the burned-over area and it is probable that all wood- frame structures within the burned-over area suffered structural damage initially by blast.

4. The mean areas of effectiveness (MAE) of the atomic bomb for structural damage about ground zero (GZ) and the radii of the MAE's for the several classes of buildings present wore computed to be as follows:

	MAE's in square miles	Radii of MAE's in feet
Multistory, earthquake-resistant _ Multistory, steel- and reinforced- concrete frame (including both earthquake- and non-earthquake- resistant construction) _	0.03 .05 3.4 3.6 6.0 8.5 9.5 6.0	500 700
1-story, light, steel-frame	5,500
Multistory, load-bearing, brick-walk. 1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall Wood-frame industrial-commercial (dimension-timber construction) Wood-frame domestic buildings (wood-pole construction)	5,700 7,300 8,700 9,200
Residential construction	7,300

Of the values listed above, those for wood-frame and residential construction are peculiar to Japan and are not applicable to any other locality.

5. MAE's for similar, high, air-burst atomic

bombs against Occidental construction were esti- mated to be approximately:

BfmnmOn Multistory, steel- and rein forced-concrete- a 06 Very light, steel-frame one-story, low-cost

industrial and storage 3.4

Multistory, load-bearing, brick wall 3. 6

One-story, load-bearing, brick wall 6 0

MAE values against other types of Occidental construction, including moderate to heavy, steel- frame, industrial construction, could not be esti- mated because buildings of comparable construc- tion were not present in Hiroshima.

6. Fire was the principal cause of damage to contents. In multistory frame construction fire caused the major part of all contents' damage, suffering only slight to moderate initial damage from blast and debris. Contents in light, steel- frame buildings suffered moderate initial damage from blast and, subsequently, in the burned-over area, almost total damage by fire. Outside the burned-over area there was some exposure damage. Blast and debris were the major causes of damage to contents of brick buildings, additional damage resulting from fire and exposure. Throughout the burned-over area practically all contents of wood-frame buildings were destroyed by fire. Beyond the limits of the fire there was slight to moderate damage to contents from blast, debris, and exposure.

7. Except for multistory, steel- and concrete- frame buildings, contents and structural damage to buildings were generally of similar extent at corresponding distances from air zero (AZ).

8. Had the bomb detonated at a somewhat lower altitude, damage to multistory, steel- and rein- forced-concrete frame buildings which were clus- tered relatively near GZ probably would have been greater. The effect of such an explosion upon the extent of damage to other classes of buildings is uncertain, but probably would not have been great.

9. Comparison of the atomic bomb with high- explosive weapons results, at best, in very rough approximations because of the assumptions neces- sary. Based upon damage to load-bearing, brick- wall structures, an equivalent bare charge of ap- proximately 4,400 tons of TNT was estimated.

10. Because of the large area through which damage extended, particularly to load-bearing brick construction which constitutes a large pro- portion of the residential and older industrial sec- tions of occidental cities, the air-burst atomic

96

Table 1. — Building data, steel- and reinforced-concrete-frame [Areas in thousands of square feet]

O

Occupancy

i j

1

00

> i M

SB

|

n

>

1

2

1

<

s

i

I a

o

Building damage— floor area

Content damage

$

Structural damage

Superficial damage

1

i

a

1

ft*

1

m

hi

o

1

4H 4H

3H 8H 6H 6H 3H 8H 6H 8H 5H 5H 6H 6H 3H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H 6H

8H

31

8H

3H

5B

51

81

31

51

31

an so

40

5G

4G

SO

7J

3J

5H

3H

&H

5H

511

SO

50

SO

4J

3H

3G

71

n

5K 5K

Office

El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El

El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El El E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 E2 El A24 A2 4 A1.2

A1.2 A24 A1.2

1.7

8,3

5.1

5.3

2.1

4.6

10.1

8.8

1.5

5.5

4.7

5.4

10.fi

0.2

5.3

21.3

27.5

1.4

1.0

34.4

13.2

11.2

26

15.5

0.0

7.2

16.3

2.6

4.8

2.1

10.3

0.0

4.8

4.2

1.1

68

20.8

6.6

7.7

4.8

8.8

124

4.1

23.7

26

4.5

1.6

3.3

.0

1.3

1.8

1.5

22

0.0

1.7

15.0

54.6

54.0 21.1 11.6

2

2/3 3

1/3

2/3 3

5/2 4 3

1/2 4 7 3 3

2/4 4

3/4 2 2 3 3 4

3 3/4 7 3 2/3 1/3 3 7 2/3 1/3 2/3 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1/2 1 1 1

1 1 1

V-l

V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l

V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-l V-3 V-3 V-3

v-s

\-3 V-3 V-3 V-3 V^3 V-4 V-4 V-i

V-4

V-l V-4

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

R N/R

R

N

R N/C

R

R N/C

R

R R R

2100 2200 2100 2100 2>0Q 2100 2200 2200 2 200 2300 2300 2300 2400 3,000 3,100 3.800 5,300 5,100 5,200 5,000 4,700 5,600

2000 2200 3,200 2600 2800 2700 3.100 2600 3,600 3,700 4.500 4.000 4,100 5.300 5.300 6,300 6,100 3.800 2800 2300 2000 8.800 8. COO 0.000 0,200 6.700 2100 3,100 2400 2800 3,300 2500 2100 2600 6,600 5,000 6,200 7,700

7,800 8,000 0.000

4.2

27.3

16.6

0.0

4.0

0.8

45.0

20.0

4.6

7.3

20.4

43.3

328

520

12 4

03.4

88.6

28

27

103.3

30.3

626

10.4

320

78,0

26.4

36.1

4.3

15.3

14.7

24.5

26.7

16.2

8.3

22

15.0

83.4

12 2

14.4

14.2

11.0

40.5

12 4

71.1

5.1

15.8

4.1

5.4

1.0

20

3.0

4.3

14.0

1.7

15.0

54.6

54.9 21.1 11.6

1.8 1.1

5.3 10 21 1.9 27 .1 .1.7 1.6 4.6

3 5

24.3

15.3

9.0

4.2

9.8

46,4

25.2

4.5

7.3

20.4

39.0

5.2

46.5

124

84.0

0

28

27

102 3

30.5

0

10.4 320 78,0 25.1 36.1 4.3 12 2 14.7 24.5 10.2 0

23

22

5.3

50.0

10.6

14.4

1.1

0

40.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0

15.8 25 5.4 1.0 20 20 20 4.3 14.0 0

15.0 0

0 0 0

00

05

100

00

100

00

100

90

30

00

100

06

25

100

15

100

96

100

80

100

80

10

100

40

70

80

100

50

30

100

75

0

100

50

100

10

100

0

0 0 0

Fire.

2

do

Do.

« 8

do

Bank

Do. Do.

»

Office

Do.

11

do

Bank

Do.

18

Do.

10

do..

Office.

Do.

20

Do.

21

Bank

Mixed.

22

Office

21

Fire.

28

do

Bank

D->.

24

Mixed.

2«

Office

.2

Fire.

27

Library

0.8

Do.

2B

Office....

Do.

XI

Hospital

Debris.

32A

Classrooms

Fire.

S2B

Library

Classroom laboratory . Classrooms

Do.

S2D

Do.

32E

Do.

S3

Office

Blast 'de-

38

do.-

do

bris. Fire.

SB

4.4

Do.

40

Department store

Classrooms

Do.

41

Do.

48

Telephone eichange. . . Department store Beerhall ...

•

Do.

44

1.7

Do.

47

Do.

40

Office

Do.

80

Newspaper

Do.

31

Bank

Office

Do.

30

Blast.

01

Radio station

Fire.

02

Residence

Do.

64

Hospital

Mixed.

65

Office

Do.

74

Electrical laboratory . . . Warehouse

Fire.

70

0.9

23

Do.

88

Telephone exchange. . Classrooms

Mixed.

80

Debris.

08

do

Clothing store

0.5 29

3.0

Fire.

08

Do.

116A

Warehouse

116B

use

do

U6P

do

122

Bank

12

Office

10 8

0.7 4.1 21

Mixed.

1A

Electric substation

Art museum

Do.

25

as

1.0

Fire.

4<i

Jewelry store

Mixed.

48

Hospital

Fire.

03

20

Mixed.

100

Office

.1

Fire.

101

Warehouse

4.3 4.0

1.7 10

Debris.

121

Railroad station

Munitions storage

Warehouse

4.9

Fire.

67

Exposure.

76

Fire.

113C

Cigarette manufactur- ing. ...do

113D

126A

Railroad roundhouse. . do

126H

103

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE BY BLAST

TO

MULTI-STORY, STEEL" AND REINFORCED- CONCRETE -FRAME BUILDINGS

(BASED ON TOTAL FLOOR AREA) MAE FOR ALL STEEL'S REINFrCONGrFRAME BLD6S «0.05 80 Ml MAC FOR EARTHQUAKE-RESISTANT BLD88 ONLY =0 03 80 Ml

s

ALL STEEL- a RE IMF.- -0 ON Cr FRAME I LOGS

ART^QUAKE -RESISTANT 8LDGS. ON|LY

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

BUILDING DAMAGE HIROSHIMA, JAPAN FIGURE G-X

±

4000

5000

DAMAGE TO CONTENTS

-IN-

KX)-r

BLOGS.

100 80 60 40 20 0

100

22 ONE-STORYt LIGHT t STEEL-FRAME SLOGS

en

ai

lilli

20 MULTI-STOUT, LOAD-BE ARINQ, BRICK-WALL BLDGS

100 80

60

40

20

0

too

80 60 40 20

28 ONE-STORY, LOAD-BEARING , BRICK-WALL BLDGS

27 WOOD-FRAME, INDUSTRIAL - COMMERCIAL BLDGS

*

(NO BURNED BLDGS INCLUDED)

O -* — ►

8*— 8^

8 9

O O

o

m

LEGEND STRUCTURAL DAMAGE BY BLAST

DISTANCE FROM GZ-FEET

CONTENTS DAMAGE ( VALUE LOSS)

{!

IRE BLAST a DEBRIS

xposure m?m

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

CONTENTS DAMAGE HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

FIGURE IQ-X

1*24

Table 7. — Combustible building data {fire)

C

4H SH 5H 5H 6H 5H 5H 6H 7H 6H 6H 6H 5H 61 51 5H 61 61 41 41 41 41 4H 4H

2,200 2,000 2,000 2,300 2,400 3,000 2,200 4,600 6,800 5,300 6,600 4,600 2,600 3,800 3,700 3,700 4,700 3.600 4,500 4,400 4,600 4,800 3,200 3,300

4H	3,600
4H	3,000
2H	7,500
2H	7,800
3H	6,600
3G	6,700
3Q	6,200
30	4,400
40	3,800
40	3,900
60	2,400
50	2,300
TO	6,300
70	6,700
70	6,800
4F	5,300
4F	6,300
4F	6,300
30	5,400
4F	4,400
4F	4,200
5F	6,200
6J	6,200
6J	6,300
71	6,900
71	6,900
71	7,400
4J	6,000
6H	6,000
7H	8,000

900 400 100 1,300 1,400 2,200 900 4,200 5,600 4,900 5,200 4,200 1,600 3,200 3,100 3,100 4,300 3,000 4,000 3,900 4,200 4,400 2,500 2,600 2.800 2,300 7,200 7,600 6,300 6,400 5.900 3,900 3,390 3,300 1,300 1,100 6,000 6,400 6,500 4,900 4,900 4,900 5,000 3,900 3,700 5,900 5,900 6,000 6,600 6,600 7,100 6,700 5,700 7,700

Occupancy

Electric substation

Mercantile

Hospital

Office

Bank

Electric repair

Office

Soy sauce warehouse..

Gymnasium

Library

Art museum

Public baths

Public auditorium

Warehouse

Match manufacturing. Electrical warehouse...

Gymnasium

Church

Army stores...

do

Army stores

....do

Auditorium

Gymnasium

Aluminum foundry

Gymnasium

Iron foundry

Light machine shop

—.do

....do

Bank

Light manufacturing...

Light machine shop

Paper machinery

Office storage

Machine shop

do

-..do

Gymnasium.

Light machine shop

Gymnasium

Auditorium

Bank

Oram warehouses

Miscellenaous storage. .

Light machine shop

Miscellaneous storage. .

Printing shop

Gymnasium

Boiler bouse

Fire shutters on wail opening*

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yei

Yea

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

srzsz

toAZ

at cerohour

Yet

Yea

Probably no.

Yea

Yes

No

Yes

Yea

Probably no.

Yea

Probably no. Probably no. Probabiyno. Probably no. Probably yes. Probably yes. Probably yes. Probably yes.

Yes

Yes.

Yes

Yes.

Yes

Yes.

Yes

No

Probably no .

Yes

No-

Yes

Yes ..

Yes

40

15

10

0

5

0

10

5

20

5

20

60 60

40

15

10

15

20

100

0

15

50

0

40

25

35

15

Probable cause of initial igni- tion

Secondary.

Fire spread.

....do

.—do

—do

Secondary...

Fire spread..

—do

....do

.—do

—do

Fire spread...

do

Secondary... Fire spread..

No fire

do

No fire

Fire spread...

No fire

....do

....do.

-..do

....do

25 | Fire spread....

25 No Are

0 Fire spread

75 ! do

80 ! No fire

50 20 6 25 50

do

Fire spread. ...

do

—do

1-Bal

Stories burned (alter blast damage)

B-l 1-3 l

1-3 1-3 1

1-2 1-2 1

1-3 1-2 1

1-2 1 1

1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1 1

1

1-Bal.

1

20% 1

1

None

1

1-2

1-Bal.

None

2% 2d only

None

1

None

1

None

1-2

1

None

1

Areas In thousands square feet

3.8

30.0

2.3

5.6

3.1

6.9

4.0

1.4

6.8

5.9

2.4

1.2

11.9

.9

2.7

9.0

6.2

3.1

19.1

14.4

6.4

13.0

5.6

6.5

9.5

3.6

7.0

2.9

4.4

3.2

7.5

5.8

5.3

5.9

13.0

3.3

2.3

4.8

8.4

2.6

30.6

.9

.8

4.2

4.3

5.8

5.0

I-

3.8 30.0 2.3 5.6 3.1 6.9 4.0 1.2 6.8 5.9 2.4 1.2 11.9

.9

2.7

9.9

6.2

3.1

19.1

14.4

6.4

2.6

5.6

0

3.6 7.0 2.9 4.4 0

.1 0 0 0 0 0 0

4.8 0

2.6 30.6 0 0

4.2 4.3 5.8 6.0

i

w <W< -»*» -•

PHOTO 3-XA, Diiildiiie 2. Looking NE. Note lightning rod.-* on roof wore not damaged by blast. Buildup gutted

by fire.

Building No.: 2. Coordinates: 4H. Distance from (C.Z) :

800, (AZ): 2.100. NAME: Hironhima Chamber of Commerce. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: 3 and basement. JTG class: El. Hoof: 5-inch reinforced-concrete slab and beam. Part itioun: Reinforced concrete, major-tile, secondary. Walls: Reinforced concrete. Floors: Wood over reinforced-concrete beam and slab.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 5. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from <GZ): 100, (AZ): 2,000.

NAME: Shima Surgical Hospital.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Bearing wall.

Number of stories: 1. J TG class: A 2-3.

Roof: Tile over wood on wood truss.

Partitions: Plaster on wood lath and studs.

Walls: Brick-bearing, 18 inches.

Floors: Wood on wood beaiis.

Framing: Wall bearing— roof only wood.

Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Unknown. Condition, workmanship and materials: Excellent . Compare with usual United States buildings: Greater strength than comparable United States type and occupancy.

OCCUPANCY: Doctor's office and private hospital.

CONTENTS: Office and medical equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Complete destruction. Entire building including walls leveled to the top of the foun- dation.

Cause: Blast.

To contents: Complete destruction.

Cause: Debris (primary). Combustibles burned.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 2,340. Structural damage: 2,340. Superficial damage: — .

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100 percent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent.

REMARKS: Of buildings studied this is the nearest to GZ. Destruction was so complete as to preclude ob- taining details on roof trusses.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Con- tents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. I)

Building No.: 5. Fire classification: C. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fin? (Wr* Automatic Effect of blant Stain: Elevator*:

EXPOSURE:

Location N K 8 W

Distance 25' 15'

30'

Flrebrt*ak Fire Clearance' Class Burned

Remark*

No

No So

No

Yes Yes Yes Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 2,300 square

feet. Floor area burned: 2,300 square feet. 100 percent

(ofter blast damage). REMARKS:

140

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALY8I8

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 6. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ) :

600, (AZ): 2,100. NAME: Chlyoda Life Insurance Co., Chugoku branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DE8IGN Type: Reinforeed-eonerete frame.

Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class: £1. Roof: Reinforeed-eonerete beam and slab-tile covered. Partitions: Reinforeed-eonerete, major — metal lath and

plaster, minor. Walls: Reinforeed-eonerete panels, 10 inches. Rein-

forced-concrete granite facing. Floors: Reinforeed-eonerete beam and slab. Framing: Reinforeed-eonerete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Wood lath and plaster third floor only.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Ex- tremely heavy construction, especially beam* and columns. OCCUPANCY: Life insurance office. CONTENTS: Office equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Minor cracking in roof slab and beams, sash trim windows, etc., destroyed by internal fire — minor damage only. Cause: Fire. To contents: Completely destroyed. Cause: Fire.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 6. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers.

Shut: Yes.

Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS:

Stain*: Elevators:

Enclosed Part V«

Fire doom Automatic None

Metal

No

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Claw Burned

Effect of hlii>si Blown in.

Iti-mnrks

X K

S

w

i.v

20'

No No No No

Yes

y«

Yes Yes

CAUSE OF

FIRE: Fire Probably

PROBABLE

exposures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:

elevator. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area:

feet. Floor area burned: lo,300 square feet. 92 |>cr-

cent (after blast damage). REMARKS: Fire in entire building except about 30

percent of basement.

spread from up stairs and 16,000 square

l.VJ

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOS DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALY8IS

Shkkt No. 1

Building No.: 10 Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ):

000, (AS): 2,100. NAME: Nippon life Insurance Co., Hiroshima brancn, CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Load-bearing brick wall. Number of stories: See drawing. JTG class: F2. Roof: Reinforced-concrete slab 6 inch (Ji-inch ban 6-inch

oe by 12 inch oe). Partitions: Major, 13-inch brick, minor, plaster and wood

stud. > Walls: Brick IS- and 4-inch stone trim on front. Floors: Concrete on earth-wood beams and flooring second

floor. Framing: Reinforced concrete and wood framed second

floor. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Unknown. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Fair con- crete not of good quality. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Life insurance company. CONTENTS: Insurance and office equipment. DAMAGE to building: Roof partially collapsed — remain- der depressed and ruptured. Walls cracked and buckled

partially collapsed. Cause: Blast. To contents: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Debris and fire (about equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA: (square feet) : 2,500. Structural

damage: 2,500. Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100

percent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Entire building so out of plumb and cracked

as to be in a virtual state of collapse.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor arcs. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No: 10. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers.

Shut: Part.

Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fir* doors Automatic Effect of blast

Stain: Yet Metal No Blown in.

Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks

N 10* No C Yea

B JaV No C Yes

8 3C No R Yes Building II do' wall

between), w »' No c Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posure.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 2,500. Square feet floor area burned: 2,500. Square feet: 100 per- cent (after blast damage).

REMARKS:

100

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

5H. Distance from

El.

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 18. Coordinates: (GZ): 1,000, (AZ): 2,200.

NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforced-concretc frame.

Number of stories: 5 and ■ .• basement. JTG class

Roof: Rcinforcod-concrete slab (metal pan).

Partitions: Reinforced-concrete (5-inch). Wood lath and plaster in rear addition.

Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch).

Floors: Reinforced-concrete slabs (metal pan construc- tion).

Framing: Reinforced concrete, heavy haunches.

Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Consid- erably heavier in structural framing.

OCCUPANCY: Bank and office.

CONTENTS: Bank equipment and furnishings.

DAMAGE to building: Light steel-framed roof over rear addition destroyed by blast. Portion of roof of main building depressed, beams cracked and spa I led at haunches and center of span-steel elongated. Minor damage throughout. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Destroyed. Cause: Fire.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 46,400. tural damage: 3,200. Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent.

REMARKS: 1,400 square feet of structural damage shown above was in inferior construction.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 18. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in west 'sec- tion and in north wall only of east section.

Shut: Yes.

Effect of blast: Most blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast

Stairs: Tart Steel nil- No None— doors open

lers

Elevators: Yes Steel rol- No None— doors uiwii lers

EXPOSURE:

Firrbrcak Fin*

Location Distance Clearance Class Burned

Remark.'*

\\

10' 2.V 20*

ur

128'

No No No

No

Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF

C FIRE

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Hui Mm/ 10 04-foot

wall between). 14-foot concrete wall

between.

Fire spread from

Strue-

exposure.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Hour urea: 40.600 square feet. Floor area burned: 46,400 square feet; 1(K) per- cent (after blast daman*').

REMARKS: Fires in exposures soon after Iwmb. This huildinu; well afire at 1000 hours.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 23. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 1,200; (AZ); 2,300.

NAME: Fukoku Building.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Steel core reinforced-concrete frame.

Number of stories: 7 and basement. JTG class: El.

Roof: Reinforced -concrete beam and slab (steel core).

Partitions: Reinforced concrete.

Walls: Reinforced concrete, stone trim.

Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish.

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Metal lath and plaster.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Compare with usual United States buildings:

OCCUPANCY: First story, commercial. Remainder, office space.

CONTENT8: Office equipment and furnishings, com- munication equipment second and third floor.

DAMAGE to building: Long-fipan trusses supporting roof ruptured and roof depressed. Three panels of first floor slab depressed by blast. Minor damage from fire throughout building. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Almost complete destruction except in i*a>e- ment.

Cause: Fire (primary): some debris damage.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 43,300. Struc- tural damage: 4,000. Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: II per- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 90 percent.

REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total ll«»or urea. Contents damuge is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No, 1)

Building No.: 23. Fire classification: N/R (unprotected

steel in roof). WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: No (wired glass in all

windows). Shut: Effect of blast: All broken.

FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed

St lire:

K levators:

Yei Yrt

Fire doors Metal anil W.n.

MrltltmlVV.O.

Auto- matic

No No

Effect of Must I'art Mown oft I 'art blown nil

Iti'tnarks HuiMiiiK T2.

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire

Location Distance Clearance Class Huron)

N 10* No It Yes

K lOfT Yes C Yes

S 3V No C Y«U

W 125' Yea r Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determine*!.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably up stairs, eleva- tor and pipe shaft.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 13,300 square feet. Floor area burned: 39,000 square feet ; \H) |s*ree?it (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Fire throughout building exeepi in basement.

£

Ullllll

ff-BIIII|

III III III III III III III III III III III III

'2 14

US STRATEGY BOMBNG SURVEY

BUILDING 23

HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H

FIGURE 23-XA

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOK DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

SHEET NO. 1

Building No.: 24. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from

(GZ): 1,300, (AZ): 2,400. NAME: Bank of Japan, Hiroshima branch. CONSTRUCTION AND DE8IGN Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame (steel core). Number of Stories: 3 and basement. JTG class: El. Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath. Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch) and stone (6-inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal (exterior) wood (in- terior). Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Much stronger — steel core construction. OCCUPANCY: Bank.

CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishings. DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage — top story

burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two

lower stories. Cause: Fire. To Contents: Destroyed in third story— moderate debris

and blast damage in first and second stories, none in

basement.

Cause: Fire and debris (about equally). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 32,800. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:

Superficial: — . Contents: 30 percent, REMARKS: Glass removed from skylight (20 by 20

feet) and light steel-frame structure and roof covered

with 12 to 18 inches of sand and cinders.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor ana. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 24. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: 8teel rollers.

8hut: Part.

Effect of blast: Blown in.

FLOOR OPENINGS:

Stalra: Tart	Steel rollers	1	^Jo Ncoe — doors o\|>en.
Elevators: Yes	Metal and W,	O. No Bent.
EXPOSURE:
	Firebreak Fire
Locution Distenc* Clearance Class	Ruined Remarks
N 25'	No C	Yes	14-foot concrete wall be- tween.
E 25'	No R	Yes	nuii'iinr.v.' u-fooi wall between).
S -	No	—	No exposure.
W 123'	Yes C	Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from cx-

l>osures. VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No. EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 32,800 square

feet. Floor area burned: 5.200 square feef; 16 percent

(after blast damage).

REMARKS: Fire only in room at southwest corner of second story and in entire third story. No fire in building right after bomb, but afire at 1000 hours. Fire in room in second story extinguished with water buckets.

217

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION

Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 26. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from

(GZ): 2,300, (AZ): 3,000. NAME: Chugoku Electric Co. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Nuraher of stories: 5 and basement and penthouse JTG

class: El. Hoof: Re in forced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: Reinforced concrete (6-inch). Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch). Floors: Reinforced-concrete slab, parquet wood surface

3, 4, 5, and 6 floors. Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings:

Condition, workmanship, and materials; Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Office.

CONTENTS: Office equipment and furnishings. DAMAGE to building: One roof slab and girder cracked

by blast. Minor damage throughout from blast and

fire.

Cause : Blast : To contents: Severe damage, except in west section of

basement and a portion of east section of basement. Cause: Fire 75 percent. Blast and debris 15 percent. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 52,000. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 220. FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural: — .

Superficial: 0.25 percent. Contents: 90 percent. REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No. : 26. Fire classification : R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north wall of west section only.

Shut: Part.

Effect of blast : Most blown in.

FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire doors Autonmilc Effectorbla.it Stain: No

Elevators: Yes No

EXPOSURE:
	Firebreak	Fin'
Location Distance Clearance	Clana	Burned	Remark*
N 60'	Yes	c	Yes
E 35'	No	(•	Ye.-*
se iw	No	('	Ye?
8 W	No	R	Yea	Building 27.
W IW	Yen	c	Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct heat radiation from Iwunb.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly upstairs and pipe shaft.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area : 52,000 square feet. Floor area burned: 46,500 square feet; 88 percent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in tiO per- cent of basement (no fire in basement of west section and about 25 percent of east section). Man who was in third story stated that he saw cotton blackout curtains in west wall and thin paper on desks catch fire from flash of bomb. Fire was reported to have been in all stories 5 minutes after bomb.

222

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAQE DIVISION Field Train No. 1, Him.- hi ma, .Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No. : 28. Coordinate*: 6H. Distance from (GZ) :

3,300, (AZ): 3,800. NAME: Hiroshima City Hall. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish. Number of stories: Four and basement. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish. Partitions: Reinforced concrete (5-iuch) and tile, wood

wainscoats in stair halls. Walls: Reinforced concrete (10- inch). Floors: Reinforced concrete, cement finish. Framing; Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings:

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger. OCCUPANCY: Office. CONTENTS: Furnishings and equipment for office and

city administration. DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only — sash blown

out, trim and finish destroyed by fire. Few tile par- titions blown out.

Cause: Fire and blast. To contents: Severely damaged.

Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 93,400. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .

Superficial: — . Contents: 75-100 percent. REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sueet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Builiing No. 28. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Kiuli. m-(1 KirtMloorfl Automatic Effect of bla*l

Stain:	No
Elevators:
XPOSURE
		Firebreak Fire
I-ocation Distance Clearance	Clow	111] rin <l	Remark s
N-	—	Vo	-	—	Nnetpooir*.
V.	W	Partial	C	Yei	At! exposure burned
SK	125'	Yts	c	Yea
w	150'	Yei	(•	Yea

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spreal from rx- posure.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 93,400 square feet. Floor area burned: 84,900 square feet; 91 |>er- cent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Fire in entire building except of 20 percent of basement and first story at oast end of east section (transverse partitions were noncombustible without openings and there were no combustible construction materials and contents in the corridors at the north wall. Two men who were in building at time of bomb stated that fire spread in from south exposure by flying embers at 1000 hours. Fire started first in the third story. Ixjwer stories may have been ignited later directly by exposure fires.

2-21)

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHY8ICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 33. Coordinates: 6H. Distance from (OZ): 5,300, (AZ): 6,600.

NAME: Hiroshima Postal Savings Bureau.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.

Number of stories: 4 and basement. JTG class: El.

Roof: Reinforced concrete, tile finish.

Partitions: Reinforced concrete.

Walls: Reinforced concrete, tile finish.

Floors: Reinforced concrete.

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal, wood (interior). Ceil- ings: Plaster on wood lath — top story. Plaster on con- crete— others.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Much stronger.

OCCUPANCY: Office.

CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Minor — glass blown out. some sash deformed. Hung ceiling in top story 75 percent collapsed. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Slight damage to furnishings and other con- tents from blast and debris. Cause: Blast and debris.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 62,600. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DA MACK: Building structural: Superficial: . Contents: 15 percent.

REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area.

Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1 )

Building No.: 33. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers in north and east walls only of northeast section. Shut: Few only. Effect of blast: Bent inward slightly.

FLOOR OPENINGS:

	Enclosed	Fire doors Automatic	KlT.it of bbst
Stairs:	Yea	Mela) No	Fart blown off.
Elevators:	Yes	Metal No	Him* ii off.
EXPOSURE		Flrtbrrak Kin-
Location Distance Clearance Class Humci!	Remarks
NW	150*	Yes C Yes
K	yn'	Yes C Yes
s	I.W	Yea C Yrs
\Y	IHf	Yes C Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from west exposure.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: None.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: r>2.(K)0 square feet. Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Sparks from west exjM»sure ignited cotton black-out curtains in west wall at 2000 hours and waste paper in fourth story of northwest section at 2100 hours. Fires were extinguished with water buckets by 20 tin* guards who were stationed inside. Kire damage to contents was negligible. Paper records stored in wood and steel racks in northeast section of building were exposed to direct radiated heat from bomb but did r.«>t catch fire.

260

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALY8IS Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 40. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from (GZ): 2,500, (AZ): 3,200.

NAME: Fukuva Department Store.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN:

Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.

Number of stories : 7 and baBement and one-half of eighth. JTG class: El.

Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and -lab (steel trusses over theater).

Partitions: Metal lath and plaster.

Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — large windows.

Floors: Wood over reinforced concrete.

Framing: Reinforced concrete (or protected steel).

Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably stronger than comparable United States buildings.

OCCUPANCY: Department store.

CONTENTS: Merchandise on display for sale.

DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout — sash blown out; finish and trim, including floors, burned out. Steel trusses supporting roof over theatre show slight defor- mation.

Cause: Mixed.

To contents: Destroyed. Cause: Fire.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet \ : 78.9(H). St ructural damage: — . Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — . Superficial: — . Contents: 90-100 percent.

UK MARKS:

Note.— Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 40. Fire classification: R (north roof on

west section). WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None. Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire doom Automatic Effect of blast Stairs; Part Metal No Blown In or bent.

Elevators: Yea Metal No Blown in or bent.

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Has* Burnett

N

B 8 W

180'

INI'

aw

No Yes Yes Yea

Yes Yea Ye*

Yes

Remarks Building :ttt

Building 3*. Direct radiated head

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: from bomb.

VERTICAL FIRE 8PREAD: Probably.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 78,900 square feet. Floor area burned: 78,900 square feet ; 100 percent (after blast damage) .

REMARKS: Three persons who were questioned indi- vidually stated that this building was afire immediately or within 20 minutes after the bomb. One man who was in the building at the time stated that cotton blackout curtains in the west wall were smouldering immediately after the bomb. The entire building was afire at 1000 hours.

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

285

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Field Team N'o. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 47. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from

(GZ): 2.300, (AZ): 3,100. NAME: Hiroshima Kirin Beer Hall. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.

Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class* El. Hoof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: 5-inch reinforced concrete. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete integral — large windows. Floors: 5-inch reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Framing: Reinforced concrete. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on

concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings. Con- siderably stronger than United States design. OCCUPANCY: Beer hall. CONTENTS: Bars, tables, etc. DAMAGE to building: Minor — sash blown out, finish and

trim partly destroyed by fire. Cause: Mixed. To contents: Moderate damage from both blast (throwing

furnishings around) and fire. Cause: Mixed. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet) : 15,300. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:

Superficial — . Contents: 60-80 percent. REMARKS: Building and contents contained so few

combustibles that internal fire was not of great in- tensity.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Budding No.: 47. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blunt Stairs: Part Metal and glass No Bent.

Elevators: Yes Metal and glass No Blown off.

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire

Location Distance Clearance Class Burned itcmark*

X _ Yes — No oi|x>?uir«'.

E TW No C Yes

S — Yes — No exposure.

W 64' Yes C Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 15,300 square feet. Floor area burned: 13,200 square feet; 80 |HTcent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Man who woiked in building but was not on premises at time of bomb stated that fire spread into building from east exposure about one hour aftei bomb. Entire building had fire in it except basement. Combustibility of contents was low and very little damage was done to building by tire.

psfBifiti;

,w»

U. 3. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL D A U AOE DIVISION

Field Team No. I, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 4H Coordinate*: 51. Distance from

(GZ): 3,000, (AZ): 8,600. Name: ChOgoku Newspaper. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforeed-concrete frame. Number of 8tories: 7 and penthouse. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforeed-concrete beam and slab. Partlt ions: Reinforced concrete— lath and plaster. Walk: 7-inch reinforced concrete — large windows. Floors: 6-inch reinforeed-concrete beam and slab — small

put wood overlay. Framing: Reinforced concrete (on steel frame). Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on

concrete. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderably heavier than United States. OCCUPANCY: Newspaper office — used in conjunction

with Building 50. . CONTENTS: Office equipment and supplies. DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout; sash blown

in, finish and trim destroyed by internal fire. Cause: Fire. To contents: Complete destruction.

Cause: Fire. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 14,700. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .

Superficial — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Contents' damage based upon interrogation as all debris was removed.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2 (Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 49. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers at first to third stories of west wall only. Shut: Part.

Effect of blast: Blown in. FLOOR OPENINGS:

	Endow*	1 Fir* doors	Automatic Effect of blast
Stabs:	Yes	No	No
Elevators:	Yes	Metal		Part blown In.
EXPOSURE		Firebreak	Fire
Location Distance Clearance Class	Burmil	Remarks
N	IW	Yes C	Yes
Bud 8	V	No R	Yes	Building 90 (unpro- tected openings).
s	IK.V	Yes C	Yes	1.10 fret beyond Build- ing SO.
w	DO*	Yes C	Yes
PROBABLE	CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct radiated heal

from bomb.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 14,700 square feet. Floor area burned: 14,700 square feet; 100 per- cent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Man who was in building at lime of bomb stated fire broke out in third and fourth stories immedi- ately after bomb flash. Head bookkeeper in bank in Building 51 stated thai then* was fire in third story of Building 49, 10 minutes after bomb flash.

312

U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOI DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 52. Coordinates: 51. Distance from (GZ):

2,800, (AZ): 3,400. NAME: Taiyo Theater. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: light steel frame. Number of stories: — . JTG class: Roof: Partitions: Walls: Floors: Framing: Window and door frames: — . Ceilings:

Condition, workmanship, and materials:

Compare with usual United States buildings: OCCUPANCY: CONTENT8: DAMAGE to building: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Mixed. To contents: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Mixed. TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): Unknown. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: — .

Superficial: — . Contents: — percent. REMARKS: Mixed construction. Damage too severe to permit analysis of cause of damage or design of st picture.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage if fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 52. Fire classification: C. WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast:

FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of hhut Stain: Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire Location Distance Clearance Class Burned Remarks N C No C Yes

E IW Yes R Yes

8 0* No C Yes Buildings 40 and SO.

W W No C Yea

PROBABLE CAU8E OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor ares: — square feet.

Floor area burned: — square feet; 100 percent (after

blast damage). REMARKS: This building was excluded from both blast

and fire studies.

321

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PSY8ICAL DAMAOE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 59. Coordinate!): 51. Distance from (GZ):

4t100, (AZ): 4,500. NAME: Geibi Bank Co., Hiroshima Branch (in use at

time of bomb as the Higashi Police Station). CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Reinforced-concrete frame. Number of stories: See sketch. JTG class: El. Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Partitions: 7-ineh reinforced concrete. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete monolithic— medium

window. Floors: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab— parquet and

tile. Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Sheet metal on

wood framing.

Condition, workmanship and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Appreci- ably stronger than United StPtes design. OCCUPANCY: Police station (office). CONTENTS: Office equipment. DAMAGE to building: Minor damage only— sash blown

out and hung ceilings partially stripped. Cause: Blast. To contents: Slight damage to contents from !»ln>t and

debris.

Cause: Blast. TOTAL FLOOR AREA 'square feet): 16,200. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building. Structural: — .

Superficial: Contents: 10 percent. REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based cm total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Effect <if t>la5i Bent slightly.

):• rii ,; ».

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 59. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: 8hutters: Steel rollers in east wall and third story of south and west walls (wired glass in all windows).

Effect of blast: Blown in at west wall, bent at south wall. FLOOR OPENINGS:

Auto Enclose*! Fire doors nmtlr

Stairs: Yes Metal No

Elevaton :

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire

Location Distance Clearance (Muss Burned

N \bOT Yes C Yea

E 6C Yes C Yes

S W Partial C Yes

100'

W 6C Yes C Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from ex- posures.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total Moor ana: 10,200 square feet. Flooi area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blast damage).

REMARKS: Sparks from south exposure ignited fru pieces of furniture in first and third stories and col ton blackout curtains in first story about 1030 hours. Fires weie extinguished with water buckets by people inside. Negligible lire danni^e resulted. Some of exposing buildings had just lx*en removed prior to the bomb.

All e\[»osiirr5 liumcd

:U1

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION*

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No* 1

Building No.: 61. Coordinates: 51. Distance from

(OZ): 3.400, (AZ): 4,000. NAME: Hiroshima Radio Station: CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Rcinforced-concrete frame. Number of ator.es: 2. JTO class: El. Roof: Reinforeed-coiierete beam and slab. Partitions: 4-inch reinforced concrete H-9 inches O. C. Walls: 8-inch reinforced concrete — moderate openings. Floors: Reinforced concrete. Framing: Reinforced-eoncrete beam and slab. Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Unknown. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Poor, con- crete poor, reinforcement exposed in many places, form work poor. Compare with usual United States buildings: Some- what heavier than United States design. OCCUPANCY: Broadcasting studio. CONTENTS: DAMAGE to building: Small panel of fir*t floor depressed

4 to 6 inches in front of door. Two non-load-bcaring

partitions blown out. Minor damage throughout.

Sash blown out. trim and finish burned out. Cause: Blaxt. To contents: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Fire (may have been some debris damage). TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 8,300. Structural

damage: — . Superficial damage: - . FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural:

Superficial: — . Contents: 100 percent. REMARKS: Water pipes in second floor ruptured at one

point. General condition and construction of building

was very poor.

Note.— Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 61. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire door* A u torn* tic Effect of blast Stairs: N'o

Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

P ire break

Eire

location Distance Clearance Class Burned

Kemarlis

N E 8 W

Off

l.V

Iff

Yes No Yes No

Yes Yes Yes Yes

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 8.300 square

feet. Floor area burned 8.300 square feet; 100 percent

(after blast damage). REMARKS: Some of exposing buildings wort- just being

removed at time of bomb.

:*47

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 80. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from (GZ): 2,000, (AZ): 2,800.

NAME: Kftko Private Grammar School.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforced concrete.

Number of stories: Three. J TG class: El.

Roof: Reinforeed-concrete slab.

Partitions: 9-inch brick and 6-inch reinforced concrete.

Walls: Reinforced concrete (8-10 inches).

Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers.

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Wood lath and plaster.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Compare with usual united States buildings: Stronger and heavier.

OCCUPANCY: School.

CONTENTS: Classroom furnishings, equipment, and office furnishings.

DAMAGE to building: One roof girder cracked, 9-inch brick partition in first story fractured at ceiling, hung ceiling destroyed. All sash blown out, floors and trim damaged. Outside toilet at west end of building coi- ls need. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Furnishings and other contents cut by glass and debris and broken by tumbling around by blast. Cause: Blast and debris {about equally).

TOTAL FLOOR A REA (square feet) : 1 1 ,500. St rucl •ml damage: 500. $ui>erficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 jsr- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 20 40 percent.

REMARKS: Lean-to toilet in which all structural damage occurred, was of weaker construction than rest of building.

Note. — Building damage based on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damn god.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 86. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Stain: Elevators:

Enclosed Fire doors Automatic Effect of blast Yas No

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire f .oral Inn Distance rimmnn< Clam Iturmfi Remarks

X 125' Yes C Yes

E ISC* Yes C Yes Illaiik wall t\ivpt flro

escB|a? exits, S lay Yes C Yes

W 12*' Yes V Yes Blank wall.

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: No lire.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 1 1 ,500 square feet. Floor area burned: 0 square feet; 0 percent (after blent damage) .

REMARKS: Extended east-west axis of building would pass approximately through zero point. Kn-r wall, which faced zero point whs blank except for exit at each story to fire escape. If doors at lire c»ca|»c were closed at time of bomb, probably the interior of tin' building was shielded from direct radiated heal from tin' bomb

42G

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. I

Building No.: 87- A. Coordinate*. 7F. Distance from (GZ): 8.000, (AZ): 8,200.

NAME: Funairi Grammar School.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Wood frame.

Number of stories: Two. JTG clam: E2.

Roof: Asbestos cement on wood trass™ and wood sheathing.

Partitions: Wood.

Walls: Wood lath and plaster with wood exterior.

Floors: Wood over wood framing.

Framing: Wood.

Window and door frame*: Wood. Ceiling*: Wood.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good, but

design rather poor. Compare with usual United States buildings: Weaker because of very slender columns and |>oor joints.

OCCUPANCY: Classrooms.

CONTENTS: Classroom furnishing and equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Entire building on verge of collapse, and one wing completely collapsed. Walls and columns facing blast buckled and building displaced away from blast. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Most of contents were severely damaged by debris and by lieing overturned and blown nltoui by blast.

Cause: Rlast and debris (abuui equally).

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3S.400. Struc- tural damage: 3K.400. Su|>crficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100 percent. Siqicrncial: Content*: 50 percent.

REMARKS: Fire walls were of reinforced concrete.

Note. Building damage I«mnI on total floor area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 87-B. Coordinates: 7F. Distance from

(GZ): 8,000, (AZ): 8,200. NAME: Funairi Grammar School. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN Type: Light steel frame. Number of stories: One. JTG class:- A2 2. Roof: Asbestos shingles over wood-sheathing and purlins. Partitions: None.

Walls: Plaster on wood lath with wood exterior sheathing. Floors: \Vood over wood l>eams on concrete |>ost8. Framing: Light steel- trussed arch. Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: None. Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Slightly lighter design but generally comparable. OCCUPANCY: School auditorium. CONTENTS: Lectern, benches, tables, teaching aid*. DAMAGE to building: Roof trusses slightly deformed

but probably will be used in place. Most of rooting

strip|Mfl or displaced. Wall facing blast blown in. Cause: lilitst. To contents: Slight damage and that primarily due to

ex|M>sure.

Cause: Exposure. TOTAL FLOOR AREA i square feet): 4.0110. Structural

damage: Superficial damage: l.'.HMI.

FRACTION OK DAMAGE: Building structural:

Superficial: 100 percent. Contents: 10 percent. REMARKS:

NirrK. Ruilding damage ba-ed on total tloorarea. Con- tents damage is fraction of it m t nits »erioii»1y damaged.

43!)

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

SllKKT No. 1

Building No.: 95. Coordinates: 4G. Distance from (GZ): 1,200, (AZ): 2,300.

NAME: Honkawa Grammar School.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforced concrete.

Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class El.

Roof: Reinforced concrete, cement finish.

Partitions: Reinforced concrete (7-inch).

Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch).

Floors: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on sleepers.

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United States buildings: Stronger.

OCCUPANCY: School classrooms.

CONTENTS: School furnishings and equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Panel walls facing blast buckled. One roof girder structurally damaged and slab de- pressed. About 15 percent of roof slabs cracked and beams cracked with some spalling but usable in place. All finish, floors and trim burned out, sash and doors blown out. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Fire (primary) may have been some debris damage.

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 19,500. Struc- tural damage: 500. Superficial damage: 3,000.

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 1 i*t- cent. Superficial: (i percent. Contents: 100 percent.

REMARKS:

Note. — Building i lunume based on tot al Hour area, f 'on-

tents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 95. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast: FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Stairs: I'url Elevators:

Fire doors Automatic Effect of hliuit No

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire

Locution Distune* N li.V E S 30'

Clearance Class Rurneri Kfiunrks Yes C

No — - No i>\|Misurr. I'artiul ISO' C Yes All e\|K>M]re<> burned

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probably.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 49,500 square feet.

Floor area burned: 49,500 square feet: 100 percent

(after blast damage). REMARKS:

4.-.C.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAC1E DIVISION'

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 90. Coordinates: G5. Distance from (GZ): 400 (AZ): 2,000.

NAME: Taisho Clothing Store.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforced concrete.

Number of stories: Three and basement. JTG class: El.

Roof: Reinforced-concrete slabs, cement finish.

Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood.

Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-inch), brick panels on first floor.

Floors: Reinforced concrete (wood finish on sleepers, second floor).

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Conditions, workmanship, and material*: Fair. Compare with usual United States buildings: Con- siderable stronger (larger structural members).

OCCUPANCY: Mercantile.

CONTENTS: Merchandise for sale

DAMAGE to building: All roof slabs depressed, fractur- ing beams and girders and Bt retching steel. Panel in east wall buckled, girders in second floor rear cracked and spalled. Ninety percent of parapet demolished. All sash aud doors blown out. Finish and trim burned out. No fire in basement. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Completely destroyed, except in basement Cause: Fire (primary cause probably some debris damage) .

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 12.400. Structural damage: 3,000. Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 31 per- cent. Superficial: — . Contents: 7"» percent.

REMARKS:

Note.— Building damage based on total floor area Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

ty

¥

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Buildiug No.: 96. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.

Shut:

Effect of blast : FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Ktre doors Automatic Effect of blast Stairs: No

Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire Ijocattun Distuncv rieunuice (llass Ilurmil fti-muiks

N 35' No C Yes

E 10' No C Yes

•S Ifr* No V Yes

\V ISO* Yrs C Yes

PROBABLE (Al'SE OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 12.4(H) square feet.

Floor area burned: 0.300 square feet ; 7") percent (after.

blast damage). REMARKS: Fire throughout building except in basement

SECTION "A-A"

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY BUILDING 9 6

HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H FIGURE 100 -X A

•n;o

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team Xo. 1. Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building N8.: 100. Coordinates: 5G. Distance from (GZ): 800, (AZ): 2,100.

NAME: Nippon Simple Fire Insurance Co.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Reinforoed-concrete frame.

Number of Btories: 2. JTG class: E2.

Hoof: Reinforoed-concrete slab and beams.

Partitions: None.

Walls: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish.

Floors: Reinforoed-concrete slab, cement finish.

Framing: Reinforced concrete.

Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good. Compare with usual United States buildings: Com- parable.

OCCUPANCY: Office.

CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipment.

DAM AGE to building: One roof girder cracked and s palled. Sash anl doors blown out or deformed. Trim and finish damaged by fire. Cause: Blast.

To contents: Completely destroyed.

Cause: Fire (probably appreciable blast awl debris damage).

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 3,000. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage: 80.

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: Superficial: 3 percent. Contents: 100 percent.

REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage based on total floor ami, Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously damaged.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1) Building No.: 100. Fire classification: R.

WALL OPENINGS:	Shutters:	No.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS	:
	Enclosed	Fire doors	Automatic	Effect of blast
Stairs:	No
Elevators:
EXPOSURE	'■'•	Firebreak	Flrr
Locution	Distance Clearance Class Burned	Kctiiurko
N	<>'	No C	Yea	Door blown otT<
E	I.V	No C	Yes
S	40'	No C	Yes
w	()'	No C	Yes	Mliink wall.

PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Not determined.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Possibly.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 3,000 square

feet. Floor area burned: 3,000 square feet 100 percent

(after blast damage). REMARKS: East wall which faced zero point was blank

and it is believed the interior of the building was shielded

from direct radiated heat from the bomb.

474

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan BUILDING ANALYSIS

Sheet No. 1

Building No.: 122. Coordinate)!: 5J. Distance from (OZ): 6,400, (AZ): 6,700.

NAME: Sumitomo Bank Co., Higashi Matsurara Branch.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

Type: Protected steel frame.

Number of stories: 2. J TO class: EI.

Roof: Relnforced-conerete slab on steel beams.

Partitions: Plaster on metal lath.

Walls: Brick panel— 13-inch.

Floors: Rein forced-concrete slab and beams.

Framing: Steel — protected.

Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilings: Plaster on concrete.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent. Compare with usual United Slates buildings: Slightly heavier.

OCCUPANCY: Bank with offices on second floor.

CONTENTS: Office and banking equipment.

DAMAGE to building: Glass blown out, few shutters facing blast deformed. Cause: Blast.

To contents: None. Cause:

TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 5,100. Struc- tural damage: — . Superficial damage:

FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: -. Superficial: — . Contents:

REMARKS:

Note. — Building damage Imsed on total Hour area. Contents damage is fraction of contents seriously ilatnnu* <l.

Sheet No. 2

(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)

Building No.: 122. Fire classification: R. WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollers and hinged shutters.

Shut:

Effect of blast: Part bent in slight I v. FLOOR OPENINGS:

Enclosed Fire door* Automutir Effect of blast Stairs: Yes No

Elevators:

EXPOSURE:

Firebreak Fire {.oration Dtefancr Clearance Class Homed Remark*

N IS* No C Yes Conn, by V i«m» in. t-

al and XX*. (I, d*mr* M<i|i|m-<I Are.

E

* XV

Yes Yes

No

Yin Yr*

No i-%|«» iMirt-

PROBABLE CAISE OF FIRE: Fin* spread from ex- posures.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.

EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor area: 3,100 square feet. Floor area burned: 0 *<|iiarr fi*et ; 0 |mtci*iii < aftrr blast damage).

REMARKS: Fin- spread into buildhiK from i*X|Mn»ure» at west wall and tiort In a-i corner. Fires were «*\t iiiKui-licd by people iu*idc and iieirjijcihle damatee w a- dune.

57N

EDGE OF FIRE AREA

GROUND ZERO

EDGE OF FIRE AREA

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HIROSHIMA

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Effects of

The Atomic Bomb

on Hiroshima, Japan

Volume III

Physical Damage Division

Dates of Survey :

14 October - 26 November 1945

Date of Publication May 1947

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Secondary Fires

Secondary fives are those that result from airblast damage, their causes include overturned gas appliances, broken gas lines, and elec- trical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied secondary fires resulting fro* the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and compared their results with data from conventional bond- ings, explosive disasters* earthquakes* and tornadoes. Their major con* elusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overall average fre- quency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided air- blast peak overpressure is at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures.

Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings.

—a—— — ^ ^M»i^ m-^-*mm a— | | || DH^HIH Ilia lu»— — ■ < Hi » — — ^— — ■ — — — <W»ifc— M«

FREQUENCY OF SECONDARY IGNITIONS AS A FUNCTION OF BUILDING TYPE

Type of Structure Frequency of Secondary Ignitions

(for each 1»000 square feet of floor area)

Wood 0.019

Brick 0.017

Steel 0.004

Concrete 0.002

MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TYPES OF BUILDING OCCUPANCIES

Type of Occupancy Multiplying Factor

Public 0.4

Mercantile 0.S

Residential 0.5

Manufacturing 1.0

Miscellaneous 10.0

MULTIPLYING FACTOR FOR TIME OF DAY Time of Day Multiplying Factor

Night 0.6

Day (other than mealtimes) 1.0

Mealtimes 2.0

Secondary Ignitions in Nuclear Attack , J. McAuliffe and K. Moll, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California 94025, SRI Project 5106 (AD 625173), July 1965.

0.12 mile from GZ, Hiroshima

Geibi Bank 250 meters

USSBS Hiroshima building 26

Chugolru Electric Bldg. (700 meters)

790m west of GZ, Hiroshima

Postal Savings Bureau 1 mile

City Hall 1100 meters

USSBS Building 28 ^

USSBS Hiroshima Building 31, 1,600 m from GZ.

Red Cross Hospital

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Chugoku Shimbun

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BANK OF JAPAN BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA

GEIBl BANK CO. BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA

Bank of Japan: USSBS Building 24, 1300 ft from GZ Geibi Bank Co: USSBS Building 59, 4100 ft from GZ (Table 5 of USSBS report 92 Hiroshima, v2.)

In both, survivors extinguished fire with water buckets.

(Ret: Panel 26 of the "DCPA Attack Environment Manual", Chapter 3.)

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OFFICE OF THE AIR SURGEON

NP-3041

MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS

The Report of the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI

By

Ashley W. Oughterson Henry L. Barnett George V. LeRoy Jack D. Rosenbaum

Averill A. Liebow B. Aubrey Schneider

E. Cuyler Hammond

July 6, 1951

[TIS Issuance Date]

Army Institute of Pathology

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Thi» document contain! information affect- ing the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Eipionage Act, 50 U. S. C. ?l and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RESTRICTED

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ALL EFFECTS

DOCUMENT NP-3041 VOL TZT

BUILDING DESIGNATION

NO. INDIVIDUALS EXPOSED

POST OFFICE 400

TELEGRAPH OFFICE 301

TELEPHONE OFFICE 474

CITY HALL 216

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 682

BRANCH POST OFFICE 346

RO. SAVINGS OFFICE 750

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BLAST EFFECTS

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MEMORANDUM RM-3079-PR

1963

403 337

DISASTER AND RECOVERY: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

Jack Hirshleifer

PREPARED FOR:

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

MilD.

*7& rvTl I I L7$M^*f<U5&*

SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

-12-

As at Hamburg, people proved tougher than structures. Almost 70 per cent of the buildings In Hiroshima were destroyed, compared with around 30 per cent of pop' ulation.

The Research Department of the Hiroshima Municipal Office is reported to have estimated the population In the city as 407,000, in Hiroshima (Hiroshima Publishing Company, 1949).

These proportions are the estimates used by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey report. The Hiroshima Municipal Office calculations show an even greater disparity, reporting 22 per cent of population killed and missing but some 89 per cent of buildings as destroyed or needing reconstruction (Hiroshima) .

-13- On August 7 power was generally restored to surviving areas, and through railroad service commenced on August 8. Telephone service started on August 15* Hiroshima was also not a dead city. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reported that plants responsible for three- fourths of the city's industrial production could have resumed normal operations within 30 days (the newer and larger plants in Hiroshima were on the outskirts of the city, and both physical premises and personnel generally survived). By

mid- 1949 the population had grown to over 300,000 once more, and

2 70 per cent of the destroyed buildings had been reconstructed.

USSBS, "The Effects of Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki," 8.

nfr?iM"ffl-

AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL

STRESS

Psychological Studies

of

Bombing and Civilian Defense

Irving L. Janis

The RAND Corporation

First Edition

NEW YORK • TORONTO • LONDON

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

1951

CHAPTER 2 EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB

UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE POPULATION

At both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disaster struck without warning. Whether intended so or not, an extraordinarily high degree of sur- prise was achieved by both A-bomb attacks. At the two target cities, prior to the bombing, there had been relatively little anxiety about the threat of heavy B-29 raids. When the planes carrying the A-bomb arrived over their targets, the population was almost completely unprepared. At the time, not even a light air raid was expected. People were caught at home, at work, out on the city streets, calmly going about their usual daily affairs.

When the first A-bomb was dropped, on August 6, 1945, very few residents of Hiroshima were inside air-raid shelters. An all-clear signal from a previous alert had sounded less than half an hour earlier and the normal routine of community life had resumed. Shortly after eight in the morning, when the explosion occurred, the working-class population was arriving at the factories and shops. Many workers were still out-of-doors en route to their jobs. The majority of school children, along with some adults from the suburbs, were also outside, hard at work building firebreaks as a defense against possible incendiary raids. Housewives, especially in middle-class families, were at home, preparing breakfast. Only a few minutes later, their flaming charcoal stoves were to create hundreds of local fires, adding to a general conflagration of such intensity that even if the assiduous labor of Hiroshima's school children had been completed, the fire storm still would have been beyond control.

At Nagasaki, three days later, the populace had heard only vague reports about the Hiroshima disaster. Here again, people were at

4

EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB 5

work in factories and offices, tending their homes, engaging in their normal daily activities. A few hours earlier a raid alert had been canceled; before the raid signal could be repeated, the bomb had already exploded. Only 400 people out of a population of close to a quarter of a million were inside the excellent tunnel shelters that could have protected some 75,000 people from severe injury or death.

It is generally recognized that the element of surprise was an important factor contributing to the unprecedented casualty rates at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of those who were exposed to lethal gamma radiation, struck down by flying debris, or trapped in col- lapsed buildings would not have been killed if they had been warned in time to flee to the outskirts of the city or if they had been in adequate shelters. Thousands of people who were out-of- doors or standing in front of windows would have been protected from incapacitating flash burns if they had been under any sort of cover.1

Whether or not they suffered severe injury, those who survived the explosion were also affected by the element of surprise in quite another way. The absence of warning and the generally unprepared state of the population undoubtedly augmented the emotional effects of the disaster. "I was just utterly surprised and amazed and awed." This brief remark, by a newspaper reporter who was living in Naga- saki at the time of the disaster, epitomizes the way in which survivors described the terrifying events to which they were so suddenly exposed.

Of great importance in the predispositional set of the population is the fact that there was not a state of readiness to face danger or to cope with the harsh exigencies of a major catastrophe. The stage was well set for extreme emotional responses to dominate the action. It is against this background of psychological unpreparedness that the emotional impact resulting from the atomic disasters should be viewed.

1 USSBS Report, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946.

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DASA 1271

BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST

by Clayton S, White, M.D*

Presented before

The Armed Forces Medical Symposium

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support

Agency, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico

November 28, 1961

Technical Progress Report

on Contract No. DA-49-146-XZ-055

This work, an aspect of investigations dealing with the Biological Effects of Blast from Bombs, was supported by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense*

(Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government*)

Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research

Albuquerque, New Mexico

December 1961

100 90 80 70

z 60 hJ O K

at so

Fig. 44

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40

30

20

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PERCENTAGE OF SURVIVORS AS A FUNCTION OF RANGE FROM GROUND ZERO (HIROSHIMA)

REF JOINT COMMISSION REPORT. VOLW DOCUMENT NP-3041

JOINT COMMISSION DATA FOR OVERALL SURVIVAL

UNSHIELDED" SCHOOL PERSONNEL

^ "SHIELDED" SCHOOL PERSONNEL

-* EXPOSED INSIDE CONCRETE BUILDINGS

POINT BUILDING NO INDIVIDUALS
NO.	DESIGNATION	EXPOSED
1	POST OFFICE	400
2	TELEGRAPH OFFICE	301
3	TELEPHONE OFFICE	474
4	CITY HALL	216
5	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE	682
6	BRANCH POST OFFICE	346
7	PO. SAVINGS OFFICE	750

0

0.5

1.0 1.5

RANGE. MILES

2.0

2.5

Oughterson, A. W. , LeRoy, G. V. , Liebow, A. A. , Hammond, E. C. , Barnett, H. L. , Rosenbaum, J. D. and Schneider, B. A. , "Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs — The Report of the Joint Commission for Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan, " Vol. VI, AEC Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, July 6, 1951.

TABLE 5

Comparative "Freen-field Effects Parameters at 50 Per Cent Survival Ranges for Hiroshima

Items of Interest

Concrete buildings

Conditions of E Inside

schools

xposure

Mixed Outside (average) schools

Range for 50% survival - mi

Estimated ,ffreen-field effects at range for 50% survival

Max side -on overpressure - psi

Max wind - mph

Thermal radiation - cal/cm

Initial ionizing radiation - rems

Max displacement velocity at 10 ft of travel - ft/sec

0.12

0.45

0,8

for a 20 kt burst

1.3

37	20	7.9	3.6
780	500	240	170
140	58	24	9
59* 000	5800	480	15
gm glass f	ragment	355	115

Probability of penetration of glass fragments into the abdomen Fig. 41

Missile moss, gms

There are a number of simple lessons portrayed by these survival curves which actually relate human experience with a nuclear detonation. Let us consider some of the more important.

1. First, the 50 per cent survival ranges for the four curves from your right to left of 1. 3, 0. 8, 0. 45 and 0. 12 miles forcefully em- phasizes the importance of the conditions of exposure.

2. The area of complete destruction at Hiroshima has been described as covering a circle of about 1. 2-mile radius (4 square miles), a range at which 4-5 psi existed. At this range there was an over -all survival of near 90 per cent. It is apparent, therefore, that one must not confuse the area of complete destruction of houses (a physical concept) with "complete destruction" of people. Even in to near 0. 2 mile, there was 5 per cent over-all survival. By way of emphasis, let it be clear that there was a marked difference between the ranges for physical and bio- logical destruction at Hiroshima. The gloomy habit of confusing the two concepts is, I am afraid, as prevalent as it is unrealistic and, indeed, untrue .

3. The great good fortune of just being indoors and shielded against the most far-reaching effect, direct thermal radiation, is illustrated by the survival range of 0.45 mile for school personnel mostly inside compared with 1. 3 miles for those mostly outside. This proved so even though the fact of being inside involved exposure to falling and flying debris, greater displacement potential and higher pressure re- flections. Apparently, the latter hazards are relatively less than the dangers from direct thermal radiation.

4. The marked value of simply being inside concrete buildings is illustrated by the 50 per cent survival range of 0. 12 mile.

-33-

What the H-bomb does to people, houses, other things 35

Houses as shelters

The chances of survival of people in such relatively fragile structures would seem to be small, but Second World War experience shows that they are better than one thinks, The main danger to people inside houses is collapse; but although the weapon that demolishes a house may vary enormously in size and range, the weight of a house remains the same, and in most cases the staircase is strong enough to support the debris that will fall on it. So people who shelter under the stairs - idiotic as this may sound for a precaution against nuclear weapons— will also be protected against heat flash and flying glass and have a good chance of surviving the almost complete destruction of their homes. Even at the 11 p.s.i. (0-8 kg/sq cm) line there should be no more than 1 1 per cent of people actually killed. . . .

In Dusseldorf in 1943, 30 per cent of the houses were destroyed, but only 0*01 per cent of people were killed or injured.

Peter Laurie

Revised and expanded edition published by Granada Publishing Limited in Panther Books 1979

AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL

STRESS

Psychological Studies

of

Bombing and Civilian Defense

Irving L. Janis

The RAND Corporation

1951

EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB 13

Time from flash to blast = 4 sec at 1 mile: A substantial proportion of the respondents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki reported having reacted immediately to the intense flash alone, as though it were a well-known danger signal, despite the fact that they were unaware of its significance at the time. A num- ber of them said that they voluntarily ducked down or "hit the ground" as soon as the flash occurred and had already reached the prone position before the blast swept over them.

14 REACTIONS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

From the above discussion, it is apparent that some of the sur- vivors immediately perceived the flash as a danger signal. It also appears that for those who were not located near the center there was an opportunity to take protective action that could reduce injuries from the secondary heat wave and from flying glass, fall- ing debris, and other blast effects. It is noteworthy that some survivors evidently failed to make use of this opportunity, as is to be expected when there has been no prior preparation for it.

In a later chapter on the problems of civil defense, we shall have occasion to take account of these findings, since they suggest that casualties in an A-bomb attack might be reduced if the population has been well prepared in advance to react appropriately to the flash of the explosion.

* 3 S * o

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Samuel Glasstone Editor

Revised Edition Reprinted February 1964

Prepared by the

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Published by the

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

April 1962

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.C. - Price £3.00 (paper bound)

Foreword

This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957, It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant govern- mental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working on the problem*

There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

Secretary of Defense

Chairman Atomic Energy Commission

S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962:

Explosion yield

20 kilotons 1, 760

1 megaton 6, 500

Time after Distance from

Height of burst detonation ground zero Height of stem

(feet) (seconds) (miles) (feet)

3 0. 87 185

11 3. 2 680

20 KILOTON AIR BURST 3 SECONDS

NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION

PRIMARY BLAST WAVE FRONT

REFLECTED BLAST WAVE FRONT

MILES J

200 MPH RATE OF RISE

10 SECONDS

REFLECTED BLAST WAVE FRONT

NUCLEAR RADIATION

HOT GASEOUS BOMB RESIDUE

PRIMARY BLAST WAVE FRONT

MUSHROOM STEM

AFTER WINDS

1 PSI

MACH STEM •

OVERPRESSURE

BLAST WIND 40 MPH

™» S~ " ' ' * 1.0 ' ' ' ' 2.0 ' ^7

At 10 seconds after a 20-kiloton explosion at an altitude of 1,760 feet the Mach front is over 2^ miles from ground zero, and 37 seconds after a 1-megaton detonation at 6,500 feet, it is nearly 9% miles from ground zero. The overpressure at the front is roughly 1 pound per square inch, in both cases, and the wind velocity behind the front is 40 miles per hour.

BASIS FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION

12.11 In Japan, where little evasive action was taken, the survival probability depended upon whether the individual was outdoors or inside a building and, in the latter case, upon the type of structure. At distances between 0.3 and 0.4 mile (530 and 700 yards) from ground zero in Hiroshima the average survival rate, for at least 20 days after the nuclear explosion, was less than 20 percent. Yet in two reinforced- concrete office buildings, at these distances, almost 90 percent of the nearly 800 occupants survived more than 20 days, although some died later from radiation injury.

These facts bring out clearly the greatly improved chances of survival from a nuclear explosion that could result from the adoption of suitable warning and protective measures.

Table 12.29— ARRIVAL TIME FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE

		Explosion yield
(miles)	1 KT	10 KT 100 KT	1MT	10 MT
		{Time in seconds)
1	4.3	3. 6 3. 7	2. 5	1. 5
2	9	8. 1 7. 4	6. 5	5.0

12.35. The major part of the thermal radiation travels in straight lines, and so any opaque object interposed between the fireball and the exposed skin will give some protection. This is true even if the object is subsequently destroyed by the blast, since the main thermal radiation pulse is over before the arrival of the blast wave.

12.36 At the first indication of a nuclear explosion, by a sudden increase in the general illumination, a person inside a building should immediately fall prone, as described in § 12.30, and, if possible, crawl behind or beneath a table or desk or to a planned vantage point.

12. 72 Because of its particulate nature, fallout will tend to col- lect on horizontal surfaces, e.g., roofs, streets, tops of vehicles, and the ground. In the preliminary decontamination, therefore, the main ef- fort should be directed toward cleaning such surfaces. The simplest way of achieving this is by water washing, if an adequate supply of water is available. The addition of a commercial wetting agent (detergent) will make the washing more efficient. The radioactive material is thus tranf erred to storm sewers where it is less of a haz- ard.

342

THERMAL RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Nevada in 1953. 12 calories per square centimeter ignitable

trash

before exposure to a nuclear explosion

after exposure to a nuclear explosion

7.59 The value of fire-resistive furnishing in decreasing the num- ber of ignition points was also demonstrated in the tests. Two identical, sturdily constructed houses, each having a window 4 feet by 6 feet facing the point of burst, were erected where the thermal radiation exposure was 17 calories per square centimeter. One of the houses contained rayon drapery, cotton rugs, and clothing, and, as was expected, it burst into flame immediately after the explosion and burned completely. In the other house, the draperies were of vinyl plastic, and rugs and clothing were made of wool. Although much ignition occurred, the recovery party, entering an hour after the explosion, was able to extinguish the fires.

7.76 It should be noted that the fire storm is by no means a special characteristic of nuclear weapons. Similar fire storms have been re- ported as accompanying large forest fires in the United States, and especially after incendiary bomb attacks in both Germany and Japan during World War II. The high winds are produced largely by the updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. They are thus the equivalent, on a very large scale, of the draft of a chimney under which a fire is burning. Because of limited experience, the conditions for the development of fire storms in cities are not well known. It appears, however, that some, although not necessarily all, of the essential requirements are the following: (1) thousands of nearly simultaneous ignitions over an area of at least a square mile, (2) heavy building density, e.g., more than 20 percent of the area is covered by buildings, and (3) little or no ground wind. Based on these criteria, only certain sections — usually the older and slum areas — of a very few cities in the United States would be susceptible to fire storm development.

Weapon test report WT-775, Project 8.1 1 b, ENCORE nuclear test Nevada, 1953:

Decayed White Decayed +

fence washed trashed

No trash kindling Trash kindling for fire

Effect of 12 calories/sq cm thermal flash:

ill

JfJj.

BURNED AFTER 15 MINUTES

NO FIRE

IMMEDIATE IGNITION

6' x 6' wood frame houses

^r.McmrMT! At

WT-774

Copy No. 138 A

OfoefuMoH

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS

March -June 1953

Project 8.11a

INCENDIARY EFFECTS ON BUILDING AND INTERIOR KINDLING FUELS

(ENCORE EFFECT REPORT)

27 kt at 2,423 feet altitude, 19% humidity (DASA-1251)

(Note: cities humidity is ^50-80%)

RESTRICTED DATA

This dc *- - ^it contairs restricted data, as define.. ... vpe Atomic £nergy Act oi 1946. Its ir« .^fiittal or the disclosure of its ccntsr.cs in any maimer to an unauthorized person" is prohibited.

HEADQUARTERS FIELO COMMAND, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT SANDIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

GONFlDENTlAt

Weapon test report WT-774, Project 8.1 la. Incendiary effects on buildings and interior kindling fuels

* ^

ENCORE test, Nevada, 1953 Immediate room flashover during thermal pulse

10' x 12' wooden houses with 4' x 6' windows ("Encore effect") in inflammables-filled house

1 7 calories/sq. cm thermal flash while fire-resistant fabrics in other house survived!

LEFT HOUSE: fire-resistant furnishings RIGHT HOUSE: non-fire resistant furnishings

(woolen rugs and clothes, vinyl plastic draperies) plus inflammable magazines and newspapers

Smouldering armchair extinguished 1 hour after detonation, when recovery party arrived at house

THERMAL RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS Harold L* Brode The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

p.27^5 August 1963

-17- We have all had the frustrating experience of trying to light a fire with green, moist, or wet wood. Just as wet wood canft be easily induced to burn, so thick combustibles are not easily Ignited* Even a dry two-by-four burns reluctantly and stops burning when taken out of the fire* It is a different matter with a shingle or a bunch of kindling! Density also plays a role* a heavier combustible being harder to ignite than lighter-weight material. Of course, the chemistry of the material to the degree that it influences kindling temperatures and flammability, is an important parameter. Modern plastics tend to smoke and boil - to ablate but not to ignite in sustained burning - while paper trash burns readily.

Just as most materials are not particularly sensitive to the sun* s thermal radiation, and are not highly inflammable nor even lgnitible, the surfaces exposed to the thermal Intensity of a nuclear explosion are generally not given to sustained burning. Very intense heat loads may mar or melt surfaces, may char and burn surfaces while the heat is on, but may snuff out immediately afterward.

-IB- PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FIRES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Although thermal radiation would start many fires in urban and in most suburban areas, such fires by themselves would seldom con- stitute a source of major destruction. 0ut6ide the region of exten- sive blast damage, fires in trash piles, in dry palm trunks, in roof shingles, in auto and household upholstery, drape6, or flammable stores are normally accessible and readily controllable. By the very fact that these fires start from material exposed to the incident light, they can be easily spotted and, In the absence of other dis- tractions, can be quickly extinguished. Where the blast effects are severe and damage extensive, little effective fire fighting is likely.

EFFECTS OF 1 PSI OVERPRESSURE ON IGNITIONS

From: Goodale, Effects of Air Blast on Urban Fires URS 7009-14 Dec. 1970

(AD 723 429)

Blast winds both cool burning material and upset flame convection system.

50% of burning curtains are extinguished by 1 psi overpressure

100% are put out by 2.5 psi. Note that burning LIQUIDS in high-wall trays are not put out by blast waves, but this is not relevant to city fires.

Burning beds can continue to smoulder until extinguished with water.

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AECU-3350

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS

By

I- Gerald Bowen Donald R. Richmond Mead B. Wetherbe Clayton S* White

Table 5, 1 Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data

for Missiles from Traps at Various Ranges from Ground Zero

30 kt TEAPOT-APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955

Distance from Ground Zero, ft Maximum overpressure, psi Number ot traps Total number of glass missiles Geometric mean missiles mass, gms Standard geometric deviation in mass Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec Standard geometric deviation in velocity Per cent of total missiles expected

to penetrate A verage number of missiles per sq ft Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate

4,700	5,500	10,500
5,0	3,8	1.9
6	2	5
2129	320	37
0. 133	0.580	1.25
3. 01	3.47	3,35
170	168	103
1,27	1,25	1.25
3,9*	12,8*	0.4*
100.9	45.5	2. 1
3,9*	5,3*	0. 006*

^Computed from individual evaluation of each missile

AD Al 05824 DNA5593T

GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS BROKEN BY AIRBLAST

E. Royce Fletcher

Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki. 3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1m behind the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave:

10 fragments /ver for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure 100 fragments/m2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure 1,000 fragments /m^ for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure

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The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1964)

GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY

Probability of penetration (percent)

Mass of glass fragments (grams)

0. 1 1.0

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overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst

E. R. Fletcher, et al., "Airblast Effects on Windows in Buildings and Automobiles on

the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 1 1 tons

of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,210 ft (0.54 psi incident, 1.1 psi reflected, 0.158 sec)

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the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 1 1 tons

of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,700 ft (0.41 psi incident, 0.83 psi reflected, 0.180 sec)

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Report to the Test Director WT-1468

SECONDARY MISSILES GENERATED BY NUCLEAR-PRODUCED BLAST WAVES

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— -100

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS

J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson, R. L. French, F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. Straker

Table 8. Fission-Product Gamma Ray Exposure During the First 60 Seconds from a Typical TN Weapon at a 100-M Burst Height

Slant Range	Shock Arrival	Percent Before	Percent After
(m)	(sec)		Shock	Shock
		100 KT
538	0.3678		13.8	86.2
740	0.8187		20.4	79.6
1030	1.822		36.2	63.8
1446	4.055		63.1	36.9
2097	11.02	300 KT	95.7	4.3
771	0.5488		13.7	86.3
1060	1.221		20.5	79.5
1472	2.718		38.6	61.4
206S	6.049		69.8	30.2
2995	16.44	1MT	98.8	1.2
1146	0.8187		11.1	88.9
1576	1.822		18.3	81.7
2190	4.055		38.2	61.8
3075	9.024		75.3	24.7
4458	24.53		99.8	0.2

ORNL-TM-3396

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE-FIELD ENVIRONMENT REGOMENDED FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS

J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burs on, R« L, French, F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A, Straker

0 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 05 0.6 0.7 0.8 Q.9 1.0 FRACTION OF Aw SOLID ANGLE, *'

Figure 9. Angular Distribution of Neutron and Secondary Gamma 1200 m from a Thermonuclear Weapon

HIROSHIMA

John Mersey New Yorker of 31 August, 1946

i

A NOISELESS FLASH

At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima,

Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors

He was one step beyond an open window when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese would, " Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave !" Just then (the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was wearing flew off his face ; the bottle of blood crashed against one wall ; his Japanese slippers zipped out from under his feet — but otherwise, thanks to where he stood, he was untouched.

Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon and rushed around to the man's office and found him terribly cut by glass.

Starting east and west from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September, made new measurements, and the highest radiation they found this time was 3.9 times the natural " leak."

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A.E.C. NEVADA TEST SITE MAY 5, 1955

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A report by the FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN,

Director j Atomic Test Operations, PCD A

The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a given point.

92

BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION

by dr. Herman elwyn pearse, Professor of Surgery at the Uni- versity of Rochester. Consultant to several Government depart- ments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiro- shima. 140

Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and we found again that the wounds healed in the same manner as those that we had produced in the laboratory. There was isome difference in these lesions from the ordi- nary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experi- ments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing.

142

For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers, you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first degree burns at 107 calories. 143

If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent thousands and thousands of burns.

. . . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree burns on bare skin required 4 calories. When we put 2 layers of cloth in contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters, about a fifth of an inch, and it increases, the protective effect 5 times. The energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second- degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you are better off than if your wear tight clothing. 144

OSTI ID: 4411414 bm&

STUDIES OH FLASH BURNS: THE PROTECTION AFFORDED W 2, k MB 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS George Mixter, Jr0, M0 Do and Herman ED Pearse, Mo D„ THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER ABSTRACT Fabric interposed between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ turns. For the 2, k and 6 layers of fabric studied this increase vas 3*6, 38 and over 10*4- cal/cm2 respectively -when the inner layer of fabric vas in contact with the skin. Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 mm increased the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 70k to 29 cal/cm2, provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation0 If the outer layer was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the thermal burn,

INTRODUCTION In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study of flash burns in unshielded skin* It is well known from the atomic bombing in Japan that this type of burn was modified by clothing „ A laboratory analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun (5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com- binations,, i. 2 Layers 20 h Layers

ae light green oxford olive green sateen

knitted cotton underwear thin cotton oxford

wool-nylon shirting b. light green oxford (HPM) knitted cotton underwear

knitted cotton underwear

6 layers

olive green sateen

thin cotton oxford

mohair frieze

rayon lining

wool-nylon shirting

knitted wool underwear

i? Jo Ho j Kingsley* Ho D„, asd Pearse, H. EOJ "Studies on Flash Burns i The Protective Effect© of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology aM Obstetrics^ <&> ^97~5©1 (April 1952) o

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WT-770 Copy No.

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UPSHOT-KNOTHO

NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS

TKHWOM n of the DFJT.NSE K< A60«

AUb !

March -June 1953

Project 8.5

THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED

TEST X|

-y. _

ASSEMBLIES

»

This document contains restpMBgps&ta as defined in the Atomic^jj^pmct of 1954. Its transmittal c^rarrffsclosure of its contents in ajwsfemer to an unauthorized

pen

HEAOQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT SANOIA 8ASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

mussnB

WT-770

This document consists of 64 pages

1 QP No. - ^ ° of 295 copies, Series A

OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

Project 8.5

THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES

REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR

by

REORaOCU

BY authority OfW.J:^U^Z€j^^^/^?^U As ^striotedj^rtn Foreign

hi iPWIH 1*11 III

VRmtaM^^ontalns restricted data as dennea Jn^nWI^fci^^jrgyAct of 1954. Its transmittal or^^WH(ta^of its contents in any manner to an unHfccized 111 | in in li iiiiilMIHIi III 3^^

Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories

Army Medical Service Graduate School

Walter Reed Army Medical Center

University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project

D

CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION

4#1 ANTICIPATED AMD OBSERVED RESULTS

4.1.1 protection Afforded by the Various Uniform Assemblies

Perhaps the most outstanding result of these tests was the degree of thermal protection afforded the test animals by the various uniform assemblies. At the higher levels of radiant energy, where laboratory tests (with the carbon arc) indicated that the animals should have sustained at least 2+ burns, (?) an unexpected degree of protection was found in the field. In the laboratory, thermal energies as low as 44 cal/cm2 (delivered In 2 sec.) were sufficient to produce burns in pigs1 skin under the four layers of the Temperate ensemble. In the field the maximum level at which any animals, clothed in the Temperate uniform, were recovered alive on Shots 9 and 10 was 26.0 cal/cm2 and one at 48 cal/cm2 (calc.) on Shot 2. Although no animals were recovered alive at the maximum exposure level of 75 cal/cm2, there was a complete lack of any evidence to indicate that the animals would have suffered burns from the primary effects of the thermal radiation. Some of the animals wearing the Temperate uniform not treated for fire resistance sustained minor skin burns, but these resulted from exo- thermic reactions (flame or glow) and occurred only at the more dis- tant stations. Damage to the fabric itself from direct thermal radiation was also less serious than expected, being limited to the two outer layers, whereas in the laboratory three of the lavers were damaged and the underwear layer discolored at 40 to 60 calAm2.

The two-layer HW 50/50 and HWFR 50/50 assemblies had not been tested in the laboratory with the carbon arc, although tests in con* nection with napalm studies had Indicated that the wool/cotton under* wear of this combination might be, quite effective* The outstanding

results obtained In the field with these fabric assemblies, however, exceeded the most optimistic anticipations. Exceptionally good thermal protection was observed up to the closest stations from which data were obtained! 41*0 cal/cm2 for HW 50/50 and 33.5 cal/cm2 for HWFR 50/50.

Severe burns were sustained by the majority of the pigs wearing the two-layer HW and HWFR assemblies. However, even these thin cotton fabrics were of considerable protective value as can be seen by com- paring these results with the bare-skin exposures of the porthole

44

pigs (Section 3*4)* The degree and extent of burns noted beneath these assemblies were less than would have been expected on the basis of previous laboratory experience, especially at the higher calorie levels*

4«1«2 Factors Contributing to the Greater Degree of Thermal Protection in the Field.

There are several conditions encountered in the field, espe- cially at the higher energy levels, but not duplicated in the labora- tory (at least not up to the present time) that may account for the fact that like amounts of thermal energy did not produce comparable results in the laboratory and in the field. First, the thermal energy is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb than it is in the laboratory • Second, due to smoke obscuration the animals in the field actually received a smaller percentage of the total energy delivered than they did in the laboratory* Third, the blast wave following the explosion tended to extinguish flames and remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laboratory tests* Fourth, where the heat reached the fabric layer next to the skin, uniform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field*

(1) In comparing field with laboratory results, considera- tion must be given to irradiance, which expresses the time- intensity of the thermal pulse (cal/cm^/sec). At the highest calorie levels labora- tory irradiances were much lower than field irradiances* The reason for this is that an atomic explosion delivers a high quantity of thermal energy per unit area in a much shorter time than the same quantity can be delivered over a practical exposure area (1*7 cm diam) with existing laboratory equipment. For example, approximately 2 sec are required to deliver 75 cal/cm2 in the laboratory with the carbon arc operating at peak capacity, an irradiance of 37*5 cal/cmr/sec. 3n the field this much energy was delivered at the forward stations in both Shots 9 and 10 in approximately 0*5 sec, an irradiance of 150 cal/cm2/sec*

Irradiances have been varied within the limits possible in the laboratory, and it has been found that certain levels of thermal energy will produce a more serious lesion if applied slowly than if applied rapidly. (18) Beneath the HVf assembly spaced 5 mm from the skin, for example, a 2* burn was produced when a thermal energy of 17 cal/cm2 was applied in 2 sec (8*5 cal/cm2/sec) but no burn, or at the most a mild 1+ burn, resulted when the same energy was applied in 0.5 sec (34 cal/cm2/sec). With lower irradiances the fabric may be scorched or charred but remain intact and thus act as a heat reservoir from which heat can subsequently be transmitted to the skin. With higher irradiances, laboratory results indicate that all or part of the thermal input may be dissipated by an endothermic decomposition

of the fabric* In the field, especially at the closer stations where irradiances exceeded 35 cal/cm?/sec, conditions were favorable for such dissipation of energy*

(2) Motion pictures of clothed animals, exposed to 50*0 and 33*5 cal/cm2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouds

U5

of black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ma of the explosion. There is reason to believe that, in view of the short tine within which most of the radiant energy from the explosion was delivered, much of this energy was prevented from reaching the animals by this smoke* In the laboratory tests* because the exposure area was so much smaller and the time of energy application at the high calorie levels so much longer* smoke obscuration appears to be of little or no significance*

(3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not been duplicated in laboratory applications of thermal energy* has two possible protective effects* First* it can be expected to extinguish flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated for fire resistance, thus removing a source of high heat. Although the blast wave may not actually extinguish the flame in all cases,* it can be expected in general to have this effect* Second* the blast wave would tend to remove any char which* if allowed to remain* would act as a heat reservoir and increase the likelihood of a severe bum*

(4>) The drape of the uniform may have contributed to a reduction of thermal injury in the field* in the case of the two- layer Hot-Wet assemblies* Laboratory tests upon which estimates of protec- tion in the field were based consisted of the application of energy to fabrics in tight contact with the animal's skin. Other tests on cotton fabrics have indicated that spacing the fabric away from the skin would increase the protection afforded* In the uniforms* although some fabric areas were in close skin contact, many were spaced away in normal drape* This fact undoubtedly gave the uniforms an additional protective value as compared to laboratory tests where fabrics were held in close skin contact*

4.2 THE ROLE OP THE FLAMEPR00FING TREATMENT

One of the major problems designated for study at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was to determine whether materials actually did flame under the conditions of the test and* if sof how much protection could be afforded by fire resistant treating the outer layer* The results of the test show conclusively that flaming and probably glow did occur in many instances The principal value of the fire retardant used in these tests j brcninated triallyl phosphate, lay in its prevention of these exothermic reactions* In seme cases it also seemed to give additional protection against the primary thermal effects of the ex- plosion, although in other cases the untreated fabrics gave better protection than the treated* The peculiar pebbly, blistered* weeping edema noted in these tests occurred only in pigs wearing the fire resistant uniforms*

♦The occurrence of persistent flame type burns that require longer to produce (according to laboratory tests) than the blast arrival time may indicate that the blast wave does not always extinguish the f3ame. On the other hand such burns may have been induced by glow.

46

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OPERATION

WT-1441

f his Jocunent consists tf 50 paps. Ni. ' it 185 cepies. Secies A

PLUMB BOB

MEVADA TEST SITE MAY-OCTOBER 1957

oi the/

7 M/r/965

. .- «.-_■■ •■ y-

Project 8.2

AVAILABLE COPY WILL NOT HSRMTT FULLY LEGIBLE RPPJ-'DtCTiO"?/'"' !u?fiODUCTION' WILL 2£ ***•■ && HEQUESTED BY USERS Gc DDC.

PREDICTION of THERMAL PROTECTION of UNIFORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U)

Issuance Date: May 2, 1960

HEADOUARTEftS HELD COMMAND DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY SANDIA 8ASE. AlBUGUERQUE. NEW MEXICO

»>-*,,-*., -.

•:V

JUN7 >*&

XiSlA Q

This material contains Information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 16, U. S. C, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In anv manner u: *n unauthorised person 1. ?- hiblter) uy taw.

1.2.2 Comparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burns to Ptge. The improved NML skin simulant, molded from silica -powder -filled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded at a depth of 0.05 cm in order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment. The basic criterion is a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human skin or for a 2+ mild bum to pig skin. This criterion is based on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mild burn In pig skin) to a second-degree burn In human skin, (2) an initial skin temperature of 31 C, and (3) correspondence of the thermal pro- perties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of tndlcent radiant exposure is estimated to be ± 10 percent. A skin-simulant temperature rise of 20 C or greater Is estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate pig skin burn, and a rise of 35 C is estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild pig burn. The latter estimations, probably accurate to ± 20 percent, are based on pig-burn data obtained at the Uni- versity of Rochester (Reference 6).

12

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2.1 RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS

Specimen

Radiant Absorptancc

Skin simulant, bare Skin simulant, blackened Poplin, Shade 116, 5-oz/yd2 Sateen, gray, 9'Oz/yd2

0.72 0.95 0.63 0.91

15

CONFIDENTIAL

0.4 at .o

Tim, toMownum.Steondt

4 8 12 IS 20

Equivalent Field Rodiont Exposure, col /cm1

DC- P- 1060

31

UNSHIELDED PERSONS

20 40

THERMAL EXPOSURE (cal/cm2)

100

20 H

18 -

3 16

or

S | 14

£ 12

■ I 10

8 -

6 -

4 -

2 -

Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

(HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI)

I

Aamori • \

\

* Barmen %

Freiberg »

• Hiroshima • Fukui \

. Solingen . Friedrickihafen I

• Aachen . uim " Toyama ■ Chosi

. Nagasaki ,Fukuyama

Heilbrann /. Hamburg Dresden .

/

/ INTENSE

/ FIRESTORMS I

I

Darmstadt

\ * \

Hamburg firestorm area = 45% area covered by buildings containing 70 Ib/sq. ft of wood Hence 0.45 x 70 = 32 Ib/sq. ft of wood loading Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.

1 BTU (British Thermal Unit) ■ energy for 1 F rise in 1 lb of water = 252 calories

Severe firestorms require 600 BTU/sq. mile/second

FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES

i i i

100

700

800

200 300 400 500 600

AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second)

T. E. Lommasson and J. A. Keller, A Macroscopic View of Fire Phenomenology and Mortality Prediction Proceedings of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposium of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Dikewood Corporation; October, 1967.

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When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling re- sults and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more water loss and the more heat or energy loss.

How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?

Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns

ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News

http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=40462

August 2008

By Patrice Wendling

Elsevier Global Medical News

CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.

The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association.

"Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap for burn wounds," he said.

Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal.

"I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral base."

Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partial- and full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed.

Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150° C, it is sterile as manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital, Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll to expose a clean surface.

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE N A T 10 N A L LABORATORY

UCRL-TR-231593

Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Environments

R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock

June 7, 2007

Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].

We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a "radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.

6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment 2007," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt, R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review.

11

Addendum No. 1

for

DNA 1240H-2, Part 2

HANDBOOK OF UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

21 January 1974

M. J. Dudash

DAS1AC

General Electric Company* TEMPO

816 State Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93102

CHAPTER TITLE

VOLUME 2 - PART 2

18 SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF

UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL

PAGE

18-1

1? August 1973 CHAPTER 18

18.7 THERMAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS ON SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL

18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria

Table 18-2 CDC NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION CRITERIA

New Thermal Radiation Criteria

■ ■i-i m im m i — — ■ — — — — m i i i

Rtek Criteria for Burns Under Summer Uniforms to Warned » Exposed Personnel

7. Incidence Mechanism tOKT cal/cm'

100KT cal/cm2 lOOOiCT cal/cm2

Negligible

Moderate

Emergency

2.5

5 5

1 burn 1 burn 2° burn

3.1 3.7 6.3

4.2

5.0 8.8

5.8 6.8 12

Time to Ineffectiveness

24.hr

Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns % Incidence 10KT cal/cm2 100KT cal/cm2

50

38

53

1000KT cal/cm4 73

Personnel Risk and Casualty Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects ACN 4260, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear Studies, August 1971

EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT

Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46

NM 006-015

25 April 1955

by

E. L. Alpen C.P. Butler S.B. Martin A.K. Davis

U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY San Francisco 24, California

For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for production of a standard burn are the following:

.tA, .tBi

•Ci itiri

, \ = 0.42/;, r = 24.4 + 3.5 per cent, Q = 3.20 + 0.37cal/cm2;

IDftX

filter ' filter ' filter ■ filter * filter • The ranges shown are standard deviations.

, X = 0.55^, r = 40.9 + 3.8 per cent, Q = 3.25 ± 0.28cal/cm2;

, Xmav = 0.65/x, r = 56.9 ± 2.5 per cent, Q = 9.9 ± 2.1 cal/cm2;

, X_ = 0.85«, r = 53.4 + 2.2 per cent, Q = 14.0 + 1.1 cal/cm2;

max ^ ~ *

FM, \ = 1.7/i, r = 17 + 0.60 per cent, Q = 2.50 cal/cm2 (approx.)

uldX

The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0.7 to 1.0 has been presented.

SUMMARY

The Problem

How does the critical energy for the production of standard burns in both rats and humans vary with the wavelength of radiant energy?

Findings

The critical radiant energy, corrected for spectral reflectance, re- quired for production of standard burns in both rat and human skin varies as much as 4^old depending on the wavelength.

AD689495 MASS BURNS

Proceedings of a Workshop 13 - 14 March 1968

Sponsored by

Office of Civil Defense

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

U. S. Department of Agriculture

Editors

David W. Bensen

Office of Civil Defense

Arnold H. Sparrow

Brookhaven National Laboratory

December 1971

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Office of Information Services

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LONG-LIVED NUCLIDES AFTER A NUCLEAR WAR

R. SCOTT RUSSELL, B. O. BARTLETT, and R. S. BRUCE

Agricultural Research Council, Letcombe Laboratory, Wantage, Berkshire, England

ABSTRACT

The radiation doses from the long-lived nuclides 90Sr and l37Cs, to which the surviving population might be exposed after a nuclear war, are considered using a new evaluation of the transfer of 9 ° Sr into food chains.

As an example, it is estimated that, in an area where the initial deposit of near-in fallout delivered 100 R/hr at 1 hr and there was subsequent worldwide fallout from 5000 Mt of fission, the dose commitment would be about 2 rads to the bone marrow of the population and 1 rad to the whole body. Worldwide fallout would be responsible for the major part of these doses.

In view of the possible magnitude of the doses from long-lived nuclides, the small degree of protection that could be provided against them, and the considerable strain any such attempt would impose on the resources of the community, it seems unrealistic to consider remedial measures against doses of this magnitude. Civil-defense measures should be directed at mitigating the considerably higher doses that short-lived nuclides would cause in the early period.

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Fig. 1 Strontium-90 in fallout and milk in the United Kingdom

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RADIATION EFFECTS ON FARM ANIMALS: A REVIEW

M. C. BELL

UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

ABSTRACT

Hematopoietic death would predominate in food-producing animals exposed to gamma radiation under fallout conditions leaving animal survivors. Gamma-radiation doses of about 900 R would be lethal to 50% of poultry, and about half this level would be lethal for cattle, sheep, and swine. Grazing cattle and sheep would suffer most from combined radiation effects of skin-beta and ingested-beta radioactivity plus the whole-body gamma effects. The LD50/60 for combined effects in ruminants is estimated to be at a gamma exposure of around 200 R in an area where the forage retention is 7 to 9%.

Either external parasites or severe heat loss could be a problem in skin irradiated animals. Contrary to early reports, bacterial invasion of irradiated food-producing animals does not appear to be a major problem. Productivity of survivors of gamma radiation alone would not be affected, but, in an area of some lethality, the productivity of surviving grazing livestock would be severely reduced owing to anorexia and diarrhea. Sheltering animals and using stored feed as countermeasures during the first few days of livestock exposure provide much greater protection than shielding alone.

80

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D. G. Brown, UT-AEC Agricultural Research Laboratory

— O JD +

6 ° Co at a dose rate between 0.5 and 1 R/min.

cattle

4 9 5% confidence interval

llo-l

400

600 800

DOSE, R

1000

FALLOUT PROPERTIES IMPORTANT TO AGRICULTURE

89

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RADIONUCLIDE BODY BURDENS

139

10 100

POSTDETONATION TIME, hr

1000

Radioactivity from 1-Mt explosive with a fission-to-fusion ratio of 1.0.

Local Fallout from Nuclear Test Detonations (U). DASA 1251-series (5 volumes with 9 separately-bound parts), by U.S. Army Nuclear Defense Laboratory for the Defense Atomic Support Agency:

Volume I. Indexed Bibliography of United states and British Documents on Characteristics of Local Fallout (U), DASA 1251-1 (AD 329971), 237 pp., 27 June 1961. (C)

Volume II. Compilation of Fallout Patterns and Related Test Data (U):

Part 1 - Trinity Through Redwing (U), DNA 1251-2-1 (AD 349123), 468 pp., August 1963. (SRD)

Part 2 - Plumbbob Through Hardtack (U). DASA 1251-2-2 (AD 329124), 456 pp., August 1963. (SRD)

Part 3 - Nougat Through Niblic (U), DASA 1251-2-3 (AD 371725), 226 pp., March 1966. (SRD)

Supplement , Foreign Nuclear Tests (U), DASA 1251 (AD 358417L), 77 pp., October 1964. (SRD)

Volume III. Annotated compendium of Data on Physical and Chemical Properties of Fallout (U). DASA 1251-3 (AD 381963L), 770 pp., November 1966. (SRD)

Volume IV. Annotated compendium of Data on Radiochemical and Radiation Characteristics of Fallout (U);

Part 1 - Specific Activity, Activity-Size Distribution. Decay (U), DASA 1251-4-1 (AD 500919L) , 643 pp., September 1968. (SRD)

Part 2 - Radiochemical Composition, Induced Activity, Gamma Spectra (U), DASA 1251-4-2 (AD 523385), 570 pp., 31 May 1972. (SRD)

Volume V, Transport and Distribution of Local (Early) Fallout from Nu- clear Weapon Tests (U). DASA 1251-5 (AD 362012), 580 pp., May 1965. (SRD)

1.2 kt JANGLE -Sugar Surface burst 19 Nov 1951

CLOUD TCP HEIGHT: 15,000 ft MSL

CRATER TATA: Diameter: 90 ft maximum dose rate: 7500 r/hr at H+l

Depth:

Maximum dose rate Distance Value from (r/hr) GZ (ft)

Maximum contour distance from GZ (ft)

500 r/hr

300

r/hr

100

r/hr

540 900 2200 4900 12,500

21 ft

at crater lip

hour

Contour area (sq mi) ^^

-jjjjj- Laurino, R. K., and I. G. Poppoff, 1951: Contamination r/hr patterns at Operation JANGLE. U. S. Nav. Rad. Def. 0.05 0.15 0.55 Lab. Rep. USNRDL-399, 28 pp.

500

r/hr

500

r/hr

•000

0i» tones From 62 ,Yortf«

18 mph mean wind speed

12

11

10

— \|— TTTnni "\| I \| M\| M\| \| i \| M\| U\| residual radiation from fission products from 1 minute after the explosion	i	1 1	1 1	t« <	1 — r	TT	TT

—																—
-																-
-																—
—																-
															-
-																—
—																—
-																-
-																—
-																-
—	i	1 1	II		— L-	-11	JLL	U	.JLL	-11	u	JJ.	11	L.	-LI	1L

0

0.01 0.04 0.1

-1.2 (t decay law)

0.4 1 4 10 40 100

TIME AFTER EXPLOSION (HOURS)

400 1,000

1.2 kt SUGAR test (Nevada surface burst)

Source: weapon test report WT-414

Gamma dose rate (R/hr)

Gamma dose (R)

610 m-

Downwind distance I 914 m

i 1220 m

1 3350 m

^'•r^-' j 4650 m

^.V ] 1830 m-|

2440 m

610 m

"914 m 3350 m 4650 m 1220 m

1830 m

10 100 1000 10*

Time after burst (seconds)

1.2 kt UNCLE test (5.2 m underground, Nevada)

1000

o.ooi I i i dim o.i

1220 m 1830 m

10 100 1000

Time after burst (seconds)

Robbins, Charles; et al. "Airborne Particle Studies ,

JANGLE Project 2.5a-l." (In: Operation JANGLE, Particle Studies, WT-371-KX, 417 pages.) Army Chemical Center. Washington, D. C. : AFSWP. WT-394-EX. October 1979. 198 Pages.

AD/A995 072

OPERATION JAHGLB

Project 2.5*-l AIRB0RN3 PARTICLE STUDIES

Lt. Col. Charles Robbins Chemical Corps

Major Hugh R. Lehaan David R. Powers

tf. S. Air Force Chemioal Corns

James D. Wiloox Cheoiosl Corps

July 1952

CHEMICAL A!fD RADIOLO&ICXL LABORATORIES Army Chemioal Center , Maryland

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DISTANCE (I04FIET)

Figure 5»1 Concentration of Activity in the Clou* as a Function of Distance on the Down- wind Leg* Filter Sampler Data, Activity was corrected to time at which cloud passed each station*

- 122 -

PROJECT 2.5a-l 5#5 STUDY OF FRACTIONATION

5»5»1 Radiocherajstrv

The data concerning the nuclide activity p8r unit mass of active material as a function of particle sizo, irhich is con- tainod in Table 4.15, provided a method of investigating the mechanism whereby particles acquire activity. The data for Sr8* and ZR9* have been plotted in Figs. 5. h and 5.5 • Referring to Fig. 5.4, it appears that a straight line with a slope of -1 may be fitted to the data, whereas this is not possible with the data in Fig. 5.5.^ Allowing for some over-simplification , it appears that the Sr89 activity is a function of particle surface, whereas that for Zr9^ tends to be more of a volume function. Ba*40 gives a plot similar to the Sr8? pi0t, while Ce1^ is similar to Zr95# Further study is being made of these data, particularly with respect to the question of whether the activity of Zr?5 and Ce^ ±a concentrated in a shell rather than a volume. Exaiaination of the decay chains of these four nuclides provides a plausible reason why there should bo a difference in the mechanism for acquiring radioactivity. The decay chains are as follows^:

Kr89 2.*y Kb89 15.^ Sr89

Kr95 shor^ Rb95 short, Sr95 shorty T95 10.5a, Zr95

Xe _lfa>.Ce 66a x Ba140

It may be seen that Ba1^0 and Sr89 both have gaseous precursors that have half-lives long in comparison with the lifetime of the fireball, s^noe gases such as krypton and xenon are not significantly subject *> adsorption above liquid air temperatures, it is logical to supoose «*t while the Zr*5 and C*LU> chains passed the rare gas stage early •nough to be adsorbed during the particle growth process, no appreci- able amount of Kr*** and XeW° decayed before the particles had ceased *° grow. Hence the Sr89 and Ba1/;tr activities were confined to the outermost surfaces of the particles.

C. D. Coryell & N. Sugarman, op cit, pp. 1996-2001

- 137 -

weapon test report WT-414

g#o INHALATION STTOISS

Dogs and sheep were exposed on. the ground surface and in foxhole? at distances of 2500 to 6000 feet in the predicted dovnvind direction from each shot, The purpose of the exposure vas to allow the assessment of hazards due to inhalation of radioactire dusts associated vita these detonations and to compare internal and external radiation dosegoe,

Total body activity for animals exposed in the underground test

ranged from Z to 31 mlcrocuries corrected to time of sacrifice. Tor lunj

tissuei integrated dosage doe to beta emission ranged betveon 0,2 and

9*0 rep, Radloautographa of lung tissues indicated the presence of a

fev alpha emitting particles. Bone analyses indicated cone uptdo of Balto and Sr90^

The amounta of activity taken up by the combined action of irhalrv- tioa and ideation are not considered to to physiologically significant even for animals rocoiving cumulative extomal gama riialr/ticn docc^cs up to several thousand roentgens,

77

9.3 CLOTHIEG lECOHTAKINAIIOtf AM) STALUAIIQg OP LADF1QY METHODS

Standard and special U, S. Army Quartermaster Corps laundering nethods and standard laundry equipment were evaluated for field decern-* tamination of clothing and selected fabrics, No clothing worn by personnel became contaminated to a significant degree during this operation. Therefore, this project vas carried out with clothing deliberately contaminated with radioactive material from the fall-out area.

The project evaluated the standard and several special laundering formulae, various types of clothing materials, and monitoring instruments (Project 6*7) • ^e significant result of this project is the indication that .clothing contamination resulting from vork in areas contaminated by atomic bomb detonations will not produce even minor injury to per- sonnel. This conclusion is based on consideration of the data on saturation values of deliberate clothing contamination reduced to one hour after detonation, The resultant exposure to personnel vould be less than that required to produce even slight skin irritation (cos*- parable to mild sunburn). Other conditions, such as muddy terrain and ouch higher specific activity, could increase the amount of contamination received by clothing, but an increase in level of neveral orders of magnitude vould be required to produce injury. In these cases it is certain that routine standards of cleanliness vould effective?.^- prevent injury from this cause.

SEjCl

AD482985

W T - 393 Copy

O/h&UtftOH

*»«jW»Ww*ifi»!'tsM*¥»r:i

JANGLE

NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS OCTOBER -NOVEMBER 1951

Project 2,3-2

FOXHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION

EACH TRANSMITTAL OF THIS DOCUMENT OUTSIDE THE AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C, 20301.

IRESTRICTED DATA

VATOMtC ENERGY ACT 1946

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

,ap-™« WASHINGTON D.C.

:vyHEff

„yi'Secur)tt Information

MIHF'I1 ■ ' ' Ia 7|

SSJCBBS

Srartty tsf veitin

PBOJBCT 2.3-2 TASB 3.1

Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Surface Burst)

Range (ft)	Location	Twonnan Foxhole	One-man \ Foxhole	doll Pipe
2000	36p Above Surface Surface 16W Below Surface 32" Below Surface US" Below Surface	800 r 700 230 205 105 2k 58 136 12.8 22 62
2500	3fi» Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32" Below Surface 1\|8* Below Surface	230 r 220 35 60 85 7 15 26 k 8.5 13.3
3000	36*1 Above Surface Surface 16° Below Surface 32" Below Surface U8n Below Surface	110 r 90 23 36 55 7.6 12.U 19.1* 2.5 1.8 6.7	6.6 2.5 1.6	$$ 6.6 2.1» 1	73 r 10 0.5 0
3500	36" Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32* 'Below Surface li8" Below Surface	tar 3 ~ 9.7 1.6 2.8 3.k .5U .99 1.9
1(000	36" Above Surface Surface 16* Below Surface 32* Below Surface 18* Below Surface	17 r 9.6 1.6 3 5.6 0.6 1.12 1.62 - 0.5L 0.57	oT39	ol35	17 r 0.17
Woo	36* Above Surface Surface 16" Below Surface 32" Below Surfaoe li8* Below Surface	9.8 r k.6 1 1.8 3.5 0.5 0.7 1.0b 0.21 O.li 0.57
5000	36* Above Surface Surface 16* Below Surfaoe 32* Below Surfaoe i8* Below Surfaoe	U.8 r 2.7 0.6 0.99 2.95 0.3 0.5 0.75 0,17 0f2 0.J8

RESTIUCTCODAtA

Atoftie cncrot act it*

PROJECT 2.3-2 TABIE 3.2 Distribution of Gamma Radiation in Foxholes (Underground Burst)

Range (ft)

Location

Two-man Foxhole

One -nan Foxhole

"SoET Pipe

2000

36" Above Surface 16" Below 32" Below k9n Below

Surface

Surface Surface Surface

3850 r 2300

USO — 300 700 1000 555 200 200 200

2560

36n Above Surface I6n Below 32« Below U8" Below

Surface

Surface Surface Surface

1000 — 550 r

78

78 98 U5

U3 56 50

73.U 9U 96

3000

36* Above Surface 16" Below 32" Below U8* Below

Surface

Surface Surface Surface

175 r

103

30 1*2 37

22 23 20

U3»5 U5 5U

20

15

Ja

75

11

il

155 r

7 3

35bo

36» Above Surface 16" Below

^2» Below 8" Below

Surface

Surface Surface Surface

12

9

31

W 17 10

11

15

9

22

llOOO

36" Above Surface

Surface

16* Below Surface * Below Surface » BeMjf Surface

s

6

5 6

32r 22

7

3.U 8.k

15 7.2 6.6

7

I-7

u

2.8

28 r

2

0

-2*1

Woo

36" Abora Surfaoa

Surf tot

16* Balow Surf act " Balow Surf aca * Briar Surf act

S

U

5.8

22 r

10

2.8

-2*2.

5

2.6

5ooo

36* Abort Surface

Surf to*

16* Balow Surfaoa

* Balow Surfaoa

* Btlflf Surf Mi

IS

15 21.5

1

73 r 23

15

22.6

a

67 15

2L

r<-

-7-

AXOmLJhMmf ACT te*t

CHAPTER J>

CONCLUSIONS

5,1 POIHOLE SHIELDING OF GAMMA RADIATION 5*1*1 Surface Detonation

Standard foxholes provide excellent protection to personnel from the gamma radiation emitted during the detonation of ma atomic weapon on the surface of the ground* The results from the comparatively small sized weapon employed in Operation JANGEB show that 2000 feet from the burst, the location of the closest foxhole doses of about 60r were measured at the bottom of a f oxhole, less than 10 per cent of the dose measured 3 feet above the surface of the ground* Due to the location of the foxhole in the crosswind direction, the dose at the bottom was caused primarily by scattered prompt radia- tion plus a small contribution from the residual activity of the fis- sion products on the surface of the ground* In the downwind direction there would be a contribution from matter that falls out from the cloud Into the foxhole in addition to the above mentioned* This fall- out will depend on the wind velocity for a given sized weapon, and although it is expected to increase the dose in the foxholes, es- pecially in those located close to the detonation* it is relatively unimportant in comparison to the prompt and residual activity since it can be easily shoveled out of the foxhole in a short tiw*

5*1*2 fltaderground Detonation

With the possible exception of those located in the area close to the point of detonation where extensive fall-out occurs* foxhole* also provide effective shielding In the case of an under- ground detonation* Even within this area of extensive fall-out, which at Operation JJU10I2 extended approximately 2000 feet, the high doses recorded in the foxholes could be greatly reduced by digging out the radioactive matter that fell into the hole* It is highly probable that one-half the doses reoorded in the foxholes located within 2500 feet of the detonation at Operation JANOB were directly attributable to this type of fall-out and most likely a higher percentage at dis- tances greater than 2500 feet*

•19-

JBREI KSTRtCTTO MTU

TQPSB3RET UK National Archives PREM 11/560,

12 July 1951

PRIME KOTSTER **

Clan dog tine Use of Atomic Weapons

The Chiefs of Staff have hem considering ths possibility that the enemy might open the next war with an atomic attack on London on the

model of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - without warning and before any formal declaration of hostilities, The most effective method of making such an attack would be to drop an atomic bomb from a military aircraft. If the control and reporting system were fully manned and alert in a period of tension, there would be some chance that hostile aircraft approaching this country could, be intercepted and driven off. At any rate, there are no special measures, outside the normal measures of air defence, whioh we could take in peace-time to guard against this type of attack. 2. It is, however, possible that the enemy might use other means

of surprise attack with atomic weapons* A clandestine attack oould be made in either of the following ways:-

(1) A complete atomic bomb oould be concealed in the hold of a

merchant ship coming from the Soviet Union or a satellite oountry to a port in the United Kingdcm: (ii) An atomic bomb might be broken dom into a number of parts and introduced into this country in about fifty wll packages of moderate wei^it. None of these packages could be detected by instruments as containing anything dangerous or explosive, and even visual inspection of the contents of the packages would not make identification certain, Iftiese packages could be introduced either as ordinary merchandise from Soviet ships, or possibly as diplomatic freight. The bomb could subsequently be assembled in any premises with the sort of eaulpaent usual in a small garage, provided that a small team of skilled fitters was available to do the job*

OPERATION HURRICANE— THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

25 KT BURST IN SHIP

FIG. 72

NORTH WEST IftLANO

I HOUR AFTER EXPLOSION

ROENTGENS, PER HOUR

T

uo

DASA-1251:
	WIXD DATA
Altitude	Direction	Speed
T—t	degrees	mph
1,000	158.5	17.2
2*000	l*i 1.5	16.7
3.000	133.0	17.1
i»,000	129.0	11. 0
5.000	123.0	12.9
6,000	117.5	12.2
7,000	117.5	11.6
6,000	122.0	10.6
9.000	129.5 138.0	9.7
10,000	9.1

200 , *

600 1,000

. , - ■'«» .100-''

— - ^£-^r*~ — --* i*«oo-^-

" - ___- ^1,000

Dose-rate Area

(r/hr) at one hour (Sq. Miles)

2,000 _---' ^ -

6,000 ^10,000

AWRE-Tl/54, ~ 27 Aug. 1954

ipoovos

**%&?

5,000

4,000

3,000

o

>* 2,000

N O

£

o 1,000

it

U

I 0

Q

tpoo

2,000 3,000

_ Baker r/hr at H+l

" » » I M ' ' ' I t I I 1

I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I Operation HARDTACK I - Umbrella

cumulative dose to 6 hours

150 ft under vater Water depth 150 ft

WT-1316 (EX)

EXTRACTED VERSION

OPERATION REDWING

Project 2.62a

Fallout Studies by Oceanographic Methods

Pacific Proving Grounds May- July, 1956

Defense Atomic Support Agency Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico

February 6, 1961

NOTICE

This is an extract of WT-1316. Operation REDWING, Project 2.62a, which remains classified Secret) Restricted Data as of this date.

Extract version prepared for: Director

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20305

1 February 1980

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

TAB

2.11

Navajo

Tewa

«m^

Total Yield, Mt 4.50 Fission proportion 5%

5.01

87%

H + 1 Hour Dose	Area (mi2)
Rate (r/hr)	Within Contour
1,000	25 450
500	55 1,050
300	80 1,550
100	310 3,500
Two -day	Area (mi2)
Dose, R	Within Contour
1,000	20 520
500	30 1,050
300	45 1,500
100	350 3,000

CLEAN BOMB: 3.53 MT (15% FISSION) ZUNI

WT-1316

DIRTY BOMB: 5.01 MT (87% FISSION) TEWA

WT-1316

Accumulated dose )6'4« Figure 2.44 t65» toH + 50

X

o 2

MM

i

a ZUNI (3.53 MT, 15% FISSION)

♦ FLATHEAD (0.365 MT, 73% FISS.)

* NAVAJO (4.5 MT, 5% FISSION) © TEWA (5.01 MT, 87% FISSION)

REDWING TEST DOSE RATES id— SCALED TO 5 MT FISSION YIELD

WT-1344 (ADA995132), FIG. 3.17

J I L_

10'

o*

AREA (SQUARE MILES)

I0J

3 o

I

03 O

O

o

J*

OS

0)

a

8-

V

•r-4 ■•->

o

03 ed 6

s

tuo

-t->

o

C

o

•ft

+■>

o

I0°c

lO-'fcr

io-2t

io-3t

10

-4

T — I I I llll| 1 — I I I l!ll|

JANGLE S

jj i ni| 1 — r

TEAPOT ESS

ASYMPTOTE FOR Fc AS Z~0

PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL

Fc CURVE FOR I kt

ASYMPTOTE FOR NO DYNAMIC VENTING

BLANCAl

UCRL-12125

i »iii ml ml | | | | mil I I MINI

i mum

-

10'

10

10'

DEPTH/W173 (ft/ktl/3)

UCRL-12125

Event	W, kt	z, ft	F	Medium
Sedan	100	635	0.10	Alluvium
Teapot ESS	1.2	67	0.46	Alluvium
Jangle U	1.2	17	0.64	Alluvium
Neptune	0.115	100	0.005	Tuff
Jangle S	1.2	0	0.50	Alluvium
Danny Boy	0.43	109	0.04	Basalt
Blanca	19	835	0.0005	Tuff

UCRL-12125

10

Sedan, 104 kt (30% fission)

90% activity was trapped in crater 8% was in main cloud 2% was in base surge

lo-'t-

PREDICTED

OBSERVED

At 24 hours, 52% of gamma radiation was neutron induced tungsten pusher

10

-2

1

10 20 30 40 50 DISTANCE, NAUTICAL MILES

60

70

TEAPOT-ESS: 5 SEC. (1.2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1955)

TEAPOT-ESS: 3 MIN. (1 .2 KT NUCLEAR TEST AT 67 FEET DEPTH, NEVADA, 23 MARCH 1 955)

m

7000

6000

8000

4000

3000

TEAPOT - Ess 23 Mar 1955 1 .2 kt at 67 ft depth, Nevada soil, 20 mph wind (Fallout on Banded Mountain spread over slopes, reducing dose rates.)

N

o 2000

6

o

jj 1000

1000

2000

3000

I000r/h? line 2000 r/hr 3000r/hc 5000 r/hr 6000r/hr

llllllIM

3000 2000 1000

4000 5000 6000 7000

DAS A 1251

0 1000 2000 3000

Olitanct from GZ, Yards

CRATER DATA: diameter: 292 ft HEIGHT OP BURST: -6'f ft

Depth: 96 ft

Maximum Dose Rate: 6000 r/hr at CIOUD TOP HKIGHT: 12,000 ft MSL

H+l hour at crater lip

UCRL-51440 (1973)

H+l hr

500 rad/hr 100 rad/hr 50 rad/hr 10 rad/hr

5 rad/hr

^TBanded

% Mt.

N

5 rod/ hr

Teapot-ESS

RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN

104 RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND ITS EFFECTS ON MAN

(May- June 1957 Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy)

STATEMENT OP DK. W. W. KELLOGG, BAND CORP.

Atmospheric Transport and Close-in Fallout of Radioactive Debris

From Atomic Explosions

In the case of an air burst in which the white-hot fireball never reaches the surface, the radioactive fission products never come into close contact with the surface material; they remain as an exceedingly fine aerosol. At first sight this might be thought to be an oversimplification, since there have been many cases in which the fireball never touched the ground, but the surface material was observed to have been sucked up into the rising atomic cloud. Actually, how- ever, in such cases a survey of the area has shown that there has been a negligible amount of radioactive fallout on the ground. Though tons of sand and dust may have been raised by the explosion, they apparently did not become contaminated by fission products.

The explanation for this curieus fact prabably lies in a detailed consideration of the way fn which the surface material is sucked up into the fireball of an air burst. Within a few seconds from burst time, the circulation in the atomic fireball develops a toroidal form, with an updraft in the middle and downdraft around the outside. Most of the fission products are then confined to a dough- nut-shaped region, and may be thought of as constituting a smoke ring. When the surface debris Is carried into the fireball a few seconds after the detonation, it passes up along the axis of the cloud, through the middle, and can often be seen to cascade back down around the outside of the cloud. In its passage through the cloud, it has passed around the radioactive smoke ring but has never mixed with it

s000' ' ■ ' | I I I | »

r/hr at H+l hour

tooo

I

IOOO

1000

tooo

*000

15 kt UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE - arable 25 May 1953 FIREBALL Radius at 2nd naximura: 557*6 HEIGHT OF BURST: $2k ft

TYPE OF BURST AND PIACEMEHT: Airburst of guntype veapon

CLOUD TOP HEIGHT: 35,000 ft MSL CLOUD BOTTOM HEIGHT: 23,000 ft MSL

ENCORE, 27 KT AIR BURST AT 2,423 FT

1000

500

8 $00

I

.10

o

1000

1500

1000 500 0 500

Distance From GZ, Yards

1000

1500

LAPLACE 1 kt 750 ft balloon air burst

S iooo

8000

000

Distance From GZ, yards

OWENS 9.7 kt 500 ft balloon air burst

DOPPLER 1 1 kt 1500 ft balloon air burst

2000

1000 0 1000

Distance From 62, yards

tooo

2000

Doppler. r/hr nt H+l hour.

U t I 1 * I ' I I * » I >

1000 0 1000

Dittanot From GZ, yards

tooo

Harold F. Per la and Harry Haller (Holmes and Narver, Inc.)* Engi- neering Study of Underground Highway and Parking Garage and Blast Shelter, OENL-TM-1381 (March 1966).

ESEB UPPER AND LOWER PARKING AREAS

'■■'■» UPPER PARKING AREAS

EZZ2I LOWER PARKING AREAS

l|lff I BLAST OOORS AND PEDESTRIAN BYPASS

MANHATTAN AQUEDUCT

TRAFFIC TUBES PARKING LOT ACCESS AND EXITS

QUEENS

Boslc Concept; Transportation Use Only

Shelter for 600 thousand Persons 1.2 million 1.8 million

^ BROOKLYN

$ 546 million Cost/ Person

$ 395

$ 339

$ 322

s^ £ASTIjmaNNel WELFARE ISLAND

HUDSON RtVER (NORTH RIVER)

Proposed Dual -Use Shelters for Manhattan* (interconnecting Traffic Tubes and Underground Parking Areas)

Report on a Study

of Non-Military Defense

July 1, 1958

Report R-322-RC

THE RAND CORPORATION

II. Population Shelters

The first big question that must be raised about non-military defense is whether people can in fact be protected from modern nuclear weapons. Protection involves not only provision of shelters capable of withstanding blast and fallout effects, but also arrange- ments for getting people into the shelters in response to different kinds of warnings. It should be stated at the beginning that it is impossible to provide reliable protection for all the population, and that the fraction of the population effectively protected depends greatly on the essentially uncertain nature of the enemy attack. There appear to be a number of possibilities for protective systems, how- ever, and under plausible assumptions about the enemy attack and the civilian response, significant — and in some cases dramatic — reductions in civilian casualties appear to be obtainable.

TYPES OF SHELTERS

Improvised fallout shelters, even if only capable of reducing radia- tion to &© or Ho of the radiation outside, could have a significant effect in reducing casualties among people outside the areas of blast damage. There seem to be many possibilities of identifying and pre- paring such shelters in existing buildings in small cities and towns. For example, a location in the center of the basement of a 40,000- square-foot building (a typical large office, store, or school building) may provide an attenuation to about Ko. Moreover, a foot of earth gives a reduction to about %0, and sandbags distributed in advance could be quickly filled and placed to provide this type of shielding. Even buildings whose structural characteristics provide smaller attenuation factors could be quite useful, with arrangements for washing down or sweeping the roofs and surrounding areas (ex- posure to carry out the decontamination being rationed among the shelter inhabitants).

20 A STUDY OF NON-MILITARY DEFENSE

Table 2 ESTIMATED LONG-TERM RADIATION AFTER VARIOUS ATTACKS

1500 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (50-CITY ATTACK)

Average Maximum Minimum

Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 0.4 8,3 0.003

Radiation rate after 90 days with counter- measured (miiliroentgens per hour) 0.46 10 0.0035

Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 3.4 73 0.026

Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) .. 40 830 0.3 Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with- out countermeasures (microcuries) 2 42 0.015

20,000 MEGATONS OF FISSION PRODUCTS (AREA ATTACK)

Average Maximum Minimum

Total fallout (kilotons per square mile) 5.3 36 0.04

Radiation rate after 90 days with counter- measures0 (miiliroentgens per hour) 6.5 43 0.049

Cumulative lifetime exposure* (roentgens) ... 48 310 0.36

Strontium-90 fallout (curies per square mile) . . 530 3600 4 Cumulative lifetime concentration in bone with- out countermeasures (microcuries) 26 180 0.2

a Assumes that radiation rates are reduced to ^oo of the level computed with the r-1-2 formula, because of decontamination, shielding and time-rationing, and inaccuracy in the formula.

Area around ground zero at Nagasaki before and after explosion (1,000-foot radius circles are shown).

THE EFFECTS OF

THE ATOMIC BOMBS

AT HIROSHIMA

AND NAGASAKI

v

REPORT OF THE BRITISH MISSION TO JAPAN

PUBLISHED

FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY

HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

LONDON

1946

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Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA, Typical, part below ground, earth- covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to " flashburn." Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have caused casualties.

Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas* nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of damage.

EARTH ARCHING USED TO STRENGTHEN SHELTERS

ORNL-5037

■■•«■»

Mound height = v half trench width

A familiar example of effective earth arching is its use with sheet metal culverts under roads. The arching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walled culvert prevents it from being crushed by the weight of heavy vehicles.

UK NATIONAL ARCHIVES: ES 5/2

ANDERSON SHELTER TESTS AGAINST 25 KT NUCLEAR

NEAR SURFACE BURST (2.7 METRES DEPTH IN SHIP)

AWRE-Tl/54, 27 Aug. 1954

SECRET -GUARD

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

(formerly of Ministry of Supply)

SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE

(Monte Bello Islands, Australia — October, 1952)

130 x 10' 77 x 106 13-5x 1Q3 p~ R3 + R2 + R

p is the maximum excess pressure in p.s.i. and R is the distance in feet

Fig. 12. 1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship shown in the photo, moored 400 yards off shore.

"

Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right: Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 27 60 ft.

12.1. Blast Damage to Anderson Shehers

At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3.

At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of the explosion owing to intervening sandhills.

SECRET-GUARD

29

13. The Penetration of the Gamma Flash

13.1. Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit Trenches

13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most important results of the trial.

13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.

The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz- fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance, with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded by open and covered trenches.

In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 1 1 inches of sand.

Table 13.1 Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench

			Rectan-
	Rectangular	gular	Circular open	Rectangular
Type of trench	broadside-on	end-on		broadside-on
	open		open		covered
Distance (yards)	1,300	943	733	1,300	1,300	943	943	733
Surface dose	300	3,000	14,000	300	300	3,000	3,000	14,000
(Roentgens]	1
Depth below grounc	I
level (inches)
6	150	1,000	—	230	214	1,200	(75)	—
12	75	430	—	150	120	545	47-6	—
24	33-3	150	584	60	54-5	188	25	(140)
36	23	70	216	31-6	30	86	13	(56)
48	(20)	43	100	20	17-7	48-5	7-7	(31)
60		(37-5)	61	13-6	10-7	(33-3)	5	(23)
72	1	~~~	(46-7)	(8-6)	7	•" ■	(3-5)

Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.

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HOME^OFFICE

CD/SA 12 £irp* .NO S.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER

A CCMPABIQON BSTDSEN TOB NUUBSR Of PEOPLE KILLED PJER TONUS OF BCMBS PPKENG WORLD «AR I AND WOULD WAR II

BOMB SIZES

For World War II the average bomb ?/eight was between 150 - 200 kg, (R.C# 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were 12 or 50 kg.

TABLE 5

Relative safeties in World War II deduced from "population and casualty distribution-""™

In the open

Under cover

In

shelter

Population exposure Location people killed Relative safety

RELATIVE DANGER!

2

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60$

1%

1C#

( 1 ) A house about 3^ times as safe as in the open. (2; A shelter about twice as safe as a house.

Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 191 6, in which the total number killed was 59, 69»5?S of the people killed in the City were in the open.

HOME OFFICE

AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

DIRECTIONS

FOR THE ERECTION AND SINKING

OF THE GALVANISED CORRUGATED

STEEL SHELTER

(ANDERSON SHELTER)

February 1939

Crown Copyright Rgurvid

London family who survived in Anderson shelter during Blitz, when the shelter absorbed the blast (earth was blown off) in 1 940

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pIG# 3 —The Individual Parts.

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Fig. 4. — Stage 12. Covering the Shelter with Earth.

Fig. 4. — Stage 13. The Shelter Complete with Earth Cover.

Anderson shelter survives hit: Norwich 27 April 1942

Anderson shelter survives, Croydon, October 1 940

>

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Proof that the Anderson garden shelter could withstand a house collapsing on It can be teen In this picture Mr and Mrs Claque bless their insistence on going to ground whan their homes and those of their neighbours were >ducad to rubbta.

Anderson shelter survives at Latham Street, Poplar, London, 1941:

And They Came Out of It Alive . . .

The edge o! this bomb crater, 30ft. dtep, In * household garden near London, U only 4ft. from the Anderson shelter. But the two people in the shelter during London's six hour raid - Mrs. Clark and Miss C'&rk—were unhurt. You see Miss Clark In the picture examining the damage to the structure. «

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27

fTHIS DOCUMENT IS ffCB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJE8TY'8 GOVERNMENT ).

81

Z&JjtfS&Jl* COPY NO. 6^

January 16th. 1941.

WAR CABINET, AIR RAID SHELTER POLICY. Memorandum by the Minister cf Home Security.

6. Shelter in the home; The Anderson shelter was originally intended for indoor usobut for a number of reasons including the danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted. Experience has shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson

or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought and two designs have been produced which can be erected indoors without support. Those new types, although they may give sllghtlj less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors, would fill the needs of a largo section of the public , especially the middle class. One design allows the use of the shelter as part of the furniture of the room.

7. I regard shelters of this typo as of the first importance and wish to provide them on a big scale* Each shelter will use over 3 cwt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to two children to sloop inside. For on outlay of about 65,000 tons of steel, as a first instalment , I could therefore produce 400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000 persons. I should wish to complete such a programme within the first three months of production and thoreafter at a similar or increasing rate. From enquiries I bolieve that manufacture can bo arranged provided steel is supplied and if the Cabinet approves my policy I shall require thoir direction that the steel be

made available.

10* Conclusions.

I ask for a general endorsoment of the polioy I have outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of my colleagues:

(i) that proposals for building shelters of massive construction should be rejected;

(ii) that steel should bo made available to carry out the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the provision of stool shelters indoors;

(iii) that the limit of income for the provision of free shelter for insured persons should be raised from £850 to £550 per annum*

H.M.

MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY, January 15th. 1941.

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November 1940 design by C. A. Joy, M. Inst. Me. & C. E., Bexley Borough Engineer (UK National Archives: HO 205/257)

ANDERSON SHELTER (Indoors to avoid groundwater flooding, damp and cold)

4.5" partition wall

9" wall

Floor boards and joists

4" x 2"

4.5" sleeper wall

6" site concrete

MORRISON SHELTER (indoor table shelter)

4" x 2" floor joists

Table shelters allowed escape from any side easily, reducing fire risks

Patent specification by Prof. John Fleetwood Baker, Ministry of Home Security (National Archives HO 356/10)

Structural Defense, 1945, by D. G0 Christopher son, Ministry of Home Security, RC 450, (1946),- Chapters VIII and IX (Confidential)

Chapter VIII summarizes the literature on the design and types of British shelters and analyzes their effectiveness.

National Archives HO 195/16

SHELTER at home

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ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY

ILLUSTRATION NO. 8.

The house in the upper photograph had a Government steel table shelter in a downstairs room and was blown up to reproduce the effect of a heavy bomb falling near. The whole house collapsed, burying the shelter under debris. In the lower photo the shelter can be seen still intact. It would have been possible for anyone in the shelter to get out unaided.

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Morrison shelter survives direct hit in York 1942

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HOME OFFICE

THE PROTECTION

OF YOUR HOME

AGAINST AIR RAIDS

READ THIS BOOK THROUGH

THEN KEEP IT CAREFULLY

THINGS TO DO NOW

HOW TO CHOOSE A REFUGE-ROOM

Almost any room will serve as a refuge-room if it is soundly constructed, and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its windows should be as few and small as possible, preferably facing a building or blank wall, or a narrow street. If a ground floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open ground is chosen, the windows should if possible be specially protected (see pages 30 and 31). The stronger the walls, floor, and ceiling are, the better. Brick partition walls are better than lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling is better than a wooden one. An internal passage will form a very good refuge-room if it can be closed at both ends.

The best floor for a refuge-room

A cellar or basement is the best place for a refuge-room if it can be made reasonably gas-proof and if

flooded by a neighbouring river that

may burst its banks, or by a burst

water-main. If you have any doubt £*"£ °'basement is the b^ m J m J ^VI~L position for a refuge-room if it

about tne risk or flooding ask for con be made reasonably ga$- advice from your local Council Proof Offices.

Alternatively, any room on any floor below the top floor may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided as they usually do not give sufficient protection overhead from small in- cendiary bombs. These small bombs would probably penetrate the roof but be stopped by the top floor, though In a house with only two floors they might burn through to the floor and witho^ Q ce/tor, choose a

, / .jf • *i j 1 -1 room on the ground floor so than

below if not quickly dealt with. you have protection overhead

Page 8

IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR

Strengthening the room

If your reftige-room is on the ground floor or in the base- ment, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above. How

to support a ceiling

The illus- tration below shows the detail of how to fix the props

you will a piece of

The smaller illustration shows how the posts are held in position at the top by two blocks of wood on the ceiling beam. The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot, driven in opposite ways. Do not drive these wedges too violendy, otherwise you may lift the ceiling and damage it. If the floor of your refuge-room is solid, such as you might find in a basement,

not need a plank across the whole floor, but only

wood a foot or so long under each prop.

Page 17

EXTRA PRECAUTIONS

EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

trenches. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air raid wardens will also be able to advise,

sandbags. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick. Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If you can completely close the window opening with a wall of sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window must still be sealed inside against gas.

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Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for cement, will do for sandbags. But if they are large, don't fill

Page 30

UK National Archives: CAB / 67 / 9 / 44 ± q g

THIS DOCUMENT IS THB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1941.

MOST SECRET. Copy No.

W.P. (O) (41) 44.

May 5, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOOK AND KEY.

It it requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

AIR RAIDS ON LONDON, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1940.

Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

Framed buildings.

Most valuable information has been gained on the effects of bombs on framed buildings. Such buildings are practically immune to anything but a direct hit. Blast damage from bombs outside is usually confined to windows and internal partitions. Even parachute mines falling immediately outside (he building or exploding on the roof produce negligible damage to structure or floors.

Relation of Casualties to Bombs Dropped.

From a knowledge of the number of bombs dropped and the casualties occurring in different boroughs, some idea can be gained of the effectiveness of bombs in producing casualties. The number of casualties per bomb varies widely from 1-59 in the least to 6 * 94 in the most populated boroughs, but it follows closely the apparent densities of population as shown in figure 1. The number of casualties per bomb is roughly a twelfth of the number of persons per acre, and the number of deaths per bomb about 1 /60th of the number of persons per acre. From this it can be deduced that the mean distance at which injury from a bomb is likely to occur is 35 ft., and that at which the bomb is lethal is 15 ft.

The casualties per bomb in Central London fell steadily from an average of 3*7 in September to 2-7 in October and 1-7 in November. This corresponds to the considerable fall in population in most of the boroughs concerned.

Conclusion.

We may now say that we have a good general understanding, both qualitative and quantitative, of the effects of bombs on buildings and on cities. New types of bombs, particularly heavier bombs, may be used, but we can anticipate no startling change in the effects apart from increase in minor damage. With bombing of the present type the results of our work are to show that in urban areas, such as that of the County of London, for one ton of bombs approximately 10 houses will be destroyed or will need pulling down. 25 more will be temporarily uninhabitable, and another 80 will be slightly damaged. 80 people will be made temporarily homeless and 35 will lose their homes permanently. 25 people, mostly among the latter category, will be wounded, the greater part of them slightly, and 6 will be killed or die from wounds.

Contact detonator

Electronic control

V2 IRBM (intermfedrate range ballistic missile)

2JD0 miles range, 1 ton warhead

Warhead / A

Warhead 1.7\m long, 0.9 m diameter

Guidance system

Steel frame

Launch cradle

Double walled alcohol pipe

Firing control (60 m safe range)

Gyroscopes Alcohol tanl

Liquid oxygen tanc

?n filling

pipe

Launch position

Plumbing ^ Hydraulics

ne pump Combustion chamber

Control vanes Support jack

Steel blast shield

Aldwych, 30 June 1944, VI attack

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V-2 ATTACK at Smithfield Market, London, where 110 people were killed and 123 seriously injured when pavements were crowded

CIVIL DEFENCE

RESCUE MANUAL

LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1952

CHAPTER XI. USE OF HEAVY MECHANICAL

PLANT IN RESCUE, DEMOLITION AND

CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

In the last war it was found that at major incidents the use of heavy mechanical plant was frequently necessary in support of rescue opera- tions. Such equipment was used to help in the quick removal of debris ; to lift heavy blocks of brickwork or masonry ; to take the weight of collapsed floors and girders so that voids could be explored and casualties extricated ; to haul off twisted steelwork and other debris and to break up sections of reinforced concrete.

In future all these tasks may be required and heavy clearance may have to be effected to enable rescue and other Civil Defence vehicles

8 March 1 945 Fjg 2o 1 ton of TNT equivalent

Using heavy mechanical plant at the Smithfield Market V.2 incident.

97

to approach within measurable distance of their tasks. The problem of debris will in fact be a major factor in Civil Defence operations.

Heavy mechanical plant may be required for the following purposes :

(a) To assist in the removal of persons injured or trapped. At this stage mainly heavy plant is needed, particularly mobile cranes with sufficient length of boom or jib to reach for long distances over the wreckage of buildings.

(A) To force a passage for Civil Defence vehicles and fire appliances to enable them to reach areas where major rescue and other problems exist and require urgent operational action.

(c) To take certain safety measures — e.g., to pull down unsafe structures.

(d) To clear streets and pavements to help restore communications and to afford access for the repair of damaged mains and pipes beneath the streets.

(e) For the final clearance of debris and the, tidying of sites. This is a long term and not an operational requirement

Urgent Rescue Operations

During rescue operations in London in the last war the machines used with great success included heavy 3 J-5 ton mobile cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 30-40 ft. jib ; medium heavy 2-3 J ton mobile cranes, mounted on road wheels, with a 26 ft. jib j heavy crawler tractor bulldozers ; medium crawler tractor bulldozers ; mechanical shovels and compressors, three stage, mounted on road wheels.

In the case of a large or multiple incident where access was obstructed by considerable quantities of scattered debris, a bulldozer or tractor was first employed in order to clear one or more approaches by which other equipment and personnel could reach the scene of operations.

Next, all debris of manhandling size was loaded into one-yard skips and discharged by the crane into lorries, giving increased manoeuvring space to the Services operating on the site.

Heavy mobile cranes were then brought up to the incident where, used under the skilled direction of the rescue party Leader, they were invaluable for removing girders and large blocks of masonry which obstructed access to casualties or persons trapped. The necessary chains and wire ropes for these operations formed part of the standard equipment of the heavy and medium-heavy mobile cranes.

The work was, of course, carried out in close co-operation with the Rescue Parties who also used various forms of light mechanical equip- ment, such as jacks and ratchet lifting tackle for work in confined spaces.

Compressors sometimes proved valuable for breaking up large masonry such as fallen walls, into sections of a size and weight within the handling and lifting capacity of the cranes. This method was only used when it was known that there were no casualties under the masonry*

HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

CIVIL DEFENCE HANDBOOK No. 7

Rescue

This Handbook is a revised edition of,

and replaces, the

Civil Defence Rescue Manual

LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1960

CHAPTER 6

Types of Damage from Modern Air Attack

General Characteristics

6.1 When a nuclear weapon explodes an immense amount of energy is released almost instantaneously and the contents are transformed into a rapidly expanding white hot ball of gas at a temperature as high as that on the sun. From this "fireball" a pulse of intense light and heat is radiated in all directions. The materials in the fireball are also a source of radioactivity in various forms. As the fireball expands and cools, a powerful blast wave develops. As it cools still further, it shoots upwards to a height of many thousands of feet, billowing out at the top to give the appearance of a huge mushroom or cauliflower on its stalk.

6.2 The three forms of energy released in the explosion, namely, light and heat, radioactivity, and blast, all produce effects in different ways and in different proportions according to the position of the explosion in relation to the surface underneath. This chapter, however, deals primarily with the damage caused to buildings by the blast effect.

6.3 With nuclear weapons (as opposed to high explosive weapons), blast pressure rather than "impulse" tends to be the criterion of damage. If the effective blast pressure exceeds the static strength of the structure, failure must be expected. If it is less, no failure can occur however long the duration of the blast. In fact, nuclear bomb blast is more like a strong wind than the sudden blow of high explosive blast, and many of the failures observed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in subsequent tests resemble closely the kind of damage that might be done to build- ings by a hurricane.

6.4 The scarcity of suction damage from the nominal bombs in Japan was due to the high blast pressures produced and to the fact that these were three or four times as great as the blast suction. With all such large explosions, if a building does not fail from blast pressure it is unlikely to fail under the lower stresses in the suction phase.

Effect of blast on structures

6.5 The type of damage which long duration blast (from nuclear weapons) causes to structures can possibly best be appreciated by considering the forces to which a simple building is subjected during the passage of a horizontal blast wave. When the blast "front" strikes the front wall it is reflected back, and the pressure in the wave front builds up to more than double the original pressure. However, this build-up only lasts for a very short time and is mainly important for large flat surfaces such as walls of big buildings.

16

Fig. 39 (a). Using a door as a stretcher

Fig. 39 (b). Using a door as a stretcher 71

CHAPTER 15

Principles of Levering and Jacking

15.1 The principles of levering and jacking are, in a variety of differing ways, brought into most aspects of rescue work. The purpose of lifting appli- ances is to gain power so as to lift a large load with a small force suitably applied.

Levers

15.2 The simplest appliance for gaining power is the lever, of which an improvised version made of laminated timber or an ordinary crowbar are most frequently used by rescue workers. There are two principal ways in which a lever can be used, as illustrated in the diagrams. In each case the advantage gained depends on the distance of (A), the centre of the load, and (C) the points where the push or force is applied from (B), the heel or fulcrum.

force*

Fig. 68. Lever (downward force)

Lever (upward force)

15.3 The relation between the load and the amount of force required to lift it is in the same ratio as the length BC is to AB, where AB and BC are the distances of the weight and the force respectively from the fulcrum. A man using a 10-foot lever and bearing down at C with half his weight, say, 6 stone or 84 lb., against a fulcrum 1 foot from the other end of the lever, can lift a weight of 84 x 9 = 756 lb. because the length from fulcrum to hand is nine times the length from pivot to weight. If B is only 6 inches away from the weight the ratio is increased to 19 times its own weight.

Fulcrum blocks

15.4 A fulcrum block should be of wood (hardwood if possible), never of brick or other crushable material. It must be resting on a firm base, which should be as large as possible so as to distribute the weight to be lifted. The fulcrum must be placed as near to the weight as is possible under the circumstances, and it should never be placed at any point where there is a possibility of a casualty being buried immediately below.

100

WEEF >ySj£;

In 12 months. 1940-1, the Blitz stray dog Rip (discovered by civil defence rescuers in Poplar, East London after an air raid) sniffed out 100 trapped casualties in London rubble.

Irma. Margaret Griffin used Irma and Psyche to find 233 trapped persons

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

June, 1953

Final Report

IMPACT OF AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR 11$ SEI£CTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING

Evaluation of Source Materials

I*

Robert 0. Shreve

SRI Project 669

Prepared for

Federal Civil Defense Administration

Washington, D. C«

Approved :

(M.

%0

rilliam J* PIt*lt, Chairman Industrial Manning Research

Weldon B, Gibson, Director Economics Research Division

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U. 8. Government Printing Office Wuhtafton 25, I). C. • Price 16 cents

Table 1

Report Outline - USSBS Project

IMPACT OP AIR ATTACK IN WORLD WAR II: SELECTED DATA FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING

Division I - PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONS

Volume 1 Summary of Civil Defense Experience

Volume 2 Analytical Studies (Restricted)

Volume 3 Causes of Fire from Atomic Attack (Secret) — VITAL! !

The documents which should be given wide distribution for civil defense use are listed below, with a brief description:

a. USSBS Reports

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan (3 volumes)*

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan (3 volumes).

These reports constitute two case studies of atomic bombing. Civil defense planners should be aware of the facts these documents record in great detail. Their distribution to all civil defense planners and analysts is highly desirable ♦

=2=

Effects on Labor in Clydebank of Clydeside Raids of March 1941. (REN 234) USSBS Target Int. (REN 236) Ministry of Home Security

A study of the effects on labor of bombing in a town of 50,000 people in which 76% of houses were rendered uninhabitable, 73# of the popula- tion homeless. An equivalent of 65 city days was utilized in the

reconstruction.

-22-

Ministry of Home Security

Effects of German Air Force Raids on Coventry (REN 441)

The city, the attack, casualties, repairs and reconstruction (cost), absenteeism, population movements, and housing occupancy. Six pages and charts and graphs. Twenty percent of houses rendered uninhabi- table or destroyed, a total reconstruction cost of h 3,492,000. Average time lost by worker after November raid was eleven days} average after April raid was 7 days. Nine percent of the workers evacuated to points within roach of the city.

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Effectiveness of Some

Civil Defense Actions in Protecting

Urban Populations (u)

Appendix B of

Defense of the US

ogoinst Attack by Aircraft and Missiles (u)

QRO-R-17 (App B)

0R0-R.17, Appendix B

6 8 10 12 14

DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, MILES

16

23

-"1

20

Kig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance from Center of City for Three Evacuation TimeB

NONMILITARY DEFENSE FOR THE UNITED STATES STRAT EGIC, OPERATIONAL, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

William K. Chipman

A publication of the National Security Studies Group

at the University of Wisconsin,

Madison, Wisconsin, May, 1961.

In Britain, by early 1940, the government had issued free, to fami- lies of low income, some 2. 3 million bomb shelters, enough to shelter over one -fourth of the population. But by the same time -- after Munich had brought home to the British people the peril in which they stood, even after the war had begun -- less than 1000 shelters had been purchased. This was under 0. 04 per cent of the total number in place, despite the fact that the shelters were sold at cost. ?

For protection against chemical and biological attack, our National Plan proposes that protective (gas) masks be made "... available to the people through regulated commercial distribution. ... "^ or in a word, sold. That too is nonsense. In Britain, in contrast, the government had decided by 1935 that it would be futile to expect the population to buy their own masks. During the Munich crisis, 38 million gas masks were issued free to the people of Great Britain. 9 The British government of that time could scarcely be called war-minded or over-prepared for war. Still less, it appears, are we prepared in 1961.

7. O'Brien, Terence H. , Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 335. In 1939 the government had decided to issue Anderson (corrugated steel) shelters free to householders with incomes of not over -fc 250 a year. ^** * 188.

8. OCDM National Plan, Annex 24, "National Biological and Chemical Warfare Defense Plan, " at 6.

9. O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 7 at 165.

-- The Argument That Increased Spending for Nonmilitary and Other Defenses May Cause an Economic Decline

A celebrated statesman not many years ago elegantly put (or rather, asserted) the argument for "national bankruptcy":

CHAMBERLAIN IN LATE 1936 WHEN

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

If we were now to follow [X's] advice and sacrifice our commerce to the manufacture of arms, we should inflict a certain injury on our trade from which it would take generations to recover, we should destroy the con- fidence which now happily exists, and we should destroy the revenue. ... 33

And, a comment on that argument,

It was held very strongly that financial stability was our fourth, and final, military arm, that we must bal- ance [the national budget], and avoid interference. . . with trade. . . . ^

The statement quoted was not made in 1949, when not muscle but fat was being pared from our military budgets. It was not made in 1955 or I9 60. It was made, rather, in the 1930's. The statesman who so anxiously viewed the dangers to be apprehended from increased expenditure for arms was- Neville Chamberlain. "X" was Winston Churchill. Britain was, if not "generations," at any rate half a generation in paying the bill for Chamber- lain's economics. Only recently have her trade, revenue and financial stability recovered from the economies of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.

10

33. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, Macmillan, 1946 at 314. Quotation reproduced by kind permission of the author . MacMillan & Company Ltd. and St. Martin's Press, Inc.

34,

Id. at 316.

--The Question of Public Apathy- -British Experience Before World War II Compared

The view is often expressed that the population is apathetic, or even hostile, towards nonmilitary defense, and that nothing can be done to dev- elop these defenses until public apathy changes to concern. This view was succinctly put by a member of the House committee which passes on budget requests for OCDM. He said in March, 1959, that, "The Congress is not going to shove something down the throats of the people that they are not

interested in. If you did, the Members of Congress would not be here very long. "46

13

A nation-wide opinion survey by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, made in 1957, revealed, among other things, that 68 per cent of the population favored planning to evacuate cities, and that 90 per cent favored constructing shelters for people who lived in areas that might be attacked. 4?

Whatever the present reaction of the public might be to a program for nonmilitary defense, it is nearly certain that after a frightening crisis had occurred, the public would not only demand these programs, but would be highly critical of a government which had not taken the necessary action. This, at least, was the experience in Britain.

Munich, however, changed all that. War seemed so imminent that the government ordered day and night digging on trenches in parks and open areas. It issued gas masks to some 38 million citizens. 50 Then, when fitting gas masks and digging trenches had given the citizens personal proof of the threat which hung over them, "Fatalism about providing effective pro- tection against air attack was. . . replaced by a feeling that this could be done, if" the authorities showed enough will and energy. "51 H

46. U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 486.

47. Pohlenz, D. Dean, "Problems of Civil Defense Preparedness -- A Policy for Today, " Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces Student Exercise M57-83 (1957) at 33.

49. O'Brien, Terence H. , History of the Second World War: Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1954 at 93, 99 and 104.

50. Id. at 161 and 165.

51. Id. at 166.

Bertrand Russell, for example, wrote in 1959 that.

On the most favourable hypothesis, [the postwar world] would consist of destitute populations, mad- dened by hunger, debilitated by disease. . . incapable of supporting educational institutions, and rapidly sinking to the level of ignorant savages. This, I repeat, is the most optimistic forecast which is in any degree plausible. bl [Emphasis added. ]

This notion of the extinction of civilization, or even of all life, is a comforting one. uo Most important, it ensures that a nuclear war will never be fought, since no sane (or perhaps even moderately insane) national leader would consider thermonuclear war as an instrument of policy. Also, if there is really nothing that can be done to mitigate the effects of nuclear war, rational men need not trouble themselves about the problems of pre- paring nonmilitary defenses -- or of paying for them.

The theory that thermonuclear war automatically results in world an- nihilation has had, and still has, some highly respectable adherents. In 1955, for example, fifty-two Nobel laureates subscribed to the statement that unless all nations renouncedthe use of force, they would simply ". . . cease to exist. "64 Writers on disarmament in 1961 continue to point out that it would be impossible to "... protect [civilians not killed by the initial attack on cities] against fallout and starvation, "65 and that "Propo- nents of the arms race are willing to risk the destruction of civilized so- ciety. . . ."66

--The	View	That Natio	nal Security Can Best Be	Achieved	by	Buy:	tng Only
Offe	nsive	and Active	Defensive Weapons
			17

61. Russell, Bertrand, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, London, copyright (C) 1959 by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , quotation re- produced by kind permission of Simon and Schuster, Inc. The notion of mutual extermination is also alluded to at 32, and tie survivors are characterized as starving and debilitated at 26.

62. On Thermonuclear War, 35.

63. Id. at 11.

64. Id. at 9. Compare Bertrand Russell's views, supra note 61.

65. ^ohn, Louis 157^ "Security Through Disarmament," 192 The Nation

ra9M^8^LJ re3(February 25, 1961).

66. Melman, Seymour, "The 'Arms -Control' Doctrine," 192 The Nation 114-116 at 116 (5re^uary 11, 1961).

Clark, Grenville andC^ouis B. Sohi^) World Peace Through World Law (2d ed. ), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960.

-- The Argument That Nonmilitary Defense Would Destabilize the Balance of Terror

To take any steps to protect the population would be to do them a dis- service, since it might make war "thinkable" again. And whatever steps were taken, millions or tens of millions would be sure to die.

A variant of the hostage theory is that if we were to embark on a serious program for nonmilitary defense, we should inescapably spread war- mindedness among the American people. '^ Once they were awakened to the possibility, or worse the "thinkability, " of war, they would inevitably become more hostile towards the source of the danger, namely, the USSR. They might then be expected, with the American penchant for grasping nettles (those, at any rate, recognized as nettles), to press for a first strike against the Soviet Union.

But other countries, not least the Soviet Union, do have non- military defense programs of substantial value.

It is not, in any case, self-evident that a nonmilitary defense program would have a destabilizing (or unbalancing) effect upon American psychology. If anything, a program which included, for example, building fallout shel- ters or issuing radiation meters, might, by bringing home the threat of war to the American people in a highly personal way, incline them rather to a sober and pacific than to a war-like psychology. City dwellers might reflect upon the fact that their shelters, at least under any program the United States is likely to undertake in the next five years, would give them not a certainty but only a fair to good chance of survival. Rural residents might reflect upon the prospect of an incursion of refugees from the cities.

19

71. Letter from Dean David F. Cavers, Harvard Law School, New York Times, March 20, I960, page 10E, column 6. See too Brown, Harrison and James Real, Community of Fear, Santa Barbara, California, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960.

This whole problem of psychological response to nonmilitary defense clearly requires detailed study by experts. British experience in the Munich and post-Munich period may not be without relevance. '^

--Would A Nonmilitary Defense Program Injure Prospects for Arms Control?

Finally, there is the question whether a program for nonmilitary de- fense is compatible with plans for arms control or even disarmament.

the reverse, it should not hazard the success of any arms control or dis- armament negotiations in which the Soviets are seriously interested, and it would stabilize any arms control agreement that might be concluded.

20 73. See, for example, O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 49 at 329 on response to the anti-gas program, and Titmuss, Richard M. , Problems of Social Policy, London, HMSO, 1950 at 29-39 on response to evacua- tion plans and programs.

Strategy for the Thermonuclear Age

Thermonuclear war is a grisly topic. It is, however, one about which we would do well to think. The argument might be made that research on war may make it somewhat more likely to occur. It is more probable, however, that the reverse is true, that not thinking about thermonuclear war may make it easier to blunder into one --or what might be even worse, to lose one.

It would be well indeed if nuclear war would be unmistakably so an- nihilating as to be unthinkable, at least for sane men, as Bertrand Russell and others hold. But it would be unfortunate if this view prevailed only in the West and not in Moscow and Peiping. There is good evidence that it does not, especially in the latter. There is in any case something of schizo- phrenia about spending tens of billions each year on thermonuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and then refusing to think about the ways and conditions in which they might be used, or (more hopefully) the ways in which we can best assure, short of surrender, that they will not be used.

The best study to date is Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, published late in 1960. * Most of what follows in this chapter draws heavily upon Kahn's work, though it is impossible to do it justice in so

21

small a space. He analyzes, so far as possible in a quantitative way, the probable or possible causes, courses and effects of thermonuclear wars which might occur in the next decade. Kahn's work has been bitterly at- tacked, although to date in no very temperate or reasoned fashion. It has been called "a moral tract on mass murder," "permeated with a blood- thirsty irrationality," and its quantitative approach a "Higher Incoher- ence. " •* It has been said to show "narrowness of vision, " and to have about it an "air of unreality. " But coherent criticism, reasoned rather than stated, marked by broadness of vision or an air of reality, has yet to appear, certainly in more than fragmentary form. 80

77. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1960. On U.S. national strategy see too Rowen, op. cit. supra note 36, and Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re- search, Johns Hopkins University, Study for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy, 85th Cong. , 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1959).

78. Newman, James R. , "A Moral Tract on Mass Murder," The Washing ton Post, February 26, 1961, page E7, columns 5-8. The level of coherence of Mr. Newman's critique is best left unstated.

79. Wolff, Robert Paul, "The Game of War," 144 The New Republic (February 20, 1961)9-13.

80. The usual criticism of Kahn's work is that it does not sufficiently take into account political problems. Careful, or even casual, read- ing of On Thermonuclear War, however, shows that Kahn has a better grasp of political problems than most of his political- scientist cri- tics have of strategy.

We may expect Soviet or Chinese support for "pro- gressive, revolutionary national liberation wars"83 in such areas as Algeria or the Congo. We may see guerilla action in Southeast Asia or other areas on the periphery of the "Socialist camp. " We may even see limited wars, fought without or perhaps even with tactical nuclear weapons. Soviet missiles may be rattled again, as they have been rattled on behalf of Nasser and Castro. (American missiles might also be rattled, though this seems unlikely during the next few years, at least. ) Finally, even negotia- tions for arms control or disarmament may be devices of cold war conflict, as they have too largely been to date.

What Are We Trying to Deter?

Kahn points out that it is critically important to distinguish between deferring an attack upon the United States and attacks or major provoca- tions at other points, for example, a "squeeze" or even armed attack on Berlin. The same weapons, dispositions of weapons, and strategies do not

suffice for both ends. 22

83. This was promised in the manifesto issued by the leaders of 81 Communist parties after their meeting in Moscow in late 1960. New York Times, December 7, 1960, pages 14 to 17, with the "progres- sive revolutionary significance" of "national- liberation wars" noted at page 17, column 7. Premier Khrushchev also adverted to the in- evitability of "national liberation wars" in a report delivered January 6, 1961. New York Times, January 19, 1961, page 6, column 4.

84. Berlin was noted as a "seat of international provocation" in the late- 1960 manifesto. New York Times, December 7, 1960, page 15, column 2. (Any Western posture other than abject surrender is doubt- less "provocative" in the communist lexicon. )

As Kahn has put it, history has a disconcerting way of being "... richer and more imaginative than any scholar. "°"

86. On Thermonuclear War at 557.

23

It is a fearsome thing to contemplate the risk of 10 or 20 or 120 million Americans, or Americans and Britons, being killed in a war, for example, over two and one -half million West Berliners. 24

--Devices to Tide Us Over the Earlier 1960's

The Soviets might not, of course, decide to risk everything, or at any

rate a great deal of capital and some millions of their citizens, on our

succumbing to postattack coercion. If the Marxist- Leninist dialectic

condemns spurning the opportunities offered by history, it also condemns

taking excessive risks, a sin termed "adventurism. "109 What can we do

to increase the risks to be apprehended from an attack on the United

States?

30

109. See, for example, Garthoff, Raymond, Soviet Strategy in the Nu- clear Age, New York, Praeger, 1958 at 5.

--A $100 Billion Program Including Blast Shelters and Extensive Preparation for Economic Recuperation

The "splendid," $100 billion or more, program is the one which might raise some reasonable Soviet appreherision that we might strike first. This program, including blast shelters into which the urban population could "duck" in a matter of twenty or thirty minutes, would in fact be part of a credible strategic posture allowing us to make a first strike.

(Expensive deep shelters create "Maginot Line" delusions : Hitler simply adapted plans to go around obstructions. Similarly , shelters in Hiroshima were unoccupied due to surprise attack! If you have deep shelters, an enemy will plan surprise attack. It takes 20 min to get into shelters , but only 3 minutes for SLBM

submarine missile attack from offshore!) 45

--History and Arms Control

The lessons of history, for what they may be worth, include those of 1914, when Europe stumbled into a major war which no power wanted, as a result of a minor war about which only Austria or Serbia were really serious. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, there are disturbing analogies between the years before 1914 and those in which we now live. 158

(Wrong: the German Kaiser did WANT war and had been planning since 1912 to use any excuse for starting war, implementing Schlieffen's plan!)

--Arms Control for the 1960's

At all events, it is clear that the problems of arms control must have

more intelligent, more intensive, and more sustained attention than they

have yet had, if we are to avoid repeating something like the disasters of

either 1914 or 1933-1939. Views on the approaches required, as noted

above, vary widely.

47

158. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 368-370.

It would plainly be futile, in view of the vigorous Soviet pacification of Hungary, or of the Chinese liberation of Tibet, to rely upon "world opinion " (whatever that is) to deter violations. • . .

One sanction might be the prospect of a renewed arms race, triggered by the discovery of violations. But this might not deter cheating, particu- larly if the party bent on violation believed it could secure a commanding position before the injured party could catch up. (Here we might remember the belated but futile efforts of the British to regain air parity, after Hitler's rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe. )*'6

50

176. See, for the history of that dismal episode in the history of the West, Sir Winston Churchill's The Gathering Storm, chapter 7. Kahn points out that if one side obtained a significant lead because of evasion or rapid rearmament after the agreement broke down, it might then ". . .feel compelled to perform a great public service by arranging to stop the arms race before a dangerous balance of terror was restored. It could do this most reliably by stopping the cause of the arms race -- its opponent. Most writers ignore this situation. . . . " On Thermonuclear War at 230.

Is Nonmilitary Defense Possible?

If nonmilitary defense is necessary, is it possible? In the discussion to this point, it has been assumed that it is. But can one say, with any measure of confidence, that nonmilitary defenses could in fact ensure the survival of most or all of the population? Even if a shelter program could preserve the lives of most Americans against fallout or even blast, would they emerge into a world worth living in, or indeed, possible to live in? What of the genetic effects of war? Would all children be born deformed? What of leukemia, of cancer, or of a shortened span of life? What of strontium-90? What of the standard of living? Would the survivors, and their descendants, be reduced to grubbing out a wretched existence, with our economy shattered beyond hope of repair? What of the social impact of attack? Could we expect that the survivors, as Bertrand Russell has predicted, would "rapidly sink to the level of ignorant savages"? 54

Further, nonmilitary defense must be designed to cope with widely varying conditions. The nature of the postattack environment would depend upon the weight and pattern of the enemy's attack- -which might in turn be influenced by the nonmilitary defense measures we had taken. The areas contaminated by fallout would of course be determined by the winds pre- vailing on the day of attack, as well as by the enemy's attack pattern. Anti- aircraft and antimissile defenses would also affect the nature of the post- attack environment.

The major systems analyses of nonmilitary defense so far published are the Rand Report and a more detailed work done by Mr. John Devaney's OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military

55 Defense . "*** Both of these studies give some ground for sober confidence that the United States could survive thermonuclear wars in the 1960's and even beyond, given appropriate levels of nonmilitary defense preparation. But much more detailed research remains to be done. There are still major areas of uncertainty in the performance of nonmilitary defense systems. The principal policy suggestion of the Rand study was therefore that the United States undertake a broad program of research and develop- ment on nonmilitary defense problems, to cost some $200 million over two or three years. 187

186. OCDM, A Preliminary Analysis of Non-Military Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan, 1959.

187. Kahn, Herman, et^aL , R-322-RC 184 at 44. (This is about fifty times the present OCDM annual research appropriation. ) R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense

—Long-Term Effects of Fallout- -Genetic Effects and Life -Shortening, and the Strontium-90 Problem

Even if fallout at first decays rapidly, so that fallout shelters could protect most of the population from immediate death or illness due to radiation, would the longer-term effects of radiation make life as we know it either impossible or insupportable for the survivors? Despite the rapid initial decay of fallout, a relatively small amount of contamination would remain in the environment for a long time. This would include strontium-90, a long-lived isotope produced by nuclear fission.

The Rand Report states that about four per cent of babies are at preset stillborn or die shortly after birth, two per cent are malformed and two per cent develop later troubles attributable to genetic defects. 200 jf as the result of nuclear war, both parents had been exposed to about 250 roentgens, spread over a long period, their chances of producing a seriously defective living child might increase from four per cent to five per cent. 2°1

58

199. Testimony of Dr. James F. Crow, Professor of Genetics, Univer- sity of Wisconsin, in 1957 fallout hearings, ojj^ cit. supra note 193 at 1013. More recent experiments show that there is a possibility that radiation received over an extended period may not have as much genetic effect as radiation received over a short period. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) at 1566.

200. Kahn, _et al_. , op. cit. supra note 184 at 16.

201. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 46.

Strontium-90, produced by fission, falls out over crop and pasture lands, is taken up by plants, and can eventually find its way into human bones, where it may cause bone cancer or, in smaller amounts, cause bone lesions and interfere with bone growth, particularly in children. 204

204. See generally Kahn, On Thermonuclear War at 63-72.

All of these long-term effects of nuclear war are serious, particularly the strontium-90 problem. It appears, however, that with proper prepara- tion, it should be possible to alleviate them. In chapter 2 the subject of decontamination, or removal of radioactive debris, is discussed. In chapter 3 is discussed a scheme suggested by Herman Kahn to ensure that relatively contaminated food be consumed only by older persons, whom it will not much affect, with the least contaminated food reserved for children and pregnant women.

The Rand Report concludes that ". . .long-term radiation problems are a less critical threat to the survival of a population than the central short-term problem, namely, how to protect a substantial fraction of the population from the immediate disaster of a nuclear war. "205 59

205. Kahn, et al. ,

R-322-RC Rand Corporation Report on a Study of Non- Military Defense

at 21.

Economic Recovery from Thermonuclear War

Even if the medical effects of nuclear war might not be insoluble, there remains the problem of economic recovery. Would the survivors be condemned to lives without hope, with standards of living, for most, similar to those of the early years of the industrial revolution? 59

In the absence of reliable predictions of social response to thermo- nuclear attack, there is a tendency to lurid speculation. One can too easily visualize society collapsing, with the survivors organizing themselves into robber bands and struggling for the few economic resources remaining, or masses of city dwellers suffering crippling mental breakdown, or man- kind rejecting science and technology and reverting to a hunting-and-gather- ing or at best pastoral existence. Others speculate upon the probability of mass panic or of widespread looting and other criminal behavior.

Just such speculations were made in Britain before the war, and made by sober scientists, government officials and soldiers. The Army Council instructed General Officers Commanding that "the initial preoccupation" of the troops would be "to sustain public morale. "214 At the time of Munich, when evacuation was being considered, "... discussions were held on the question of drafting regular troops into London to keep order and prevent panic. . . . "215 Gloomiest of all were the predictions of the psychiatrists, who thought that mental casualties might outnumber physical casualties bv two or three to one: 216

. . . the experts foretold a mass outbreak of hysterical neurosis among the civilian population. It was expected that the conditions of life brought about by air raids would place an immediate and overwhelming strain upon the individual. Under this strain, many people would regress to an earlier level of needs and desires. They would behave like frightened and unsatisfied children, and they would demand with the all-or-none vehemence of infants the security, food and warmth which the mother had given in the past.

None of this, of course, occurred. Rather than a dramatic increase in neurosis or mental illness, there was in fact a decrease. Statistics for insanity, suicide, drunkenness and disorderly behavior fell by as much as half. 21 ' Workers absented themselves from their factories after heavy bombing only when their houses had been damaged or destroyed, and then only for an average of six days. 21°

62

214. Titmuss, op. cit. supra note 73 at 19.

215. Id. at 30.

216. Id. at 338-339.

217. Id. at 340-341.

218. Id. at 341.

Individual and group protection against chemical attack poses great problems. In World War I, gas was considered one of the most effective means for producing casualties, 1X ' even though the CW agents used then were far less lethal than the nerve gases developed in Germany prior to World War II. A seven-ton load of nerve gas can reportedly cause cas-

ualties over an area fifteen miles wide and twenty-five to fifty miles long, and death over an area of 100 square miles, H9 given weather conditions favorable to the spread of gas clouds. **0 j^ew non-lethal gases are under development, including the so-called psychochemicals, related to com- pounds used to simulate mental disease, and other incapacitating agents. These agents affect victims by upsetting normal behavior patterns or phy- siological processes, *21 though their short-term effectiveness appears to suit them more to tactical use against troops than to attack of civilian pop- ulations.

117. Rothschild, Brig. Gen. J. "Germs and Gas, the Weapons Nobody Dares Talk About" 218 Harper1 u Magazine 29 at 30 (June 1959). This article also states, ibid, that 26. 8 per cent of AEF casualties were caused by gas. FCDA Technical Bulletin 11- 25, "Introduction to Chemical Warfare" (1957) states that mustard gas and other blister gases produced more than 400, 000 casualties in the last 16 months of World War L» more than were caused by any other weapon then in uae. U. S* House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Research in CBR, House Report No. 815, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) states at 4 that some 9 million artillery shells filled with mustard gas produced about 400* 000 casualties, which effect was about five times that produced by high explosive shell, on a casualty per ton of shell basis. One should also note that CW casualties in World War I included few deaths. About one-third of U.S. casualties were caused by gas, but only 2 per cent of these died, as compared with 25 percent of nongas casualties. Ibid.

119 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil

Defense Program, 84th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1955) Part 2 at 800 The 100 square mile figure also appears in ACS, ^d. at 3.

120. "Inversion" conditions, where air temperatures increase with increase in altitude, are most favorable to the spread of gas clouds, and obtain on clear nights and early mornings until about one hour after sunrise. U. S. Department of the Army, Technical Manual 3-240, Field Behavior of Chemical Agents, Washington, 1951, at 16.

121. US. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Depart- ment of Defense Appropriations for 1960, 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1959) Part 6 at 364-365 and 426-436.

In Great Britain, in contrast, some 44 million masks were dis- tributed by the outbreak of World War n, virtually one per inhabitant, and 1. 4 million infants' respirators and 2 million children's masks by January, 1940; 13? 55 million masks are now stockpiled in Britain for issue to civi- lians. 138 (They are 1950 designed civilian C7 respirators . )

Procuring 100 million masks for that part of our population concentra- ted in urban areas might cost $250 million, at $2.50 per mask, and exten- sive training in defense against BW and CW would also be required.

90

137, O'Brien, Terence, Civil Defence, London, HMSO, 1955 at 330. Note that as early as 1935 the British government decided that masks would have to be issued free of charge. _Id. at 61.

138. Interview Col. Francis B. Stewart, FCDA (now OCDM), Battle Creek, Michigan, January 30, 1958.

3000 roentgens per hour intensity at one hour 12, 000 roentgens outdoor dose in the first year

10, 000 r in the first two weeks (emergency phase) 2000 r in the remaining fifty weeks (reclamation phase)

EMERGENCY PHASE RECLAMATION PHASE

	(10,	000 r)	(2000 Decontamination	r)
Shelter		10, 000 r dose	effectiveness		2000 r dose
attenuation		reduced to	(reduction to) 90% (1/10)		reduced to
1/100	100	200
1/1000		10	99% (1/100)		20

Radiological decontamination involves no very mysterious or sophis- ticated techniques. In general, fallout material can be swept or flushed off

91

Evacuation

Contrary to popular belief, the effectiveness of tactical evacuation is by no means destroyed by the ICBM. While it is clear that no tactical evacua- tion could even be started during the 30-minute flight of an ICBM, it is also true, as the Rand Report points out, that cities are not likely to be at- tacked with the enemy's first ICBM salvo, and it is quite possible that most cities might not be attacked at all.

As Herman Kahn has pointed out, a national evacuation capability could be of the greatest importance in time of international crisis: If the Soviets evacuated their cities, they would have made it highly credible that they were prepared to go to war unless we backed down. 155

93

155. Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, N. J. ,

Princeton University Press, 1960 at 213-214, also 132. Objec- tions to evacuation and other nonmilitary defense measures are dealt with at 641-651, with objections bearing on evacuation in particular at 648-651.

The Bureau of Roads in 1956 prepared a report 160 on national evacua- tion capabilities for 161 urban target areas, containing 90. 7 million people, about 55 per cent of the population. The report assumed orderly and disci- plined movement, making maximum use of escape routes, and the findings included the following: 1 61

(1) In 1 1/2 hours, 32 million persons could be evacuated at least

15 miles from the centers of target areas, over existing highways and streets;

(2) In 4 1/2 hours, 72 million persons could be evacuated at least 15 miles from target area centers;

(3) In 2 hours, 22 million persons could be evacuated at least 25 miles;

(4) In 5 hours, 33 million persons could be evacuated at least 25 miles;

(5) Evacuation of the largest cities within reasonable time 1 units would not be possible.

In sum, four hours' warning would allow substantial clearance of all but the largest cities, and even in these cities, this warning would allow eva- cuation of some 9 million of their 48 million inhabitants. 162

160. Reprinted and ds cussed in U. S. House, Committee on Govern- ment Operations, Hearings, New Civil Defense Legislation, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) at 111-136.

161. Discussed^d. at 124-126.

162. OCDM Operations Research Office, A Preliminary Analysis of Nonmilitary Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan, 1959 at 169.

94

Since 1956 Great Britain has had a simple scheme for classifying rad- iation zones by intensity and for evacuating the most dangerous zone, of 1000 r/hr and upwards at H / 1. 171 Such a program is dependent on a monitor- ing system, so that fallout zones may be delineated and appropriate instruc- tions given their inhabitants. It requires sophisticated and technically com- petent control, related to the area affected by fallout, not to preattack poli- tical subdivisions.

Remedial evacuation also requires detailed arrangements for traffic

control, if existing transport within the most dangerous area is relied on

for evacuation.

96

171. Home Office, Radioactive Fall-out, Provisional Scheme of Public Control, London, HMSO, 1956.

The requirement for rescue forces would depend upon the number of survivors trapped or incapacitated in areas which could be approached by rescue teams. OCDM estimated that in the 1446-megaton attack assumed for the 1959 JCAE hearings, 11.5 million people would have been fatally injured by blast and heat effects and 6. 3 million nonfatally injured. Fall- out would have caused a further 10. 7 million fatal and 10. 9 million nonfatal injuries. *•* Many of the blast casualties would require to be rescued and, together with fallout casualties, to be transported from the danger area. Other casualty estimates, however, show markedly fewer blast injuries, on the order of one -fourth of those estimated in the JCAE hearings. x ''e

(JCAE hearings used gross Hiroshima casualty data, which applies to people watching the B-29 deliver bomb, i.e. no

proper "duck and cover" for elayed blast behind windows . )

99

175. 1959 JCAE Hearings, Effects of Nuclear War, at 651.

176. SRI calculations show only 1. 6 million blast casualties from a 15 00 -megaton attack

177. Note that casualty effects are extrapolated from experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were attacks with air-bursted kiloton weapons. U, S. Atomic Energy Commission, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, 1957, at 456. Factors which may affect casualty numbers include yield, height of burst, strength of buildings (or shelters, ) and the weather at the time of attack. Ibid. It is interesting to note that prewar British estimates of casualties from aerial attack, based on limited experience from World War I, turned out in the event to have been too high by 6 times*

Finally, fallout would limit rescue operations. Fallout from surface bursts far upwind might make operations impossible, if radiation levels were so high that rescue crews could not work without accumulating harm- ful radiation doses. Even if rescue groups could approach damaged areas from upwincU rescue of severe blast and burn casualties from within six or nine miles of ground zero would not be possible to a significant extent, since the level of contamination even upwind of a surface burst would be so high as to prevent rescue parties from working in these areas for several days at least, by which time most of the seriously injured would have died. 178 It might be possible, however, to organize rescue operations on the first day from upwind into the areas of lighter damage, perhaps fifteen miles from the center of a 20-megaton burst, where numbers of casualties would have resulted due to burns and partial collapse of frame houses. Rota-

tion of rescue teams could allow exposure to higher radiation intensities, and hence earlier rescue operations, but would increase the requirement for rescue forces. If weapons were airbursted, so that little fallout contam- ination resulted, rescue forces could enter blast areas soon after the deton- ation.

99

(NOTE: severe upwind fallout in the blast damaged area was measured after 10 megaton surface burst MIKE in 1952, see weapon test report WT-615 and AFSWP-507. However, this upwind fallout was a fluke due to the 82 -ton steel bomb "case shock" which embedded itself deep into the crater, increasing the activity on large fallout flakes around ground zero. Data from weapons with lighter casings in Castle 1954 and Redwing 1956 disproved the MIKE upwind fallout data for practical, deliverable weapons, WT-1317. MIKE upwind fallout data was given in Glass tone ENW 1957 but was replaced with Redwing upwind fallout data in Glasstone 1962, so light upwind fallout permitted rescue.)

178. U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, Survival in Public Shelters , 1957, at 5-9.

179. Id. at 7-8.

The Corps of Engineers analysis of requirements for rescue squads is in U. S. Army Engineer School, Extension Subcourse 321, Civil Defense and Disaster Recovery, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia (May 1958) at 3-3 to 3-4, This document states that about 25 per cent of persons surviving in blast -damaged areas will be lightly trapped and 5 per cent heavily trapped. About 2 man-hours are required to release persons lightly trapped and 20 man-hours for those heavily trapped. Trapped casualties can survive for 4 days, and rescue squads can each produce some 768 man-hours of efficient rescue work in this time. Thus in a city where 100, 000 persons remained in blast areas, about 25, 000 people would be lightly trapped and 5000 heavily trapped. This would require 65 light rescue squads and 130 heavy squads, each composed of 26 men with appropriate equipment. The total rescue force require- ment is thus 5070 persons, or about 50 per 1000 of target area population at the time of detonation.

439

One promising avenue for reducing vulnerability is to put selected in- Mustries underground. The Rand Report suggests that if we had put some- thing like twenty per cent of our manufacturing capital underground by 1970, that economy ought to be able to withstand a 20, 000-megaton, 150-city at- tack somewhat better than our undispersed economy in 1960 could withstand a 1500-megaton, 50-city attack. 252 A 1956 study by the Corps of Engin- eers discussed in some detail the problems of constructing underground industrial plants. The study pointed out that some sixty per cent of Ameri- can industry lay in a quadrangle from Boston to Kansas City, and that about two-thirds of existing mine sites, suitable for underground plants, also lay in this quadrangle. *5o Experience both with underground plants in Sweden and Germany and with windowless, fully air-conditioned surface plants in this country indicates that no major personnel problems are likely to arise from working underground. ^54

109

252. Kahn, Rand Report, og. cit. supra note 62 at 29-30 and 11.

253. U. S. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Underground Plants for Industry, Washington, GPO, 1956 at 7; see toojd. at 19.

254. Id. at 37-38 and 7. For discussion of an underground metal processing and fabricating plant in Norway see Skarsgaard, Olav K.," "The Largest Underground Industry in the World.11 The Fifteen Nations (Number 16) at 124-125.

u jSJ^ 1979 l)cP^-

CIVIL DEFENSE FOR THE 1 gap's-- CURRENT ISSUES

Presidential Decision (PD) 41, September 1978, established new policies for U.S. civil defense: that it should "enhance deterrence and stability and. . . reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension," and "include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis." The PD 41 policies are in marked contrast to previous rationales for CD, dating from 1961, which were to the effect that the program should provide "insurance" In the unlikely event of a failure of deterrence.

President Kennedy 1n 1961:

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century, 1s sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an Irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of escalation 1n which the stakes by each side grad- ually Increase to the point of maximum danger which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. It 1s on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable— as Insurance for the civilian population 1n case of an eneny miscalculation. It 1s Insurance we trust will never be needed— but Insurance which we could never forgive our- selves for foregoing 1n the event of catastrophe. 18/

18/ President John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs, A Special Message to Congress," May 25, 1961.

More light was shed on Issues of credibility by a national -sample survey conducted for DCPA in late 1978, Involving in-depth Interviews with 1620 adult Americans. 31/ The results suggest that the public remains favorable 1n general to civTl defense, and 1s receptive to crisis relocation in particular:

67% believe there could be crisis circumstances under which

the President might urge people to evacuate high risk areas

78% believe the U.S. should have crisis relocation plans

70% say that 1f the President directed relocation, they would comply. (And additional people Indicate they might well leave spontaneously, before any direction to do so)

75% believe the nation's communities would be helpful to evacuees

82% believe their own communities would be helpful, if asked to host evacuees. (In fact, 73% say they'd be willing to take evacuees into their own homes)

3l/Nehnevasja, Jiri, Issues of Civil Defense: Vintage 1978— Summary Results of the 1978 National Survey, University of Pittsburgh, 1979.

It 1s significant that on September 1-3, 1939 the British moved some 1.5 million women and children from London and a few other large cities 1n what was a crisis evacuation, for Britain did not declare war until September 3. (Also of interest are the facts that some 2 million additional persons spontaneously evacuated at their own initiative, and that this was unsuspected at the time by the British government.) It is also worthy of note that in Hurricane Carla, in 1961, between half and three-quarters of a million people were evacuated from Gulf Coast cities without a single fatality or a major reported accident .32/

32/Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearings, tTvil Defense, 95th Congress, 2d Session (January 1979) at 51-52.

In 1939. Hitler attacked Poland, thouqh it appears he calculated (mistakenly) that he had good chances of achieving his objectives without triggering World War II, based upon his earlier successes. In 1941 he attacked the USSR, anticipating the destruction of Bolshevism and not, eventually, of the Third Reich.

In 1941 the leaders of Japan attacked the U.S., not anticipating the defeat of the empire 1n 1945.

—Presidential Decision 41

At all events, the PD 41 policies lay 1t down clearly that U.S. civil defense should ". . . enhance deterrence and stability, and contribute to perceptions of the overall U.S. /Soviet strategic balance and to crtsis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of crisis."

Civil Defense and the Cuban Crisis

In a 1978 interview, Steuart L. Pittman, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense in 1961 to 1964, pointed out:

[I]t 1s Interesting that President Kennedy personally raised the civil defense question during the Cuban crisis. He was considering conventional military action against Cuba to knock out the missile sites. I understand he was the only one of the "Conrnittee" to raise the issue of civil defense, which tells us something. He asked whether it would be practical to evacuate Miami and other coastal cities in Florida. ... I was called into the marathon crisis meeting and had to tell him that 1t would not be practical; we did not have any significant evacuation plans. ... The President dropped the idea, but shortly after the crisis was over, his personal concern over Ms limited civil defense options led him to sign a memorandum directing a significant speedup in the U.S. civil defense preparations. (Emphasis added. )93/

While history seldom repeats Itself exactly, it does indeed "tell us something" that in the only overt nuclear confrontation the world has

93/Sullivan, Roger J. et al, The Potential Effects of Crisis Relocation on Crisis Stability, System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, September 1978 at 152-153.

yet seen, the American President was concerned about dv11 defense— and that the Idea of population relocation during the crisis was one of his specific concerns. Certainly it is clear that in 1962, the notion of vulnerability being stabilizing held little attraction for the Chief Executive.

There is an historical precedent for a relatively rapid buildup of CD capabilities. At the time of the 1938 Munich crisis, Britain had developed civil defense plans but had little capability for actual operations. Spurred by the belief that war had become not only not unthinkable but not unlikely, Britain mounted an intensive effort.

By the time Germany attacked Poland the next September, the British were able to evacuate 1.5 million women and children from major target cities. And by the time of the August 1940 "blitz," the CD system was able to contribute substantially to Britain's ability to "take it" and to continue the war.

Following the Munich crisis, which found Britain as unprepared in civil defense as in all other areas of defense, the working of the civil defense services was reviewed by the House of Commons during a censure debate:

Members were in a worried and critical mood, and among the charges made it was maintained that the Government had neither policy nor plans for evacuation when the country was on the verge of war. . . . [T]here was much uneasiness 1n Whitehall. 102/

In short, there will be no public outcry for civil defense in normal times. There will be modest political profit, if any, for an Adminis- tration proposing enhanced civil defense, or a Congress approving it; the subject is not a congenial one. But should a frightening crisis find civil defense in disarray, the people (and the Congress) would surely demand to know what had been done in "the years that the locust hath eaten. "103/

Summary

The PD 41 policies provide that the U.S. civil defense program should enhance deterrence and stability, and reduce the possibility of Soviet coercion during a crisis.

10Z/Titmuss7"KTchard M., Problems of Social Policy, HMSO, London, 1950 at 30.

103/ Joel 2; 25. This phrase, according to Churchill, was used by Sir Thomas Inskip in referring to the period 1931-1935: The Gathering Storm, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1948 at 66.

Arguments Against Civil Defense and a Rebuttal ~~

Some of the arguments made against civil defense were parodied as follows in a piece in the Harvard Crimson in 1962:

Reconmendations by the Committee for a Sane Navigational Policy:

It has been brought to our attention that certain elements among the passengers and crew favor the installation of lifeboats on this ship. These elements have advanced the excuse that such action would save lives in the event of a maritime disaster such as the ship striking an iceberg. Although we share their concern, we remain unalterably opposed to any consideration of their course of action for the follow- ing reasons:

1. This program would lull you into a false sense of security.

2. It would cause undue alarm and destroy your desire to continue your voyage 1n this ship.

3. It demonstrates a lack of faith in our Captain.

4. The apparent security which lifeboats offer will make our navi- gators reckless.

5* These proposals will distract our attention from more Important things, e.g., building unslnkable ships. They may even lead our builders to false economies and the building of ships which are actually unsafe.

6. In the event of being struck by an iceberg (we will never strike first) the lifeboats would certainly sink along with the ship.

7. If they do not sink, you will only be saved for a worse fate, inevitable death on the open sea.

8. If you should be washed ashore on a desert island, you could not adapt to the hostile environment and would surely die of exposure

9. If you should be rescued by a passing vessel, you would spend a Hfe of remorse mourning your lost loved ones.

10. The panic caused by a collision with an Iceberg would destroy all semblance of civilized human behavior. We shudder at the prospect of one man shooting another for the possession of a lifeboat.

11. Such a catastrophe 1s too horrible to contemplate. Anyone who does contemplate it obviously advocates 1t.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

ence

By T. H. O'BRIEN

4 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION

The point is of importance for students of the subject in an era in which marked 'progress' has been made in the technique of air warfare by the invention of the atomic bomb. This invention has given fresh currency to the view that 'nowadays every war is different from the one before' — which, if it were valid, would abolish any need to learn the lessons of past experience,

THE WAR OF 1914-1918 9

But in May 191 7 the Germans began a series of assaults with twin-engined aircraft, called Gothas, which soon became severe. The daylight attack of 13th June on London by fourteen Gothas was the worst single attack of the war measured in casualties, which numbered 162 killed and 426 injured; 118 high explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on the City and the East End.

10 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION

The Government only gave in gradually and reluctantly to demands for public warnings in London. In July 1917 a system was introduced, under the control of the Commissioner of Police, which to those accustomed to the sirens of 1939-45 may appear somewhat primitive. Warnings were distributed partly by maroons (or sound bombs) fired into the air, and partly by policemen on foot, on bicycles or in cars carrying Take Cover placards and blowing whistles or sounding horns.

THE WAR OF 1914-1918 11

during 19 14-18 There were in all

103 bombing raids (51 by airships and 52 by aeroplanes) ; and about 300 tons of bombs were dropped causing 4,820 casualties, 1,413 of which were fatal.

These totals appear small; but when they are broken down into details many different pictures emerge. The two heavy raids on London of June and July 1917, for example, together caused 832 casualties (216 fatal), which amounted to 121 casualties for each ton of bombs dropped; and these casualty figures were to have much significance for the planning authorities of the future.

13 June London raid: 118 bombs, 162 killed, 426 injured. 7 July London raid: 54 killed, 190 injured

121 casualties/ton, 31 killed/ton (Air raids by twin-engined Gothas began in May 1 91 7)

12 Ch. I: INTRODUCTION

The Committee of Imperial Defence, created in 1904 In November 1921 the Committee asked the principal Service experts to report on the problem of possible future air attack on the United Kingdom. This report, which appeared the next year, accepted the conclusions of the Air Staff about future air attack, which were briefly as follows.

France's Air Force could drop an average weight of 1,500 tons of bombs on Britain each month by using only twenty bombing days in the month and only fifty per cent of its aircraft. London, which would be an enemy's chief objective, could be bombed on the scale of about 150 tons in the first 24 hours, 1 10 tons in the second 24 hours, and 75 tons in each succeeding 24 hours for an indefinite period. It was to be anticipated that an enemy would put forth his maximum strength at the outset.

Page 14: on 15 May 1924, the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Sub- Committee first met, chaired by Sir John Anderson.

THE SCALE OF A TTACK 15

The serious picture thus presented assumed its darkest tones when the Air Staff proceeded to estimate casualties. The 300 tons of bombs dropped in the 1914-18 attacks, the experts pointed out, had caused 4,820 casualties, or 16 per ton of bombs. The 832 casualties of the two big daylight attacks on London in the summer of 191 7, however,

16 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935)

produced an average of 121 casualties per ton; and sixteen night raids on London in 191 7-18 gave an average of 52 casualties per ton.1 After weighting these figures with various factors, the experts concluded that 50 casualties (one-third of which would be fatal) per ton formed a reasonable estimate of casualties caused by air attacks of the future on densely-populated areas. For other areas this figure should be reduced in proportion to the actual density of population.

30 Ch. II: PLANNING {MAY 1924- APRIL 1935) In March 1927 the committee was faced with two matters

Royal Charter incorporating the British Broadcasting Corporation, Wireless Broadcasting, Cmd* 2756, 1926.

PROGRESS, 1926-1929 31

The Chemical Warfare Research Department had been making experiments to determine how long persons could remain under certain conditions in a 'gas-proof room; and had prepared a handbook, The Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, now on sale to the public.

The first of the matters just referred to was a broadcast in February by Professor Noel Baker, on 'Foreign Affairs and How They Affect Us\ This, read in cold print at a distance of twenty years, appears as an attempt to rouse the British public to realisation of the horrors of future war, and to enlist its support for the disarmament negotia- tions at Geneva. The Professor quoted Mr Baldwin's speech to the Classical Association in the Middle Temple hall, 'Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the West and the civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?' He painted a picture of gas attack from the air in another war and claimed, 'all gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civil population from this form of attack'. The Chemical Warfare Research Department emphatically disputed the accuracy both of the details of the picture and of this general statement. They considered it unfortunate that statements of this nature should have been broadcast to the public, particularly after the Cabinet's decision that the time was not ripe for education of the public in defensive measures.

The committee discussed whether to draw the B.B.C.'s attention to this talk. The Corporation, only a few months old, was then prohibited by the Postmaster-General's instructions from broad- casting 'matter on topics of political, religious or industrial con- troversy'; but the Post Office representative pointed out this did not mean that his Department was prepared to undertake censoring programmes. The committee, not wishing to incur the obligation! to approve in advance all proposed broadcasts relating to their field of study, decided to take no action with respect to the talk in question.

68 CL III: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937)

Gas was the risk most prominently associated in the public mind with future air attack, as was demon- strated a few weeks before the school opened by British reaction to Italy's use of mustard and other gases against Abyssinia.4

* According to the Annual Register, 1936 (p. 27), 'feeling in England could hardly contain itself when the Italians were reported to be using poison gas against both soldiers and civilians9.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS 81

A final matter which concerned gas-masks belongs perhaps more properly to the topic of public reactions to A.R.P. Early in 1937 some scientific workers at Cambridge University, who described themselves as the 'Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group' and their function as that of acting as 'a technical and advisory body to national and international peace movements', published a book attacking the Government's A.R.P. plans.1 This body had studied the official advice about the 'gas-proofing' of rooms, the civilian mask, and extinguishing incendiary bombs, and then conducted some experiments. It claimed to have shown that the measures officially proposed were ineffective or inadequate, and implied that these constituted deception of the public.

It has been noticed that as 1937 opened the Government was taking steps to make A.R.P. plans more widely known to the public;* and this deliberate challenge found a sympathetic echo in various quarters, and caused it some concern. Questions about the Cam- bridge experiments were asked in Parliament, for example on the occasion of the announcement of the new Wardens' Service; sections of the Press began a critical campaign, and questions were put to officials trying to build up A.R.P. services over the country. The Government's reply was that the experiments were academic (in the sense of removed from reality), and based on fallacious assump- tions about the conditions likely to be met in actual warfare.8 In spite of pressure the authorities refused to engage in technical con- troversy with the scientists in question and within a few months the agitation subsided. At the close of the year, however, a report on the official experiments (in supervision of which the Chemical Defence Committee had been helped by eminent scientists not in Government employment) was circulated to local authorities and otherwise made public.

1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack (Left Book Club Topical Book, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937.) *p. 71. 8 H. of C. Deb., Vol. 320, Col. 1348, 18th February 1937.

86 Ch. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT (1935-1937)

A demonstration of how to deal with the light incendiary bomb had been included in the Anti-Gas School curriculum in November 1936; and in February 1937 the Home Office Fire Adviser staged a demonstration at Barnes at which bombs were successfully controlled and fires extinguished by teams of girls with only short training. At an exercise held later at Southampton a group of air raid wardens carried out this function with such success that the Department concluded it must aim to train all householders in the handling of incendiary bombs.

96 Ck. Ill: THE A.R.P. DEPARTMENT {1935-1937)

Air Staff had raised their estimate of the weight of bombs which an enemy (now Germany) might drop on Britain during the first stages of an attack from 150 tons per diem to no less than 600 tons. The committee proceeded, as their predecessor of 1924 had done, to question the experts and then to accept their hypothesis.1 The estimate of over 600 tons of bombs per diem during the first few weeks (which took account of Britain's various potential forms of counter- offensive) also embraced the possibility of a special bombing effort on the part of the enemy in the first 24 hours which might amount to 3,500 tons. Consideration had to be taken not only of this greatly increased weight of attack but of new methods of attack for which past experience afforded no precedents. The measure offered by the accepted air raid casualty figure of 1914-18 (50 per ton of bombs, 17 of which were killed and 33 wounded) was subject to the caveat that modern bombs were more effective. The committee pointed out that an arithmetical computation on this basis for the scale of attack at 600 tons per diem would indicate casualties of the order of 200,000 a week, of which 66,000 would be killed.

1 The new estimated scale of attack had been referred to the Home Defence Com- mittee, and was not approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence until 28th October

1937.

ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT, & OTHER SUPPLIES 139

The 25 million civilian gas-masks accumulated by the opening of 1938 were, from various points of view, one of the most tangible assets of the A.R.P. Service.

SHELTERS; CIVIL DEFENCE ACT, 1939 187

The invention of a practical household shelter — to be quickly known as the * Anderson' — had transformed the possibilities hitherto envisaged for protection of homes against air attack. The Govern- ment had undertaken to supply these shelters, as well as steel fittings for strengthening basements, free to some 2& million families.

The 'Anderson* had originally been conceived as a shelter to be erected inside the average small working-class home. But the experts soon discarded this idea as open to various objections, including the probability that occupants would be trapped by the fall of their house and killed by fire or escaping coal-gas. During Munich householders had been advised to dig trenches in their yards or gardens, and now, by an extension of this plan, the 'Anderson' was designed as an outdoor or surface shelter. It con- sisted of fourteen corrugated steel sheets weighing, with other components, about 8 cwt. A corrugated steel hood, curved for greater strength, would be sunk some two feet in the ground and covered with earth or sandbags.

196 Ch. V: THE NEW ARM OF CIVIL DEFENCE

The programme for manufacture and distribution by the end of 1939-40 of 2 J million c Andersons' to protect about 10 million citizens was being steadily carried through.

SHELTERS 371

householders in May in the form of a booklet, Your Home as an Air Raid Shelter.1 This stated that an ordinary soundly-built house would offer very substantial protection; and it gave those unable to build some form of shelter much detailed guidance on the preparation of refuge rooms, the protection of windows and so on.

1 H.S.C. 98/40, 22nd May 1940.

416 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE

16 April 1941: heaviest London air raid of WWII:

On the night of 1 6th- 17th some 450 aircraft made the heaviest raid so far on the capital, dropping 446 tons of high ex- plosive and 150 tons of incendiaries and causing more casualties — about 1,180 killed and 2,230 badly injured — than in any previous attack.1 Over 2,250 fires were started; and the centre and south of the metropolis bore the brunt of the attack.

1 German records show the much higher' figures of 685 aircraft, 890 tons of H.E. and 4,200 incendiary canisters dropped. This attack proved the worst on London of the war in terms of weight of bombs dropped, casualties inflicted and the number of fires caused.

438 Ch. X: THE TIDES OF BATTLE 194&

These occasions apart, the attack was predominantly of the tip and run or — as it was sometimes called — 'the scalded cat9 variety. The worst single incident of the year took place on 3rd March at Bethnal Green Tube shelter when, ironically enough, no attack was in progress on this particular area. A night attack of moderate proportions was being made on London, and warnings had sounded. A woman among the crowd entering this shelter, encumbered by a baby and a bundle, fell, causing those pressing behind her to tumble in a heap and the death by suffocation of no less than 178 persons. 3 March 1 943

508 Ch. XII: SHELTERS

In London a periodical count was made of shelterers, usually once a month; but this took place on a single night which was not neces- sarily typical. In addition, the population was continually fluctuating owing to evacuation, the call-up to the Forces and war damage. The first shelter census in Metropolitan London, taken early in Nov- ember 1940, showed that 9 per cent, of the estimated population spent the night in public shelters, 4 per cent, in the Tubes and 27 per cent, in household shelters — in all, only 40 per cent, in any kinds of official shelter. In September and October this proportion was probably a good deal higher. Later, as the London public became accustomed to raids, the figures dropped.

STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 527

Experience of raids also led to the introduction of an entirely new type of household shelter. 'Andersons', though structurally satis- factory, had not originally been intended for sleeping and became in many cases unfit for winter occupation. Domestic surface shelters were very cramped when used for sleeping and were in some places not popular, and strengthened domestic basements had been neither very successful nor widely used. After night raiding had ceased to be a novelty, many people preferred to stay in their houses rather than to go out of doors even to their own domestic shelters. The 'Anderson', it will be recalled, had at first been envisaged as an indoor shelter. Since many people were now determined to remain in their homes, it had become necessary to introduce some indoor shelter which might reduce the risk of injury from falling masonry and furniture. The fact that many who had hitherto sheltered under their staircases or furniture had been rescued unhurt from the wreckage of houses suggested that extra protection might be given by a light structure on the ground floor.

By the end of 1940 two designs had been produced. The first, later known as the •Morrison* shelter, had a rectangular steel frame- work 6 ft. 6 in. long, 4 ft. wide and about 2 ft. 9 in. high. The sides were filled in with wire mesh, the bottom consisted of a steel mattress and the top was made of steel plate an eighth of an inch thick, fastened to the framework by bolts strong enough to withstand a heavy swinging blow. The shelter, which could be used as a table in the daytime, could accommodate two adults and either two young children or one older child, lying down. Experiments showed that it would carry the debris produced by the collapse of two higher floors.

528 Ch. XII: SHELTERS

The Prime Minister showed great interest in these shelters the first of which, in fact, were erected in No. 10 Downing Street.1 In January 1 941 the Cabinet approved the manufacture of 400,000, providing protection for perhaps 1,200,000 people.8

In February contracts had been placed for 270,000 shelters, and another order for the same number was placed in April (thus exceeding the 400,000 originally approved). Two further orders for 270,000 were placed at the end of July and the end of September.

1 Instructions were given in a pamphlet, How to put up your Morrison shelter, on sale to the public.

1 One with a flat top and one with a curved top were erected in No. 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister was at first inclined to favour the curved design but he afterwards recognised the advantages of the flat top, which would allow the shelter to be used as a table, and gave his approval to both designs.

* It was estimated that each 'Morrison' would use over g cwt. of steel, and that about 65,000 tons would be needed for the 400,000 shelters. This proved to be an under- estimate since the table shelter, as finally designed, actually weighed 4.43 cwt.

STRENGTHENING AND MULTIPLYING SHELTERS 529

In June a revised version of Tour Home as an Air Raid Shelter was issued with the title Shelter at Home. This included informa- tion about three types of shelter which could be put inside refuge rooms — the 'Morrison', a commercially made steel shelter, and a timber-framed structure designed by the Ministry of Home Security.

546 Ch. XII: SHELTERS

It was assumed that to be effective in attacks by pilotless aircraft or long-range rockets, shelters would have to be easily accessible. Yet a review of London shelter in the summer of 1943 had shown that large numbers still had no domestic shelter, and that many thousands would be unable to reach a public shelter quickly. Though the obvious solution to the problem was the 'Morrison', production of these had stopped twelve months before; and in order to build up a reserve issue had been discontinued in various areas, including London. At the beginning of October it was decided that another 100,000 'Morrisons' should be manufactured and that the reserves held in Scotland, the North of England, the Midlands and North Wales should be moved to the vicinity of London and to the Reading and Tunbridge Wells Regions, from where they could, if necessary, be used to supply London.

Large-scale redistribution of 'Morrisons' and the procurement of new ones called for a substantial administrative effort. Nonetheless, most reserves were transferred during the autumn, and by the end of January 1944 some 12,000 had deen distributed to London householders. At the beginning of this year, however, preparations for the Allied invasion of Europe began to choke the railways with more important traffic, and it became impossible to transport new shelters from manufacturers in the north of England. This diffi- culty, combined with delays in the production of spanners and nuts, meant that no new shelters could be delivered before late February or early March, when it was expected that the V-weapon attacks would have begun. Arrangements were made for some to be shipped coastwise to London; but in mid-February the contract for the remaining 'Morrisons' (about 20,000) was cancelled. y2 THREAT:

648 Ch. XV: CHALLENGE OF '7' WEAPONS

On nth September the War Cabinet considered the need for a revival of the plan (known as the 'black move') to evacuate a pro- portion of the staffs of Government Departments from London. The numbers now involved in such an exodus of the war-expanded Departments would be high, and difficulties of communications, transport, accomodation and billeting again seemed overwhelming; it was, therefore, agreed that the more practical course would be to devise measures such as 'citadel' accommodation to enable essential work to continue in London. The production of the further 100,000 'Morrison' shelters and the work on the reinforcement of street shelters proposed by the Home Secretary were also authorised.

PLANNING AGAINST NEW WEAPONS 651

As far as shelter policy was concerned, orders had been placed in September 1943 for an additional 100,000 indoor table shelters and existing stocks were moved into the areas of probable attack. Difficulties of manufacture and transport had led to poor deliveries of 'Morrisons', and it seemed unlikely that more than half of the additional shelters ordered would be available by the time attacks were likely to begin. As the remainder would probably arrive too late to be of any use, contracts for the shelters were to be reduced by about 25,000. On the question of deep Tube shelters it had been agreed earlier that priority in the allocation of space would have to be given to the essential machinery of government. The Ministry of Works worked out a plan to shelter those government staffs not already provided for in the strengthened basements of their own steel-framed buildings. All shelter plans, the reader will recall, were given valuable impetus by the resurgence of 'conventional' attack on London and the south in the 'Little Blitz' of early 1944.

VI flying bomb.THE ■ V. 1 s ATT A CKS 659

Flying glass was a special danger and people were warned to take cover on the sound of a bomb diving or the engine stopping, and later on the sounding of imminent danger warnings. The vast damage to houses inevitably caused great domestic upheavals. To begin with there was a definite decline in production in London, due to an increase in the rate of absenteeism, to loss of time in actual working hours through workers taking shelter and to lowered efficiency through loss of sleep and anxiety. The extension of the industrial alarm system and the increase in the labour force repairing damaged property, however, soon reduced these early signs of disturbance. Within a few weeks evacuees were returning to London, shelters were less full and most people were going about their normal tasks as usual.

For the civil defence services the new weapon demanded new tactics. In many ways these attacks were much easier to contend with than ordinary bombing. Firsdy, most of the incidents were isolated, so that services could be directed in strength to the affected area without constant competing demands on the personnel at every turn. Secondly, the fall of the bombs could be spotted within a matter of seconds by high-placed observation posts either by night or by day, so that rescue and first aid squads could be on the spot very quickly. Thirdly, the penetrative power of this weapon was slight so that incidents rarely involved die complications of broken gas, electricity or water mains, and there was also little tendency for fires to break out. On the other hand the bombs could fall at any time in crowded thoroughfares; the proportion of casualties in the streets was much higher than ever before while the proportion of trapped casualties was lower. At night time, since there were no German eyes above, the use of artificial light was less restricted and searchlights could be used for rescue work.

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The Official Story of the CIVIL DEFENCE

of Britain

1942

London : His Majesty's Stationery Office

THE MAN IN THE STREET 67

So far was all this from panic that it took three months lor the population of the twenty-eight central boroughs to drop by about 25 percent, from a little over 3,000,000 (the figure before heavy bombing began) to 2,280,000 at the end of November. In a group of the most heavily bombed eastern lx>roughs the pre-war population of 800,000 had fallen to 582,000 before the blitz began ; for four months it had dropped steadily to 444,000 ; by 3 1 st December a fall of 23 per cent. These figures do not spell panic, and a further substantial fall in 1941, after con- tinuous heavy raiding had ceased, completes the evidence that those who went did so in cold blood, for practical reasons as valid for their hard-pressed city as for their private selves.

But what did all this mean to the average Londoner ? In November, inner London (the county) contained some 3,200,000 people. Not more than 300,000 of these were in public shelter of any kind, half of that number at most in those larger shelters on which the limelight shone so exclusively Nor is this all ; in domestic shelter (Ander- sons, small brick shelters and private rein- forced basements) there were no more than

68 FRONT LINE

1,150,000 people. Thus of every hundred Londoners living in the central urban areas, nine were in public shelter (of whom possibly four were in " big " shelters), 27 in private shelter, and 64 in their own beds — possibly moved to the ground floor — or else on duty. Particular big shelters, and for a few nights the tubes, were overcrowded, but there was public shelter for twice the number who made use of it. In outer London, with a population of some 4,600,000, there were in November 4 per cent, in public shelter, 26 per cent, in domestic shelter, and 70 per cent, at home or on duty.

In the last great war there had been out- bursts of hate against the distant enemy, and shops with German names had been wrecked. This time the citizens did not stop for such things. After the first shock of realisation they found no more need for direct recrimination than does the soldier. Like him, they got on with the job and waited their chance. Neither in this nor in any other way was there a sign of instability ; no panic running for shelter, no white faces in the streets (though plenty of taut, grim ones), no nerve disease. In all London, the month of October saw but twenty-three neurotics admitted to hospital. The mind- doctors had rather fewer patients than usual.

BLOCKED ROADS. The morning of 12th May: each raid sets the police still another traffic problem.

ENORMOUS CRATERS. At the Bank, where the road collapsed into the subway beneath. A temporary bridge was thrown right across it.

CITY OF COVENTRY

[

II

**-

in view of p#**%t*nt damage to DRAINAGE

communication* in the City. %p**ctat precaution*

agafn%t TypttoMl Fever are advt%*:4

BOIL ALL

DRINKING WATER

The outcome may be seen in the following table, which shows coastal bombing to November, 1941, in round figures.

Town.	(	Number. ■>f Raids.	Civilians Killed.	Houses Damaged.
Fraserburgh		18	40	700
Peterhead	• * *	16	36
Aberdeen	« * *	24	68	2,000
Scarborough	* » *	. 17	30	2,250
Bridlington	• • •	30	2U	3,000
Grimsby ...	• • *	22	18	1,700
Gt. Yarmouth	# * •	72	110	1 1 ,500
Lowestoft		54	94	9,000
Clacton ...	• » ■	31	10	4,400
Margate	• • •>	47	19	8,000
Ramsgate		41	71	8,500
Deal	• » »	17	12	2,000
Dover	... 53 (and shelling)	92	9,000
Folkestone	• • •	42	52	7,000
Hastings ...	• ft ■	40	46	6,250
Bexhill ...	• • *	37	74	2,600
Eastbourne		49	36	3,700
Brighton Hove	}	25	1 27	4,500
Worthing	...	29	20	3,000
Bournemouth		33	77	4,000
Weymouth	...	42	48	3,600
Falmouth	• • •	33	31	1,100

A PENGUIN SPECIAL

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND COURAGE

BY

EDWARD GLOVER

(Published for Blitz air raids in 1 940)

PENGUIN BOOKS

HARMONDS WORTH MIDDLESEX ENGLAND 41 EAST 28TH STREET NEW YORK U.S.A.

ON BEING AFRAID

Real knowledge, for example, is one of the best antidotes to unreal fear. Useful action is also an excellent pre- ventive, and vigorous preparation to meet real danger will enormously reduce unreal fear. The strength of a common purpose will do the rest. Knowledge, a common purpose, and preparedness for action. These are the remedies for faintness of heart in the face of danger.

22

Now as to preparation. You may recall that when

Napoleon was asked how he was always able to give an

instant decision in a crisis, he replied : " Because I

constantly prepare every detail in advance." Here is a

discipline you can readily cultivate. Always make a point

of knowing beforehand exactly what you are going to do

in an air raid; whether you find yourself in house,

street, train, bus or shelter. Have it word perfect.

23

A stray crowd packed into a cinema is likely to panic at the cry of "Fire." There are no common bonds between the people concerned; and there are no leaders. Each one is for himself.

34

Already we have the advantage that we are fighting not only for our lives and homes but for the immemorial cause of human liberty. But that is not enough. Pro- vided we are united with our leaders in a common effort, real danger will never sap our morale. The greatest danger to our morale is unreal fear.

36

i\. Xv* Jr.

(Air Raid Precautions)

by J. B. S. HALDANE, F.R.S.

(Co-inventor of 1915 gas masks)

LONDON

VICTOR GOLLANGZ LTD

1938

88 A.R.P.

keyholes and cracks in the wall or between the floor- boards are to be filled with putty or sodden newspaper.

The windows must be specially protected against breakage by blast or splinters.

(Plastic sheets and duct tape for broken windows)

How far are these precautions effective? In 1937 a committee of the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group published a book1 in which it was stated that no ordinary room is anywhere near gas-proof.

1 The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack.

Error of Cambridge Scientists' Anti War Group: 94, A.R.P.

The real criticism is as follows. It is unlikely that there would be a lethal concentration of _gas_out_of doors for a long period. "The wind carries gas away, ana in cities tnere are vertical^ air^urrents even in calm weather. 11 many tons of bombs could^be droppei in the same small area either at once or in succession this would not be so. .But given any sort^ of_defence bombs will be dropped more or less at random.

Suppose we~Ka<r ouFbf doors during 10 minutes a phosgene concentration of one part in 10,000, which would be fatal in a few breaths to people in the street, the concentration inside would never rise as high as ^ of this value1 if the leakage time were 2J hours, which

is rather low. (Hence protection factor = 15)

1 Since 10 minutes is T^ of 2 J hours.

10 PREFACE

Many of the questions which are asked concerning Air Raid Precautions are unanswerable in the form in which they are put. If I am asked "Does any gas mask give complete protection against phosgene" the only literally true answer is "No." One could not live in a room full of pure phosgene in any of them. And one would be killed if a hundred-pound phosgene bomb burst in the room, even when wearing the very best mask. But one would be safe in a phosgene concentra- tion of one part per thousand, of which a single breath would probably kill an unprotected man. Hence in prac- tice such a mask is a very nearly complete protection.

18

A.R.P.

1. Non-persistent gases, such as phosgene. They can be dropped in bombs which burst, and suddenly let loose a cloud of gas, which is poisonous when breathed, but which gradually disperses. If there is a wind the dispersal is very quick; in calm, and especially in foggy weather, it is much slower. These gases can penetrate into houses, but very slowly. So even inT badly-constructed house one is enormously saier than in the open air. Even the cheapest type of gas mask, provided it Jits properly and is put on at once]~~fipves good protection against them_ (see Chajpter TVJ7

2. Persistent gases, such as mustard gas. Mustard gas is the vapour of an oily liquid, which I shall call mustard liquid. So far as I know this has not been dropped from aeroplanes in bombs on any great scale. It was used very effectively by the Italians in Abyssinia, who sprayed it in a sort of rain from special sprayers attached to the wings of low-flying aeroplanes.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MASS MURDER 21

If the mustard liquid could be sprayed evenly, things would be far more serious. All the outside air of a large town would be poisonous for several days. But this would only be possible if the spraying aero- planes could fly to and fro over the town in formation, and at a height of not more than 300 feet or so. A fine rain of mustard liquid would probably evaporate on its way to the ground, or blow away, if it were let loose several thousand feet up in tEe air. Spraying from low-flying aeroplanes was possible in Abyssinia because the Abyssinians had no anti-aircraft guns and no defensive aeroplanes. It would probably not be possible in Britain.

The Hamburg disaster. Fantastic nonsense has been talked about the possible effects of gas bombs on a town. For example, Lord Halsbury said that a single gas bomb dropped in Piccadilly Circus would kill everyone between the Thames and Regent's Park. Fortunately, although no gas bombs have been dropped

in towns in war-time, there are recorded facts1 which give us an idea of what their effect would be. On Sunday, May 20th, 1928, at about 4.15 p.m., a tank containing 1 1 tons of phosgene burst in the dock area of Hamburg.

Casualties occurred up to six miles away. In all 300 people were made ill enough to be taken to hospital, and of these ten died. About fifty of the rest were seriously ill. These casualties are remarkably small.

1Hegler, Deutsche Medizinische Wockenschrift, 1928, p. 1551.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MASS MURDER 23 WHY GAS WAS NOT USED IN SPAIN

In view of the terrible stories as to the effects of gas, many people are surprised that it has not been used in Spain. First, why was it not used against the loyalist army? Secondly, why was it not used against towns? The soldiers had respirators after about February 1937, but were not well trained in their use, and often lost them. Very few civilians had any respirators at all.

Gas was not used in the field for several reasons. The main reason is that the number of men and guns per mile was far less than on the fronts in the Great War. Gas is effective if you have a great deal of it,

24 A.R.P.

but the amount needed is enormous. Thus during the night of March io-nth, 1918, the Germans fired about 150,000 mustard-gas shells into an area of some twenty square miles south-west of Gambrai. If most of the air in a large area is poisoned the effects are serious. But if a few gas shells are fired or a few cylinders let off, the gas soon scatters and ceases to be poisonous, and a man can often run to a gas-free place, even with- out a mask, before he is poisoned.

Gas was not used against the towns for this reason, and for another, which is very important. Gas only leaks quite slowly into houses, particularly if there are no fires to make a draught, and draw in outside air; and there is very little fuel in loyal Spain.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MASS MURDER 37

PANIC

Panic can be a direct cause of death. If too many people crowd into a shelter, especially one with narrow stairs leading to it, they may easily be crushed to death. In January 1918 fourteen people were killed in this way at Bishopsgate Station in London, and sixty-six were killed in a panic in one of the Paris Underground stations as the result of a false gas alarm.

(Bishopsgate Station incident: 28 January 1918) BACTERIA AND OTHER MICROBES

It is possible that these will be used in some kind of spray or dust. The difficulty is a technical one. It is easy to disperse many solids as smoke. But this needs heat, and cooked bacteria are harmless. Many

38 A.R.P.

bacteria are killed even by drying. And once bacteria are on the ground they generally stay there. Possibly pneumonic plague or some other air-borne disease might be started by a dust-bomb. Cholera bacilli might be dropped in a reservoir. But they would probably be stopped by filters, and even without this would be likely to die before they reached the houses.

A million fleas weigh very little, and could easily be dropped. In theory they could be infected with plague. In practice this would need a staff" of hundreds of trained bacteriologists, and huge laboratories. So with other possible means of infection. Some may very well be tried, if only to create a panic, but I would sooner face bacteria than bombs.

248 A.R.P.

Certain pacifist writers are severely to blame for

■"■■ ■ 11 j rfftirr^— i- g ; ' ' 4 ■ r -

our present terror of air raids. They nave given quite exaggerated accounts of what is likely to happen.

250 A.R.P.

So long as civilian populations are unprotected^ criminal States" will continue to murder the citizens ot their weaker neighbours and to blackmail the

- • ■ - • m •

stronger.

POISONOUS OASES AND SMOKES 261

Physical properties of a Gas-cloud. Every student of chemistry learns that a heavy gas such as chlorine can be poured from one vessel into another almost like water, whilst a light gas such as hydrogen rapidly rises. Now all the poisonous gases and vapours used in war are heavier than air, so it is thought that they would inevitably flood cellars and underground shelters, and that on the first floor of a house one would not be safe.

262 A.R.P.

But within a short time it would be mixed with many times its volume of air. Now air containing one part in 10,000 of phosgene is extremely poisonous. But its density exceeds that of air by only one part in 4,000.

APPENDIX II

GAS-MASKS, AND GAS-PROOF BAGS

FOR BABIES

The earliest gas-masks made in 1915, relied on chemical means to stop chlorine, which was the first gas used. A cloth soaked with sodium phenate or various other compounds will stop chlorine on its way through. But it would not stop carbon monoxide, mustard gas, or many other gases. The terrible prospect arose that it would be necessary to devise a new chemical to stop each new gas. There would be a continual series of surprise attacks with different gases, each successful until a remedy was found, and each involving the death of thousands of men.

It is a most fortunate fact that the majority of vapours can be removed from air, not by chemical combination, but by a process called adsorption, which is non-specific. For example lime will stop an acid gas such as carbon dioxide, and woollen cloth soaked in acid will stop an alkaline gas such as ammonia. No single chemical will combine with both.

But charcoal, silica, and various other substances, when properly prepared, will take up vapours of different chemical types. The molecules form a very thin liquid layer on the surface of the adsorbent, as indeed they do on glass or metals. But charcoal is full of pores and has an enormous surface per unit of weight; so it can take up a great deal of gas.

264 A . R . P .

The main characteristic in a vapour which renders it adsorbable is that it should be the vapour of a liquid with a high boiling point. Thus carbon monoxide boils at-1900 C, and is hardly adsorbed at all. Phosgene boils at 8° G and is fairly easily adsorbed. Mustard gas boils at 2 1 70 C and is very easily adsorbed indeed. This has a lucky consequence. It is quite sure that there are no unknown poisonous gases with a boiling point as low as that of carbon monoxide. For only a substance with very small molecules can have so low a boiling point. And chemists have made all the possible types of very small molecules. It is unlikely that there are any unknown poisonous gases with as low a boiling point as phosgene, though it is just possible. But if there are they will probably be stopped by charcoal. There may very possibly be some vapours of high boiling point more poisonous than mustard gas. But if so I am prepared to bet a thousand to one that charcoal will stop them all.

ad 4 0 8 094

FINAL REPORT 11 March 1963

Recovery and Decontamination

Measures after Biological and Chemical Attack

This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defease and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

Contract OCD-OS-62-183

Prepared for Office of Civil Defense Department of Defense

by

Science Communication, Inc. 1079 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W Washington 7, D. C.

To plan for countermeasures against any weapons one must understand the problem —the nature, the potentials, and the Limitations. This research project and the resultant final report were intended to bring together current information most applicable to civil defense. It was particularly intended for those who are responsible for planning preparatory, reclamation and countermeasures effort to minimize the damage from a BW/CW attack.

William J. Lacy Project Coordinator Postattack Research

vi Decontaminants

An important class of decontaminants comprises the common sub- stances or natural influences such as time, air, eartti water, and fire.

Natural Effects

Biological agents are living organisms and tend to die off with time unless they are in a favorable environment with moisture, food, warmth, and other factors necessary for their survival. In addition, most biological organisms are very sensitive to the conditions of temperature and humidity -- and, particularly to the ultra-violet portion of sunlight. Adverse exposure to the elements — air, sunlight, high temperature, low humidity — is effective, in fact, against ail biological agents except the spore forms of bacterial organisms,

It is generally assumed that in the vegetative form bacteria, (as contrasted to the spore form) can persist for less than two hours during daytime and about eighteen hours at night. Since these short-lived bacteria are the most probable agents, outdoor decontamination is usually not called for unless the agent has been identified, either by laboratory tests or by the character of the disease, as one which forms spores or is otherwise known to be persistent.

Appraisal of Biological and Chemical Warfare Protection in the U.S. Field Army. Booz, Allen Aoolied Research, Inc. , June 1961. AD 329 113, (SECRET).

Area-Coverage Capabilities of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons (U). Tamplin, A.R. , Rand Corporation, April 1962. AD 329 207, (SECRET ).

Biological Decontamination. Asher, T.M. , Naval Biological Laboratory, February 1954. AD 72 485, (SECRET).

Biological Problems Attendant Upon the Application of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents in Limited War (U). Tamplin, A. R.t Rand Corporation, RM-2677, June 1961, AD 324 462, (SECRET).

Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment. Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 3-10, February 1962.

Community Reaction to an Accidental Chlorine Exposure - Task Sirocco. Segaloff , Louis, University of Pennsylvania, November 1961. AD 269 681,

Decontamination of Water Contaminated with VX. Lindsten, Don C. and Bauer, Virginia E,, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Research Report 1630-RR, May 1960. AD 239 310.

Effects of Cooking and Baking Processes on the Sterilization of Food Contaminated with Bacterial Spores. Commissary Research Division, U.S. Naval Supply Research and Development Facility, Final Report Navy Project NT 002 024 (CR 53-89), 1953.

Evaluation of Standard and Modified Laundering Procedures as BW Decon- tamination Methods. Portner, Dorothy M*, Mayo, Elizabeth C. and Surkiewicz, Bernard F. , Biological Warfare Laboratories, Technical Memorandum 1-2, March 1959. AD 252 270L.

Field Purification of Water Contaminated by G Agents. Chemical Corps Medical Division .Report No. 220, 1949. AD 212 449.

Field Tests of Protective Clothing Exposed to BW Aerosols. Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Special Report No. 112, August 1949.

Possible Applications of Bacteriological Warfare to Public Water

Supplies. Maloney, John R. , Office of Naval Research, November 1959. AD 69 721, (CONFIDENTIAL).

Some Indications of Soviet Views on the Strategic Employment of

CW/BW(U). Goure, Leon, Rand Corporation, RM-2725, March 1961. (SECRET).

Studies on Insect Control (U)» U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Research Report 1656 -RR, October 1960. AD 321 975, (CONFIDENTIAL).

DECAY OF BOTULINUM TOXIN, <50% HUMIDITY

Decay occurs faster in humid air

1<X> 200 MINUTES 300

Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-3

DECAY OF ANTHRAX, <50% HUMIDITY

Decay occurs faster in humid air

30 20 10

Twilight

Bright Sunlight

0 100 200 MINUTES 300

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-3 (1992), Fig. B-l.

Chemical and biological contamination avoidance, FM 3-3 (1992)

10 grams/square meter

TABLE 1-2. Chemical Ageru Persistency in Hours on CARC Painted Surfaces.
Temperature	GA/ GF1	GB2'3	GD2'3	HD1	VX2'3
C°	F°
-30	-22	•	110.34	436.69	# *	• # »
-20	-4	1 •	45.26	145.63	» •	• ••
-10	14	•	20.09	54.11	• •	• • •
0	32	•	9.44	22.07	• •	• ••
10	50	1.42	4.70	9.78	12	1776
20	68	0.71	2.45	4.64	6.33	634
30	86	0.33	1.35	2.36	2.8	241
40	104	0.25	0.76	1.25	2	102
50	122	0.25	0.44	0.70	1	44
55	131	0.25 I 0.34	0.51	1	25
NOTE 1 For grassy terrain moltiply the number in the chart by 0.4. 2 For grassy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 1.75. 3 For sandy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 4.5. • Agent persistency time is less than 1 hour. *• Agent is in a frozen state and will not evaporate or decay. ••• Agent persistency time exceeds 2,000 hours. -

COMPARATIVE VOLATILITY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

Agent	Volatility (mg/m3) at 25°C
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN)	1,000,000
Sarin (GB)	22,000
Soman (GD)	3,900
Sulfur mustard	900
Tabun (GA)	610
Cyclosarin (GF)	580
VX	10
VR ("Russian VX")	9

Data source: US Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds. Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, DN, DAF; December 12, 1990. Field Manual 3-9. Naval Facility Command P-467. Air Force Regulation 355-7.

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Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) Medical Management of Chemical Toxicity in Pediatrics

TABLE 21-3

MANAGEMENT OF MILD TO MODERATE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURES

Management

Antidotes

Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs)

Nerve Agents Symptoms

Age

Dose

Age

Dose

• Tabun

• Sarin

• Cyclosarin

• Soman

• VX

• Localized sweating

• Muscle fasciculations

• Nausea

• Vomiting

• Weakness /floppiness

• Dyspnea

• Constricted pupils and blurred vision

• Rhinorrhea

• Excessive tears

• Excessive salivation

• Chest tightness

• Stomach cramps

• Tachycardia or bradycardia

Neonates and infants up to 6 months old

Young children (6 months old-4 yrs old)

Older children (4-10 yrs old)

Adolescents (> 10 yrs old) and adults

Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IOtomax 4 mg or 0.25 mg AtroPen+ and 2-PAM 15 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr

Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IOtomax 4 mg or 0.5 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr

Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IOtomax 4 mg or 1 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr

Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IOtomax 4 mg or 2 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slow- ly to max 2 g/hr

Neonates

Young children (30 days old-5 yrs old)

Children (> 5 yrs old)

Adolescents and adults

Diazepam 0.1-0.3 mg/ kg/ dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lora- zepam 0.05 mg/kg slow IV

Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/dose or Loraze- pam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/dose or Loraze- pam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

Diazepam 5-10 mg up to 30 mg in 8 hr period or Lorazepam 0.07 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

2-PAM: 2-pralidoxime IM: intramuscular IO: intraosseous IV: intraveneous

PDH: Pediatrics Dosage Handbook

*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 minutes until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. fMeridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term.

Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtropPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi- cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook, 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio; Lexi-Comp Inc: 2006.

Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare

TABLE 21-4

MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURE

Management

Antidotes4

Benzodiazepines

(if neurological signs)

Nerve Agents Severe Symptoms

Age

Dose

Age

Dose

• Tabun • Convulsions

• Sarin • Loss of consciousness

• Cyclosarin • Apnea

• Soman • Flaccid paralysis

• VX • Cardiopulmonary arrest

• Strange and confused behavior

• Severe difficulty breathing

• Involuntary urination and defecation

Neonates and infants up to 6 months old

Young children (6 months old-4 yrs old)

Older children (4^10 yrs old)

Adolescents (s 10 yrs old) and adults

Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IM/IV/IOor3doses of 0.25mg AtroPen* (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark If kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist

Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IOor3doses of 0.5mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist

Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IOor3doses of lmg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25-50 mg/ kg IM or IV slowly, 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 7, 2 Mark I kits for ages > 7-10 yrs

Atropine 6 mg IM or 3 doses of 2 mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 1800 mglV/ IM/IO,or2Mark I kits (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 14, 3 Mark I kits for ages a 14 yrs

Neonates

Young children (30 days old-5 yrs and adults

Children (^ 5 yrs old)

Adolescents and adults

Diazepam 0.1-0.3 mg/kg/ dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lorazepam 0.05 mg/ kg slow IV

Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/ dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

Diazepam 0.05-0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/ dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

Diazepam 5-10 mg up to 30 mg in 8-hr period, or Lora- zepam 0.07 mg/ kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

IM: intramuscular IO: intraosseous

IV: intravenous ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^—

*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10-20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5-10 min until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. ^Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Term. Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. Pediatrics. 2003;112:648-658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Term: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtroPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemi- cal terrorism. / Pediatr. 2002;141(3):311-326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook. 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio: Lexi-Comp Inc; 2006.

French family at Marbache, Meurthe et Moselle, France, September 1918. Gas masks were compulsory in the village, due to nearby gas attacks. Photo is the frontispiece of the October 1921 reprint of Will Irwin's book "The Next War" (Dutton, N.Y. , 19th printing Oct 1921; first published April 1921.)

J. Davidson Pratt, "Gas Defence from the Point of View of the Chemist" (Royal Institute of Chemistry, London, 1937): "... during the Great War, French and Flemish . . . living in the forward areas came unscathed through big gas attacks by going into their houses, closing the doors - the windows were always closed in any case - and remaining there ..."

London 1941 baby gas mask drill

Hand pumped (asthmatic)

Hospital patient's

Police Civilian Soldier's /warden until 1942

Small child's (mickey mouse)

An eminent chemist gives the facts about poison gas

and air bombing

t He freely /

THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS

h

7 antes JCtnaall M.A., D.Sc. F.R.S.

Professor of Chemistry, University of Edinburgh

The civilian has been told that he will have to bear the brunt of another war, that within a few hours from the outset enemy bombers will destroy big cities and exterminate their inhabitants with high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs. What is the truth?

Here, in this book, written in language everyone can understand, is the considered opinion of an authority on chemical warfare.

Breathe Freely !

THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS JAMES KENDALL

M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S.

Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh ;

formerly Lieutenant-Commander in the United

States Naval Reserve, acting as Liaison Officer

with Allied Services on Chemical Warfare

J938

52 GAS IN THE LAST WAR

CASUALTIES IN INITIAL GAS ATTACKS

Amount Lethal

Used Concentra- Non-fatal

Gas Date In Tons tion * injuries Deaths

Chlorine Apr. 22, 191 5 168 56 i5sooo 5,000

Phosgene Dec. 19, 19 15 88 05 1,069 120

Mustard July 12, 191 7 125 015 2,490 87

(* mg/litre for 10 minutes exposure unprotected) between September 15 and November 11, 1918, 2,000,000 rounds of gas shell, containing 4,000 tons of mustard gas, were fired against the advancing British troops ; our losses therefrom were 540 killed and 24,363 injured. Gas defence had progressed to the point where it took nearly 8 tons of mustard gas to kill a single man !

A GAS ATTACK ON LONDON 109

The first

salvo_ofgas shells often reaches the trenches before the occupantlTddirtheir masks, whereas the Londoner will receive ample warning of the approaching danger.

IIO GAS IN THE NEXT WAR

The alarmist and the ultra-pacifist love to quote the fact that one~toh of mustard gas is sufficient to kill 45,000,000 people. This would indeed be true if the 45,000,000 people all stood in a line with their tongues out waiting for the drops to be dabbed on, but they are hardly likely to be so obliging. One steam- ronef~woulclrsuffice to flatten out all' the inhabitanfcTof Londoin^f^they lay down in rows in front of it, but nobody panics at the sight of a steam-roller.

11

Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have I>een delugmgTEcT long-suffering British public with lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination

These three classes are pure sensa- tionalists, ultra-pacifists andTmilitary experts7

12 PANIC PALAVER

perpetrators of such articles may not recognize them- selves that what they are writing is almost entirely imaginary, "but theyjio want jojget their manuscript "accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the Weekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the horrors thick, and they certainly do their best

The amount of damage done by such alarmists can- not be calculated, b^tlTislindoubtedly very great.

poison gas has a much greater laews^value. It is still a new and mysterious form of warfare, it is something which people do not under- stand, and what they do not understand they can readily be made to fear.

The recent film Things to Come, in particular, has provided a picture of chemical warfare of the future which shows how simply and rapidly whole populations will be wiped out. Millions of people, perhaps, have been impressed by the authority and reputation of Mr. H. G. Wells into believing that this picture repre- sents the plain truth.

Exhibit 'B* is the work of the ultra^^acifist. He abominates war and everything connected with war to such an extent that he paints a highly coloured picture of its horrors,Tirthe most extreme Surrealistic style, with the objecF of frightening the public to the point where they will relinquish, in the hope of escaping war, even the right of self<tefence. His motives may be praise- worthy, but his methods are to be deplored.

Tel. No. : Victoria 6826

Any communication on the subject of this letter should be addressed to —

The Under Secretary of State. Home Office (A.R.P. Dept.), Horseferry House, Thorney Street,

London, S.W.i.

and the following number quoted :— 701,602/109

HOME OFFICE, Air Raid Precautions Dept., HORSEFERRY HOUSE, THORNEY STREET, LONDON, S.W.i,

3 is* December, 1937.

Sir,

Experiments in Anti-Gas Protection of Houses

I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit, for the information of your Council, the annexed Report describing in detail the experiments to which reference was made by the Par- liamentary Under Secretary of State in his speech on the second reading of the Air Raid Precautions Bill in the House of Commons on the 16th November.

The experiments were conducted by the Chemical Defence Research Department under the aegis of a special Sub-Com- mittee of the Chemical Defence Committee. That Sub- Committee was composed of eminent experts not in Government employment, and included a number of distinguished University professors and scientists.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

R. R. Scott.

The Clerk of the County Council.

The Town Clerk.

The Clerk to the District Council.

Issued to all

County Councils

County Borough Councils (and the Corporation of the City of London)

Metropolitan Borough Councils

Municipal Borough Councils

Urban and Rural District Councils

in England and Wales

Copies sent for information to Chief Officers of Police in England and Wales.

Crown Copyright Reserved PROTECTION AGAINST GAS

REPORT OF EXPERIMENTS CARRIED OUT BY THE CHEMICAL DEFENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Handbook No. i issued by the Air Raid Precautions Depart- ment of the Home Office describes the steps which the public are advised to take in order to protect themselves against the effects of any chemical warfare gases which might be employed by enemy aircraft in time of war;

The gist of these recommendations is : —

First, to go indoors.

Secondly, to arrange for the room into which you go to be made as gas-proof as possible.

Thirdly, to take with you the respirator which will have been issued to you.

Whilst it has never been claimed that any one of these steps by itself will make an individual completely safe, experiments and trials have shown that each of these measures is by itself of considerable value and that when all of them are adopted a very high degree of protection is obtained. An outline is given below of certain typical experiments which have been carried out.

These particular experiments were carried out with four different types of actual war gas. The first four experiments to be described will show the degree of protection that is obtained from each type of gas merely by going indoors and shutting the doors and windows.

As explained in Handbook No. i*, a chemical warfare gas may be dropped from aircraft either as spray or in bombs. In the former case the liquid drops fall like rain, and it is obvious that by going indoors the public will avoid them. On the other hand, if gas bombs are dropped, people who have gone indoors will avoid being splashed by the chemical in the bomb, and even in an ordinary room they will receive some protection from the gas cloud. The amount of protection obtained in a house which has not been treated in any way can be gathered from the following experiments.

(a) Protection obtained in a house which has not been treated in any way.

The house employed was a gamekeeper's cottage with three rooms on the ground floor and three rooms upstairs. It had been unoccupied for about 15 years but was in a reasonable state of repair. It was to a large extent sheltered by belts of

* A.R.P. Handbook No. i, " Personal Protection against Gas ", price 6d. (8d. post free) : published by H.M. Stationery Office (see back page).

trees which reduced the strength of the wind in the vicinity of the cottage to about one-eighth of that in the open. In this respect therefore the location of the cottage resembled a house in a town. In one experiment over a ton of actual chlorine gas was released 20 yards from the house so that the wind carried ' it straight on to the unprotected room. A very strong gas cloud was thus maintained outside the house for about 40 minutes, during which time the gas gradually penetrated to the inside. A fire was burning in the hearth the whole time, and the only measures taken to exclude the gas consisted of closing the doors and windows in the normal way.

Human beings who occupied this unprotected room found that gas penetrated slowly into the room, and after about seven minutes is became necessary for them to put on their respirators. Had these men been outside the house, they would have been compelled to put on their respirators immediately, since other- wise the very intense gas cloud would have caused instantaneous incapacitation and ultimate death.

If the gas, which with its containers weighed about z\ tons, had been released more quickly, the strength of the gas cloud would have been greater but the time during which the house was enveloped by it would have been correspondingly shorter.

It is important to appreciate properly the severity of this trial. The quantity of gas concentrated on this house could under practical conditions only be obtained by several^ large bombs dropping very close to the building. The period of exposure to the maximum effects of the gas was also many times longer than would normally be experienced under most prac- tical conditions, since the initial cloud from a gas bomb soon begins to be diluted and dispersed by the action of even quite ; moderate winds. It is clear that conditions similar to those of the experiment are extremely severe, and are such as would be likely to occur very rarely indeed and to a very small number of houses.

It should also be noted that the cottage used in this experi- ment had no carpets or other floor coverings. Most of the gas which leaked in came through the spaces between the floor boards, and it is therefore clear that much less would have got into an ordinary room in which there was a carpet, linoleum, or a solid floor.

In another experiment the house was surrounded at a dis- tance of 20 yards by large shallow trays which were filled with mustard gas, the trays being spaced a few yards apart. By this means the vapour given off by the mustard gas was carried on to the house no matter how the direction of the wind varied. As the weather at the time was not very warm, the conditions of the experiment were made more severe by producing a fine spray of mustard gas at a point 10 yards to windward of

the house so that the house was enveloped in the resultant cloud of mustard gas for a period of an hour. The cloud produced in this way was about a hundred times as strong as that caused by the evaporation of the mustard gas from the trays. Animals were placed in an unprotected room in the house and remained there during the spraying period and for a further 20 hours while the house was subjected to the vapour of mustard gas given off from the trays. Observations made upon the animals during the three subsequent days and also post mortem examina- tion showed that none of them was seriously harmed by the mustard gas.

The third type of gas used was tear gas. In this experiment the same cottage was enveloped for an hour in an intense atmosphere of tear gas produced by spraying the gas into the air at a point 10 yards upwind of the house. Men who were stationed 200 yards downwind from the house and in the track of the gas cloud were incapacitated in about a minute, and in some cases in 20 seconds. On the other hand, men who occu- pied rooms in the house which had received no treatment beyond the closing of the windows and doors found no need to put on their respirators for the first 13 minutes. The tear gas gradually penetrated into these unprotected rooms, although after three-quarters of an hour the strength of the gas inside the house was still very much less than that outside.

In the fourth experiment the cottage was enveloped for 20 minutes in a dense cloud of arsenical smoke. Men occupy- ing an unprotected room of the house found that the arsenical smoke penetrated into the room, but the strength of the cloud inside was much less than that outside. When Civilian respirators were worn in this room, complete protection was obtained. Men who were stationed 200 yards downwind of the house and in the path of the gas cloud were rapidly affected, but when they wore Civilian respirators no effects were felt.

The above four examples clearly demonstrate that, apart from the protection which a house provides against falling airplane spray, some measure of protection is afforded even by an ordinary unprotected room against gas clouds such as are pro- duced by bombs close to the building.

(b) Protection afforded by a house treated in accordance with Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 1.

A brief account will now be given of four further experi- ments with the same four war gases in order to illustrate the added protection which can be obtained by treating a room in accordance with the instructions given in Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 1. These experiments were also conducted with the cottage already mentioned. The room selected for treat- ment was situated on the ground floor on the windward side

of the house so that it was subjected to the full effect of the gas and the wind. It measured about 12 feet square. The Air Raid Precautions instructions for excluding gas were carried out by unskilled men, the official procedure being rigidly followed. As the house was not provided with carpets or other floor covering, it became necessary to seal up the joints between the boards over the whole of the floor of the selected room. This was done by pasting strips of paper along the joints between the floor boards. Some of these strips became displaced by the boots of the men who were inside the room, and an appre- ciable leakage of gas into the room undoubtedly occurred due to this cause. Two tons of chlorine were released 20 yards from the house, the time of emission being an hour. Animals were placed in the house, some in the " gas protected " room and others in rooms which had received no such treatment. The latter set of animals were killed by the gas which pene- trated into the unprotected rooms under these very severe conditions. The animals in the " gas protected " room, how- ever, were unaffected and remained normal, notwithstanding the severity of the trial.

An experiment with mustard gas, similar to that already described, was also carried out after the ground floor room on the windward side of the house had been treated in accordance with the Air Raid Precautions Department's procedure. Animals were placed in the room, which was then subjected to the same exposure of mustard gas spray and vapour as before. At the end of 20 hours the animals were removed and a most thorough examination of them showed no evidence of the effects of the gas at all. Animals placed outside the house during the first hour of the experiment were, of course, very seriously affected. The amount of mustard gas penetrating into the room was also measured by chemical methods and it was found that the amount of gas inside the room was so small that a man could have remained there for the whole 20 hours without its being necessary for him to wear a respirator and without any subsequent ill-effects.

The experiment with tear gas previously described was also performed against the " gas protected " room. A number of men occupied this room and found they were able to remain there without its being necessary for them to put on their respirators at any time during the hours that this very severe experiment lasted.

An experiment with arsenical smoke, similar to that already described, was also carried out against the " gas protected " room. The occupants found that the arsenical smoke penetrated the room to an extent which caused some irritation of the nose and throat and eventually rendered the wearing of respirators desirable to ensure comfort. After putting on the respirator, no

discomfort was felt throughout the remainder of the experiment. Men who left the " gas protected " room wearing their Civilian respirators were able to traverse the densest part of the cloud without discomfort. Under these severe conditions the presence of the arsenical smoke could be detected, but the effects were insignificant.

^ It is important to appreciate fully the severity of the condi- tions imposed in the two trials with arsenical smoke. A very high concentration of the irritant smoke was maintained around the house for 20 minutes. Under practical conditions such a high concentration could be produced only by a large and efficiently designed bomb falling close to the building, and then only for a short period. The conditions of the trials were there- fore extremely severe and represent a situation which would only rarely be met, and in which only a small number of houses would be involved.

From this second series of experiments it will be seen that treating a room in accordance with the recommendations of the Air Raid Precautions Department does reduce very consider- ably the amount of gas penetrating into the room, and that a room so treated is correspondingly safer than a room which has received no such treatment.

Indeed, in the case of the experiments with mustard gas and tear gas, the amount of gas which was able to penetrate into the gas protected room was so small that no further measures of protection were necessary.

In the experiment with chlorine, although the amount of gas which entered the treated room was insufficient to injure the animals, human beings who occupied the room during this extremely severe test could smell the gas. They were provided with Civilian respirators, and they found that by putting these respirators on they were completely protected against every trace of gas. Some of these individuals then left the " gas protected " room, passed out of the house, and traversed the lethal cloud of gas which enveloped it. Although they deli- berately stood in the densest part of the cloud for some minutes, no trace of the gas passed through their respirators.

Similarly the experiments with arsenical smoke show that although, under the most severe conditions, the cloud may penetrate into the " gas protected " room in sufficient quantity to be detected, or even to cause some irritation, the effects are materially reduced in a room so treated. It is also demon- strated that wearing a Civilian respirator affords complete protection against any smoke which may gain access to the room. The respirator also enabled individuals to pass through an extremely dense cloud of arsenical smoke in complete safety.

The experiments which have been outlined in this statement were purposely designed to represent the most severe conditions likely to be met. The results all combine to show that if the instructions given in Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. I are carried out a very high standard of protection is obtained. With regard to the first precaution it has been shown that going indoors and closing the doors and windows affords some measure of protection, even though the room occupied has not been specially prepared. In these circumstances there is ample time to put on the respirator at leisure if this should be necessary. If the second precaution of rendering the room as gas-proof as possible has been carried out, then the occupants will normally be able to remain in complete safety and comfort without further protection. Under the most severe conditions sufficient gas may penetrate such protected rooms to be recog- nized or even to cause slight irritation. When this occurs the respirator can be put on though in many cases this will be as a matter of convenience and extra precaution rather than real necessity. With regard to the Civilian respirator it has been shown that this will, in conjunction with the above precautions, provide complete safety for any period for which it is likely to be required. It has further been demonstrated that this respirator will enable the wearer to reach a place of safety even if he should for a time be exposed to the most dangerous situation — for example if he is caught out of doors in a gas cloud, or if his gas-protected room becomes damaged and he is compelled to seek shelter elsewhere.

(47178— 34 Wt. 3276 — 335 20,000 12/37 P- St G. 373

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:

Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2;

26 York Street, Manchester 1; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, CardirT;

80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through any bookseller

1937

Price %d. net

S.O. Code No. 34-9999

HOME OFFICE

CIVIL DEFENCE

Manual of Basic Training

VOLUME II

BASIC CHEMICAL WARFARE

PAMPHLET No.l

LONDON: HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1949

CHAPTER VII

SI. COLLECTIVE PROTECTION

Every individual can rely on his respirator for his own protection against war gas. and this is his primary defence, but the protection which is afforded against vapour, by buildings in sound condition, is of considerable value and against liquid and spray is complete.

HOME OFFICE

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS1 OPERATIONAL NOTES

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorised to receive it.

ON3-1

Mechanism of fallout

Definitions

Wind direction is the direction from which the wind blows, and is given in degrees measured clockwise from north. E.g. A 270° wind blows from the west.

Wind speed is actually measured in knots, but the unit of speed usually used by the SIO is the mile per hour (mph).

1 knot = 1 nautical mile per hour 1 nautical mile = 6080 feet 1 knot = 1 .15 mph N.B» In meteorological forecasts received by the SIO wind speeds will normally be in mph. If a forecast is mistakenly transmitted in knots, then the SIO should transform, using the above relationship. In approximate calculations the difference between a knot and a mile per hour may be neglected.

Winds changing direction with time

(a) If a wind turns clockwise it is said to be veering, (b) If a wind turns anti clockwise it is said to be backing.

A forecast concerns meteorological data only.

A prediction indicates where fallout may go. It is based on a forecast and on bomb data.

A micron (p) is one millionth of a metre . 1000 microns = 1 millimetre.

ON3:3

Useful wind data

The following data applies to the 0-60,000, 0-70,000 and 0-80,000 feet mean vector winds.

(a) Variation with speed

Probabilities of occurrence of speeds (all directions)

Speed range (mph)	0-7	7-18	18-35	35 +
Percentage probability	4	17	36	43

(h) Variation with direction Probabilities of directions occurring in 60 sectors (all speeds)

Wind direction (degrees)	0-60	60-1 20	120-180	180-240	240-300	300-360
Percentage probability	7	4	5	17	41	26

(c) Angular wind shear

This is defined for the present purpose as the angle which includes the directions of all the mean vector winds up to the 0-90,000 feet one, excluding the surface wind. This angle will give a very crude idea of the amount of lateral spreading which might occur in the fallout pattern,

Percentage probability of occurrence of angular shear

Angular shear (degrees)	Mean vector wind speed (mph)	Total
0-7	7-18	18 - 35	35 +
0-15 15-30 30-75 75 +	0 1 2 1 2 3	2* 3* 7 4	9* 13 10s 3	21 11 10 1	33 28 28 11
Total	4	17	36	43	100

ON4J2

Mode of decay

Any single radioisotope decays according to an exponential law

N. = N e , where N and N. are the number of atoms present initially

and at time t. A is a decay constant and can be shown to equal 0..693/T, where T is the half -life of the isotope, i.e. if the activity was originally, say, 8 units, then it will have decayed to 4 units after time T, 2 units after time 2T, 1 unit after time 3T, etc.

Fission products from a nuclear explosion are a mixture of over 200 different radioisotopes with half-lives varying from fractions of a second to many thousands of years. Many of them, moreover, are not produced immediately but are the result of the decay of other nuclides. In addition, the mixture may contain some activity due to neutron activation of the bomb components resulting in the formation of neptunium 239* The decay of this mixture is not exponential and thus cannot be described by a half-life. From nuclear weapons trials it has been found for the first 1 00 days to follow approximately the t"1 -2 power law, i.e. R= R t , where R and R. are the dose-rates at 1 hour and t hours after detonation

Factors upsetting normal decay

Probable causes of deviation from the t decay law are:-

(a) fractionation

(b) neutron activation of soil elements weathering rigging or salting of weapons

$

Fractionation

This is a complex condensation process and is by no means fully understood. Its effect is to give the close-in F0 a different composition and hence a different decay from the more distant F0 downwind. For example, close-in F0 has been found to contain less strontium 90.

Two likely causes of fractionation are:-

(a) as the fireball cools the nuclides with the higher boiling points condense first and do so while the larger particles forming the close-in F0 are still present in the cloud. The more volatile nuclides condense later when the larger particles have left the cloud and so tend to contaminate the lighter particles which are carried further downwind.

ON4:3

(b) certain of the fission products are inherently gaseous (e.g.. kiypton) or have gaseous precursors (e.g. caesium 137)* The heavier particles fall out before these nuclides have decayed to non-gaseous daughters capable of condensing on to thenu Close-in PO is therefore deficient in these elements. Conversely the smaller particles forming the more distant FO are enriched in thenu

Neutron activation of soil elements

For FO to be produced on a substantial scale, the explosion must take place on or near the ground, in which case the radioactivity from the fission products and the bomb materials is supplemented by neutron-induced activity from certain elements in the soil* For the 50jS fission weapon this extra activity is small but may be appreciable for the so-called "clean" bomb where possibly only ^CP/o of the total energy is from fission. The number of spare neutrons is doubled and the fission product activity reduced by a factor of 5. Under these circumstances induced activity can become a substantial proportion of the whole. Calculations made on typical UK soils show that the elements most likely to contribute to this activity are sodium and manganese. Under neutron activation these form the gamma emitters sodium 24 and manganese 56 • Sodium and manganese are present in soils in varying amounts according to the locality. Sodium, for example, is more abundant in the rock-salt areas of Cheshire and in regions of igneous rock formation. Manganese is fairly uniformly distributed but usually only in small amounts.

If a large quantity of a particular isotope such as sodium 24 is added to a fission product mixture obeying the t"^ #^ law, the effect is to increase the dose- rate by an amount varying with time. It can be shown that the isotope exerts its maximum proportional effect at a time equal to 1 .73 times its half-life. For sodium 24 and manganese 56 the details are:-

Isotope

Half-life (hours)

Time of maximum

proportional effect

(hours)

Na24 Mn56

15

2i

26

For a 1 CP/c fission bomb the sodium 24 contribution to the total DR at H + 26 hours could be over QOyb for some bomb designs and soil constitutions; the manganese 56 contribution at H + 42 hours could be over '[Qjo.

ON23:i

Notes on BW and CW

General

Toxicological warfare can consist either of a tactical attack with chemical weapons producing an immediate incapacitating effect, or of a strategic attack with biological weapons which have a delayed effect.

The new Civilian Respirator (C7), with pneumatic tube face fitting which is comfortable for long periods of wearing, affords excellent protection against BW and CW attacks.

BW

In attacks on populations, since the airborne hazard is the main one, only agents of high infectivity and high virulence (i.e. a small number of organisms required to produce infection and cause severe illness), combined with viability for many hours in the atmosphere, are likely to prove effective.

Some representative pathogenic micro-organisms

{Anthrax (lethal f very persistent spores but relatively low infectivity) Brucellosis (incapacitating) Tularaemia (incapacitating or lethal)

* Rickettsial Q fever (like typhus)

* Viruses Encephalomyelitis (brain fever)

Smallpox (epidemic)

ON23:2

Personal protection

Respirators and discardable covers for head and body may be used. Extreme personal cleanliness is necessary. Total dosage can be reduced very considerably in a closed room in a house by sealing window cracks and door gaps before the arrival of contamination and ventilating the room fully as soon as it has passed.

Decontaminat ion

Where appropriate the following measures may be taken :- (a) weathering for a few days will destroy most bacterial

agents other than anthrax spores (b; use of bleach solution

(c) scattering petrol and firing it on open contaminated ground.

OT

Mustard gas and anticholinesterase agents (persistent and non-persistent nerve gases) are the CV7 agents most likely to be encountered in a tactical battle.

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MARTIN MAfllETTA ENERGY

for the mmn states

ORNL/TM-10423

Technical Options for Protecting Civilians from Toxic Vapors and Gases

C V, Chester

Date Published - Hay 1988

OF ENERGY

Prepared for

Office of Program Manager

for

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland

ORNL-DWG 88M-7585

DOWN WIND DISTANCE (km)

Fig. 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some Very Toxic Gases

ORNL-DWG 88M-7584

100 -

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CLOUD PASSAGE (h)

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ORNL/TM-2001/154

Energy Division

Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work? Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place

John H. Sorensen Barbara M. Vogt

Date Published— August 2001

Prepared for the

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

Prepared by OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6285

managed by

UT-BATTELLE, LLC

for the

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725

Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall.

Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil (0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink- wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance.

3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN?

Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical warfare agents.

3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY

Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of 10 mil (0.01 -in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organoposphorous pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that "duct tape exhibits reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP (210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents" (Pal et al. 1993, p. 140).

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THE

PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM AERIAL ATTACK

Being

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS DEPARTMENT OF

THE HOME OFFICE

by

THE CAMBRIDGE SCIENTISTS' ANTI-WAR GROUP

First published February isth ig3j Second impression February zsth ig^y

LONDON

VICTOR GOLLANCZ LTD

1937

GAS-PROOF ROOMS 21

the time taken for the eras to leak out to half its

i . nr-— — *— " ■'■■■■ >*^*>**hi««m>>.*— ^h»— -^- — Ti.if in n«-

t^t^M>>j»i*»MI^»l' iiMiiW i ■ i*"' — — " ■■■■ » nt^tfi i n iimi. iiibmium rm iwnmn -~w.»^-.— ..... . .|M -n ■ ■ -■-■■ ■■ ,

original value was measured in four rooms — the base-

v+m+—ifH*4m*+m***M** ■■»■>■■■,

ment of a shop, the dming-room of a semi-detached house, the sitting-room of a Councflnouse and the

wf- y -1-* ■»*•-*- ■-»<■-.■<!■ ii i

bathroom of a modern villa. As stated above the

_ %.-»■ - ■"■**■

leakage half-times for these rooms were 2$, 2j, 3^ and

9 J hours respectively. The reason for the last room being so much better than all the others is that it has steel-frame windows which were sealed with plasticine,

i .1 I 1 ' : M ■- -"-■--- ■ -■ - • ....«■■■..-—■■,■—— '--iibiiMlli !■ ihCj iIi.-.iui;

painted and tiled walls, and a concrete floor covered

■ ■I 1 '- I'm || .

with cork tiles.

Note : even a 1 mile wide gas cloud 4I passes in 6 min in 10 miles/hr wind *

(hence good protection) This property of

drifting with the wind is of some importance, for it means that the gas will not remain for long periods in any one place except on still days.

Now it may be objected that, although the " gas-

proof" room is not hermetically sealed, it will never- protect the occupants for the two or three hours

necessary in case of an attack by a choking gas.

42 GAS-MASKS

We assume that the gas blows away so quickly that every 10 minutes its concentration is halved. In Engelhard's experiments it took 10 minutes to liberate the gafc from its joinders, so that this assumption is reasonaMe. Then a person occupying a good " gas- proof" rttom, the leakage half-time of which (defined on p. 1 8) is 3 hours, would have breathed a lethal dose of phosgene in 2 hours.

Gas-schutz und Luftschutz> 4> 174, 1934

Comple'teXCies : bombs are dropped, not cylinders, EngelKardTs 1934 article in the Nazi controlled "Gas protection and air protection" journal is snemy propaganda; the Nazis kept the facts secret

INCENDIARY BOMBS 59

As, however, our experiments on the "gas-proof" room illustrate quite clearly that the ordinary dwelling-house is quite incapable of affording protection71I"proT3ably wilTnot matter much what a civil population does under a gas and incendiary attack. l^FIslFproEtaHe to argue^vvHetHer the gas or incen- "diary bombTs the more devastating^ as_it js necessary to "contemplate an air attack in which both will be employed, with a sprinkling of high explosive bombs, which will considerably heighteiT^ effect." This is the type of attack which people in large towns must expect if war breaks out ; our task in this section is to discuss the proposals of the Home Office for dealing with incendiary bombs, remembering that whoever deals with them will require, almost certainly, simultaneous protection against gas. fAtNtD 1M£*MM

68 INCENDIARY B OMBS *pfUffr fafitfl

extreme lightness and cheapness ofjfthe incendiary bomb must be borne in mind, Mr. Noel-Baker cites the case of a single aeroplane carrying a load of less than a ton of bombs which succeeded in starting three hundred fires, ancTlFwe^ take a specimen raid of nine bombers, each carrying a thousand " kilo " bombs, nine thousand of these could be dropped on an area of two square miles. If very generous allowances are made for failures to function^nd~fbTl3or^s fanihg^ri non- inflammable sites, in an urban area one fifth at least of these bombs should cause EresT This makes one

thousand eight hundred fires. The danger of fire spreading over sev^al^locksjof buildings as in the San Francisco (1906) and Tokyo (1933) earthquakes, mak- ing the centre of the conflagration quite unapproach- able by fire brigades is obvious.

To summarise this section, we reach the conclusion :

(a) That for individuals the cost of making buildings

impenetrable to incendiary bombs is proHIbitive.

(b) That, bearing in mind the probability of com- bined incendiary^

will have considerable difficulty in extinguishing fires caused by incendiary bombs in private houses, unless

(c) That the fires caused by a raid such as is outlined above would very likely be impossible to deal with, even with the improved fire brigade organisation envisaged by the Home Office, because of the probable amalgama- tion of separate outbreaks into a vast conflagration.

FM 3-10

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

EMPLOYMENT

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FEBRUARY 1962

Line

1 2 3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25

26

27

28

29 30

Munition

Agent

Shell, M2A1

Shell, M360

Shell, M60

Shell, M121

Shell, MHO

Shell, T (M121).

Shell, M122

Shell, M104

Shell, Gas, 175-mm. Shell, Gas, 175-mm. Shell, T174

Shell, T174

Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT).. Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT)..

Warhead, M79, 762-mm (HON- EST JOHN).

Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm (HONEST JOHN).

Warhead, E20, 318-mm (LIT- TLE JOHN).

Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT)..

Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT).. Bomb, M34A1, 1000-lb, Cluster.. Bomb, MC-1, 750-lb

Projectile, 5"/38, MK53, MOD O. Projectile, 5"/54, MK54, MOD O. Warhead, Rocket, 5" MK40,

MOD O. Warhead, Rocket, 5", MK40,

MOD O. Bomb, MK94, MOD O

Bomb, M70A1.

Mine, Land, Chemical, M23

Mine, Land, Chemical, One- Gallon.

HD

GB

HD

GB

HD

VX

GB

HD

GB VX

GB

VX

GB VX GB GB VX GB GB VX GB GB

GB GB GB

HD

GB

HD

VX HD

Delivery system

4.2-inch Mortar.

105-mm Howitzer, M2A1,

M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52. 105-mm Howitzer, M2A1,

M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52. 155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1,

M44. 155-mm Howitzer, Ml, M1A1,

M44. 155-mm Gun, M2, M53

155-mm Gun, M2, M53.

M107Gun (SP)

M107 Gun (SP)

8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1, M55.

8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1,

M55. Launcher, M91

Launcher, M91.

Rocket, M31A1C Launcher,

M386. Rocket, XM50 Launcher,

M386. Rocket, XM51 Launcher,

XM80. Rocket, Launcher

Rocket, Launcher. Fighter, Bomber.. Fighter, Bomber..

5-inch Gun

Launcher, MK 105 Rocket,

M40, MOD O. Launcher, MK 105 Rocket,

M40, MOD O. Fighter, Bomber

Fighter, Bomber.

N/A. N/A.

User

Employment data

(a)

Range (1) (Meters) (2)

(b)

US ARMY

USMC US ARMY

USMC USMC

Maximum

USMC.

US ARMY

USMC

US ARMY

USMC. US ARMY

USMC. US ARMY.

US ARMY.

USAF. USAF.

3,930. 11, 140. 11, 140. 14, 950. 14, 950. 14,950. 23,500.

Minimum

180. 862.

31,500. 31,500. 16,930.

US NAVY. US NAVY. US NAVY.

US NAVY.

US ARMY. US ARMY.

16,930..

10,970..

10,970-

24,960.-

33,830..

33,830-

18,290..

139 km....

Range of Aircraft.

16,450. 19,200. 4,200-.

180. 180.

4,200.

Range of Aircraft.

Range of

Aircraft. N/A

N/A

2,740.. 2,740.. 8,500- 8,500- 8,500- 3,200 J. 50 km. 50 km.

N/A. N/A.

Error

(c)

Fuze (Capability)

t

$ to

a

s

2

f

S g

03

a i

«

-t->

O

X

M8PD

M508PD... M51A5PD. M508PD... M51A5PD. T76E6VT >. M508PD... M51A5PD.

VT-M514A1. M51A5PD..

304m.

304m..

I

a a

N/A N/A

T2061VT

M417PD

T2061VT

T2075 Mech Time... . T2075MechTime.... T2075 Mech Time.... T2075 Mech Time—

Preset Radar

M152E3 Mech Time. M905BD—

MK29MOD3PD. MK30MOD3PD. MK30MOD3PD.

MK30MOD3PD.

AN-M103A1ND M195 BD (IM- PACT).

AN-M158ND (IM- PACT).

See notes at end of figure.

16

Figure 6. Chemical munitions and delivery systems.

Employment data— Continued

Functioning and physical characteristics of CML munitions

(d)

Time for delivery

(1) Preplanned

(2)

Target of opportunity

1-3 min. 1-3 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min. 1-5 min.

(e)

Organization

6 Mort/Plt

8Mort/Btry

6 How/Btry

H-6hr.

H-6hr.. 30 min.. 30 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 15 min.. 120 min. 120 min.

15 min +flight

time. 15 min +night

time.

6 How/Btry . 6 How/Btry. 6 How/Btry. 6 How/Btry . 4 Gun/Btry. 4 Gun/Btry.

4 Gun/Btry . 4 Gun/Btry. 4 How/Btry.

(f)

Rate of fire per weapon

30Rds/2min... 105 Rds/15 min 6Rds/Hmin... 18 Rds/4 min 6 Rds/H min... 18 Rds/4 min 3Rds/Hmin... 12 Rds/4 min 3 Rds/H min... 12 Rds/4 min 3Rds/Hmin... 12 Rds/4 min 2 Rds/H min... 8 Rds/4 min 2Rds/Hmin... 8 Rds/4 min

4 How/Btry. 36 Lchr/Bn.. 36 Lchr/Bn.. 2 Lchr/Bn... 2 Lchr/Btry. 2 Lchr/Btry. 4 Lchr/Btry. 4 Lchr/Bn... 4 Lchr/Bn

6 Rds/4 min... 10 Rds/10 min

6 Rds/4 min

10 Rds/10 min. 45 Rkt/Lchr/16 sec.

(g)

Height of burst

GND.

20m >..

GND.

GND. GND. GND.

(h)

(a)

Diameter

(meters)

of impact area

(single rd) *

Weight

of

munition

(kg)

16. 27. 11. 49. 20.

45Rkt/Lchr/15sec.

2/Hr

2/Day

2-6/Ftr„... 4-18/Bmbr.

2-6/Ftr

4-27/Bmbr.

48 Rkt/Lchr/. 1 min

20m »

GND

20m i

Variable

Intervals of

1,524m. Intervals of

1,524m. Variable —

GND

76.

46.

Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable. Variable.

170

127

90.

29.

10.8

16.1

15.2

45.9

42.0

45.9

43.0

66.8 66.8 97.0

97.0 26.4 26.2

737

568

119

744

513

322

25.1 29.1 22.9

(b)

Weight

agent (kg)

222

58.0

10.50 5.45

2.72

.739

1.22

2.95

4.4

2.95

5.31

6.68 6.04 7.12

7.12 4.80 4.54 177.5 210 210 30 190 190 89.6 99.9

1.47 2.02 2.18

(c)

Effective weight of agent

(kg) 3

49.8

272

5.23 4.50

(d)

Function- ing effi- ciency of munition (percent)

104.8 171

99 99 99 99 99 99 99

(e)

Agent dissemi- nation efficiency

90

62 per- cent.

86 per- cent.

1 Estimated.

* Instantaneous a«jent area coverage 30 seconds after detonation.

» Vali.es are the product of values given in columns 6(6), 6(d), and 6(e). Since values for 6(e) are not available, values for 6 (c)cannot be computed at this time.

Figure 5. — Continued

626007 O— 6S

17

Agent— GB.

Wind speed — 5 knots (approx 9 km/hr).

Temperature gradient — inversion.

Temperature— 60° F. (15.5° C.).

Terrain — open, level, scattered vegeta- tion.

Precipitation — none.

Time limitations on the delivery of

agent on target — 4 minutes or less.

Casualty level desired — 20 percent. Find: Whether or not the mission can be fired with a 105-mm howitzer battery. Solution:

(a) Using figure 11, convert 20 percent cas-

ualties among protected personnel to the corresponding casualty level among unprotected personnel. This is 80 percent.

(b) Using the "GB (over 30-sec attack)"

column of figure 12, determine the total effects components to be 3.21 as follows:

Inversion 1. 09

Wind speed, 9 km/hr 1. 00

Temperature, 60° F. (15.5°

C.) .12

Open terrain .30

No precipitation .70

quired. Since the target is twice as large as the dispersion pattern of a 105-mm battery (par. 31c(3)(c) and 41c/), a shift of fires should be made. Figure 9 gives a time of 30 seconds for shifting of fires. On this basis the battery could fire twenty-four rounds on half the target in a little less than 30 seconds, take 30 seconds to shift fires, and have ample time to deliver the remaining twenty-four rounds on the other half of the target. The firing should be completed in less than 2 minutes.

3. 21

(c) Using figure 13, place a hairline between

80 percent on the percent casualties scale and 12 hectares on the target area scale. On the point of intersec- tion on the reference line, pivot the hairline until it intersects 3.21 on the effects components scale. On the mu- nitions expenditure scale, read 12 as the number of 155-mm equivalents required.

(d) To find the number of 105-mm rounds required to fire the mission, multiply 12 by a factor of four (obtain this factor from figure 8); the product is 48 rounds.

(e) From figure 9, it is evident that one

battery of six howitzers can easily fire the mission if no shift of fires is re-

28

Munition	Munition expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents
	OB	vx	HD
155-mm Shell	1 0.25 2.40	1 2. 17	1
105-mm Shell.	0.28
8-inch Shell
4.2-inch Mortar Shell _	.62
175-mm Shell	2. 1 1. 6 60 71 10 65 30 35 .50 . 68 .74 17	2. 1 1. 6
M55 Rocket -
M79 Warhead— HONEST JOHN
E19R2 Warhead— HON- EST JOHN	71 10 65
LITTLE JOHN
SERGEANT
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster
MCI 750-lb Bomb.
5"/38 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5"/54 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5" Gas Rocket (Navy) 500-lb Gas Bomb



115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy)		6.2

Figure 7. Munitions expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents. (The figures given are an estimate of the number of 155-mm howitzer rounds required to give the same effect as one round of the specified munition. Dissemination efficiency has not been considered.)

Weapon

105-mm Howitzer

155-mm Howitzer

155-mm Gun

8-inch Howitzer

4.2-inch Mortar

M91 Launcher (M55 Rocket)

Maximum rate (rounds)

30 sec

6 3 2

1 10

45 (15 sec)

Munition	Conversion factor
	GB	vx	HD
155-mm Shell	1 4 0.41	1 0.45	1
105-mm Shell .	3.6
8-inch Shell
4 2-inch Mortar Shell	1. 61
175-mm Shell ..	.48 .61 .017 .014 .098 .016 .033 .029 2.00 1.46 1. 35 . 059	.48 . 61
M55 Rocket
M79 Warhead— HONEST JOHN _.
E19R2 Warhead— HON- EST JOHN.	.014 . 098 .016
LITTLE JOHN
SERGEANT
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster
MCI 750-lb Bomb
5' 738 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5'754 Gas Projectile (Navy). 5" Gas Rocket (Navy) 500-lb Gas Bomb



115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy) *		. 164

Figure 8. Conversion factors for converting 155-mm munitions to other munitions.

Rates of fire for chemical fire missions without shifting or relaying of the piece (rounds)

lmin

10 5 4 2

16

2min

14

7

6

3 30 (max)

4min

18

12

8

6

50

lOmin

40 30 12 10 80

15min

60 40 18 15 105

Estimated

time to

shift fires

30 sec 30 sec 60 sec 60 sec 30 sec

Launcher must relocate after firing each ripple.

Figure 9. Approximate rates of fire for division cannon artillery, mortars, and multiple rockets firing chemical rounds. (Rates

of fire for other weapons are given in figure 5.)

30

UJ

o

CO OT UJ Q.

Q UJ

O

UJ

o a.

3 O

o

<

CO UJ

<

CO

< o

UJ

o

UJ

a.

-99 -90

-80 -70 ^60

-50 r40

-30 -25

IT20

— 15

I — i

-10 -9 -8

-7 -6

-5 -4

— 3

-F

.MASKS IN PLACE (Exact level of protection dependent on condition of masks and training of troops)

2 —

UJ '

h- o or a.

+-

MASKS AVAILABLE (Troops well trained)

-MASKS AVAILABLE (Troops poorly trained)

UJ

>

UJ

-U- — NO MASKS

If the target personnel had protection available, the following factors would be applied to the percent casualties for unprotected personnel :

Degradation Level of protection factors

Masks in place 0. 05

Masks available, troops well trained .10

Masks available, troops poorly trained .25

The above are estimates for GB.

L_ I

3—

4 —

5- 6-

7-

8-

9- 10-

15-

20-

25t 30-

40-=

50-5 60 —

70 ~ 80—

90— 99_

UJ

z z o

CO

a:

UJ

o. o

UJ

O UJ

O

o

z o

<

CO

UJ

!:

<

CO

< o

z

UJ

o or

UJ Q.

Figure 11. Nomogram for conversion of percent GB casualties for protection of personnel in the target area.

32

Meteorological and terrain conditions

Effects components

GB»

(surprise attack)

GB

(over 30-sec attack)

VX

HD

1. Temperature Gradient

Inversion

Neutral

Lapse

0.67 .57 .30

1.09 .69 .09

1.89 1.89 1.89

2. Wind Speed (km/hr)

0to5-_. __

6to 10__ _.

11 to 16

17 to 26

27 to 52

3. Temperature (° F.)

a. 0to39 (-18° to 4° C.)__.

40 to 79 (5° to 26° C.)

80 and up (27° C. and up).

b. 30 to 49 (-l°to9° C.)--- 50 to 69 (10° to 21° C.)--- 70 and up (22° C. and up).

4. Terrain

Open, level, scattered vegetation. Rugged, mountainous

20 50 70 55 30

12 23

30

1.30

1.00

.70

.30

0

. 12 .23

.30

'0

0 *0

0.69 .54 .32

.87 .70 .60

.48

0

0 .70 1.00

30

1 0

5. Precipitation

None

Moderate rain.

.70

70

>0

»0

i Estimated.

* Tentative figures not yet verified.

Figure 12. Effects components.

0

'0

Note: paragraph 105 on page 82 states that the "safe entry times" after bio attacks are:

NU (Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus) ,

AB (bovine brucellosis) , and

UL (tularemia) : 2 hrs sun or 8 hrs cloudy

OU (Q fever) : 2 hrs sun or 18 hrs cloudy

Cloudy conditions also apply to nighttime

626007 O— 62-

33

cr

IS!

O UJ

h- O

A |— 99

— 95 —90

80

70

60 50

40 30

gE

IF

O

co

UJ

u

E

20

10

I — I

CO

o

z

o

W

s

E E

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or

UJ CD

UJ

I

o

UJ

B 1—10,000

- 5,000

- 4,000

- 3,000 -2,000

— 1,000

-500 -400

-300 -200

— 100

5 4	Z	— 50
	UJ or	— 40
3
	K	— 30
	Q
2	2
UJ
	a.	— 20

2

O

3

USE SCALES A and a

and B and B

I

TOGETHER

— 9

— 8

— 7

— 6

UJ

u

z

UJ

or

UJ

u.

UJ

tr.

— 2

1.0

10

5

4

3 2

-I i—o

Figure IS. Target area, casualty level, munitions requirement nomogram.

4.0

- 20,000— —

10,000

3.5

3.0

2.5

— 4

2.0

— 3

1.5

5,000 — 4,000 —

3,060—3 2,000 —

,000

CO

I- z

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500

? 400

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UJ

200 100

50 40

30 20

10-

O 300-^

CO UJ

or

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UJ

or <

UJ CD

<

34

o

x KILOGRAMS Per METER

ijjH 8 o oo o o o ^ - S

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W POUNDS Per METER

REFERENCE NUMBER

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REFERENCE LINE IE

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(H313H aiano j»d ssinNiw-wvdomm ni) sovsoa

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40

DOWNWIND DISTANCE NOMOGRAM II

10

=-20

-30 -40

-50 -60 -70

cr

u

GO

100

200

300

400

500

-600 700

- — 1,000

LU

o

z

UJ Or Ul U.

UJ

=- 2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000 6,000 •7,000

- 10,000

— 20,000

30,000 -40,000 -50,000

100,000

— 200,000

•300,000

- 400,000

500,000

1,000,000

LINE SOURCE

B

m -n m

m

z o m

TEMPERATURE GRADIENT

NOTE: A to D

B

B to Temperature Gradient


	=-.2
	—.3
	— .4
	— 5
	t-.6
	— .7


CO
oc
UJ	S_2
UJ
2	— 3
O
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*	— 5
2	— 6

V— *	— 7
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$	— 40
z	— 50
*	— 60
o	70
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too —

70 - 60- 50- 40-

30-

20 — d

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i:

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	^
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.4	~
.3—=
.2^
—

.07- .06

.05-

04

03 .02

.01 —

CO O

c 3) o m

m

Figure 15. Downwind distance nomogram II.

41

USACGSC

RB 3-1

REFERENCE BOOK

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON EMPLOYMENT

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1 May 1968

This reference book supersedes RD 3-1, 1 May 1967

CHAPTER 2 TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS

1. Characteristics and Effects

a. General. The following antiperson- nel chemical agents are used for College instruction in chemical weapon employ- ment: nerve agents GB and VX; blister agent HD (mustard); and incapacitating agent BZ. Actual or assumed character- istics of these agents are described in the following paragraphs for instructional purposes only and are summarized in figure 1.

b_. Nerve Agent GB. GB is a quick acting, nonpersistent lethal agent that produces casualties primarily by inhala- tion.

(1) Inhalation effects. Inhaled GB vapor can produce casualties within min- utes. As an example, 50 percent of a group of unprotected troops engaged in mild activity, breathing at the rate of about 15 liters per minute, and exposed to 70 milligrams of GB per cubic meter of air for 1 minute will probably die if they do not receive medical treatment in time. This is the median lethal dosage (50) and is expressed as 70 mg-min/m3. For troops engaged in activities that in- crease their breathing rate, the median lethal dosage can be as low as 20 mg-min/m3. The median incapacitating dosage of GB vapor by inhalation is about 35 mg-min/m3 for troops engaged in mild activity. Incapacitating effects con- sist of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and difficulty with vision, followed by muscu- lar twitching, convulsions, and partial paralysis. Dosages of GB less than the median incapacitating dosage cause gen- eral lowering of efficiency, slower reac- tions, mental confusion, irritability, severe headache, lack of coordination, and dimness of vision due to pinpointing of the eye pupils.

(2) Percutaneous effects. Percu- taneous effects refer to those effects produced by the absorption of the agent through the skin. GB vapor absorbed through the skin can produce incapaci- tating effects. Sufficient GB liquid ab-

sorbed through the skin can produce incapacitation or death. The effectiveness of the liquid or vapor depends on the amount absorbed by the body. Absorption varies with the original amount of agent contamination, the skin area exposed and the exposure time, the amount and kind of clothing worn, and the rapidity in removing the contamination and /or con- taminated clothing and in decontaminating affected areas of the skin.

(3) Maj or considerations in the employment of nerve agent GB. The em- ployment of GB is based primarily on achieving casualties by inhalation of the nonpersistent vapor (or aerosol) of the agent. Major considerations in the em- ployment of this agent are:

(a) Time to incapacitate. The onset of incapacitation resulting from inhalation of casualty-producing doses is rapid, the average time being approx- imately 3 minutes. To allow for the time required for the agent cloud to reach the individual, 10 minutes is used as the mean time to achieve incapacita- tion. Nonlethal casualties from GB will be incapacitated for 1 to 5 days.

(b) Persistency. Persistency is defined as the length of time an agent remains effective in the target area after dissemination. Nerve agent GB is con- sidered nonpersistent. GB clouds capable of producing significant casualties will dissipate within minutes after dissemina- tion. Some liquid GB will remain in chemical shell or bomb craters for peri- ods of time varying from hours to days, depending on the weather conditions and type of munition. Because of this con- tinuing but not readily discernible threat, GB can also be highly effective in har- assing roles by causing exposure to low concentrations of the vapor. Rounds fired sporadically may compel the enemy to wear protective masks and clothing for prolonged periods, thereby impairing his effectiveness as a result of fatigue, heat stress, discomfort, and decrease in per- ception.

-7-

(c) Level of protection. The weapon system requirements for positive neutralization of masked personnel by GB are too great to be supported except for important point or small area tar- gets. A major factor affecting casualties resulting from GB attacks of personnel equipped with masks but unmasked at the time of attack is the time required for enemy troops to mask after first de- tecting a chemical attack. Therefore, surprise dosage attack is used to estab- lish a dosage sufficient to produce the desired casualties before troops can mask. Casualty levels for surprise dos- age attack that are tabulated in the weap- on system effects tables (app A) are based on an assumed enemy masking time of 30 seconds. (Refer to FM 3-10 series manuals for operational data for masking times less than 30 seconds.) A total dosage attack is used to build up the dosage over an extended period of time and is normally employed against troops who have no protective masks available. Dosages built up before troops can mask inside foxholes, bunkers, tanks, buildings, and similar structures will generally be less than dosages attained during the same period of time in the open, thereby reducing the effects on occupants from surprise dosage attacks. Total dosage effects are essentially the same inside or outside.

c. Nerve Agent VX. VX is a slow- acting, lethal, persistent agent that pro- duces casualties primarily by absorption of droplets through the skin.

(1) Effects. VX acts on the nerve systems of man; interferes with breath- ing; and causes convulsions, paralysis, and death.

(2) Maj o r considerations in the employment of nerve agent VX.

(a) General. Agent VX dissemi- nated in droplet (liquid) form provides maximum duration of effectiveness as a lethal casualty threat. VX will remain effective in the target area for several days to a week depending on weather conditions. Because of its low volatility,

there is no significant vapor hazard downwind of a contaminated area. Except when disseminated by aircraft spray tanks, meteorological conditions have little effect on the employment of VX, although strong winds may influence the distribution of the agent and heavy rain- fall may wash it away or dissipate it. (b) Employment to cause cas- ualties. Agent VX is appropriate for direct attack of area targets containing masked personnel in the open or in foxholes without overhead protection, for causing severe harassment by the con- tinuing casualty threat of agent droplets on the ground or on equipment, and for creating obstacles to traversing or occu- pying areas. Casualties produced by agent VX are delayed, occurring at times greater than 1 hour after exposure. Al- though this agent can be used relatively close to friendly forces, it should not be used on positions that are likely to be occupied by friendly forces within a few days. Because of this continuing hazard, areas in which agent VX has been used should be recorded in a manner similar to minefields or fallout areas so that necessary precautions can be taken.

d. Blister Agent HP. HD, sometimes referred to as mustard, is a persistent slow-acting agent that produces casual- ties through both its vapor and liquid effects.

(1) Vapor effects.

(a) The initial disabling effect of HD vapor on unmasked troops will be injuries to the eyes. Temporary blind- ness can be caused by vapor dosages that are insufficient to produce respira- tory damage or skin burns. However, skin burns account for most injuries to masked troops. The vapor dosages and the time required to produce casualties (4 to 24 hours) vary with the atmospheric conditions of temperature and humidity and with the amount of moisture on the skin. Depending on their severity, skin burns can limit or entirely prevent movement of the limbs or of the entire body.

•8-

INVERSION

NEUTRAL

LAPSE

J)

WARMER AIR (Stable)

COOLER AIR

NO CHANGE

(Moderately stable)

NO CHANGE

Increase in temperature with increase in altitude. Stable atmospheric conditions near the ground.

Very little or no change in tempera- ture with increase in altitude. Moderate- ly stable atmospheric conditions near the ground.

\\l//

COOLER AIR

f t (Unstable)

^ JJf

WARMER AIR^ ^ j&Z

Decrease in temperature with altitude. Unstable atmospheric condi tions near the ground.

Figure 2. Temperature gradients.

Surprise dosage GB attacks are influ- enced only slightly by the temperature gradient except when made with the spray tank. Downwind vapor hazards to both enemy and friendly forces will be most significant during inversion and neutral conditions. Employment of VX is not affected by the temperature gradient.

Temperature gradients	Time
1. Inversion	From sunset to sunrise.
2. Neutral	2 hours before sunset to sunset, sunrise to 2 hours after sunrise, or any time windspeed is 15 kmph or greater*
3. Lapse	2 hours after sunrise to 2 hours before sunset.

Figure 3. Estimated times that temperature gradients will

prevail. (Use when meteorological data are not

available.)

(3) When actual or predicted mete- orological conditions are not available for a target analysis, 70* F is used for

temperature, 9 kmph is used as wind- speed, and the temperature gradient is approximated from figure 3.

d. Windspeed and Direction.

(1) Air moving over the earth !s surface sets up eddies, or mechanical turbulences, that act to dissipate a chem- ical cloud. A condition of calm will limit the merging of the individual gas clouds. Both of these conditions may reduce the effectiveness of a chemical agent attack. High winds increase the rate of evaporation of HD and dissipate chemical clouds more rapidly than low winds. Moderate winds are desirable for chemical employment. Large -area non- persistent chemical attacks are most effective in winds not exceeding 28 kmph. Small-area nonpersistent chemical attacks with rockets or shell are most effective in winds not exceeding 9 kmph. However, if the concentration of chemical agent can be established quickly, the effects of high windspeed can be partially offset.

-12-

CHAPTER 4 EMPLOYMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

1. General

a. Antipersonnel biological agents are micro-organisms that produce disease in man. These agents can be used to in- capacitate or kill enemy troops through disease. They may cause large numbers of casualties over vast areas and could require the enemy to use many personnel and great quantities of supplies and equipment to treat and handle the casual- ties. Many square kilometers can be effectively covered from a single air- craft or missile. The search capability of biological agent clouds and the rela- tively small dose required to cause in- fection among troops give biological munitions the capability of covering large areas where targets are not precisely located.

b^. A biological attack can occur with- out warning since biological agents can be disseminated by relatively unobtrusive weapon systems functioning at a con- siderable distance from the target area and relying upon air movement to carry the agent to the target.

c. Biological agents do not produce effects immediately. An incubation period is required from the time the agent enters the body until it produces disease. Some agents produce the desired casualty levels within a few days, whereas others may require more time to produce useful casualty levels. A variety of effects may be produced, varying from incapacitation with few deaths to a high percentage of deaths, depending on the type of agent.

2. Methods of Dissemination

a. The basic method of disseminating antipersonnel biological agents is the generation of aerosols by explosive bomblets and spray devices. Because exposure to sunlight increases the rate at which most biological agent aerosols die and thereby reduces their area cov- erage, night is the preferable time for most biological attacks. However, if troop safety is a problem, an attack may be made near sunrise to reduce the

distance downwind that a hazard to friendly forces will extend. Conversely, to extend the downwind cloud travel and the area coverage from spray attack, a biological agent may be employed soon after sundown.

b. Missile -delivered Biological Munitions. Missile-delivered biological munitions are used for attack of large - area targets. A typical biological missile system consists of the following com- ponents:

(1) A missile vehicle and its launching equipment.

(2) A warhead that can be opened at a predetermined height to release biological bomblets over the target area. The warhead is shipped separately for assembly to a missile at the launching site.

(3) A warhead shipping container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit.

(4) Biological bomblets consisting of an agent container and a central burster that functions on impact. The bomblets have vanes that cause them to rotate in flight, thereby achieving lateral dispersion during their free fall and resulting in random distribution as a circular pattern.

c . Aircraft Spray Tank. Biological agents released from an aircraft spray tank cover a large area downwind of the line of release. A typical spray tank consists of the following components:

(1) An agent reservoir section that is shipped separately in an insulated shipping and storage container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit.

(2) A discharge nozzle assembly that can be mechanically adjusted to vary the agent flow rate.

9PL8-2790-RETKUOJ

-27-

Table 1. Chemical Weapons Data

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Delivery system	Range (meters)	Agent	Munition	No of weapons per delivery unit	Weapon rate of fire	RT max (meters)1 2	Reference (table)
Fire unit	Total dosage	Surprise dosage
Casualty threat	Casualty threat
Min	Max	10%	30%	10%	30%
4. 2- in mortar	180	4,500	HD	Cartridge, M2A1	4/Plat	50 rd/3 min 105 rd/ 15 min						18 19
105-mm howitzer		11,100	GB	Cartridge, M360	6/btry	5 rd/30 sec 30 rd/3 min 66 rd/15 min	1 btry3	200	100	100	50	2 3
lbn3	300	300	200	100
HD	Cartridge, M60						18 19
155-mm howitzer		14,600	GB	Projectile, M121	6/btry	2 rd/30 sec 12 rd/3 min 24 rd/15 min	1 btry3	300	200	100	0	4 5
lbn3	500	400	300	100
HD	Projectile, MHO						18 19
VX4	Projectile, M121	1 btry3	400	200	NA	NA	13
lbn3	500	400
8-in howitzer		16,800	GB VX4	Projectile, M426	4/btry	1 rd/30 sec 4 rd/3 min 10 rd/15 min	1 btry3	300	200	200	0	6 7
lbn3	500	400	300	100
1 btry3	400	200	NA	NA	14
lbn3	500	400
115-mm multiple rocket launcher, M91	2,740	10,600	GB4	Rocket, M55 (THE BOLT)		45 rkt/lchr/15 sec	llchr	1,000	750	500	200	8
3 Ichr	1,000	1,000	750	400
6 Ichr	1,000	1,000	1,000	750
9 Ichr	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
VX4	llchr	300	0	NA	NA	15
3 Ichr	750	300
6 Ichr	1,000	400
9 Ichr	1,000	750
762-mm rocket, Honest John	8,500	38,000	GB4	Warhead, M190 (M139 bomblets)	2/btry	2 rkt/lchr/hr	llchr	600	600	600	400	9
2 Ichr	600	600	600	400
Sergeant missile	46,000	139,000	GB4	Warhead, M212(M139 bomblets)	2/bn	2 msl/lchr/hr	1 msl	600	400	600	200	10
2 msl	600	600	600	400
Aircraft	Dependent on type aircraft	GB4	Bomb, MC-1, 750- lb	Dependent on type aircraft	1 bomb	50				11
6 bombs	300	200	300	50
12 bombs	500	300	400	200
24 bombs	500	300	500	300
GB4	Spray tank, 100-gal	1 spray tank	RT max =750 meters (one-half effective spray release line length)	12
2 spray tanks
VX4	1 spray tank	RT max=500 meters (one-half effective spray release line length)	16
BZ4	Bomb, 150- lb						17
		Bomb, 700-lb

RT max is largest target radius for which indicated casualty threat is tabulated for appropriate fire unit. Division of target into subtargets NOT considered.

All windspeeds, temperature gradients, and protection categories considered.

3 RT max computed for maximum number of volleys for which data are tabulated.

4Weapon system capabilities derived from tables composed of hypothetical data for INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY at U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. For actual data, refer to FM 3-10.

the

-39-

105-MM HOW/GB BTRY FIRE

Table 2. Estimated Fractional Casualty Threat From 105-mm Howitzer,

GB Projectile, Battery Fire

1 2

1	2	3	4	5	6	7\| 8	9	10	11 12	13	14	15
Target radius- radius of effect (meters)	Range to target (km)	No of volleys	Windspeed3
4 kmph	9 kmph	28 kmph
Surprise4	Total dose5	Surprise4	Total dose5	Surprise4	Total dose5
1	N	L	1	N	L	1	N	L
50	<7.5	1	.10	.25	.20	.15	.10	.15	.10	.10
2	.20	.45	.40	.30	.15	.30	.25	.20		.10	.05	.05
3	.30	.60	.60	.35	.30	.50	.45	.30	.10	.20	.15	.10
4	.30	.75	.70	.45	.30	.55	.45	.35	.10	.25	.20	.10
5	.35	.90	.85	.55	.35	.60	.50	.40	.15	.30	.25	.15
>7.5	1	.05	.15	.15	.10	.05	.10	.05	.05
2	.15	.30	.25	.15	.10	.20	.15	.10		.05	.05
3	.15	.30	.30	.25	.10	.20	.20	.15		.10	.05	.05
4	.20	.40	.35	.25	.15	.30	.30	.15	.05	.15	.15	.05
5	.25	.45	.45	.30	.25	.40	.35	.25	.10	.20	.20	.10
100	<7.5	1	.05	.15	.15	.10	.05	.10	.05	.05
2	.10	.30	.30	.15	.10	1.20	.15	.10
3	.15	.40	.35	.20	.15	.25	.25	.15	.05	.10	.05
4	.15	.40	.35	.30	.15	.30	.30	.15	.05	.10	.10	.05
5	.20	.45	.40	.35	.20	.35	.35	.20	.10	.15	.15	.10
>7.5	1	.05	.10	.10	.05		.05	.05
2	.10	.20	.20	.10	.05	.15	.10	.05
3	.10	.25	.25	.15	.10	.15	.15	.10		.05	.05
4	.10	.30	.25	.20	.10	.25	.20	.15		.10	.05
5	.15	_35	.30	.25	.15	.30	.25	.15	.05	.15	.10	.05
200	Any	1		.05	.05
2		.10	.10	.05		.05	.05
3	.05	.15	.15	.05		.10	.05
4	.05	.15	.15	.10		.10	.10
5	.05	.20	.20	.10	.05	.15	.10	.05

Blank spaces indicate fractional casualties are below 0.05.

If the target is predominately wooded, use a windspeed of 4 kmph and neutral temperature gradient for total dose attack; use a windspeed of 4 kmph for surprise attack. 3 For wind speeds other than those shown, use data given for the nearest windspeed.

4 .

Multiply the figures given in the table by the appropriate factor to obtain the fractional

casualties from surprise dose attack:

Troops in open foxholes: 0.7

Troops in covered foxholes or bunkers: 0.6

l = inversion, N = neutral, L = lapse.

-40-

Effect of Shielding: Estimation	of the number of exposed floors
	Distance from explosion miles	Angle of arrival 0	Width of street (units of 10 ft.)
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3 4 5	13* 10 6	.5 .5 .5	.5 .5 .5	1 .5 • 5	1 1 .5	1.5 1 1	1.5 1*5 1	2 1.5 1

	Number of fly bombs	Ply Bombs Caused
No fire	Small fire	Medium fire	Serious fire	Major fire
Grand Totals	1,499	804	609	75	7	4

FIRE-BOMBS rained	on London	They did not all tall on roads
	P^^S^fl l^j^fl	L 1 8
^■b^-*.	.^ , af	^to«M?* .^uid^^E
Jv^ 0**		•
	*3BS

		Specific
	Density, p	Heat, C« (cal/gm * C)	Conductivity, k	Diffusivity, a
Materials	(gm/cm3)	(cal/sec *	cm * 9C)	(cm2 /sec)
Insulating Materials
Air	9.46 x IO*4	0.24	0.55	X	io-4	0.22
Asbestos	0.58	0.20	4.6	X	io-4	40. x IO"4
Balsa	0.12	0.4	1.2	X	IO"4	25. x IO"4
Brick (common red)	1.8	0.2	16.	X	io-4	18. x IO"4
Celluloid	1.4	0.35	5.0	X	IO"4	10. x IO"4
Cotton, sateen, green	0.70	0.35	1.5	X	IO"4	2.5 x IO"4
Fir, Douglas-
spring growth	0.29	0.4	2.	X	io-4	17. x IO"4
summer growth	1.00	0.4	5.	X	IO"4	12. x IO*4
Fir. white	0.45	0.4	2.6	X	io-4	14 x IO"4
Class, window	2.2	0.2	19.	X	io-4	43. x IO"4
Granite	2.5	0.19	66.	X	io-4	140. x IO"4
Leather sole	1.0	0.36	3.8	X	io-4	11. x IO"4
Mahogany	0.53	0.36	3.1	X	io-4	16. x IO"4
Maple	0.72	0.4	4.5	X	IO"4	16. x IO"4
Oak	0.82	0.4	5.0	X	io-4	15. x IO"4
Pine, white	0.54	0.33	3.6	X	io-4	18. x IO"4
Pine, red	0.51	0.4	5.	X	io-4	24. x IO"4
Rubber, hard	1.2	0.5	3.6	X	to-4	60. x IO"4
Teak	0.64	0.4	4.1	X	io-4	16. x IO"4
Metals (100°C)
Aluminum	2.7	0.22	0.49			1.0
Cadmium	8.65	0.057	0.20			0.45
Copper	8.92	0.094	0.92			1.1
Gold	19.3	0.031	0.75			1.2
Lead	11.34	0.031	0.081		0.23
Magnesium	1.74	0.25	0.38			0.87
Platinum	21.45	0.027	0.17			0.29
Silver	10.5	0.056	0.96			1.6
Steel, mild	7.8	0.11	0.107		1.2
Tin	6.55	0.056	0.14			0.38
Miscellaneous Materials
Ice (0°C)	0.92	0.492	54.	X	IO-4	120. x IO*4
Water	1.00	1.00	14.	X	io-4	14. x IO"4
Skin (porcine, dermis, dead)	1.06	0.77	9.	X	io-4	11. x IO*4
Skin (human, living, averaged	1.06	0.75	8.	X	Iff4	30. x IO"4
for upper 0.) cm)					A	A
Polyethylene (black)	0.92	0.55	8.	X	io-4	17. x IO*4

					Radiant Exposure*
	Weight <oz'yd2)	Color	Effect on. Material		(ctl/cm*)
Material	'max 0.2 sec	'max 1 0 sec	3!?^
Clothmg Fabrics
Cotton	8	White	Ignites		32	48	85
		Khaki	Tears on	flexing	17	27	34
		Khaki	Ignites		20	30	39
		Olive	Tears on	flexing	9	14	21
		Olive	Ignites		14	19	21
		Dark blue	Tears on	flexing	11	14	17
		Dark blue	Ignites		14	19	21
Coil on corduros.	8	Brown	ignites		11	16	22
Cotton denim, new	10	Blue	Ignites		i:	2?	44
Cotton shirting	3	Khaki	Igniies		14	21	28
Cot ton- nylon mixture.	5	Olive	Tears on	flexing	a	15	17
	5	Olhc	Ignites		12	. 28	53
Wool	*	White	Tears on	flexing	14	25	38
		Khaki	Tears on	flexing	14	24	34
		Olive	Tears on	flexing	9	13	19
		Dark blue	Tears on	flexing	S	12	18
	20	Dark blue	Tears on	flexing	14	20	26
Rainwear (double-neoprene-	9	Olive	Begins to	* melt	5	9	13
eouted n>loii tv.ili)	9	Olive	Tears on	flexing	8	14	22
Draper \ Fabrics
Ravon gabardine	6	Black	Ignites		9	20	26
Rj>on-acetaie draper)	5	Wine	Ignites		9	22	28
Ra>on gabardine	7	Cold	Igniies		••	24*	28*
Rj\on twili Inline	3	Black	Ignites		7	17	25
Rayon twill lining	3	Biege	Ignites		13	20	2S
Aceiaie-shamung	3	Black	Ignites		10*	22+	35+
Cotton lev\ dt aperies	13	Djrk colors	Igniies		IS	18	34
Tent Fabric*
Canvas (cotton 1	12	White	Ignites		13	28	51
Canvas	12	Olive drab	Ignites		12	18	28
Other Fabrics			•
Cotton chenille bedspread		Light blue	Ignites		•*	11+	15+
Cotton Venetian blind lape.		White	Ignites		10	18	■»-> +■*-
ditty
Cotton Venetian blind tape		White	Ignites		13+	27+	31+
Cotton muslin window shade	8	Green	Ignites		7	13	19

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	1	. \| - \| . \| . , 1 Figure 3-3. Traramlttanea OK— i a Bint Within 1/4 Milt of tht Surfan and a Tarovt on tha Ground 1 1 1 I	- -
"		S. 1	* = e** ■	W (1 +	1.9 R/V)>		-
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	Violent Burning	Residual Burning
Fuel Type	Time (min)	Energy Release (percent)	Time (min)	Energy Release (percent)	Total Burning Time
Grass	1.5	90	0.5	10	30 min
Light Brush (12 tons/acre)	2.	60	6.	40	16 hr
Medium Brush (25 tons/acre)	6.	50	24.	50	36 hr
Heavy Brush (40 tons/acre)	10.	40	70.	60	72 hr
Timber	24.	17	157.	83	7 days

Metal- Atomic Weight	To Melt	Through Melt	To Vapor	Through Vapor	Sublimation Energy
Be 9.013	876.0	1,187.0	2,147.0	10,040.0	8,6810
Al 26.9$	160.4	255.3	771.1	3,347.0	2,891.0
Fe 55.85	250.8	315.8	573.0	2,071.0	1,7810
Cu 63.54	110.0	160.0	336.0	1,481.0	1,275.0
W 183.85	153.9	200.0	304.0	1353.0	1,110.0
U 238.00	49.0	64.5	171.9	596.1	4911 *

Metal	(gm/cro )	To Mett	Through Melt	To Vapor	Through Vapor	Sublimation Eneigy,£t
Be	1.85	0.068	0.0918	0.166	0.776	0.671
AJ	2.70	0.0181	0.0288	0.087	0.378	0.326
Fe	7.86	0.0824	0.1036	0.188	0.680	0.585
Cu	8.92	0.04)0	0.0596	0.J25	0.552	0.475
W	19.3	0.124	0.161	0.245	1.092	0.895
U	18.7	0,0383	0.0504	0.134	0.466	0385

		Table	9-20.	Pressure Change, P (Mb)
Mc-.a:	(»	To Meh		Throug;: Meli	To Vappr	Through Vapor	Sublimation Energy. £,
b.-	i.45	o.o°y		0.133	0.24 J	0.12	0.973
a:	:.j?	0.03 So		0.0613	0.185	0.805	0.694
re	u>(>	0.139		0.175	0.318	1.15	0.969
Cn	2.(H'	0.0S2		0.1 1<>	0.250	1.10	0.950
w	1.4?- ■	0.177		0.230	0.350	1.56	13
t	2.0s	0.076		0.102	0:273	0.946	0.7*2

1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A PROMPT		—
\	INELASTIC SCATTERING OF NEUTRONS \ BY NUCLEI OF AIR ATOMS	—
>- \
\ \	^W ISOMERIC DECAYS vs.	—
™ ^~	\x.	"^~
	\ >k NEUTRON CAPTURE V \ IN NITROGEN V \ v \ \ \ very high altitude ""^^v
	—
	FISSION PRODUCT \.
1 1	11(1111

Designation	Function	Gamma, (rads(Si))	Neutron.* (n/cm2 »
SC 11"!	NAND gate	2 x 10*t	—
MEM 529	Binary element	14 x icy5*	-
SC JJ7>	Binary element	1. JO5*	-
MEM 50)	Shift register	1. x 10* §	—
MEM 590	Chopper	Not measured**	3 X 1014
SC 1149	Flip-Flop	Not measured**	8 x JO14
MC J155	AND/OR gate	2 x 105 (Cobalt*60)++
3300	25-bit static shift register	>5 x 103 (FXR)tJ >8 x 104 (TRlGA)tt
3003	100-bit shift register	>2 x JO4 (FXR)tt >5 x JO4 (TRlGA)Jt
1406	100-bit shift register	>105 (FXR)« <2.5 x JO4 (TR1GA)
1101	256-random access memory	4 x 104 (FXRV 2 x 104 (TRIQA)	3 x 10n

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Type	Minimum Joule Energy	Material	Other Data
2N36 2N327A 2NJ04J	4.0 x i.6 x 1 2.0 x	icr2 io2 I02	Ge Si Ge	PNP Audio Transistor PNP Audio Transistor PNP Audio Transistor
2NI308 2N706 2N594	5.0 x 6.0 x 6.0 x 1	to5 o-5 o*3	Ge Si Ge	NPN Switching Transistors NPN Switching Transistors NPN Switching Transistors
2N398 2N240	8.0 x ] 1.0 x 1	IO'4 a2	Ge Ge	PNP Switching Transistors PNP Switching Transistors
MC7I5	8.0 x 1	0'5	Si	Data Input Gate Integrated Circuit
2N4220 2N4224	1.0 x 1 3.0 x	o*5 IO'5	Si Si	RF General Purpose FET VHF Amp and Mixer FET
1N3659	8.0 x 1	to*3	Si	Automotive Rectifier Diode
JN277	2.0 x	IO'5	Ge	High Speed Switching Diode
JN3720 1N238	5.0 x 1.0 x	icr4 icr7	Si	Tunnel Diode Microwave Diode
2N3528	3.0 x	IO'3	Si	Silicon Controlled Rectifier
67D-5010	1.0 x	IO*4		G.E. Varistar (30-joule Rating)
6AF4 66N8	J.O x 2.0 x	10° 10°		UHF Oscillator Vacuum Tube General Purpose Triode Vacuum Tube

Designation	Minimum Joule Energy	■ Malfunction	Other Data
Relay	2 x Iff3	Welded Contact	Potter'Brurmleld (539) low-current relay
Relay	] x Iff1	Welded Contact	Sigma (IIF) one-ampere - relay
Microammeter	3 x I0"3	Slammed Meter	Simpson Microammeter (Model I2I2C)
Explosive Boll	6 x ]0T4	Ignition	EBW 8. amp. for 10 *tsec detonator, MK1
Squib	2 x 10r5	Ignition	Electric Squib. "NS 3.5 watts for 5 /isec detonator
Fuel Vapors	3 x Iff3	Ignition	Propane-air mixture. 1,75 mm ignition gap

Designation	Minimum Joule Energy	Malfunction	Other Data
Logic Card	3 x. i<r9	Circuit Upset	Typical logic transistor inverter gate
Logic Card	1 x 10*9	Circuit Upset	Typical flip-flop transistor assembly
Integrated Circuit	4 x 10'10	Circuit Upset	Sylvania J-K flip-flop monolithic integrated circuit (SFSO)
Memory Core	2 x I0*9	Core Erasure Via Wiring	Burroughs fast computer core memory (FC200I)
Memory Core	5 x 10'8	Core Erasure Via Wiring	Burroughs medium speed computer core memory (FC6001)
Memory Core	3 x 10*9	Core Erasure Via Wiring	RCA medium speed, core memory (269MI)
Memory Core	2 x 10*8		Minimum observable energy in a typical high-gain subsystem
Amplifier	4 x Iff21	Interference	Minimum observable energy in a typical high-gain amplifier

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Total Isodose Contour	Table II : 500r from Fall-	-out to H+50 Hours
Yield (MT)	15	1	10	60
Downwind extent (mi) Area (mi )	180 5^00	52 V70	152 3880	3^0 17,900

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Size	Vela	ht		Fissions
Range Grams	Percent	Percent	Total	For Gram
00		of Total of Total	(101*)
>iooo	37*70	ttl.8	15.8	21.	0.56
500-1000 U1.91	k6.k	W.O	60.	l.h
250- 500	*.9T	5.5	19*8	26.
loo- 250	3.51	3-9	10.7	1*.
50- 100	O.60	0.9	2.3	3.0	3.8
<50	I.38	1.5	5-*	7.1	5.1
Total	90*27			131*	1.5

Altitude	75 fj.	100 m	200 fj,	350 jx
0	8,060 3,360 3,870 4,200 8,910	5,040 5,980 6,910 7,700 6,960	11,700 14,400 18,600 24,400 27,800	21,600 27,100 35,300 47,200 61,900
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